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SGI 2020 | 2 Sweden Report

Executive Summary
Democratic governance remains robust and deeply institutionalized in
Sweden. Some of the societal underpinnings of governance are, however,
changing. For example, party membership continues to decline and electoral
allegiance to parties is increasingly volatile. These changes demonstrate that
Sweden’s system is capable of adaptation and reinvention.

The Swedish political and administrative system is fragmented by design.

Agencies are autonomous in relationship to the political center. Local and
regional governments likewise enjoy substantive, constitutionally guaranteed
autonomy. Reforms over the past several years have focused on strengthening
the political center’s oversight powers. The Government Offices (GO), as an
integrated public authority that includes government ministries and the Prime
Minister’s Office, have tightened their control over government agencies, and
regional and local authorities. Advocates of these reforms argue that such
powers are essential to sustaining responsive political leadership. Equally
important is accountability, as the agents of political power must be held
responsible for the policy measures they advance.

These reforms have increased the strategic capacity of the political system,
though at some cost to the inclusiveness of societal interests, discourse and
debate. By using information as a strategic asset, the government, especially
the GO, has become more inaccessible to the media and interest associations.
Increasing coordination among government departments, where fragmentation
had been a major hinderance, is enhancing the strategic capacity of the
government while also weakening points of contact with society.

In terms of economic policy, the government has skillfully navigated the

Swedish economy through a period of crisis and instability. Not being a
member of the euro zone has certainly helped, but the government deserves
praise for its management of the economy through financial and economic
crises, global as well as European. The past four years have witnessed
sustained economic growth, although there are now clear signs that a recession
is looming – as there are in most other European countries.

Perhaps the biggest challenge facing the Swedish government in late 2019
involves integrating the large number of asylum-seekers that have arrived in
SGI 2020 | 3 Sweden Report

Sweden, both socially and in terms of employment. This policy challenge has
upended traditional dynamics between parties as new alliances have formed
and conventional collaborative arrangements have been strained.

This development has exacerbated ambiguities in an already fragile

parliament. Until the change of government in September 2014, the center-
right “Alliance” government had pursued a goal-oriented policy of
transforming the welfare state. It had implemented market-based reforms
across a wide variety of sectors, so much so that it appeared that bringing the
market into public services was an end in itself. This previous government had
cut tax rates substantially and reduced many welfare programs. Some of the
implemented measures did not, at first glance, undermine the logic of the
Swedish welfare model. Considered separately, the family, labor market, tax
and social insurance reforms seem moderate. However, in aggregate, these
reforms represent a significant departure from the traditional Swedish model.
The tax policy reforms, in particular, marked a genuine break with the past and
were uncommonly ideologically driven.

The unique features of Sweden’s political, economic and social systems

appear to be fading. Stability, broad consensus and the absence of right-wing
populist parties have traditionally been defining features of Sweden’s political
environment just as corporatism, centralized wage bargaining, high taxes and a
generous welfare state have attracted considerable praise. Noted for its societal
homogeneity, and high levels of equality, employment and affluence, Sweden
is becoming increasingly heterogeneous, and faces sustained unemployment,
dualities in the labor market, growing inequality, and diminished quality of life
and health outcomes. In short, Sweden is losing its “unique” status as a role
model in the European context.

The Social Democratic and Green coalition government, which formed after
the 2014 general elections, placed less trust in the market than its predecessor.
Though this red-green coalition government had no clear majority in
parliament, it nonetheless performed reasonably well in terms of securing
majorities for its most significant bills. The strong economy offered the
government a tailwind in terms of growing tax revenues to help fund
government commitments.

The 2014 to 2018 distribution of parliamentary seats and resulting difficulties

in terms of providing stable majorities for the government foreshadowed the
even greater complexities that followed the 2018 elections. The red-green
coalition and center-right “Alliance” parties control roughly the same share of
seats. The right-wing populist Sweden Democrats party, with 62 parliamentary
seats, holds a pivotal position between these two blocs. Though neither of the
SGI 2020 | 4 Sweden Report

two major party blocs is willing to negotiate with them. In the 2014 to 2018
parliament, the main parties struggled to find arrangements to secure workable
parliamentary majorities without the support of the Sweden Democrats.
Cabinet formation in the wake of the 2018 election proved to be an
exceedingly complex process. Eventually, the Social Democratic-Green
coalition secured enough support to remain in office, albeit significantly
weakened. In January 2019, a major agreement was negotiated between the
red-green coalition, and the Liberals and Center Party who, in return for
supporting the coalition, secured government commitments to implement
many of their pet reform ideas. These ideas include far-reaching neoliberal
reforms in the areas of tax and labor market policies. The shift in government
policy direction, and the apparent divorce of policy influence and
accountability appears to have confounded party activists, voters and
commentators.

The current state of parliamentary politics in Sweden is complex, with two

parties (the Social Democrats and Greens) in government, two parties (the
Liberals and Center Party) supporting government and redirecting government
policy in a neoliberal direction, three parties (the Moderates, the Christian
Democrats and Swedish Democrats) opposing the government from the right
and one party (the Left Party) opposing the government from the left. The
combination of a political system under duress and the challenge of
maintaining a workable majority in parliament has weakened the strategic
capacity of government institutions. Long-term strategic agenda setting and
policy-planning, and providing the economy with political stability are crucial
roles of government, which at present are suffering.

Citation:
Jochem, S. (2020), Das politische System Schwedens (Wiesbaden: VS Verlag).

Lindvall, J. et al. (2017), Samverkan och strid i den parlamentariska demokratin, SNS Demokratirapport
2017 (Stockholm: SNS).

Pierre, J. (ed) (2015), The Oxford Handbook of Swedish Politics (Oxford: Oxford University Press).
SGI 2020 | 5 Sweden Report

Key Challenges
Sweden’s long-term strategic priorities include global competitiveness, a lean
but effective and productive public sector, and carefully managed international
influence. Many indicators suggest that Sweden is well on its way to achieving
these goals. The key sustainability challenges facing the government relate to
aiding those constituencies that are not part of the new, future-oriented
economy. Sweden’s government now faces the challenge of clearly defining
its social agenda. Choosing the specific strategy is, however, not feasible until
the government delineates its policy objectives; a process that, in late 2019,
appears uncertain due to the extraordinarily complex representation of political
parties in the parliament and shifting allegiances among those parties.

The current government faces several challenges, including accommodating,

integrating and ensuring employment for asylum-seekers. Visible and invisible
obstacles prevent immigrants from finding meaningful jobs and societal
acceptance in Sweden. Unlike many other countries, Sweden has devoted huge
financial resources to solving these problems. Yet its formula has not produced
obvious improvements, likely because the government has been unable to
overcome societal obstacles. The government has strengthened the internal
strategic capacity of the state, but now, in a second step, it needs to address the
issue of making governance more integrative and effective.

Over the past several years, Sweden has enjoyed strong economic
development. Sweden stands out internationally as an economically strong,
socially engaged and innovative country. Even during high-growth periods,
however, the government has recorded relatively high levels of
unemployment. Unemployment in general and youth unemployment in
particular remain problematic. The share of young Swedes (15 – 24 years old)
not in education, employment or training is slowly increasing, albeit from a
low level. The center-right governments (2006 – 2014) put their trust
overwhelmingly in the market and in incentives, while the red-green
governments (2014 onwards) have adopted a more “dirigiste” approach.
However, the red-green governments have been unable to implement far-
reaching reforms, because of the need to compromise with the center-right
“Alliance” parties in order to isolate the Sweden Democrats.

In the period under review, we have seen the red-green government align itself
with the Liberals and the Center Party. This move has ensured a working
majority in parliament for the government and has split the center-right
SGI 2020 | 6 Sweden Report

opposition, ensuring that the Swedish Democrats remain isolated on the far
right. The political costs for this strategy have been high and its success can
also be called into question as the Swedish Democrats are increasingly seen as
a legitimate partner by other center-right parties, especially the Conservatives
and Christian Democrats.

Core values of Swedish governance, such as equality and equal treatment, are
being tested by the challenge of integrating asylum-seekers from Syria and
other war-torn countries. In the past, equality was one of the major features of
the Swedish model. However, inequality has increased in Sweden because of
wage bargaining deregulation, the decline in collective wage determination
and increasing income from capital for high-income earners. Tax reforms
under the previous government (2006 – 2014) have accelerated the rise in
inequality. So far, this trend has not been halted or reversed by the red-green
governments (2014 onwards). Historically and comparatively, Sweden is a
very egalitarian society although the rise in inequality has been strikingly fast
and threatens to further undermine societal trust and integration. Addressing
rising inequality will therefore remain a political challenge for the current red-
green government.

The government has the rare opportunity to capitalize on high institutional

trust, a strong economy, a vibrant civil society and competent professional
staff at all levels of government. The key political decision facing the
government will be whether to employ these resources to pursue collective
goals or to promote partisan initiatives. It appears unlikely that Sweden’s
strong economic growth can be sustained with a “race to the bottom” strategy
that undermines integration, equality and trust. Economic prosperity will more
likely be achieved through the concerted action of an effective public sector
and a globally competitive business ecosystem.

Citation:
Jochem, S. (2020), Das Politische System Schwedens (Wiesbaden: Springer VS).

Lindvall, Johannes et al. (2017), Samverkan och strid i den parlamentariska demokratin, SNS
Demokratirapport 2017 (Stockholm: SNS).

Pierre, J. (ed) (2015), The Oxford Handbook of Swedish Politics (Oxford: Oxford University Press).
SGI 2020 | 7 Sweden Report

Party Polarization
For a long time now, Swedish politics has been polarized. With few
exceptions, cooperation across the left-right divide has been rare and short
lived. More recently, the so-called GAL-TAN divide (GAL: green, alternative,
libertarian and TAN: traditional, authoritarian, nationalist), which refers to the
political cleavages associated with values and lifestyles, has emerged as a new
feature of the party system. Traditionally opposed parties within the left-right
spectrum may adopt similar positions within the GAL-TAN scale. For
example, on issues such as migration, the Social Democrats and Conservatives
share a similar policy position, while left-wing, green and center parties tend
to share a different policy position.

Thus, the party system remains polarized, both along the traditional left-right
continuum and in terms of the emergent GAL-TAN divide. Herein lies a major
reason for why it proved so challenging to form a government following the
2018 elections. (Score: 6)

Citation:
Jochem, Sven (2020), Das politische System Schwedens (Wiesbaden: Springer VS).

Lindvall, Johannes et al. (2017), Samverkan och strid i den parlamentariska demokratin, SNS
Demokratirapport 2017 (Stockholm: SNS).

Pierre, J. (ed) (2015), The Oxford Handbook of Swedish Politics (Oxford: Oxford University Press).
SGI 2020 | 8 Sweden Report

Policy Performance

I. Economic Policies

Economy

Economic Policy Over the past several years, the Swedish economy has been exceptionally
Score: 9
strong. Growth in terms of GDP in 2017 and 2018 was 2.3%. For 2019, GDP
growth is expected to be somewhat weaker, mainly due to the impending
international recession. In 2020 and 2021, the GDP growth rate is expected to
be approximately 1.5%. As a highly trade-dependent economy, Sweden’s
economic development is sensitive to fluctuations in international markets.

Notwithstanding, most long-term economic indicators on Sweden assuage

concern; particularly with regard to international competitiveness. Thus, it is
fair to say that the institutional and regulatory framework of the Swedish
economy provides basic stability and predictability. However, there are some
challenges. The National Bank of Sweden, fearing deflationist tendencies in
the economy, lowered its “steering interest rate” to an unprecedented 0% in
late October 2014, then to -0.35% in September 2015. By November 2016, the
interest rate had fallen to -0.5%, which is also the interest rate level in October
2019. In addition, the inflation rate remains below the National Bank of
Sweden’s target.

Another concern is household debt, which remains high. There are also
growing fears (e.g., mentioned in an IMF report) of an emerging bubble in the
real-estate market. In an attempt to cool the market, the government
introduced mandatory mortgage repayment rules and there is discussion on
phasing out tax deductions for interest rate payments. Together with increasing
construction, these measures would help cool off the real-estate market in
metropolitan areas in the longer term. Nonetheless, the current housing
shortage in metropolitan areas that is driving real-estate prices up increases the
short-term risk of a bubble in the real-estate market. In November 2017, the
government announced plans to introduce a mortgage requirement, the exact
SGI 2020 | 9 Sweden Report

date is yet to be decided, to help cool the real-estate market and curb
household debt.

Economic growth and international competitiveness are closely linked to

unemployment and labor-market dynamics. The red-green government
committed itself in 2014 to halving the country’s unemployment rate (which,
at the time, was one of Europe’s lowest) by 2020, a target which will be
difficult to reach. Unemployment gradually decreased since 2015. In 2018,
unemployment fell to approximately 6%. In other European countries, the
decline of open unemployment is stronger.

There are now signs on both sides of the political aisle that policymakers
might relax their commitment to the regulatory framework that has to date
shaped public budgets and the economy. The previous center-right government
(2006 – 2014) downplayed the importance of a surplus goal, a stance which
the incoming Social Democratic and Green government after the 2014 election
has shared. The argument for doing so is that there are urgent programs that
require public funding. In 2016, the Social Democratic and Green government
negotiated with opposition parties to introduce a reform of the financial
framework. The revised framework retains the surplus goal, but at a lowered
0.33% over a business cycle. More importantly, the revised framework states
that public debt is to be brought down incrementally.

Moreover, some sectors of the economy, for example the housing market,
suffer from low efficiency and lack of transparency. In addition, tax reforms
implemented before the last period under review have further undermined
economic equality. Nonetheless, Sweden’s economy and its regulation thereof
are generally considered to be efficient and sound. Whether this is a product of
policy incentives, or a consequence of being outside the euro area is a matter
debated among economic experts.

Although the institutional and regulatory framework of economic policy

remains overall robust and efficient, the governance of that system has proven
exceedingly complex since the 2018 general elections. With 62 seats, the
Sweden Democrats (SD) party holds a pivotal position between the Social
Democratic-Green-Left bloc and the center-right “Alliance.” In January 2019,
the Social Democratic-Green government negotiated a 73-item agreement
(“the January Accord”) with the Center Party and the Liberals in order secure
parliamentary passage for major government bills. The agreement indicates a
shift toward neoliberal economic policy, including an overhaul of the tax
system and re-evaluation of public services across a large number of policy
areas.
SGI 2020 | 10 Sweden Report

Citation:
Finanspolitiska rådet (2019), Finanspolitiska rådets rapport 2019.
http://www.finanspolitiskaradet.se/download/18.3503cfdc16c417dd2ae56a76/1567153042967/Swedish%20
Fiscal%20Policy%202019.pdf

Agreement between the Social Democrats, the Greens, the Center Party and the Liberals in January 2019.
https://www.socialdemokraterna.se/globalassets/aktuellt/utkast-till-sakpolitisk-overenskommelse.pdf

Regeringen (2016), Överenskommelse om skuldankare, nytt överskottsmål och förstärkt uppföljning

(https://www.regeringen.se/49f5b0/globalassets/regeringen/dokument/finansdepartem
entet/pdf/2016/utredningars-prm/overenskommelse-om-skuldankare-nytt-overskottsma l-och-forstarkt-
uppfoljning.pdf)

Mehrtens, Philip (2014), Staatsschulden und Staatstätigkeit. Zur Transformation der politischen Ökonolmie
Schwedens (Frankfurt/New York: Campus).

Brenton, S. and J. Pierre, “Budget surplus goal experiments in Australia and Sweden,” New Political
Economy 22 (2017):557-72.

Labor Markets

Labor Market The heyday of full employment policies in Sweden is gone, seemingly forever.
Policy
Current labor market statistics indicate that Sweden (with an unemployment
Score: 7
rate of 7.1% in August 2019) does not differ in any significant way from
comparable capitalist economies. If anything, unemployment among youth and
immigrants is higher than in other comparable countries. This pattern raises
questions about the efficiency of Sweden’s labor market policies and the
overall regulatory framework. The huge influx of asylum-seekers into Sweden
in 2015 and 2016 has put a pressure on the labor market. Unemployment
among immigrants in August 2018 was more than twice as high (15.4%) as
among native Swedes. In 2017 and 2018, the strong economy kept
unemployment (primarily among native Swedes) at a very low level, thereby
moderating the impact of the growing number of job seekers. With a recession
expected to hit Sweden in 2020 and 2021, we should expect unemployment to
increase further.

One of the key problems is matching the recently arrived refugees to the often
knowledge-intensive jobs that are available in the job market. Also, language
skills remain a significant barrier for the recently arrived job seekers. There is
also a more general problem associated with matching. The Public
Employment Service (Arbetsförmedlingen) has for some time now been
criticized for underperforming in this respect. The agency has also undergone
a massive internal reorganization process and developed a new model for its
internal management, which will take time to implement. In the midst of this
process, a key part of the January Accord – a 2019 agreement between the
government, the Center Party and the Liberals – involves relaxing regulation
SGI 2020 | 11 Sweden Report

on private business to boost the efficiency of matching job seekers and

available jobs. The initial reform of the Public Employment Service was
effectively dismantled with the 2019 budget, which significantly reduced the
agency’s resources in lieu of a reform opening up the task of matching
unemployed with available jobs to private businesses.

While language skills and professional skills remain major problems in

matching job seekers with job vacancies, more and more asylum-seekers do
successfully enter the labor market. Overall, employment has increased
significantly since 2014 and reached an all-time high in 2018. In 2019, a large
number of immigrants are actively looking for employment, posing a
challenge to the labor market system in terms of matching job seekers with
available jobs. The proportion of adults not in education, employment or
training (NEET) in Sweden is about the OECD average. This indicates that,
despite high open unemployment, the Swedish labor market is successfully
integrating a large share of people into the labor market.

Ongoing EU integration and the mobility of labor has triggered a new set of
issues related to the domestic regulations in the market. Also, there has been
extensive debate about introducing an apprentice model to help younger age
cohorts to make the transition from education to the labor market.
Additionally, Swedish policymakers have been trying to create a short-time
work scheme for public employees, as it exists in Germany. These examples
may indicate that the old Swedish model of labor market policy is gradually
moving toward the German model.

Union strength has declined rapidly in recent years, but union power remains
strong by international standards. The strength of unions in part explains the
relatively modest reform in labor market rules related to dismissal, minimum
wage and apprentice arrangements, which would entail some workers earning
a lower salary. But this applies only to insiders on the labor market because
employment protection legislation for precarious work is underdeveloped. As
in other European countries, Sweden’s labor market is undergoing dualization,
albeit at a slower speed than, for example, in Germany.

Thus, whether related to culture or differences in training and work

experience, immigrants to Sweden continue to have severe problems entering
the labor market. Sweden shares this problem with many countries but has
proven to be particularly inept at addressing this aspect of integration. The
large number of unemployed immigrants tears at the fabric of integration
policies.

Citation:
OECD (2019), Youth not in Employment, Education or Training (NEET) (Paris: OECD).
SGI 2020 | 12 Sweden Report

OECD (2019), Employment Outlook (Paris: OECD)

OECD (2018), Interim Economic Outlook (Paris: OECD).

OECD (2018), Education at a Glance (Paris: OECD).

SCB (2018), Employment increased mainly among foreign born persons in 2017
(https://www.scb.se/en/finding-statistics/statistics-by-subject-area/labour-market/labour-force-
surveys/labour-force-surveys-lfs/pong/statistical-news/labour-force-surveys-lfs-annual-averages-2017/).

Taxes

Tax Policy In terms of horizontal equity, this aspect of tax policy has improved over the
Score: 8
last several years. The tax system has been reformed and simplified with fewer
deductible items, which in turn has broadened the overall tax base. Combined
with a less progressive tax rate and an overall reduction in taxes, horizontal
equity has improved. A broad tax reform is envisaged for the next few years.

Vertical equity has significantly decreased, however. Studies show that

differences between different socioeconomic strata has increased over the past
decade in most OECD countries, but more rapidly so in Sweden. Current tax
policy penalizes those who do not work, regardless of the reason for not being
part of the workforce. Thus, for instance, retirees have not been able to make
deductions that the employed are allowed to make (this arrangement, however,
is currently under review). This policy has served to incentivize people who
are outside the workforce to seek jobs.

Taxes are obviously central to budget balance or surplus. The economic boom
of the past few years have helped the government balance the budget and
reduce the national debt. In 2017, the budget surplus was some SEK 61 billion,
roughly equal to €10 billion. During 2018 and 2019, the government has made
strong progress in reducing the national debt, which is now quite low.

Taxes are also increasingly used to promote sustainability. This includes

taxing energy consumption and CO2 emissions. Exemptions are given to high
energy-consuming industries in order to safeguard their international
competitiveness.

Tax policy is less of a factor in national competitiveness today than it was 10

to 15 years ago when economists pointed to the high-income tax levels as a
major impediment to the competitiveness of Swedish businesses. The first two
budgets of the red-green government, however, signal a return – however
modest – to a philosophy of higher levels of taxation and public spending,
rather than incentives, as the engine of the domestic economy. Swedish tax
SGI 2020 | 13 Sweden Report

levels are still largely on par with those of its main competitors – in fact,
taxation of business is low from a comparative perspective.

Citation:
Finanspolitiska rådet (2019), Finanspolitiska rådets rapport 2019.
http://www.finanspolitiskaradet.se/download/18.3503cfdc16c417dd2ae56a76/1
567153042967/Swedish%20Fiscal%20Policy%202019.pdf

Mehrtens, Philip (2014), Staatsschulden und Staatstätigkeit. Zur Transformation der politischen Ökonomie
Schwedens (Frankfurt/New York: Campus)

OECD (2015), In It Together: Why Less Inequality Benefits All (Paris: OECD)

Budgets

Budgetary Policy Since the mid-1990s, fiscal, and budgetary discipline has been extraordinarily
Score: 9
strong in Sweden and its tight budgetary regime has begun to yield benefits. In
the wake of a financial crisis in the early 1990s, maintaining sound fiscal
policy has been an overarching policy goal for both center-right and Social
Democratic governments. Sweden is one of very few countries that targets a
budget surplus and neither government nor opposition harbor any plans to
abolish it. In 2016, a revised budget surplus goal of 0.33% was negotiated
between the two major blocs in parliament. The agreement also includes a
commitment to a long-term reduction of public debt. Thus, while the surplus
goal is somewhat relaxed, there is now a stronger commitment to addressing
public debt. Indeed, the past three budgets have generated surpluses. Overall,
these developments indicate a continuing broad commitment to maintaining
fiscal and budgetary discipline.

The budget surplus goal issue ultimately relates to the Keynesianism-

monetarism controversy. The government wants to use the budget actively to
drive the economy while the coalition of center-right parties in opposition
(Alliance) take a somewhat more monetaristic approach. Either way, the fiscal
and budgetary regulatory framework helps sustain a course of strong and
sustained economic development.

After the 2018 election, the coalition government between the Social
Democrats and the Green Party continued, although with the additional
parliamentary support of the Liberals and the Center Party. In return for their
support, the Liberals and Center Party presented an extensive list of demands
to the government. Even so, however, the 2019 budget proposal submitted to
parliament in late 2019 shows a surplus of SEK 130 billion (€12 billion).

There are only two clouds on this otherwise bright sky. One is the level of
private lending, which the National Bank of Sweden and other financial
SGI 2020 | 14 Sweden Report

observers find alarming given that interest rates may rise over the next few
years. The other source of concern is the low rate of inflation, despite very low
general interest rates.

Citation:
The Swedish Government (2019), The budget in numbers. https://www.regeringen.se/sveriges-
regering/finansdepartementet/statens-budget/statens-budget-i-siffror/

Brenton, S. and J. Pierre, “Budget surplus goal experiments in Australia and Sweden,” New Political
Economy 22 (2017):557-72.

Finanspolitiska rådet (2019), Finanspolitiska rådets rapport 2019.

http://www.finanspolitiskaradet.se/download/18.3503cfdc16c417dd2ae56a76/1
567153042967/Swedish%20Fiscal%20Policy%202019.pdf

Mehrtens, Philip (2014), Staatsschulden und Staatstätigkeit. Zur Transformation der politischen Ökonolmie
Schwedens (Frankfurt/New York: Campus).

Regeringen (2016), Överenskommelse om skuldankare, nytt överskottsmål och förstärkt uppföljning

https://www.regeringen.se/49f5b0/globalassets/regeringen/dokument/finansdepartementet/pdf/2016/utrednin
gars-prm/overenskommelse-om-skuldankare-nytt-overskottsmal-och-forstarkt-uppfoljning.pdf

Research, Innovation and Infrastructure

R&I Policy Sweden ranks among the top five advanced industrialized democracies on all
Score: 10
aspects of research and development (R&D): spending (public and private) per
capita; number of researchers; number of patent applications and intellectual
ownership licenses. This high level of investment in R&D has existed for
considerable time. As an economy with high labor costs, Sweden’s
competitive edge lies not in large-scale manufacturing but in knowledge-
intensive sectors. R&D spending thus directly sustains that competitive edge.

Governments – center-right as well as Social Democratic-Green – rarely miss

an opportunity to reinforce the argument that public spending on higher
education, research institutions and research and development in general is
integral to future prosperity and wealth. There is nothing suggesting that the
commitment among all major political players to R&D spending is about to
change.

While R&D spending has a long history, converting research and development
concepts into valuable products was for a long time far more challenging for
Sweden. The “Swedish paradox,” as it is called, was precisely the inability to
convert research findings into commercially viable products. However, as
recent data show, Sweden now ranks first with regard to patent applications
and license fees for intellectual property. This is a valid indicator that R&D is
bearing fruit, as securing intellectual ownership of emerging products is a
critical stage in the process from the research facility to the market. Public
SGI 2020 | 15 Sweden Report

policy has targeted this issue lately, for instance, by simplifying the regulatory
framework for private businesses, and the data suggest that R&D is now
increasingly paying off.

Meanwhile, the new era of digital entrepreneurship has seen Sweden emerge
as a global center of digital innovation. This applies to digital communication,
computer games and IT-based services. The World Economic Forum, which
views Sweden’s tax levels as burdensome, suggests that the social welfare
safety net has made Swedes less risk averse than entrepreneurs in many other
countries. Overall, it appears that much of this success can be attributed to
deregulation and other pro-business reforms introduced by the 2006 to 2014
center-right government.

Citation:
Edquist, C. and L. Hommen (eds) (2008), Small Country Innovation Systems (Cheltenham: Edward Elgar).

World Economic Forum (12 October 2017), “Why does Sweden produce so many startups?”

Global Financial System

Stabilizing The Swedish government has stood behind essentially all efforts to enforce
Global Financial
regulation aiming at preventing criminal financial behavior in international
System
Score: 9
financial management. Sweden also supports and implements rules laid out by
the European Union and other international institutions related to international
finance. It has rejected proposals, however, to introduce a Tobin-style tax on
international financial transactions.

On the domestic scene, some friction between the Ministry of Finance and
large commercial banks has been noticeable over the past couple of years. This
discord has related to the banks’ high profit levels and their insistence on
giving their staff huge bonuses while charging high financial management
fees. The government announced in August 2019 that it intends to levy a
special tax on the commercial banks of SEK 5 billion per annum, starting in
2022. The government argues that this tax will help fund an increase in
defense spending.

Another potential source of friction between the finance ministry and major
commercial banks relates to political signals, and subsequent reforms, to force
lenders to mortgage their loans rather than just pay interest. The Ministry, in
concert with the National Bank, is concerned about the level of household
debt, suggesting that there is a growing bubble in the metropolitan real-estate
markets. Reducing debt and/or phasing out the right to deduct interest
payments would help reduce the likelihood of such a bubble. Although the
SGI 2020 | 16 Sweden Report

banks do not have a commercial interest in debt reduction per se, they have
also recently expressed concerns regarding the high household debt levels.

Taken together, Sweden is a forerunner for the sustainable regulation of

international as well as domestic financial markets. This status is a
consequence of the financial crisis in Sweden in the early 1990s, which
initiated rapid policy learning in all major parties represented in the Swedish
parliament.

II. Social Policies

Education

Education Policy Education policy remains a subject of heated debate in Sweden. Critics point
Score: 7
to how Sweden has slipped in most international comparisons in terms of
student knowledge and analytical skills. Sweden now ranks 19th on PISA (up
from 32nd in the previous PISA report), which indicates that the decline
appears to have been arrested. Notwithstanding, this remains an alarmingly
poor ranking for a country relying on knowledge-intensive sectors for its
economic growth and competitiveness. Recent studies suggest that Swedish
students’ knowledge in key subjects are falling behind students in other
countries. Some studies attribute the decline to the decentralization of primary
education in the early 1990s; others argue that the teaching profession is not
held in high enough regard within society and thus fails to attract highly
qualified professionals; while yet others suggest that poor performance could
in part be attributed to the fact that many teachers lack the formal
qualifications needed to teach the subjects they are teaching. Promisingly, all
three potential sources of deterioration in primary education are now on the
policy agenda. Overall, it remains clear that Swedish schools continue to
deliver high-quality education.

Critics also point to the high level of youth unemployment, which suggests
that the education system fails to provide skills and knowledge demanded by
the contemporary labor market. However, the NEET data provided by the
OECD show that the share of Swedes (15-24 years old) who are neither
employed nor in education is slightly lower than in Germany. A final criticism
is that the skills required to enter into a teachers’ education program at
universities today are relatively low, hence there is very little competition to
enter those programs. As a result, new teachers may have only a limited
aptitude to teach successfully.
SGI 2020 | 17 Sweden Report

In its defense, the previous center-right government (2006 – 2014) argued that
it was extremely active in reforming education at all levels. The former center-
right governments as well as the red-green governments (2014 onwards) have
shown strong financial commitments to education. To improve the “fit”
between education and the labor market, the current government announced to
open alternative education programs that provide an avenue of learning other
than to prepare for university studies. There are also plans, as mentioned
earlier, to develop apprenticeship programs, which have proven successful in
other countries like Germany. Finally, the Social Democratic-Green
government intends to raise teachers’ salaries and increase the number of the
staff present in schools.

A key means of assessing Sweden’s education policy involves looking at the

extent to which the education system successfully provides a skilled labor
force. High youth unemployment could be seen as an indicator of failure in
this respect but could also be explained by the performance and the specific
demand of the economy. Some education policy experts support a two-tier
model where apprenticeships facilitate a smooth transition from work-related
secondary education programs into employment in industry, and where
students who seek to continue their education arrive at universities well-
prepared. This model has not been entirely successful elsewhere, but that may
be attributable to economic factors or labor market rigidities. Also, as
mentioned earlier, the PISA results substantiate the problems in Sweden’s
primary education to deliver good quality.

Concerning graduate output of secondary and tertiary education, Sweden’s

performance in this respect could be seen as good but not great. Sweden is not
as high in the rankings as its need for skilled and well-trained students to enter
the research sector would require.

A third and final way to assess Sweden’s education policy concerns equitable
access to education. Education policy has performed rather well in this respect.
Coming back to a previous point, if anything, the system is “too equitable” in
that requirements to enter some programs in university are so low that
basically anyone who applies is admitted, resulting in a “race to the bottom” in
tertiary education standards. Nevertheless, equitable access to adult education
has been realized to a very large extent. Sweden is rather successfully
targeting the ambitious goals of life-long-learning as a high percentage of
adults are regularly in contact with further education organizations.

In summary, the data show that resources are not the key problem and public
debate shows no shortage of ideas and inclination for reform. In 2017, a major
royal commission on education presented its findings and recommendations.
SGI 2020 | 18 Sweden Report

The key proposals put forth by the commission are gradually being rolled out.
Meanwhile, education remains high on the political agenda, although the
political parties differ significantly in their analysis of the problems that the
education system is facing and what should be done to address those problems.

Citation:
OECD (2018), Education at a Glance (Paris: OECD).

SOU 2017: 35: Samling för skolan. Nationell strategi för kunskap och likvärdighet
(https://www.regeringen.se/498092/contentassets/e94a1c61289142bfbcfdf54a44377507/samling-for-
skolan—nationell-strategi-for-kunskap-och-likvardighet-sou-201735.pdf).

Social Inclusion

Social Inclusion An analysis of Sweden’s social inclusion policy probably yields different
Policy
results depending on whether it is conducted diachronically or synchronically.
Score: 7
In the first approach, which observes Sweden over time, it is not difficult to
see that social inclusion in some areas, particularly gender equality, works
extremely well while other aspects of social inclusion are more problematic.
Young people find it very difficult to find a job; large groups of immigrants
are far from integrated into Swedish society (see Integration Policy); poverty
is low, but increasing; the Gini coefficient measuring the distribution of wealth
remains low but is rapidly increasing; and the “life satisfaction” index is fairly
high but somewhat decreasing. Thus, the empirical data point to significant
challenges in the areas of intergenerational justice and justice between native
Swedes and immigrants.

If we compare Sweden with other countries, we find that recent developments

challenge the country’s historical position as a leader in the public provision of
welfare through wealth redistribution and as a country with extremely low
levels of poverty. Together, the data and recent developments suggest that
Sweden is gradually losing its leading role in these respects and is today
largely at par with other European countries in terms of its poverty levels and
income distribution. If Sweden could previously boast an egalitarian and
inclusive society, there is less justification to do so today. Reflecting on the
2014 general elections, Bo Rothstein concludes that “the days of Swedish
exceptionalism are over.” Not only does Sweden now have a strong anti-
immigration party in its parliament, core data on Sweden’s welfare state are
moving toward levels found among comparable, average-performing
countries. This pattern continues to hold true in 2019, not least after the
general elections.
SGI 2020 | 19 Sweden Report

Citation:
Jochem, S. (2020), Das Politische System Schwedens (Wiesbaden: Springer VS).

Pierre, J. (ed) (2015), The Oxford Handbook of Swedish Politics (Oxford: Oxford University Press).

Rothstein, B. (2014), “The End of Swedish Exceptionalism,” Foreign Affairs, September 18.

Health

Health Policy The healthcare system continues to be a problem area for Sweden, as is the
Score: 7
case for most European countries. The media regularly reports on excessive
waiting times in emergency rooms and scandals in long-term care, in which
patients received sub-standard treatment. These weaknesses may be the
consequence of far-reaching privatization measures during the most recent
past. The Health and Social Care Inspectorate was created in 2013 to address
problems with administrative oversight of the healthcare sector.

The general account of Swedish healthcare is that once you receive it, it is
good. Funded primarily by the government, the Swedish healthcare system is
decentralized with regional governments (landsting) allocating 90% of their
budgets to healthcare services. Healthcare is divided into primary care, which
is delivered locally (albeit under the auspices of regional government), and
advanced care, which is provided by the hospitals.

The key challenge, as pointed out in previous assessments, is a governance

problem. Healthcare is driven by three contending sources: elected officials,
the medical profession and the market. These three sources governing the
healthcare system send different signals, make different priorities, and allocate
resources differently. This bureaucratic split at the top has the effect of
reducing quality, inclusiveness and cost efficiency. Governance problems are
rarely solved by pouring more financial resources into the organization, which
has thus far largely been the typical political response to problems in the
healthcare sector.

From the patient’s perspective, a key problem is accessibility. This applies to

accessing general practitioner, specialist or emergency services. Patients in
need of care are required to make an appointment with a primary healthcare
provider, not with a hospital, but even primary care often struggles to meet the
demand. Referrals to specialists may offer the patient an appointment with an
medical doctor in weeks or even months. An evaluation published in 2019
suggests that there has been some moderate improvement in terms of general
practitioner waiting times.
SGI 2020 | 20 Sweden Report

Partly as a result of these problems, a rapidly increasing number of people in

Sweden purchase private health insurance. Estimates in 2018 suggest that
more than 650,000 Swedes have a private health insurance policy, either
purchased privately or, more common, provided by their employer. The
rapidly increasing number of private health insurance policies clearly suggests
a lack of faith in the expediency and quality of public healthcare.

Specific assessments:

• The quality of advanced medical care is generally quite good. The care
provided by hospitals draws on close access to research centers and is of high
standard.

• Concerning inclusiveness, eligibility to healthcare is generously defined in

Sweden. Instead, the big problem is the waiting time from diagnosis to
treatment. The previous, center-right government (2006 – 2014) introduced a
“care guarantee,” (“vårdgaranti”), which entitles a patient to see a general
practitioner within 90 days. Evaluations suggest that the guarantee has
somewhat improved the situation but also that a large number of patients still
have to wait beyond the stipulated 90 days for treatment, or that patients are
offered a brief consultation with a medical doctor, which means that the 90-
day rule on service delivery is formally met.

• Properly assessing cost efficiency in the healthcare sector is extremely

difficult. The medical profession advocates that evidence-based assessment of
costs for treatment and medication are used to a greater extent than is presently
the case, that is, costs should be related to expected patient utility.

Citation:
Socialstyrelsen (2019), Uppföljning av hälso- och sjukvårdens tillgänglighet (Stockholm: Socialstyrelsen)
(https://www.socialstyrelsen.se/globalassets/sharepoint-dokument/artikelkatalog/ovrigt/2019-4-10.pdf).
Kollega, 20 February 2014: “Sjukvård som förmån ökar” (http://www.kollega.se/sjukvard-som-forman-
okar).
Dickinson, H. and J. Pierre (2016), “Between substance and governance: Health care governance and the
limits to reform,” Journal of Health Organization and Management 30:1-9.

Families

Family Policy Sweden has been politically and economically committed to strong family
Score: 10
policy for the past 50 years. Major features of Sweden’s policy have been the
separation of spouses’ income and individual taxation, the expansion of public
and private day care centers and a very generous parental leave program
provided to both women and men, which has created much better possibilities
to combine a professional career with parenthood.
SGI 2020 | 21 Sweden Report

The basic difference between the Social Democratic and Green parties, on the
one hand, and the center-right parties, on the other, is that the former
emphasize gender equality whereas the latter emphasize freedom of choice.
Both constellations of parties are, however, fully committed to the overarching
goals of family policy and see it as integral to promoting gender equality.

Citation:
Eydal, G. B./Rostgaard, T. (eds.) (2015): Fatherhood in the Nordic Welfare States. Comparing Care Policies
and Practice (Bristol: Policy Press).

Jochem, S. (2020), Das politische System Schwedens (Wiesbaden: Springer VS).

Pierre, J. (ed) (2015), Handbook of Swedish Politics (Oxford: Oxford University Press), esp. Section 1.

Pensions

Pension Policy Sweden’s pension system succeeds in preventing poverty among senior
Score: 8
citizens, but those living only on the very basic pension have problems making
ends meet. In fact, Sweden has twice as many pensioners living at or below the
poverty line as in Denmark and three times as many as in Norway, two
comparable Nordic countries. Pensioners living on a baseline pension with
limited savings and no private pension insurance are, however, eligible for
additional support from social welfare programs.

The stability of the pensions system was a problem for a long time but appears
to have improved over the last several years, due to major reforms of the
whole pension system in Sweden. One result of the pension reforms is a new
public-private mix, strengthening capital funded occupational and private
pension schemes. The distributional principles appear to be sound but the
volatility of the stock market during the most recent past has meant a major
source of uncertainty about how stable and sustainable the system will be in
the future.

Lastly, in regard to equity in the system, the results are mixed. Ideally, a
pension system ensures equity among pensioners, the active work force and
the adolescent generation. If equity refers to basically similar living
conditions, Sweden’s system fails in this respect. If equity however refers to a
provision of baseline material goods related to needs, the performance of the
system looks better. Some studies state that the new Swedish pension system
does not undermine intergenerational equity, as long as the entry into the labor
market for the adolescent generation is not blocked. Therefore, high and
persistent youth unemployment rates threaten this aspect of equity in the long
run.
SGI 2020 | 22 Sweden Report

There is a long-term plan to gradually raise the retirement age in order to

ensure the sustainability of the pensions system as the proportion of senior
citizens in Sweden increases. In 2019, the parliament confirmed an agreement
between the government and most of the opposition parties to increase the
retirement age to 67 years, with an option to remain in the workforce for
another year.

Citation:
OECD (2019), Pensions at a Glance (Paris: OECD).

Integration

Integration Policy By most international comparisons, Sweden has a generous immigration

Score: 7
policy. The country has received a large number of refugees from Iraq,
Afghanistan, and Syria and, in 1992, from the former Yugoslavia. Indeed,
there are individual local authorities (Södertälje) that have received more
immigrants from Iraq than has the entire United States. In the European
setting, Sweden stands out as one of the most immigration-friendly countries
(together with Germany).

As is the case across Europe, the war in Syria has triggered huge immigration
to Sweden. In 2015 and 2016, Sweden received some 163,000 and 29,000
asylum-seekers respectively; for 2017 the number was about 22,500 and by
October 2018 some 16,000 people had applied for asylum. The number of
asylum-seekers increased further in 2019. By end of September 2019, 89,000
asylum-seekers had been granted permanent residency.

For 2020, the prognosis is that 20,000 – 30,000 asylum-seekers will arrive in
Sweden, many of whom will arrive as part of the family reunification program.
Permanent residency was granted to about 120,000 refugees between 2015 and
2017. These provisions, however, are widely debated in public and
parliamentary discussions. Sweden offers permanent residency for
unaccompanied children and for Syrian families with children.

The increasing immigration represents a major challenge, unprecedented in

size and scope, to Swedish integration policy. These policies cover a wide
range of measures, from language training to supportive labor market and
housing policies. Most of the policies are implemented locally. Given the
extensive autonomy of Swedish local governments, the instruments vary
regionally. There are now political signals that local autonomy should no
longer prevent individual local authorities from being requested by central
government to receive asylum-seekers.
SGI 2020 | 23 Sweden Report

It is difficult to argue that integration policy in Sweden has been successful. In

terms of both educational attainment and employment, immigrants in Sweden
find it much more difficult to integrate than immigrants in comparable
countries. This is not to say that there is a lack of political or economic
commitment to integration policy. To the contrary, integration policy remains
a very important policy sector and related political activities are far-reaching.
Swedish integration policy ranks highly from a comparative perspective. The
activities of the ombudsman and the minister for immigration and equality
ensure that immigration issues have a high public salience.

Sweden’s lack of success in integrating immigrants, despite strong efforts, thus

indicates that the problem lies in the design and implementation of its
integration policies. It is possible that the same obstacles facing young people
as they try to make their way into the labor market also discriminates against
immigrants. The current surge in immigration in the wake of the Syrian crisis
has exacerbated these problems. Whether this is a short-term phenomenon or a
lasting situation remains to be seen.

There is some good news, however. Studies show that second generation
immigrants, particularly girls, perform well in secondary and tertiary
education. However, for immigrants with low education, entry into a labor
market with high standards seems more or less blocked.

Citation:
Migrant Integration Policy Index (http://www.mipex.eu/key-findings).
Multiculturalism Policy Index (http://www.queensu.ca/mcp/).

Safe Living

Internal Security The crime rate in Sweden is slightly higher than it is in comparable countries.
Policy
Assessing the effectiveness of the internal security police is a complex
Score: 6
undertaking. For a long time, Sweden has experienced substantial problems
with organized crime and conflicts among gangs. Despite increased efforts to
address this problem during the period of review, organized and/or gang-
related crime shows no sign of waning, rather the opposite. Many media
accounts of homicides and assaults relate these incidents to rivalry among
competing organizations. Much of the growing violence in Sweden is related
to gangs and organized crime.

These issues are atop of the political agenda in Sweden in 2019. While all
major parties agree that the present situation is not acceptable, they do not
always agree on which strategy to curb the violence will be the most effective.
In the 2018 election campaign, law and order-related issues played a major
SGI 2020 | 24 Sweden Report

role. It seems clear that many people living in cities now feel increasingly
unsafe. This means, for instance, that they will be less inclined to be outdoors
after dark and less assured of the police’s capacity to guarantee safety and
solve crimes. The response time, particularly outside metropolitan areas, is
today longer than what many people find acceptable.

In terms of solving and preventing crime, there has been extensive debate
about police effectiveness. Studies suggest that the police do not use their
resources effectively and that only 2% of their working time is spent on actual
crime prevention or resolution. These problems appear to have been
exacerbated during the last couple of years: Sweden is falling in international
rankings on the number of homicides, the percentage of crimes which have
been resolved and brought to trial is decreasing, and media reports argue that
gang-related violence in distressed suburbs and neighborhoods is rapidly
increasing.

In 2015, regional police districts and core national staff were merged into one
police authority. A recent evaluation by the Swedish Agency for Public
Management (Statskontoret 2018:18) found that the organizational reform has
not improved performance and that the organization remains fragmented.

The red-green coalition government and the center-right parties agree that
recruiting more police officers is an important component of the response to
this situation. There is also a growing understanding that some percentage of
rising crime levels in metropolitan areas reflect a failure of integration
programs.

An additional problem is related to the emphasis on performance measurement

and management which, critics argue, has led the police to focus on high
performance scores rather than crime prevention. Preemptive police work
which may observers argued is the best way to prevent crime does not show up
in performance measures. Also, given the performance targets some aspects of
police work such as checking automobile drivers’ sobriety is conducted with
almost more attention to getting the numbers in than actually bringing
criminals to court.

The percentage of “smaller” crimes, particularly petty crimes such as theft and
burglary that are solved is still lower than deemed acceptable by many
Swedish citizens.

Citation:
Holgersson, S. and J. Knutsson (2012), Vad gör egentligen polisen? (Institutionen för ekonomisk och
industriell utveckling. LIU-IEI-Research Report 12/0004. Linköping: Linköpings Universitet).
Statskontoret (2018), Ombildningen till en samlad polismyndighet. Slutrapport. (Report number 2018:18)
(Stockholm: Statskontoret).
SGI 2020 | 25 Sweden Report

Global Inequalities

Global Social Promoting global social justice is an overarching policy goal for Swedish
Policy
governments regardless of their ideological orientation. Sweden combines
Score: 10
bilateral strategies with an active involvement in multilateral efforts toward
those objectives. Additionally, public spending for development issues is
comparable high. There has been a gradual shift from conventional aid to
developing countries, mainly sub-Saharan countries, toward aid directed at
countries that are closer to Sweden. This involves, for instance, promoting
democratization and civil society in Eastern Europe. There are growing
concerns about the effectiveness and efficiency of some foreign aid programs
and the risk of aid being used for unintended purposes by actors in the
receiving country. That said, the commitment to international solidarity and
aid to developing countries remains very strong.

The red-green governments (2014 onwards) launched a campaign of “feminist

foreign policy” which has gained international attention: international
solidarity has a gender dimension which has long been ignored. This foreign
policy approach has been introduced in various international venues such as
the United Nations and European Union. The new government has also
become known for showing less tolerance than its predecessors with what it
describes as “medieval” punishment techniques employed in Middle East
countries, which has caused some diplomatic friction. More broadly, the return
of the Social Democrats to government reenergized Swedish foreign policy. It
has become more visible, but also more controversial. Whether the complex
outcomes of the 2018 elections will impact Sweden’s foreign policy direction
remains to be seen.
:
Aggestam, K. and A. Towns (2018), “The gender turn in diplomacy: A new research agenda,” International
Feminist Journal of Politics.
Pierre, J. (ed) (2015), The Oxford Handbook of Swedish Politics (Oxford: Oxford University Press), esp.
Section 7

III. Enviromental Policies

Environment

Environmental As is the case with global social injustice, Sweden tries to be a forerunner in
Policy
environmental policy as well. Sweden performs extremely well in areas such
Score: 9
as reduction of greenhouse gas emissions and the use of renewable energy
sources but is not a leader in recycling or water usage. Thus, while there is
SGI 2020 | 26 Sweden Report

strong political commitment among all the major political parties, the
execution of that commitment in some aspects is still lagging. Meanwhile,
Sweden continues to push environmental issues in international forums such as
the EU and is a strong supporter of the Paris Agreement. Environmental policy
made its way onto the political agenda in the 1970s and has remained a salient
set of issues. With its legacy as a high-energy consuming industrial economy,
Sweden certainly has a long way to go, but the data suggest its environmental
policy is working. It should be noted that environmental policy is an integrated
component of the larger project of restructuring the economy and making it
more sustainable; much of this work takes place at the urban level.

After the 2014 elections, the Social Democrats formed a coalition government
with the Greens; a government which remains in office despite a slight setback
in the 2018 election. While both are strongly committed to “green” issues, it
seems as if the Greens’ ascendance to power has further increased the attention
on environmental issues. Nonetheless, the two coalition partners disagree on
some issues. For instance, they do not seem to agree on the future of nuclear
power. As fate would have it, two nuclear power plants are scheduled to be
closed over the next few years by their owners due to low profitability
resulting from falling electricity prices.

The commitment to sustainable development and addressing climate change is

strong among all political parties. After the 2018 election, the government is
reliant on the parliamentary support of the Liberals and Center Party. There is
nothing to suggest that this new parliamentary situation has altered the
coalition’s commitment to green issues and sustainable development.

Global Environmental Protection

Global Sweden continues to present a very strong international record in terms of

Environmental
supporting international environmental protection regimes, including the Paris
Policy
Score: 10
climate change conference in 2015. Indeed, the country has a record of going
beyond the requirements of international accords, from the Kyoto Protocol to
the Paris Agreement, as a means of setting an example to other countries.
Climate change and global warming can only be addressed through
multilateral efforts and Sweden has played an important role toward such
arrangements. Sweden is also a very active player on the EU’s environmental
policy agenda.
:
Zannakis, M. (2010), Climate Policy as a Window of Opportunity: Sweden and Global Climate Change
(Gothenburg: Department of Political Science, university of Gothenburg).
SGI 2020 | 27 Sweden Report

Quality of Democracy

Electoral Processes

Candidacy During the period under review, the electoral process was free and fair. Parties
Procedures
or candidates were not treated differently on any grounds.
Score: 10

Candidates are selected and ranked within the party organizations with
essentially no public rules guiding the process. Political representation in
Sweden is overwhelmingly collective representation. Since 1998, there has
been the opportunity to indicate preferences not just for a particular party but
also for specific candidates, but voters tend to vote for parties rather than for
individual candidates. This culture of representation gives parties a central role
in candidate selection. Against that backdrop it is perhaps not very surprising
that indicating preferences for specific candidates has, with a few exceptions,
not had a major impact on outcomes.

Citation:
Bengtsson, Åsa et al. (2014), The Nordic Voter. Myths of Exceptionalism (Colchester: ECPR Press).

Karlsson, D. and M. Gilljam (2014), Svenska politiker. Om de folkvalda i riksdag, landsting och kommun
(Stockholm: Santérus).

Oscarsson, H. and S. Holmberg (2014), Svenska väljare (Stockholm: Wolters Kluwer).

Oscarsson, Henrik (2017) Det svenska partisystemet i förändring, in: Ulrika Andersson, Jonas Ohlsson,
Henrik Oscarsson, Maria Oskarson (eds.): Larmar och gör sig till, Göteborgs universitet: SOM-institutet,
411-427.

Media Access All candidates and all parties have equal opportunities of access to the national
Score: 10
media and other means of communication. The equality among political
candidates in terms of their access to media is to a large extent safeguarded by
the public service rules of the SVT (public television) and Sverige Radio (SR),
a public radio outlet.

The print media in Sweden is overwhelmingly center-right in its political

allegiance and is therefore more likely to cover center-right candidates than
candidates from the parties on the political left. However, journalists have a
significantly stronger preference for the Green and the Left parties than does
the electorate as a whole. There is also a genuine left-wing media, particularly
SGI 2020 | 28 Sweden Report

present on the internet. The right-wing Sweden Democrats

(Sverigedemokraterna, SD) was initially marginalized by mainstream media
and some newspapers still refuse to publish their advertisements. Given the
party’s sustained growth in elections and polls, however, they are now given
somewhat more media coverage.

In Sweden, as elsewhere in Europe, the usage of social media and other new
forms of information sharing are increasing. These media are becoming more
important for political campaigns. Though the information provided by social
and other electronic media is vast and varied, selectivity facilitates a more
narrow consumption of information than in traditional print media.

Citation:
Andersson, U., A. Carlander, E. Lindgren, M. Oskarson (eds.) (2018), Sprickor i fasaden (Gothenburg: The
SOM Institute).
Asp, K. (2012), “Journalistkårens partisympatier,” in K. Asp (ed.), Svenska Journalister 1989-2011
(Gothenburg: JMG), 101-107.

Voting and The Swedish electoral system meets the highest requirements in terms of
Registration
eligibility, transparency and the basic right to participate. There are no legal
Rights
Score: 10
obstacles to anyone who wants to run in an election. Political parties conduct
candidate selection without any interference from the state, and the media
closely monitor the parties during the selection process. Electoral turnout has
always been high and increased even further in the 2000s. In the 2018
elections, turnout was 87.2%.

Citation:
Valmyndigheten (http://www.val.se/).

Party Financing Political parties in Sweden receive public as well as private support. Despite
Score: 8
extensive debate, political parties still do not make their financial records
available to the public and there is no regulation requiring them to do so.

This lack of disclosure has become increasingly frustrating to the public, as the
parties receive extensive financial support from the state. The current support
(central, regional and local) amounts to a total of some SEK 440 million (equal
to €52 million) per annum. The only information that is made available about
party financing is scattered and provided on an ad hoc basis by the respective
parties.

In spring 2018, the government passed legislation that substantially increased

the transparency of party financing in Sweden. Relating to the 2018 election,
public demands again surfaced to further sharpen the rules to clearly document
the financial sources of electoral campaigns and further increase monetary
penalties for violations.
SGI 2020 | 29 Sweden Report

Citation:
https://www.riksdagen.se/sv/dokument-lagar/dokument/svensk-forfattningssamling/lag-201890-om-insyn-i-
finansiering-av-partier_sfs-2018-90

Popular Decision- Citizen initiatives for national referendums are rare but they do happen. Such
Making
initiatives have occurred on several occasions at the local level concerning a
Score: 7
wide variety of issues, for instance a referendum on poll taxes (for
automobiles, “trängselskatt”) in the city of Gothenburg in 2014.

Outcomes of referendums are never binding in Sweden. However, it is

customary that all parties commit themselves to obeying the outcome of the
referendum. In constitutional terms, no referendum can be legally binding.

Citation:
For an overview over national referendums cf.
https://www.scb.se/hitta-statistik/statistik-efter-amne/demokrati/allmanna-val/folkomrostningar-valresultat/
https://www.val.se/val-och-folkomrostningar/folkomrostningar.html

Access to Information

Media Freedom Media freedom in Sweden is valued and well-protected. The Swedish
Score: 10
constitution’s Freedom of the Press Act and the Fundamental Law on Freedom
of Expression guarantee freedom of the press.

The media in Sweden operate independently from government. This is not to

say that government is not present in the media sector, however. Government
institutions offer financial support to newspapers (typically smaller
newspapers) and also to magazines.

Furthermore, government is a leading owner of the public service companies

Sverige Radio (SR) and Sveriges Television (SVT). In November 2017, a
royal commission (SOU 2017:79) proposed that public service radio and
television should henceforth be financed not via license fees but through a tax.
This reform comes into effect in 2019.

The media market in Sweden has opened up considerably over the past couple
of decades. Today, the SR and SVT face significant competition from
privately owned and managed radio and television channels. It is noteworthy
that trust is especially high in public media (television and radio), whereas
trust in private media (especially television) is low in Swedish society. Private
media ownership is concentrated in a small number of major corporate actors
inside and outside Sweden.
SGI 2020 | 30 Sweden Report

A precondition for the media to scrutinize government and hold elected

officials to account is that the government provides access to public
documents. During the last couple of years there appears to be growing
frustration among the media against government departments for failing to
provide public documents to the media or individual citizens. Government
departments increasingly use information as a strategic means of
communication. Nevertheless, Swedish government and administration still
meet high requirements regarding transparency and publicity.

Citation:
Andersson, U. et al. (eds.) (2017), Larmar och gör sig till (Gothenburg: The SOM Institute).

Andersson, U., A. Carlander, E. Lindgren, M. Oskarson (eds.) (2018), Sprickor i fasaden (Gothenburg: The
SOM Institute).

Olsson, J., H. E. Oscarsson and M. Solevid (eds.) (2016), Eqvilibrium (Gothenburg: The SOM Institute).

SOU 2017:79 Finansiering av public service – för ökad stabilitet, legitimitet och stärkt oberoende
(https://www.regeringen.se/4a9767/contentassets/c557ad42ef7245daa0b9f60a8fe54769/finansiering-av-
public-service–for-okad-stabilitet-legitimitet-och-starkt-oberoende-sou-201779).

Media Pluralism The Swedish media market is highly competitive. There is a very clear
Score: 9
distinction between public service and commercial media with the former
mitigating the downsides of the latter. The only problem with the growing
private media market is that it has a highly centralized ownership structure
with significant foreign ownership.

New social media (Facebook, blogs, Twitter, Instagram, etc.) are developing at
an amazing speed in Sweden, as elsewhere, and are playing an increasingly
important role in politics. Electronic media are most popular with a younger
and well-educated demographic. Internet penetration in Sweden is among the
highest in the world.

Citation:
Andersson, U. et al. (eds.) (2017), Larmar och gör sig till (Gothenburg: The SOM Institute)
(https://som.gu.se/publicerat/bocker/70.-larmar-och-gor-sig-till).

Andersson, U., A. Carlander, E. Lindgren, M. Oskarson (eds.) (2018), Sprickor i fasaden (Gothenburg: The
SOM Institute).

Johansson, B. et al. (2014), Det politiska spelet. Medborgare, medier och politiker i den representativa
demokratin (Lund: Studentlitteratur).

Olsson, J., H. Ekengren Oscarsson and M. Solevid (eds.) (2016), Eqvilibrium (Gothenburg: The SOM
Institute).

Access to Sweden is a forerunner and remains a leading country on all issues related to
Government
transparency in government and public access to government information and
Information
Score: 9
documents. Both the political elite and public cherish the fundamental
SGI 2020 | 31 Sweden Report

principle that all government documents are public, unless they are classified
or relate to individual integrity. If anything, the emergence of e-government
has further promoted the objective of accessibility and transparency. Sweden
is also pursuing greater transparency within the European Commission.

There has been a growing problem lately in the willingness of government

departments to provide documents to the public and the media as swiftly as the
constitution states. Media representatives in particular have criticized the
government on this matter. There is also some frustration among executive
agencies to have access to documents of the government departments.
Nevertheless, Swedish government and administration still meet high
requirements regarding transparency and publicity.

Citation:
Andersson, U., A. Carlander, E. Lindgren, M. Oskarson (eds.) (2018), Sprickor i fasaden (Gothenburg: The
SOM Institute).
Olsson, J., H. E. Oscarsson and M. Solevid (eds.) (2016), Eqvilibrium (Gothenburg: The SOM Institute).

Civil Rights and Political Liberties

Civil Rights Civil rights and legality are core values in Swedish governance. The
Score: 9
constitution has a chapter devoted to human rights. Legal security is an
essential guideline for the public administration. In all these respects, Sweden
earns a top score for this indicator.

However, the emphasis on efficiency in administrative reform is undermining

legal security. This applies, for instance, to the immigration service and the
performance management system used by the police, which incentivizes staff
to prioritize efficiency and closure over full legal consideration. Moreover, the
immigration administrative system has come under considerable stress from
the rapid increase in asylum-seekers caused by the Syrian war. The Migration
Agency has done its utmost to step up to this challenge by increasing staff and
introducing work shifts to deal with the soaring number of immigrants.

Also, there were instances in the recent past which raise issues about the extent
to which state institutions or actors uphold the basic civil rights codified in the
constitution. There is a current debate about whether it is humane to return
young Afghan men or boys who have been denied asylum to their country of
origin. While such extradition is consistent with the law – migrants that have
been denied asylum are to be extradited – these cases still raise questions
about what constitutes humane treatment. The number of cases where
extradition has raised objections in the media increased significantly in 2015
and 2016 along with the increase in asylum applications.
SGI 2020 | 32 Sweden Report

Lastly, it is worth noting that organized crime has taken a hold in some
metropolitan regions of Sweden. Without a doubt, infringement of individual
freedom caused by private actors such as organized crime is a real and
growing problem. The national police have prioritized tackling organized
crime and, in 2019, the government, under heavy criticism from the center-
right opposition, rolled out a program addressing the issue of organized crime.
Political Liberties Political liberties and human rights are written into the constitution. Sweden is
Score: 10
a highly institutionalized advanced democracy. As such, it upholds all political
liberties.
Non- Sweden still ranks as one of the most egalitarian societies in the world.
discrimination
Discrimination based on any feature, be it gender, race, sexual preferences or
Score: 9
ethnicity, is not tolerated.

That said, it is clear that there are still differences between salaries for men
and women performing the same work as well as between immigrants and
Swedes in the labor market. These are spheres of society where public
regulation is only effective when complaints are filed with public authorities.
There are two ombudsmen dealing exclusively with discrimination issues; one
for gender issues and one for other forms of discrimination.

In terms of ethnicity, Sweden is an increasingly heterogeneous and diverse

society. Integration policies are highly contested in the public debate. A
Discrimination Ombudsman and a minister of integration and gender equality
devote their political activities to anti-discrimination.

However, during the review period, ethnic segmentation in several suburbs of

metropolitan areas in Sweden has further increased. This societal fracturing
remains an unsolved political challenge in contemporary Sweden. With the
increased immigration since 2015, there is an imminent risk that these
challenges will be exacerbated.

Rule of Law

Legal Certainty The Swedish legal framework is deeply engrained and the rule of law is an
Score: 10
overarching norm in Sweden. With a Weberian-style public administration,
values of legal security, due process, transparency and impartiality remain key
norms. The only disturbing observation in this context is the growing emphasis
on efficiency in public administration that has arisen in the context of a recent
public management reform. This focus on efficiency potentially jeopardizes
the integrity of legal certainty and security, in particular with respect to
migration processes. Recent media reports have shown that pressures on
migration staff to process a given number of asylum applications within a
specific timeframe undermines the legal certainty and fairness of case work.
SGI 2020 | 33 Sweden Report

There are now signs emerging that market-based administrative reforms may
have peaked in Sweden; there is now a search for a “post-NPM” or “neo-
Weberian” model of administration. Again, the tension between efficiency
goals in public administration and legal security is well-known but still looms
large in the context of administrative reform. Most recently, the red-green
government announced plans to downplay New Public Management as a
philosophy of public sector reform and to reemphasize trust (“tillit”) as a
normative foundation of the public administration. A series of “experiments,”
replacing performance management with various types of trust-based
management were carried out in 2017 and 2018, primarily at the local and
regional levels.

The clients of the administration and the courts also expect and appreciate
these values. The legal system is characterized by a high degree of
transparency. The ombudsmen institution (a Swedish invention) remains an
important channel for administrative complaints. The Ombudsman of Justice
keeps a close watch on the application of the rule of law in Sweden.

Different arrangements to protect and strengthen the position of

whistleblowers came into force in 2017 and are now being implemented.
:
Petersson, O. (2014), Den offentliga makten (Lund: Studentlitteratur).

Judicial Review The Swedish system of judicial review works well and efficiently. Courts are
Score: 10
allowed to question legislation that they find to be inconsistent with the
constitution. In addition, Sweden has a system of judicial preview where the
Council on Legislation (“lagrådet”) is consulted on all legislation that
potentially relates to constitutional matters. The institution’s review (or
preview) goes beyond that assignment and includes an overall assessment of
the quality of the proposed legislation. The government and the parliament
have the right to ignore the council’s advice, however.

At the same time, critics have increasingly questioned this model of judicial
review over the past few years. They argue it is part of a more general trend
toward the judicialization of politics, where courts and lawyers acquire an
inappropriate level of influence over political decisions. However, these
criticisms are not particular to Sweden; they are observable in most European
countries.
Appointment of The cabinet appoints Supreme Court (“regeringsrätten”) justices. The
Justices
appointments are strictly meritocratic and are not guided by political
Score: 9
allegiances. Although the cabinet almost always makes unanimous decisions,
there are no special majority requirements in place for these decisions.
SGI 2020 | 34 Sweden Report

There is only modest media coverage of the appointments, mainly because the
Swedish Supreme Court is not a politically active body like the Supreme Court
in countries such as Germany and the United States.
Corruption Sweden has one of the lowest levels of corruption in the world. As a result,
Prevention
public trust in democratic institutions and public administration is
Score: 9
comparatively high. There are, however, significant differences among
government agencies in the level of trust they enjoy from citizens, with the
National Tax Agency being the most trusted agency and the National Social
Insurance Agency and the Labor Market Agency the least trusted.

Corruption at the state level remains extremely rare in Sweden. Regulatory

systems safeguarding transparency and accountability, coupled with an overall
administrative culture that strongly forbids corrupt behavior, prevent
corruption. At the local government level, however, there have been an
increasing number of reports of corruption and court decisions on related
charges.

Citation:
Andersson, U. et al. (eds.) (2017), Larmar och gör sig till (Gothenburg: The SOM Institute)
(https://som.gu.se/publicerat/bocker/70.-larmar-och-gor-sig-till).

Bergh, Andreas, Gissur Ó. Erlingsson, Richard Öhrvall, Mats Sjölin (2016), A Clean House? Studies of
Corruption in Sweden (Lund: Nordic Academic Press).

Olsson, J., H. Ekengren Oscarsson and M. Solevid (eds.) (2016), Eqvilibrium (Gothenburg: The SOM
Institute).
SGI 2020 | 35 Sweden Report

Governance

I. Executive Capacity

Strategic Capacity

Strategic The strategic capacity of government has been enhanced over the past few
Planning
years. Much of that capacity is found in the finance ministry where most of the
Score: 8
long-term planning takes place. The main role of the Prime Minister’s Office
is not so much long-term planning but more coordination within government.

A case in the point is the so-called future commission which presented its final
report in early 2013. In the final report, the commission assesses the economic
and social changes that are likely to shape Swedish society in the longer term.
The commission was not an institutionalized feature of the normal policy
process but rather a group of experts the government appointed to examine
long-term issues. The creation of the commission does signal that the
government is thinking in the longer term, and other commissions have since
been appointed to take a similar long view on various issues on the policy
agenda.

In addition to these planning efforts in the government departments, the

agencies are also engaged in planning. They are not operating in close
proximity to the departments, however. The exception to this pattern is when a
department asks one of its agencies to look into a particular issue and to
prepare advice on policy-initiatives.

The center-right government (2006 – 2014) invested considerable energy to

increase coordination among government departments and improve steering of
the executive agencies. The Social Democratic-Green governments (2014
onwards) have not made any sustained efforts in this respect.

Historically, policy-planning has been achieved to a large extent by the use of

royal commissions. Most of these commissions were composed of elected
SGI 2020 | 36 Sweden Report

officials and stakeholders. During the past decade or so, the quality of these
commissions – particularly with regard to the quality of the studies they
deliver and their capacity to generate consensus among major political actors
and stakeholders as to policy goals and means – has deteriorated, as shown in
a recent study published by the SNS. Many commissions today have very few
members and are often dominated by civil servants. This has had a negative
impact on those commissions’ final reports and the quality of the advice they
produce as well as the political role of commissions as a forum in the policy
process where compromises among the political parties can be negotiated.

Citation:
Zetterberg, K. (2011), ”Det statliga kommittéväsendet: En del av den svenska modellen,” Svensk
Juristtidning 8:753-763.
Svenska framtidsutmaningar. Slutrapport från regeringens framtidskommission (2013) (Stockholm:
Statsrådsberedningen) (http://www.regeringen.se/content/1/c6/21/33/06/9cde7be8.pdf)
Garsten, C., B. Rothstein and S. Svallfors (2015), Makt utan mandat: de policyprofessionella i svensk politik
(Stockholm: Dialogos).
Dahlström, C., E. Lundberg and K. Pronin (2019), Det statliga kommittéväsendets förändring 1990-2016.
SNS Analys Rapport nr 59. (Stockholm: SNS).

Expert Advice The government’s search for scholarly advice is today less institutionalized
Score: 8
than it was 25 or 30 years ago when royal commissions would almost always
include experts and scholars. With the decline in the royal commission
institution (most commissions today are one-man task forces given 18 or 24
months to look into an issue and produce a final report), the government now
seeks scholarly advice on a more ad hoc basis.

There are some positive signs, however. The 2006 to 2014 governments
increased the number of boards or advisory groups where scholars (often, but
not always, bona fide sympathizers of the ruling parties) could offer input and
advice. There is a similar pattern among agencies that set up scientific councils
to provide advice. There also appears to be a trend among agencies to organize
hearings and public debates to bring in a variety of views on current issues.
This can be seen not least in the context of administrative reform where
commissions and agencies like the Swedish Public Management Agency
frequently organize these kinds of meetings.

Overall, the government department staff solicits advice or other contacts with
external actors less frequently than in the past. Communication is today
managed in detail and there are disincentives to open up to external actors at
sensitive stages of the policy process. The extent to which the government
remains open to scholarly advice depends much on how politically salient the
issue is. When policymakers seek scholarly advice, it is in most cases ad hoc
and selective.
SGI 2020 | 37 Sweden Report

A recent study by Garsten, Rothstein, and Svallfors argues that “policy

professionals” – networks of non-elected but highly influential policy experts
– have significant influence on policymaking and policy design.
:
Garsten, C., B. Rothstein and S. Svallfors (2015), Makt utan mandat: de policyprofessionella i svensk politik
(Stockholm: Dialogos).
Dahlström, C., E. Lundberg and K. Pronin (2019), Det statliga kommittéväsendets förändring 1990-2016.
SNS Analys Rapport nr 59. (Stockholm: SNS).

Interministerial Coordination

GO Expertise Interministerial coordination has been a significant problem in the Swedish

Score: 8
system of government for a long time but has now been addressed in a
comprehensive strategy. The previous government (2006 – 2014) implemented
a major program (“RK Styr”) in order to strengthen the coordination among
departments. This goal was believed to be a necessary step to increase the
capability of the GO to steer the agencies more effectively.

In formal and legal terms, the government and its departments act as a
collectivity. All decisions in government are made collectively and there is no
individual ministerial accountability. The Prime Minister’s Office (PMO)
plays a significant role in the coordination process. This is also the case for the
finance ministry. Furthermore, when the incumbent government is a coalition
government, as has been the case since 2006, policies must be coordinated not
just among the relevant departments but also among the governing parties.

The practice of governing and coordination is much more complex. Each

department has a fair amount of autonomy in their respective sector.
Coordination among departments takes places at different organizational levels
depending on whether the issue is a technical and administrative issue, or
whether it is a more political matter. With the latter, political actors make the
final decisions. When bills involving more than one department are drafted,
coordination is achieved through meetings where drafts of the bill are
discussed. There are instances where drafts have gone through a very large
number of revisions as part of the coordination process. In pro-growth policies
in the mid-2000s, for instance, the bill that eventually was submitted to the
parliament (Riksdag) was the 56th version of the bill.

The lack of coordination has to some extent been resolved by increasing the
centralization within the Government Office. The finance ministry has become
a “primus inter-pares” among the departments; a pattern that emerged in the
wake of the financial crises in the early 1990s but that has remained ever
since.
SGI 2020 | 38 Sweden Report

The PMO rarely coordinates policy content, which generally takes place
during the process of deliberation or drafting of bills.

Citation:
Dahlström, C., B. G. Peters and J. Pierre (eds) (2011), Steering from the Center (Toronto: University of
Toronto Press).

Jacobsson, B., J. Pierre and G. Sundström (2015), Governing the Embedded State (Oxford: Oxford
Universirty Press).

Niemann, C. (2013), Villkorat förtroende. Normer och rollförväntningar i relationen mellan politiker och
tjänstemän i Regeringskansliet (Stockholm: Department of Political Science, University of Stockholm).

Pierre, J. and G. Sundström (eds) (2009), Den nya samhällsstyrningen (Malmö: Liber).

Premfors, R. and G. Sundström (2007), Regeringskansliet (Malmö: Liber).

Line Ministries The leadership of the GO and the PMO are primarily involved when policies
Score: 7
are initiated, when final decisions are to be made, and if a disagreement
emerges among the governing parties or ministers. However, the line nature of
the GO – and the chain of command between the political and administrative
levels – means that the top leadership, apart from initiating and deciding on
policy, does not routinely monitor its development. There are instead regular
briefings and informal consultations. This informal coordination procedure
nevertheless ensures that the PMO, in line with the finance ministry, play a
crucial role in policy developments. Also, there are established but informal
rules regulating procedures when there is disagreement among the non-
political advisers on how to design policy. Essentially, the political level of the
department should only be consulted when its ruling is critical to policy
formulation; otherwise policy design should rest with non-partisan members of
staff.

When the government is made up of more than one party, as has been the case
for most of Sweden’s recent history, there are mechanisms in place when
disagreement arises. Either the political leadership proactively intervenes in
the policy-planning process to resolve disagreements or such disagreements
are “lifted” to the political level for a ruling.

It should also be noted that line ministries frequently ask for advice from the
executive agencies during the early stages of the policy process.

Citation:
Jacobsson, B., J. Pierre and G. Sundström (2015), Governing the Embedded State (Oxford: Oxford
University Press).

Niemann, C. (2013), Villkorat förtroende. Normer och rollförväntningar i relationen mellan politiker och
tjänstemän i Regeringskansliet (Stockholm: Department of Political Science, University of Stockholm).
SGI 2020 | 39 Sweden Report

Page, E. C. (2012), Policy Without Politicians: Bureaucratic Influence in Comparative Perspective (Oxford:
Oxford University Press).

Premfors, R. and G. Sundström (2007), Regeringskansliet (Malmö: Liber).

Cabinet There are no standing cabinet committees in the Swedish system of

Committees
government. Cabinet proposals are coordinated through iterations of sending
Score: 1
drafts of bills to the concerned departments. This usually takes place at the
middle level of the departments and thus does not involve the political level of
the departments.

The cabinet is both a policy-shaping institution as well as the final institution

of appeal on a wide range of issues. There is also a requirement that the
cabinet must be the formal decision-maker on many issues. This means that
the cabinet annually makes more than 100,000 decisions (mostly in bulk).

Ministerial Most of the daily coordination on policy matters does not involve the political
Bureaucracy
level of the departments but is instead handled at the administrative level.
Score: 7
However, as soon as coordination takes place on a political dimension, it is
“lifted” to the political level.

Coordination within the GO remains a significant problem, although some

measures have been implemented to address that problem. Many departments
still find it difficult to coordinate policy across departmental boundaries.
Departments that were formed through mergers of departments tend to display
“subcultures” of the former departments.

Citation:
Jacobsson, B., J. Pierre and G. Sundström (2015), Governing the Embedded State (Oxford: Oxford
University Press).

Niemann, C. (2013), Villkorat förtroende. Normer och rollförväntningar i relationen mellan politiker och
tjänstemän i Regeringskansliet (Stockholm: department of Political Science, University of Stockholm).

Informal Informal mechanisms of coordination among civil servants and higher-ranking

Coordination
politicians alike are common and important in the Swedish system, although
Score: 8
they may not always be effective. And yet, informal contacts between
departments and agencies are believed to be integral to the efficiency of the
politico-administrative system. Informal coordination procedures effectively
filter many, but not all, policy proposals.

Citation:
de Fine Licht, J. and J. Pierre (2017), Myndighetschefernas syn på regeringens styrning (Stockholm:
Statskontoret).
SGI 2020 | 40 Sweden Report

Digitalization for The digitalization of the Swedish public sector has come a rather long way.
Interministerial
One exceptional example is the budget process (one of the key mechanisms to
Coordination
Score: 6
support coordination among government departments), where documents are
digitally shared and simultaneously developed among various departments.
The government also uses digital services to coordinate interdepartmental
responses to communications from the EU. Overall, however, digitalization is
mainly used to support intraorganizational processes such as drafting
documents and only to a lesser extent to support interdepartmental
coordination.

The Swedish government now communicates all new legislation and

regulations (SFS) digitally, with digital versions given legal precedence over
printed versions as they are the most current versions of legislation.

Digitalization has been implemented more extensively at the agency level. For
instance, there is now a joint service center (SSC) that manages back-office
functions for a growing number of agencies. Also, statistical material and
maps are shared digitally among agencies.

Evidence-based Instruments

RIA Application The purpose of regulatory impact analysis (RIA) is to assess the degree to
Score: 7
which regulation has negative and/or unintended consequences for the targets
of regulation. More broadly, RIA is nowadays used to avoid increasing
regulatory burdens on private businesses. RIAs are also used to examine which
regulatory framework could be simplified or abolished.

Ex ante assessments of regulatory impact have been mandatory since 2007. In

terms of the OECD’s iREG scores, Sweden scores just below the OECD
average for primary laws and just above average for subordinate regulations.

Sweden, according to an evaluation, has had “rather modest” results from

RIAs. Simplifying rules pertaining to private businesses has been an important
part of economic development policy over the past several years, but RIAs as a
specific model of analysis do not seem to be used systematically and over a
broad range of issues.

Citation:
Erlandsson, M. (2010), Regelförenkling genom konsekvensutredningar (Stockholm: Sieps).

http://www.regelradet.se/in-english/about/

OECD (2019), Indicators of regulatory policy and governance. Europe 2019. Sweden (Paris: OECD).
SGI 2020 | 41 Sweden Report

Quality of RIA As mentioned, RIAs play some role in Sweden but the system is less elaborate
Process
compared to many other countries. The Swedish model of RIA seems to
Score: 7
perform reasonably well with regard to participation and communication but
less so in terms of independent evaluations. Sweden scores somewhat below
the OECD average in terms of stakeholder engagement in developing
regulation.

Overall, simplifying regulatory frameworks appears to be conducted fairly ad

hoc. For instance, the Simplex project in the Department of Industry and
Economic Development aimed at removing regulations that were either
obsolete or unnecessarily obstructing private businesses. The project appears
to have practiced RIA without applying the entire RIA framework.

The increasing number of inspections agencies created specifically to review

and evaluate the performance of other agencies in areas such as healthcare and
social insurance is likely to strengthen quality evaluation and transparency.

Citation:
OECD (2019), Indicators of regulatory policy and governance. Europe 2019. Sweden (Paris: OECD).

Sustainability Environmental sustainability is one of several mainstreamed goals in the

Check
policy process. In theory at least, all government bills, procurements and
Score: 7
directives to royal commissions are supposed to be assessed to determine their
impact on environmental sustainability. As for other types of sustainability
criteria, there is little evidence available about the degree to which they are
considered in the RIA process.
Quality of Ex Ex post evaluations take various forms in the Swedish system. For the past 10
Post Evaluation
to 15 years, performance measurement and management has been an integral
Score: 8
part of public management in Sweden, as in most other countries. Also, audits
conducted by the Swedish supreme audit institution (Riksrevisionen) are
important evaluation instruments. There is, however, a tendency to focus more
on institutions and cost efficiency (the audit approach) than on programs and
impact (the evaluation approach) – a trend that is increasingly noticeable
across many Western countries. That said, both approaches are useful as
feedback on public policy.

Citation:
Pierre, J., B. G. Peters and J. de Fine Licht (2018), “Is auditing the new evaluation? Can it be? Should it
be?,” (tillsammans med B. Guy Peters och Jenny de Fine Licht), International Journal of Public Sector
Management 31:726-39.

B. G. Peters and J. Pierre (2019), ““From evaluation to auditing and from programs to institutions?: Causes
and consequences of the decline of the program approach,” Governance: An International Journal of Policy,
Administration, and Institutions.
SGI 2020 | 42 Sweden Report

Societal Consultation

Public Consultation with societal actors has historically been of a defining feature of
Consultation
Swedish (and Scandinavian) neo-corporatist governance, and such
Score: 8
arrangements are still in place to a large extent. In this corporatist
arrangement, government consults with key societal partners on a wide range
of issues. Stakeholders are thus given an opportunity to influence public policy
from the early stages of the policy process until implementation.

The more specific nature of the relationship between the state and societal
actors is changing, however. Previously, these contacts were institutionalized
with all major players invited to provide input on almost all major policy
issues. Today, these consultations are more ad hoc and strategic. The current
red-green government appears to have a more continuous dialog with
organized interests, primarily the unions, than the earlier “Alliance”
government. Even so, Swedish corporatism is weaker today than it was in the
1970s and 1980s. The previously mentioned decline of the royal commissions
is one important example of the reduction of societal consultation in Sweden
under the period of review. Overall, most observers today agree that
corporatism as a model of governance has been significantly weakened in
Sweden.

However, there have also been some tendencies toward increasing societal
consultation. The increasing significance of so-called new modes of
governance – networks, markets, partnerships and so on – has opened up new
arenas for exchanges and communication between government institutions and
organized interests. Also, studies show that societal actors now target specific
institutions rather than engaging the state as a whole. Unions, for example, still
target public institutions that draft policy, whereas business organizations are
more active vis-à-vis executive agencies.

Citation:
Dahlström, C., E. Lundberg and K. Pronin (2019), Det statliga kommittéväsendets förändring 1990-2016.
SNS Analys Rapport nr 59. (Stockholm: SNS).

Jochem, Sven (2020), Das Politische System Schwedens (Wiesbaden: Springer VS).

Pierre, J. (ed) (2015), Oxford Handbook of Swedish Politics (Oxford: Oxford University Press), esp. Section
10.

Pierre, J. and B. G. Peters (2005), Governing Complex Societies (Basingstoke: Palgrave).

Svensson, T. and P-O.Öberg (2010),“Does Power Drive out Trust? Relations between Labor Market Actors
in Sweden,” Political Studies 58:143-166.
SGI 2020 | 43 Sweden Report

Policy Communication

Coherent Improved communications dovetails with increasing coordination among the

Communication
government departments. During the past couple of years, the government has
Score: 9
developed and implemented a more coherent communications strategy. The
flow of communication from government departments and the PMO is now
carefully controlled such that only a very limited number of officials are
authorized to engage the media or other actors outside the core of government.

This strategy is very similar to the communications strategies today used in

countries such as Canada and the United Kingdom. It implies that cabinet
ministers carefully assess invitations from radio and television and, perhaps
surprisingly, frequently decline those invitations if they cannot control the
format or if they are to debate with representatives from the opposition.

This strategy has been rather successful; indeed, in some ways it may even
have been too successful. Scholars and the media are increasingly objecting to
problems in accessing ministers and other representatives of the governing
parties. There is also increasing frustration with the GO’s tendency to be slow
in providing the media with public documents. Even among several agencies
there is now frustration about the decreasing access to government
departments and government information.

Citation:
Dahlström, C. J. Pierre and B. G. Peters (eds) (2011), Steering from the Center (Toronto: University of
Toronto Press).

Erlandsson, M. (2008), ”Regeringskansliet och medierna. Den politiska exekutivens resurser och strategier
för att hantera och styra massmedier,” Statsvetenskaplig tidskrift 110: 335-49.

Jacobsson, B., J. Pierre and G. Sundström (2015), Governing the Embedded State (Oxford: Oxford
Universirty Press).

Implementation

Government The implementation capacity of the Swedish government is strong. The circa
Effectiveness
340 executive agencies are the key actors in the implementation of policy.
Score: 9
Over the past few years, the departments have increased the steering of their
agencies. Also, performance measurement and management have become
increasingly important in monitoring the agencies and the implementation
process.

Yet like the challenge of efficient policy coordination, policy implementation

is also a challenge under the restrictions of new governance forms. The
SGI 2020 | 44 Sweden Report

relationship between the government and the agencies no longer follows a

strict command and control pattern; rather, it is a more interactive form of
governance where departments utilize the expertise in the agencies during the
early stages of the policy process. This pattern is largely due to the fact that
policy expertise is located not just in the departments but also in the agencies.

The total number of staff in the departments is about 4,600, whereas the
number of staff at the agency level is about 225,000. To a large extent, and
with considerable variation among policy sectors and even specific issues,
agencies provide informal advice to government on policy design. In some
cases, there is a weekly dialogue between departments and agencies, not just
on what departments want agencies to do, but also on matters of policy design.
This means effectively that agencies are involved in shaping the policies they
will later implement. This arrangement obviously increases the agencies’
commitment to a policy, but at the same time it complicates the
implementation process.

The main challenge in implementing government policies is not institutional

but rather political. Neither the current nor previous red-green coalition
government has held a majority of seats in the parliament. As a consequence,
policy proposals have had to be negotiated with opposition parties. If all
opposition parties unite against the government, the government’s proposals
will be defeated. The complexity of this parliamentary situation has
significantly complicated the policy process, especially as the situation was
further exacerbated by the inconclusive 2018 election results. After lengthy
negotiations, the red-green government struck a deal with the Center Party and
the Liberals in January 2019, the so-called January Accord. Under the deal, the
government has agreed to implement several distinctly liberal or neoliberal
reforms. Thus, while the capacity of the government to implement its policies
remains strong, those policies now represent a rather broad spectrum of the
party system.

Citation:
Jacobsson, B., J. Pierre and G. Sundström (2015), Governing the Embedded State (Oxford: Oxford
Universirty Press).

Premfors, R. and G. Sundström (2007), Regeringskansliet (Malmö: Liber).

Ministerial In Sweden, ministers and departments do not implement policy. The task is
Compliance
handled by the executive agencies. A major concern in Sweden is the degree to
Score: 10
which ministers can, and should, steer the agencies. Swedish agencies are
highly autonomous, but departments can formally steer them by appointing the
Director General of the agency, deciding on the regulatory and institutional
framework of the agency, and allocating financial resources to specific tasks
and programs.
SGI 2020 | 45 Sweden Report

In Sweden, as in many other countries, the relationship between departments

and agencies, and the willingness of the latter to implement policies defined by
the former, can hinder or enable implementation. In Sweden, the relationship
between departments and agencies is an institutional relation, not a personal
relation between a minister and the director of an agency. Thus, to the extent
that it is meaningful to talk about incentives, they must be organizational
incentives. Furthermore, implementing policy is a core role for the agencies,
so incentives are hardly necessary.

Citation:
Premfors, R. and G. Sundström (2007), Regeringskansliet (Malmö: Liber).

Jacobsson, B., J. Pierre and G. Sundström (2015), Governing the Embedded State: The Organizational
Dimension of Governance (Oxford: Oxford University Press).

Monitoring Formally, ministries are not very involved in the implementation of policies. It
Ministries
is rather the task of agencies to implement policies. Nevertheless, Swedish
Score: 9
ministries still control the implementation process of the agencies. The
relationship between ministries and agencies implies monitoring by
communication and mutual adaptation, less than through a hierarchical chain
of command.
Monitoring Government departments in the GO monitor the activities (not just
Agencies,
implementation) of the agencies quite closely. Since the introduction of
Bureaucracies
Score: 9
performance management some 15 to 20 years ago, agencies report to their
parent department on their performance targets. In fact, many criticize this
reporting, which requires agencies to devote much time and effort reporting on
their performance to their respective department, because it is so extensive that
it has become burdensome. Recently, there has been a tendency to reduce the
number of objectives and performance indicators on which the agencies are to
report. This tendency is likely to continue over the next several years.

It should be noted that there is a significant imbalance between the

departments and the agencies. The GO has a total staff of about 4,600. The
total staff in the agencies is about 220,000. Thus, the steering structures in the
system are considerably smaller than the targets of that steering. This state of
affairs has encouraged the use of informal communication between
departments and agencies to supplement formal steering.

Citation:
Jacobsson, B., J. Pierre and G. Sundström (2015), Governing the Embedded State: The Organizational
Dimension of Governance (Oxford: Oxford University Press).

Pierre, J. and J. de Fine Licht (2017), Myndighetschefernas syn på regeringens styrning (Stockholm:
Statskontoret).
SGI 2020 | 46 Sweden Report

Task Funding Unfunded, or insufficiently funded, mandates have been a long-standing issue
Score: 4
in Sweden; indeed recent studies show an almost complete unanimity among
local governments with regard to their frustration of insufficiently funded
mandates. Subnational governments enjoy extensive autonomy in relation to
the central government in Sweden. Local governments and their national
association, Swedish Association of Local Authorities and Regions (SALAR),
have insisted that all tasks placed upon them by central government must be
fully funded.

SALAR has made this claim an overarching principle, which it emphasizes

whenever the central government delegates tasks to local authorities. Instead
of fully funded mandates, though, the central government frequently
negotiates the funding aspect of delegated tasks with the local governments
and SALAR. From the local authorities’ perspective, this problem has become
more significant as central government has increased its control over local
authorities during the past couple of years, as Statskontoret (the Swedish
Agency for Public Management) recently showed.

As a reaction to the large number of asylum-seekers in 2015 and 2016, the

former red-green government (2014 – 2018) to a great extent funded the
additional work required of local authorities. However, this additional funding
does not change the fact that in more routine exchanges between the central
government and local government, funded mandates remain usually
insufficient. In 2017, much of the central government’s support to local
authorities to assist their work with asylum-seekers was terminated; it is now
up to local authorities to fund these activities. As a result, almost half of local
authorities report budget deficits and service cutbacks for 2019, with this
situation predicted to continue in 2020.

Citation:
Pierre, J. (2014), Globalization and Governance (Cheltenham: Edward Elgar).

Statskontoret (2018) Utveckling av styrningen av kommuner och landsting 2018 (Stockholm: Statskontoret).

Constitutional Although unfunded mandates have been much debated, central government
Discretion
overwhelmingly respects local autonomy. Local government enjoys extensive
Score: 9
autonomy, which is guaranteed by the constitution. Indeed, the strength of
local autonomy adds to the fragmented nature of the Swedish political system
and sometimes creates problems in governance and coordination. In terms of
crisis, extraordinary challenges or when there are major national interests at
stake, however, government can increase its pressure on local government,
despite the latter’s formal autonomy. In these cases, the usual procedure is first
to negotiate with the Swedish Association of Local Authorities and the
Regions (SALAR) and, if that proves unsuccessful, introduce stronger
SGI 2020 | 47 Sweden Report

regulatory measures. For instance, in 2015, to what extent the central

government should force all local authorities to receive asylum-seekers was
thoroughly debated.

Pre-policy studies conducted in 2016 and 2017 show that state control over
autonomous local governments has increased gradually during the past several
years. Such control reaches not across the board but is generally targeted at
specific issues and programs such as education. The former government (2014
– 2018) and its key advisory agencies have had a royal commission and the
Public Management Agency review intergovernmental relations in preparation
for a reform proposal. With the expected change in the composition of
government following the 2018 election, this reform appears to be on hold.
National Public services have been extensively decentralized over the past decades.
Standards
Once services are transferred from central to local government, safeguarding
Score: 6
national standards and even defining and sustaining those standards becomes
problematic. The same problem applies to increasingly privatized services,
where the oversight over national standards becomes even more challenging.

Decentralization and local autonomy are essentially institutional choices and,

as all choices, these arrangements have their downsides. One of the problems
with a decentralized system is that it becomes very difficult to enforce national
standards. This became obvious to the government after the extensive
decentralization reform during the 1980s and early 1990s. In primary and
secondary education, the past two decades have witnessed central government
trying to regain some control in order to ensure some degree of national
standards. The main strategy toward this objective has been to extensively
evaluate the performance of schools and publicize evaluation reports (i.e., to
“name, blame and shame” underperforming schools). Thus, government
exercises a strategy of steering by auditing. In addition, central government
has tried to increase equality among local authorities by revising the general
regulatory framework of primary and secondary education, and by targeting
financial resources to improve the quality of teaching.
Effective Much of modern regulation is responsive regulation: it is designed and
Regulatory
implemented through a dialogue with the targets of the regulation rather than
Enforcement
Score: 9
forcefully imposed. Often, regulatory agencies prefer to use incentives rather
than formal rules to elicit the desired behavioral changes among the targets of
the regulation. Given that changing behavior is the overarching objective,
regulators may use a combination of rules, bargaining and incentives toward
that objective. There is no evidence of a systematic bias in this respect among
Swedish regulatory agencies.

Citation:
OECD (2019), Indicators of regulatory policy and governance. Europe 2019. Sweden (Paris: OECD).
SGI 2020 | 48 Sweden Report

Adaptablility

Domestic Following Sweden’s EU membership, which came into force in the mid-
Adaptability
1990s, there has been a sustained effort to adapt government, policy and
Score: 10
regulation to EU standards. The bulk of this adaptation relates to changes in
domestic regulatory frameworks and policies, a development that does not
impact the structure of government.

Estimates suggest that some 75% of the regulations that pertain to Sweden are
today EU rules, not domestic rules. This pattern is probably typical for all EU
member states. However, Sweden is today among the forerunners in the EU
with respect to its adoption of EU directives and decisions. Most of the
adaptation has taken place not at the policy level, but on the administrative
level (e.g., by integrating domestic regulatory agencies with EU agencies).

Citation:
Jacobsson B. and G. Sundström (2006), Från hemvävd till invävd: Europeiseringen av svensk förvaltning
och politik (Malmö: Liber).

Zannakis, M. (2010), Climate Policy as a Window of Opportunity: Sweden and Global Climate Change
(Gothenburg: Department of Political Science).

International Sweden has maintained a rather high international profile on a number of

Coordination
issues requiring international collective action. These issues have traditionally
Score: 9
included disarmament, human rights, international solidarity and more
recently, climate change and a feminist approach to international relations and
peacekeeping.

Sweden tends to look at itself as an international broker and coordinator,

though it may exaggerate its capacity in this regard. Certainly, Sweden,
together with several other smaller nations, exerts some degree of international
influence through “soft power.”

Citation:
Aggestam, K. and A. Towns (2018), “The Gender Turn in Diplomacy: A new research agenda,”
International Feminist Journal of Politics (DOI: 10.1080/14616742.2018.1483206).

Ingebritsen, C. (2006), Scandinavia in World Politics (Lanham: Rowman & Littlefield).

Jochem, S. (2020), Das politische System Schwedens (Wiesbaden: Springer VS).

Pierre, J. (ed) (2015), Oxford Handbook of Swedish Politics (Oxford: Oxford University Press).
SGI 2020 | 49 Sweden Report

Organizational Reform

Self-monitoring Institutional arrangements of governing obviously cover a wide array of

Score: 9
arrangements. As indicated earlier, it is astounding in many ways to think that
Sweden has transformed politically from a pre-democratic system to a
democratic state, embedded in an international union such as the EU, with
only a minimum amount of institutional and constitutional reform. Such a
transformation testifies to the capacity of institutions to accommodate change.
Given their institutional capacity to adapt to external change, institutional
arrangements as such are rarely assessed.

The cabinet and government departments were reformed (i.e., merged and/or
abolished) during the 1980s and 1990s, but today most observers seem to
agree that this type of reform rarely solves any problems. Instead, the main
institutional monitoring and reform takes place at the agency level where the
number of agencies has decreased by about 25% over the past five to six years.
While some agencies have been abolished, the bulk of reduction has come
from mergers. There are about 340 agencies in the Swedish administrative
system. This reduction in the number of agencies says very little about the
extent of regulation; in some ways it is a numbers game aiming to
communicate the image to the voters that the government is cutting back in
central bureaucracy. That having been said, there is more or less continuous
assessment of the agency system and the performance of agencies in service
delivery and policy implementation.

Agencies are monitored fairly closely, so much so that a couple of recent royal
commissions have recommended that agencies should not have to provide data
on their performance with the same frequency as they do today and that the
system should allow for more variation among agencies in this respect. The
red-green government that came into power in 2014 has launched a process of
reducing the number of performance indicators that agencies are requested to
provide data on. These efforts are part of a larger project to replace New
Public Management models of public sector management with a more trust-
based model of management. Several reforms of this kind were developed in
2016 and 2017 and scheduled to be implemented in 2018 and 2019. Given the
prospect of a change in government after the 2018 elections, this reform is
now pending.

Citation:
SOU 2007:75 Att styra staten – regeringens styrning av sin förvaltning.
SOU 2008:118 Styra och ställa – förslag till en effektivare statsförvaltning
SGI 2020 | 50 Sweden Report

Institutional While the structural design of the Swedish system looks almost identical to
Reform
how it did a century ago, there have been substantive changes in the modus
Score: 9
operandi of institutions at all levels of government, particularly concerning the
relationship between institutions. Perhaps most importantly, coordination
among government departments has increased. Furthermore, the agency
system is continuously reviewed, and the structure of the system is reformed
(e.g., through mergers of agencies). Finally, department steering of the agency
has increased, formally and informally.

It is fair to say that the design and functionality of the system is continuously
assessed. Over the past decade, issues related to steering and central control
have dominated reform ambitions. Again, governments have not hesitated to
alter the configuration of departments or agencies when deemed necessary to
reflect the changing agenda of the government.

II. Executive Accountability

Citizens’ Participatory Competence

Political The Swedish population has a strong interest in politics. Election turnout is
Knowledge
still very high by most international comparisons. The turnout in the 2014
Score: 9
general elections was 85.8%, which was an increase of 1.2 percentage points
from the previous election. In 2018, the turnout increased even further to
87.2%, which is remarkably high compared to other European countries.
Swedish voters tend to decide very late for which party to vote, which may be
interpreted as the voters’ desire to gather as much information on political
parties as possible before they make their final decision.

The definition of high or low levels of political knowledge is obviously a

relative measure. Official data on the knowledge level of Swedish voters is not
available. It can, however, be assumed that voters here are not significantly
more – or less – knowledgeable than their colleagues in comparable countries.

Recent studies suggest that if voters had been more knowledgeable on political
issues this would have changed their party allegiance. Increasing levels of
knowledge should reduce the support for the two major parties – the
Moderates and the Social Democrats – while most of the other, smaller parties
would have benefited. This is a purely hypothetical study, as the perfectly
informed voter does not exist.
SGI 2020 | 51 Sweden Report

Citation:
Andersson, Ulrika, Anders Carlander, Elina Lindgren, Maria Oskarson (eds.) (2018), Sprickor i fasaden
(Gothenburg: The SOM Institute).

Oscarsson, H. and S. Holmberg (2014), Svenska väljare (Stockholm: Wolters Kluwer).

Oscarsson, H. (2007), ”A Matter of Fact? Knowledge Effects on the Vote in Swedish General Elections,
1985-2002,” Scandinavian Political Studies 30:301-322.

http://www.val.se

Open Strictly speaking, given the extensive rules about public availability of
Government
government documents, government does not have to actively publish material
Score: 9
but rather simply ensure that it is available. Thus, withholding information that
would be relevant to an assessment of the government’s performance would be
difficult. True, there may be incentives for government to seek to avoid the
public disclosure of sensitive information, but to do so government would
have to produce the legal justification for such an action.

Legislative Actors’ Resources

Parliamentary Members of the parliament can collectively monitor all aspects of government
Resources
activities. They can find some support for these and other activities from the
Score: 9
parliament’s (Riksdag) administrative support (Riksdagens Utredningstjänst,
RUT). RUT conducts inquiries requested by groups of members of parliament.
Individual members of parliament in Sweden receive rather little
administrative support; instead, support is given to the political party
organizations within parliament.
Obtaining Parliamentary committees (or indeed any persons) have the right to review all
Documents
public documents in Sweden unless they are classified or part of an ongoing
Score: 10
decision-making process.

In this respect, the Swedish system leaves very little to be desired. The
problem, instead, has been the execution of these rights. In the annual reviews
conducted by the Parliamentary Committee on Constitutional Affairs (KU)
during the past several years, the committee has severely criticized the
government’s central office (Regeringskansliet) for not providing documents,
or for being exceedingly slow in doing so. The media, too, has been critical of
the government in this respect.
Summoning Parliamentary committees summon ministers who appear and respond to
Ministers
questions. This is most frequently the case with the annual review conducted
Score: 9
by the Parliamentary Committee on Constitutional Matters, but has been used
by other committees, too. Except for very few cases, summoned ministers will
appear in parliamentary committees. A few years ago, there was extensive
SGI 2020 | 52 Sweden Report

media attention on a couple of instances when former cabinet ministers

declined to appear before a parliamentary committee.

The hearings occur regularly and are often broadcasted by public service
television. The results of the hearings are published and accessible to
everyone.
Summoning Parliamentary committees may certainly summon experts. They do not usually
Experts
do so as part of the regular deliberation of the committees, but rather in the
Score: 10
form of a public hearing on some specific issue.
Task Area There is a high degree of congruence between government departments and
Congruence
parliamentary committees, but no perfect overlap. This is of course no
Score: 9
coincidence. The configuration of government departments is more flexible
than that of parliamentary committees, which has undergone very few changes
over the last several decades. Ensuring that the committee system matches the
GO’s organization in departments is essential to the efficiency of both
institutions. Furthermore, the GO and the parliament (Riksdag) staff have
regular meetings to ensure that the parliament and individual committees are
not overloaded with government bills, but that there is a steady flow of bills
across the year.

Media

Media Reporting Sweden has dropped somewhat over the past couple of years in terms of
Score: 9
newspaper circulation. Most newspapers are experiencing a gradual shift in
subscriptions from conventional print to digital formats. The overall quality of
the political coverage provided by Swedish media is good, if not extremely
good.

Public service radio and television in Sweden is still central to the media
system. There have been discussions and Commissions concerning the future
of public service but thus far no major changes have been put on the agenda.
The only reform worth noting is that public service radio and television is now
funded through the tax system and not, as was previously the case, by annual
fees.

Compared to many other countries, the coverage is presented by journalists

who are experts on Swedish politics. The level of analysis is good and, for the
most part, balanced. There is obviously sometimes less professional coverage,
too, but taken together, the quality of Swedish newspapers is very good.

Citation:
Andersson, Ulrika, Anders Carlander, Elina Lindgren, Maria Oskarson (eds.) (2018), Sprickor i fasaden
(Gothenburg: The SOM Institute).
SGI 2020 | 53 Sweden Report

Parties and Interest Associations

Intra-party Politics in Sweden is party politics. The political parties shape public discourse
Decision-Making
on political issues and control public decision-making at all levels of the
Score: 8
political system. All the major parties have developed extensive party
organizations, in part supported by state subsidies. Party membership has
historically been high but has declined over the last couple of decades. Elected
delegates from all constituencies make decisions on party policy and programs
at national conferences. These meetings are increasingly public events, used
not only as forums to make decisions, but also to market the party politically.
Beyond that, however, rank and file members are very rarely consulted or
invited to voice their opinions on daily policy issues.

Candidate selection, too, is an internal party matter. Voters do have the

opportunity to indicate support for specific candidates, however.

Over the past years, the internet has played a role in making the decision-
making process within the major parties more open. The Social Democratic
party, for instance, discussed some issues of the party’s platform in blogs and
on its homepage. In such instances, even those who are not members of the
party can join in the formulation of the party’s platform.
Association Sweden has a long corporatist tradition. Although corporatism as a mode of
Competence
governance has declined, economic interest associations are still important
(Employers &
Unions)
players in the policy process.
Score: 9
The major business interest organizations and unions are certainly very
capable of analyzing the economic situation and presenting policy proposals.
As organized interests, they obviously pursue their respective agendas, but
overall, the expertise and policy capacity of the major interest organizations is
impressive. During the global economic crisis, for example, the interest
associations showed a high degree of responsibility by not counteracting the
crisis management of the government.
:
Garsten, C., B. Rothstein and S. Svallfors (2015), Makt utan mandat: de policyprofessionella i svensk politik
(Stockholm: Dialogos).
Jochem, S. (2020), Das politische System Schwedens (Wiesbaden: Springer VS).
Pierre, J. (ed) (2015), Oxford Handbook of Swedish Politics (Oxford: Oxford University Press), esp. Section
10.

Association For noneconomic interest associations, their capacity to conduct analysis and
Competence
produce relevant policy proposals varies significantly depending on their size.
(Others)
Score: 9
For instance, in the environmental policy field, the major interest organizations
have large staff that conduct high-quality studies and present highly relevant
SGI 2020 | 54 Sweden Report

policy proposals. In other policy fields, small interest associations do not have
the staff to produce high-quality policy proposals. Yet, if we assess the quality
of noneconomic interest associations over the very broad range of all Swedish
interest associations, most of them produce high-quality policy proposals.

Citation:
Jochem, S. (2020), Das Politische System Schwedens (Wiesbaden: Springer VS).

Pierre, J. (ed) (2015), Oxford Handbook of Swedish Politics (Oxford: Oxford University Press).

Independent Supervisory Bodies

Audit Office For a long time, Sweden was one of the few countries where the audit office
Score: 10
reported to the government and not to the parliament. In order to conform to
international standards, such as the International Organization of Supreme
Audit Institutions (INTOSAI), this institutional arrangement was changed in
2003. For all intents and purposes, the audit office now reports to the
parliament. The mandate and mission of the audit office is such that this
represents the only chain of accountability. In this respect, the constitutional
role and mandate of the audit office is now in harmony with INTOSAI
standard.

The audit office underwent a major crisis during 2016, culminating with the
resignation of the three national auditors. The crisis did not trigger a revision
of the constitutional mandate of the audit office, but the parliament did point
out that they wanted a “closer relationship” with the audit office. After the
crisis was resolved and three new “national auditors” were appointed to lead
the national audit office, the institution resumed its work. It now delivers high-
quality audits and appears to exhibit the integrity and autonomy necessary to
pursue its mission.

Citation:
www.riksrevisionen.se

Bringselius, L. (2013), Organisera oberoende granskning: Riksrevisionens första tio år (Lund:

Studentlitteratur).

Bringselius, L. (ed.) (2017), Den statliga revisionen i Norden: forskning, praktik och politik (Lund:
Studentlitteratur).

Ombuds Office It is fair to say that Sweden invented the ombudsman institution. Sweden
Score: 10
currently has seven ombudsmen who focus on the following: legal matters,
gender equality, consumer matters, discrimination, discrimination on the basis
of sexual orientation, matters related to disability and matters related to
children.
SGI 2020 | 55 Sweden Report

The ombudsman for legal matters (JO), which has been around the longest, is
appointed by the parliament, while the government appoints the other
ombudsmen. Some of them are their own agencies.

Assessing the effectiveness of the ombudsmen is a difficult task. Their mission

is not only to follow up on complaints but also to form opinion in their area of
jurisdiction. Their position in the political system and in society appears to be
quite strong.
Data Protection The Swedish Data Protection Agency (Datainspektionen) is charged with the
Authority
task of protecting personal integrity. To that end, it handles complaints as well
Score: 9
as conducts its own inquiries and inspections. It works closely with similar
agencies in other EU member states and with EU institutions.

Citation:
https://www.datainspektionen.se/other-lang/in-english/
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