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 Introduction to Logic
ird Edition

Michael Genesereth
Stanford University

Eric J. Kao
VMware, Inc.

SYNTHESIS LECTURES ON COMPUTER SCIENCE #8

M
&C Morgan & cLaypool publishers
 Copyright © 2017 by Morgan & Claypool

Introduction to Logic, ird Edition

Michael Genesereth and Eric J. Kao
www.morganclaypool.com

ISBN: 9781627056366 paperback

ISBN: 9781627059992 ebook

DOI 10.2200/S00734ED2V01Y201609CSL008

A Publication in the Morgan & Claypool Publishers series

SYNTHESIS LECTURES ON COMPUTER SCIENCE

Lecture #8
Series ISSN
Synthesis Lectures on Computer Science
Print 1932-1228 Electronic 1932-1686
ABSTRACT
is book is a gentle but rigorous introduction to Formal Logic. It is intended primarily for use
at the college level. However, it can also be used for advanced secondary school students, and it
can be used at the start of graduate school for those who have not yet seen the material.
e approach to teaching logic used here emerged from more than 20 years of teaching
logic to students at Stanford University and from teaching logic to tens of thousands of others
via online courses on the World Wide Web. e approach differs from that taken by other books
in logic in two essential ways, one having to do with content, the other with form.
Like many other books on logic, this one covers logical syntax and semantics and proof
theory plus induction. However, unlike other books, this book begins with Herbrand semantics
rather than the more traditional Tarskian semantics. is approach makes the material consider-
ably easier for students to understand and leaves them with a deeper understanding of what logic
is all about.
In addition to this text, there are online exercises (with automated grading), online logic
tools and applications, online videos of lectures, and an online forum for discussion. ey are
available at
http://intrologic.stanford.edu//.

KEYWORDS
Formal Logic, Symbolic Logic, Propositional Logic, Herbrand Logic, Relational
Logic, deduction, reasoning, Artificial Intelligence
 Contents
Preface . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . xi

1 Introduction . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 1
1.1 Introduction . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 1
1.2 Possible Worlds . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 1
1.3 Logical Sentences . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 3
1.4 Logical Entailment . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 4
1.5 Logical Proofs . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 5
1.6 Formalization . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 7
1.7 Automation . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 11
1.8 Reading Guide . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 13
1.9 Exercises . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 14

2 Propositional Logic . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 17
2.1 Introduction . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 17
2.2 Syntax . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 17
2.3 Semantics . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 19
2.4 Evaluation . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 22
2.5 Satisfaction . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 23
2.6 Example–Natural Language . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 24
2.7 Example–Digital Circuits . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 26
2.8 Exercises . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 27

3 Logical Properties and Relationships . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 31

3.1 Introduction . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 31
3.2 Logical Properties . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 31
3.3 Logical Equivalence . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 32
3.4 Logical Entailment . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 33
3.5 Logical Consistency . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 35
3.6 Connections Between Properties and Relationships . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 36
3.7 Exercises . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 38
4 Propositional Proofs . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 41
4.1 Introduction . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 41
4.2 Linear Reasoning . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 41
4.3 Hypothetical Reasoning . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 44
4.4 Fitch . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 46
4.5 Reasoning Tips . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 48
4.6 Soundness And Completeness . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 50
4.7 Exercises . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 50

5 Propositional Resolution . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 53
5.1 Introduction . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 53
5.2 Clausal Form . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 53
5.3 Resolution Principle . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 55
5.4 Resolution Reasoning . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 57
5.5 Exercises . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 60

6 Relational Logic . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 63
6.1 Introduction . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 63
6.2 Syntax . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 63
6.3 Semantics . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 66
6.4 Evaluation . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 67
6.5 Satisfaction . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 69
6.6 Example–Sorority World . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 70
6.7 Example–Blocks World . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 71
6.8 Example–Modular Arithmetic . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 73
6.9 Logical Properties . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 74
6.10 Logical Entailment . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 75
6.11 Relational Logic and Propositional Logic . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 76
6.12 Exercises . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 79

7 Relational Analysis . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 83
7.1 Introduction . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 83
7.2 Truth Tables . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 83
7.3 Semantic Trees . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 84
7.4 Boolean Models . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 84
7.5 Non-Boolean Models . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 89
7.6 Exercises . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 94
8 Relational Proofs . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 97
8.1 Introduction . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 97
8.2 Proofs . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 97
8.3 Example . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 100
8.4 Example . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 101
8.5 Example . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 103
8.6 Exercises . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 105

9 Herbrand Logic . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 107

9.1 Introduction . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 107
9.2 Syntax and Semantics . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 107
9.3 Evaluation and Satisfaction . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 109
9.4 Example–Peano Arithmetic . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 109
9.5 Example–Linked Lists . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 111
9.6 Example–Pseudo English . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 112
9.7 Example–Metalevel Logic . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 114
9.8 Undecidability . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 115
9.9 Exercises . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 117

10 Herbrand Proofs . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 119

10.1 Introduction . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 119
10.2 Non-Compactness and Incompleteness . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 119

11 Induction . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 121
11.1 Introduction . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 121
11.2 Domain Closure . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 122
11.3 Linear Induction . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 123
11.4 Tree Induction . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 125
11.5 Structural Induction . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 127
11.6 Multidimensional Induction . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 130
11.7 Embedded Induction . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 134
11.8 Exercises . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 135

12 Resolution . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 139
12.1 Introduction . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 139
12.2 Clausal Form . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 139
12.3 Unification . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 142
12.4 Resolution Principle . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 146
12.5 Resolution Reasoning . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 148
12.6 Unsatisfiability . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 149
12.7 Logical Entailment . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 150
12.8 Answer Extraction . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 152
12.9 Strategies . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 154
12.10 Exercises . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 159

Bibliography . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 161
 Preface
is book is a first course in Formal Logic. It is intended primarily for use at the college level.
However, it can also be used for advanced secondary school students, and it can be used at the
start of graduate school for those who have not yet seen the material.
ere are just two prerequisites. e book presumes that the student understands sets and
set operations, such as union, intersection, and so forth. It also presumes that the student is
comfortable with symbolic manipulation, as used, for example, in solving high-school algebra
problems. Nothing else is required.
e approach to teaching Logic used here emerged from more than 10 years of experience
in teaching the logical foundations of Artificial Intelligence and more than 20 years of experience
in teaching Logic for Computer Scientists. e result of this experience is an approach that differs
from that taken by other books in Logic in two essential ways, one having to do with content,
the other with form.
e primary difference in content concerns that semantics of the logic that is taught. Like
many other books on Logic, this one covers first-order syntax and first-order proof theory plus
induction. However, unlike other books, this book starts with Herbrand semantics rather than
the more traditional Tarskian semantics.
In Tarskian semantics, we define an interpretation as a universe of discourse together with
a function (1) that maps the object constants of our language to objects in a universe of discourse
and (2) that maps relation constants to relations on that universe. We define variable assignments
as assignments to variables. We define the semantics of quantified expressions as variations on
variable assignments, saying, for example, that a universally quantified sentence is true for a given
interpretation if and only if it is true for every variation of the given variable assignment. It is a
mouthful to say and even harder for students to understand.
In Herbrand semantics, we start with the object constants, function constants, and relation
constants of our language; we define the Herbrand base (i.e. the set of all ground atoms that can be
formed from these components); and we define a model to be an arbitrary subset of the Herbrand
base. at is all. In Herbrand semantics, an arbitrary logical sentence is logically equivalent to the
set of all of its instances. A universally quantified sentence is true if and only if all of its instances
are true. ere are no interpretations and no variable assignments and no variations of variable
assignments.
Although both approaches ultimately end up with the same deductive mechanism, we get
there in two different ways. Deciding to use Herbrand semantics was not an easy to choice to
make. It took years to get the material right and, even then, it took years to use it in teaching
Logic. Although there are some slight disadvantages to this approach, experience suggests that
the advantages significantly outweigh those disadvantages. is approach is considerably easier
for students to understand and leaves them with a deeper understanding of what Logic is all
about. at said, there are some differences between Herbrand semantics and Tarskian semantics
that some educators and theoreticians may find worrisome.
First of all, Herbrand semantics is not compact—there are infinite sets of sentences that
are inconsistent while every finite subset is consistent. e upshot of this is that there are infi-
nite sets of sentences where we cannot demonstrate unsatisfiability with a finite argument within
the language itself. Fortunately, this does not cause any practical difficulties, since in all cases of
practical interest we are working with finite sets of premises.
One significant deficiency of Herbrand semantics vis a vis Tarskian semantics is that with
Herbrand semantics there are restrictions on the cardinality of the worlds that can be axioma-
tized. Since there is no external universe, the cardinality of the structures that can be axiomatized
is equal to the number of ground terms in the language. (To make things easy, we can always
choose a countable language. We can even choose an uncountable language, though doing so
would ruin some of the nice properties of the logic. On the positive side, it is worth noting that in
many practical applications we do not care about uncountable sets. Although there are uncount-
ably many real numbers, remember that there are only countably many floating point numbers.)
More significantly, recall that the Lowenheim-Skolem eorem for Tarskian semantics assures
us that even with Tarskian semantics we cannot write sentences that distinguish models of dif-
ferent infinite cardinalities. So, it is unclear whether this restriction has any real significance for
the vast majority of students.
Herbrand semantics shares most important properties with Tarskian semantics. In the ab-
sence of function constants, the deductive calculus is complete for all finite axiomatizations. In
fact, the calculus derives the exact same set of sentences. When we add functions, we lose this
nice property. However, we get some interesting benefits in return. For one, it is possible with
Herbrand semantics (with functions) to finitely axiomatize arithmetic. As we know from Godel,
this is not possible in a first-order language with Tarskian semantics. e downside is that we
lose completeness. However, it is nice to know that we can at least define things, even though
we cannot prove them. Moreover, as mentioned above, we do not actually lose any consequences
that we are able to deduce with Tarskian semantics.
at’s all for what makes the content of this book different from other books. ere is also
a difference in form. In addition to the text of the book in print and online, there are also online
exercises (with automated grading), some online Logic tools and applications, online videos of
lectures, and an online forum for discussion.
e online offering of the course began with an experimental version early in the 2000s.
While it was moderately successful, we were at that time unable to combine the online mate-
rials and tools and grading program with videos and an online forum, and so we discontinued
the experiment. Recently, it was revived when Sebastian run, Daphne Koller, and Andrew Ng
created technologies for comprehensive offering online courses and began offering highly suc-
cessful online courses of their own. With their technology and the previous materials, it was easy
to create a comprehensive online course in Logic. And this led to completion of this book.
anks also to Pat Suppes, Jon Barwise, John Etchemendy, David-Barker Plummer, and
others at the Stanford Center for the Study of Language and Information for their pioneering
work on online education in Logic. Language, Proof, and Logic (LPL) in particular is a wonder-
ful introduction to Logic and is widely used around the world. Although there are differences
between that volume and this one in theory (especially semantics) and implementation (notably
the use here of browser-based exercises and applications), this volume is in many ways similar to
LPL. In particular, this volume shamelessly copies the LPL tactic of using online worlds (like
Tarski’s World) as a teaching tool for Logic.
And thanks as well to the thousands of students who over the years have had to endure early
versions of this material, in many cases helping to get it right by suffering through experiments
that were not always successful. It is a testament to the intelligence of these students that they
seem to have learned the material despite multiple bumbling mistakes on our part. eir patience
and constructive comments were invaluable in helping us to understand what works and what
does not.
Finally, we need to acknowledge the enormous contributions of a former graduate
student—Tim Hinrichs. He is a co-discoverer of many of the results about Herbrand seman-
tics, without which this book would not have been written.

Michael Genesereth and Eric J. Kao

October 2016
 CHAPTER 1

Introduction
1.1 INTRODUCTION
Logic is one of the oldest intellectual disciplines in human history. It dates back to Aristotle. It
has been studied through the centuries by people like Leibniz, Boole, Russell, Turing, and many
others. And it is still a subject of active investigation today.
We use Logic in just about everything we do. We use the language of Logic to state observa-
tions, to define concepts, and to formalize theories. We use logical reasoning to derive conclusions
from these bits of information. We use logical proofs to convince others of our conclusions.
And we are not alone! Logic is increasingly being used by computers—to prove mathemat-
ical theorems, to validate engineering designs, to diagnose failures, to encode and analyze laws
and regulations and business rules.
Logic is also becoming more common at the interface between man and machine, in “logic-
enabled” computer systems, where users can view and edit logical sentences. ink, for example,
about email readers that allow users to write rules to manage incoming mail messages—deleting
some, moving others to various mailboxes, and so forth based on properties of those messages.
In the business world, eCommerce systems allow companies to encode price rules based on the
product, the customer, the date, and so forth.
Moreover, Logic is sometimes used not just by users in communicating with computer
systems but by software engineers in building those systems (using a programming methodology
known as logic programming ).
is chapter is an overview of Logic as presented in this book. We start with a discussion of
possible worlds and illustrate the notion in an application area known as Sorority World. We then
give an informal introduction to the key elements of Logic—logical sentences, logical entailment,
and logical proofs. We then talk about the value of using a formal language for expressing logical
information instead of natural language. Finally, we discuss the automation of logical reasoning
and some of the computer applications that this makes possible.

1.2 POSSIBLE WORLDS

Consider the interpersonal relations of a small sorority. ere are just four members—Abby, Bess,
Cody, and Dana. Some of the girls like each other, but some do not.
Figure 1.1 shows one set of possibilities. e checkmark in the first row here means that
Abby likes Cody, while the absence of a checkmark means that Abby does not like the other girls
(including herself ). Bess likes Cody too. Cody likes everyone but herself. And Dana also likes the
popular Cody.

Abby Bess Cody Dana

Abby ü

Bess ü

Cody ü ü ü

Dana ü

Figure 1.1: One state of Sorority World.

Of course, this is not the only possible state of affairs. Figure 1.2 shows another possible
world. In this world, every girl likes exactly two other girls, and every girl is liked by just two girls.

Abby Bess Cody Dana

Abby ü ü

Bess ü ü

Cody ü ü

Dana ü ü

Figure 1.2: Another state of Sorority World.

 As it turns out, there are quite a few possibilities. Given four girls, there are sixteen possible
instances of the likes relation—Abby likes Abby, Abby likes Bess, Abby likes Cody, Abby likes
Dana, Bess likes Abby, and so forth. Each of these sixteen can be either true or false. ere are
216 (65,536) possible combinations of these true-false possibilities, and so there are 216 possible
worlds.

1.3 LOGICAL SENTENCES

Let’s assume that we do not know the likes and dislikes of the girls ourselves but we have infor-
mants who are willing to tell us about them. Each informant knows a little about the likes and
dislikes of the girls, but no one knows everything.
Here is where Logic comes in. By writing logical sentences, each informant can express
exactly what he or she knows—no more, no less. For our part, we can use the sentences we have
been told to draw conclusions that are logically entailed by those sentences. And we can use logical
proofs to explain our conclusions to others.
Figure 1.1 shows some logical sentences pertaining to our sorority world. e first sentence
is straightforward; it tells us directly that Dana likes Cody. e second and third sentences tell us
what is not true without saying what is true. e fourth sentence says that one condition holds or
another but does not say which. e fifth sentence gives a general fact about the girls Abby likes.
e sixth sentence expresses a general fact about Cody’s likes. e last sentence says something
about everyone.

Dana likes Cody.

Abby does not like Dana.
Dana does not like Abby.
Bess likes Cody and Dana.
Abby likes everyone that Bess likes.
Cody likes everyone who likes her.
Nobody likes herself.

Figure 1.3: Logical sentences describing Sorority World.

Sentences like these constrain the possible ways the world could be. Each sentence divides
the set of possible worlds into two subsets, those in which the sentence is true and those in which
the sentence is false. Believing a sentence is tantamount to believing that the world is in the first
set. Given two sentences, we know the world must be in the intersection of the set of worlds in
which the first sentence is true and the set of worlds in which the second sentence is true. Ideally,
when we have enough sentences, we know exactly how things stand.
Effective communication requires a language that allows us to express what we know, no
more and no less. If we know the state of the world, then we should write enough sentences to
communicate this to others. If we do not know which of various ways the world could be, we
need a language that allows us to express only what we know. e beauty of Logic is that it gives
us a means to express incomplete information when that is all we have and to express complete
information when full information is available.

1.4 LOGICAL ENTAILMENT

Logical sentences can sometimes pinpoint a specific world from among many possible worlds.
However, this is not always the case. Sometimes, a collection of sentences only partially constrains
the world. For example, there are four different worlds that satisfy the sentences in Figure 1.3,
viz. the ones shown in Figure 1.4.

Abby Bess Cody Dana Abby Bess Cody Dana

Abby ü Abby ü ü

Bess ü Bess ü

Cody ü ü ü Cody ü ü ü

Dana ü Dana ü

Abby Bess Cody Dana Abby Bess Cody Dana

Abby ü Abby ü ü

Bess ü Bess ü

Cody ü ü ü Cody ü ü ü

Dana ü ü Dana ü ü

Figure 1.4: Four states of Sorority World.

 Even though a set of sentences does not determine a unique world, it is often the case that
some sentences are true in every world that satisfies the given sentences. A sentence of this sort
is said to be a logical conclusion from the given sentences. Said the other way around, a set of
sentences logically entails a conclusion if and only if every world that satisfies the sentences also
satisfies the conclusion.
What can we conclude from the bits of information in Figure 1.3? Quite a bit, as it turns
out. For example, it must be the case that Bess likes Cody. Also, Bess does not like Dana. ere
are also some general conclusions that must be true. For example, in this world with just four
girls, we can conclude that everybody likes somebody. Also, everyone is liked by somebody.

Bess likes Cody.

Bess does not like Dana.
Everybody likes somebody.
Everybody is liked by somebody.

Figure 1.5: Conclusions about Sorority World.

One way to check whether a set of sentences logically entails a conclusion is to examine the
set of all worlds in which the given sentences are true. For example, in our case, we notice that,
in every world that satisfies our sentences, Bess likes Cody, so the statement that Bess likes Cody
is a logical conclusion from our set of sentences.

1.5 LOGICAL PROOFS

Unfortunately, determining logical entailment by checking all possible worlds is impractical in
general. ere are usually many, many possible worlds; and in some cases there can be infinitely
many.
e alternative is logical reasoning, viz. the application of reasoning rules to derive logical
conclusions and produce logical proofs, i.e., sequences of reasoning steps that leads from premises
to conclusions.
e concept of proof, in order to be meaningful, requires that we be able to recognize certain
reasoning steps as immediately obvious. In other words, we need to be familiar with the reasoning
“atoms” out of which complex proof “molecules” are built.
One of Aristotle’s great contributions to philosophy was his recognition that what makes a
step of a proof immediately obvious is its form rather than its content. It does not matter whether
you are talking about blocks or stocks or sorority girls. What matters is the structure of the facts
with which you are working. Such patterns are called rules of inference.
As an example, consider the reasoning step shown below. We know that all Accords are
Hondas, and we know that all Hondas are Japanese cars. Consequently, we can conclude that all
Accords are Japanese cars.
 All Accords are Hondas.
All Hondas are Japanese.
erefore, all Accords are Japanese.
Now consider another example. We know that all borogoves are slithy toves, and we know
that all slithy toves are mimsy. Consequently, we can conclude that all borogoves are mimsy.
What’s more, in order to reach this conclusion, we do not need to know anything about borogoves
or slithy toves or what it means to be mimsy.
All borogoves are slithy toves.
All slithy toves are mimsy.
erefore, all borogoves are mimsy.
What is interesting about these examples is that they share the same reasoning structure,
viz. the pattern shown below.
All x are y .
All y are z .
erefore, all x are z .
e existence of such reasoning patterns is fundamental in Logic but raises important ques-
tions. Which patterns are correct? Are there many such patterns or just a few?
Let us consider the first of these questions. Obviously, there are patterns that are just plain
wrong in the sense that they can lead to incorrect conclusions. Consider, as an example, the (faulty)
reasoning pattern shown below.
All x are y .
Some y are z .
erefore, some x are z .
Now let us take a look at an instance of this pattern. If we replace x by Toyotas and y by
cars and z by made in America, we get the following line of argument, leading to a conclusion that
happens to be correct.
All Toyotas are cars.
Some cars are made in America.
erefore, some Toyotas are made in America.
On the other hand, if we replace x by Toyotas and y by cars and z by Porsches, we get a line
of argument leading to a conclusion that is questionable.
All Toyotas are cars.
Some cars are Porsches.
erefore, some Toyotas are Porsches.
 What distinguishes a correct pattern from one that is incorrect is that it must *always* lead
to correct conclusions, i.e., they must be correct so long as the premises on which they are based
are correct. As we will see, this is the defining criterion for what we call deduction.
Now, it is noteworthy that there are patterns of reasoning that are sometimes useful but
do not satisfy this strict criterion. ere is inductive reasoning, abductive reasoning, reasoning by
analogy, and so forth.
Induction is reasoning from the particular to the general. e example shown below illus-
trates this. If we see enough cases in which something is true and we never see a case in which it
is false, we tend to conclude that it is always true.
I have seen 1000 black ravens.
I have never seen a raven that is not black.
erefore, every raven is black.
Now try red Hondas.
Abduction is reasoning from effects to possible causes. Many things can cause an observed
result. We often tend to infer a cause even when our enumeration of possible causes is incomplete.
If there is no fuel, the car will not start.
If there is no spark, the car will not start.
ere is spark.
e car will not start.
erefore, there is no fuel.
What if the car is in a vacuum chamber?
Reasoning by analogy is reasoning in which we infer a conclusion based on similarity of
two situations, as in the following example.
e flow in a pipe is proportional to its diameter.
Wires are like pipes.
erefore, the current in a wire is proportional to diameter.
Now try price.
Of all types of reasoning, deduction is the only one that guarantees its conclusions in all
cases. It has some very special properties and holds a unique place in Logic. In this book, we
concentrate entirely on deduction and leave these other forms of reasoning to others.

1.6 FORMALIZATION
So far, we have illustrated everything with sentences in English. While natural language works
well in many circumstances, it is not without its problems. Natural language sentences can be
complex; they can be ambiguous; and failing to understand the meaning of a sentence can lead
to errors in reasoning.
 Even very simple sentences can be troublesome. Here we see two grammatically legal sen-
tences. ey are the same in all but the last word, but their structure is entirely different. In the
first, the main verb is blossoms, while in the second blossoms is a noun and the main verb is sank.
e cherry blossoms in the Spring.
e cherry blossoms in the Spring sank.
As another example of grammatical complexity, consider the following excerpt taken from
the University of Michigan lease agreement. e sentence in this case is sufficiently long and
the grammatical structure sufficiently complex that people must often read it several times to
understand precisely what it says.

e University may terminate this lease when the Lessee, having made application and
executed this lease in advance of enrollment, is not eligible to enroll or fails to enroll in the
University or leaves the University at any time prior to the expiration of this lease, or for
violation of any provisions of this lease, or for violation of any University regulation rela-
tive to resident Halls, or for health reasons, by providing the student with written notice of
this termination 30 days prior to the effective date of termination, unless life, limb, or prop-
erty would be jeopardized, the Lessee engages in the sales of purchase of controlled substances
in violation of federal, state or local law, or the Lessee is no longer enrolled as a student,
or the Lessee engages in the use or possession of firearms, explosives, inflammable liquids,
fireworks, or other dangerous weapons within the building, or turns in a false alarm, in
which cases a maximum of 24 hours notice would be sufficient.

As an example of ambiguity, suppose I were to write the sentence ere’s a girl in the room
with a telescope. See Figure 1.6 for two possible meanings of this sentence. Am I saying that there
is a girl in a room containing a telescope? Or am I saying that there is a girl in the room and she
is holding a telescope?

Figure 1.6: ere’s a girl in the room with a telescope.

 Such complexities and ambiguities can sometimes be humorous if they lead to interpreta-
tions the author did not intend. See the examples below for some infamous newspaper headlines
with multiple interpretations. Using a formal language eliminates such unintentional ambiguities
(and, for better or worse, avoids any unintentional humor as well).

Crowds Rushing to See Pope Trample 6 to Death

Journal Star, Peoria, 1980

Scientists Grow Frog Eyes and Ears British Left Waffles On Falkland Islands
e Daily Camera, Boulder, 2000

Food Stamp Recipients Turn to Plastic Indian Ocean Talks

e Miami Herald, 1991 e Plain Dealer, 1977

Fried Chicken Cooked in Microwave Wins Trip

e Oregonian, Portland, 1981

Figure 1.7: Various newspaper headlines.

As an illustration of errors that arise in reasoning with sentences in natural language, con-
sider the following examples. In the first, we use the transitivity of the better relation to derive a
conclusion about the relative quality of champagne and soda from the relative quality of cham-
pagne and beer and the relative quality or beer and soda. So far so good.
Champagne is better than beer.
Beer is better than soda.
erefore, champagne is better than soda.
Now, consider what happens when we apply the same transitivity rule in the case illustrated
below. e form of the argument is the same as before, but the conclusion is somewhat less
believable. e problem in this case is that the use of nothing here is syntactically similar to the
use of beer in the preceding example, but in English it means something entirely different.
Bad sex is better than nothing.
Nothing is better than good sex.
erefore, bad sex is better than good sex.
Logic eliminates these difficulties through the use of a formal language for encoding infor-
mation. Given the syntax and semantics of this formal language, we can give a precise definition
for the notion of logical conclusion. Moreover, we can establish precise reasoning rules that pro-
duce all and only logical conclusions.
 In this regard, there is a strong analogy between the methods of Formal Logic and those
of high school algebra. To illustrate this analogy, consider the following algebra problem.

Xavier is three times as old as Yolanda. Xavier’s age and Yolanda’s age add up to twelve.
How old are Xavier and Yolanda?

Typically, the first step in solving such a problem is to express the information in the form
of equations. If we let x represent the age of Xavier and y represent the age of Yolanda, we can
capture the essential information of the problem as shown below.

x 3y D 0
x C y D 12

Using the methods of algebra, we can then manipulate these expressions to solve the prob-
lem. First we subtract the second equation from the first.

x 3y D 0
x C y D 12
4y D 12

Next, we divide each side of the resulting equation by 4 to get a value for y . en substi-
tuting back into one of the preceding equations, we get a value for x .

xD9
yD3

Now, consider the following logic problem.

If Mary loves Pat, then Mary loves Quincy. If it is Monday and raining, then Mary loves
Pat or Quincy. If it is Monday and raining, does Mary love Quincy?

As with the algebra problem, the first step is formalization. Let p represent the possibility
that Mary loves Pat; let q represent the possibility that Mary loves Quincy; let m represent the
possibility that it is Monday; and let r represent the possibility that it is raining.
With these abbreviations, we can represent the essential information of this problem with
the following logical sentences. e first says that p implies q , i.e., if Mary loves Pat, then Mary
loves Quincy. e second says that m and r implies p or q , i.e., if it is Monday and raining, then
Mary loves Pat or Mary loves Quincy.
 p ) q
m^r ) p_q

As with Algebra, Formal Logic defines certain operations that we can use to manipulate
expressions. e operation shown below is a variant of what is called Propositional Resolution. e
expressions above the line are the premises of the rule, and the expression below is the conclusion.
p1 ^ ... ^ pk ) q1 _ .. _ ql
r1 ^ ... ^ rm ) s1 _ ... _ sn
p1 ^ ... ^ pk ^ r1 ^ ... ^ rm ) q1 _ ... _ ql _ s1 _ ... _ sn
ere are two elaborations of this operation. (1) If a proposition on the left hand side of
one sentence is the same as a proposition on the right hand side of the other sentence, it is okay to
drop the two symbols, with the proviso that only one such pair may be dropped. (2) If a constant
is repeated on the same side of a single sentence, all but one of the occurrences can be deleted.
We can use this operation to solve the problem of Mary’s love life. Looking at the two
premises above, we notice that p occurs on the left-hand side of one sentence and the right-hand
side of the other. Consequently, we can cancel the p and thereby derive the conclusion that, if is
Monday and raining, then Mary loves Quincy or Mary loves Quincy.
p ) q
m^r ) p_q
m^r ) q_q
Dropping the repeated symbol on the right hand side, we arrive at the conclusion that, if
it is Monday and raining, then Mary loves Quincy.
m^r ) q_q
m^r ) q
is example is interesting in that it showcases our formal language for encoding logical
information. As with algebra, we use symbols to represent relevant aspects of the world in ques-
tion, and we use operators to connect these symbols in order to express information about the
things those symbols represent.
e example also introduces one of the most important operations in Formal Logic, viz.
Resolution (in this case a restricted form of Resolution). Resolution has the property of being
complete for an important class of logic problems, i.e., it is the only operation necessary to solve
any problem in the class.

1.7 AUTOMATION
e existence of a formal language for representing information and the existence of a corre-
sponding set of mechanical manipulation rules together have an important consequence, viz. the
possibility of automated reasoning using digital computers.
 e idea is simple. We use our formal representation to encode the premises of a problem
as data structures in a computer, and we program the computer to apply our mechanical rules
in a systematic way. e rules are applied until the desired conclusion is attained or until it is
determined that the desired conclusion cannot be attained. (Unfortunately, in some cases, this
determination cannot be made; and the procedure never halts. Nevertheless, as discussed in later
chapters, the idea is basically sound.)
Although the prospect of automated reasoning has achieved practical realization only in
the last few decades, it is interesting to note that the concept itself is not new. In fact, the idea of
building machines capable of logical reasoning has a long tradition.
One of the first individuals to give voice to this idea was Leibnitz. He conceived of “a
universal algebra by which all knowledge, including moral and metaphysical truths, can some day
be brought within a single deductive system.” Having already perfected a mechanical calculator
for arithmetic, he argued that, with this universal algebra, it would be possible to build a machine
capable of rendering the consequences of such a system mechanically.
Boole gave substance to this dream in the 1800s with the invention of Boolean algebra and
with the creation of a machine capable of computing accordingly.
e early twentieth century brought additional advances in Logic, notably the invention of
the predicate calculus by Russell and Whitehead and the proof of the corresponding completeness
and incompleteness theorems by Godel in the 1930s.
e advent of the digital computer in the 1940s gave increased attention to the prospects for
automated reasoning. Research in artificial intelligence led to the development of efficient algo-
rithms for logical reasoning, highlighted by Robinson’s invention of resolution theorem proving
in the 1960s.
Today, the prospect of automated reasoning has moved from the realm of possibility to that
of practicality, with the creation of logic technology in the form of automated reasoning systems,
such as Vampire, Prover9, the Prolog Technology eorem Prover, Epilog, and others.
e emergence of this technology has led to the application of logic technology in a wide
variety of areas. e following paragraphs outline some of these uses.
Mathematics. Automated reasoning programs can be used to check proofs and, in some
cases, to produce proofs or portions of proofs.
Engineering. Engineers can use the language of Logic to write specifications for their prod-
ucts and to encode their designs. Automated reasoning tools can be used to simulate designs and
in some cases validate that these designs meet their specification. Such tools can also be used to
diagnose failures and to develop testing programs.
Database Systems. By conceptualizing database tables as sets of simple sentences, it is pos-
sible to use Logic in support of database systems. For example, the language of Logic can be used
to define virtual views of data in terms of explicitly stored tables, and it can be used to encode
constraints on databases. Automated reasoning techniques can be used to compute new tables, to
detect problems, and to optimize queries.
 Data Integration e language of Logic can be used to relate the vocabulary and structure
of disparate data sources, and automated reasoning techniques can be used to integrate the data
in these sources.
Logical Spreadsheets. Logical spreadsheets generalize traditional spreadsheets to include log-
ical constraints as well as traditional arithmetic formulas. Examples of such constraints abound.
For example, in scheduling applications, we might have timing constraints or restrictions on who
can reserve which rooms. In the domain of travel reservations, we might have constraints on
adults and infants. In academic program sheets, we might have constraints on how many courses
of varying types that students must take.
Law and Business. e language of Logic can be used to encode regulations and business
rules, and automated reasoning techniques can be used to analyze such regulations for inconsis-
tency and overlap.

1.8 READING GUIDE

Although Logic is a single field of study, there is more than one logic in this field. In the three
main units of this book, we look at three different types of logic, each more sophisticated than
the one before.
Propositional Logic is the logic of propositions. Symbols in the language represent “condi-
tions” in the world, and complex sentences in the language express interrelationships among these
conditions. e primary operators are Boolean connectives, such as and, or, and not.
Relational Logic expands upon Propositional Logic by providing a means for explicitly talk-
ing about individual objects and their interrelationships (not just monolithic conditions). In order
to do so, we expand our language to include object constants and relation constants, variables and
quantifiers.
Herbrand Logic takes us one step further by providing a means for describing worlds with
infinitely many objects. e resulting logic is much more powerful than Propositional Logic and
Relational Logic. Unfortunately, as we shall see, many of the nice computational properties of
the first two logics are lost as a result.
Despite their differences, there are many commonalities among these logics. In particular,
in each case, there is a language with a formal syntax and a precise semantics; there is a notion of
logical entailment; and there are legal rules for manipulating expressions in the language.
ese similarities allow us to compare the logics and to gain an appreciation of the fun-
damental tradeoff between expressiveness and computational complexity. On the one hand, the
introduction of additional linguistic complexity makes it possible to say things that cannot be
said in more restricted languages. On the other hand, the introduction of additional linguistic
flexibility has adverse effects on computability. As we proceed though the material, our attention
will range from the completely computable case of Propositional Logic to a variant that is not at
all computable.
 One final comment. In the hopes of preventing difficulties, it is worth pointing out a poten-
tial source of confusion. is book exists in the meta world. It contains sentences about sentences;
it contains proofs about proofs. In some places, we use similar mathematical symbology both for
sentences in Logic and sentences about Logic. Wherever possible, we try to be clear about this
distinction, but the potential for confusion remains. Unfortunately, this comes with the territory.
We are using Logic to study Logic. It is our most powerful intellectual tool.

RECAP
Logic is the study of information encoded in the form of logical sentences. Each logical sentence
divides the set of all possible world into two subsets—the set of worlds in which the sentence
is true and the set of worlds in which the set of sentences is false. A set of premises logically
entails a conclusion if and only if the conclusion is true in every world in which all of the premises
are true. Deduction is a form of symbolic reasoning that produces conclusions that are logically
entailed by premises (distinguishing it from other forms of reasoning, such as induction, abduction,
and analogical reasoning ). A proof is a sequence of simple, more-or-less obvious deductive steps
that justifies a conclusion that may not be immediately obvious from given premises. In Logic, we
usually encode logical information as sentences in formal languages; and we use rules of inference
appropriate to these languages. Such formal representations and methods are useful for us to use
ourselves. Moreover, they allow us to automate the process of deduction, though the computability
of such implementations varies with the complexity of the sentences involved.

1.9 EXERCISES
1.1. Consider the state of the Sorority World depicted below.

Abby Bess Cody Dana

Abby ü ü

Bess ü

Cody ü ü ü

Dana ü ü
 For each of the following sentences, say whether or not it is true in this state of the world.
(a) Abby likes Dana.
(b) Dana does not like Abby.
(c) Abby likes Cody or Dana.
(d ) Abby likes someone who likes her.
(e) Somebody likes everybody.
1.2. Come up with a table of likes and dislikes for the Sorority World that makes all of the
following sentences true. Note that there is more than one such table.
Dana likes Cody.
Abby does not like Dana.
Bess likes Cody or Dana.
Abby likes everyone whom Bess likes.
Cody likes everyone who likes her.
Nobody likes herself.
1.3. Consider a set of Sorority World premises that are true in the four states of Sorority
World shown in Figure 1.4. For each of the following sentences, say whether or not it is
logically entailed by these premises.
(a) Abby likes Bess or Bess likes Abby.
(b) Somebody likes herself.
(c) Everybody likes somebody.
1.4. Say whether or not the following reasoning patterns are logically correct.
(a) All x are z . All y are z . erefore, some x are y .
(b) Some x are y . All y are z . erefore, some x are z .
(c) All x are y . Some y are z . erefore, some x are z .
 CHAPTER 2

Propositional Logic
2.1 INTRODUCTION
Propositional Logic is concerned with propositions and their interrelationships. e notion of a
proposition here cannot be defined precisely. Roughly speaking, a proposition is a possible condi-
tion of the world that is either true or false, e.g., the possibility that it is raining, the possibility
that it is cloudy, and so forth. e condition need not be true in order for it to be a proposition.
In fact, we might want to say that it is false or that it is true if some other proposition is true.
In this chapter, we first look at the syntactic rules that define the language of Propositional
Logic. We then introduce the notion of a truth assignment and use it to define the meaning
of Propositional Logic sentences. After that, we present a mechanical method for evaluating
sentences for a given truth assignment, and we present a mechanical method for finding truth
assignments that satisfy sentences. We conclude with some examples of Propositional Logic in
formalizing Natural Language and Digital Circuits.

2.2 SYNTAX
In Propositional Logic, there are two types of sentences—simple sentences and compound sen-
tences. Simple sentences express simple facts about the world. Compound sentences express log-
ical relationships between the simpler sentences of which they are composed.
Simple sentences in Propositional Logic are often called proposition constants or, sometimes,
logical constants. In what follows, we write proposition constants as strings of letters, digits, and
underscores (“_”), where the first character is a lower case letter. For example, raining is a propo-
sition constant, as are rAiNiNg, r32aining, and raining_or_snowing. Raining is not a proposition
constant because it begins with an upper case character. 324567 fails because it begins with a
number. raining-or-snowing fails because it contains hyphens (instead of underscores).
Compound sentences are formed from simpler sentences and express relationships among the
constituent sentences. ere are five types of compound sentences, viz. negations, conjunctions,
disjunctions, implications, and biconditionals.
A negation consists of the negation operator : and an arbitrary sentence, called the target.
For example, given the sentence p , we can form the negation of p as shown below.

(:p )
Another Random Scribd Document
with Unrelated Content
The patterns that by God and by French fathers
Had twenty years been made. This is a stem
Of that victorious stock; and let us fear
The native mightiness and fate of him.[4803]

Enter a Messenger.

Mess. Ambassadors from Harry King of

England[4804]65
Do crave admittance to your majesty.

Fr. King. We'll give them present audience. Go, and

bring them.

[Exeunt Messenger and certain

Lords.[4805]

You see this chase is hotly follow'd, friends.

Dau. Turn head, and stop pursuit; for coward dogs

Most spend their mouths when what they seem to
threaten70
Runs far before them. Good my sovereign,[4806]
Take up the English short, and let them know[4807]
Of what a monarchy you are the head:
Self-love, my liege, is not so vile a sin
As self-neglecting.

Re-enter Lords, with Exeter and train.

Fr. King. From our brother England?[4808]75

Exe. From him; and thus he greets your majesty.

He wills you, in the name of God Almighty,
That you divest yourself, and lay apart
The borrow'd glories that by gift of heaven,
By law of nature and of nations, 'long[4809]80
To him and to his heirs; namely, the crown
And all wide-stretched honours that pertain
By custom and the ordinance of times
Unto the crown of France. That you may know
'Tis no sinister nor no awkward claim,85
Pick'd from the worm-holes of long-vanish'd days,
Nor from the dust of old oblivion raked,
He sends you this most memorable line,[4810]
In every branch truly demonstrative;[4811]
Willing you overlook this pedigree:[4812]90
And when you find him evenly derived
From his most famed of famous ancestors,
Edward the third, he bids you then resign
Your crown and kingdom, indirectly held
From him the native and true challenger.95

Fr. King. Or else what follows?

Exe. Bloody constraint; for if you hide the crown

Even in your hearts, there will he rake for it:
Therefore in fierce tempest is he coming,[4813]
In thunder and in earthquake, like a Jove,100
That, if requiring fail, he will compel;[4814]
And bids you, in the bowels of the Lord,[4815]
Deliver up the crown, and to take mercy
On the poor souls for whom this hungry war
Opens his vasty jaws; and on your head[4816]105
 p yj ; y
Turning the widows' tears, the orphans' cries,[4817]
[4818]
The dead men's blood, the pining maidens' groans,
[4818][4819]
For husbands, fathers and betrothed lovers,
That shall be swallow'd in this controversy.
This is his claim, his threatening and my message;110
Unless the Dauphin be in presence here,
To whom expressly I bring greeting too.[4820]

Fr. King. For us, we will consider of this further:

To-morrow shall you bear our full intent
Back to our brother England.[4821]

Dau. For the Dauphin,115

I stand here for him: what to him from England?

Exe. Scorn and defiance; slight regard, contempt,

And any thing that may not misbecome
The mighty sender, doth he prize you at.
Thus says my king; an if your father's
highness[4822]120
Do not, in grant of all demands at large,
Sweeten the bitter mock you sent his majesty,
He'll call you to so hot an answer of it,[4823]
That caves and womby vaultages of France
Shall chide your trespass and return your
mock[4824]125
In second accent of his ordnance.[4825]

Dau. Say, if my father render fair return,[4826]

It is against my will; for I desire
Nothing but odds with England: to that end,[4827]
As matching to his youth and vanity,[4827]130
[4828]
I did present him with the Paris balls.[4828]

Exe. He'll make your Paris Louvre shake for it,[4829]

Were it the mistress-court of mighty Europe:
And, be assured, you'll find a difference,
As we his subjects have in wonder found,135
Between the promise of his greener days
And these he masters now: now he weighs time[4830]
Even to the utmost grain: that you shall read[4831]
In your own losses, if he stay in France.[4832]

Fr. King. To-morrow shall you know our mind at full.

[4833]140

Exe. Dispatch us with all speed, lest that our king

Come here himself to question our delay;
For he is footed in this land already.

Fr. King. You shall be soon dispatch'd with fair

conditions:
A night is but small breath and little pause[4834]145
To answer matters of this consequence. [Flourish. Exeunt.
[4835]

FOOTNOTES:

[4644] Act II. Prologue.] om. Ff. Act II. Scene I. Johnson.
[4645] Pope places the Chorus after Act II. Scene I.
[4646] thrive] strive Collier (Collier MS.).
[4647] see thy fault! France ... out A nest] Capell. see, thy fault
France ... out, A nest Ff.
[4648] he] she Hanmer.
[4649] And by ... Southampton] Johnson proposed to arrange
these lines in the following order: 28, 29, 33, 34, 35, 30, 31, 32.
[4650] France, and in Southampton.] France; and in
Southampton. F1 F2 F3. France; and in Southampton, F4. France.
Then in Southampton Pope. France, e'en in Southampton Capell.
[4651] Linger ... play] See note (II).
and we'll ... force] and you'll ... for we'll force Lloyd conj.
[4652] we'll] F3 F4. wee'l F1 F2. well Pope.
[4653] distance; force] Ff. distance, while we force Pope.
distance, while we farce Warburton conj. distance, and so force
Collier (Collier MS.). distance; foresee Staunton conj.
[4654] The ... agreed;] This line should follow line 27, Keightley
conj.
[4655] But, till ... come] But when ... comes Hammer.
But ... not] Not ... but Malone conj.
not] but Roderick conj. But, ere ... come Keightley conj.
[4656] Scene I.] Hanmer. Act I. Scene IV. Pope.
London....] Capell. Before Quickly's house in East-cheap.
Theobald.
[4657] be smiles] be—[Smiles.] Hanmer (Warburton). be smites
Collier (Farmer conj.). similes Jackson conj.
[4658] an end] Ff. the humour of it (Qq) Steevens.
[4659] be all ... to] all go ... to or all be ... in Johnson conj.
let it] Rowe. let't F1 F2 F3. let's F4.
[4660] do] die Mason conj.
rendezvous] F4. rendevous F1 F2 F3.
[4661] throats] thoughts Jackson conj.
[4662] mare] (Qq) Theobald. name Ff. dame Hanmer. jade Collier
MS.
[4663] Hostess.] Quickly. Ff. Hostes Quickly his wife. (Qq).
[4664] tike] tick Malone conj.
[4665] As in (Qq) Johnson. As prose in Ff.
[4666] [Nym ... draw.] Nym draws his sword. Malone. Nym, and
Pistol, eye one another and draw. Capell. om. Ff.
[4667] O ... drawn now!] Hanmer. O ... drawn! Now Theobald. O
... hewne now, Ff (hewn F3 F4). O ... if he be not hewing now!
Steevens conj. O ... Lord here's Corporal Nym’s— Malone (from
Q1). O ... here. Now Knight. O Lord here's Corporal Nym's—O
well-a day ... hewn now! Halliwell.
Lady] om. Malone conj.
[4668] Bard. Good lieutenant] Ff. Bar. Good ancient Capell. Good
lieutenant Bardolph Malone (continuing the speech to Host.).
[4669] Pish!] Push (Qq).
[4670] Iceland] Steevens (Johnson conj.). Island Ff. Iseland (Qq),
once only.
[4671] thy valour] the valour of a man (Qq) Capell.
[4672] [sheathing his sword. Malone. off] off now Keightley conj.
[4673] 'Solus’ ... follow] Arranged as by Pope. As prose in Ff.
[4674] mervailous] F1 F2. marvelleus F3 F4.
[4675] nasty] Ff. mesfull (Qq).
[4676] take] talke (Qq). talk Capell.
[4677] doting] groaning (Qq) Pope.
[4678] [Pistol and Nym draw. Malone.
[4679] [Draws.] Malone.
[4680] Give ... tall] As in Pope. As prose in Ff.
[4681] most] more Pope.
[4682] Couple a] Ff. Couple (Qq). Coupe a Rowe (ed. 2). Coupe
le Capell. Coupe la Dyce.
[4683] As prose in Ff. As verse in (Qq) and Pope.
[4684] thee defy] (Qq) Capell. defe thee Ff.
[4685] Go to] Pope. to go to Ff. om. (Qq) Capell. so, go to Collier
conj.
[4686] you,] Hanmer. your Ff.
[4687] face] nose (Qq) Pope.
[4688] [Exeunt ...] Capell. Exit. Ff.
[4689] [They draw.] (Qq). Draw. Ff.
[4690] an ... an] & ... and Ff.
[4691] Nym. I shall ... betting?] (Qq) Capell. Omitted in Ff.
[4692] Arranged as by Pope. As prose in Ff.
[4693] combine, and] combind our Q3.
[4694] that's] that F1.
of't] Ff. of it (Qq) Capell.
Re-enter ...] Enter ... Ff.
[4695] came] (Qq) F2 F3 F4. come F1.
[4696] Ah] Pope. A Ff.
[4697] Arranged as by Capell. As prose in Ff.
[4698] lambkins we] Malone. lambkins, we Ff.
[4699] Scene II.] Pope. Scene III. Johnson. om. Ff.
Southampton.] Pope.
A council-chamber.] Malone. A Hall of council. Capell.
[4700] Exe. Nay ... treachery.] Ff. Glost. I ... trechery. Exe. O the
Lord of Masham (Qq).
[4701] dull'd] F1 F2. lull'd F3 F4. dol'd Steevens conj.
dull'd and cloy'd] cloy'd and grac'd (Qq) Steevens.
[4702] Trumpets sound.] Sound Trumpets. Ff.
King Henry] the King, Ff.
and Attendants] Theobald. om. Ff.
[4703] kind] om. (Qq) Pope.
[4704] head] aid Warburton.
[4705] consent] concent Malone.
[4706] Nor] Ff. And Pope.
[4707] monarch] a monarch F3 F4.
[4708] I think] om. Pope.
[4709] Grey.] Gray. F4. Kni. F1 F2 F3.
True: those] Even those (Qq) Capell.
[4710] do serve] observe Pope.
[4711] the weight] Ff. their cause (Qq). their weight Anon. conj.
[4712] his] our Collier (Collier MS.).
[4713] merciful] merciful, my lord (Collier MS.)
[4714] Sir, You] Dyce. Sir, you Ff. You (Qq) Pope.
[4715] yet] om. Pope.
[4716] And] om. Pope.
[4717] late] state Collier (Collier MS.). lord Keightley conj.
[4718] I] Ff. me (Qq) Capell.
royal] om. Pope.
[4719] Lord] F1 F4. Lords F2 F3.
[4720] hath] (Qq) F4. have F1 F2 F3.
[4721] do confess] confess Pope.
[4722] into] upon (Qq) Pope.
[4723] you] them (Qq) Capell.
[4724] of] om. Pope.
[4725] him] om. F1.
[4726] stands] F1. stand F2 F3 F4.
[4727] and white] Ff. from white (Qq) Capell.
[4728] grossly] closely Hanmer.
a natural] an naturall F1. unnatural Nicholson conj.
cause] course Collier MS.
[4729] whoop] Theobald. hoope F1 F2. hoop F3 F4.
[4730] and on] F1. and no F2 F3 F4.
[4731] thee] these Warburton.
[4732] Hath] H'ath Capell.
[4733] All] Hanmer. And Ff. For Malone conj.]
by treasons] Ff. by-treasons Rowe. to treasons Mason conj.
[4734] being] om. Keightley conj.
[4735] temper'd] tempted Johnson conj.
[4736] lion gait] Lyon-gate Ff.
[4737] seem] or seem Pope.
[4738] not] nor Rowe (ed. 2).
[4739] complement] compliment Theobald.
[4740] eye without the ear] ear but with the eye Theobald
(Warburton).
[4741] To mark the ... With] Malone. To mark the ... the best
endu'd With Theobald. To make thee full fraught man, and best
indued With Ff. To make the full-fraught man, the best, endu'd
With Pope. To mark the ... the best endow'd Capell conj. To mock
... and best indued With Malone conj. (withdrawn). To mark the
full fraught man and least inclined With Mitford conj. See note
(III).
[4742] I] and I F4.
[4743] Henry] (Qq) Theobald. Thomas Ff.
[4744] knight, of] Collier. knight of (Qq) Ff.
[4745] seduce] seduce me Keightley conj.
[4746] I] om. F1.
will rejoice] will rejoice for Rowe. rejoice for Pope. will rejoice at
Capell conj.
[4747] proclaim'd] om. Pope.
[4748] into] unto Capell.
[4749] you have] (Qq) Knight. you three F2 F3 F4. you F1. See
note (IV).
[4750] Get you] Go Pope.
[4751] [Exeunt ...] Exeunt. F2 F3 F4. Exit. Ff.
[4752] war,] Ff. war; Capell.
[4753] way] F3 F4. way, F1. way. F2. path Anon. conj.
[4754] beginnings. We] F1. beginning. We F2 F3 F4. beginnings,
we Capell.
We doubt not now] Now we doubt not Pope.
[4755] on] in F4.
[4756] sea;] Theobald. sea, Ff. sea Rowe.
[4757] Scene III.] Pope. Scene IV. Johnson. om. Ff.
London ... Tavern.] Capell. London. Pope. Quickly's house in
Eastcheap. Theobald.
[4758] honey-sweet] Theobald. honey sweet F1 F2. honey, sweet
F 3 F 4.
[4759] No; ...therefore] As verse by Pope. As prose in Ff.
[4760] yearn] erne F1 F2. yern F3 F4.
[4761] Boy] om. Rann (Capell conj.).
[4762] Capell ends the lines up ... therefore.
[4763] either ...hell] om. Farmer conj. MS.
[4764] he's ... hell] om. Farmer conj. MS.
[4765] a finer] F1 F2. finer F3 F4. a fine Capell.
[4766] an it] Pope. and it Ff. as it (Qq).
christom] F4. christome F1 F2 F3. crysombd (Q1 Q3). chrisombd
(Q2). chrisom Johnson. chryssom' Capell. chrisom'd Steevens
(1778).
[4767] even just] ev'n just F1 F2. just F3 F4.
[4768] even at the] ev'n at the Ff. e'en at Capell.
[4769] o'] of Capell.
[4770] play with] Ff. talk of (Qq). play with the Anon. conj.
[4771] ends] (Qq) Capell. end Ff.
[4772] and a' babbled of green fields.] Theobald. Omitted in
(Qq). and a Table of greene fields. F1 F2. and a Table of green
fields. F3. and a Table of green Fields. F4. Omitted by Pope. and
a' talked of green fields. Anon. MS. conj. apud Theobald. and a'
fabled of green fields. W. N. conj. apud Long MS. in a table of
green fields. Malone conj. upon a table of green fells. Smith conj.
on a table of green frieze. Collier MS. or as stubble on shorn
fields. Anon. (Fras. Mag.) conj. See note (V).
[4773] be o'good] be a good Ff. be of good Theobald.
[4774] cold as any] F1 F2. cold as a F3 F4.
[4775] knees, and ... stone, and so] (Qq) Capell. knees, and so
Ff.
[4776] upward and upward] (Qq) F3 F4. up-peer'd and upward
F1. upwar'd and upward F2. up'ard and up'ard Grant White.
[4777] of] Ff. on (Qq).
[4778] Bard.] Ff. Boy. (Qq) Warburton.
[4779] devils] Deules F1.
[4780] Host.] Woman. Ff.
[4781] devil] Capell. Deule Ff.
[4782] hell-fire] (Q1 Q2) Capell. hell (Q3) Ff.
[4783] Arranged as by Capell. As verse, first by Pope. As prose in
Ff.
[4784] senses rule] sense us rule Johnson conj. sentences rule
Mason conj.
word] (Q1 Q3) Rowe (ed. 2). world (Q2) Ff.
Pitch] Pinch Johnson conj.
[4785] Caveto] Ff. cophetua (Qq).
[4786] Yoke-fellows] Yoke-yoke-fellows Pope.
[4787] that's] that is Hanmer.
[4788] [Kissing her.] Capell.
[4789] Scene IV.] Pope. Scene V. Johnson. om. Ff.
France.] Pope. The ... Palace. Theobald.
Flourish.] F1. om. F2 F3 F4.
Enter ...] Enter King of France, Bourbon, Dolphin, and others.
(Qq). Enter the French King, the Dolphin, the Dukes of Berry and
Britaine. Ff.
... Dauphin ...] ... Dauphin, the Duke of Burgundy ... Rowe.
[4790] comes] Ff. come Rowe. See note (VI).
[4791] carefully] carelessly Hanmer (Warburton).
[4792] Orleans] Rowe. Orleance Ff.
[4793] fatal and] fatally Hanmer.
[4794] And] But (Qq).
[4795] shallow, humorous] shallow-humorous S. Walker conj.
[4796] think it] think not Roderick conj.
[4797] cases] F1. causes F2 F3 F4.
[4798] Which of] While oft Malone conj. Which, oft Rann. Of
which Knight. Which if Staunton conj.
projection] protection Jackson conj.
[4799] haunted] hunted Warburton.
[4800] Whiles] While Rowe (ed. 2).
mountain] Mountaine F1 F2. Mountain F3 F4. mounting Theobald.
monarch Coleridge conj. mighty Anon. conj. (Gent. Mag. 1845).
[4801] Up ...sun] Inclosed in brackets, as spurious, by
Warburton.
[4802] heroical] heroick Rowe.
[4803] fate] force Hanmer.
[4804] Harry] Henry Steevens.
[4805] [Exeunt ...] Capell. om. Ff.
[4806] far] fear'd Capell conj.
[4807] the English] this English (Qq). these English Capell conj.
[4808] Re-enter ...] Capell. Enter Exeter. Ff.
Scene V. Pope. Scene VI. Johnson. om. Ff.
brother England] (Q1 Q2) Pope. brother of England (Q3) Ff.
[4809] 'long] Pope, longs Ff.
[4810] this ... line] Ff. these ... lines (Qq).
[4811] [Gives the French King a Paper. Theobald.
[4812] this] his Rowe.
[4813] Therefore in fierce] (Qq) Ff. And therefore in fierce Rowe.
Therefore in fiercest Mitford conj. Therefore in fiery S. Walker
conj.
[4814] will] may Pope.
[4815] And bids] He bids Rowe.
[4816] and on] upon Pope.
[4817] Turning] Turns he (Qq) Capell.
[4818] the widows' tears ... groans] the dead men's blood, the
widows' tears The orphans' cries, the pining maidens' groans
Johnson conj.
[4819] pining] (Qq) Pope. privy Ff. primy Theobald conj. 'prived
Warburton conj.
[4820] greeting too] (Qq) F2 F3 F4. greeting to F1.
[4821] England] (Q1 Q2) Pope. of England (Q3) Ff.
[4822] an if] Dyce (S. Walker conj.). and if Ff.
[4823] hot] loud (Qq) Capell.
of it] for it Pope.
[4824] chide] hide Theobald.
[4825] of] Ff. to Pope.
ordnance] ordenance (Qq). ordinance Ff.
[4826] render] tender F4.
return] reply (Qq) Pope.
[4827] Arranged as by Rowe. Line 129 ends at England in Ff.
[4828] the] those Pope.
[4829] Louvre] Pope. Louer (Qq) F1. Loover F2. Lover F3. Louver
F 4.
[4830] masters] musters (Qq).
[4831] that] which (Qq) Pope.
[4832] he] we (Q2 Q3).
[4833] shall you] you shall Rowe (ed. 2).
[4834] breath] F4. breathe F1 F2 F3.
[4835] [Flourish.] Ff, after line 140. Transferred by Dyce.
 ACT III.

PROLOGUE.

Enter Chorus.[4836]
Chor. Thus with imagined wing our swift scene flies
In motion of no less celerity[4837]
Than that of thought. Suppose that you have
seen[4837]
The well-appointed king at Hampton pier[4838]
Embark his royalty; and his brave fleet5
With silken streamers the young Phœbus fanning:
[4839]
Play with your fancies, and in them behold
Upon the hempen tackle ship-boys climbing;
Hear the shrill whistle which doth order give
To sounds confused; behold the threaden sails,10
Borne with the invisible and creeping wind,[4840]
Draw the huge bottoms through the furrow'd sea,
Breasting the lofty surge: O, do but think
You stand upon the rivage and behold
A city on the inconstant billows dancing;15
For so appears this fleet majestical,
Holding due course to Harfleur. Follow, follow:[4841]
Grapple your minds to sternage of this navy,[4842]
And leave your England, as dead midnight still,
Guarded with grandsires, babies and old women,20
Either past or not arrived to pith and puissance;[4843]
For who is he, whose chin is but enrich'd
With one appearing hair, that will not follow
These cull'd and choice-drawn cavaliers to France?
Work, work your thoughts, and therein see a siege;25
Behold the ordnance on their carriages,[4844]
With fatal mouths gaping on girded Harfleur.
Suppose the ambassador from the French comes back;
[4845]
Tells Harry that the king doth offer him
Katharine his daughter, and with her, to dowry,30
d f bl d k d
 Some petty and unprofitable dukedoms.
The offer likes not: and the nimble gunner
With linstock now the devilish cannon touches,

[Alarum, and chambers go off.

[4846]

And down goes all before them. Still be kind,[4847]

And eke out our performance with your mind. 35
[Exit.[4848]

Scene I. France. Before Harfleur.

Alarum. Enter King Henry, Exeter, Bedford, Gloucester, and

Soldiers, with scaling-ladders.[4849]
K. Hen. Once more unto the breach, dear friends, once
more;[4850][4851]
Or close the wall up with our English dead.[4851]
In peace there's nothing so becomes a man
As modest stillness and humility:
But when the blast of war blows in our ears,5
Then imitate the action of the tiger;
Stiffen the sinews, summon up the blood,[4852]
Disguise fair nature with hard-favour'd rage;
Then lend the eye a terrible aspect;
Let it pry through the portage of the head10
Like the brass cannon; let the brow o'erwhelm it[4853]
As fearfully as doth a galled rock
O'erhang and jutty his confounded base,[4854]
Swill'd with the wild and wasteful ocean.
Now set the teeth and stretch the nostril wide,[4855]15
Hold hard the breath and bend up every spirit
To his full height. On, on, you noblest English,[4856]
Whose blood is fet from fathers of war-proof![4857]
Fathers that, like so many Alexanders,
Have in these parts from morn till even fought20
And sheathed their swords for lack of argument:
Dishonour not your mothers; now attest
That those whom you call'd fathers did beget you.
Be copy now to men of grosser blood,[4858]
And teach them how to war. And you, good yeomen,25
Whose limbs were made in England, show us here
The mettle of your pasture; let us swear[4859]
That you are worth your breeding; which I doubt not;
For there is none of you so mean and base,
That hath not noble lustre in your eyes.30
I see you stand like greyhounds in the slips,
Straining upon the start. The game's afoot:[4860]
Follow your spirit, and upon this charge
Cry 'God for Harry, England, and Saint George!'

[Exeunt. Alarum, and chambers

go off.[4861]

Scene II. The same.

Enter Nym, Bardolph, Pistol, and Boy.[4862]

Bard. On, on, on, on, on! to the breach, to the breach!

Nym. Pray thee, corporal, stay: the knocks are

too[4863]
hot; and, for mine own part, I have not a case of lives:
the
humour of it is too hot, that is the very plain-song of
it.

Pist. The plain-song is most just; for humours do5

abound:[4864]

Knocks go and come; God's vassals drop and die;

[4865]

And sword and shield,[4865]

In bloody field,[4865]
Doth win immortal fame.[4865][4866]

Boy. Would I were in an alehouse in London! I

would10
give all my fame for a pot of ale and safety.[4867]

Pist. And I:[4867]

If wishes would prevail with me,[4867][4868][4869]

My purpose should not fail with me,[4867][4869]
But thither would I hie.[4867][4870]15

Boy. As duly, but not as truly,[4867][4871][4872]

As bird doth sing on bough.[4867][4872]

Enter Fluellen.[4867][4873]
Flu. Up to the breach, you dogs! avaunt, you cullions!
[4867][4874][4875]

[Driving them forward.[4867][4874]

[4876]
Pist. Be merciful, great duke, to men of mould.[4867]
[4877]20

Abate thy rage, abate thy manly rage,[4867][4877]

Abate thy rage, great duke![4867][4877][4878]
Good bawcock, bate thy rage; use lenity, sweet chuck!
[4867][4877]

Nym. These be good humours! your honour wins

bad[4867][4879]
humours. 25 [Exeunt all but
Boy.[4867]
Boy. As young as I am, I have observed [4880]
these three
swashers. I am boy to them all three: but all they
three,[4881]
though they would serve me, could not be man to me;
for
indeed three such antics do not amount to a man. For
Bardolph, he is white-livered and red-faced; by the
means30
whereof a' faces it out, but fights not. For Pistol, he
hath
a killing tongue and a quiet sword; by the means
whereof
a' breaks words, and keeps whole weapons. For Nym,
he
hath heard that men of few words are the best men;
and
therefore he scorns to say his prayers, lest a' should
be35
thought a coward: but his few bad words are matched
with
as few good deeds; for a' never broke any man's head
but his
own, and that was against a post when he was drunk.
They
will steal any thing, and call it purchase. Bardolph stole
a
lute-case, bore it twelve leagues, and sold it for three
half-pence.40
Nym and Bardolph are sworn brothers in filching,
and in Calais they stole a fire-shovel: I knew by that
piece
of service the men would carry coals. They would have
me
as familiar with men's pockets as their gloves or their
hand-kerchers:
which makes much against my manhood, if I[4882]45
should take from another's pocket to put into mine; for
it[4882][4883]
is plain pocketing up of wrongs. I must leave them,
and
seek some better service: their villany goes against my
weak
stomach, and therefore I must cast it up.
[Exit.
Re-enter Fluellen, Gower following.[4884]
Gow. Captain Fluellen, you must come presently to50
the mines; the Duke of Gloucester would speak with
you.

Flu. To the mines! tell you the duke, it is not so good

to come to the mines; for, look you, the mines is not
according
to the disciplines of the war: the concavities of it[4885]
is not sufficient; for, look you, th' athversary, you may
discuss55
unto the duke, look you, is digt himself four yard[4886]
under the countermines: by Cheshu, I think a' will
plow
up all, if there is not better directions.

Gow. The Duke of Gloucester, to whom the order of

the siege is given, is altogether directed by an
Irishman, a60
very valiant gentleman, i' faith.

Flu. It is Captain Macmorris, is it not?[4887]

Gow. I think it be.

Flu. By Cheshu, he is an ass, as in the world: I

will[4888]
verify as much in his beard: he has no more directions
in65
the true disciplines of the wars, look you, of the
Roman
disciplines, than is a puppy-dog.

Enter Macmorris and Captain Jamy.[4889]

Gow. Here a' comes; and the Scots captain, Captain
Jamy, with him.

Flu. Captain Jamy is a marvellous falorous gentleman,

[4890]70
that is certain; and of great expedition and knowledge
in
th' aunchient wars, upon my particular knowledge of
his
directions: by Cheshu, he will maintain his argument
as
well as any military man in the world, in the disciplines
of
the pristine wars of the Romans.75

Jamy. I say gud-day, Captain Fluellen.[4891]

Flu. God-den to your worship, good Captain James.

[4892]

Gow. How now, Captain Macmorris! have you

quit[4893]
the mines? have the pioners given o'er?[4894]

Mac. By Chrish, la! tish ill done: the work ish

give[4895]80
over, the trompet sound the retreat. By my hand, I
swear,
and my father's soul, the work ish ill done; it ish give
over: I would have blowed up the town, so Chrish save
me, la! in an hour: O, tish ill done, tish ill done; by my
hand, tish ill done!85

Flu. Captain Macmorris, I beseech you now, will you

voutsafe me, look you, a few disputations with you, as
 partly
touching or concerning the disciplines of the war, the
Roman[4896]
wars, in the way of argument, look you, and friendly
communication; partly to satisfy my opinion, and
partly90
for the satisfaction, look you, of my mind, as touching
the
direction of the military discipline; that is the point.

Jamy. It sall be vary gud, gud feith, gud captains

bath: and I sall quit you with gud leve, as I may pick
occasion; that sall I, marry.95

Mac. It is no time to discourse, so Chrish save me: the

day is hot, and the weather, and the wars, and the
king,
and the dukes: it is no time to discourse. The town is
beseeched,[4897]
and the trumpet call us to the breach; and we
talk, and, be Chrish, do nothing: 'tis shame for us all:
so100
God sa' me, 'tis shame to stand still; it is shame, by my
hand: and there is throats to be cut, and works to be
done;
and there ish nothing done, so Chrish sa' me, la!

Jamy. By the mess, ere theise eyes of mine take

themselves
to slomber, ay'll de gud service, or ay'll lig i'
the[4898]105
grund for it; ay, or go to death; and ay'll pay 't as
valorously[4898]
as I may, that sall I suerly do, that is the breff
and[4899]
the long Marry I wad full fain hear some question
the long. Marry, I wad full fain hear some question
'tween[4900]
you tway.

Flu. Captain Macmorris, I think, look you, under

your110
correction, there is not many of your nation—[4901]

Mac. Of my nation! What ish my nation? Ish a villain,

[4902]
and a bastard, and a knave, and a rascal. What
ish[4902]
my nation? Who talks of my nation?[4902]

Flu. Look you, if you take the matter otherwise

than115
is meant, Captain Macmorris, peradventure I shall
think
you do not use me with that affability as in discretion
you
ought to use me, look you; being as good a man as
yourself,
both in the disciplines of war, and in the derivation of
my birth, and in other particularities.120

Mac. I do not know you so good a man as myself: so

Chrish save me, I will cut off your head.

Gow. Gentlemen both, you will mistake each other.

[4903]

Jamy. A! that's a foul fault.

[A parley sounded.[4904]
Gow. The town sounds a parley.125

Flu. Captain Macmorris, when there is more better

opportunity to be required, look you, I will be so bold
as to tell you I know the disciplines of war; and there
is[4905]
an end. [Exeunt.

Scene III. The same. Before the gates.

The Governor and some Citizens on the walls; the

English forces below. Enter King Henry and his train.
[4906]
K. Hen. How yet resolves the governor of the town?
This is the latest parle we will admit:[4907]
Therefore to our best mercy give yourselves;
Or like to men proud of destruction
Defy us to our worst: for, as I am a soldier,[4908]5
A name that in my thoughts becomes me best,
If I begin the battery once again,
I will not leave the half-achieved Harfleur
Till in her ashes she lie buried.
The gates of mercy shall be all shut up,10
And the flesh'd soldier, rough and hard of heart,
In liberty of bloody hand shall range
With conscience wide as hell, mowing like grass
Your fresh-fair virgins and your flowering infants.[4909]
What is it then to me, if impious war,15
Array'd in flames like to the prince of fiends,[4910]
Do, with his smirch'd complexion, all fell feats
Enlink'd to waste and desolation?
What is't to me, when you yourselves are cause,
If your pure maidens fall into the hand20
Of hot and forcing violation?
What rein can hold licentious wickedness
When down the hill he holds his fierce career?
We may as bootless spend our vain command
Upon the enraged soldiers in their spoil25
As send precepts to the leviathan[4911][4912]
To come ashore. Therefore, you men of Harfleur,[4911]
Take pity of your town and of your people,
Whiles yet my soldiers are in my command;[4913]
Whiles yet the cool and temperate wind of
grace[4913]30
O'erblows the filthy and contagious clouds[4914]
Of heady murder, spoil and villany.[4915]
f h l k
If not, why, in a moment look to see
The blind and bloody soldier with foul hand
Defile the locks of your shrill-shrieking daughters;
[4916]35
Your fathers taken by the silver beards,
And their most reverend heads dash'd to the walls,
Your naked infants spitted upon pikes,
Whiles the mad mothers with their howls confused
Do break the clouds, as did the wives of Jewry40
At Herod's bloody-hunting slaughtermen.
What say you? will you yield, and this avoid,
Or, guilty in defence, be thus destroy'd?[4917]

Gov. Our expectation hath this day an end:

The Dauphin, whom of succours we entreated,[4918]45
Returns us that his powers are yet not ready[4919]
To raise so great a siege. Therefore, great king,[4920]
We yield our town and lives to thy soft mercy.
Enter our gates; dispose of us and ours;
For we no longer are defensible.50

K. Hen. Open your gates. Come, uncle Exeter,

Go you and enter Harfleur; there remain,[4921]
And fortify it strongly 'gainst the French:
Use mercy to them all. For us, dear uncle,[4922]
The winter coming on and sickness growing55
Upon our soldiers, we will retire to Calais.[4923]
To-night in Harfleur we will be your guest;
To-morrow for the march are we addrest.

[Flourish. The King and his train

enter the town.[4924]

Scene IV. The French King's Palace.

Enter Katharine and Alice.[4925]
Kath. Alice, tu as été en Angleterre, et tu parles
bien[4926]
le langage.

Alice. Un peu, madame.

Kath. Je te prie, m'enseignez; il faut que j'apprenne à

parler. Comment appelez-vous la main en Anglois?5

Alice. La main? elle est appelée de hand.

Kath. De hand. Et les doigts?

Alice. Les doigts? ma foi, j'oublie les doigts; mais je

me souviendrai. Les doigts? je pense qu'ils sont
appelés
de fingres; oui, de fingres.10

Kath. La main, de hand; les doigts, de fingres. Je

pense que je suis le bon écolier; j'ai gagné deux mots
d'Anglois vîtement. Comment appelez-vous les ongles?

Alice. Les ongles? nous les appelons de nails.

Kath. De nails. Ecoutez; dites-moi, si je parle bien:15

de hand, de fingres, et de nails.

Alice. C'est bien dit, madame; il est fort bon Anglois.

Kath. Dites-moi l'Anglois pour le bras.

Alice. De arm, madame.

Kath. Et le coude?20

Alice. De elbow.

K th D lb J ' f i l é étiti d t
Kath. De elbow. Je m'en fais la répétition de tous
les mots que vous m'avez appris dès à présent.

Alice. Il est trop difficile, madame, comme je pense.

Kath. Excusez-moi, Alice; écoutez: de hand, de

fingres,25
de nails, de arma, de bilbow.

Alice. De elbow, madame.

Kath. O Seigneur Dieu, je m'en oublie! de elbow.

Comment appelez-vous le col?

Alice. De neck, madame.30

Kath. De nick. Et le menton?

Alice. De chin.

Kath. De sin. Le col, de nick; le menton, de sin.

Alice. Oui. Sauf votre honneur, en vérité, vous

prononcez les mots aussi droit que les natifs
d'Angleterre.35

Kath. Je ne doute point d'apprendre, par la grace de

Dieu, et en peu de temps.

Alice. N'avez vous pas déjà oublié ce que je vous

ai[4927]
enseigné?

Kath. Non, je reciterai à vous promptement: de

hand,40
de fingres, de mails,—[4928]

Alice. De nails, madame.

 Kath. De nails, de arm, de ilbow.

Alice. Sauf votre honneur, de elbow.

Kath. Ainsi dis-je; de elbow, de nick, et de sin.45

Comment appelez-vous le pied et la robe?

Alice. De foot, madame; et de coun.

Kath. De foot et de coun! O Seigneur Dieu! ce sont

mots de son mauvais, corruptible, gros, et impudique,
et non
pour les dames d'honneur d'user: je ne voudrais
prononcer50
ces mots devant les seigneurs de France pour tout le
monde.
Foh! le foot et le coun! Néanmoins, je reciterai une
autre[4929]
fois ma leçon ensemble: de hand, de fingres, de nails,
de
arm, de elbow, de nick, de sin, de foot, de coun.

Alice. Excellent, madame!55

Kath. C'est assez pour une fois: allons-nous à dîner.

[Exeunt.[4930]

Scene V. The same.

Enter the King of France, the Dauphin, the Duke of Bourbon,

the Constable of France, and others.[4931]
Fr. King. 'Tis certain he hath pass'd the river Somme.

Con. And if he be not fought withal, my lord,[4932]

Let us not live in France; let us quit all,
And give our vineyards to a barbarous people.

Dau. O Dieu vivant! shall a few sprays of us,5

The emptying of our fathers' luxury,[4933]
Our scions, put in wild and savage stock,[4934]
Spirt up so suddenly into the clouds,[4935]
And overlook their grafters?[4936]

Bour. Normans, but bastard Normans, Norman

bastards![4937]10
Mort de ma vie! if they march along[4938]
Unfought withal, but I will sell my dukedom,
To buy a slobbery and a dirty farm[4939]
In that nook-shotten isle of Albion.[4940]

Con. Dieu de batailles! where have they this mettle?

[4941]15
Is not their climate foggy, raw and dull,
On whom, as in despite, the sun looks pale,[4942]
Killing their fruit with frowns? Can sodden water,
A drench for sur-rein'd jades, their barley-broth,
Decoct their cold blood to such valiant heat?20
And shall our quick blood, spirited with wine,
Seem frosty? O, for honour of our land,
Let us not hang like roping icicles[4943]
Upon our houses' thatch, whiles a more frosty
people[4944]
Sweat drops of gallant youth in our rich fields!—
[4945]25
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