1

Neutral Citation No. - 2025:AHC:91662-DB

Reserved
AFR
Court No.44

Case :- Case :- SPECIAL APPEAL No. - 167 of 2024

Appellant :- Devendra Singh
Respondent :- State Of Up And 4 Others
Counsel for Appellant :- Siddharth Khare
Counsel for Respondent :- C.S.C.,Yogesh Kumar Saxena

with

Case :- SPECIAL APPEAL No. - 200 of 2024

Appellant :- Jujhar Singh
Respondent :- State Of Up And 4 Others
Counsel for Appellant :- Siddharth Khare
Counsel for Respondent :- C.S.C.,Yogesh Kumar Saxena

Hon'ble Siddhartha Varma, J.

Hon'ble Dr. Yogendra Kumar Srivastava, J.

(Per : Siddhartha Varma, J.)

1. The two special appeals are being decided together as they

involve a common question of law. The appellant-Jujhar Singh in

Special Appeal No.200 of 2024 was appointed on ad-hoc basis on

31.8.1987 as an Assistant Teacher in CT grade in the institution

known as P.N.V. Inter College, Chilli (Muskara), Hamirpur. His

appointment on ad-hoc basis was also approved on 11.9.1987.

Similarly, the appellant-Devendra Singh in Special Appeal

No.167 of 2024 was appointed on ad-hoc basis on the post of

Assistant Teacher in CT grade on 26.2.1989. His appointment

was also approved on 25/26.7.1989. However, the services of

both the appellants were terminated on 17.10.1989 by the District

Inspector of Schools, Hamirpur on the allegation that the

appellants had been posted on such posts which were in excess of

 2
the sanctioned strength. Aggrieved thereof, the two appellants

jointly filed a writ petition being Writ Petition No.19879 of 1989

(Jujhar Singh & Anr. vs. District Inspector of Schools, Hamirpur

& Ors.). On 4.12.1989, the High Court in Writ Petition No.19879

of 1989, passed an interim order whereby the order dated

17.10.1989 was kept in abeyance. Thereafter in pursuance of the

interim order granted on 4.12.1989, the appellants-petitioners

continued to work and also they continued to receive their

salaries. On 31.3.2006, it so happened that the appellants-

petitioners were absorbed against substantively vacant posts. The

order dated 31.3.2006 is being reproduced here as under :-

“कार्याालर्या जि ला वि द्यालर्या वि रीक्षक हमीरपुर

आदेश संख्र्यााः-96 /2005-06 विद ांक 31.03.06
समार्याो आदेश
उप शिशक्षा वि देशक झांसी मण्डल झांसी के पत्रांक /मा०/10227-
29/91-92 विद ांविकत 05-02-1992 ए ं पत्रांक/मा०/10550-51/93-94
विद ांविकत 28-01-1994 में वि विहत वि द5शा ुसार पी०ए ० ी० इण्टर काले , चि:ल्ली
(मुस्करा) हमीरपुर में स् ीकृत संख्र्याा से अचिAक सहार्याक अध्र्याापक (सी०टी०) की
वि र्याुविD मा क के आAार पर तत्काली जि ला वि द्यालर्या वि रीक्षक हमीरपुर द्वारा की
गई थी। र्याे वि र्याुविDर्याां अवि र्याविमत हो े के कारण वि रस्त कर दी गई थी, लेविक
मा ीर्या उच्च न्र्याार्याालर्या इलाहाबाद द्वारा पारिरत आदेश विद ांक 27-10-89 के
अ ुपाल में वि द्यालर्या में कार्यारत हैं।
अतः प्रबन्Aक, पी०ए ० ी० इण्टर काले चि:ल्ली (मुस्करा) हमीरपुर के
पत्रांक/197/पीएफ/2005-06 विद ांक 09-01-2006 के संदर्भ में पी०ए ० ी०
इ०का० चि:ल्ली (मुस्करा) हमीरपुर के श्री रामाAार सहार्याक अध्र्याापक के से ावि ृत्त के
फलस् रूप रिरD पद पर श्री ुझर सिंसह सहार्याक अध्र्याापक ए ं श्री सूर प्रसाद सिंसह
सहार्याक अध्र्याापक के से ावि ृत्त से रिरD पद पर श्री दे ेन्द्र सिंसह सहार्याक अध्र्याापक
मा ीर्या उच्च न्र्याार्याालर्या इलाहाबाद के आदेश पर समार्याोजि त विकर्याा ाता है। र्याविद इस
सम्बन्A में संस्थाचिAकारी/कम:ारी द्वारा कोई गलत तथ्र्या अथ ा सू: ा दी गर्याी है तो
र्याह आदेश वि रस्त कर विदर्याा ार्याेगा।

(अखि^लेश पाण्डेर्या)
जि ला वि द्यालर्या वि रीक्षक
हमीरपुर।

पृष्ठांक संख्र्यााः-मा०/3641-43 /2005-06 तदविद ांक।

प्रचितखिलविपः- वि म् ांविकत को सू: ाथ ए ं आ श्र्याक कार्या ाही हेतु सादर प्रेविaत।
1- संर्याD ु शिशक्षा वि देशक, झांसी मण्डल झांसी।
2- सहार्याक वि त्त ए ं ले^ाचिAकारी (मा०शिश०) कार्याा०जि ०वि ०वि ० हमीरपुर।
3- प्रबन्Aक/प्रAा ा:ार्या, पी०ए ० ी०इ०का० चि:ल्ली (मुस्करा) हमीरपुर।

(अखि^लेश पाण्डेर्या)
जि ला वि द्यालर्या वि रीक्षक
हमीरपुर।”
 3
2. To put the record straight, it may be noted that the Writ

Petition No.19879 of 1989 was dismissed as having become

infructuous on 17.10.2001. The order dated 17.10.2001 is being

reproduced here as under :-

“The office has placed this writ petition in the group

of cases relating to service matter on account of
efflux of time, presuming suggesting that the writ
petition has become infructuous on account of efflux
of time. Be that as it may, since no one turns up on
behalf of the petitioner to press this writ petition, it is
accordingly dismissed.”

3. This order was not known to the appellants-petitioners.

However, when the petitioners came to know of the order dated

17.10.2001, they filed an application for recalling of the order

dated 17.10.2001. When the case was taken up on 8.3.2010, the

order dated 17.10.2001 was recalled and on the same day it was

got dismissed as not pressed. Despite the order dated 8.3.2010

being passed by the High Court by which the Writ Petition

No.19879 of 1989 was dismissed as not pressed, the petitioners-

appellants continued to function and were paid their regular

monthly salary on the strength of the order dated 31.3.2006. After

a passage of quite some time i.e. on 1.6.2017, the

Management/Principal of the college was put to notice by the

District Inspector of Schools to explain as to on what basis they

were paying the petitioners their salary. They were also required

to provide the order dated 8.3.2010 by which the Writ Petition

No.19879 of 1989 was dismissed as not pressed. This notice

which was sent by the Committee of Management/Principal was

 4
challenged by the petitioners jointly in Writ Petition No.34860 of

2017 and in that writ petition on 4.8.2017, this Court passed an

order by which the order dated 1.6.2017 was stayed. The interim

order dated 4.8.2017 is being reproduced here as under :-

“It is contended on behalf of the petitioners that they

are working since 1987 and 1989 respectively.
Previously, they have preferred a writ petition and an
interim order was granted therein. While they were
working, the District Inspector of Schools vide order
dated 31.3.2006 has regularized the services of the
petitioners. Both the petitioners are working.

It appears that in the meantime the petitioners have

got the writ petition withdrawn. Consequently, the
impugned orders have been passed and the salary of
the petitioners has been stopped.

Learned counsel for the petitioners submits that the

petitioners are working for more than 25 years and
there is no complaint with regard to their work and
conduct and on the technical ground the respondents
have stopped the salary of the petitioners.

Matter needs consideration.

Learned Standing Counsel appears for the State

functionaries.

Issue notice to respondent no. 4 returnable at an

early date.

Counter affidavit be filed within six weeks.

Rejoinder affidavit, if any, may be filed within a
week thereafter.

List after expiry of the said period.

Till the next date of listing effect and operation of

the impugned orders dated 1.6.2017 and 6.6.2017
shall remain stayed. It is further provided that the
petitioners shall be paid their salary.”

4. It is thereafter the case of the petitioners-appellants that

when the Education Department asked the petitioners to get their

 5
Writ Petition No.34860 of 2017 withdrawn so that their case for

regularisation could be considered, they withdrew the writ

petition on 29.8.2022. Subsequent to that on 7.9.2022, the District

Inspector of Schools, Hamirpur wrote to the Management of the

Institution to forward the resolution for the regularisation of the

services of the petitioners in view of the fact that Writ Petition

No.34860 of 2017 had been withdrawn. For reasons best known

to the Committee of Management, the communication/direction

dated 7.9.2022 of the District Inspector of Schools was put to

challenge by filing a writ petition being Writ-A No.18341 of

2022. This writ petition came to be disposed of on 14.11.2022

with a direction to the Joint Director of Education, Jhansi to

consider the proceedings vis.-a-vis. the notice dated 1.6.2017.

Before the decision could be taken by the Joint Director of

Education, the Committee of Management took a decision to stop

the petitioners-appellants from making their signatures on the

attendance register and the petitioners were thereafter restrained

from working in the institution. Consequently the petitioners-

appellants filed Writ-A No.34990 of 2023 in which on 24.2.2023,

an interim order was passed by which the Management was

directed to permit the petitioners-appellants to work in the

institution in question. On 2.6.2023, the Joint Director of

Education, in pursuance of the order of the High Court dated

14.11.2022 passed in Writ-A No.18314 of 2022, decided the

matter and concluded that since the appointment of the petitioner-

 6
Jujhar Singh in the year 1987 and that of Devendra Singh in the

year 1989 were made in the CT grade without there being any

posts vacant, their appointments were to be considered as

irregular and they were also not to be given any regularisation. In

the meantime, Jujhar Singh retired from the service on 21.3.2023.

Therefore, the appellant-Jujhar Singh filed Writ-A No.11163 of

2023 separately and Devendra Singh filed a separate writ petition

being Writ-A No.11129 of 2023. Both these writ petitions were

connected to each other and they were heard together and when

by a common order dated 16.12.2023, the writ petitions were

dismissed, separate special appeals were filed. The special appeal

of Devendra Singh was numbered as Special Appeal No.167 of

2024 and that of Jujhar Singh was numbered as Special Appeal

No.200 of 2024.

5. Learned counsel for the appellants submitted that the

learned Single Judge did not appreciate the fact that the

controversy with regard to absence of posts had come to an end

with the passing of the order dated 31.3.2006 by the District

Inspector of Schools, Hamirpur. Learned counsel for the

appellants submitted that this was the error which was also

committed by the Joint Director of Education in his order dated

2.6.2023 wherein he had not considered the order dated 31.3.2006

in its right perspective. Learned counsel for the appellants further

stated that when independent of the orders passed in Writ Petition

No.19879 of 1989, the order dated 31.3.2006 had been passed

 7
then it mattered little if the Writ Petition No.19879 of 1989 was,

to begin with, dismissed in default on 17.10.2001 and that

thereafter, after it was restored on 8.3.2010, it was got dismissed

as not pressed. Learned counsel for the appellants referred to the

order dated 31.3.2006, which has also been reproduced earlier in

this order. Referring to that order, he submitted that even though

the order dated 31.3.2006 had stated that the appellants were

working because of the order dated 27.10.1989, the actual reason

for passing the order dated 31.3.2006 was that the Committee of

Management had requested the District Inspector of Schools to

adjust the appellants on posts which had become vacant on

account of the retirements of two Assistant Teachers namely Sri

Ramadhar and Sri Suraj Prasad Singh. He submits that on the

post vacated by Sri Ramadhar, the appellant-Jujhar Singh was

absorbed and on the post vacated by Sri Suraj Prasad Singh, the

appellant-Devendra Singh was absorbed. He submits that if in the

order it was mentioned that the absorption was being done on

account of some order of the High Court then that statement had

no basis.

6. Learned counsel for the appellants further submitted that

section 33A(1-B) which was introduced in the U.P. Secondary

Education Services Selection Boards Act, 1982 on 6.4.1981 was

clearly to the effect that if a teacher was directly appointed after

12.6.1985 and before 13.5.1989 on an ad-hoc basis against a

substantive vacancy in the CT grade in accordance with

 8
paragraph 2 of the Uttar Pradesh Secondary Education Service

Commission (Removal of Difficulties) Order, 1981 and was

possessed with all the qualifications prescribed thereunder then

with effect from the commencement of the Uttar Pradesh

Secondary Education Services Commission and Selection Boards

(Amendment) Act, 1991 that teacher shall be deemed to have

been appointed in substantive capacity provided that teacher had

been continuously serving in the institution from the date of ad-

hoc appointment to the date of commencement of the

Amendment Act.

7. Learned counsel for the appellants states that essential

requirements, therefore, for getting regularized were definitely

present in the instant case. The ad hoc appointments of the

appellants were done under the Removal of Difficulties Order,

1981; the petitioners were possessing all their educational

qualifications and that they had continued to teach in the

institution till the date of their retirement and not just till

6.4.1991. Learned counsel for the appellants states that even if

initially there was an irregularity which had subsequently been

remedied conscientiously then the initial irregularity could not be

made the basis for taking action against the appellants after the

passage of several years. In the instant case, learned counsel for

the appellants states that the appellant Jujhar Singh was appointed

on 31.8.1987 whereas Devendra Singh was appointed on

26.2.1989. Realizing the mistake, the Committee of Management

 9
and also the State Authorities had absorbed these two teachers on

23.1.2006 on substantive vacancies.

8. Relying upon the judgments of the Supreme Court in

Mansaram vs. S.P. Pathak & Ors. reported in (1984) 1 SCC

125 and Madras Aluminium Company Limited vs. Tamil

Nadu Electricity Board & Anr. reported in (2023) 8 SCC 240,

learned counsel for the appellants states that if any mistake was

committed initially then action should have been taken with

regard to it within a reasonable time, specially when there is no

limitation prescribed. However, what would be the ‘reasonable

time’ would depend upon the facts and circumstances of each

case; the nature of default; prejudice caused and whether any

third party rights had been created. Relying upon the two

judgments, learned counsel for the appellants states that even if

the appointments were made irregularly in the year 1987 and

1989 respectively of the two teachers namely Jujhar Singh and

Devendra Singh, the mistake was rectified conscientiously by the

Education Department on 31.3.2006 and now it did not lie in the

mouth of the Education Department or the Committee of

Management of the Institution to say that the initial appointments

were made without any vacancies and, therefore, the

regularisation could not be done.

9. Learned counsel for the appellants relied upon another

judgment of the Supreme Court in Radhey Shyam Yadav &

Anr. vs. State of U.P. & Ors. reported in 2024 SCC OnLine SC
 10
10 and submitted that admittedly the appellants were appointed

on posts which were not vacant. This did not happen because of

any fault of theirs. Also the initial appointments were definitely

approved on 11.9.1987 and 25/26.7.1989. Learned counsel,

therefore, submitted that definitely then it could not be said that

the appellants were to suffer for no fault of theirs.

10. In the judgment of Radhey Shyam Yadav (supra) the

three petitioners namely Lal Chandra Kharwar; Radhey Shyam

Yadav and Ravindra Nath Yadav were appointed as Assitant

Teachers in a Junior High School in the year 1999. However,

their salaries were stopped in the month of October 2005. There

was a dispute as to whether the petitioners were appointed on

vacant posts and as to whether fraudulently the vacancies were

shown and the petitioners therein were appointed. The petitioners

had approached the Allahabad High Court which (learned Single

Judge) on 10.9.2013 dismissed the writ petition and their Special

Appeal was also dismissed on 15.9.2021. However, the Supreme

Court reversed the judgment of the learned Single Judge and that

of the Special Appellate Court saying that the petitioners

definitely were not at fault and that the State could not, after

taking work for such a long time, stop the salaries of the

petitioners/appellants therein. Relying upon this judgment of

Radhey Shyam Yadav (supra) learned counsel for the

appellants states that in this case also the appellants were

appointed after due procedure and their appointments were also

 11
approved and thereafter realizing that they had been appointed on

non-existing posts, when the vacancies occurred, the appellants

were also absorbed on 31.3.2006. Learned counsel for the

appellants states that this order dated 21.3.2006 was never

challenged by the State or the Committee of Management and it

would be deemed that the appellants were continuing on

substantive vacancies which was a primary requirement of

section 33-A(1-B) of the 1982 Act.

11. Learned counsel for the appellants thereafter referring to a

decision of the Supreme Court in Vinod Kumar & Ors. vs.

Union of India & Ors. reported in (2024) 9 SCC 327 submitted

that in view of the continuous service of the appellants in the

capacity of regular employees and in view of the fact that the

appellants were performing duties similar to those in permanent

posts ought to have been regularized. Learned counsel for the

appellants, relying upon this judgment of Vinod Kumar (supra)

submitted that any irregular appointment which is not an illegal

appointment ought to be considered for regularisation. Learned

counsel for the appellants relied upon paragraph nos.7 and 8 of

this judgment and, therefore, the same are being reproduced here

as under :-

“7. The judgement in the case State of Karnataka vs.

Umadevi : (2006) 4 SCC 1 also distinguished between
“irregular” and “illegal” appointments underscoring the
importance of considering certain appointments even if
were not made strictly in accordance with the prescribed
Rules and Procedure, cannot be said to have been made
illegally if they had followed the procedures of regular
appointments such as conduct of written examinations or
 12
interviews as in the present case. Paragraph 53 of the
Uma Devi (supra) case is reproduced hereunder:
“53. One aspect needs to be clarified. There may
be cases where irregular appointments (not illegal
appointments) as explained in State of Mysore vs.
S.V. Narayanappa [(1967) 1 SCR 128 : AIR 1967
SC 1071] , R.N. Nanjundappa vs. T. Thimmiah :
(1972) 1 SCC 409 and B.N. Nagarajan vs. State
of Karnataka [(1979) 4 SCC 507 : 1980 SCC
(L&S) 4] and referred to in para 15 above, of duly
qualified persons in duly sanctioned vacant posts
might have been made and the employees have
continued to work for ten years or more but
without the intervention of orders of the courts or
of tribunals. The question of regularisation of the
services of such employees may have to be
considered on merits in the light of the principles
settled by this Court in the cases abovereferred to
and in the light of this judgment. In that context,
the Union of India, the State Governments and
their instrumentalities should take steps to
regularise as a one-time measure, the services of
such irregularly appointed, who have worked for
ten years or more in duly sanctioned posts but not
under cover of orders of the courts or of tribunals
and should further ensure that regular
recruitments are undertaken to fill those vacant
sanctioned posts that require to be filled up, in
cases where temporary employees or daily wagers
are being now employed. The process must be set
in motion within six months from this date. We
also clarify that regularisation, if any already
made, but not sub judice, need not be reopened
based on this judgment, but there should be no
further bypassing of the constitutional
requirement and regularising or making
permanent, those not duly appointed as per the
constitutional scheme.”
(emphasis in original)
8. In light of the reasons recorded above, this Court finds
merit in the appellants' arguments and holds that their
service conditions, as evolved over time, warrant a
reclassification from temporary to regular status. The
failure to recognise the substantive nature of their roles
and their continuous service akin to permanent
employees runs counter to the principles of equity,
fairness, and the intent behind employment regulations.”

12. Learned counsel for the appellants further relied upon the

judgment of the Supreme Court in Jaggo vs. Union of India &

Ors. reported in 2024 SCC OnLine SC 3826 and submitted that

 13
long and continuous service, nature of work and the fact that

there was no illegal entry into the job ought to have been

considered for the purposes of regularisation. Since, learned

counsel for the appellants relied upon paragraph nos. 10 and 20 of

the judgment, the same are being reproduced here as under :-

“10. Having given careful consideration to the

submissions advanced and the material on record, we
find that the appellants’ long and uninterrupted service,
for periods extending well beyond ten years, cannot be
brushed aside merely by labelling their initial
appointments as part-time or contractual. The essence of
their employment must be considered in the light of their
sustained contribution, the integral nature of their work,
and the fact that no evidence suggests their entry was
through any illegal or surreptitious route.
………………..
20. It is well established that the decision in Uma Devi
(supra) does not intend to penalize employees who have
rendered long years of service fulfilling ongoing and
necessary functions of the State or its instrumentalities.
The said judgment sought to prevent backdoor entries
and illegal appointments that circumvent constitutional
requirements. However, where appointments were not
illegal but possibly “irregular”, and where employees
had served continuously against the backdrop of
sanctioned functions for a considerable period, the need
for a fair and humane resolution becomes paramount.
Prolonged, continuous, and unblemished service
performing tasks inherently required on a regular basis
can, over the time, transform what was initially ad-hoc or
temporary into a scenario demanding fair regularization.
In a recent judgement of this Court in Vinod Kumar and
Ors. Vs. Union of India & Ors. [2024] 1 S.C.R. 1230, it
was held that procedural formalities cannot be used to
deny regularization of service to an employee whose
appointment was termed "temporary" but has performed
the same duties as performed by the regular employee
over a considerable period in the capacity of the regular
employee. The relevant paras of this judgement have
been reproduced below:

“6. The application of the judgment in Uma Devi (supra)

by the High Court does not fit squarely with the facts at
hand, given the specific circumstances under which the
appellants were employed and have continued their
service. The reliance on procedural formalities at the
outset cannot be used to perpetually deny substantive
 14
rights that have accrued over a considerable period
through continuous service. Their promotion was based
on a specific notification for vacancies and a subsequent
circular, followed by a selection process involving
written tests and interviews, which distinguishes their
case from the appointments through back door entry as
discussed in the case of Uma Devi (supra).
7. The judgement in the case of Uma Devi (supra) also
distinguished between “irregular” and “illegal”
appointments underscoring the importance of
considering certain appointments even if were not made
strictly in accordance with the prescribed Rules and
Procedure, cannot be said to have been made illegally if
they had followed the procedures of regular
appointments such as conduct of written examinations or
interviews as in the present case…”

13. Learned counsel for the State in opposition to the two

Special Appeals has relied upon the judgment of Abhishek

Tripathi vs. State of U.P. through Secy. Secondary Education,

Lucknow & Ors. (Writ Petition No.655 (S/S) of 2014) dated

17.12.2015 and has submitted that any appointment which was

made dehors the rules could not be considered to be an

appointment worth regularisation. He has also laid much stress on

the fact that when the initial appointment was made, the same

was not so made on a regular vacancy.

14. Having heard learned counsel for the appellants and Sri

Devesh Vikram, leaned Additional Chief Standing Counsel, the

Court is of the view that both the Special Appeals deserve to be

allowed. The appellants after they were appointed on 31.8.1987

and 26.2.1989, their appointments were also approved on

11.9.1987 and 25/26.7.1989. After their services were terminated

on 17.10.1989, they had approached the High Court by means of

Writ Petition No.19879 of 1989, wherein an interim order was

 15
passed on 4.12.1989 and the termination order dated 17.10.1989

was kept in abeyance. The writ petition was thereafter dismissed

as having become infructuous on 17.10.2001. Upon an

application moved by the petitioners, the said order was recalled

on 8.3.2010 and on the same day, it was got dismissed as not

pressed. However, during the intervening period, the appellants

had been absorbed on two existing vacancies by means of an

order dated 31.3.2006. The appellants having been absorbed on

existing vacancies, the irregularity, if any initially in their

appointments, would be deemed to have been cured as per the

judgments of the Supreme Court cited by learned counsel for the

appellants i.e. Mansaram (supra) and Madras Aluminium

Company Limited (supra). As per these judgments definitely if

any action had to be taken, it ought to have been taken within

reasonable time and that having not been taken, the appellants

could not now be penalized. Further, the Court is of the view that

as per the judgment of the Supreme Court in Radhey Shyam

Yadav (supra) the appellants definitely were not at fault. As per

the judgment of the Supreme Court in Vinod Kumar (supra) and

Jaggo (supra) we find that definitely when there was an

irregularity in the appointments of the appellants, that irregularity

had been removed and the appointments were regularized.

15. In the ultimate analysis, we are thus of the view that the

writ petitions had to be allowed. The orders of the Joint Director

 16
of Education which were passed on the fact that the initial

appointment was wrongly made, were erroneously passed.

16. For all the reasons which we have stated above, we are of

the considered view that if there was any irregularity in the initial

appointment, it was done away with by the State and, therefore, it

cannot be said that the appellants did not come within the

purview of the relevant provisions relating to regularisation. The

appellants after they were absorbed on regular vacancies, it had to

be taken that they were always working on the regular vacancies

and since they were throughout teaching till the date when they

retired, it could be taken that they were always in continuous

service.

17. Thus, for the reasons stated above, Special Appeal No.167

of 2024 and Special Appeal No.200 of 2024 are allowed. The

judgment and order of the learned Single Judge dated 16.12.2023

passed in Writ-A No.11129 of 2023 and Writ-A No.11163 of

2023 is set-aside. The writ petitions are allowed and the order

dated 2.6.2023 passed by the Joint Director of Education, Jhansi

Region, Jhansi is also quashed. The appellants be treated as

having been regularized and they be provided with all

consequential benefits.

Order Date :- 28.05.2024

GS
(Siddhartha Varma, J.)

(Dr. Y.K. Srivastava, J.)

Digitally signed by :-
GAUTAM SONI
High Court of Judicature at Allahabad