The route to recall a dream:

Theoretical considerations and methodological implications

Georgina Nemeth
Cognitive Neuroscience Research Unit, CFIN, Aarhus University, Denmark
[email protected]

Abstract
The goal of this paper is to shed new light on the relation between dream recall and
dream experiences by providing a thorough analysis of the process that leads to dream
reports. Three crucial steps of this process will be distinguished: dream production (the
generation of a conscious experience during sleep), dream encoding (storing a trace of
this experience in memory), and dream retrieval (accessing the memory trace upon
awakening). The first part of the paper will assess how major theories think about the
relationship between dream reports and these distinct steps. The second part will
systematise how trait and state factors affecting dream recall — given different
theoretical assumptions — might interact with dream production, encoding and
retrieval. Understanding how the distinct steps of dream recall can be modulated by
different factors is crucial for getting a better grip on how to acquire information about
these steps empirically, and for drawing methodological conclusions with regard to the
tools dream research relies on to collect subjective data about dream experiences. The
third part of the paper will analyse how laboratory reports, logs and retrospective scales
interact with the different factors that affect the distinct steps leading to dream reports,
and will argue that prospective methods provide more direct access to data regarding
dream production and encoding than retrospective methods, which — due to their
inability to provide systematic control over the factors affecting the retrieval stage —
screen-off the variability in the production and the encoding of dreams.

KEYWORDS: dream recall; dreaming; dream experience; encoding; retrieval; trait

factors; state factors; methods; prospective and retrospective measures.

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1. Introduction
Although the existence of conscious experiences during sleep is not debatable anymore,
(Arkin, 1981; Crespin, 2015; Kramer, 2007; LaBerge, 1985; Leclair-Visonneau et al.,
2010; Siclari et al., 2017; Valli et al., 2012) since dream mentations can be accessed
only via post-awakening reports, there is still an open question regarding the
correspondence between dream experiences and dream reports. Do the number and
quality of dream reports reliably reflect the experiences subjects undergo while asleep
(Windt, 2013)?
On the one hand, there is a distinct group of dreams that show the electro-
encephalography (EEG) signs of consciousness, yet still cannot be recalled after
awakening (Fazekas, Nemeth, & Overgaard, 2019; Siclari et al., 2017). Some of these
might pop into mind later during the day (Cipolli et al., 1992; Domhoff, 1969; Kanzer,
1959), while others can be lost forever. On the other hand, the constructive nature of
memory retrieval can produce false memories resulting in reports of never-experienced
‘dreams’ (Beaulieu-Prévost & Zadra, 2015; Rosen, 2013). So the route from the actual
contents of dreams to dream reports are not straightforward: the reliability of dream
recalls as accurate reflections of dream experiences are undermined by both false
positives and false negatives.
Moreover, dream recall frequency (DRF), the most often used index for capturing
the number of dreams reported from a given time-period, shows extremely high inter-
and intra-personal variance. While some can remember more than one dream per day,
others almost never can retrieve any dream (Dement & Kleitman, 1957; Eichenlaub et
al., 2014a; Schredl, 2007, 2018; Siclari et al., 2013). On average, dreams are reported
every second morning (Webb & Kersey, 1967); however, data collection with
retrospective methods results in a significantly lower number: around one dream per
week (Schredl, 2008, 2009). DRF shows an especially high variance depending on the
method used (Aspy, 2016; Bernstein & Belicki, 1996; Schredl, 2002; Zadra & Robert,
2012). Nonetheless, there is still a stable trait dimension to be captured independently of
measuring tools (Cohen, 1979; Pagel, 2003). High-frequency recallers (grouped by
dream recall scales) provide dream reports from 95% of all rapid eye movement (REM)

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sleep awakenings in the laboratory, while low recallers can recollect experiences from
only 46% of all REM awakenings (Goodenough et al., 1959). Beyond this trait
difference, dream recall shows high variability on a case-by-case basis as well (Schredl
& Fulda, 2005a). One of the most relevant factors affecting this variance is the sleep
stage before awakening. On average, subjects give reports in 80% of all cases when
awakened from REM sleep, while only around in 50% when awakened from non-rapid
eye movement (NREM) sleep (Nielsen, 2000).
What is the reason behind the discrepancy between the findings of the different
methods of measuring dream recall? How can the large intra- and inter-personal
differences be explained? Do they reflect a diversity in dream experiences themselves
or rather mirror the ability of retaining or retrieving them?
Since dream experiences are not directly available, the same set of data is used
independently of whether the aim is to find correlates of dream production or of
memory processes, therefore the term ‘dream recall’ is often used ambiguously.
Sometimes it reflects the retrieval of dreams (Tart, 1962; Williamson, Heckel, &
Boblitt, 1970), in other cases, it refers to dream generation itself (Nielsen et al., 2017),
while in still other papers it appears as an umbrella term capturing the whole process
without separating its steps (Cipolli et al., 2017).
In agreement with Schredl’s suggestion (Schredl, 2018), this paper proposes that
an important move towards understanding the relation between dream experiences and
recalled dreams is to draw attention to the different steps of the process that leads to
dream reports. To have a dream report, it is necessary to undergo a conscious experience
during sleep (production/generation), retain its memory trace (encoding), and be able to
retrieve it at awakening (retrieval). Throughout this paper, the terms ‘dream recall’ and
‘dream reporting’ will refer to this whole process.
The goal of this paper is twofold: to offer a review of the literature from this
perspective, and to emphasise the methodological consequences of being more
reflective about the individual roles of dream production, encoding and retrieval. In
Section 2, major theories will be confronted with each other regarding how they think
about the relation between dream reports and the different steps of dream recall. Section

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3 will systemise at which of these steps — given different theoretical assumptions —
the trait and state factors that are known correlates of DRF might exert their effect on
the process leading to dream reports. Section 4 will draw methodological conclusions
by analysing how the distinct measures of DRF — laboratory reports, dream logs and
retrospective scales — modulate these different steps, and by clarifying whether and
how the different methods distort the information about dream experiences themselves.
This approach will shed new light on how and to what degree the three steps of
dream recall can be responsible for the high variability in DRF between and within
subjects. Moreover, it will provide insights into the possible reasons of why DRF is so
different depending on the measures used. By concentrating on the building blocks of
the complex process of dream recall, this new perspective can help researchers
articulate the aims of their investigations as clearly as possible, stay more focused with
regard to which step of the process is relevant, and choose the most appropriate
measuring tools in order to get the clearest information about the step is question. In
particular, in cases where the main aim is to gain a better understanding of aspects of
dream generation and encoding, following this approach can help clarify that those
methods that are able to control for factors affecting the retrieval stage should be
preferred. This paper, thus, can hopefully contribute to breaking the bad habit of
preferring retrospective scales of DRF independently of the purpose of the examination.
Finally, from a more general perspective, the methodological approach proposed can
also be useful for studying all different types of involuntary, stimulus-independent
experiences that are hard to capture directly in real time, like mind-wandering and other
forms of spontaneous thoughts and imagery.

2. The relation between dream experience and dream report

Although the fact that the number of retrieved mentations does not reflect the number of
dream experiences accurately is indisputable, there is a disagreement between different
approaches about which pre- and post-awakening factors and to what degree are
relevant for this discrepancy. Addressing this issue can lead us closer to the
understanding of the origin of inter- and intra-personal variance in DRF, i.e. if

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individuals with stable high and low DRF differ in the number or quality of their
dreams, or if the variability stems from a difference in their memory skills for encoding
or retrieving experiences. The very same question appears in the well-known debate
over the interpretation of the diversity in the quantity and quality of reports collected
after REM and NREM periods of sleep (Nielsen, 2000): whether there is any stage
difference in the encoding and retrieval of the experiences, or sleep stages affect the
production of dream mentation itself. The following three sub-sections (§2.1, §2.2,
§2.3) provide an overview of how different theories think about whether and to what
extent it is the production, the encoding or the retrieval of dream experiences that DRF
is informative about.

2.1 DRF reflects dream generation processes

The theories discussed here emphasise the importance of the quantity or the quality of
dream production in determining intra-individual differences in DRF. From their
perspective, when the process of awakening is ideal for maximising recall and post-
awakening factors modulating retrieval are at an optimal level, dream recall accurately
reflects the differences in dream production.

2.1.1 DRF depends on the occurrence of dream generation processes

According to Hobson’s activation-synthesis theory (Hobson & McCarley, 1977) and

AIM model (Hobson, 2014; Hobson, Pace-Schott, & Stickgold, 2000b), REM processes
— such as increased arousal during sleep, aminergic demodulation, and the operation of
internal input sources — are responsible for dreaming. Although these different
processes do not necessarily occur together, and thus so-called transient or dissociated
states can arise, it is a two-generator model (Nemeth & Fazekas, 2018; Nielsen, 2000)
claiming that NREM mentations differ both in their quantity and quality from REM
dreams. Whereas during REM sleep the level of activation is high, and internal input
source and cholinergic modulation dominate, NREM sleep is characterised by
intermediate values along all the three dimensions of the AIM model (activation,
internal-external input source, cholinergic-aminergic modulation). In deep NREM sleep

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the brain’s activation is on the border of being strong enough to support the occurrence
of consciousness (Hobson, 2014).
Moreover, since the relative hypoactivity of the dorsolateral prefrontal cortex (as a
result of acetylcholine mediated inhibition of this region) is a common characteristic of
sleep (Braun et al., 1997; Dang-Vu et al., 2007; Fazekas & Nemeth, 2018; Hobson,
Pace-Schott, & Stickgold, 2000a; Hobson et al., 2000b; Hobson et al., 1998; Maquet et
al., 1996; Muzur, Pace-Schott, & Hobson, 2002; Pace-Schott, 2007) forgetting dreams is
a general phenomenon irrespective of sleep stages. Therefore, Hobson states (in line
with the arousal-retrieval model (§2.2.1)) that an awakening is necessary for retaining
the memory of a dream as such awakenings reverse the aminergic demodulation and
prefrontal cortical deactivation (Hobson, 2001; Hobson et al., 2000b). However,
Hobson also claims that when the process of awakening and post-awakening factors are
under control, there is still a major difference regarding dream-recall from different
sleep stages. In these cases, the stage difference in DRF mirrors the processes of dream
production quite precisely, since the significant variance in the reports of REM and
NREM experiences arises from the difference between the distinct generation processes
— the low level of dream recall from NREM sleep is mainly due to the low frequency
and poor quality (short, thought-like) of the mentations themselves, which are not
necessarily defined as dreams by the subject.

2.1.2 DRF depends on the intensity of dream generation processes

One-generator models of dreaming (Nemeth & Fazekas, 2018) are motivated by results
indicating that there are only moderate differences between REM and NREM
mentations (Cicogna, Cavallero, & Bosinelli, 1991; Cicogna et al., 2000), and argue that
the source of these differences is the fact that the intensity of the process of dream
generation varies during sleep (Domhoff, 2018; Foulkes, 1999; Hartmann, 2001).
Sharing this view, Antrobus (Antrobus, 1991, 2000; Wamsley & Antrobus, 2007)
states that not just high, but lower arousal can induce dream production as well, but it is
not enough to switch higher-order cognitive processes (the so-called constructive
module) on. Weaker elaboration leads to lower recallability of NREM mentations,
which then explains the variance in DRF from REM and NREM sleep.

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 While Antrobus (2000) emphasises the intensity of dream production and its link
to the level of arousal, others argue for a multi-dimensional view with regard to the
quality of dreams and the underlying neural processes (Nemeth & Fazekas, 2018).
According to this approach, the quality of conscious experiences can vary along
multiple dimensions, such as the intensity, precision and temporal stability of content-
specific neural representations (Fazekas & Overgaard, 2016, 2018). What matters, form
this point of view, then, is that dream production is determined not by the overall level
of arousal but rather by local features like neural activity in content-specific areas. In
addition, this view claims that the features of dream production have a direct influence
on the efficiency of the encoding of the corresponding dream experience, and thus they
have a major impact on its recallability (Fazekas et al., 2019).
Cohen (1974b) arrives at similar conclusions. He postulates that DRF reflects the
quality of the dream experience. Dream saliency (greater novelty, bizarreness, sensory
intensity, number of activities, emotionality) correlates with autonomic activity (eye-
movement, breathing rate and irregularity) during sleep that might be a sign of
augmented dream production processes. Intensified dream experiences lead to more
effective encoding and therefore to greater recallability (Cipolli et al., 1993). The first
results supporting this so-called saliency theory demonstrated that the dreams of
frequent recallers were more salient, than those of poor recallers (Cohen, 1974b; Cohen
& MacNeilage, 1974). Saliency is also an important factor in the re-recall of once
reported dreams (Cipolli et al., 1993; Hartmann, 2008; Trinder & Kramer, 1971). The
mechanism described by the saliency theory is also supported by the findings that high
recallers, in general, have greater ability to visualise (form vivid, clear and controllable
mental images) in wakefulness as well. This capacity might contribute — via intensified
dream images — to better retrieval (Hiscock & Cohen, 1973). This view is also in line
with modern approaches (Kensinger, 2009) demonstrating the impact of emotions and
vividness on memory encoding and consolidation (and less conclusively on retrieval
processes: Buchanan, 2007; D'Angiulli et al., 2013).
Irrespective of the difference in what they think about the number of relevant
dimensions of the dream generation process, these approaches agree that the high

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variability that dream production shows during sleep is not entirely determined by the
stages of sleep (Nemeth & Fazekas, 2018). These theories emphasise that the intensity
of dream production is the most significant factor affecting dream recall, moreover it is
able to modulate the encoding and retrieval of the experience as well, as a lower quality
dream image can be encoded less effectively and/or is harder to be retrieved.

2.2 DRF reflects the encoding of the perceived experiences

The theories discussed below hypothesise that the encoding of dreams can vary
independently of the intensity of dream production, and thus it is a more important
factor of determining dream recall than dream generation itself. DRF, thus, cannot
provide faithful information about dream production — especially not in the case of
awakening from NREM sleep, as memory encoding and stabilisation often fail in
NREM. Different proposals disagree with regard to whether what is necessary for the
retaining of a dream experience is a general global increase in brain activity or rather
just a local increase in specific regions. Hence there is a disagreement about the exact
timing of these memory processes: while some claim that awakenings are necessary for
them, others think that they can happen during sleep.

2.2.1 Global activation of the brain is necessary for dream encoding

According to this group of theories, the distinction in DRF between awakenings from
REM and NREM stages of sleep is due to stage differences in the encoding of dream
experiences.
The most famous theory of dream recall that first drew attention to the importance
of the memory formation step of dream recall was the arousal-retrieval model
(Goodenough, 1991; Koulack, 1991; Koulack & Goodenough, 1976). It states that the
stabilisation of a dream memory depends on the level of arousal. For creating and
retaining memory traces it is necessary to awake during or right after the experience.
Since in the REM stage the brain is in a more activated state than during slow-wave
sleep, the awakening threshold is low and spontaneous awakenings happen easily,
especially in the second half of the night (Åkerstedt et al., 2002; Rechtschaffen, Hauri,
& Zeitlin, 1966). Memory formation thus happens more often, which leads to more

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successful dream recall from REM than from NREM sleep, and from late night than
from the first cycles of sleep. Additionally, since awakening from slow-wave sleep is
slower and more gradual (the sleep inertia is more intense) than from NREM1 and REM
(Tassi & Muzet, 2000), memory processes might be less effective after deep sleep
(Schredl, 2018). This theory does not reflect on the possible differences in dream
generation between sleep stages. It only emphasises that for the formation and retention
of dream memories REM sleep provides a more appropriate background than NREM
sleep.
Conduit’s attention based model (Conduit, Crewther, & Coleman, 2000; Conduit,
Crewther, & Coleman, 2004) goes further arguing that there is no evidence to reject the
null hypothesis that both the quantity and quality of dream generation are identical in
REM and NREM. According to this view, the only difference occurs in the encoding
phase, as in REM sleep higher arousal increases attentional awareness which is required
for creating memory traces. This hypothesis is claimed to be supported by a diverse set
of PET and EEG findings, like the appearance of P300, the occipital EEG alpha
decrease, the increase of dopamine release, the hippocampal theta activity, and the
enhanced parietal-temporal-occipital (PTO) activity in REM sleep, as these can reflect
more intense attentional processes (Conduit et al., 2000). However, many of these
findings can have alternative interpretations, for instance, they could equally be seen as
signs of enhanced dream production (Fazekas & Nemeth, 2018).
Some new approaches share the idea that dream recall depends mainly on
attentional processes due to their contribution to the encoding of dream experiences
(Eichenlaub et al., 2014b). High recallers show significantly higher regional cerebral
blood flow in the temporoparietal junction (TPJ) and in the medial prefrontal cortex
(MPFC) during wakefulness and even during sleep (in REM in both area, in NREM3
only in the TPJ) than low recallers (Eichenlaub et al., 2014b). Higher activity in the TPJ
is associated with higher brain reactivity to the environment during sleep and
wakefulness (Eichenlaub et al., 2014a), which, via a greater number of longer intra-
sleep awakenings, leads to the better encoding of the experiences (Vallat et al., 2017).

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 However, as the authors themselves emphasise (Eichenlaub et al., 2014b), this is
not the only adequate interpretation of these results. Since the implicated areas are parts
of the default mode network (Domhoff, 2018; Domhoff & Fox, 2015; Fox et al., 2015),
it is also possible that the differences between low and high recallers stem from a
difference in the capacity to produce intense mind-wandering and dreaming (Mason et
al., 2007; Solms & Turnbull, 2002) — in which case the results would be relevant not
for dream encoding but for dream generation (§2.1.2).

2.2.2 Local activations are responsible for dream encoding

Comparing white dreams (when subjects are certain that they had a dream but are
unable to recall any content) with contentful dreams and no dreams, Siclari and
colleagues (Siclari et al., 2017) argue for a distinction between the neural correlates of
consciousness and the memory processes necessary for the recall of the content of
experiences. Their findings show that conscious experiences can occur in slow-wave
sleep as well, and their occurrence depends on local decrease in the delta activity-range
in the posterior hot zone (low- and high-level sensory areas, precuneus, posterior
cingulate, retrosplenial cortex) independently of sleep-stages (this evidence is also
confirmed by Scarpelli et al., 2017). Additionally, they claim that while local high
frequency (20-50Hz) activity over the posterior hot zone determines the content of
dreams, an increase in high frequency activity over medial and lateral frontal areas are
responsible for memory formation and storing (Siclari et al., 2017). As the results show,
both conscious experiences and memory processes occur independently of sleep-stages;
their frequency, however, is not constant across sleep stages: they occur fewer times
(fewer conscious experience, and from those fewer recalled content) in NREM2 and in
NREM3 sleep than in REM or NREM1 sleep (Siclari et al., 2013). These findings — in
line with the arousal-retrieval model — demonstrate that increased brain activity is
necessary for successful dream recall, but — contrary to the arousal-retrieval model —
they decompose the process of successful dream recall and specifically address its
subcomponents by differentiating between the possible neural underpinnings of dream
generation and memory-production.

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 While the view that dream encoding is underlain by local brain activations during
sleep (and thus a global increase in arousal is not necessary for memory formation) is
also shared by others (Cipolli et al., 2017; Esposito, Nielsen, & Paquette, 2004;
Marzano et al., 2011; Scarpelli et al., 2015; Takeuchi et al., 2003), they emphasise the
decrease of alpha activity over the temporo-parietal lobe in NREM, and less intensively
in REM (Esposito et al., 2004; Marzano et al., 2011), and the increase of frontal theta
activity in REM (Marzano et al., 2011) as the correlates of successful dream encoding.

2.3 DRF reflects the availability of the encoded experience

Many theories focus on the post-awakening stage of dream recall. The situational
interference hypothesis (see §3.2.2 for more detail) aims to define the most optimal
setting for dream-retrieval. Others emphasise the relevance of motivation and attitudinal
factors (§3.1.4) in having an influence on the last step of dream recall, whereas the life-
style hypothesis (§3.1.3) tries to identify the personality traits that might affect dream
retrieval. The repression theory (§3.2.3) also states that the variability of DRF derives
(at least partly) from differences in the capacity to retrieve the perceived experience, as
according to its central claim, although most of the dreams are encoded they are still not
consciously available for the subject after awakening (Anderson & Green, 2001;
Koukkou & Lehmann, 1983; Solms & Turnbull, 2002) due to ‘retrieval-induced
forgetting’ (Anderson & Spellman, 1995).
These approaches are not aimed to define the relation between production,
encoding and retrieval, nor do they deny that state or trait differences might exist and
have an impact on the quality or quantity of dream production or on the encoding of
dreams. They simply emphasise the relevance of post-awakening state and trait factors
as an important but not the only source of influence on dream reporting (Goodenough,
1991). They only state that under some circumstances (see §3.2) or in the case of certain
people with special characteristics (see §3.1), DRF neither mirrors dream generation
appropriately, nor reflects encoding faithfully, as it is highly distorted by the problems
of retrieval.

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 The functional state-shift model (Koukkou & Lehmann, 1983) goes much further
by proposing that dream production and encoding happen throughout the night, so we
experience dreams and also retain information about them independently of sleep-
stages. However, according to the central claim of this approach, in lower functional
states of the brain information is stored in a form, which is not accessible for higher
functional states. This claim is supported by the phenomenon of asymmetrical state-
dependent recall (Overton, 1979): whereas memories formed in a state with a higher
level of arousal can be recalled in states with a lower level of functioning, memories
formed in a lower level of arousal are only recallable in a similar state. As REM sleep is
a state with a high level of arousal (similar to wakefulness) experiences from this stage
are in general more accessible after awakening. In the case of NREM sleep, which
usually is a state with a lower level of arousal than waking, only a transient period of
awakening during or immediately after NREM dreaming can ‘elevate’ the memories to
a higher level of storage, making them available from the wakeful state (Koukkou &
Lehmann, 1983). Without an immediate awakening, although NREM dreams are
experienced and encoded (just like those occurring in a REM stage), but won’t be
available for later recall.

3. Factors affecting dream recall

Traditionally, variables predicting dream recall are divided into trait and state factors
(Schredl, 2007, 2018; Schredl & Montasser, 1996/1997). However, differentiating
between effects of trait and state factors are not always straightforward, as both actual
situational factors and stable trait-like dispositions have some effect on almost every
measure (Steyer et al., 2015).
Different investigations use different time scales: serial awakening paradigms rely
on seconds before awakenings, more traditional EEG studies focus on periods of time
specific to distinct sleep stages, other methodological approaches concentrate on one-
night measures of sleep-parameters, and some studies targeting habitual characteristics
use questionnaires to summarise data over weeks, months or years. While focusing on
short periods (seconds, minutes) or sleep stages is meant to determine state factors, and

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questionnaires measuring habitual characteristics are usually used to capture the effects
of trait variables, one-night measures of sleep parameters are used in both cases: in
some studies these are used as being informative of state (Schredl, 1995; Taub, 1970)
whereas in others as being informative of trait effects (Pagel & Shocknesse, 2007; Vallat
et al., 2017). Although the trait-like characteristics of sleep EEG is well-documented
(Ambrosius et al., 2008; De Gennaro et al., 2008; Tarokh, Carskadon, & Achermann,
2011), this is not the case with all physiological variables that can affect dream recall
(Bei et al., 2016; Knutson et al., 2007; Mezick et al., 2009), which renders it unclear
whether one-night laboratory measures are able to inform us about stable
characteristics.
While DRF in the context of focusing on the relationship between trait factors and
dream reports is typically measured by using questionnaires, in the context of trying to
capture the relation between state factors and dream reports it is mostly determined by
using laboratory awakenings. Dream logs, although offer an alternative way to measure
the effects of trait factors on dream recall, are only rarely used due to their resource-
intensive nature (see §4).
As it will be argued in the next sections, grouping factors as state versus trait
variables is not the only way to evaluate them. Considering how different factors affect
distinct steps of dream reporting might provide a new and valuable approach to
choosing the right measuring tool that matches one’s purpose more adequately (see §4).
This section reviews the most popular trait and state variables discussed in the literature,
and summarises (in Table 1 and Table 2, respectively) the possible effect-mechanisms
through which they might have an impact on dream reporting.

3.1 Trait variables affecting dream recall

DRF shows a stable gender difference: women remember their dreams more often than
men (Schredl, 2008, 2010; Schredl & Reinhard, 2008b). The number of dream reports
seems to show a descending trend during the life span with two peeks on the curve at
young adulthood, and at around age 60 (Nielsen, 2012; Schredl, 2008). Still, there are
relatively stable interpersonal differences regarding DRF. Depending on the method and

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the retest time interval (between 4-19 weeks), dream recall shows medium to high retest
reliability (r=0.59-0.906) (Bernstein & Belicki, 1996; Cohen, 1969; Schredl, 2004;
Schredl & Fulda, 2005b; Schredl et al., 2001). However, there is no data on dream recall
stability on longer (years, decades) time periods. The trait factors, which are meant to be
responsible for individual differences in dream recall are the stable characteristics of
sleep physiology and brain activity, cognitive abilities, personality traits, and variance in
attitude towards dreams.
As summarised in Table 1, these trait factors affect the number of dream reports in
different ways: some of them influence dream production itself, others interact with
memory encoding, still others have an impact on retrieval. Some factors can have an
effect on more than one step of the process that leads to dream recall (Blagrove, 2007;
Blagrove & Pace-Schott, 2010).

3.1.1 Trait characteristics of sleep physiology and brain activity during sleep

Habitual sleep duration. Longer habitual sleep duration is often hypothesised to

increase dream recall. Antrobus and colleagues (Antrobus, Dement, & Fisher, 1964)
found a weak but significant difference between home reporters and non-reporters in the
total amount of time spent is REM-sleep obtained in the laboratory for two consecutive
nights. This could not be replicated by Pagel and Schocknesse (2007), who used a one-
night measure of sleep parameters (e.g. total sleep time, time spent in REM, number of
awakenings) and questionnaire-based DRF. It is, however, debatable whether these one-
night sleep parameters can be treated as real trait variables, and whether they are
informative with regard to the sleep habits of the subjects. The subjective estimation of
habitual sleep duration on questionnaires or by using the average of the daily
estimations of diaries is a more trait-like variable, but as results show, it has no or only
negligible effect on DRF (Blagrove & Akehurst, 2000; Schredl & Fulda, 2005a; Schredl
& Reinhard, 2008a). Trying to understand how habitual sleep duration might influence
the number of recalled dreams reveals a complex relationship characterised by possible
interactions with different steps of the process. On the one hand, more habitual sleep, by
increasing the time spent in REM and light sleep stages, can affect dream generation
itself. On the other hand, by leading to more awakenings, it might have a direct

14
influence on the encoding step. Moreover, due to resulting in a higher number of
experiences from high-level functional states, it can even be seen as a factor affecting
dream retrieval.
Sleep quality. In line with the arousal-retrieval model, beyond sleep duration,
poor sleep quality — via the increased number of awakenings — could also lead to a
higher number of dream reports by interacting either with the encoding or the retrieval
step of the process. However, this hypothesis could not be reinforced by laboratory
studies (which were derived from only one-night data: Pagel & Shocknesse, 2007).
Moreover, questionnaire-based investigations resulted in controversial findings (Brand
et al., 2011; Schredl et al., 1998; Schredl et al., 2003b) not allowing for drawing
overarching conclusions. Nevertheless, this result is unsurprising, given that although
the subjective estimation of the quality of sleep in the morning mirrors the actual
laboratory indexes of sleep-efficiency, the number of awakenings and also the total
wake time quite well (Keklund & Åkerstedt, 1997; Rosipal, Lewandowski, & Dorffner,
2013), responses to questions about the subjects’ habitual quality of sleep (and also
about the subjects’ habitual dream recall, as will be discussed in §4.4) are often
distorted by estimation biases.
Brain activity. Looking for further trait factors of dream recall, Eichenlaub and
colleagues (Eichenlaub et al., 2014a) pointed out that the regional cerebral blood flow in
TPJ and MPFC is different between the groups of low and high recallers. There is a
distinction between these groups in the response to evoked potentials (Eichenlaub et al.,
2014a), and in the frequency of awakenings that last at least 1 minutes as well (Vallat et
al., 2017). These factors can affect both the intensity of dream production (§2.1.2) and
the probability of transferring memory from short-term to long-term storage (§2.2.1). In
addition, if Koukou and Lehman’s state-shift theory (Koukkou & Lehmann, 1983) is
correct (§2.3), then frequent and longer awakenings might also influence the
accessibility (retrieval) of the stored information as well. However, due to the between-
subject design employed in these studies, it is, again, controversial whether these
differences reflect stable characteristics. As De Gennaro and Ferrera (2017) and
Scarpelli and colleagues (Scarpelli et al., 2015) emphasise, the existence of trait-like

15
characteristics in brain activity or in morphologic-anatomic measures in relation to
dream recall is still questionable.

3.1.2 Stable cognitive factors

Memory performance. Given the fact that in order to report a dream, memory
processes are undoubtedly needed, the idea that the capacity for storing and retrieving
experiences might interact with DRF is pretty straightforward. However, the results
regarding the existence of trait-like memory skill differences in the explanation of inter-
individual differences in DRF are insufficient so-far. Whereas Butler and Watson (1985)
and Schredl, Frauscher and Shendi (1995) both reported a correlation between visual
memory performance and dream recall, others could not replicate these findings
(Cohen, 1971; Eichenlaub et al., 2014b). It has also been argued that beyond visual
memory performance the capacity to remember personal events (autobiographical
memory) might also count as a trait variable that affects dream recall (Nielsen, 2012;
Robbins & Tanck, 1978; Sehulster, 1981). At the neural level, awake memory
performance is correlated with theta synchronisation and alpha desynchronisation
(Mölle et al., 2002). Theta activity increases both during the encoding phase (Klimesch
et al., 1996; Klimesch et al., 1997) and during the retrieval of previously studied
information (Klimesch et al., 2001; Klimesch et al., 2006). In line with the view that
mechanisms of episodic memory encoding and retrieval are the same along different
states of consciousness, it has been repeatedly demonstrated that frontal theta power
might be seen as a — state — factor that determines dream encoding (§2.2.2). Theta
oscillations have also been suggested to be trait factors of waking episodic memory
performance (Addante et al., 2011; Cohen, 2011; Guderian et al., 2009). In parallel with
this, Fell and colleagues (Fell et al., 2006) demonstrated that values of medio-temporal
connectivity in waking state and NREM and REM sleep differentiate between good and
bad dream recallers (measured over awakenings in one laboratory night), which might
be considered as a trait difference leading to inter-individual differences in dream recall
capacity. However, as the authors themselves and others emphasise, further data are
needed in order to prove this hypothesis (De Gennaro & Ferrara, 2017; Fell et al.,
2006).

16
 IQ. With regard to the relationship between dream recall and intelligence, the
findings are inconsistent. While some studies find no correlation between IQ and dream
recall (Hill, 1974), others show that high performance scores on the Block design of
Wechsler scales correlate with high recall capability in childhood and adolescence
(Foulkes, 1985). Since this performance did not correlate with memory skills, Foulkes
(1999) claims that it affects, via enhanced visual imagination, dream production itself.

3.1.3 Personality traits

Imagination, absorption, fantasy proneness. Intense visual imagination, absorption,

fantasy proneness and dissociation are the most promising candidates for trait factors
that have an influence on DRF. People characterised by these traits are hypothesised to
have more salient, more vivid dreams, which, then, in line with the salience theory,
would explain why they can recall their dreams more easily (Giesbrecht &
Merckelbach, 2006; Levin & Young, 2001-02; Watson, 2003) implicating that these
factors exert their effects on dream reports by having an impact on the quantity and
quality of dream production. This claim, however is debated as others have argued that
imagination, absorption and fantasy proneness primarily interact not with dream
generation but with retrieval via attitudinal and motivational factors and via estimation
biases affecting the retrospective assessment of one’s DRF (see below; Beaulieu-
Prévost & Zadra, 2007; Levin, Fireman, & Rackley, 2003).
Boundary thinnes. Boundary thinness (degree of separation of intra-psychic
components of the mind) is another important variable, that can affect the bizarreness,
emotionality and vividness of dreams, and can even make experiences more accessible
from different states of consciousness (Hartmann, Elkin, & Garg, 1991; Kunzendorf et
al., 1997; Schredl, Kleinferchner, & Gell, 1996).
Inner-life acceptance style. Focusing on personality factors, Schonbar (1965)
claims that frequent dream recalling is part of a so called inner-life acceptance
personality style, which is characterised by openness to experience, divergent thinking,
creativity, intense imagination, field-independence, inner locus of control, introspection,
and tendency to cope with anxiety, instead of repressing feelings.

17
 Although several studies provided support for the correspondence between these
personality variables and DRF (Brand et al., 2011; Goodenough et al., 1974; Schredl et
al., 2003a; Schredl, Jochum, & Souguenet, 1997; Tart, 1962; Watson, 2003; Williamson
et al., 1970), others found no such correlations (Blagrove & Akehurst, 2000; Bone,
Nelson, & McAllister, 1970; Cohen, 1974b; Cohen & Wolfe, 1973; Levin et al., 2003;
Schredl et al., 2003b). Furthermore, the majority of the results are weak, and cannot
provide information about the direction of the hypothesised causal relationship. The
contradictory findings are mostly due to methodological issues regarding how to
measure DRF (see §4). While scale-based measures found notable relationships
between the traits in question and DRF, log-based measures revealed much weaker
correlations. This means that although these personality traits might influence DRF by
affecting the salience of dreams, they most likely correlate with modulations of retrieval
via estimation biases (tendency for retrospective under- or overestimation; Beaulieu-
Prévost & Zadra, 2007; Levin et al., 2003) and via their co-occurrence with attitudinal
(see §3.1.4) and motivational (§3.2.2) factors (Blagrove, 2007; Blagrove & Pace-Schott,
2010).

3.1.4 Attitude towards dreams

The concept of ‘attitude towards dreams’ captures the subjects’ interest in and
motivation to concentrate on their dreams. Therefore, unsurprisingly — by facilitating
the retrieval of dream experiences — it shows a consistent relationship with DRF, and
an even stronger relationship with the personality traits discussed above (Schredl &
Göritz, 2017). As Schredl and colleagues (Schredl et al., 2003b) propose, attitude
towards dreams may mediate between personality variables and DRF (although the
direction of causality between these factors is unclear). However, the level of
correlation between attitude towards dreams and DRF falls drastically when DRF is
measured by diaries. Consequently, attitude towards dreams might at best only slightly
correlate with the capacity of dream reporting, and could rather exert significant
influence, via attention and estimation biases, on the answers subjects provide to the
questions of retrospective scales (Beaulieu-Prévost & Zadra, 2005; Beaulieu-Prévost &
Zadra, 2007).

18
 Table 1

Trait variables affecting DRF

TRAIT variables GENERATION MEMORY ENCODING RETRIEVAL

more dreaming due to more

REM processes (§2.1.1), or more awakening from more easier access to information
longer habitual
more intensi ed dreaming due REM and more light sleep due to more high-level
sleep duration
to more periods of higher (§2.2.1) functional states (§2.3)
brain activity (§2.1.2)

easier access to information

from states interrupted by
poor habitual more awakening due to
awakening due to elevating
sleep quality poor sleep quality (§2.2.1)
memories to higher order
storage (§2.3)

easier access to information

enhanced tendency to intensive imagery more awakening due to from higher level functional
activation of due to enhanced activity of enhanced brain reactivity states due to higher arousal or
TPJ and MPFC the DMN (§2.1.2) (§2.2.1) due to more frequent
awakenings (§2.3)

higher medio-temporal higher medio-temporal

memory
connectivity (§2.2.2) connectivity (§2.2.2)

enhanced visual imagination

IQ (Block Design
due to better visuospatial
Test)
skills (§2.1.2)

absorption positive attitude towards

more intense dreaming -
fantasy-proneness dreams and increased
saliency (§2.1.2)
dissociation motivation (§2.3)

information is more accessible

a ects bizareness and
boudary thinnes between distinct states of
vividness of dreams (§2.1.2)
consciousness

“inner-life positive attitude towards

more intense dreaming -
acceptance” dreams and increased
saliency (§2.1.2)
style traits motivation (§2.3)

positive attitude more awareness to dreams

towards dreams due to higher motivation (§2.3)

Note. The hypothesised ways in which previously studied trait variables correlating with DRF enter the

process of dream recall, and influence the number of dream reports (with reference to parts of §2 where

the theoretical background assumed is discussed).

19
ff
fi
3.2 State variables affecting dream recall
Since the effects of trait variables on DRF are quite small and controversial (and highly
affected by the chosen method of measuring DRF), the conclusion in the literature is
that state factors are the main determinants of dream recall (Blagrove, 2007; Blagrove
& Pace-Schott, 2010; De Gennaro & Ferrara, 2017; Levin et al., 2003; Scarpelli et al.,
2015).
There is a large intra-individual fluctuation on a case-by-case basis in reporting
dreams. State characteristics of the preceding sleep or sleep stage, situational factors at
the moment of awakening, and life events and stressors affecting different steps of the
dream recall process can all be responsible for this high variability.

3.2.1 State variables of sleep physiology and brain activity during sleep

Sleep duration. Sleep duration, used as a state factor, is a better predictor of dream
recall than habitual sleep duration (Schredl & Fulda, 2005a; Schredl & Reinhard,
2008a). With more and more time spent in sleep the number of reported dreams
increases (Schredl & Reinhard, 2008a; Taub, 1970). This effect might be due to more
and longer REM periods, more intra-sleep awakenings, or post-awakening factors like
sleep inertia, which is more pronounced when sleep duration is below average (Trotti,
2017). Since one night sleep duration can possibly influence dream recall in all these
different ways, as a concept it is too broad to be able to differentiate between the
different steps of the process that leads to dream recall. A more informative approach in
this respect would be to distinctively focus on all those factors that change with sleep
duration.
Sleep stages. The sleep stage preceding awakening is one of the most robust
indicator of dream reporting. While 80% of all awakenings from REM lead to dream
recall, only 50% do so when waking from NREM sleep (Nielsen, 2000). However, the
interpretation of this result is still not straightforward. It might be a consequence of the
differences regarding the number or qualities of dreams produced in the different sleep
stages (§2.1). The REM stage, due to more spontaneous awakenings, can also interact
with the step of memory encoding (§2.2). Moreover, easier access to experiences

20
occurring in the REM stage can result in an impact even on dream retrieval (§2.3).
Reduced sleep inertia associated with awakening from REM sleep, can also interact
with both the encoding (in accordance with those theories that claim that encoding
happens at the time of awakening, see §2.2) and the retrieval steps (as increased
cognitive performance right after awakening from light and REM sleep might promote
attention and motivation thereby facilitating retrieval; Tassi & Muzet, 2000; Vallat et al.,
2017).
Autonomic activities during sleep. Autonomic activities (breathing rate,
irregularity of breathing, eye-movement density) during REM and NREM sleep are also
hypothesised to be state factors that correlate with dream recall. According to the
salience hypothesis (§2.1.2), this correlation is due to the characteristics of dream
production, which act as a common cause: the intensity of the dream content (its
vividness, emotional tone, etc.) induces these physiological reactions, and, at the same
time, enhances the efficiency of the encoding of the experience. Nevertheless, the causal
relationship between these variables are still debated, and the results are inconclusive
(Goodenough, 1991).
Brain activity during sleep. As discussed above (§2.2.2), recent studies have
attempted to identify those neural state characteristics that uniquely correlate with
dream production and dream encoding. Siclari and colleagues (Siclari et al., 2017)
reported high-frequency (20-50 Hz) posterior hot zone activity as the neural signature of
dream production and high-frequency activity in the medial and lateral frontal areas as
pre-awakening EEG signs of memory processes. Others identified a decrease in alpha
activity over the temporo-parietal lobe (Cipolli et al., 2017; Esposito et al., 2004;
Marzano et al., 2011; Scarpelli et al., 2015; Takeuchi et al., 2003) and increased frontal
theta activity (Marzano et al., 2011) as the correlates of better dream encoding.

3.2.2 Situational interference, motivation and attention

Situational interference and abrupt awakenings. The interference theory (Cohen &
Wolfe, 1973), focusing on the relevance of awakening (Shapiro et al., 1965) and
situational factors (Cohen & Wolfe, 1973), emphasises that memories of dreams can
easily be displaced by distracting thoughts or tasks upon awakening. While the slightest

21
distraction (like listening to weather forecast) or delay can disrupt memory retrieval
drastically (see Cohen & Wolfe (1973) for a now classical study; and Parke & Horton
(2009) for a recent replication), abrupt awakenings enhance dream reporting especially
for infrequent recallers (Parke & Horton, 2009; Shapiro et al., 1965). A sudden
awakening (contrary to a gradual one), thus, seems to reduce the chance of being
distracted by concurrent tasks, and thereby maintains access to the memory trace of the
dream (Parke & Horton, 2009). Abrupt awakenings by inducing immediate and
intensive enhancement of arousal, might even influence the formation and retainment of
a memory trace as well (Schredl, 2018) — if this transfer occurs at awakening as
suggested by the arousal-retrieval model (Koulack & Goodenough, 1976; see §2.2.1)
and some more recent experimental approaches (Vallat et al., 2017).
Motivation. The subjects’ motivation to catch a dream is also a significant factor
of dream reporting, as it has been robustly demonstrated by several experiments that
manipulated the instructions for morning dream recall or the context of dream recall
questionnaires (Aspy, 2016; Cohen & Wolfe, 1973; Halliday, 1992; Schredl, 2002;
Schredl et al., 2001). The motivation to remember dreams, by enhancing the subject’s
attention to and concentration on the dream, decreases situational interference and
therefore leads to a higher level of recall.

3.2.3 Life events and stressors

Life events, psychological and physical well-being or stressors show robust correlations
with dream features, such as emotionality, bizarreness, intensity or complexity (Bódizs
et al., 2008; Hartmann & Brezler, 2008; Hartmann et al., 2001; Najam et al., 2006;
Pesant & Zadra, 2006; Punamäki, 2007; Zadra & Donderi, 2000), and less conclusively
with DRF as well (Bódizs et al., 2008; Cartwright, 2005; Hill, 1974; Punamäki, 2007).
However, the direction of causality between such psychological factors and the qualities
of dreams are highly questionable (Blagrove & Fisher, 2009; Bódizs et al., 2008; Zadra
& Donderi, 2000).
It is also debated what those characteristics of dreams might be that lead to better
recallability. Freud (1964/1900), for instance (see also Vedfelt, 1999), states that the
high intensity of latent wishes compel the repression of dreams, and therefore lead to

22
forgetting. Psychoanalytic approaches are indecisive regarding whether intensified
latent wishes caused by different life situations lead to the modulation of dream
production itself. Their focus is on repression, which is the prevention of retrieval (of
dreams that might have been successfully encoded and have a further impact on the
subject’s behaviour; see §2.3).
The salience theory (Cohen & MacNeilage, 1974) emphasises the exact opposite:
more salient dreams (more intensified dream generation), due to richer encoding, have
higher chance to be recalled after awakening. This entails that the quality of dream
production has an influence on DRF — via determining the process of encoding
(§2.1.2).
Since it is impossible to compare the characteristics of never recalled dreams with
successfully retrieved ones, there are only indirect results available to understand the
relation between different dream qualities and DRF. Studies aimed to test the
assumption that stressors have an impact on dreams via laboratory manipulations of
subjects’ emotions before sleep yielded controversial results reporting either enhanced
or diminished dream recall (Baekeland, 1971; Cohen, 1974a; Foulkes et al., 1967;
Foulkes & Rechtschaffen, 1964). Findings regarding the relationship between natural
life-situations (divorce, bereavement, different kinds of traumas) and variations in DRF
are also ambivalent (Arkin et al., 1976; Cartwright, 1996; Najam et al., 2006; Rofe &
Lewin, 1979; Valli et al., 2006). This inconsistent set of data probably reflects a
complex relation between awake emotional state, dream content and recall. There might
be plenty of factors that can influence this connection, like the intensity of awake
emotions, personality traits, or even the gender of the dreamer (Armitage, 1992;
Blagrove & Akehurst, 2000; Punamäki, 2007).
While the modern approach of neuro-psychoanalysis (Solms, 2000a, 2000b) has
difficulties with understanding censorship in terms of neuroscience (Hobson, 2001), and
struggles with identifying the mechanism of repression in physiological terms (Solms &
Turnbull, 2002), the process proposed by the saliency theory is much more consistent
with contemporary knowledge regarding the relationship between emotions and
memory operations.

23
 Table 2

State variables affecting DRF

STATE variables GENERATION MEMORY ENCODING RETRIEVAL

higher number of dreams due to more awakening from

more REM processes (§2.1.1), more light sleep and REM increased motivation and
sleep duration or more intense dreams due to (§2.2.1), and reduced better cognitive performance
higher chance of increased sleep inertia after longer due to reduced sleep inertia
brain activity (§2.1.2) sleep (§2.2.1)

higher number of dreams due to easier access to information

more awakening from
more REM processes (§2.1.1), from REM (§2.3) and
REM (§2.2.1), and
REM stage or more intense dreams due to increased motivation and
reduced sleep inertia
higher chance of increased better cognitive performance
after REM (§2.2.1)
brain activity (§2.1.2) due to reduced sleep inertia

autonom activity more intense dreaming -

under sleep saliency (§2.1.2)

opportunity for and content

local posterior hot
characteristics of dream
zone activity
generation (§2.2.2)

increased 20-50Hz activation of processes

activity in medial and necessary for encoding
lateral frontal areas (§2.2.2)

decreased alpha
activity over the activation of processes
temporo-parietal necessary for encoding
lobe and increased (§2.2.2)
frontal theta activity

disrupted retrieval due to

situational
reduced access to memory
interference
trace (§2.3)

intensi ed and immediate

decreased situational
abrupt awakening arousal-enhancement at
interference (§2.3)
awakening (§2.2.1)

more awareness to dreams

motivation
(§2.3)

enhanced tendency for

more intense dreaming -
life events, stressors repression due to intensi ed
saliency (§2.1.2)
latent wishes (§2.3)

Note. The hypothesised ways in which previously studied state variables correlating with DRF enter the

process of dream recall, and influence the number of dream reports (with references to parts of §2 where

the theoretical background assumed is discussed).

24
fi
fi
4. Methods of measuring DRF
As shown in Section 3, trait and state factors correlating with DRF can influence the
process of dream reporting in multiple ways. In order to clarify the exact mechanisms of
their impact, the studied variables on both sides of the hypothesised correlations should
be chosen more carefully. On the one hand, instead of the classical broad concepts of
trait and state factors (like sleep duration or sleep quality), more rigorously specified
variables are needed. On the other hand, both for the operationalisation of dream recall
and for choosing the most appropriate measuring tool for capturing DRF it should be
carefully considered which step of the dream reporting process is in the focus of the
actual study. As I will argue below, the methods available to measure DRF differ not
just in terms of their time-scales, but also in terms of how informative they are able to
be about the different steps of dream recall. The current domination of questionnaires as
a method of collecting information on the trait characteristics of DRF is a manifestation
of the ignorance of this latter aspect, as these scales are not able to recover trustworthy
information about the pre-awakening steps of dream reporting since they are highly
distorted not just by uncontrolled variables at awakening (interacting with retrieval), but
even by estimation biases affecting the answers on retrospective scales.

4.1 Varieties of dream recall

Although dream recall is the only route to dream experiences, it is not an all-or-nothing
kind of phenomenon (Goodenough, 1991). There is a continuum extending from no
report at all, through white dreams and dreams with slight impressions or only with a
few specific content-elements, to dream stories with complex narratives. Without an
insight into the sleeping mind, the question whether these characteristics of the reports
reflect dream production, or rather they are consequences of modifications in the
memory processes necessary for encoding and retrieving experiences, is unresolved
(Fazekas et al., 2019; Feinberg, 2000; Siclari et al., 2017; Windt, Nielsen, & Thompson,
2016).
For example, while some results (Dement & Kleitman, 1957; Dement & Wolpert,
1958; Stickgold, Pace-Schott, & Hobson, 1994) partly show that the total word count of

25
a report correlates with the time spent in a REM stage before awakening — implicating
that report-length reflects the length of the dream itself, — others couldn’t replicate
these findings (Rosenlicht, Maloney, & Feinberg, 1994). As Rosenlicht and colleagues
(Rosenlicht et al., 1994) argue, the number of words used to describe a dream
corresponds not with the length of a given sleep stage but rather with prior sleep
duration. Since reports after late-night 10-minute REM periods are longer than reports
after early-night 10-minute REM periods, Rosenlicht and colleagues (Rosenlicht et al.,
1994) claim that report-length is a measure of dream encoding (instead of dream
generation) since it depends on the level of arousal, which is higher during late-night
REM sleep, and which has known effects on memory processes (Koulack &
Goodenough, 1976). Cipolli and colleagues (Cipolli et al., 2015) add that higher intra-
sleep arousal might be a sign of elevated cognitive functioning contributing to the
generation of more organised dream narratives, which, then, are better retained and
easier to recall.
Another phenomenon that raises questions regarding which steps of dream
reporting it is informative about is the peculiar case of white dreams. White
(contentless) dreams are sometimes categorised as successful dream reports (Herlin et
al., 2015) while in other cases they are sidelined as uninformative data (Lewis et al.,
1966; Zadra & Robert, 2012). Siclari and colleagues (Siclari et al., 2017) argue that
white dreams are consequences of the failure of dream encoding, which means that they
should be merged with contentful dreams if the aim is to explore the correlates of dream
production, and that they are most informative with regard to how dream encoding
might break down. Others, however, have argued that white dreams correlate with low
intensity dream production (Fazekas et al., 2019), implying that they are the results of
the modulation of the process right at dream generation, and thus they carry information
about the first step of dream recall.

4.2 Retrospective-logbook disparity: methodological considerations

Prospective methods — laboratory dream reports and dream logs — are meant to
capture dream recall relatively close to the experience. Retrospective measures —

26
different kinds of DRF scales — capture a general subjective estimation of DRF
referring to a time-interval from the past. There is a moderate to high correlation
(between r=0.33 and r=0.69) between dream recall measured by these methods (Cohen,
1979; Goodenough et al., 1959; Robert & Zadra, 2014; Watson, 2003). Nonetheless, the
exact number of dream reports, or the number of special kinds of dreams (like
nightmares, bad dreams, lucid dreams, dreams with aggressive, friendly or sexual
elements) differ significantly when measured by logs or scales (Aspy, 2016; Aspy,
Delfabbro, & Proeve, 2015; Beaulieu-Prévost & Zadra, 2007; Bernstein & Belicki,
1996; Robert & Zadra, 2008; Schredl, 2002; Wood & Bootzin, 1990; Zadra & Domhoff,
2017; Zadra & Donderi, 2000; Zadra & Robert, 2012). With prospective tools DRF is
3-10 times higher than when measured retrospectively by scales (Cohen, 1969;
Redfering & Keller, 1974).
Additionally, individual differences in DRF assessed by dream logs do not show
the same correlations with personality traits that can be found in the case of scale-
measured DRF (Beaulieu-Prévost & Zadra, 2005; Beaulieu-Prévost & Zadra, 2007;
Bernstein & Belicki, 1996; Levin et al., 2003; Levin & Young, 2001-02).
There is no agreement with regard to the possible causes of this so-called
retrospective-logbook disparity (Aspy et al., 2015). Two alternative explanations have
been proposed: the retrospective underestimation and the logbook enhancement effects.
The claim that there is a tendency to retrospectively underestimate experiences
can be derived from the results that people make their estimation about the frequency of
past events on the basis of how easily they can recall specific examples of them (Aspy
et al., 2015; Tversky & Kahneman, 1973). Since it is relatively easy for high recallers to
remember their dreams, their assessments reflect the real frequency of the experiences
quite well. However, if not enough instances of dream memories are available (like in
the case of subjects not interested in dreams), people are more vulnerable to estimation
biases based on their report style, cognitive representations and personality traits. This
might account for the well documented results that retrospective assessments —
compared to logs — are more robustly related to attitude towards dreams (Beaulieu-
Prévost & Zadra, 2005; Beaulieu-Prévost & Zadra, 2007), and personality traits like

27
psychological boundaries, absorption, openness to experiences (Beaulieu-Prévost &
Zadra, 2007; Hill, Diemer, & Heaton, 1997), and imaginative involvement and fantasy
(Levin et al., 2003; Levin & Young, 2001-02). The same is true in the case of the
relation between nightmare frequency and trait anxiety: this relation is significantly
weaker when the index of nightmare frequency is based on log instead of scale
measures (Wood & Bootzin, 1990). The most robust difference between log- and scale-
based DRF occurs when the scale focuses on a long time period, as with the increase of
the time interval covered it becomes progressively more difficult for subjects to rely on
real examples to answer the questions properly (Robert & Zadra, 2008; Zadra &
Donderi, 2000).
Due to estimation biases and memory defaults as selective recall and
embellishment, retrospective scales not only underestimate, but give a massively
deformed index of dream recall capacity. Consequently, several authors claim that
retrospective one-item scales are inadequate measures of such a highly fluctuating
phenomenon like dreaming — especially in the case of subjects who are not interested
in and therefore rarely pay attention to their dreams ponder (Beaulieu-Prévost & Zadra,
2007; Blagrove & Akehurst, 2000; Levin et al., 2003; Zadra & Domhoff, 2017).
The other explanation states that, by forcing subjects to focus on their dreams
after awakening, dream logs enhance DRF (Aspy, 2016; Schredl & Montasser,
1996/1997). This approach offers an alternative account of the greater retrospective-
logbook disparity in the case of subjects who are not interested in dreams (Aspy, 2016;
Aspy et al., 2015; Cory et al., 1975; Schredl, 2002), since keeping a logbook greatly
enhances the motivation and attention of these subjects, while, due to a ceiling-effect,
not much enhancement is possible in the case of those who already had high interest in
dreams (Aspy et al., 2015). According to this approach, it is the intrusive nature of logs
that is responsible for this effect. Logs, therefore, are claimed to be inaccurate
reflections of DRF (Aspy et al., 2015).
Note that this second argument is based on the premise that the enhancement
effect of logbooks on DRF is an artefact — a distortion of the correct number that can
best be approximated by retrospective scales (Beaulieu-Prévost & Zadra, 2005;

28
Beaulieu-Prévost & Zadra, 2007). However, although the fact that completing a log
enhances the number of dream reports (compared to scales) is demonstrated by several
studies (Aspy, 2016; Zadra & Robert, 2012), it does not follow that maximising
attentional and motivational factors would degrade the validity of this method.
In fact, as the rest of the paper will argue, the opposite is true: the intensified
motivation and attention to dreams, enhanced by logs, improve the quality of the data
for studies interested in dream production or the encoding of dream experiences. In
what follows, it will be shown that the phenomena of logbook enhancement and
retrospective underestimation are both reflections of how the different variables
affecting the retrieval step of dream recall influence the outcomes of these two kinds of
measurements. Therefore, the main difference between the distinct measures of DRF is
how they control for the factors that determine the retrieval of dreams.

4.3 Prospective methods: laboratory reports and logs

4.3.1 Laboratory reports

The highest percentage of reports are produced after awakenings in the laboratory. This
is the only method that is specifically designed to be able to differentiate between REM
and NREM mentations, and the only tool that can ensure gaining access to early-night
dreams (Zadra & Domhoff, 2017). With its ability to match neurophysiological data
with the presence or absence of a dream report or a specific dream characteristic, it is
the only way to get detailed information about the state variables affecting dream
production and encoding.
Laboratory awakenings can keep most of the state variables affecting the retrieval
step under control, since the awakening process is standard, upon awakenings the
subjects are immediately asked about their dreams, and the commitment needed to
participate in such a research can maximise the subjects’ attentional and motivational
efforts to catch their dreams, even if they are generally not interested in following their
dream-life. DRF measured by laboratory reports, therefore, is the best indicator of
production and encoding processes as it provides information about dream recall
capacity in a situation when interference with dream retrieval is close to minimal.

29
 One of the downsides of this method is that it is the most expensive and time-
consuming one, especially because more nights in the laboratory are necessary to reduce
the effect of the unusual environment (Zadra & Domhoff, 2017). So, even if, by relying
on several awakenings (during several nights) in the laboratory, it is possible to estimate
the trait-like dream recall capacity of a subject (Goodenough et al., 1959), this method
is generally used to collect data from shorter time-intervals, and, therefore, to focus on
intra-individual rather than inter-individual differences.
The greatest worry about this method is related to its construct validity, since
frequent awakenings might interrupt the natural process of sleep, and thus they might
affect the natural mechanisms of dream production and encoding as well. Relatedly,
frequent awakenings might generate sleep inertia (Zadra & Domhoff, 2017) that has a
negative effect on dream recall (Schredl, 2018).

4.3.2 Dream logs

Although narrative dream logs (diaries) are the most popular tools for examining the
contents of dreams, they are rarely used in studies of dream recall. In order to complete
a narrative dream log, subjects need to collect and write down their dreams with as
many details as possible every morning right after awakening for one or more weeks.
When subjects cooperate, this method is able to ensure lower situational interference by
directing the subjects’ attention to their dreams right after awakening (however,
situational factors are not controlled in the same way as in the case of laboratory
studies). Moreover, participating in a log study keeps motivation relatively high (even
for those who are generally not interested in dreams). Via these effects, this method
provides reasonably adequate conditions for retrieval, therefore the individual
differences in log DRF can uncover differences in production and encoding quite well.
Since after one week the participants’ motivation starts to decrease, and becomes
drastically reduced by the end of the second week, logs covering a two-week period are
best at balancing between collecting enough data and keeping the data valid (Aspy,
2016; Zadra & Robert, 2012).
Checklist format logs try to solve the problem of diaries, as completing them
requires less effort. Participants are asked only to indicate if they had any, and if so,

30
then what kind of dreams (chosen from a given list) during the night before. Other kinds
of checklists also ask for a title or a short transcription of the dream as well. As previous
studies have demonstrated (Robert & Zadra, 2008; Zadra & Robert, 2012), the more
demanding a method is, the easier it is to loose the motivation for following instructions
properly. Therefore, especially in the case of relatively longer periods, checklist dream
logs appear to yield more accurate DRF values compared to narrative ones (Zadra &
Robert, 2012).
As we have seen, some accuse this method of being intrusive and leading to
distorted data (§4.2). However, no evidence has been collected so far in support of the
claim that dream logs would affect the quality or quantity of dream production or the
process of encoding. In fact, contrary to the intrusiveness claim, logs attenuate the
impact of those factors that would inhibit dream retrieval. Thus, by preventing
interference with retrieval, logs help acquiring more accurate information about dream
production and encoding.
Since DRF based on logs are quite stable over time (Schredl & Fulda, 2005b;
Watson, 2003) and correlate with habitual dream recall measured by scales (Schredl,
2002; Zadra & Robert, 2012), dream logs are good candidates to be valid tools for
measuring the trait-like dream recall capacity of a subject. Nonetheless, as it requires
much more effort from participants than a one-item scale, it is inevitable that more
subjects will leave the study prematurely. However, as shown above and below, its
benefits greatly outweigh its costs.

4.4 Retrospective methods: dream recall scales

Dream recall scales are the most common methods for capturing inter-individual
differences in DRF. Scales can differ in the time-interval they cover, but to decrease
retrospective underestimation (§4.2) relying on shorter periods — e.g. a week (Zadra &
Robert, 2012) or using answer-options with mixed time-intervals (Schredl et al., 2014)
— are preferred.
Scales are typically used to sort participants into groups of high and low dream
recallers. Relying on logs to capture DRF is more the exception than the rule in

31
contemporary literature (but see e.g. Zou et al., 2018). Relying on scales for this
purpose is the default method even in laboratory studies where the aim is to reveal
neurophysiological trait correlates of dream recall (Eichenlaub et al., 2014a; Eichenlaub
et al., 2014b; Pagel & Shocknesse, 2007; Vallat et al., 2017). This is the quickest and
cheapest way of acquiring information about general DRF, since only a single question
is needed to be answered. It even has good test-retest reliability (Schredl, 2004).
However, scales have major limitations that question their validity (Beaulieu-
Prévost & Zadra, 2007; Blagrove & Akehurst, 2000; Levin et al., 2003; Zadra &
Domhoff, 2017). As demonstrated by Beaulieu-Prévost and Zadra (2015) remembering
dream-experiences from the past is very fragile — false memories can easily be
generated. Sometimes it is even hard to determine the origin of a memory: confusion
regarding whether it was a dream or something that has really happened is a common
feeling.
Moreover, these kind of scales do not make an effort to impose any systematic
control on the variables affecting retrieval. Thus the time, the environment and the
process of waking up, morning habits, and the attitude towards and interest in dreams,
and therefore the motivation for retrieving them, which all show great variance between
individuals, can significantly modulate retrospectively measured DRF. Even demand
characteristics (Blagrove & Akehurst, 2000), personality traits (Beaulieu-Prévost &
Zadra, 2005; Beaulieu-Prévost & Zadra, 2007; Blagrove, 2007; Levin et al., 2003) and
the self-concept of the individual (Bernstein & Roberts, 1995) have serious impact on
how DRF is judged on scale measures. These effects, by interacting mostly with the
post-awakening step of dream reporting, can screen off the characteristics of the
production and encoding of dreams, therefore dream recall scales are inappropriate
choices for investigations that aim to get a better grip on these mechanisms.

5. Conclusion
The aim of this paper was to provide a crucial clarification for dream science to resolve
an existing confusion regarding what different measures of dream recall can carry
information about. The paper brought to centre stage the fact, rarely acknowledged in

32
the literature, that dream recall depends on three important steps: the generation, the
encoding and the retrieval of dreams. Emphasising this helps reorganise and reanalyse
the relevant literature, which is necessary for fully appreciating the role of those
theoretical assumptions that highly influence the answers to the question whether and to
what extent the variability in dream recall reflects differences in the generation, the
encoding or the retrieval of dreams. Most importantly, the paper draws attention to the
fact that the different methods of measuring dream recall interact with the three steps
differently.
Scale-based DRF is highly determined by factors affecting dream retrieval.
Therefore, investigations using retrospective methods provide information not about the
frequency of dreams per se, but rather about the factors that modulate the retrieval of
dreams (and also the answers given on retrospective scales in general): contextual and
motivational factors, the subjects’ personality traits, self-concept and their tendency to
pay attention to their dreams.
However, understanding the retrieval step of dream recall is not the issue that
dream researchers are most interested in. The factors determining retrieval are quite
clear. There is no doubt that memory fades over time (Roediger III, Weinstein, &
Agarwal, 2010). Similarly well known is that the allocation of attention during the
encoding or the retrieval of an experience can highly influence future remembering
(Dudukovic, DuBrow, & Wagner, 2009; Mulligan, 2004). Most importantly, since the
retrieval of a dream happens in the wakeful state, there is no reason to treat it distinctly
from any other form of retrieval examined by studies focusing on memory.
What is more in the focus of current dream research, is trying to shed new light on
the mechanisms of dream production and encoding. Since there is no direct tool
available to measure the exact number of conscious experiences occurring during sleep,
or the proportion of them that could successfully been encoded, we must rely on
indicators like DRF. To get the most precise estimation possible, it is important to
control for the variables that can negatively influence retrieval, and thus to keep the
efficiency of retrieval at or close to its maximum. By maximising retrieval, false

33
negative responses (there was a dream, but it couldn’t be retrieved) decrease drastically,
and thus cannot distort the data.
Therefore, to understand the state factors determining the intensity or quantity of
dream production or the mechanisms of dream encoding, the best method is to collect
dream reports right after awakenings in the laboratory. To reveal the trait variables
determining the production or encoding of dreams, it is more suitable to use two-week-
long checklist-type dream logs capturing a person’s dream recall capacity, since these
provide better control over variables affecting retrieval than scale measures.
To further differentiate between the mechanisms of generation and encoding is
less straightforward, as they are highly intertwined. In order to differentiate between
them, the distinction between contentful versus contentless dream reports (i.e. white
dreams) might be helpful. However, it is still debated whether white dreams only differ
from contentful dreams regarding memory processes and are identical to them regarding
dream production itself (Siclari et al., 2017), or whether there is a significant difference
between them already in dream production (Fazekas et al., 2019). The question whether
dream encoding is independent from or determined by the characteristics of dream
generation is highly relevant for this debate. Answering this, and the further question of
what features of dream generation might influence dream encoding are currently the
biggest challenges for future research.

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