· Literal Rule

· Golden Rule
· Mischief Rule and Purposive Interpretation

· Statute must be read as a whole

· Rule of harmonious construction

Ut res magis valeat quam pereat

· Expressio unius est exclusio alterius

· Noscitur a sociis
Ejusdem Generis
 PRIMARY RULES OF CONSTRUCTION
Application

the words used in the text are to be given or interpreted in their

natural or ordinary meaning. After the interpretation, if the
meaning is completely clear and unambiguous then the effect
shall be given to a provision of a statute regardless of what
may be the consequences.

Golden rule of interpretation is, which allows courts to modify

the meaning of a law in order to avoid absurd or unreasonable
results. However this rule is only applied when the literal
meaning of the law is clear and unambiguous.

i) To determine whether a particular conduct is prohibited by

law
ii) To determine whether a government agency acted lawfully
 This rule gives the court justification for going behind the
actual wording of the legislation in order to consider the
problem that the particular legislation was aimed at remedying.
At one level it is clearly the most flexible rule of
interpretation, but it is limited to using previous common law
to determine what mischief the legislation in question was
designed to remedy.

SECONDARY RULES OF CONSTRUCTION

Application

Interpretation is a process to ascertain the correct meaning of

the legislations, In this
process, the whole statute, wherever necessary, must be read
and the interpretation must be in such a in way to make the
statute workable and effective. But if the language of the
statute is plain and unambiguous, it should be given effect to,
even if the consequences result in injustice, or oppressive or
unreasonable. The basic and fundamental rule of interpretation
is that statute must be read as a whole, and all parts of an Act
should be taken together. The whole and every part of the act
should be considered in the determination of the meaning of
any of its parts
when any disputation is observable, either between two statutes
or provisions, and both of these cannot be entertained together,
then the Court is required to interpret these finely and by
maintaining the harmony and consistency, so that the effect
could be served to both of those.

Ut res magis valeat quam pereat is a Latin phrase that means

"to give effect to the matter rather than having it fail." It is a
maxim of construction applied when alternative readings are
possible, one of which (usually the broader reading) would
achieve the manifest purpose of the document and one of which
(usually the narrower reading) would reduce it to futility or
absurdity, whereby the interpreter chooses the one that gives
effect to the document's purpose
 "to express or include one thing implies the exclusion of the
other, or of the alternative." This means that if a law or
contract explicitly mentions one thing, it is assumed that other
things are not included or allowed.

“To know from the association”.

1.The meaning of a word is to be judged by the company it

keeps.
2.Unclear words or phrases should be determined by the words
immediately surrounding it.
3.If multiple words having similar meaning are put together,
they are to be understood in their collective.
4.Questionable meaning of a doubtful word can be derived
from its association with other words.
5.This principle needs a word or phrase or even a whole
provision that stands alone and has a clear meaning.
 "of the same kind and nature”. 1.There is ambiguity in the
language of the provisions of statutes, or
2.When in the provision, there is a possibility of two views, or
3.The meaning which the provision of a statute gives defeats
the purpose of the statute.
 PRIMARY RULES OF CONSTRUCTION
Case 1
State of WB v. Washi Ahmad - Section 6, sub-section (1) of
Bengal Finance Sales Tax Act 1941 provides that no tax shall
be payable under the Act on the sale of goods specified in
the first column of Schedule I, subject to the conditions and
exceptions, if any, set out in the corresponding entry in the
second column thereof and Item (6) of Schedule I specifies in
the first column "vegetable, green or dried, commonly known
as "Sabji, tarkari or ask" so that no. tax is payable on the sale
of goods falling within this category, subject to the exception
setout in the second column, namely, that they would be liable
to bear tax "when sold in sealed containers." It was common
ground in the present case that green ginger was not sold by
the assessee in sealed containers and the only question
which, therefore, requires to be considered is whether green
ginger can be regarded as vegetable commonly known as
’sabji, tarkari or sak’.observed that "the word ’vegetable’ in
taxing statutes is to be understood as in common parlance i.e.
denoting class of vegetables which are grown in a kitchen
garden or in a farm and are used for the table". This meaning of
the word ’vegetable’ was reiterated by this Court in Motipur
zamindary case where this Court was called upon to consider
whether sugarcane can be regarded as vegetable and it was held
by this Court that sugarcane cannot be said to fail within the
definition of the word ’vegetable’.

G. Narayanaswami v. G. Pannerselvam - The term

"electorate", used in Article 171(3), (a), (b) and (c) has neither
been defined in the constitution or by any enactment of the
legislation. However, Section 2(1) (a) of the Representation of
People Act defines "elector" in relation to a constituency as a
person whose name is enrolled in the constituency's electoral
roll and is not subject to disqualifications mention in Section
16 of the Act. Section 16 of the Act did not include any
element that was the ground of setting aside set b the Madras
High Court
Hence, the main issue in front of the Apex Court was; whether
the representative of the Graduates should also be a graduate to
stand in the election? The Hon'ble Apex Court incorporated the
Golden Rule of interpretation to interpret the laws at issue and
subsequently deviate from the judgment of the High Court.
The court construed the term "electorate" in a plain and
ordinary manner to mean a body of persons who elect. It held
in its judgment that within its ambit, the term does not contain
any extended notion. Thus the court interpreted the law in a
way by which the term "electorate" in the Constitution, could
not, by itself impose a limit upon the field of choice of
members of the electorate by requiring that the person to be
chosen must also be a member of the electorate.
Heydon's case In this case it was held that there are four things
which have to be followed for true and sure interpretation of all
the statutes in general, which are as follows-

What was the common law before the making of an act.

What was the mischief for which the present statute was
enacted.
What remedy did the Parliament sought or had resolved and
appointed to cure the disease of the commonwealth.
The true reason of the remedy.
The purpose of this rule is to suppress the mischief and
advance the remedy

SECONDARY RULES OF CONSTRUCTION

Case 1
Butter vs. Bennett
According to section 1 of the Income-tax Act, 1952 (England,
the costs of "living or
other accommodation, of entertainment, of domestic or other
services or of other benefits or faculties
of whatsoever nature" provided to an employee by his
employer, were liable to be taxed in the hands of
the employee
In the above case, the employer appointed the employee to
manager a mill, and provided a house
appurtenant to the mill with free coal and electricity supply and
the services of a gardener. The income-tax officer included these
facilities in the salary of the employee in the assessment. The
employee
contended that due to the nature of the job, being the manager
of the mill, he was required to live
nearby the mill and watch the functions of the mill day and
night. Theses facilities were provided by the
employer as a part and parcel to promote his business
activities, but not with an intention to provide
them to the employee
The Court of Appeal gave judgement in favour of the employee
Section 1 of the
Income-tax should be construed along with other provisions of
that Act. The income-tax could not
be charged solely basing upon Section 1
 This doctrine has been emerged from the notable case,
Shankari Prasad v. Union of India, where a conflict was
noticeable, between Part 3 and Part 4 of the Indian
Constitution. However, the Apex Court exercised the Doctrine
of Harmonious Construction and held that both the concept of
Fundamental Rights as well as the Directive Principles of State
Policy are required and indispensable for the public welfare.
Afterwards the Apex Court resolved this conflict by employing
the rule of Harmonious Construction.
Besides that, in C.P and Berar General Clauses Act, the
dispute sprung between entries 24 & 25 of the State List (
Indian Constitution). The Court employed the doctrine and
interpreted these two in accordance with the predominant
subject matter of the provisions.

Avtar Singh v. State of Punjab 1965 AIR 666, 1965 SCR

(1) 103 -In this case, the question arose regarding the
interpretation of Section 39 of the Electricity Act, 1910. The
appellant was convicted for theft of electricity from the Punjab
State Electricity Board under Section 39 of the Electricity Act
and the respondent proceeded against him under Section 379 of
the Indian Penal Code, 1860. In the appeal filed by the
appellant, he did not challenge the finding that he had
committed the theft but only raised a question of law that his
conviction was illegal in view of certain statutory provisions.
The Supreme Court ruled that since the offence was related to
the Electricity Act and not the Indian Penal Code, the
procedure outlined in Section 50 must have been adhered to.
Consequently, the appellant’s conviction was overturned. In
this case, the Court applied the doctrine of ‘ut res magis valeat
quam pereat,’ ensuring that the interpretation adopted did not
render Section 50 ineffective and pointless.
 Prabhani Transport Co-operative Society Ltd. v.
RegionalTransport Authority, Aurangabad and Others,
1960 SCR (3) 177“.
That maxim has its utility in ascertaining the intention of the
legislature. Since S.42 (3) (a) of the Motor Vehicles Act leaves
no manner of doubt as to that intention by its clear indication
that the Government cannot run buses as a commercial
enterprise without first obtaining permits under S. 42(1) of the
Act, that maxim cannot operate so as to imply a prohibition
against applying under Ch. IV of the Act.
There was therefore, no reason for holding that Ch. IVA of the
Act contained the only provision under which the Government
could be allowed to ply stage carriages.”

Alamgir vs. State of Bihar

Word detention under Section 498 of Indian Penal Code was in

doubt.
Section 498:- Whoever takes or entices away any woman who
is and whom he knows or has reason to believe to be the wife
of any other man, from that man, or from any person having
the care of her
on behalf of that man, with intent that she may have illicit
intercourse with any person, or conceals, or detains with that
intent any such woman, shall be punished with imprisonment
of either description for a term which may extend to two years,
or with fine, or with both. The Supreme Court held that
though the word detains generally means detention against
will, this meaning cannot be
attributed to the word here because the expression should be
construed in the light of other words in its company. This
means that the word detains should be interpreted with
reference to the expression takes, entices and conceals used
U/S. 498. The word detains, therefore, should means detention
without the consent of the husband.
 Amar Chandra Chakraborty v. Collector of Excise, 1972
and Uttar Pradesh State Electricity Board v. Hari shanker,
1979 the five essential conditions for the application of this
rule were laid. “The conditions or the elements are as follows:
1.The statute contains an enumeration of specific words,
2.The subjects of enumeration constitute a class or category;
3.That class or category is not exhausted by the enumeration;
4.The general terms follow the enumeration; and
5.There is no indication of a different legislative intent.”
Thus, for the application of the doctrine of ejusdem generis,
there has to an enumeration of specific words and those words
should necessarily be of a class or a genus and there such genus
or class should not be exhausted. Also such specific words
must be followed by the general words. And most importantly
there was no contrary intention of the legislation. That means
that the intention of the legislation was there to restrict the
general words by the doctrine of ejusdem generis.
TRUCTION
Case -2
Budhaiprasad v. Sales Tax Officer - The central issue in the case
was whether betel leaves should be considered "vegetables"
under the C.P. and Berar Sales Tax Act, 1947. If so, the petitioner
would be liable for sales
tax on the sale of betel leaves.The Court employed a literal
interpretation approach, giving the term "vegetables" its
ordinary and natural meaning. In this context, the Court considered
hecommon
understanding of "vegetables" as edible plants or their parts used as
food, particularly in
preparing dishes or salads. Betel leaves, primarily used for paan,
did not fit this definition.
The Court also examined the context of the Act, noting that the
exemption for "vegetables"
appeared alongside other exemptions for specific agricultural
products. This suggested that
the legislature intended to exempt a broad range of commonly
understood vegetables rather
than extending the exemption to less commonly considered items
like betel leaves
Lastly, the Court delved into the legislative history of the Act,
finding no indication that the
legislature specifically intended to include betel leaves within the
scope of the term
"vegetables.

SR Batra v. Taruna Batra - In Batra the issue was whether the

property in the name of the mother-in-law would constitute ‘shared
household’ within the meaning of Sec. 2(s) of the Act.

The Hon’ble Supreme Court, accepting the submission that

property held in the name of the mother-in-law will not constitute
a ‘shared household’, took a view in Paragraph 26 (which was the
heart of Batra) held that any other interpretation of the provision
‘would lead to chaos and would be absurd’. Overruled by Satish
Chander Ahuja v. Sneha Ahuja
 Smith v. Huges, 1960 WLR 830, in this case around the 1960s,
the prostitutes were soliciting in the streets of London and it was
creating a huge problem in London. This was causing a great
problem in maintaining law and order. To prevent this problem,
Street Offences Act, 1959 was enacted. After the enactment of this
act, the prostitutes started soliciting from windows and balconies.

Further, the prostitutes who were carrying on to solicit from the

streets and balconies were charged under section 1(1) of the said
Act. But the prostitutes pleaded that they were not solicited from
the streets.

The court held that although they were not soliciting from the
streets yet the mischief rule must be applied to prevent the
soliciting by prostitutes and shall look into this issue. Thus, by
applying this rule, the court held that the windows and balconies
were taken to be an extension of the word street and charge sheet
was held to be correct.

NSTRUCTION
Case -2

State of Bombay v. RMD Chamarbaugwala - The petitioners,

who were promoting 'and conducting prize
competitions in the different States of India, challenged
the constitutionality Of ss. 4 and 5 Of the Prize
Competitions Act and rr. xi and 12 framed under S. 20 of the
Act. Their contention was that 'prize competition' as defined in
S. 2(d) of the Act included not
merely competitions that were of a gambling nature but also those
in which success depended to a substantial degree on skill and
the sections andthe rules violated their fundamental right
to carry on business, and were unsupportable under Art. 19(6) of
the Constitution, that they constituted a single inseverable
enactment and, consequently, must fail entirely. On behalf of the
Union of India this was controverted and it was contended that
the definition, properly construed, meant and included only such
competitions as were of a gambling nature, and even if that was
not so, the impugned provisions, being severable in their
application, were valid as regards gambling competitions.
Held, that the validity of the restrictions imposed by SS. 4
and 5 and rr. ii and 12 of the Act as regards gambling
competitions was no longer open to challenge under Art. 19(6)
of the Constitution in view of the, decision of this Court that
gambling did not fall within the purview of Art. 19(i) (g) of the
Constitution.
 Unni Krishnan v State of Andhra Prades hThe case of Unni
Krishnan was momentous with respect to the Right to education in
India as it contested the question of the ‘Right to life’ as provided
under Article 21 of the Constitution of India. Article 21 guarantees
every citizen a right to education. The issues which came before the
Apex Court were, whether a citizen has a Fundamental Right to
education for professional degrees like medicine, engineering etc.
and whether our Constitution guarantees the right to education to
all its citizens.

A writ petition was filed challenging whether the ‘Right to life’

under Article 21 also covers and guarantees the right to education
to all the citizens of India, and the right to education here also
includes professional education or degree.

The Supreme Court held that the right to basic education was
inferred by the: Right to life under Article 21 when read with
Article 41 of the directive principle on education. The Court also
referred to Article 45 and inferred that there is no fundamental right
to education for a professional degree that emanates from Article
21. On the issue of the prevalence of Fundamental Rights over
Directive Principles of State Policy (DPSP), the Court commented
that the provisions of Part Three and Part Four are supplementary
and complementary to each other and that the Fundamental Rights
and Directive Principles should be interpreted harmoniously as
they form the social conscience of the Indian Constitution.

Ravindra Babu Shriwas and Ors. vs. State of U.P. and

Ors.(06.12.2017 - ALLHC)- “A statute must be construed as a
workable instrument. “Ut-res-magis-valet-quam-pereat” is a well-
known principle of law and on this principle the provision of a
statute must be construed as to make it effective and operative. The
Courts will reject that construction which will defeat the plain
intention of the legislature even though, there may be some in
exactitude in the language used. Reducing the legislation to futility
shall be avoided and in case where the intention of the legislature
cannot be given effect to, the Court should accept the bolder
construction for the purposes of bringing about an effective result.”
 Hakkam Singh v. Gammon (India) Ltd (1971)The Supreme
Court declared in this decision that when two courts have
jurisdiction to hear a dispute, choosing one by agreement does not
amount to a constraint of legal procedures or the offending public
policy under Sections 28 and 23 of the Contract Act, respectively.
The parties, on the other hand, could not confer jurisdiction on a
court that would otherwise lack legal authority to adjudicate the
matter in question. This stance has been upheld by the Supreme
Court in different other cases.

State of Assam v. Ranga Muhammad, the court applied the rule

for the question of whether the HC had to be consulted by the
Governor in the transfer of a sitting Judge, and held that upon
applying the rule of noscitur a socii in the instant case, the word
“posting” in the context of district judges was associated with the
other words of “appointments” as well as “promotions.” But these
two words could not be interpreted to include “transfer” as well,
and hence the Governor had to consult the HC in this circumstance.
 Siddeshwari Cotton Mills (P) Ltd v. UOI, 1989 .
In this case, the Supreme Court applied the rule of ejusdem
generis while interpreting the general words ‘any other process’
under section 2(f) of the Central Excise & Salt Act, 1944 read with
Notification Number 230 and 231 dated 15-07-1977. This general
word followed the specific words which were “bleaching,
mercerizing, dyeing, printing, waterproofing, rubberizing, shrink-
proofing, organic processing”. The Court here by applying the
doctrine of ejusdem generis held that “the specific words form a
class of process which is importing a change which is of lasting
nature. And therefore ‘any other word’ must share one or any other
of that process/incident.”
 Case-3

Motipur Zamindary v. State of Bihar - Under s. 6 of the Bihar

Sales Tax Act, 1947, the Government issued a notification
exempting certain goods from the 499 payment of sales tax,
including "green vegetables other than potatoes, except when
sold in sealed containers". The appellant who was a producer of
sugar can was assessed to sales tax. He contended that sugar cane
was a green vegetables and was exempted from tax and that he
was not a dealer as defined in s. 2 (c) of the Act and could not
be assessed to sales tax. Held, that sugar cane was not a
green vegetable and was not exempted under the
notification. The word "vegetables" in taxing statutes was to
be understood as in common parlance i.e. denoting class of
vegetables which were grown in a kitchen garden or in a farm
and were used for the table. The dictionaries defined sugar cane as
a "grass."

Mahalaxmi Oils Mills, v. State of A.P. the SC observed how

the term “tobacco” was defined in law by the lawmakers.
Interpreting the law led the SC to state that tobacco encompassed
all types of tobacco regardless of whether it was cured/uncured,
produced or not as the stems and leaves of the tobacco plant. The
Court concluded that this definition was comprehensive but did
not include tobacco seeds.
 Sodra Devi v. Commr. Of Income Tax
By s 16(3) of the Indian Income Tax Act 1922, ‘In computing the
total income of any individual for the purpose of assessment, there
shall be included so much of the income of a wife or minor child
of such individual as arises indirectly or directly’ In CIT v Sodra
Devi the court observed that the legislature was guilty of using an
ambiguous term. There is no knowing with certainly as to whether
the legislature meant to enact these provisions with reference only
to a male of the species using the words ‘any individual’ or ‘such
individual’ in the narrower sense of the term indicated above or
intended to include within the connotation of the words ‘any
individual’ or ‘such individual’ also a female of the species.

Holding the words ‘any individual’ and ‘such individual’ as

restricted in their connotation to mean only the male of the
species, the court observed that the evil which was sought to be
remedied was the only resulting from the widespread practice of
husbands entering into nominal partnerships with their wives, and
fathers admitting their minor children to the benefits of the
partnerships of which they were members. This evil was sought to
be remedied by the Income-tax Act. The only intention of the
legislature in doing so was to include the income derived by the
wife or a minor child, in the computation of the total income of
the male assessee, the husband or the father as the case may be for
the purpose of the assessment.

Case-3
 The five principles underlying this doctrine had been expounded
by the Hon’ble Supreme Court, in the case CIT v. Hindustan
Bulk Carriers (2003).
1. The Court is required to ignore the altercation between both the
provisions (or statutes) and strive to reconcile those provisions, to
constitute harmonisation.
2. The provision laid down in a section cannot be utilised to
dismiss the provision laid down in another section, unless and
until the Court fails to sustain the conformity (i.e. harmony)
between those. 3. When the Court
perceives that it’s implausible to sustain the conformity between
the provisions, the Court is required to interpret the provisions in
a manner, so that both the provisions get prioritised within the
bounds of possibility.
4. If, due to the Interpretation, carried out by the court, one of
the controversial provisions remains ineffective, then that shall not
be regarded as the application of Harmonious Construction, hence,
that is supposed to be avoided.
5. Harmonisation does not imply annihilating the significance of a
statutory provision, thus the Court must take the matter into
consideration, while interpreting.

KB Nagpur, MD (Ayurvedic) v. the Union of India (2012) SC,

the issue at hand concerned the interpretation of Section 7(1) of
the Indian Medicine Central Council Act, 1970. This provision
stated that the President, Vice President, or a member of the
Central Council would remain in office until their successor was
duly elected or nominated. A part of the clause that added “or
until his successor shall have been duly elected or nominated,
whichever is longer” was challenged as unconstitutional and in
violation of Articles 14 and 16 of the ConstitutionThe Supreme
Court, applying the principle of ‘ut res magis valeat quam pereat,’
upheld the constitutionality of Section 7(1). The Court reasoned
that Parliament had included this provision to address situations
where the election to these positions might be delayed for various
reasons. This ensured that there would be no vacancy in the
membership of the Central Council.
Consequently, the Court interpreted Section 7(1) in a way that
made it effective and functional, preserving its intended purpose.
In the case of Swastik Gases Pvt. Ltd v. Indian Oil Corp.Ltd, a
dispute arose between the parties and the parties made several
attempts to resolve the dispute amicably, but they all failed. The
Respondent eventually filed a case against the Appellant in the
Rajasthan High Court, whereas Clause 18 of the agreement
stipulated that the Agreement would be subject to the jurisdiction
of the Calcutta courts. The same was dismissed by the Rajasthan
High Court, instructing them to approach the Calcutta High
Court, which had exclusive jurisdiction over the issue. When the
parties moved to the Supreme Court, it was dismissed and it was
ruled that only the Calcutta High Court had the authority to hear
their concerns.

Vania Silk Mills Pvt. Ltd. v. Commissioner of IT,

Ahmedabad,the understanding of S2(47) of the Income Tax Act
1961 was done with the help of the rule of noscitur a socii. With
the usage of this rule, the SC interpreted that the term “transfer”
and said that because the legislature had provided for examples
such as sale and exchange, the phrase “extinguishment of any
rights therein” had to be interpreted as an extinguishment of rights
because of a transfer only, and that it cannot be said to refer to
termination of any other right either related to or unrelated to a
transfer.
Maharashtra University of Health and others Vs Satchikitsa
Prasarak Mandal & Others, 2010 “soccis” is a Latin word,
which means “society”. “Noscitur a sociis” is a Latin maxim
which means that “the term in a statute is to be recognized by the
associated words”. The doctrine of ejusdem generis is a facet of
Noscitur a sociis. “Therefore, when general words are juxtaposed
with specific words, general words cannot be read in isolation.
Their color and their contents are to be derived from their
context.” Same observation has been made by the Court in the
case of Viscount Simonds in Attorney General v. Prince Ernest
Augustus of Hanover, (1957) AC 436 at 461 of the report.