Geopolitical Outlook – Monthly Intelligence Report - October 2022
Geopolitical Outlook – Monthly Intelligence Report - October 2022
G E O P O L I T I C A L O U T LO O K I N T E L L I G E N C E S E V R V I C E S
M AT T E R S O F O P I N I O N
ON GEOECONOMICS
T H E WO R L D AT L A R G E
M E T H O D O LO GY
T H I S M O N T H I N G EO P O L I T I C S
There will be a lot of talk of a cease-fire in the next And we are still seeing uncertainty surrounding its
month. Russia and Ukraine will both be tempted, but relationship with its biggest customer, the United
ultimately neither will sign on — Ukraine is being too States. Pressure on China’s exports, led by declining
heavily armed by the West for Russia to consider, economies around the world, has unbalanced
and I can’t believe Ukraine believes Russia would its economy, and there is apparently real political
respect it. Instead, much of the next month will be pressure on President Xi Jinping as a result. Russia’s
about rest and deployment ahead of an assault on performance in Ukraine, meanwhile, has forced
Odessa. Russia’s recent gains open the door to Beijing to rethink its relationship with Moscow. It still
success, but Ukraine has had a lot of time to train needs Russian energy but would be happy to find
and reorganize. It’s hard to imagine anything decisive other sources. More than anything, though, Beijing
will happen right now. doesn’t want to be drawn into Russia’s war; next
month, we will see more and more evidence that it
The same could be said for Joe Biden’s visit to isn’t going to sabotage its relations with the U.S. just
Saudi Arabia. Washington wants Riyadh to hike oil to please Russia.
production, something Riyadh can absolutely do if it
wants to. Bilateral ties are fraught — more on that in
a separate article — but the fact is that Saudi Arabia
can’t completely spurn the U.S. any more than the
U.S. can completely spurn Saudi Arabia. We expect a
shift in supply of oil next month. The only question is
how much.
M AT T E R S O F O PI N I O N
Mali is only the latest African nation to employ Russian private military contractors, or PMCs. Wagner-affiliated
PMCs are also known to have operated recently in the Central African Republic, Mozambique and Libya.
Their deployment represents a sort of return by Russia to Africa. During the Soviet era, Moscow maintained a
substantial presence throughout the continent, competing with the U.S. for influence and doling out military
and development aid. But when the Soviet Union collapsed, Soviet funding dried up, and Russia ceased to
be seen as a player in the region. Over the past few decades, it has been primarily an arena for U.S.-China
competition. It seems that Moscow has joined the fray.
Gallup routinely collects data on how certain African populations view the leadership of these three powers.
The level of approval for U.S., Chinese and Russian leadership is often a gauge of overall views of the countries
in question. In general, Africans in these countries tend to be fairly positive on all three, with substantial
percentages of the populations mostly approving.
Gallup, 2021
But even then, opinions differ markedly. In 2021, for example, approval of U.S. leadership ranged from a high of
80% in Cote d’Ivoire to a low of 12% in Egypt. In general, levels of approval for U.S. leadership are close to but
slightly higher than that of Chinese leadership — approval of U.S. leadership tends to be particularly high in
Sub-Saharan Africa — and are dramatically higher than that of Russian leadership.
Gallup, 2021
Approval of Chinese leadership in 2021 ranged from 82% in Mali to 11% in Egypt. Elsewhere, approval of
Chinese leadership exceeded that of the U.S. and Russia in Cote d’Ivoire, Malawi, Morocco, Namibia, Nigeria,
Senegal and Tanzania. (Interestingly, none of these countries were in the top 10 of African recipients of foreign
direct investment [FDI] from China in 2020.) Approval of Russian leadership tends to be lower than that of
either U.S. or Chinese leadership.
Gallup, 2021
Each power has its own strategy for courting Africa. The U.S. has offered investment, development aid and
military aid, which generally comes with strings attached — commitment to transparency, general adherence
to global norms of human rights, etc. This approach has been criticized as having colonial overtones and
creating a debt dependency for recipient countries. Though China’s investment and development comes with
much less oversight, Beijing is often criticized for exercising debt-trap diplomacy, offering African governments
massive loans for projects that can never be paid back to increase its political leverage. Russia tends to offer
military equipment and direct intervention through the Wagner Group, much of which has gone to illiberal
African countries.
The data suggest that the approaches taken by the U.S. and China seem to be the most appealing. Gallup data
on Africans’ views of two key aspects of infrastructure — satisfaction with roads and highways and internet
access — may provide insight into African countries that would be particularly open to trading influence for
development in these areas, with those countries with the lowest levels of each potentially being the most open.
Gallup, 2021
Africans’ low levels of satisfaction with roads and highways and internet access — perhaps the two most
important aspects of African infrastructure — suggest a predisposition toward China and the U.S., which
unlike Russia can actually help develop them. For now, Moscow is largely relegated to offering weapons and
manpower through organizations like the Wagner Group. But for illiberal regimes fighting extremists, other
countries or their own citizens, that may be enough.
O N G EO EC O N O M I C S
American war-time economies have a relatively Both were significant, but GDP’s movement
stable pattern. GDP rises while inflation holds stable. was more dramatic, and its sustained rise finally
As the end of war approaches, GDP falls. Inflation, controlled inflation. This pattern held during the
meanwhile, will rise, even if it stabilizes to different Vietnam War too. GDP rose, and inflation followed.
degrees from year to year. The major variable is The key difference was that GDP growth could not
time. The longer the war lasts, the more extreme the keep up with inflation.
shifts. And the more extreme the shifts, the greater
the impact on other variables. Take World War II. GDP
rose dramatically during the conflict, only for inflation
to cut in after it ended.
Note: An estimate for 2022 is based on the change in CPI from Q1 2021 to Q1 2022
Source: U.S. Federal Reserve, Minneapolis
For the United States, war may create relatively have its cities or industrial plants come under major
short-term economic instability, built around attack. The Atlantic and Pacific oceans buffer the
crises of confidence that generally tend to resolve United States, while Canada and Mexico present no
themselves. The reason they do is rooted in threat. The costs of war, then, are relatively little, and
geography. In no war since the 19th century has the U.S. industry will maintain its value while consumption
U.S. homeland been in danger of occupation, nor of goods continues, at times at higher prices.
This is not the case for most other nations. China Also important is the economic nature of warfare
was devastated by Japan in World War II and took outside of military action. In the current war in
more than a generation to rebuild its economy. Ukraine, the U.S. has withheld direct intervention but
Russia essentially paid the same price in World War II has nonetheless waged a multifront economic war
as Germany and Japan did. against Russia. One tactic was to weaponize the
dollar, specifically by denying Moscow access to
Even the victorious pay a price: Britain in the dollar as a trade currency, thus making it difficult
World War II and the North Vietnamese during for Russia to trade even with countries not involved
the Vietnam War both incurred huge costs in the conflict. Blocking an enemy’s trade is routine
despite winning. The American model involves in war, of course, but Washington demonstrated
a secure homeland, while most other nations that it had the strength to demand other countries
face the possibility, even the likelihood, of participate in the dollar war and that the war was
war at home. The two have very different not so much a physical war but a conceptual one in
economic outcomes. which the abstract force of currencies was used to
endanger the Russian economy.
The Russians have a more conventional option There is another vital dimension that allows
to use against the NATO alliance opposing them war, or war preparations, to power an economy.
— cutting off the supply of natural gas to Europe Consider the effect the development of long-range
— and they have used this option early and often. bombers in World War II had on the development
For Russia, the economic cost of losing European of civilian aircraft and the subsequent economic
customers was worth the risk if spiraling prices on consequences. Consider the Roman road system
the Continent compelled members of the alliance to developed for military purposes but serving to unite
break faith with the rest of the West. Italy and, in time, overawe Europe. The development
of military projects powers the civilian world and even
It’s an old but effective move; the U.S. severed oil civilization itself.
supplies to Japan before World War II, and Arab
oil producers imposed an embargo during their This is just as true in our time. Consider the
war with Israel. But it’s not without its dangers. components of the iPhone. The microchip was
Japan responded by striking Pearl Harbor. The used in minuteman missiles. The GPS system was
West responded to the oil embargo by slowly but designed for the U.S. Navy to use in guiding cruise
surely reducing dependence on Arab oil. Economic missiles and navigating nuclear submarines. The
attacks, then, are vulnerable to military and economic digital camera was first developed for use by the
countermeasures and thus require contingencies. National Reconnaissance Office in the 1960s. There
The sanctions imposed on Iran over the past few is a huge expenditure in most major countries on
years, for example, have indeed hurt its economy, their militaries. There is a counterflow of value in the
but they haven’t forced Tehran into submission. If spinoffs from the development of weapons of war.
anything, they have led to more Iranian proxy attacks
A nation survives by being able to protect its citizens
throughout the Middle East. In short, economic
and to deliver the necessities and pleasures of life
attacks are never guaranteed to work and are never
to them. Militaries and economies are essential in
without consequence.
that regard, their relationship immeasurably complex.
Kinetic warfare is therefore conducted with And though that relationship is different for every
economic measures and physical contact. Here, country, for the U.S. it is central: The economy helps
too, geography gives the United States a huge create national power and the military helps create
advantage. The North American continent can the economy.
sustain American economic needs — reliably if
not quite painlessly. It’s difficult for an enemy force
to interdict supplies from outside the continent
because the U.S. dominates the world’s oceans.
The strength of the American economy powers
the American dollar, which can open another
front. Most nations lack this critical advantage of
economic geography.
T H E WO R L D AT L A RG E
The most recent high-profile victim of this policy is their accounts had been frozen and that they would
in Henan province. In April, four rural banks there — not be able to withdraw their money. The banks
Shangcai Huimin County Bank, Yuzhou Xinminsheng repeatedly promised to unfreeze the accounts, but
Village Bank, New Oriental Country Bank of Kaifeng after a few months without satisfaction depositors
and Zhecheng Huanghuai Community Bank — and staged a protest at a bank in Zhengzhou, the
one in the neighboring province of Anhui — Guzhen provincial capital, to demand that their savings
Xinhuaihe Village Bank — notified depositors that be returned.
The Henan incident has called into question the Despite its best efforts, Beijing is unable to
central government’s traditionally hands-off offload the work of fixing the problem to provincial
approach for dealing with small rural banks. Years of governments. Small rural banks used to have a
soaring debt, unproductive investment and rising lifeline in local government funding vehicles and in
property prices severely distorted the Chinese selling deposits through third-party online platforms.
financial system. From this emerged risky, self- But in recent years, most local government funding
reinforcing borrowing structures such as shadow vehicles have accumulated a substantial amount
banking, a pattern that is especially pronounced of debt, and many are on the verge of defaulting.
in small rural banks. Rather than recognize these Changing bank management is a half-measure since
systemic vulnerabilities, the central government there’s no guarantee new management would be
often downplays their existence and instead any less corrupt. The inability of local governments
attributes any observed problems in rural banks to to address local banking problems, combined with
isolated incidents. Investigations into the Henan Beijing’s political sensitivity to unrest, has forced the
incident, for example, revealed that a private firm central government to action, even if it would prefer
called the Henan Xincaifu Group had stakes in to sit this one out.
all of the banks listed and had embezzled funds
through the use of fabricated loans and internal and
external collusion.
Beijing’s Options
After the Henan protests, the Chinese central bank One such reform was to modify rural credit unions
held an emergency meeting with other major banks — cooperatives sanctioned by the central bank
and financial regulators. From the meeting came a to provide credit in rural areas — to tighten the
measure for local officials to create task forces to qualification requirements for executive management
mitigate the systemic risks posed by defaulters. To teams of rural credit unions, to regulate the corporate
be sure, this is mostly symbolic; rampant corruption governance structures of RCUs and to strictly
and insufficient enforcement mechanisms will scrutinize shareholder behavior. The reforms worked
completely defang it. well enough, but the government stopped short of
executing a second round meant to fix problems
Interestingly, the central government did such as insufficient assets, inadequate technology,
not implement banking reforms that it has poor corporate governance, weak risk management
introduced in other rural areas like Zhejiang and and the fragile credit quality of individual institutions.
Guangdong provinces.
Note: Approximate USD figures based on average 2019 USD-CNY exchange rate of 6.91
Source: China Statistical Yearbook 2020
China’s broader economic problems and the By improving regulatory and governance
systemic problems facing its financial sector mechanisms in small rural banks, the latter will be
constrain Beijing’s ability to directly address the able to improve their business strength, capital
banking crisis. Larger banks facing mortgage strength and risk management capacity. But
boycotts and mounting debt problems in the this requires uprooting influential business and
real‑estate sector threaten to collapse a major political leaders across affected provinces and
sector of the economy. Huge amounts of shaking the pillars of rural economies. It’s a recipe
government funding are still being diverted to mass for destabilization.
COVID-19 testing and related lockdown measures.
Unsurprisingly, Beijing has decided to focus on
This is, of course, in addition to government funding
containing the political fallout from bank failures
used to prop up local industrial production, secure
rather than to address the financial problems
expensive energy imports and support agriculture
head on. The government first showed signs of
projects to make sure the country can feed its
this strategy back in 2020. At the time, local banks
people. Compounding all of this is the contentious
successfully regulated their systemic issues and
trade and investment with the U.S., both a key
increased their money by selling deposit products
consumer of Chinese goods and an important
through third-party online platforms. By partnering
source of investment. Beijing is simply unable to
with these platforms, smaller banks were able to
offer financial measures on a large enough scale to
offer better rates and rewards for customers as well
effectively aid rural banks since doing so would divert
as easier channel access. The practice has since
funds from other projects and provoke backlash from
been officially banned by national regulators who
stronger business and political entities.
feared that expanding the mostly unregulated and
In theory, the government could enact financial uncontrolled fintech sector could increase risks in
reforms, but this too is easier said than done. The the wider financial and social system.
reforms needed to address the structural problems
facing small rural banks require political capital that
is currently in short supply. The problems afflicting
small rural banks have a common source: rising debt
and property prices, illegal activities, corruption, and
the growing distrust of depositors and investors.
From the outside looking in, the decision may working against them. Xi can’t afford to give them any
seem unreasonable. But policymakers in Beijing more political ammunition.
are hypersensitive to even the smallest amount of
social unrest, especially in interior regions. To them, Nor can China risk the foreign investment that
depriving local banks of the opportunity to replenish political unrest could endanger. Unprecedented FDI
their capital was an acceptable risk. And history outflow caused by the country’s recent economic
shows that the discontent that starts in the interior downturn has plagued Beijing for months. Beijing will
regions can spread like fire. Already there are forces have a difficult time solving its banking crisis — not
within the Chinese Communist Party that oppose to mention stabilizing its economy and boosting
President Xi Jinping’s recovery plans and are actively GDP growth — without foreign and especially
dollar‑denominated investment.
Source: IMF
Germany — the economic engine of the Continent, (Though LNG exports from the latter have plateaued
the de facto leader of the EU and a huge buyer of lately, many are optimistic that they will rebound.
Russian gas — began planning for this contingency The Texas Freeport LNG terminal will be back online
months ago, meeting its natural gas inventory target as early as November, and Qatar appears to have
of 85% of storage capacity, increasing coal-based agreed to supply Europe with LNG from Texas’
energy generation and agreeing to keep some Golden Pass plant.)
nuclear power plants up as a failsafe for consumers.
This is good news for a global LNG market that
Berlin has also supported the rapid expansion and
has proved quite flexible when sellers share pricing
improvement of the national and European liquefied
incentives with contract buyers. It means there will
natural gas (LNG) infrastructure.
be enough supply for Europe in the coming months.
Other European states have taken similar measures. It also means it will be more expensive: The newer,
Most reduced their overall energy consumption by smaller suppliers entering the European market
10% to 15%, giving them time to fill their reserves are located farther away than Russia, and the other
and, just as important, to negotiate with new alternative — LNG — is appreciably more expensive
suppliers. France, Poland, Germany and others have than natural gas.
thus been courting the likes of Algeria, Nigeria and
Azerbaijan, even as they coordinate policy with the
United States.
Source: Eurostat
If the lights go out in Europe this winter, it’ll be Naturally, the countries most vulnerable to the
because Europeans will have a hard time affording crisis are the ones with a higher percentage of their
it, not a hard time finding it. European governments respective populations having trouble making ends
can’t afford to let their people die, but neither can meet. Last year, at least 25% of the populations of at
they foot the bill for endless subsidy regimes, so least 12 countries said they found it difficult or very
expect them to set more energy reduction targets difficult to get by on their current incomes. Though
for consumers and to enact measures prohibiting data isn’t available for every country this year, the
major companies from exploiting them. It’s unclear percentage of the population finding it difficult to get
what the targets will be exactly, but many observers by has risen to 16% in the United Kingdom and 11%
believe consumption needs to drop by about 20% in Denmark. If those figures have risen in traditionally
to 30% in the next few months. Any more than that more affluent countries, it is reasonable to expect
will almost certainly require a reduction in industrial them to have risen in others.
output, which no one is eager to do.
Gallup, 2021
Germany is in arguably the most difficult position At best, this is a recipe for political protest. As
come winter. Like all European countries, it will Germany opts for cutting industrial demand, keeping
struggle to keep consumption down in the coldest direct negotiations with Russia off the table will get
months of the year and so will have to walk a more difficult as the winter gets colder.
tightrope between reducing household demand
There is, however, a potential lifeline. The United
and industrial demand. Leaving its people to freeze
States is the most important destination for German
is such a self-evidently bad idea that it will be all
goods and has a vested interest in the outcome of
but forced to curb industrial output. Businesses
the Ukraine war. To some degree or another, it will be
already expect as much. The latest surveys
for Washington to decide whether or not it wants to
published by Ifo — a Munich institute measuring
save the heart of German manufacturing and thus
the German business climate index — indicate the
the European economy.
German business community is expecting a drop
in production and its expectations are “extremely
pessimistic” for the months to come.
For Iran, a nuclear program is more than just a Iran’s approach to those talks is to hard-bargain on
new weapon; it is a means to reshape the power a host of peripheral issues in the hopes of wearing
structure of the Middle East. Building a regional down U.S. negotiators before bringing the real issue
system with Iran on top is an old dream that to the table. But Tehran also knows the limits of
refuses to die, even if the tools to reach and the possible. It understands that President Biden
achieve it differ. Tehran failed to do so after both cannot issue a formal treaty because it would never
world wars, but after the revolution in 1979, it be ratified by the Senate. It has abandoned its
began a campaign of expansionism throughout demands to have the Islamic Revolutionary Guard
the region. Corps removed from the U.S. terrorist list (thanks to
the efforts of Qatar, which persuaded Washington
But Iran knew its expansion had to be measured. to allow the group’s financial companies to transact
The Iran-Iraq War taught it as much. The conflict business with foreign banks). And it has given up on
killed as many as a million Iranians and cost more seeking guarantees that a future U.S. president will
than $700 billion while revealing Iran’s military not withdraw unilaterally from the deal.
weakness and inefficiency in conventional warfare, Still, Iran refuses to make meaningful concessions
the obsolescence of its weapons and the absence about its missile program as a sovereign right and a
of significant international allies. The war convinced deterrent force, and it rejects internationalizing the
Tehran to craft a new security doctrine based on the issue of regional dialogue, insisting that the region’s
premise that it would never fight a direct war again, countries can resolve the matter themselves.
and if it had to, it would not do so on its own soil. This is both tactic and true position: Keeping the
And so it decided to infiltrate the fragmented discussions going, even with lengthy suspensions,
societies of the neighboring Arab countries to ensures that the U.S. will not authorize a military
woo the marginalized Shiites, most notably and solution while diplomatic solutions exist. And the
most successfully through Hezbollah in Lebanon. longer the talks drag on, the longer Tehran has to
It adopted the use of proxy wars to achieve its gain concessions on regional issues that it considers
regional objectives at the lowest possible costs. more important than its nuclear program qua nuclear
It commandeered the Palestinian issue when the program, and it will not compromise on any of them.
Arabs abandoned it, giving arms to Hamas and the Iran’s fixation on regional dominance makes reaching
Palestinian Islamic Jihad to win over Arabs who were a nuclear deal in Vienna more unlikely than likely.
still sympathetic to the plight of Palestinian refugees.
The strategy has mostly paid off. It has reduced
the risk of direct involvement in armed conflict,
deterred Iran’s enemies from attacking it, and offset
its conventional weaknesses and vulnerabilities.
Unsurprisingly, the strategy has also become a major
sticking point in the ongoing nuclear talks.
M E T H O DO LOGY