FROM L AB TO FIELD:

Challenges and Opportunities

for Operationalising 
Border Security Research
Challenges and Opportunities for Operationalising Border Security Research

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RAND Europe
RR-2306-Frontex
December 2017
Prepared for the European Border and Coast Guard Agency (Frontex)

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Table of contents

Executive Summary #5
Kate Cox, Sarah Grand-Clement, Jacopo Bellasio, Giacomo Persi Paoli

Final Report #13

Kate Cox, Sarah Grand-Clement, Jacopo Bellasio, Giacomo Persi Paoli

Technical Annex #55

Kate Cox, Sarah Grand-Clement, Jacopo Bellasio, Richard Warnes, Lucy Strang, Giacomo Persi Paoli

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Executive
Summary
Challenges and Opportunities for Operationalising Border Security Research
This study examines how border
security research is set up, managed and
operationalised in and beyond Europe

Today, the European Union (EU) faces is set up, managed and operationalised Tunisia. Based on this preliminary in-
a range of pressures on its external and within and beyond Europe, with a view vestigation, we conducted a more in-
internal borders. Research and innova- to exploring how these processes could depth analysis of functional roles in R&I
tion (R&I) can help border guards (‘end be improved in the EU. to address RQ3. To do this, a second set
users’) understand and respond to these To support this overarching objective, of case studies was undertaken, focusing
threats, which include illegal border- Frontex commissioned a study to look at on six organisations: the European Space
crossings, people-smuggling activi- the following research questions (RQs): Agency (ESA), the European Institute
ties, weapons smuggling, trafficking ▪▪ RQ1: How is R&I in the area of border of Innovation & Technology (EIT), US
in human beings (THB) and terrorism. security set up, conducted and oper- Defense Innovation Unit – Experimental
A number of R&I funding mechanisms ationalised by EU organisations and (DIUx), the US Department of Homeland
(such as the Horizon 2020 (H2020) pro- Member States (MS)? Security (DHS) Small Business Innovation
gramme) support border security policy ▪▪ RQ2: What approaches are used in Research (SBIR), the US Homeland
priorities at the EU level,1 and an impor- the United States (US), Canada and Security Innovation Programs (HSIP),
tant part of Frontex’s mandate involves Australia to fund and apply research and US Centers of Excellence (COEs).
monitoring and contributing to research in this area?2 Complementing the case study analy-
developments. ▪▪ RQ3: What ‘good practices’ from these sis and in support of RQ3, the study team
Despite the millions of euros invested different approaches could be incor- held an external stakeholder workshop
in EU border security each year, chal- porated into the EU approach? in order to analyse the different types of
lenges remain in translating R&I into The study team used two main meth- functional role that Frontex could play to
operational practice. There is already ev- ods to address these research questions: support the operationalisation of border
idence to suggest that the ‘pull-through’ case studies (drawing on literature re- security research. Three internal analysis
of research can be difficult, given that views, research interviews and surveys) workshops were also held with a RAND
research providers often lack under- and workshops. To address RQ1–2, a first Experts Group in order to develop and re-
standing of the operational context set of case studies focused on good prac- fine a ‘research and innovation pathway’
and long-term research can lose its rele- tices and challenges in relation to bor- designed to map the processes that link
vance over time. Given these challenges, der security research in the EU, the US, border security research and its imple-
Frontex is interested in developing a bet- Canada and Australia, and (to a lesser mentation by border guards.
ter understanding of how border security extent) in Turkey, Egypt, Morocco and

2 At the client’s request, the study analysis

focuses on the EU, US, Canada, Australia
and – to a lesser extent – on Turkey and
1 European Union (2015), European three North African countries: Egypt,
Commission (2015e). Morocco and Tunisia.

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Challenges and Opportunities for Operationalising Border Security Research

A ‘research and innovation pathway’

is used to frame the study analysis

In relation to research and innovation, a ▪▪ Project specification and selection: ▪▪ Impact: the extent to which research
series of sequential steps can be identi- the creation of technical specifica- improves operational practice, en-
fied that connect the identification of a tions for research and selection of hances understanding of policy is-
capability gap to the adoption of a solu- suppliers; sues and builds capacity; and
tion by end users. As part of this study, ▪▪ Inputs to research: the components ▪▪ Evaluation: identifying gaps and re-
a research and innovation pathway was that provide a basis for the research starts the cycle described in the steps
developed which draws on existing liter- process (e.g. funding, personnel); above.
ature on research and innovation but is ▪▪ Research processes: all activities re-
intended to be specific to the situation lated to research dlivery; As Figure 1 shows, research and innova-
and needs of Frontex (see Figure 1 below). ▪▪ Research outputs: products that re- tion do not happen in a vacuum: these
Several steps follow the identification sult from project activities (e.g. tool- processes are shaped by key stakehold-
of a need to form a ‘research and innova- kits, technologies/prototypes); ers (including policy makers, research
tion pathway’. These include: ▪▪ Adoption by end users: integration providers and end users), by drivers of
of research outputs into operational innovation, and by the wider political,
practice; technological and social environment in
which they take place.

Figure 1 The research and innovation pathway

Research outputs Project specification

& selection

Adaption by users

Need identification
INNOVATION & prioritisation RESEARCH

Impact Inputs to research

Evaluation Research process

ENABLING FACTORS

KEY STAKEHOLDERS

CONTEXTUAL FACTORS

Source: RAND Europe analysis.

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The case studies highlight good
practices and challenges for R&I

Based on the case studies, the report border security research activities. ▪▪ Lack of end user interest in re-
identifies good practices that relate to Case study example: US. search: Despite improvements in en-
both the ‘research’ and ‘innovation’ parts ▪▪ Networks of industry and research gaging end users in research, in some
of the R&I pathway. These are: experts: Engagement between indus- cases end users’ unfamiliarity with
▪▪ End user involvement: Engaging end try and academic stakeholders can financial rules, intermittent project
users in research planning and deliv- support the development of R&I solu- engagement and lack of research en-
ery can help ensure that operational tions with practical value, leveraging gagement remain areas for improve-
requirements inform funding allo- both research expertise and technol- ment. Case study examples: EU, Turkey.
cation and research prioritisation. ogy development knowledge. Case ▪▪ Poor information exchange: While
This can lead to their successful up- study examples: SBIR, COE, EIT. a good understanding of the links
take in the field. Case study examples: ▪▪ Evaluation of research processes: between stakeholder networks and
EU, Canada, ESA. Regular monitoring and evaluating research results is important, chal-
▪▪ Engagement with leadership: Invol­ of existing research processes can en- lenges remain in disseminating this
ving senior representatives of border sure that they remain fit for purpose information due to, for example,
guard agencies and government de- over time. Case study examples: EU, US. shortcomings in interagency coop-
partments in research processes can eration. Case study example: ESA.
help strengthen the profile of bor- While the case studies highlight areas ▪▪ Intellectual Property (IP) con-
der security research, signalling sen- of good practice for R&I, various chal- straints: When project IP rights re-
ior commitment. Case study example: lenges can also be identified: main with developers in the EU, this
Australia. ▪▪ Poorly defined ‘impact’ criteria: can make it difficult for research prod-
▪▪ Flexible funding models: To remain While a central objective of research ucts to be applied in practice by bor-
adaptable to changing threats and op- programmes across the case study der guards. Case study examples: US, EU.
erational requirements, more agile countries is to achieve research im- ▪▪ Lack of available resources: A short-
funding models can help ensure that pact, ‘impact’ is often poorly defined age of funding and personnel for op-
research is responsive to emerging is- and lacks a clear set of assessment cri- erationalising research activities is
sues and continues to have practical teria. Case study example: EU. a constraint affecting several case
value for end users. Case study examples: ▪▪ Disconnect between research and study countries and regions. To ob-
EU, Australia, DIUx. operational practice: Despite on- tain available funding, it is important
▪▪ Coordinated research processes: going efforts to strengthen links be- to demonstrate the value of research
Having a centralised entity or set of tween border security research and through, for example, securing the
processes aimed at coordinating re- operational practice, not all research buy-in of senior ‘champions’ within
search efforts can help avoid duplica- products are successfully translated relevant agencies. Case study examples:
tion of effort, as well as supporting into operational practice. Case study EU, Canada.
situational awareness of ongoing example: EU.

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Organisations can adopt various

functional roles across the R&I pathway

Following the scoping of good practices ▪▪ Facilitating information provision –– Role 5.3: Launching an innovation
and challenges, we conducted a more and knowledge transfer: incubator.
in-depth analysis of R&I functional –– Role 3.1: Centralising information ▪▪ Facilitating access to funding:
roles, drawing on all the case studies on R&I opportunities –– Role 6.1: Providing direct R&I
conducted, in order to inform a set of –– Role 3.2: Sharing information on funding
recommendations for Frontex. The roles operational impacts of research –– Role 6.2: Facilitating access to
identified include: –– Role 3.3: Facilitating knowledge available funding instruments
▪▪ Coordinating requirement identifica- transfer –– Role 6.3: Using procurements to
tion and setting: –– Role 3.4: Delivering training and ‘pull’ innovative solutions from
–– Role 1.1: Performing horizon scan- education for end users. the market.
ning to identify threats and inno- ▪▪ Providing an ‘honest broker’ function:
vation opportunities –– Role 4.1: Facilitating cooperation Mapping the roles described above onto
–– Role 1.2: Analysing the operational between industry, academia and the research and innovation pathway
needs of end users. practitioners (see Figure 2 below) shows that most are
▪▪ Providing thought leadership: –– Role 4.2: Supporting coordination enablers or connectors between the dif-
–– Role 2.1: Conducting research in between industry, academia, na- ferent steps of the pathway. Some ac-
house tions and investors. tivities appear in multiple locations: for
–– Role 2.2: Influencing policy ▪▪ Hosting innovation: example, direct funding could be pro-
developments. –– Role 5.1: Running technology vided for the research itself or to support
demonstrations operationalisation of research outputs by
–– Role 5.2: Running prize competi- sponsoring capability demonstrations.
tions or ‘grand challenges’

Figure 2 Functional roles and the research and innovation pathway

Research outputs Project specification

3.2, 3.3
& selection
6.1, 6.2, 6.3
3.1

Adaption by users
3.4, 5.1, 5.3

Need identification
INNOVATION & prioritisation RESEARCH
1.1, 1.2

3.2, 3.3
Impact Inputs to research
2.2 6.1, 6.2

Evaluation Research process

2.1, 5.2
ENABLING FACTORS

KEY STAKEHOLDERS 4.1, 4.2

CONTEXTUAL FACTORS 2.2

Source: RAND Europe analysis.

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This report presents a set of
recommended interventions for Frontex

The study leverages findings on good findings, these interventions are de- with supporting activities for Frontex
practices, challenges and the functional signed to assist Frontex in developing and relevant examples from the study
roles played by other organisations to new solutions or expanding existing ini- analysis. Chapter 5 outlines further prac-
generate three overarching recommenda- tiatives for the setup, management and tical considerations relating to key ac-
tions, each of which suggests a number operationalisation of border security re- tors, benefits, risks, time and cost.
of interventions which could be under- search. These recommendations and in-
taken by Frontex. Drawing on the study terventions are listed in Table 1, along

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Table 1 Recommended interventions for Frontex

Recommendation 1:
Frontex should facilitate access to information, knowledge and networks for relevant
national and EU institutions, industry, academia and investors
Intervention 1.1: Supporting activities:
▪▪ (Further) developing a web platform (e.g. Border Tech-Net – BTN)
Creating a centralised repository of information ▪▪ Preparing analysis briefs on R&I activities for MS
on research, funding opportunities and successful ▪▪ Creating an online discussion forum for R&I providers and recipients
implementation of outputs. ▪▪ Facilitating access to a centralised contact book of border security R&I experts.

Relevant examples: Frontex BTN, ESA web portal.

Intervention 1.2: Supporting activities:
▪▪ Introducing a requirement for project teams to submit electronic project evaluation forms
Systematically capturing lessons identified to ▪▪ Discussing lessons internally every 6 or 12 months to identify areas for improvement
inform the future setup, management and ▪▪ Championing a wider ‘lessons learned’ R&I initiative (e.g. annual conference) with other EU institutions.
operationalisation of research projects.
Relevant examples: NATO Lessons Learned Portal.
Intervention 1.3: Supporting activities:
▪▪ Creating a form of ‘industry advisory group’
Brokering connections between R&I providers ▪▪ Leveraging networks, communities and centres already established by other EU agencies
and recipients. ▪▪ Establishing a Frontex-led network of COEs.

Relevant examples: NATO Industrial Advisory Group, ESA network of business incubation centres, US COE.

Recommendation 2:
Frontex should establish mechanisms to ensure that research projects are designed,
selected and implemented to be relevant for identified operational needs
Intervention 2.1: Supporting activities:
▪▪ Setting up an internal horizon-scanning function that produces a quarterly ‘key trends’ document
Systematically collecting information on border ▪▪ Leveraging wider EU horizon-scanning activities by partnering with other institutions
security technology development. ▪▪ Requesting that MS with horizon-scanning experience share outputs that Frontex can combine and
circulate to its stakeholder community
▪▪ Commissioning a horizon-scanning provider to produce a quarterly or biannual analysis.

Relevant examples: DHS Science & Technology directorate (S&T).

Intervention 2.2: Supporting activities:
▪▪ Requesting that MS share information on national operational requirements
Centralising information on national operational ▪▪ Sharing a list of aggregated requirements (cleared of any sensitive information) through, for example, a
requirements to support harmonisation. restricted area of BTN
▪▪ Performing high-level market analysis to identify existing solutions and sharing with MS
▪▪ Connecting MS with shared requirements so they can consider joint procurement.

Relevant examples: DHS Science and Technology Resource Allocation Strategy (STRAS), USCG Idea
Submission Review.
Intervention 2.3: Supporting activities:
▪▪ Using business cases to present recommendations for border security research prioritisation at the EU level
Adopting a ‘research champion’ role to inform ▪▪ Engaging with EU institutions to collect information on ongoing research and funding
policy and decision making in EU institutions. ▪▪ Feeding this information back through a regular publication or a centralised webpage.

Relevant examples: Frontex BTN, US Defense Innovation Board.

Intervention 2.4: Supporting activities:
▪▪ Implementing (i) more traditional public procurement procedures; and (ii) alternative processes like prizes,
Integrating traditional research selection grants and challenges in accordance with existing regulations.
processes with innovative approaches.
Relevant examples: EIT annual ‘EIT Awards’, US Defense Advanced Research Projects Agency (DARPA) Grand
Challenges.

Recommendation 3:
Frontex should facilitate the uptake and operationalisation of research outputs by end users
Intervention 3.1: Supporting activities:
▪▪ Creating cross-organisational project teams involving, for example, one manager from Frontex, a border
Establishing mechanisms for maintaining guard representative and the contractor
continuous engagement of end users. ▪▪ Involving end users in technology demonstrations to test systems or to demonstrate the added value of
research outputs
▪▪ Sponsoring pilot programmes designed to demonstrate the benefit of new R&I solutions.

Relevant examples: DHS S&T Integrated Product Teams, SBIR technology demonstrations, H2020 technology
demonstrations.
Intervention 3.2: Supporting activities:
▪▪ Providing direct funding for the commercialisation of technology (e.g. through Public Procurement of
Facilitating access to funding for the Innovative Solutions, Pre-Commercial Procurement)
commercialisation of research outputs. ▪▪ Sharing information on available EU funding instruments
▪▪ Offering a quality assurance process for business cases and research proposals aimed at further developing
R&I solutions
▪▪ (Further) building connections with investors.

Relevant examples: US HSIP programme events and industry days, EIT Knowledge and Innovation
Communities.

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Final
Report
Challenges and Opportunities for Operationalising Border Security Research
Table of contents

List of figures #16

List of tables #16

Abbreviations #17

Glossary of key terms #18

Preface #20

Acknowledgements #21

1. Introduction #22
1.1. Study context #22
1.2. Purpose and scope #24
1.3. Research approach #24
1.4. High-level assumptions #27
1.5. Structure of the report #28

2. Conceptualising research and innovation #29

2.1. Overview of key definitions #29
2.2. The research and innovation pathway #29

3. Good practices and challenges for border security R&I #32

3.1. Good practices in research setup, management and operationalisation #32
3.2. Challenges in translating research into operational practice #34

4. Functional roles for R&I organisations #38

4.1. Overview of functional roles for R&I #38
4.2. Mapping roles onto the research and innovation pathway #40

5. Ways forward for Frontex #42

5.1. Defining Frontex’s role in research and innovation for border security #42
5.2. Providing implementation guidelines for Frontex #43
5.3. Next steps #50

References #51

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List of figures

Figure 1.1 Overview of research approach #25

Figure 1.2 Overviev of WP1 and WP2 case studies #26

Figure 1.3 Structure of this report #27

Figure 2.1 Research and innovation as connected processes #30

Figure 2.2 The eight steps of the research and innovation pathway #30

Figure 2.3 The research and innovation pathway in context #31

Figure 4.1 Functional roles and the research and innovation pathway #41

List of tables

Table 0.1 Glossary of key terms #18

Table 1.1 Distribution of interviews across countries and regions (WP1–3) #27

Table 3.1 Summary of lessons identified from case studies #37

Table 4.1 Numbering of functional roles #41

Table 5.1 Overview of recommended interventions #42

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Abbreviations

BIC  usiness Incubation Centre

B HSIP  omeland Security Innovation Programs
H
bn Billion IBM Integrated Border Management
BTI Borders, Trade and Immigration Institute IITT Intended Invitation to Tender
BTN Border Tech-Net IPR Intellectual Property Rights
CBSA Canada Border Service Agency IPT Integrated Product Teams
CG-STIC USCG S&T Transition and Innovation Center IS Islamic State
COE Centre of Excellence ISF Internal Security Fund
COSME Competitiveness of Enterprises and SMEs ISR Idea Submission Review
CSS Centre for Security Science ITT Invitation to Tender
DARPA Defense Advanced Projects Research Agency KIC Knowledge and Innovation Community
DeVenCI Defence Venture Catalyst Initiative KPI Key Performance Indicator
DHS Department of Homeland Security m Million
DHS SBIR Department of Homeland Security Small M&E Monitoring and Evaluation
Business Innovation Research MS Member State(s)
DIBP Department of Immigration and Border NATO North Atlantic Treaty Organisaton
Protection NFPOC National Frontex Point of Contact
DIUx Defense Innovation Unit – Experimental NIAG NATO Industrial Advisory Group
DoD Department of Defense NLLP NATO Lessons Learned Portal
DOTMLPFI Doctrine, Organisation, Training, Materiel, PCP Pre-Commercial Procurement
Leadership and Education, Personnel, PPI Public Procurement of Innovative Solutions
Facilities, and Interoperability PPP Public-private partnership
DRDC Defence Research and Development Canada QHSR Quadrennial Homeland Security Reviews
EBCG European Border and Coast Guard R&D Research and Development
EDTIB European Defence Technological R&I Research and Innovation
and Industrial Base RCMP Royal Canadian Mounted Police
EFSI European Fund for Strategic Investments RDU Research and Development Unit
EIT European Institute of Innovation and RQ Research Question
Technology RTD&E Research, Development, Test and Evaluation
EMITS Electronic Mailing Invitation to Tender System S&T Science and Technology
ESA European Space Agency S&T (US) Science and Technology Directorate
ESIF European Structural and Investment Funds SBIR Small Business Innovation Research
EU European Union SME Small to Medium-sized Enterprise
Europol European Union Agency for Law Enforcement STRAS Science and Technology Resource Allocation
Cooperation Strategy
EUROSUR European Border Surveillance System THB Trafficking in Human Beings
FP Framework Programme TRADOC US Army Training and Command
FP7 Seventh Framework Programme for Research TRL Technology Readiness Level
and Technological Development US United States
GAO (US) Government Accountability Office USCG United States Coast Guard
H2020 Horizon 2020 WP Work Package

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Glossary of key terms

Table 0.1 provides expanded definitions of the key terms used in this document.

Table 0.1 Glossary of key terms

Term Definition Source

Applied research ‘Applied research’ is designed to solve practical problems of the modern world, rather than to Lawrence Berkeley National
acquire knowledge for knowledge’s sake. This contrasts with ‘basic research’ (see below). Library (n.d.).

Basic research ‘Basic research’ (also referred to as ‘fundamental’ or ‘pure’ research) is driven by interest in Lawrence Berkeley National
expanding knowledge, rather than a focus on creating or inventing products. This contrasts Library (n.d.).
with ‘applied research’ (see above).

Capital ‘Capital’ refers both to the equipment and physical assets held by firms to produce their Freeman et al. (2015).
goods/services, and to funding for the creation of ideas and for packaging and delivering this
knowledge as innovation.

Dissemination ‘Dissemination’ involves sharing research results with potential end users (definition below). European Commission (n.d.-a).1

Drivers ‘Drivers’ are the motivations that guide innovation. Drivers for innovation will vary by sector Freeman et al. (2015).2
depending on the incentives and perceived benefits of innovation; for border security, drivers
include enhancing border management capability, whereas for companies the key driver is
typically profit.

Effectiveness ‘Effectiveness’ is a measure of how successful an intervention has been in achieving or European Commission (2015b).
progressing towards its objectives.

End user An ‘end user’ is the ultimate user or customer of a product or service. End users in the Robinson et al. (2011).
context of this study refer to the individuals working in national or multinational authorities
responsible for border management. The terms ‘end user’ and ‘border guard’ are used
interchangeably throughout this document.

Exploitation ‘Exploitation’ involves using R&I results for commercial purposes, in public policymaking and European Commission, (n.d.-a.)
in policy implementation.

High-technology research ‘High-technology’ or ‘high-tech’ research refers to highly sophisticated and advanced Collins (n.d.)
technology.

Impact While definitions vary, ‘impact’ can be defined as the extent to which research improves ESRC (n.d.).
operational practices, contributes to an enhanced understanding of policy issues, and builds
capacity through skills development.

Innovation ‘Innovation’ refers to a process that is able to transform new ideas into products, services and Freeman et al. (2015).
processes, also encompassing the process of invention with a focus on ensuring that such
new ideas are applied to the benefit of end users.

Inputs ‘Inputs’ are the raw materials that provide a basis for the research process (e.g. money, RAND Europe analysis.
technical expertise, relationships, personnel).

Interoperability ‘Interoperability’ refers to the ability of countries to act together coherently, effectively and NATO (2012).
efficiently to achieve tactical, operational and strategic objectives. In the context of border
security, it enables border guard authorities and/or systems to adopt common procedures
and to share infrastructure.

1 European Commission (n.d.-a).

2 Freeman et al. (2015).

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Term Definition Source

Low-technology research ‘Low-technology’ or ‘low-tech’ refers to machines or systems that do not use modern or Collins (n.d.).
sophisticated technology.

Outputs ‘Outputs’ are the products that result from project activities (e.g. research publications, RAND Europe analysis.
toolkits, research briefings).

Operationalisation The integration of research findings into operational practice. RAND Europe analysis.

Needs ‘Needs’ refer to the issues that applied research is designed to address (e.g. capability gaps, RAND Europe analysis.
security threats).

Public-private partnerships ‘Public-private partnerships’ (PPPs) are long-term contracts between two units, whereby one European Commission (n.d.-d).
unit acquires or builds an asset or set of assets, operates it for a period and then hands the
asset over to a second unit. Such arrangements are usually between a private enterprise and
government but other combinations are possible, for example with a public corporation as
either party or a private non-profit institution as the second party.

Research ‘Research’ is a detailed study of a subject, especially in order to discover (new) information or Cambridge dictionary (n.d.-b).
reach a (new) understanding.

Research and development ‘Research and development’ (R&D) is work directed toward the introduction, innovation and Cambridge dictionary (n.d.-a).
improvement of products and processes.

Research and innovation The ‘research and innovation (R&I) pathway’ is the R&I cycle encompassing need RAND analysis.
pathway identification and prioritisation, project specification and selection, inputs to research, the
research process, and adoption of research outputs by end users.

Talent ‘Talent’ refers to the (human) technical and managerial expertise necessary to support Freeman et al. (2015).
successful innovation processes.

Technology Readiness Level Technology Readiness Levels (TRLs) are indicators of the maturity of particular technologies. European Commission (2017c).
There are nine TRLs, with TRL 1 being the lowest and TRL 9 being the highest. The following
definitions apply:
▪▪ TRL 1: Basic principles observed.
▪▪ TRL 2: Technology concept formulated.
▪▪ TRL 3: Experimental proof of concept.
▪▪ TRL 4: Technology validated in lab.
▪▪ TRL 5: Technology validated in relevant environment.
▪▪ TRL 6: Technology demonstrated in relevant environment.
▪▪ TRL 7: System prototype demonstration in operational environment.
▪▪ TRL 8: System complete and qualified.
▪▪ TRL 9: Actual system proven in operational environment.

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Preface

This is the final report of an 11-month Tunisia and Egypt. It also explores ways organisations with a need for rigorous,
study commissioned by the European in which research can be more effectively independent, interdisciplinary analysis.
Border and Coast Guard Agency (Frontex), operationalised through innovation, be-
which examines how border security re- fore presenting a set of practical recom- For more information about RAND
search is set up, managed and operation- mendations for Frontex. Europe or this study, please contact:
alised in and beyond the European Union RAND Europe is an independent, Dr Giacomo Persi Paoli
(EU). This report provides an overview of not-for-profit policy research organi- Research Leader, Defence,
good practices and challenges for border sation that aims to improve policy and Security & Infrastructure
security research in the EU, the United decision making in the public interest Westbrook Centre, Milton Road
States (US), Canada and Australia, with through research and analysis. RAND Cambridge CB4 1YG, United Kingdom
a secondary focus on Turkey and three Europe’s clients include European gov- Tel. +44 (0) 1223 353 329 x2563
North African countries – Morocco, ernments, institutions, NGOs and other [email protected]

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Acknowledgements

In conducting this study, the RAND representatives who took part in re- Within RAND Europe, the team is
Europe study team is grateful to the search interviews. Appendix A of the appreciative of the valuable contribu-
many people who have provided their Technical Annex lists their affiliations tions of Jennifer Moroney and the ex-
time, advice and support. The team is and, in some cases, their names: some perts group, comprising Alex Hall, Sonja
grateful to Frontex for providing nu- interviewees’ identities have been an- Marjanovic, Jon Freeman and Catriona
merous contacts, coordinating survey onymised at their request. Thanks are Manville. Finally, the team is very grate-
responses, and contributing valuable also due to the Member State (MS) and ful to the quality assurance reviewers
feedback as the study has progressed. industry survey participants for their val- Emma Disley and James Black for their
The study team would like to thank uable insights, as well to those who at- constructive feedback.
the policy officials, border security prac- tended the stakeholder workshop held
titioners, academic experts, and industry in Warsaw, Poland, on 5 September 2017.

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1. Introduction

This report presents the results of a RAND continued pressure on EU borders, with Given the scale, severity and cross-
Europe study examining the setup and 96 per cent of immigrants arriving in border nature of these security threats,
management of border security research the Central Mediterranean region in 2016 integrated border management (IBM)
within and beyond the European Union stating that they had used the services of remains a strategic priority for the EU.
(EU). Commissioned by the European illegal smuggling networks.6 According IBM is a concept that consists of five
Border and Coast Guard Agency (Frontex)3 to the European Union Agency for Law elements:
in December 2016, this study aims to in- Enforcement Cooperation (Europol), ▪▪ Border control (checks and surveil-
form possible alternatives to the current many of the organised crime groups in- lance);
model of contracting and managing bor- volved in migrant smuggling are ‘poly- ▪▪ Detection and investigation of cross-
der security research, and explore the criminal’ and engage in a range of other border crime;
role that Frontex could play in facilitat- criminal activities, including document ▪▪ Inter-agency cooperation for bor-
ing uptake of research outputs by end counterfeiting, property crime, drug traf- der management and international
users (‘border guards’).4 This chapter pro- ficking, excise fraud, and trafficking in cooperation;
vides an overview of the study context, counterfeit goods. Other forms of organ- ▪▪ Coordination and coherence of activi-
its purpose and scope, and the research ised crime posing security problems at ties of MS and institutions; and
approach employed. EU borders include weapons smuggling ▪▪ Four-tier access control model’: this
and trafficking in human beings (THB).7 model supports the detection and
Recent attacks in France,8 Germany9 investigation of cross-border crime
1.1. Study context and Belgium10 also highlight that ter- through a combination of measures
rorist threats are becoming more inter- in third countries, cooperation with
1.1.1. Diverse threats highlight national and cross-border in nature.11 In neighbouring countries, border con-
the need to strengthen EU border particular, the Syrian conflict has at- trol at the external border, and control
security tracted thousands of so-called ‘foreign measures within the Schengen area. 15
fighters’ from Europe, many of whom
Today, the EU faces a range of pressures are likely to return as the Islamic State By assigning strategic importance to
on its external and internal borders. (IS) continues to lose territory.12 As some border security, the EU aims to ensure
In 2016, Member States (MS) reported of these individuals may pose a threat to that EU citizens’ freedom and security
more than half a million detected ille- internal security, the role of Frontex13 and are protected in full compliance with
gal border crossings. While this figure European border authorities in monitor- the Union’s values, including the rule
represents a significant decrease from ing their cross-border movements is in- of law and fundamental rights.16 Border
the number of illegal crossings detected creasingly important.14 security is central to two of the European
in 2015 (over a million), it is markedly Commission’s Ten Priorities for Europe,17 and
higher than any annual total between 6 Europol (2017). two of the three strategic priorities set
2010 (around 100 000) and 2014 (around 7 Frontex (2017). out in the European Agenda on Security.18
290 000).5 An increase in people-smug- 8 The Guardian (2017); BBC (2016); BBC Under the European Agenda on Migration,19
(2015a); BBC (2015b).
gling activities has contributed to this a number of measures have been taken to
9 The Guardian (2016); The Telegraph
(2016a); The Telegraph (2016b).
reinforce the security of the EU’s external
10 France 24 (2017).
3 While Frontex is now officially named 11 European Commission (2015c).
the ‘European Border and Coast Guard 12 Frontex (2017). 15 Council of the European Union (2006).
Agency’, it is still widely referred to as 13 Established in 2004, Frontex promotes, 16 European Commission (2015d).
‘Frontex’. In this report, ‘Frontex’ and ‘the coordinates and develops European border 17 These priorities are ‘justice and fundamen-
Agency’ are used interchangeably to refer management in line with the EU funda- tal rights’ and ‘migration’. See European
to the organisation. mental rights charter and the concept of Union (2015).
4 An ‘end user’ in the context of this study Integrated Border Management. See Fron- 18 These priorities focus on supporting a
refers to the national or multinational tex (n.d.). strong EU response to terrorism and for-
authority responsible for border manage- 14 While Frontex (2017) highlights IS as the eign fighters and on tackling serious and
ment. The terms ‘end user’ and ‘border main terrorist threat to EU borders, al- organised crime, which both pose cross-
guard’ are used interchangeably through- Qaeda, its affiliates and other terrorist border challenges. See European Commis-
out this document. groups may similarly pose a threat to bor- sion (2015e).
5 Frontex (2017). der security. 19 European Commission (2017a).

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borders and to support the national bor- 1.1.2. Research is important for cross-border dimension.31 Horizon 2020
der guards deployed by MS. One such border security (H2020), which replaced the Seventh
measure was the creation in October 2016 Framework Programme (FP) for Research
of a European Border and Coast Guard Research25 can help security officials un- and Technological Development (FP7)
(EBCG), comprising Frontex and the var- derstand and respond to these threats (2007–2013), is the biggest EU R&I pro-
ious national authorities responsible for to border security, as well as support- gramme, with around €80bn of funding
border management at the MS level.20 ing the development of evidence-based available over seven years (2014–2020).32
To support these strategic objectives, security policies and operational tools.26 Border security research sits within the
the funding, personnel and remit of An important part of Frontex’s man- ‘Secure Societies’ strand of the H2020
Frontex have been increased since the date involves monitoring and contribut- programme,33 with a maximum amount
EBCG came into force in 2016. EU fund- ing to research developments relevant of €73m and €55m available for border
ing for Frontex is set to increase from to the Agency’s area of operations in security research projects in 2014–2015
€281m in 2017 to €322m in 2020, with the order to bridge the gap between tech- and 2016–2017, respectively.34 ‘Secure
number of staff members expected to rise nological and research advancements Societies’ was set up to focus on ‘multi-
from 400 in 2016 to 1 000 by 2020.21 The and the needs of border control author- disciplinary, mission-oriented research’
role and activities of the Agency have ities. Responsibility for monitoring de- which combines ‘end users and suppli-
been strengthened with, for example, a velopments in these areas lies with the ers in project definition and execution’.35
new Rapid Reaction Pool of 1 500 border Research and Development Unit (RDU).27
guards and other officers being placed Through projects, workshops and con- 1.1.3. Challenges remain in
at the Agency’s immediate disposal ferences, the RDU aims to facilitate en- incorporating research into
since December 2016, alongside a Rapid gagement and exchange of information operational practice
Reaction Equipment Pool consisting of between border management authori-
helicopters, vessels and other equipment ties and providers of research, includ- Despite the millions of euros invested in
to carry out rapid border interventions.22 ing research institutes, universities EU border security research each year,
Additional measures have been taken and industry. Frontex is also responsi- challenges remain in achieving ‘impact’
to improve situational awareness at the ble for keeping MS and the European through research; that is, improving
EU’s external borders and to support the Commission up to date with develop- operational practices, contributing to
detection of cross-border crime. For ex- ments, and provides input to policy an enhanced understanding of policy
ample, under the EU’s earth-observation development.28 issues, and building capacity through
programme ‘Copernicus’, the European Beyond the border security research skills development.36 There is already
Commission has agreed to provide projects awarded directly by Frontex, some evidence to suggest that the ‘pull-
€46.7m to Frontex between 2015 and 2020 several EU funding mechanisms for re- through’ of border security research can
in order to implement satellite services search and innovation29 support the pri- be challenging and that many promis-
dedicated to border surveillance.23 With orities of the European Agenda on Security.30 ing insights are never incorporated into
the agreement finalised on 10 November These priorities focus on countering practice. In some cases, research pro-
2015, the European Commission has en- terrorism, organised crime and cyber- jects can be ‘overtaken by events’ and lose
trusted Frontex with the border sur- crime as interlinked areas with a strong their relevance over time, particularly
veillance component of the Copernicus given that EU research funding tends
programme. This involves supporting to be long-term in nature, while politi-
the European Border Surveillance System 25 ‘Research’ is the detailed study of a sub- cal priorities and personnel can change
ject, especially in order to discover infor-
(EUROSUR) by providing real-time data more rapidly. A lack of understanding
mation or reach a new understanding (see
on activities on land and sea around EU among research providers of the opera-
‘Glossary of key terms’, and fuller defini-
borders. Satellite data has already been tion provided in Chapter 3). While a core tional context and constraints affecting
used in combination with ship report- focus of this report is the integration of end users can also reportedly limit the
ing systems to identify smugglers and research findings into operational prac- relevance of research outputs to the end
tice across these case studies, the report
save lives at sea.24 user community.37
focuses on both ‘basic research’, which is
driven by interest in expanding knowledge
rather than on developing new products,
and ‘applied research’, which is designed 31 European Commission (2015a).
to address practical problems. 32 European Commission (n.d.-a).
26 European Commission (2015a). 33 European Commission (n.d.-b).
27 European Union (2011). 34 European Commission (2015e); European
28 European Union (2011). Commission (2016a).
20 European Union (2016). 29 ‘Innovation’ refers to a process that is able 35 European Security Research Advisory Board
21 European Commission (2015a). to transform new ideas into products, ser- (2006).
22 European Commission (2016b). vices and processes, also encompassing 36 Economic and Social Research Council
23 Frontex (2015). the process of invention with a focus on (ESRC) (2017).
24 For example, 350 people were rescued af- ensuring that such new ideas are applied 37 Startup project meeting at Frontex offices,
ter Copernicus helped identify four rub- to the benefit of end users. See Chapter 3 Warsaw, 19 January 2017. See Section 3.2
ber dinghies leaving the coast of Libya on and the glossary of key terms. for a more in-depth discussion of these
7 October 2015. See Copernicus (n.d.-a). 30 European Commission (2015d). challenges and constraints.

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1.2. Purpose and scope approach combining data-collection ac- six organisations also operating in other
tivities with a rigorous analytical pro- domains – namely defence and space –
Given the challenges inherent in pulling cess. Figure 1.1 presents the overall with a view to understanding different
through operationally relevant research, research approach, which is structured functional roles for R&I.
Frontex is interested in developing a bet- around three Work Packages (WP) linked The case studies conducted in WP3 fo-
ter understanding of how border security to the three RQs above. cused on the following six organisations:
research is set up, managed and opera- ▪▪ European Space Agency (ESA): The
tionalised by agencies operating at the The RAND Europe project team used two ESA is the coordinating entity for
national level within and beyond the main research methods to conduct this European civilian space activities. It
EU. This is intended to increase aware- study: case studies (drawing on docu- is an intergovernmental organisation
ness of alternative or new ways of set- ment reviews, research interviews and – of 22 MS, dedicated to the exploita-
ting up, managing and using research for WP1 only – surveys) and workshops. tion of space science, research and
outcomes that enable the faster integra- As shown in Figure 1.1, the case studies technology.
tion of relevant research, make research were conducted in two separate phases ▪▪ European Institute of Innovation &
more focused on operational needs, and and with different purposes. Technology (EIT): The EIT is an in-
ensure that its potential for positive im- dependent EU body set up to sup-
pact on EU and MS border security is fully Case studies port innovation in Europe. The EIT
realised. brings together universities, research
To support this overarching objective, In the first phase of the study, the WP1–2 labs and companies to form partner-
this study addresses three research ques- case studies were used to answer the first ships (‘Knowledge and Innovation
tions (RQs):38 two research questions (RQ1 and RQ2) Communities’).
▪▪ RQ1: How is research and innovation described in Section 1.2. As part of this ▪▪ Defense Innovation Unit – Experi-
in the area of border security set up, analysis, these case studies helped gen- mental (DIUx): Headquartered in Sili-
conducted and operationalised by EU erate a high-level understanding of good con Valley in California, DIUx is a US
organisations and MS? practices and common challenges relat- Department of Defense (DoD) organ-
▪▪ RQ2: What approaches are used in the ing to the operationalisation of border isation focused on accelerating com-
US, Canada and Australia to fund and security research. As per WP1 and WP2, mercial technology development for
apply research in this area?39 this first set of case studies focused ex- the US military.
▪▪ RQ3: What ‘good practices’ from these clusively on institutions or organisations ▪▪ Department of Homeland Security
different approaches could be incor- involved in border security research in (DHS) Small Business Innovation
porated into the EU approach? the following countries and regions: the Research (SBIR): The DHS SBIR
EU, the US, Canada, Australia, Turkey programme aims to increase small
While a central focus of the study is and selected parts of North Africa (Egypt, business participation in US federal
on the integration of research findings Morocco and Tunisia).42 These case stud- research that has the potential for
into operational practice, this report fo- ies are presented in Figure 1.2 on page 26, commercialisation.
cuses on both ‘basic research’, which is along with an overview of the main gov- ▪▪ Homeland Security Innovation
driven by interest in expanding knowl- ernmental actors and EU institutions re- Programs (HSIP): The HSIP aims to
edge rather than on developing new sponsible for the setup and management generate innovation in hubs across
products,40 and ‘applied research’, which of border security research. Detailed de- the US in order to solve DHS’s most
is designed to address practical problems scriptions of the EU and non-EU case complex challenges through outreach
of the modern world rather than to ac- studies are presented in Chapters 2 and to investors and funding for innova-
quire knowledge for knowledge’s sake.41 3, respectively, of the Technical Annex. tive start-ups.
▪▪ Centers of Excellence (COEs): COEs
In the second phase of the study (WP3), refer to a coordinated, university-
1.3. Research approach to inform the development of recommen- based programme that aims to har-
dations for Frontex, the project team con- ness expertise from US academic
To achieve the objectives of the study, ducted a more in-depth investigation of institutions in order to support re-
the project team deployed a structured search efforts and deliver tools,
technologies, knowledge products,
42 At Frontex’s request, the EU, US, Canada training and expertise for the home-
38 More detailed information in response to and Australia cases studies offer a more
land security enterprise.
RQ1, RQ2 and RQ3 can be found in Chap- granular analysis of how research is set
ters 2, 3 and 4, respectively, of the Tech- up, conducted and implemented in prac-
nical Annex. tice, while the Turkey and North Africa The WP3 case studies were selected at
39 At the client’s request, the study’s anal- cases offer a ‘lighter-touch’ analysis that an internal analysis session. At this ses-
ysis focuses on the EU, US, Canada, Aus- provides a high-level description of: (i) the sion, the study team identified research
tralia and – (to a lesser extent) on Turkey extent to which border security research is
organisations for further, more in-depth
and three North African countries: Egypt, already being conducted and operational-
Morocco and Tunisia (see Section 1.3).
analysis from the first phase of the study
ised in these countries; and (ii) any exist-
40 Lawrence Berkeley National Library (n.d.). ing or intended involvement in the Hori- (SBIR, HSIP and COE), before agreeing on
41 Lawrence Berkeley National Library (n.d.). zon 2020 programme. organisations from other sectors with

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Figure 1.1 Overview of research approach

Data collection Outcomes Analitical process

WP1 & WP2 WP3

Case studies: Case studies: Case studies: Workshop:

EU border Non-EU border Selected External experts
security research security research EU and non-EU (national border guard
(EU organisation and MS) (Relevant authorites in organisations agencies, Frontex
US, Canada, Australia, and other EU
(Including those operating
plus selected industries) institutions)
in defence and space
Interviews sectors)
Interviews
Literature review Interviews
Literature review
Surveys Literature review

Understanding of Stakeholders’ perception

Landscaping of good practices and challenges
different operational of Frontex role in the
related ato border security research
models context of research

Consultation with internal experts Consultation with internal experts

Creation of R&I pathway for the operationalisation of Development of

Option analysis
border security research organisational functions

Development of
way forward

applicable lessons for border security R&I ‘grey’ literature.43 The WP1–2 review fo- ernment agencies and other stakehold-
(ESA, EIT and DIUx). Literature availa- cused on literature relating to the insti- ers involved in the setup, management
bility was also a considered as part of se- tutional setup of border security research and operationalisation of research. The
lection in order to ensure that there was across the case study countries and re- team included literature in the review
sufficient source material to conduct an gions, while the WP3 review explored on the basis of relevance to the research
informed analysis. Detailed descriptions the functional activities of the six case questions and to the scope of the study,
of the WP3 case studies are provided in study organisations. Both reviews were and findings were written up in a nar-
Chapter 4 of the Technical Annex. conducted through Google and Google rative synthesis.
As the following paragraphs describe Scholar searches and ‘snowball’ search-
in more detail, the WP1–3 case studies ing.44 Given the institutional and proce- Research interviews
are based on a combination of literature dural focus of the study, the study team Complementing the literature review, a
review and research interviews, with identified most of the literature reviewed total of 32 semi-structured45 telephone in-
additional WP1 data collected through by searching the websites of relevant gov-
two surveys.
45 Semi-structured interviews combine the
43 ‘Grey literature’ is produced by organisa- use of an interview protocol containing
Literature reviews tions outside of academic or commercial specific questions with flexibility to ask
Across all WPs, data was collected through publishing channels. Examples of grey lit- unplanned follow-up questions. By con-
structured reviews of peer-reviewed and erature include government documents, trast, structured interviews follow an in-
technical reports, working papers, doc- terview protocol with all interviewees
toral theses and conference proceedings. asked exactly the same questions in the
44 ‘Snowball searching’ involves using a same order, while unstructured interviews
given document’s reference list to iden- consist of a free-flowing conversation on
tify other relevant documents. a given topic.

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Challenges and Opportunities for Operationalising Border Security Research

Figure 1.2 Overviev of WP1 and WP2 case studies

Canada European Union Turkey

Main actors: Public Safety Canada, Defence Main actors: European Commission, DG HOME, Main actors:
Research & Development Canada (Centre for Frontex, Resarch Executive Agency, MS Unknown (owning to political sensivities)
Security Science), Canada Border Services
Agency (Science & Technology)

United States
Main actors:
Departament of Homeland Security
(Science and Technology Directorate,
Coast Guard)

North Africa: Australia

Source: RAND analysis (2017). Egypt, Morocco and Tunisia Main actors: Departament of
Main actors: National Ministries of Defence and Immigration and Border Protection,
Ministries of Interior Minister of Immigration, Cabinet

terviews were conducted across all WP.

Interviewees were policy officials, bor-
der guard practitioners, academic ex- Surveys Workshops
perts and industry representatives with
expertise relating to the case studies un- To support the WP1 analysis, the study In addition to the case studies, an ex-
der analysis.46 Interviewees were identi- team distributed two electronic sur- ternal stakeholder workshop was held
fied by conducting online searches and veys. The first survey was circulated at Frontex premises in Warsaw, Poland,
leveraging RAND’s contact networks, to National Frontex Points of Contact on 5 September 2017 with the participa-
and through recommendations from (NFPOC) within all 28 EU MS, with a tion of 30 experts from national border
Frontex. An interview protocol was 39 per cent response rate (11 of 28 MS).47 guard agencies, Frontex and other EU
used to conduct these interviews (see In order to complement the MS survey institutions.48 The purpose of this ex-
Appendix B of the Technical Annex). This data with perspectives from research, ternal stakeholder workshop was to an-
guidance document was designed to help academic and industry representatives, alyse different types of functional role
interviewers cover all the desired topics Frontex circulated a second survey to 52 that Frontex could play in order to sup-
while allowing scope for flexibility, and of their contacts from industry and aca- port the operationalisation of border se-
was adjusted for each of the case stud- demia, with a 10 per cent response rate curity research (see Chapter 5).
ies. It was also designed to ensure that (5 of 52 contacts). The purpose of these To help structure our research ap-
all topics of discussion were, as far as surveys was to expand on and validate proach and synthesise findings, three
possible, covered with all participants. the emerging findings of the WP1 lit- internal analysis workshops were held
We conducted 14 interviews focused erature review and interviews, as well with a RAND Experts Group made up
on EU border security research (WP1), 14 as to provide further details about EU of senior researchers and topic experts
interviews focused on non-EU border se- border management processes and the in research, innovation and border se-
curity research (WP2), and 4 interviews roles of different agencies that were not curity at RAND Europe. The purpose
with representatives from R&I organisa- otherwise captured through the litera- of the first internal workshop, held at
tions (WP3). The majority of interviews ture review. the early stages of the study, was to de-
focused on WP1–2, given that the WP3 velop a draft research and innovation
case studies were intended to be based pathway to map the possible processes
primarily on a literature review. Table 1.1 47 7 NFPOC (Surveys A–G) provided completed linking border security research and its
presents the distribution of interviewees survey responses: 3 NFPOCs (Surveys H–J)
informed the study team that they do not
across countries and regions.
perform activities related to border secu- 48 For information on supporting materials
rity research, and 1 NFPOC (Survey K) was used at the workshop and on workshop
46 A full list of interviewees is included in unable to complete the survey due to other findings, please refer to Appendices D and
Appendix A of the Technical Annex. work commitments. E of the Technical Annex, respectively.

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Table 1.1 Distribution of interviews across countries and regions (WP1–3)49

North Africa,
EU US Canada Australia Turkey (Tunisia, Morocco, Egypt)
Interviews 15 5 5 4 1 2
conducted (WP1: 14, WP3: 1) (WP2: 2, WP3: 3) (All WP2) (All WP2) (WP2) (Both WP2)

Source: RAND analysis (2017).

Figure 1.3 Structure of this report

ANALYSIS OF FUTURE
INTRODUCTION CONCEPTUALISATION ANALYSIS OF CURRENT PRACTICES
OPPORTUNITIES

Chapter 1 Chapter 2 Chapter 3 Chapter 4 Chapter 5

Technical Annex Technical Annex

Chapters 2-3 Chapter 4

Scoping of
Background Functional roles
R&I framework good practices Recomendations
and approach for R&I
& challenges

implementation by border guard author- innovation’ to refer to the entire pro- examples of ‘research impact’, ‘end
ities. The resulting framework was used cess that leads to the operationalisa- user involvement’ and ‘the operation-
to structure the study team’s approach tion of research and its related impact alisation of research’ were sought by
to data collection (see Chapter 2). The on policy and operational practices. RAND researchers, in some cases little
second internal workshop focused re- This process includes, but it is not detail on this could be elicited from
spectively on refining the research and limited to, the ‘research & develop- the available literature, interviews
innovation pathway, and the third on ment’ phase (see Chapter 2 for more and survey responses.
validating the case study and external details). ▪▪ The identification of ‘good practices’
stakeholder workshop findings. ▪▪ Across the WP1–2 case studies, more and ‘challenges’ in the setup and
literature and interview data was management of border security re-
available for the EU and the US than search across the case studies is based
1.4. High-level assumptions for other countries and regions.50 A largely on the views of WP1–3 study
relative shortage of data on Canada, interviewees representing policy,
A number of high-level assumptions Australia, and in particular North practitioner, academic and industry
should be noted in considering the find- Africa and Turkey (in part due to po- stakeholder communities.
ings presented in this report: litical sensitivities)51 has implications ▪▪ While the report highlights the main
▪▪ From a terminology perspective, this for the depth of analysis on these fo- challenges and areas of good practice
report uses the term ‘research and cus countries and regions. identified through the WP1–3 inter-
▪▪ In a number of areas, the nature of views and literature review conducted
the data available to the study team within the study timeframe, the
49 Since submission of the Interim Report
means that the WP1–2 case study find- study team recognises that there are
in June 2017, additional interviews have
ings lack granularity. While specific likely to be good practices and chal-
been conducted with EU stakeholders
(n=3) and Australian stakeholders (n=1) lenges not captured in this document,
to update WP1 and WP2 content. A to- and that those listed are not exclu-
tal of 4 WP3 interviews have also been 50 While comparatively few interviews were sive to the case studies in which they
conducted (n=3 US interviews compris- conducted with US stakeholders (n=2), this
are outlined.
ing 1 with SBIR, 1 with HSIP and 1 with limitation was offset by the high availa-
▪▪ Relatively low WP1 survey response
an anonymous US organisation; and n=1 bility of US literature.
EU interview with an anonymous EU 51 Please refer to Section 2.2.3 of this report rates (39 per cent and 10 per cent re-
organisation). and Section 3.4 of the Technical Annex. spectively for the MS and industry

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Challenges and Opportunities for Operationalising Border Security Research

surveys) limited the generalisability ▪▪ Chapter 2 outlines the concepts of re- ▪▪ Chapters 2–4 are the ‘core’ chapters of
of the data collected from respond- search and innovation, and presents the Technical Annex, presenting case
ents. However, complementing sur- the research and innovation path- study findings relating to EU border
vey data with data from the research way developed as part of this study security research (WP1), non-EU bor-
interviews ensured that our analy- to guide our analysis. der security research (WP2), and the
sis was informed by a wide range of ▪▪ Chapter 3 provides a summary of functional roles for R&I within dif-
stakeholder perspectives. findings across the WP1–3 case stud- ferent organisations (WP3).
▪▪ Discussions at external workshop ies in relation to good practices and ▪▪ Appendix A lists the study
were informed mainly by EU bor- challenges for operationalising bor- interviewees.
der guards and Frontex representa- der security research. ▪▪ Appendices B–D present supporting
tives, given that these stakeholder ▪▪ Chapter 4 explores a range of func- research materials: interview ques-
groups accounted for the majority of tional roles that organisations can tions (Appendix B), survey outlines
attendees. play along the research and innova- (Appendix C), and materials for the
tion pathway described in Chapter 2. external workshop (Appendix D).
▪▪ Chapter 5 presents a series of forward- ▪▪ Appendix E summarises proceedings
1.5. Structure of the report looking recommendations for consid- and findings of the external stake-
eration by Frontex. holder workshop.
This report outlines the findings of this
study and provides a set of recommen- This report is accompanied by a Technical Figure 1.3 on the previous page high-
dations for Frontex. In addition to this Annex, the contents of which are as lights the links between the chapters of
introduction, this document contains follows: this report and the core chapters of the
four substantive chapters: ▪▪ Chapter 1 provides an overview of the accompanying Technical Annex.
Technical Annex.

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2. Conceptualising research
and innovation

This chapter introduces the concepts of Whether basic or applied, research is processes set out under the DOTMPLFI
research and innovation, explaining how part of innovation (though not all inno- framework. While the definition of
the latter relates to the adoption of re- vation requires research), but it is lim- capability and its constituent parts
search by end users in the border secu- ited to the creation and investigation may vary by sector or country, the
rity context. The following sections then of new ideas and solutions – in simple principle that it includes more than
draw on established R&I models and theo- terms, it goes only halfway to solving just new technologies or new knowl-
ries identified through a literature review an identified gap since it does not in- edge still holds true. The process
to develop a bespoke ‘research and inno- clude all the steps that turn ideas into through which new technologies and
vation pathway’, which serves two pur- new products, services and processes. new knowledge are integrated fully
poses. First, this pathway offers a way of Translating border security research into operational practice is usually
presenting case study findings related to into operational practice goes beyond referred to as capability development.57
EU and non-EU border security research the success of any individual project
(WP1–2) in a structured and consistent and relies on the existence of two main Given that the focus of this study is on
way (see Chapters 2 and 3 of the Technical processes: research (both basic and applied) and in-
Annex).52 Second, a number of ‘functional ▪▪ From an industrial and academic novation, analysis of the capability-de-
roles’ for R&I, identified through the case perspective, it requires a process that velopment process is beyond the scope of
study research (WP1–3), are mapped onto is able to transform new ideas into this report. However, Frontex should re-
the pathway (see Chapter 4) in order to new products, services and processes, main cognisant of these considerations
inform a set of recommendations for also encompassing the process of in- when approaching R&I if it is to take in-
Frontex (see Chapter 5). vention with a focus on ensuring that novative new products and effectively
such new ideas are applied to the ben- put them into the field as fully matured,
efit of end users. This process is usu- supportable new capabilities.
2.1. Overview of key ally known as ‘innovation’.55
definitions ▪▪ From a border security perspective,
the acquisition of a newly available 2.2. The research and
Understanding the distinctions between technology is not per se a new capabil- innovation pathway
‘research’ and ‘innovation’ is important ity. In most cases, ‘capability’ com-
for enhancing awareness of how new prises a range of different constituent In relation to research and innovation, it
technology or knowledge can be more ef- parts (e.g. pieces of equipment, in- is possible to identify a series of sequen-
ficiently and effectively translated into frastructure and knowledge). For tial steps that connect the generation of
operational practice. As described in example, the North Atlantic Treaty an idea, or the identification of a capa-
Section 1.2, one possible way of defin- Organisation (NATO) identifies eight bility gap, to the adoption of a solution
ing research is by splitting the concept elements that collectively make up a by end users and its related impact on
into two categories: capability: Doctrine, Organisation, operational practices and its wider so-
▪▪ ‘Basic research’ (also referred to as Training, Materiel, Leadership and cietal benefits. These steps are often in-
‘fundamental’ or ‘pure’ research), Education, Personnel, Facilities, and tegrated into the concept of a ‘pathway’
which is driven by interest in expand- Interoperability (DOTMLPFI).56 Even in the literature.58 Pathways are not lin-
ing knowledge, rather than a focus on when thinking only about new equip- ear processes, but are often cyclical, with
creating or inventing products;53 and ment or technology, it is not enough
57 This refers to the development and oper-
▪▪ ‘Applied research’, which is designed simply to procure it for border guards
ationalisation of a capability. Capability
to solve practical problems of the to use; there must also be an effec-
is defined as: ‘The power to achieve a de-
modern world, rather than to acquire tive maintenance and support so- sired operational effect in a nominated
knowledge for knowledge’s sake.54 lution in place, in addition to the environment within a specified time and
wider changes to training, policy and to sustain that effect for a designated pe-
riod’ (Australian Government Department
52 See in particular Sections 2.1.4, 3.1.4, of Defence (2014).
3.2.4 and 3.3.4 of the Technical Annex. 55 Freeman et al. (2015). 58 For an example of a research and inno-
53 Lawrence Berkeley National Library (n.d.). 56 US Army Training and Doctrine Command vation pathway model, see Donovan and
54 Lawrence Berkeley National Library (n.d.). (TRADOC) (2013). Hanney (2011).

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Figure 2.1 Research and innovation as connected processes

Need identification
INNOVATION & prioritisation RESEARCH

Source: RAND Europe analysis.

Figure 2.2 The eight steps of the research and innovation pathway

Research outputs Project specification

& selection

Adaption by users

Need identification
INNOVATION & prioritisation RESEARCH

Impact Inputs to research

Evaluation Research process

Source: RAND Europe analysis. Please note that the steps of this graphic should be read in the order described on the previous page
(i.e. beginning with ‘needs identification and prioritisation’, moving clockwise to ‘project specification and selection’, and continuing
in the order indicated by the arrows).

continuous feedback loops between each ▪▪ Project specification and selection: ▪▪ Research outputs: ‘Outputs’ are the
of the steps. This step includes the creation of tech- products that result from project ac-
Figure 2.1 illustrates how border se- nical specifications to be addressed by tivities (e.g. research publications,
curity research and innovation are part the research project, as well as the toolkits, technologies/prototypes).
of a cyclical process originating from the overall selection process of suppliers. ▪▪ Adoption by end users: This step,
identification of a capability gap (or area ▪▪ Inputs to research: ‘Inputs’ are the also referred to as ‘operationalisation’,
requiring improvement). Figures 2.2 and components that provide a basis for refers to the integration of research
2.3 elaborate on this pathway, which was the research process to take place outputs into operational practice.
refined through a series of internal work- (e.g. funding, technical expertise, ▪▪ Impact: While definitions vary, ‘im-
shops with RAND Europe border security relationships, project management, pact’ can be defined as the extent
and innovation experts. personnel). to which research improves opera-
Several steps follow the identification ▪▪ Research process: This includes all tional practices, contributes to an
of a need (e.g. a capability gap) to form activities related to the delivery of enhanced understanding of policy
the research and innovation pathway. the research against the technical issues, and builds capacity through
These include:59 requirements (see definition of ‘ba- skills development.60
sic’ versus ‘applied research’ above).

59 RAND Europe analysis. 60 ESRC (n.d.).

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Figure 2.3 The research and innovation pathway in context

Research outputs Project specification

& selection

Adaption by users

Need identification
INNOVATION & prioritisation RESEARCH

Impact Inputs to research

Evaluation Research process

ENABLING FACTORS

KEY STAKEHOLDERS

CONTEXTUAL FACTORS

Source: RAND Europe analysis.

▪▪ Assessment: This last step focuses The second aspect relates to key The research and innovation pathway
on the ex-post evaluation of the im- stakeholders. These may vary on a pro- outlined above has been used to present
pact generated by the adoption of in- ject-by-project basis and differ along the core processes in relation to research
novative solutions. As a result of this the research and innovation pathway. setup, management and operationali-
assessment, new gaps may be iden- Key stakeholders can include: (i) policy sation within and beyond the EU (WP1-
tified in the same or different areas, makers, as those setting strategic pri- 2: see Chapters 2 and 3 of the Technical
re-starting the cycle described in the orities and with an interest in the over- Annex). The WP3 case studies (Chapter
steps above. arching impact of research; (ii) actors 4 of the Technical Annex) are intended
commissioning, funding and manag- to enhance understanding of how dif-
As described above, the research and in- ing research; (iii) research and inno- ferent organisations, operating in the
novation pathway is not a linear process, vation providers such as industry and border security sector as well as in other
but is characterised by continuous feed- academia; (iv) investors; and (v) border sectors, position themselves along this
back loops as illustrated in Figure 2.2 (on security authorities. pathway and what functional roles they
the left). The third and final aspect refers more play in facilitating research and innova-
specifically to the innovation part of the tion. These functional roles are mapped
Research and innovation do not take pathway and includes a series of ena- onto the pathway in Chapter 4, and used
place in a vacuum, but rather are shaped bling factors that facilitate and shape as a basis for the recommendations for
by a series of overarching aspects that innovation. These factors range from the Frontex presented in Chapter 5.
influence each step of the pathway. As drivers, or motivations, that allow inno-
Figure 2.3 shows, the first aspect to con- vation to occur. For example, in the con-
sider is the wider contextual factors of text of border security, possible drivers
the country or region in which research include the reduction of the number of
and innovation are undertaken. This illegal entries through document fraud
wider context includes political, strate- at border crossing points, as well as cap-
gic, cultural, social and technological ital, talent and skills, networks, struc-
factors. In the context of border secu- tures and infrastructures.61
rity, the wider context may determine,
for example, the perception and prior-
itisation of threats, which would sub-
61 For more information on the innovation
sequently trigger the identification of a factors, please refer to Freeman et al.
capability gap. (2015).

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3. Good practices and challenges

for border security R&I

This chapter outlines a summary of find- ▪▪ Efficient management processes, selection, research delivery and user
ings in relation to good practices and such as coordinated research mech- adoption.
common challenges for operationalising anisms, can help identify capability At the need identification stage, vari-
border security research. These findings gaps (Section 3.1.4). Collaboration ous mechanisms can serve to capture end
relate to both the ‘research’ and ‘inno- between industry and academia can user input, including meetings and an
vation’ parts of the pathway presented drive R&I (Section 3.1.5), and regular analysis of capability gaps. In Canada,
in the previous chapter. This summary evaluation of research processes can for example, Public Safety Canada meets
is not intended to be exhaustive, but ensure their continued fitness for pur- with the agencies responsible for bor-
to highlight the main lessons identi- pose (Section 3.1.6). der management on an annual basis to
fied from analysis of all case study data discuss their operational priorities and
collected within the timeframe of the The following sections explore these ex- needs, in order to inform the develop-
project.62 The accompanying Technical amples of good practice in more detail. ment of calls for proposals.65 Similarly,
Annex provides more detail on the im- the US STR facilitates cooperation be-
plementation of these good practices 3.1.1. End user involvement at tween S&T stakeholders and end users
and the occurrence of different chal- all stages of the research and through quarterly meetings aimed at
lenges at EU and national levels in the innovation pathway can help ensuring that research efforts remain
US, Canada, Australia, Turkey and North ensure that research reflects focused on operational requirements.
Africa, as well as among selected R&I operational needs STRAS also records the work of border
organisations. guards to identify capability gaps and
Actively engaging border guards early create a strategy for addressing these.
and repeatedly throughout research End user participation in work-
3.1. Good practices in research processes has a number of recognised ing groups and committees can also
setup, management and benefits.63 For example, involving end help ensure that operational require-
operationalisation users in research planning can help en- ments are understood and incorpo-
sure that priorities are set and funds rated into research programmes. For
Case study analysis at the EU, non-EU allocated in a way that takes opera- example, the USCG S&T Transition and
and organisational levels identifies a tional requirements into considera- Innovation Center (CG-STIC) coordinates
number of good practices in relation to tion. This is the case in the US with the an Innovation Council and a series of
the end user networks, funding mecha- Quadrennial Homeland Security Reviews working groups to inform its under-
nisms and management processes sup- (QHSR), Integrated Product Teams (IPTs), standing of end user needs. On the ba-
porting border security research: the Science and Technology Resource sis of this understanding, it then tailors
▪▪ End user networks can support the Allocation Strategy (STRAS), and the existing technologies to end user require-
integration of research products into US Coast Guard Research, Development, ments in order to improve the delivery of
operational practice through close in- Test and Evaluation (USCG RTD&E) busi- operationally useful solutions. Another
volvement of border guards (Section ness process.64 Engaging border guards example is ESA’s active engagement with
3.1.1) and engagement with senior in this way can also increase their un- users of space technologies in order to
leadership (Section 3.1.2). derstanding of the advantages of re- tailor its programmes to operational
▪▪ Flexible funding models enable re- search products, which may then lead needs and the wider environment.66
search to adapt to changes in opera- to a greater likelihood of their success- Interviewees and survey respond-
tional requirements (Section 3.1.3). ful uptake in the field. End users can ents identified numerous other exam-
provide support in a number of ways ples of effective involvement of border
at various stages of the R&I pathway, guards in research delivery, as discussed
62 For detailed information regarding the including need identification and pri- in Chapters 3 and 4 of the Technical
WP1 (EU border security research), WP2 oritisation, project specification and
(non-EU border security research) and WP3
(functional roles for R&I within different 65 Please refer to Section 3.2 of the Techni-
organisations) case studies, please refer to 63 Industry survey respondents (Surveys L, O). cal Annex.
Chapters 2, 3 and 4, respectively, of the 64 Please refer to Section 3.1 of the Techni- 66 Please refer to Section 4.1 of the Techni-
Technical Annex. cal Annex. cal Annex.

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Annex. In the Canadian case, for exam- order to drive up interest in research is not yet a rapid funding mechanism
ple, universities and research organisa- among border security staff.69 The buy- that addresses short-term end user re-
tions submitting proposals are required in of senior personnel is important to quirements.72 Nonetheless, the EU offers
to collaborate with a ‘champion’ oper- ensuring that border security research several follow-on funding mechanisms
ational partner agency that will then is prioritised and allocated sufficient that are reportedly designed to promote
work with them on the proposed pro- resources. the application of research projects in
ject. Similarly, according to one study the field, although their effectiveness
interviewee, Frontex’s involvement on 3.1.3. Flexible funding models could not be determined by the RAND
the Advisory Board of various EU-funded are responsive to the short-term study team based on the data available.
projects has helped ensure that research needs of end users and support These include InnovFin, the European
reflects border guard requirements and further development of existing Fund for Strategic Investments (EFSI),
the wider operational context.67 research InvestHorizon and Progress TT, which
According to one study interviewee, are part of the ‘Industrial Leadership’
the transition from FP7 to H2020 has in- The dynamic nature of the threat land- pillar of H2020. InnovFin and EFSI are
creased the visibility of research to bor- scape means that the operational re- both ‘risk finance’ instruments avail-
der guards and introduced a requirement quirements of border guards may change able to various types of organisation
for end user involvement in H2020 pro- quickly (see Section 1.1). For research including small and medium-sized en-
ject consortia.68 While the extent and na- programmes to be responsive to these terprises (SMEs), research centres, PPPs
ture of their participation varies across changing requirements, flexible fund- and joint ventures.73 This type of fund-
the EU FP, end users can participate ing models can help ensure that research ing can be used to develop, commer-
in workshops, demonstrations and re- continues to have practical value for cialise and deploy new technologies.74
search, as well as leading the consortia end users. In Australia, for example, InnovFin provides direct loans designed
responsible for delivering projects. These DIBP’s approach to funding research to help ‘support the smallest to the larg-
practices not only help ensure that the has become more responsive in recent est R&I projects in the EU and countries
research is informed by an understand- years, with commissioned research in- linked to Horizon 2020’,75 and EFSI helps
ing of operational needs and priorities, creasingly focusing on studies with a finance ‘infrastructure and innovation
but also that proposed projects are de- shorter turnaround and those that are projects’.76
signed in a way that has practical util- more reactive to emerging issues.70 In
ity to border guards. the US, the STRAS, QHSR, IPTs, SBIR 3.1.4. Coordinated research
and USCG processes also exemplify this processes can help identify
3.1.2. Engaging with senior flexible approach to need identification. capability gaps and avoid
leadership can help ensure the These mechanisms ensure that opera- duplication of effort across
continuous profile of border tional needs and emerging priorities multiple teams or organisations
security research are captured in a flexible and dynamic
way before the allocation of resources to When multiple agencies and divisions
Involving the senior representatives of projects takes place. Further, as these are responsible for overseeing border se-
border guard agencies and government processes are based on different imple- curity research, this can lead to dupli-
departments in research processes can mentation timelines with staggered de- cated efforts if research activities are not
also help strengthen the profile of border cision-making points, this facilitates a coordinated effectively.77 Having a cen-
security research, signalling senior-level continuous capturing of R&D needs.71 tralised entity or set of processes aimed
commitment to research in this field and Beyond DHS, DIUx maintains flexibility at coordinating research efforts can help
encouraging buy-in from other stake- through an open call for research propos- mitigate these problems, as well as sup-
holders. The benefits of engaging senior als, which it then assesses on a rolling porting situational awareness of ongo-
leadership in research are highlighted basis (see Section 4.3 of the Technical ing border security research activities.78
by the Australian case. Interviewees Annex). In the US, for example, interviewees ob-
noted that positive organisational and While important for encouraging in- served that IPTs demonstrate the benefits
cultural changes in the Department vestment in long-term research, multi- of coordinating DHS research processes
of Immigration and Border Protection annual funding programmes such as in this way by linking research activ-
(DIBP) are linked to strong engagement the EU FPs are said to be less adapta- ities with the work of the DHS Joint
at the senior leadership level in encour- ble to the short-term needs of border Requirements Council to close existing
aging innovation, research partnerships guards. In the EU, for example, there
and secondments with think tanks in
69 RAND Europe interview with Dr John 72 Technopolis (2015).
Coyne, 20 March 2017; RAND Europe in- 73 European Commission (n.d.-f.).
67 RAND Europe interview with Dragos terview with Australian representative, 74 European Commission (n.d.-h).
Voicu, 11 April 2017. 30 March 2017; RAND Europe interview 75 European Commission (n.d.-f).
68 H2020 regulations state that there should with DIBP representative, 29 March 2017. 76 European Commission (n.d.-g).
be at least three end user entities within 70 RAND Europe interview with Australian 77 Industry survey respondent (Survey O).
a project. Source: RAND Europe interview representative, 30 March 2017. See Section 2.3 of the Technical Annex.
with EU project officer, 26 June 2017. 71 DHS S&T (2015). 78 2 respondents (Surveys A, E).

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technology capability gaps.79 Assigning study: in response to the findings of a 3.2. Challenges in translating
responsibility for research coordination Government Accountability Office (GAO) research into operational
to one set of actors, such as IPTs, can pro- evaluation of the performance of its re- practice
mote a standardised approach to iden- search portfolio, DHS actively worked to
tifying and tracking research efforts, as address concerns regarding its limited While the case studies highlight a num-
well as centralising mechanisms for the supervision and coordination mecha- ber of good practices with regard to re-
identification and reporting of capability nisms for research activities by launch- search, various challenges can also be
gaps. The US experience suggests that a ing IPTs.81 IPTs have reportedly mitigated identified in relation to end user involve-
more holistic understanding of research the duplication of research efforts and ment and decision making:
activities across agencies or divisions en- ‘stove-piping’ across the department, ▪▪ Challenges linked to end user in-
ables awareness of where research is not providing a centralised platform for volvement include poorly defined
addressing capability gaps, which can the identification and prioritisation of ‘impact’ assessment criteria (Section
then inform future research work and research needs (see Section 3.2.3). The 3.2.1), a disconnect between research
planning. results achieved by IPTs highlight the providers and border guards’ opera-
significant contribution that external tional activities (Section 3.2.2), a
3.1.5. Networks of industry evaluations can make to the internal pro- lack of end user interest in research
specialists and academic experts cesses, efficiency and accountability of (Section 3.2.3), and issues relating to
can drive research and innovation a department or function – something information sharing (Section 3.2.4).
which is particularly important when ▪▪ Challenges linked to decision mak-
Effective engagement between indus- border security research is being con- ing include IP constraints (Section
try and academic stakeholders can also ducted using taxpayer money and when 3.2.5) and a lack of available resources
promote research and innovation. In multinational (i.e. EU) research initia- (Section 3.2.6), which can create fur-
the US, for example, the DHS SBIR and tives must demonstrate value to MS.82 ther challenges for integrating re-
COEs have engaged with DoD contractors The importance of effective evaluation search into operational practice.
with technology development expertise of research processes is also a key fea-
in order to design innovative solutions ture of the EU case study. Regular eval- The following sections explore these is-
with operational value. Stakeholder net- uations of EU Framework Programmes sues in more detail.
works have also helped enable border se- have been undertaken throughout their
curity innovation in the EU: for example, duration in order to ‘steer the imple- 3.2.1. ‘Impact’ assessment criteria
through its Knowledge and Innovation mentation of research and innovation often lack a clear definition
Communities (KICs), the EIT has created programmes, as well as guide future
innovation hubs that focus on thematic Framework Programmes’.83 The FP7 and While achieving impact is a central ob-
topics and involve collaboration between H2020 programmes have both been, or jective of research programmes across
academic and business stakeholders.80 will be, the subject of an interim and the case study countries, ‘impact’ is of-
an ex-post evaluation. By conducting ten poorly defined and lacks a clear set of
3.1.6. Regular evaluation of these evaluations, it is possible to as- assessment criteria. By focusing on this
existing research processes can sess whether research programmes re- objective, research funders seek to im-
help ensure their continued main relevant, continue to meet their prove operational practices, contribute
fitness for purpose objectives, offer added value, and re- to an enhanced understanding of pol-
main efficient in their use of resources.84 icy issues, and build capacity through
It is important that existing research According to one interviewee, sharing skills development.86 As the EU case dem-
processes are monitored and evaluated lessons learned regarding the research onstrates, ‘impact’ is a core component
at regular intervals to ensure that they process can be helpful for both the con- of proposal review processes yet is of-
remain fit for purpose over time. These tracting party and the research provid- ten not measured in a systematic way
evaluations should use a rigorous, evi- er.85 Importantly, funding bodies must by research funders (see Chapter 2 of the
dence-based approach focused on deliv- also have the will and the processes in Technical Annex). Furthermore, the type
ery of tangible benefit to border security place to act upon the findings of these of ‘impact’ that a proposed project will
and other organisational goals. This in- evaluations and make effective interven- have is likely to depend on the whether
volves ensuring that research providers tions to support, restructure or re-orient the research undertaken is ‘basic re-
capture a dashboard of relevant manage- research projects that are found to fall search’ driven by interest in expand-
ment information and Key Performance short of the required standards of value, ing knowledge, or ‘applied research’
Indicators (KPIs) as a basis for monitor- good governance and relevance. designed to address practical problems
ing and evaluation (M&E). The poten- rather than to acquire knowledge for
tial benefits of M&E in identifying ‘what knowledge’s sake.87
works’ are demonstrated by the US case 81 GAO (2013).
82 DHS S&T (2015); GAO (2013).
83 European Commission (n.d.-e). 86 Economic and Social Research Council
79 RAND Europe interview with US represen- 84 European Commission (n.d.-e). (n.d.).
tatives, May 2017. 85 RAND Europe interview with EU project 87 For further information, see also : RAND
80 EIT (n.d.-a). officer, 26 June 2017. Europe (n.d.).

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While H2020 proposals are required to and operational practice, challenges re- programme aimed at addressing these re-
describe a project’s expected impact, the main in relation to the operationalisation quirements (see Section 3.1.3). This is be-
European Commission’s interim H2020 of research in many cases. As outlined cause a prolonged lag between these two
evaluation notes that the programme in Section 3.2.1, end users have been in- phases could lead to the development of
lacks a rigorous, overarching system to volved extensively at various stages of research products that meet operational
assess ‘research impacts’.88 Study inter- the research and innovation pathway in needs that have since evolved or disap-
viewees also observed that the ‘expected many different organisations. They not peared.98 It is important that needs and
impact’ of H2020 research lacks a clear only sit on project advisory boards and priorities emerging from sudden changes
definition and noted a lack of guidance review deliverables, but also contribute in the threat landscape can be captured
regarding the expected timelines for ‘im- to the prioritisation of research areas, and quickly investigated through re-
pact’, which may vary depending on the participate in workshops and demon- search work (see Section 3.1.3).
focus of research and the specific type of strations, and lead the consortia respon-
impact sought.89 At the MS level, various sible for delivering research projects. 3.2.3. A lack of end user uptake
indicators of successful impact are ap- Regardless of these efforts, not all re- can hinder innovative operational
plied, including the efficiency of opera- search products are successfully trans- practices
tions drawing on research outputs,90 the lated into operational practice, and the
provision of positive end user feedback practical impact of research is not al- A lack of interest among border guards in
concerning research-based solutions,91 ways tracked after the end of a project. new research products can also impede
or the financial impact of research-based Several factors are said to contribute their operational application. According
solutions applied in the field.92 Similarly, to this disconnect between research and to one study interviewee, end users are
in the Australian case, it is not clear from operational practice. Several study par- often not interested in research prod-
the information collected by the study ticipants highlighted a lack of commu- ucts because they are operationally fo-
team whether ‘impact potential’ is meas- nication between research providers cused ‘generalists’ with responsibility for
ured in any formal way.93 and end users.94 Similarly, one EU re- a range of tasks, and therefore tend to fo-
Furthermore, under existing research port notes that the communication of cus on using existing tools and processes
processes, there are often limits on the research results to end users should be to conduct their day-to-day activities,
ability of research providers to directly improved.95 At the proposal stage, the rather than engaging with unfamiliar
influence operational ‘impact’ in the border security experts responsible for alternatives.99
field. In Canada, for example, the pri- evaluating proposals are not always In the EU case study, it was reported
mary role of the Defence Research and sufficiently aware of practitioner needs that a lack of end user uptake is related
Development Canada Centre for Security and the wider operational context.96 As to their lack of effective involvement in
Science (DRDC-CSS) programme is report- a result, the resulting research is not research.100 Despite recent improvements
edly to present decision makers in the always operationally focused or appli- in engaging end users in EU-funded re-
Canada Border Service Agency (CBSA), cable for end users. As highlighted by search (see Section 3.1.1), factors such
the Royal Canadian Mounted Police one study interviewee, challenges can as end users’ unfamiliarity with H2020
(RCMP) and other operational agencies also arise when border security research financial rules, intermittent project en-
with evidence upon which to base their does not take into account affordabil- gagement, and lack of engagement in
decisions. While the implementation ity constraints facing border guards or technical research are said to remain ar-
of research outputs is viewed as a de- the compatibility of research-based solu- eas for improvement.101
sirable outcome within the DRDC-CSS tions with the technology and legacy sys- In certain countries, such as Turkey,
programme, it is recognised that the de- tems already in use in the field.97 In these political sensitivities can lead to reluc-
cision to deploy a technology, or to im- cases, the results of research tend to re- tance among border guards to incorpo-
plement recommendations from border main on paper and fail to make any last- rate new research-based solutions into
security research, ultimately rests with ing impact beyond the end of the project. their operational practice. In the Turkish
the operational agencies. Problems can also arise when there case, following the attempted coup in July
is a substantial time lag between need 2016, many police and military officials,
3.2.2. A disconnect remains identification by operational agen- civil servants and academics were made
between research and operational cies and the launching of a research redundant, leading to reluctance among
practice these stakeholder groups to discuss bor-
der security and related research with
94 Industry survey respondent (Survey O);
Despite ongoing efforts to strengthen
RAND Europe interview with Peter Ry-
links between border security research
man, 20 September 2017. 98 RAND Europe interview with US repre-
95 European Commission (2017b). sentatives, May 2017.
88 European Commission (n.d.-c). 96 RAND Europe interview with FP7 project 99 RAND Europe interview with Phil Light-
89 European Commission (n.d.-c). coordinator, 31 March 2017; industry sur- foot, 19 April 2017.
90 1 respondent (Survey E). vey respondents (Surveys L, O). 100 Industry survey respondent (Survey O);
91 1 respondent (Survey F). 97 RAND Europe interview with Frontex rep- RAND Europe interview with EU project
92 1 respondent (Survey G). resentative, 19 April 2017; RAND Europe officer, 26 June 2017.
93 RAND Europe interview with Australian interview with EU institution represen- 101 RAND Europe interview with EU project
representative, 30 March 2017. tatives, 24 April 2017. officer, 26 June 2017.

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end users (see Section 3.4 in the Technical sult, MS may in some cases lack a com- in practice.110 This approach contrasts
Annex). One way of mitigating this is- prehensive situational understanding of with the US approach (see Chapter 3.1 of
sue and increasing the interest of border research activities undertaken across the the Technical Annex), whereby all prop-
guards in research outputs is by involving EU. More could be done at both the EU erty developed through US-funded re-
them more continuously and effectively and MS levels to facilitate information search programmes is federally owned
in research processes (see Section 3.1.1). exchange across MS and organisations and research can be further developed
Other ways include improving communi- involved in border security research.104 and exploited by border guards.111
cation around H2020 financial rules and While Frontex has set up an online
procedures, and doing more to share ex- platform for sharing research content 3.2.6. A lack of available resources
amples of the effective operationalisation (Border Tech-Net),105 one interviewee can impede implementation of
of EU-funded research outputs. noted that this website would benefit research products
from further inputs from border guards
3.2.4. Poor information exchange in order to provide a comprehensive pic- A shortage of funding for the operation-
limits awareness of ongoing ture of border security research activities alisation of research activities is a con-
research activities undertaken across the EU and its MS.106 straint affecting several of the case study
While MS participation in EU-funded countries. For example, the evaluation
A good understanding of the links be- research remains high, another EU MS of the FP7 programme found that EU
tween research processes, stakeholder survey respondent reported that MS of- Framework Programmes lack the fund-
networks and project results is impor- ten lack access to information regard- ing to support the commercialisation and
tant and can be achieved by coordinat- ing project results that could help border implementation of research findings.112
ing research processes (see Section 3.1.3). guards integrate these lessons into op- Limited funding for research and man-
For end users to implement research- erational practice.107 power shortages were also mentioned as
based solutions, it is essential that they key challenges facing MS survey partici-
are aware of research findings and rec- 3.2.5. IP constraints can create pants.113 Similarly, in the Canadian case,
ommendations. For example, the ESA barriers to the continued the majority of border security resources
offers a centralised repository of infor- development of research are reportedly allocated to the improve-
mation on completed research and on- ment of cross-border infrastructure and
going research opportunities, with key A further challenge relates to the treat- other operational priorities, while far less
publications, forums and news items ment of IPR within research programmes have been assigned to longer-term border
posted on its Industry Web Portal.102 DHS in a number of countries. Under the EU security research projects and their im-
S&T Centres of Excellence also have a system, for example, IPR rules stipulate plementation.114 For available funding to
web portal that provides academic in- that project partners retain IPR to the be allocated to border security research, it
stitutions with information regarding products resulting from their EU-funded is important to demonstrate the value of
funding opportunities, COE projects, research. While the model grant agree- research through, for example, securing
COE-related events, and project results ment provides a ‘general obligation for the buy-in of senior ‘champions’ within
and achievements. Other means of shar- beneficiaries to exploit and disseminate relevant agencies (see Section 3.1.2).
ing information include involving end the project results that they own’ and
users in the research. For example, the to grant access rights to the project,108 Table 3.1 on the right provides a com-
EU H2020 programme requires that at project IPR still often remain with the parative overview of the key challenges
least three members of the proposed con- developers, meaning that it can be dif- and areas of good practice discussed in
sortium represent the end user commu- ficult for research products to be applied this chapter.
nity. Proactive outreach and engagement in practice by border guards. According
can also raise awareness of the outputs to industry survey respondents, IPR 110 RAND Europe interview with Frontex rep-
of research activities with, for example, challenges are also linked to the con- resentative, 19 April 2017; industry sur-
SBIR running technology demonstra- sortium model for EU-funded research vey respondents (Surveys M, N, O).
111 RAND Europe interview with Frontex rep-
tions with a view to attracting investors. projects, as it can be difficult for the var-
resentative, 19 April 2017; Freeman et al.
However, challenges remain in dis- ious partners to arrive at a commercial (2015). The extent to which US-funded
seminating this information. For ex- agreement.109 This can play a role in con- research is developed further by border
ample, one EU MS survey respondent straining border guards not directly in- guards is not clear from the interviews
reported that national authorities are volved in the research from developing conducted as part of this study.
112 Technopolis (2015). However, it should be
not always kept up to date with the lat- the findings further and applying them
noted that this is a constraint that does not
est EU border security research devel- affect all EU funding programmes: for ex-
opments due to reported shortcomings 104 MS survey respondent (Survey C). ample, EU MS reportedly only use half of
in interagency cooperation.103 As a re- 105 Border Tech-Net/ Frontex. 2017. the funding available to them through the
106 RAND Europe correspondence with Dra- Internal Security Fund (ISF) (RAND Europe
gos Voicu, 27 September 2017. interview with Frontex representative, 19
102 Please refer to Section 4.1 of the Techni- 107 MS survey respondent (Survey B). April 2017).
cal Annex. 108 European IPR Helpdesk (n.d.). 113 4 respondents (Surveys B, C, D, E).
103 MS survey respondent (Survey C). Please 109 Industry survey respondents (Surveys M, 114 RAND Europe interview with Canadian
refer to Section 2.2 of the Technical Annex. N, O). representative, 21 April 2017.

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Table 3.1 Summary of lessons identified from case studies115

Selected case study evidence

Good Practices

End user involvement EU: Frontex’s involvement on the advisory boards of numerous EU-funded projects helps tailor research to border
(Section 3.1.1) guard requirements and context (see Technical Annex Section 2.1).

Canada: Annual Public Safety Canada meetings are held with border management agencies to discuss
operational priorities, which feed into the development of invitations to tender (see Technical Annex Section 3.2).

ESA: The ESA engages with users of space technologies in order to ensure that its programmes reflect
operational needs and context (see Technical Annex Section 4.1).

Engagement with leadership Australia: Positive organisational changes in the DIBP are reportedly linked to strong engagement at the senior
(Section 3.1.2) leadership level in encouraging innovation and research partnerships (see Technical Annex Section 3.3).

Flexible funding models EU. The EU offers several follow-on funding mechanisms reportedly designed to support the operationalisation of
(Section 3.1.3) research, e.g. InnovFin, EFSI and InvestHorizon (see Technical Annex Section 2.1).

Australia: DIBP’s approach to funding research has become more responsive to emerging issues in recent years,
with commissioned research increasingly focusing on studies with a shorter turnaround (see Technical Annex
Section 3.3).

DIUx. In the US, DIUx maintains flexibility through an open call for research proposals, which are then assessed
on a rolling basis (see Technical Annex Section 4.3).

Coordinated research processes US: IPTs link research activities to the work of the DHS Joint Requirements Council in order to close existing
(Section 3.1.4) technology capability gaps (see Technical Annex Section 3.1).

Networks of industry and research experts SBIR and COE: SBIR and COEs work with DoD contractors with technology development expertise in order to
(Section 3.1.5) design innovative solutions (see Technical Annex Sections 4.4 and 4.6).

EIT: Through its KICs, the EIT has created innovation hubs that involve engagement between academic and
business stakeholders (see Technical Annex Section 4.2).

Evaluation of research processes EU: The FP7 and H2020 programmes have both been, or will both be, the subject of an interim and an ex-post
(Section 3.1.6) evaluation (see Technical Annex Section 2.1).

US: In response to GAO evaluation findings, DHS has worked to address concerns regarding its limited research
supervision mechanisms by launching IPTs (see Technical Annex Section 3.1).

Challenges

‘Impact’ criteria poorly defined EU: While H2020 proposals are required to describe a project’s expected impact, the interim H2020 evaluation
(Section3.2.1) notes that there is not an overarching system in place to assess ‘research impacts’ (see Technical Annex Section
2.1).

Disconnect between research and EU: According to EU MS survey respondents, there is a gap between research and operational practice due to
operational practice (among other factors) a lack of communication between research providers and end users (see Technical Annex
(Section 3.2.2) Section 2.2).

Lack of end user interest in research Turkey: Following the attempted coup in July 2016, political sensitivities in Turkey have led to reluctance among
(Section 3.2.3) end users to discuss border security and related research (see Technical Annex Section 3.4).

Poor information exchange ESA: To address information-sharing challenges, the ESA’s Industry Web Portal offers a centralised repository of
(Section 3.2.4) information on completed research and ongoing research opportunities (see Technical Annex Section 4.1).

IP constraints US: All property developed through US-funded research programmes is federally owned and research can be
(Section 3.2.5) further developed and exploited by border guards. This contrasts with the EU system (WP1), whereby IPR rules
state that project partners retain IPR to research products (see Technical Annex Sections 2.1 and 3.1).

Lack of available resources Canada: Most border security resources are allocated to improving cross-border infrastructure, while far less
(Section 3.2.6) funding is provided for border security research (see Technical Annex Section 3.2).

115 This table is not intended to be exhaustive: it highlights the main challenges and areas of
good practice identified through the literature review, interviews and surveys, with 1–3
examples cited for each area. It is recognised that there are likely to be additional good
practices and challenges that are not captured here.

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4. Functional roles for R&I organisations

Following the scoping of good practices successful in supporting a clear research undertakes a horizon-scanning func-
and challenges outlined in Chapter 3, the and innovation pathway for border se- tion and a ‘technology-scouting’ pro-
study team conducted a more in-depth curity research. Although the WP3 case cess to research and evaluate specific
analysis of functional roles for R&I organ- studies were the primary basis for iden- technology landscapes.118
isations in order to inform a set of recom- tifying these functional roles, the case
mendations for Frontex (see Chapter 5). studies of research within and beyond Role 1.2: Analysing the operational
This chapter outlines different functional the EU (WP1–2) also provided relevant needs of end users
roles that a range of organisations and examples, as elaborated below. ▪▪ Description: Engaging end users in re-
institutions have adopted along the re- The functional roles are presented in search planning in order to help en-
search and innovation pathway pre- the following sections, with more de- sure that priorities are set and funds
sented in Chapter 2. Appendix D of the tailed information found in Appendix allocated in a way that takes oper-
Technical Annex explains these roles in D of the Technical Annex. These are in- ational requirements into consider-
more detail. tended to summarise existing roles un- ation – this input can be captured
dertaken by organisations involved in through various mechanisms, in-
research and innovation in a range of cluding meetings and an analysis of
4.1. Overview of functional sectors, including border security. While capability gaps.
roles for R&I these roles are grouped by theme (e.g. ▪▪ Examples: In the US, DHS S&T has
providing thought leadership, hosting adopted a STRAS to ensure that S&T
After developing the research and in- innovation), the WP1-3 case study evi- efforts are aligned with operational
novation pathway described in Chapter dence does not indicate that the roles are requirements. DHS has also launched
2, the project team conducted a series mutually exclusive or that it is necessary IPTs in order to mitigate duplication
of case studies (WP3). The purpose of to undertake them in a particular order. of research effort; and the USCG has
these case studies was to understand The following paragraphs offer descrip- implemented an Idea Submission
how different organisations, operating tions and examples of these functional Review (ISR) process that allows
in the border security domain as well roles, and serve as a basis for the rec- project ideas to be submitted from
as in other sectors, position themselves ommendations presented in Chapter 5. within the USCG.119 In Canada, an-
along this pathway and what roles they nual meetings take place between
play in facilitating research and inno- 4.1.1. Coordinating requirement Public Safety Canada and operational
vation (see Chapter 4 of the Technical identification and setting agencies (Canada Border Services
Annex). Case studies include: Agency, Royal Canadian Mounted
▪▪ European Space Agency Role 1.1: Performing horizon scan- Police and Immigration, Refugees
▪▪ European Institute of Innovation & ning117 to identify security threats and Citizenship Canada) in order to
Technology and innovation opportunities better understand agencies’ opera-
▪▪ US Defense Innovation Unit ▪▪ Description: Systematically examin- tional priorities and interests.120
Experimental ing information in order to identify
▪▪ US Small Business Innovation innovation opportunities and po- 4.1.2. Providing thought
Research tential risks and threats relating to leadership
▪▪ US Homeland Security Innovation security, the environment and the po-
Programs litical climate, which allows for better Role 2.1: Conducting research in
▪▪ US network of Centers of Excellence. preparedness and decision making. house
▪▪ Example: In the US, the DHS Science ▪▪ Description: Participating in research
The analysis of these case studies, com- and Technology directorate (S&T) and innovation, whether through
bined with findings from other recent actively leading research projects or
RAND Europe research on innovation 117 ‘Horizon scanning’ is a technique for de-
models,116 allowed the project team to tecting early signs of potentially impor-
identify a set of specific functional roles tant developments through a systematic 118 Please refer to Appendix D of the Techni-
examination of potential threats and op- cal Annex.
for organisations coordinating research
portunities, with emphasis on new tech- 119 Please refer to Section 3.1 of the Techni-
that characterise organisations that are
nology and its effects on the issue at hand. cal Annex.
See Organisation for Economic Coopera- 120 Please refer to Section 3.2 of the Techni-
116 Freeman et al. (2015). tion and Development (OECD) (n.d.). cal Annex.

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contributing to research activities in a increasing awareness among end us- academia, policy officials and
more secondary, supportive capacity. ers of the operational benefits of EU- practitioners
▪▪ Examples: In the US, S&T is the pri- funded research. ▪▪ Description: Cultivating relationships
mary R&D organisation within DHS, ▪▪ Examples: The study research did not between research, industry, policy of-
with responsibility for the RD&I pro- identify an organisational example; ficials and end users in order to help
gramme that involves conducting ba- this was a gap identified by Frontex develop greater cross-sector partner-
sic and applied research.121 In the EU, study interviewees.125 ships – this involves moving away
Frontex contributes to border security from more contractual customer/
R&I activities through, for example, Role 3.3: Facilitating knowledge supplier relationships to an increased
its role on project advisory boards.122 transfer focus on innovation in partnership
▪▪ Description: Systematically capturing towards a shared endeavour, which
Role 2.2: Influencing policy lessons learned during project imple- would be encouraged by an ‘hon-
developments mentation and after project comple- est broker’ organisation that would
▪▪ Description: Providing independent tion to build a repository of good also identify opportunities for these
advice and recommendations to key practices and inefficiencies, with partnerships.
decision makers on innovative means a view to supporting MS and other ▪▪ Examples: In the EU, Frontex organ-
to address future security challenges. relevant authorities in the setup and ises events that bring together end
▪▪ Examples: The US Defense Innovation management of future research and users, research providers and indus-
Board was introduced in order to pro- innovation. try.130 An FP7 project, SOURCE, aims
vide independent advice on inno- ▪▪ Examples: NATO has set up a Joint to create a virtual centre of excel-
vative means of addressing future Analysis and Lessons Learned Centre lence to help with networking, re-
challenges for defence.123 aimed at capturing lessons in a sys- search, information gathering and
tematic way and, among other activ- education.131 In the US, funding op-
4.1.3. Facilitating information ities, managing the NATO Lessons portunities for COEs are open to US
provision and knowledge transfer Learnt Portal.126 universities and colleges, who are en-
couraged to partner with industry.
Role 3.1: Centralising information Role 3.4: Delivering training and One example is the Borders, Trade
on R&I opportunities education for end users and Immigration Institute (BTI),
▪▪ Description: Presenting information ▪▪ Description: Delivering training for which focuses on developing tech-
regarding R&I funding in a consoli- end users on the use of newly devel- nology-based tools, techniques and
dated and easily accessible way, for oped technologies to support the up- educational programmes.132
example on a single webpage or on take and operationalisation of tools,
an openly accessible database – this technologies and other solutions de- Role 4.2: Supporting coordination
can help raise awareness regarding veloped through R&I. and cooperation between industry,
R&I opportunities among research ▪▪ Examples: In the US, the DHS S&T academia, nations and investors
stakeholders, industry representa- COE model provides education and (e.g. venture capitalists)
tives and end users, at both the EU training through, for example, ▪▪ Description: Supporting innova-
and MS levels. the Military Services Academics tion by coordinating the actions of
▪▪ Examples: The study research did not Program.127 In the EU, the ESA pro- third parties, rather than by directly
identify an organisational example; vides education and training for funding or performing the work – for
this was a gap identified by Frontex astronauts through its European example, facilitating regular inter-
study interviewees.124 Astronaut Centre.128 actions among the members of the
private venture capital community,
Role 3.2: Sharing information on op- 4.1.4. Providing an ‘honest small innovative companies and end
erational impacts of research broker’129 function users.
▪▪ Description: Systematically commu- ▪▪ Examples: In the US, the Defense
nicating information on how research Role 4.1: Facilitating coordination Venture Catalyst Initiative (DeVenCI)
results have been integrated into op- and cooperation between industry, supports R&D by coordinating the ac-
erational practice after the end of each tions of third parties, and facilitates
project, for example through press re- regular interactions among stake-
125 Please refer to Section 2.1 of the Techni-
leases, briefings and other commu- holders within the private venture
cal Annex.
nications activities – this is aimed at capital community.133
126 NATO (n.d.).
127 Please refer to Section 4.6 of the Techni-
121 Please refer to Section 3.1 of the Techni- cal Annex.
cal Annex. 128 Please refer to Section 4.1 of the Techni- 130 Please refer to Section 2.1 of the Techni-
122 Please refer to Section 2.1 of the Techni- cal Annex. cal Annex.
cal Annex. 129 An ‘honest broker’ is an organisation that 131 SOURCE (n.d.).
123 Mehta (2016). actively seeks and encourages partnership- 132 Please refer to Section 4.6 of the Techni-
124 Please refer to Section 2.1 of the Techni- oriented relationships with external ac- cal Annex.
cal Annex. tors. See Freeman et al. (2015). 133 Webb et al. (2012).

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4.1.5. Hosting innovation communication. 137 The National its purpose, activities, timeframe,
Institute of Standards and Technology budget, eligibility, and application
Role 5.1: Running technology also runs a similar challenge on the process.
demonstrations topic of ‘Virtual Public Safety Test ▪▪ Examples: The European Defence
▪▪ Description: Presenting a prototype Environment’ in order to identify Agency has a centralised webpage
or incomplete version of a future sys- new first responder technologies.138 that presents information on EU
tem, put together as proof of concept funding opportunities.143 In the US,
with the purpose of showcasing the Role 5.3: Launching an innovation DHS S&T has a grants resource web-
possible applications, feasibility, incubator page that presents information on
performance and method of a new ▪▪ Description: Hosting an innova- available grants.144
technology. Demonstrations can be tion ‘incubator’ or ‘hub’ on an or-
run for potential investors, research- ganisation’s premises, which can Role 6.3: Using procurements
ers or end users in order to test the strengthen innovative capacity by to ‘pull’ innovative solutions
technology and convince these stake- bringing together key stakeholders from the market
holders of the viability of the chosen from academia, industry and end us- ▪▪ Description: Providing funding for
approach. It also presents an opportu- ers, and by offering skills training R&I projects designed to address
nity to gather end user feedback and and key infrastructure (e.g. labs, IT short-term, high-priority end user re-
make adjustments to the prototype tools). An incubator can also be vir- quirements that need to be addressed
or concept to better deliver value to tual (i.e. run online). quickly.
end users and increase the probabil- ▪▪ Examples: The NATO Cyber Incubator ▪▪ Examples: In the US, the Rapid
ity of successful commercialisation. tests ways of strengthening pre-com- Innovation Fund allows small busi-
▪▪ Examples: In the EU, H2020 projects petition cooperation between indus- nesses to provide DoD with innova-
often involve technology demonstra- try (including SMEs), academia and tive technologies that can be rapidly
tions that bring together academic, NATO’s technical community.139 inserted into acquisition programmes
industry and end user stakehold- that meet specific defence needs.145
ers.134 In Canada, the Technology 4.1.6. Facilitating access to
Demonstration Programme funds funding
one or more large-scale R&D projects 4.2. Mapping roles onto the
per year.135 Role 6.1: Providing direct R&I research and innovation
funding pathway
Role 5.2: Running prize ▪▪ Description: Providing grants, sub-
competitions or ‘grand challenges’ sidies, subsidised loans and equity When considering the placement of the
▪▪ Description: Running innovation financing for R&I, often (although roles described above onto the research
competitions to encourage industry not always) offered on a competitive and innovation pathway (see Figure 4.1),
experts to attempt to solve innovation basis.140 the majority of roles are shown to be en-
challenges – by offering financial or ▪▪ Examples: In the EU, H2020 and ablers or connectors between the differ-
other incentives (‘prizes’), these ini- Frontex provide funding for research ent steps, rather than being an integral
tiatives can help entrepreneurs grow projects.141 In the US, HSIP provides di- part of a specific step. In practice, this
their business ideas, connect them rect funding for R&I start-ups.142 means that it is important to ensure that
to investors and global markets, and core R&I activities (need identification,
strengthen their innovative capabil- Role 6.2: Facilitating access to research, evaluation, etc.) do not take
ities for the benefit of industry, end available funding instruments place in isolation. Rather, these activ-
users and wider society. ▪▪ Description: Raising awareness on ities should be coherent and mutually
▪▪ Examples: In the US, the Defense how to access funding opportunities. supportive in order to sustain the feed-
Advanced Projects Research Agency For each funding programme, this back loops within the pathway.
(DARPA) Grand Challenges is a cash involves providing details regarding In addition, some of these specific
prize competition for autonomous functions can appear in multiple loca-
vehicles.136 DHS S&T also runs the tions. For example, direct funding could
‘InnoPrize’ Programme which fo- 137 DHS (n.d.-a); Global Biodefense (2015). be provided to support the research it-
cuses on addressing innovation 138 Challenge.gov (n.d.). self or, once the research is completed,
139 NATO (2015).
gaps: in 2015, for example, the support the transition of research out-
140 Non-competitive funding can also be of-
challenge focused on sensors and fered through, for example, sole-source
puts into operational practice. This could
mechanisms where the funding is in- be achieved by sponsoring capability
tended for a unique technology or where demonstrations or the advancement
it has to be allocated within a short
134 Please refer to Section 2.1 of the Techni- timeframe.
cal Annex. 141 Please refer to Section 2.1 of the Techni-
135 Please refer to Section 3.2 of the Techni- cal Annex. 143 European Defence Agency (2017).
cal Annex. 142 Please refer to Section 4.6 of the Techni- 144 DHS (n.d.-b).
136 DARPA (2014). cal Annex. 145 Defense Innovation Marketplace (2017).

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Figure 4.1 Functional roles and the research and innovation pathway

Research outputs Project specification

3.2, 3.3
& selection
6.1, 6.2, 6.3
3.1

Adaption by users
3.4, 5.1, 5.3

Need identification
INNOVATION & prioritisation RESEARCH
1.1, 1.2

3.2, 3.3
Impact Inputs to research
2.2 6.1, 6.2

Evaluation Research process

2.1, 5.2
ENABLING FACTORS

KEY STAKEHOLDERS 4.1, 4.2

CONTEXTUAL FACTORS 2.2

Source: RAND Europe analysis.

of the research output through succes- Table 4.1 Numbering of functional roles
sive TRLs.146 In addition, some roles may
be linked to broader aspects (e.g. wider Number Description of functional role
context, or key stakeholders) and may 1.1 Performing horizon scanning to identify security threats and innovation opportunities
therefore have an impact on the entire 1.2 Analysing the operational needs of end users
pathway. Figure 4.1 illustrates how the 2.1 Conducting research in house
study team has mapped the functional
2.2 Influencing policy developments
roles onto the research and innovation
3.1 Centralising information on R&I opportunities
pathway, listing each option by number
3.2 Sharing information on operational impacts of research
(explained in Table 4.1, on the right).
3.3 Facilitating knowledge transfer

3.4 Delivering training and education for end users

4.1 Facilitating coordination and cooperation between industry, academia, policy officials and
practitioners

4.2 Supporting cooperation between industry, academia, nations and investors (e.g. venture
capitalists)

5.1 Running technology demonstrations

5.2 Running prize competitions or ‘grand challenges’

5.3 Launching an innovation incubator

6.1 Providing direct R&I funding

6.2 Facilitating access to available funding instruments

6.3 Using procurements to ‘pull’ innovative solutions from the market

146 Please refer to Appendix F of the Technical

Annex for a definition of ‘TRL’ and other
key terms.

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5. Ways forward for Frontex

This chapter draws on the findings of Table 5.1 Overview of recommended interventions
all case studies conducted as part of this
project, as well as the R&I pathway pro- Recommendation 1:
vided in Chapter 2, to identify opportu- Frontex should facilitate access to information, knowledge and networks for relevant
nities for Frontex to improve the status national and EU institutions, industry, academia and investors
quo by developing new solutions or ex- ▪▪ Intervention 1.1: Frontex should create a centralised repository of information related to existing and
prospective research initiatives, funding opportunities and successful implementation of research
panding existing initiatives. The recom- outputs.
mendations presented in this chapter ▪▪ Intervention 1.2: Frontex should create a mechanism for the systematic capturing and sharing of
lessons identified to inform the future setup, management and operationalisation of research
build on the outcomes of the external projects, both within the organisation and within MS.
expert workshop held at Frontex’s prem- ▪▪ Intervention 1.3: Frontex should play an active role in brokering connections between stakeholders,
including research and innovation providers and recipients.
ises in September 2017, at which over 30
representatives of national border agen- Recommendation 2:

cies, European institutions and Frontex Frontex should establish mechanisms to ensure that research projects are designed,
itself were asked to analyse and prior- selected and implemented to be relevant for identified operational needs
▪▪ Intervention 2.1: Frontex should create a mechanism to systematically collect information on the
itise the functional roles described in development of technological solutions with specific applications and potential added value for
Chapter 4147. The findings of the work- border security.
▪▪ Intervention 2.2: Frontex should centralise information on national operational requirements with
shop were further analysed at two in- a view to supporting harmonisation where applicable. In this context, Frontex should also support
ternal expert workshops, in October and innovative approaches to ‘pull’ innovation ideas from end users themselves, in addition to more
traditional ‘top-down‘ approaches.
November 2017, to generate the recom- ▪▪ Intervention 2.3: Frontex should adopt a ‘research champion’ role in order to inform policy and
mendations presented below. decision making within EU institutions, ensuring that border security research priorities and themes
established at the EU level are tailored to the most up-to-date user requirements and technological
developments.
▪▪ Intervention 2.4: Frontex should integrate traditional research selection and implementation processes,
5.1. Defining Frontex’s role in which are generally focused on technical requirements, with more innovative approaches focused on
problem statements and desired end state, without imposing too many restrictions on solutions.
research and innovation for
border security Recommendation 3:
Frontex should facilitate and support the uptake and operationalisation of research outputs
by end users
Chapters 3 and 4 identified a series of
▪▪ Intervention 3.1: Frontex should establish mechanisms to maintain the continuous engagement of end
good practices that could, if imple- users during the research and innovation process.
mented, support a more efficient and ▪▪ Intervention 3.2: Frontex should facilitate access to funding that could be used to bridge the gap
between the completion of the research project and the commercialisation of the technology.
effective operationalisation of research This may include the provision of direct funding, the facilitation of access to available EU funding
outputs. Within this general context, instruments, and/or the establishment of efficient networks and connections with investors (e.g.
venture capitalists).
a key question is how to define the role
that Frontex could play in the research
and innovation domain.
In general terms, based on a synthe- 2. Helping bridge the gap between re- In assessing the viability of each
sis of stakeholder and expert views gath- search outputs and operational imple- recommendation and intervention,
ered through this study,148 Frontex’s role mentation by EU MS border agencies; Frontex should consider the internal
should be to consolidate and accelerate and implications and the changes for im-
the delivery of border security outcomes 3. Evaluating and disseminating re- plementation would require in relation
through research and innovation by: search outputs and outcomes, as to resources, mandate, staff, and exist-
1. Acting as an honest broker be- well as their impact on operational ing processes and procedures.149
tween end users, MS, the European practice.
Commission, industry, academic ex- These recommendations and related in-
perts and other stakeholders; In order to fulfil this role, the project terventions are not intended to be cu-
team identified nine interventions, mulative (i.e. they can be implemented
147 See Appendixes D and E in the Technical which were grouped under three high- individually and in any order) or mu-
Annex for further details on the workshop.
level recommendations linked directly tually exclusive. They are, however,
148 Stakeholder workshop at Frontex, War-
to the three roles described above. These
saw, 5 September 2017; internal expert
workshop at RAND Europe, Cambridge, are listed in Table 5.1 and further ana- 149 This type of feasibility assessment is out-
5 October 2017. lysed in Section 5.2. side of the scope of this study.

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interconnected and mutually reinforc- 5.2.1. Accessing information, Fund), with a view to increasing aware-
ing. The order and extent of Frontex’s knowledge and networks ness of available funding vehicles (see
implementation of these recommenda- also Intervention 3.2 for further details).
tions is dependent on the level of ambi- SUMMARY OF CHALLENGE BTN should also be leveraged to provide
tion and available resources. Study participants highlighted a lack information on future areas, or tech-
The purpose of this study is not to of awareness of current research ini- nologies, of particular interest for bor-
prioritise or recommend any specific tiatives in Europe among a number der security, building on the outcomes
intervention over another, but rather of national border security agen- of a more proactive approach to horizon
to present, in a structured way, inter- cies. The evidence also points to scanning and needs identification (see
ventions that Frontex may want to con- limited understanding of the vari- Intervention 2.1 for further details).
sider as it rethinks its role in the context ous funding vehicles available, both With respect to MS, BTN should con-
of research and innovation for border in terms of funding opportunities tain a repository of completed research
security. for border security research, and in projects related to border security (im-
terms of funding available to help plemented by Frontex or otherwise,
operationalise the research outputs. including national and multinational co-
5.2. Providing implementation Furthermore, limited engagement operation projects that can be presented
guidelines for Frontex with end users adversely affects pro- in the public domain). BTN should also
ject uptake.150 be used to share analysis briefs prepared
The following sections provide more de- by Frontex (using a simple template with
tailed information on each recommen- RECOMMENDATION 1: a two-page cap) on the prospective bene-
dation by elaborating on: Frontex should create means and op- fits and impact that such projects could
▪▪ The challenge that each recommen- portunities that facilitate access to have on operational practices and identi-
dation is designed to address information, knowledge and net- fied needs. These analysis briefs should
▪▪ Implementation-focused descriptions works by relevant national and EU be prepared with a view to providing rel-
of specific interventions, including: institutions, industry, academia and evant national border authorities with
–– Key actors involved; investors. a concise and user friendly description
–– Description of benefits; of the ‘so what’ related to each project,
–– Description of risk (defined as as well as a clear indication of the next
factors impacting the probability Intervention 1.1 steps required to bring project outputs to
of failure to achieve the desired fruition. These Frontex-led briefs could
outcomes); Frontex should create a mechanism (for be hosted on a restricted-access section
–– Indicative assessment of the time- example a web platform) to support ac- of BTN, visible only to MS, should the in-
frame necessary to implement the cess by MS, industry and academia to formation contained be considered too
intervention; a centralised repository of information sensitive to share openly. Should Frontex
–– Considerations on drivers of costs related to existing and prospective re- consider this activity unsustainable over
(specific figures are given only in search initiatives, funding opportuni- time, the responsibility for populating
relation to known examples of ties and successful implementation of these forms could be transferred to re-
good practices); and research outputs. search providers.
–– Examples of good practices. This web platform could build on the BTN could also be leveraged to promote
existing Border Tech-Net (BTN) if appro- more active engagement and information
It is relevant to note that considerations priate, or it could be developed as part of exchange between R&I providers and re-
and assessments of time and costs are a new Frontex-owned web platform. This cipients. This could be achieved through
made assuming that each recommen- intervention is based on the assumption the creation of a discussion forum ad-
dation is technically feasible (e.g. it is that enhancing BTN is the most viable ministered and moderated by Frontex.
supported by existing regulations and and cost-effective solution, but this as- Finally, the BTN platform could be
resources). More detailed discussion of sumption should be verified as part of a used to facilitate access to experts from
this caveat is presented in Section 5.3. feasibility study (see Section 5.3). academia or industry by fully develop-
Frontex could build on its BTN web ing the existing ‘Key Players’ webpage.
platform in order to centralise access to Experts could be identified by leverag-
all European research calls related to bor- ing existing Frontex networks. This cen-
der security, whether issued by Frontex tralised contact book of border security
or other organisations. Targeting po- R&I experts would facilitate the identi-
tential research providers (e.g. industry fication of SMEs for inclusion in future
and academia), BTN should also provide project proposals.
guidelines on how to apply for different Below we outline the key actors,
EU funds (e.g. H2020, Internal Security benefits and risks associated with this
intervention, as well as an indicative
150 Please refer to Section 3.2 of this report timeframe, cost considerations and ex-
and Section 2.1 of the Technical Annex. amples of relevant good practices:

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▪▪ Key actors involved: for all interested parties, including which previous lessons identified have
–– Implementing agency: Frontex industry, research institutions, been taken up in organisational practice.
–– Other actors/beneficiaries: bor- universities and ESA MS delega- In addition, Frontex may consider
der guard agencies, industry, ac- tions. This portal offers a central- championing a wider ‘lessons identified’
ademia, investors. ised list of Intended Invitations initiative with other EU institutions that
▪▪ Description of benefits: This plat- to Tender (IITT) and a list of live commission border security-related R&I
form would offer a ‘one-stop shop’ for Invitations to Tender (ITT).151 projects, with a view to promoting in-
all information regarding border secu- –– The EDA has a centralised web- formation sharing on this issue. This
rity R&I by centralising information page presenting information on initiative could take the form of an an-
that is already available on different EU funding opportunities, which nual conference open to other European
websites. In addition, this platform aims to raise awareness across the agencies operating in different sectors
would facilitate and stimulate dia- European Defence Technological (e.g. the EDA and ESA), but with simi-
logue between industry, academic ex- and Industrial Base (EDTIB) on lar emphasis on improving operational
perts and end users. how to access this funding. The practices and outcomes. This conference
▪▪ Description of risks: The main risk webpage focuses in particu- would provide the opportunity to discuss
associated with this intervention is lar on European Structural and lessons identified in the last 12 months,
a potential lack of engagement with Investment Funds (ESIF), the new including, for example, the presenta-
the new platform from MS, industry, EU COSME (Competitiveness of tion of particularly relevant case study
academic experts or investors. This Enterprises and SMEs) programme projects. The outcomes of this confer-
might be due to a lack of awareness and H2020.152 ence should be consolidated in a report
of its existence, or a decrease in inter- shared among EU agencies, MS and, to
est if the platform is not seen to bring Intervention 1.2 the extent possible, the public through
benefits. Should Frontex decide to im- BTN or other means.
plement this intervention, it should Frontex should create a mechanism for Below we outline the key actors,
consider planning an outreach cam- the systematic capturing and sharing of benefits and risks associated with this
paign to ensure that maximum vis- lessons identified to inform the future intervention, as well as an indicative
ibility is given to the enhanced BTN setup, management and operationali- timeframe, cost considerations and ex-
platform. In addition, it should al- sation of research projects, both within amples of relevant good practices:
locate sufficient resources to ensure the organisation and within MS. These ▪▪ Key actors involved:
that the content is updated regularly. lessons should include the perspective –– Implementing agency: Frontex
Depending on the uptake of the fo- of both the research provider (discuss- –– Other actors/beneficiaries: Fron-
rum tool, moderating and admin- ing, for example, technical challenges or tex, EC, ESA, EDA, MS and oth-
istrating the portal might become management issues caused by Frontex- ers as appropriate.
particularly time-intensive. mandated processes) and Frontex related ▪▪ Description of benefits: This inter-
▪▪ Indicative assessment of timeframe: to, for example, difficulties in integrat- vention would allow Frontex to sys-
Less than 6 months, as the interven- ing research outputs with other work if tematically capture over time enough
tion would build on the existing BTN projects exceed a certain duration. data to adapt project-management
platform. This should include engagement with processes with a view to maximis-
▪▪ Considerations on costs: Considering individual project teams at the end of ing the impact of R&I on operational
that the BTN platform is already op- each project to reflect on lessons identi- practices. This body of knowledge,
erating, the main cost sources would fied during implementation. This could ideally built and shared with the sup-
be limited to the refitting of the web- be done in person or through the use of port of other EU agencies facing sim-
site architecture and development of project evaluation forms to be submit- ilar challenges, would enable a more
new content. Long-term staff costs ted electronically and stored locally on consistent and operationally focused
are likely to increase as the portal Frontex networks. These lessons should approach to R&I management, allow-
increases its content and traffic, po- then be discussed within Frontex on a ing for the cross-fertilisation of expe-
tentially requiring full-time staff al- regular basis (e.g. every 6 or 12 months) riences between different projects.
located to the administration and to identify areas requiring improvements ▪▪ Description of risks: There is a risk
maintenance of the platform. or examples of best practices related to that the outcomes of this interven-
▪▪ Examples of good practice: project management, engagement with tion (i.e. the lessons identified)
–– The ESA has an online web portal end users and operational impact. To en- will not be used in a practical way.
(Electronic Mailing Invitation to sure that lessons identified are used ef- Lessons identified are only useful to
Tender System – EMITS) that pro- fectively, each internal meeting within the extent that they inform changes
vides interested parties with up- Frontex should also review the extent to within processes, practices and pro-
to-date information on existing cedures (including an informed deci-
and prospective research initia- sion of ‘no change’). To mitigate this
151 Please refer to Section 4.1 of the Techni-
tives. The purpose of this portal risk, Frontex, through its leadership,
cal Annex.
is to support fair competition and 152 EDA (2017). See also Table D2 in Appendix should promote an internal culture
allow access to ESA’s procurement D of the Technical Annex. of innovation.

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▪▪ Indicative assessment of timeframe: ▪▪ Creating a form of ‘industry advisory the Technical Annex. The advantages of
Less than 6 months for the initiation group’; creating a bespoke network of COEs in-
of an internal process within Frontex; ▪▪ Leveraging networks, communities clude the possibility of centralising in
between 6 and 12 months for the or- and centres already established by these centres several of the functions
ganisation and delivery of the first other European agencies; and/or described in other interventions (e.g.
multi-agency Lessons Identified ▪▪ Creating a Frontex-led network of Intervention 3.2).
Conference. Centres of Excellence. Below we outline the key actors,
▪▪ Considerations on costs: The cost benefits and risks associated with this
of setting up and running an inter- The least time- and resource-intensive intervention, as well as an indicative
nal process within Frontex would option would be to build on the existing timeframe, cost considerations and ex-
be limited, as the capturing of les- agenda of an annual meeting with in- amples of relevant good practices:
sons identified for individual pro- dustry and MS. Frontex could consider ▪▪ Key actors involved:
jects could be included as part of creating an industry advisory group com- –– Implementing agency: Frontex
the original list of project activities posed of high-level industrial represent- –– Other actors/beneficiaries: ESA,
and the periodic internal meetings atives selected by each MS and acting EIT, MS, industry, academia.
would not require additional fund- as a focal point and spokesperson for ▪▪ Description of benefits: While dif-
ing. The cost of organising a multi- national security industries and asso- ferent options are based on different
agency Lessons Identified Conference ciations. This group could also include levels of sophistication with their
would depend on location, time and representatives from relevant academic own additional benefits, all options
the extent to which external contrac- institutions. Such an advisory group described above will contribute to a
tors will be involved in its organisa- would provide a forum for exchanging more structured, goal-oriented ap-
tion and delivery. views on industrial, technical, manage- proach to engaging with research and
▪▪ Example of good practice: ment and other relevant aspects of R&I innovation suppliers.
NATO has a strong culture of using based on current operational needs, as ▪▪ Description of risks: Risks associ-
lessons learned activities to promote well as advice on how to foster industrial ated with this intervention will vary
constant improvement in the military cooperation to satisfy border security re- depending on the chosen course of
context, through its Joint Analysis quirements. Should Frontex decide to action. In the case of the advisory
and Lessons Learned Centre. This pursue this option, the first action would group, the main risk resides in the se-
Centre undertakes a number of ac- be to establish clearly defined Terms of lection by MS of the national industry
tivities to support the systematic cap- Reference for the group, including de- representatives (e.g. profiles chosen
turing of lessons learned, including tails on group composition, selection of more on the basis of national interests
hosting an annual Lessons Learned members, frequency of meetings and than on the added value they would
Conference, undertaking joint analy- format of outputs. bring to Frontex). Should Frontex de-
sis, offering support to exercises, and Building on the assumption that cide to engage with other EU agencies
managing the NATO Lessons Learned many technologies are shared by dif- to leverage existing networks, care-
Portal (NLLP). The NLLP is considered ferent sectors (which differ in the way ful consideration should be given to
to be NATO’s primary tool for sharing they apply these technologies), a second tailoring R&I in other sectors to the
information on lessons learned. Based option would be to consider establish- border security context. Regarding
on SharePoint technology, the NLLP ing collaboration agreements with other the option of Frontex creating its own
is a platform for sharing documents European organisations or agencies such network of COEs, notwithstanding
and announcing events in this area. as the ESA and the EIT to leverage the the need to conduct a feasibility study
While the focus of NATO is on captur- network of specialised centres already to ensure that such network could be
ing and analysing operational lessons established by these organisations (busi- established in the first place, risks
learned, the principles behind this in- ness incubation centres (BICs) and KICs would include Frontex’s ability to mo-
itiative are transferable to other con- respectively). This option would support bilise the R&I supply base to gener-
texts, making this a relevant example Frontex’s effort to expand its reach into ate enough interest and momentum
for Frontex.153 the R&I supply-base, including investors, around such new entities.
and provide an opportunity for develop- ▪▪ Indicative assessment of timeframe:
Intervention 1.3 ing internal know-how on how to create The time required to implement this
and manage more effective relationships intervention will depend on which
Frontex should play an active role in fa- with all parties involved in R&I. option Frontex is willing to pursue.
cilitating and brokering connections The more ambitious, resource-inten- Establishing an industrial advisory
between stakeholders, including R&I sive and long-term option would be for group and for creating partnerships
providers and recipients. This could be Frontex to establish its own network with other entities (e.g. the ESA or
achieved through different approaches, of COEs, building on different models EIT) to exploit existing networks and
depending on the level of ambition and currently operating in Europe (e.g. the communities of innovators would
available resources. These include: ESA’s BICs and the EIT’s KICs) or abroad take 6–12 months, whereas the es-
(e.g. the US DHS S&T COE model) as de- tablishment a Frontex-led network
153 NATO (n.d.). scribed in the Sections 4.1, 4.2 and 4.5 of of COEs would take 18–24 months

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(including the timelines necessary 5.2.2. Ensuring operational would support ‘detection of signal over
for conducting a feasibility study, but relevance of research noise’ (i.e. S&T developments of interest
excluding the time required to obtain for border security specifically). A further
the necessary approvals). SUMMARY OF CHALLENGE layer of analysis could then be added to
▪▪ Considerations on costs: Depending A disconnect is often evident between compare relevant technologies and their
on which option is adopted, estab- end users’ needs and the border se- suitability to address identified needs.
lishing an industry advisory group or curity research commissioned. This Depending on the level of ambition
leveraging the networks of other R&I reduces the likelihood of successful and resource availability, Frontex may
organisations would be relatively in- translation of research outputs into wish to:
expensive compared to the costs as- operational practices, limiting the ▪▪ Set up an internal horizon-scanning
sociated with setting up one or more potential for innovation. In some function that adopts a simplified
COEs. cases, end users report that they of- method and produces a basic output,
▪▪ Examples of good practice: ten do not feel engaged in the re- such as a document summarising top
–– Recognising the need for close search, or see its added value.157 trends on a quarterly basis;
involvement with the industry, ▪▪ Leverage other EU horizon-scanning
NATO has established the NATO RECOMMENDATION 2 : activities by partnering with another
Industrial Advisory Group (NIAG) Frontex should establish mecha- institution that does this and import-
to assist in the development of nisms to ensure that research pro- ing the results, producing a summary
military capability requirements jects are designed, selected and document that can be shared with MS;
and foster industrial cooperation. implemented to be relevant for iden- ▪▪ Request that MS with experience in
The NIAG meets in its plenary form tified operational needs. horizon scanning share outputs that
three times a year, while special Frontex can then combine and circu-
advisory groups are created as late to its stakeholder community;
required.154 Intervention 2.1 and/or
–– The ESA helps facilitate coor- ▪▪ Purchase a continuous horizon-scan-
dination and collaboration be- Frontex should create a process to sys- ning service or commission a hori-
tween MS, industry, academia tematically collect information on the zon-scanning provider to produce a
and the ESA itself through a va- development of technological solu- quarterly or biannual analysis which
riety of initiatives and activities. tions with specific application and po- Frontex can then share with its con-
One such initiative is a network tential added value for border security. tact networks.
of BICs which aim to support en- This could be achieved through horizon
trepreneurs and work with young scanning and technology watch or scout- Below we outline the key actors, benefits
start-ups.155 ing – processes that are often used in the and risks associated with this interven-
–– In the US, DHS S&T funds and man- defence context. The main output of this tion, as well as an indicative timeframe,
ages a programme of academic activity could be a quarterly newsletter cost considerations and examples of rel-
COE. This programme facilitates (on emerging technologies of interest in evant good practices:
cooperation between academia, border security) that Frontex circulates ▪▪ Key actors involved:
industry and government stake- to its stakeholder networks in industry, –– Implementing agency: Frontex
holders: for example, calls for the academia, EU institutions and border (with the potential support of an
setup of COEs encourage universi- guard agencies. external provider);
ties and colleges to partner with The main difference between horizon –– Other actors/beneficiaries: indus-
industry and private sector stake- scanning and technology watch resides try, academia.
holders in proposal preparation on the scope of the research. The former ▪▪ Description of benefits: The goal
and project delivery.156 prioritises breadth of research with a of adopting this type of approach is
view to capturing science and technol- threefold: (i) to position Frontex to
ogy developments in all areas and then better anticipate emerging or future
analysing them through the lense of a threats or opportunities relevant to
particular application (e.g. border secu- border security (e.g. new technolo-
rity). The latter pre-identifies technology gies/methods for stand-off visual ID
areas of particular interest and priori- or detection of imbibed illegal sub-
tises depth of analysis in those areas. stances); (ii) to minimise the risk of
Both approaches are based on two ‘strategic surprise’ or rapid obsoles-
main components: a data-collection/ cence of border security capabilities,
scanning function that aims to capture offsetting as far as possible the com-
154 For more information on the NIAG, please new S&T developments in a structured paratively slow pace of procurement
refer to NATO (2017).
way, and an assessment method that by starting the process of acquiring
155 Please refer to Section 4.1 of the Techni-
new capabilities as early as possible;
cal Annex.
156 Please refer to Section 4.5 of the Techni- 157 Please refer to Section 3.2 of this report and (iii) to more proactively seek out
cal Annex. and Section 2.1 of the Technical Annex. emerging and future requirements.

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▪▪ Description of risks: Risks associ- relevant solutions already exist) or ▪▪ Example of good practices:
ated with this intervention include collaborative R&I projects (in cases DHS S&T draws on a variety of means
the lack of internal resources to per- where R&I is needed to develop rel- to ‘pull’ innovative ideas from differ-
form and sustain a horizon-scanning evant solutions); ent stakeholders. These include the
function, as well as the lack of the re- ▪▪ Identifying ongoing work (within or Science and Technology Resource
quired research and analysis meth- outside Frontex) that could provide Allocation Strategy, which is a coordi-
odologies to ensure that the horizon a partial or complete solution to an nated framework designed to ensure
scanning produces information that identified need; and/or that S&T efforts are aligned with oper-
is useful and tailored to the specific ▪▪ Generating a set of requirements in ational requirements. STRAS records
border security context. areas where there is no ongoing or the work of end users in order to iden-
▪▪ Indicative assessment of timeframe: completed research to address the tify capability gaps and chart a course
Less than six months to set up a ho- problem. of action for filling these gaps. The
rizon-scanning function. USCG also deploys an Idea Submission
▪▪ Considerations on costs: The costs of In the context of requirement identifi- Review process that allows for RTD&E
running a continuous horizon-scan- cation, Frontex should also support in- project ideas to be submitted from a
ning function would depend on the novative approaches to ‘pull’ innovation variety of USCG members and stake-
extent to which processes are con- ideas from end users themselves, in ad- holders across different operating
ducted in house or outsourced. dition to more traditional ‘top-down‘ ap- levels.159
▪▪ Example of good practices: proaches whereby requirements are set
DHS S&T provides analysis and recom- by organisational leadership following Intervention 2.3
mendations on technologies, prod- political guidance.
ucts and services that can advance Below we outline the key actors, Frontex should adopt a ‘research cham-
homeland security capabilities. To do benefits and risks associated with this pion’ role in order to inform policy and
this, DHS draws on horizon-scanning intervention, as well as an indicative decision making within EU institutions,
activities and a ‘technology scouting’ timeframe, cost considerations and ex- ensuring that border security research
process to research and evaluate spe- amples of relevant good practices: priorities and themes established at the
cific technologies by sifting through ▪▪ Key actors involved: EU level are tailored to the most up-to-
global data on technology and mar- –– Implementing agency: Frontex date users requirements and technolog-
ket environments.158 –– Other actors/beneficiaries: MS, ical developments. Frontex should use a
end users. structured approach to presenting these
Intervention 2.2 ▪▪ Description of benefits: The benefits recommendations, using business cases
of this intervention include the pos- to document needs, costs and benefits.
Frontex should centralise information sibility of creating research projects These recommendations should be in-
on national operational requirements, that, by design, meet clearly identi- formed by other activities conducted as
needs and capability gaps with a view to fied operational needs of multiple MS. result of other interventions (e.g. horizon
supporting harmonisation where appli- ▪▪ Description of risks: The risks asso- scanning, harmonisation of needs, etc.)
cable. For Frontex to do this, MS should ciated with this intervention include to build stronger business cases, as well as
first provide information on their na- willingness of MS to share their re- by information that Frontex has on capa-
tional operational requirements. Frontex quirements and, if and when they bility gaps, ongoing research and funding
would then be in a position review the are shared, the difficulty of harmo- opportunities. By engaging with other EU
aggregated requirements, needs and ca- nising requirements both from a institutions, Frontex can collect informa-
pability gaps, before: quality perspective (in the absence tion on research initiatives and funding
▪▪ Sharing a list of these requirements of clearly identified standards/perfor- opportunities in order to feed this back
(cleared of any sensitive information) mance indicators) and from a plan- through a regular publication or a cen-
with MS to present a picture of com- ning perspective (in terms of aligning tralised webpage (see Intervention 1.1).
mon trends, for example through the timelines and budgets). Below we outline the key actors,
use of a virtual platform (e.g. a re- ▪▪ Indicative assessment of timeframe: benefits and risks associated with this
stricted area of BTN) or through pe- Between 6 and 12 months to create intervention, as well as an indicative
riodic consultations with MS; a structured mechanism to central- timeframe, cost considerations and ex-
▪▪ Performing high-level market analy- ise information on requirements, in- amples of relevant good practices:
sis to identify what solutions exist on cluding those flagged by end users, ▪▪ Key actors involved:
the market and sharing this informa- and map them against current mar- –– Implementing agency: Frontex
tion with MS; ket opportunities (leveraging the ho- –– Other actors/beneficiaries: Euro­
▪▪ Connecting states with shared re- rizon-scanning function, if available) pean Commission and other EU
quirements so that they can consider or current research projects. bodies as appropriate, MS.
joint procurement (in cases where ▪▪ Considerations on costs: Infra­struc­
ture costs related this intervention
158 DHS (2016). See also Table D2 in Appen- would be minimal. 159 Please refer to Section 3.1 of the Techni-
dix D of the Technical Annex. cal Annex.

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▪▪ Description of benefits: This inter- procedures, Frontex should also con- targeted industry (e.g. start-ups ver-
vention would help ensure that prior- sider implementing alternative processes sus primes), rules of the competition
ity areas, research requirements and like prizes, grants and challenges in ac- (e.g. winner takes all; prizes for the
allocation of resources are informed cordance with existing regulations.161 first, second and third place; or oth-
by operational needs and are coher- Depending on the level of ambition and ers). Prizes can range from tens of
ently developed. resource availability, Frontex could ei- thousands of euros to several mil-
▪▪ Description of risks: The main risk ther (i) host the challenges and commu- lion euros.
associated with this intervention is nicate the results to MS; or (ii) award ▪▪ Examples of good practice:
that the advice received by Frontex grants for projects and carry out the se- –– In order to create an environment
is not fully considered, or is diluted lection, award, monitoring and com- that supports entrepreneurship
to the point where it loses its value. munication activities. and innovation, the EIT organises
▪▪ Indicative assessment of timeframe: These instruments would be particu- annual ‘EIT Awards’ to recognise
Less than six months to collect and larly valuable in attracting new entrants, and reward successful European
present information on EU research including young start-ups and SMEs, to start-ups, innovative projects and
in a regular publication or on a cen- the field of border security. young entrepreneurial talent. Held
tralised webpage. Below we outline the key actors, at the EIT’s annual Innovation
▪▪ Considerations on costs: If present- benefits and risks associated with this Forum, prize money ranges from
ing information on research on BTN intervention, as well as an indicative €15 000 to €50 000 and around 600
(as one example of a centralised web- timeframe, cost considerations and ex- individuals attend.164
page), the main cost would be asso- amples of relevant good practices: –– The US DARPA Grand Challenges is
ciated with developing new website ▪▪ Key actors involved: a cash prize competition for auton-
content and reframing the website –– Implementing agency: Frontex omous vehicles. Funded by DARPA,
architecture. –– Other actors/beneficiaries: the competition is designed to drive
▪▪ Example of good practices: industry. innovation and develop solutions
 The US Defense Innovation Board ▪▪ Description of benefits: The main more quickly than possible through
was established in order to encour- benefit of adopting innovative R&I more traditional funding mecha-
age a culture of innovation in the approaches is to emphasise the link nisms. Other DARPA prize chal-
Pentagon. The mission of the Board between the technology solution and lenges include: Urban Challenge
is to provide the Secretary of Defense a clearly identified operational chal- (2007), Network Challenge (2009),
with independent advice and recom- lenge, while at the same time incen- Chikungunya Challenge (2014–
mendations on innovative means to tivising innovation and attracting a 2015) and Robotics Challenge (2012–
address future challenges. Proposals wider pool of suppliers. 2015).165 Nonetheless, it should be
put forward include the appointment ▪▪ Description of risks: Risks associ- noted that there is some debate
of a Chief Innovation Officer to serve ated with this intervention relate to on how beneficial these Grand
as a point of contact for innovation the sub-optimal identification and Challenges have been in practice.166
efforts across the DoD, and the crea- definition of the problem and de-
tion of a COE for Artificial Intelligence sired end-state. This may have also
and Machine Learning.160 repercussions for industry’s inter-
est in participating in challenges or
Intervention 2.4 other forms of prize competitions.
In this regard, particular attention
Frontex should integrate traditional re- should be paid to setting the rules of
search selection and implementation the challenge, as rules can increase
processes with more innovative ap- or decrease (intentionally and/or un-
proaches designed to tackle specific op- intentionally) the level of technologi-
erational needs without imposing too cal achievements of the participating
many restrictions on solutions. teams.162
These approaches may include the ▪▪ Indicative assessment of timeframe:
use (where appropriate) of open-ended Key planning times (based on DARPA’s
problem statements with associated lessons learned): 12 months for organ-
desired end state, scenarios and user isers, 6 months for performers.163
cases, rather than highly prescriptive ▪▪ Considerations on costs: The costs
technical requirements. While these ap- of running competitions or chal-
proaches can also be used in the context lenges vary significantly depend-
of more traditional public procurement ing on factors such as complexity, 164 Please refer to Section 4.2 of the Techni-
cal Annex.
165 DARPA (2014). See also Table D2 in Appen-
160 Office of the Federal Register (2017). See 161 European Commission (2014). dix D of the Technical Annex.
also Table D2 in Appendix D of the Tech- 162 DARPA (2014). 166 Please refer to Table D2 in Appendix D of
nical Annex. 163 DARPA (2014). the Technical Annex.

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5.2.3. Facilitating and supporting timeframe, cost considerations and ex- service prototype to potential in-
operationalisation of research amples of relevant good practices: vestors in order to convince these
▪▪ Key actors involved: stakeholders of its relevance and
SUMMARY OF CHALLENGE –– Implementing agency: Frontex feasibility.169
In some cases, it is difficult to trans- –– Other actors/beneficiaries: end –– In the EU, the H2020 programme
late research outputs into innovative users. actively encourages the involve-
operational practices. This can alien- ▪▪ Description of benefits: Integrating ment of end users in research pro-
ate the end user community from re- end users’ input throughout the life jects – it is a requirement that at
search providers, resulting in a loss cycle of a project would increase the least three members of the pro-
of trust, interest and willingness to likelihood of the project successfully posed consortium are from the end
collaborate.167 reaching the end of the research and user community. During the life-
innovation pathway. It would do so cycle of H2020 projects, end us-
RECOMMENDATION 3 : by increasing the confidence of indus- ers are often directly involved in
Frontex should facilitate and support try and investors that research out- technology demonstrations or-
the uptake and operationalisation of puts could be exploited if brought ganised by the research providers.
research outputs by end users. to the market. Sponsoring pilot pro- Similarly, Frontex organises dem-
grammes as described above would onstrations as part of their inter-
also help demonstrate the benefits nally funded research projects.170
Intervention 3.1 of new solutions, thus encouraging
uptake among stakeholders. Intervention 3.2
Frontex should establish mechanisms to ▪▪ Description of risks: The main risk
maintain the continuous engagement of associated with this intervention re- Frontex should facilitate access to fund-
end users during the research and inno- lates to end users’ reluctance to en- ing that could be used to bridge the gap
vation process. This could include, for gage in these types of activity, either between the completion of the research
example, the creation of cross-organisa- because this has not been mandated project and the commercialisation of the
tional project teams (e.g. including one by their national authorities, or be- technology. This may involve:
manager from Frontex, one from a se- cause of a general lack of interest in ▪▪ Providing direct funding for the
lected border guard agency, and one from research. commercialisation of technology,
the contractor if appropriate). Frontex ▪▪ Indicative assessment of timeframe: including through alternative ap-
should be responsible for the identifica- Between 6 and 12 months to create an proaches (e.g. Public Procurement
tion of the end user(s), transferring this operating model and framework of of Innovative Solutions (PPI), Pre-
role to the research supplier as part of reference (e.g. guidelines, roles and Commercial Procurement (PCP));
the selection procedure if deemed appro- responsibilities) for cross-organisa- ▪▪ Sharing information on availa-
priate. This approach would be particu- tional project teams. ble EU funding instruments (see
larly useful in managing the risk that ▪▪ Considerations on costs: Costs re- Intervention 1.1) and on alternative
research projects lasting several months/ lated to running cross-organisational funding approaches;
years lose their operational relevance as project teams would be absorbed by ▪▪ At the pre-submission stage, provid-
they become overtaken by events. existing staff costs. The cost of run- ing a quality-assurance process for
End users should also be involved in ning demonstrations is dependent on business cases and research propos-
technology demonstrations to test and the complexity of the system, and als aimed at further developing R&I
validate the system as part of the re- can range from the low tens of thou- solutions; and/or
search phase, and/or (after the research sands to the low hundreds of thou- ▪▪ Further building connections with
has been completed) in the organisation sands of euros. investors (e.g. venture capitalists).
of operational/capability demonstrations ▪▪ Example of good practices:
to showcase the potential added value of –– DHS S&T launched R&D Integrated In relation to direct funding, Frontex
research outputs. Additionally, Frontex Product Teams in 2015. IPTs are could explore different funding models to
could sponsor pilot programmes whereby tasked with identifying and co- ‘procure innovation’. These may include,
budget is provided for MS to use both old ordinating DHS research efforts in for example, the use of PPI to bring to the
and new solutions in parallel in order to priority mission areas, and linking market solutions already tested and vali-
(i) identify areas for revision within old research activities with the work dated by end users, or, where no near-to-
systems; and (ii) help demonstrate the of the DHS Joint Requirements market solutions exist, PCP can be used
benefits of new solutions. Council to close existing technol- to compare the advantages and limita-
Below we outline the key actors, ogy capability gaps.168 tions of competing solutions.171
benefits and risks associated with this –– In the US, SBIR involves running
intervention, as well as an indicative technology demonstrations with
169 Please refer to Section 4.4 of the Techni-
a view to presenting a product or
cal Annex.
170 Please refer to Section 2.1 of the Techni-
167 Please refer to Section 3.2 of this report 168 Please refer to section 3.1 of the Techni- cal Annex.
and Section 2.1 of the Technical Annex. cal Annex. 171 Iossa et al. (2016).

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Alternatively, or in addition, Frontex of promising projects that remain months). HSIP holds a number
could leverage a web platform (e.g. the ‘blocked’ at the research phase with- of external events and industry
enhanced BTN portal – see Intervention out having the necessary resources to days, and participates in confer-
1.1) to provide guidance to industry complete the entire research and in- ences and technology days in order
and academia on how to access other novation pathway. By enabling access to raise awareness of its funding
European funds such as ESIF, the EU to innovation funding, this interven- opportunities.174
COSME programme, H2020, and the tion will increase the likelihood of –– The EIT has supported the suc-
Internal Security Fund. border guards implementing R&I so- cessful implementation of re-
In addition to providing useful lutions in the field. search outputs through its KICs,
information on available funding ▪▪ Description of risks: One risk associ- which are COEs around specific
instruments,172 Frontex could establish ated with this intervention is the cost topics of importance to Europe and
a mechanism to offer free-of-charge attached to performing and sustain- which comprise businesses, aca-
technical assistance to a selection of ing a free-of-charge technical assis- demic institutions and research
promising S&T projects proposed by in- tance function for research proposals organisations.175
dividual MS to maximise their chances over time.
of securing EU funding (e.g. ESIF). This ▪▪ Indicative assessment of timeframe:
could involve ‘red-teaming’ (providing Less than six months to generate 5.3. Next steps
constructive challenge to) research pro- guidelines for industry in relation
posals before submission, as well as as- to EU funding opportunities, which The implementation guidelines de-
sistance in overcoming administrative can then be presented on BTN or an- scribed above provide Frontex with an
hurdles that might be particularly chal- other web platform (see Intervention initial point of reference for possible fu-
lenging for SMEs. A similar procedure 1.1). Between 12 and 18 months to cre- ture courses of action. They can be used
has already been implemented success- ate a mechanism designed to support by Frontex to decide which interventions
fully by the EDA.173 promising R&I projects in securing to prioritise, but should not be consid-
Finally, as discussed in Intervention EU funding. ered substitutes for a more rigorous im-
1.3, by leveraging existing networks of ▪▪ Considerations on costs: PPI and PCP plementation plan.
COEs (or equivalents like BICs and KICs) costs will vary on a case-by-case basis. As next steps, we recommend that
or by creating a Frontex-led network of Other initiatives under this interven- Frontex (i) identifies which intervent­
COEs, Frontex could proactively con- tion would not require major infra- ion(s) it is willing to pursue; and (ii) for
nect stakeholders from industry and ac- structural investments, but would each selected intervention, conducts a
ademia with interested investors (e.g. have higher staff costs. feasibility study (either internally or
venture capitalists). ▪▪ Example of good practices: with the support of an external con-
Below we outline the key actors, –– The US HSIP programme pro- tractor) to assess current capabilities
benefits and risks associated with this vides direct funding for innova- within Frontex (including governance,
intervention, as well as an indicative tive start-ups. To do this, HSIP regulations, infrastructure, skills, staff,
timeframe, cost considerations and ex- streamlines bidding procedures budget, and ongoing initiatives). This
amples of relevant good practices: in a way that caters for the needs assessment would support the identi-
▪▪ Key actors involved: of start-ups and technology inno- fication of gaps to be addressed as well
–– Implementing agency: Frontex vators. For example, contracting as existing capabilities that could be
–– Other actors/beneficiaries: industry. timelines are significantly shorter leveraged, enabling a more accurate as-
▪▪ Description of benefits: This inter- (45 days) than those for standard sessment of time and cost in relation to
vention is likely to reduce the number DHS tendering procedures (9–12 the chosen intervention(s).

174 Please refer to Section 4.4 of the Techni-

cal Annex.
172 See for example EDA (2017). 175 Please refer to Section 4.2 of the Techni-
173 See EDA (2017). cal Annex.

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 Challenges and Opportunities
for Operationalising 
Border Security Research

Technical
Annex
Challenges and Opportunities for Operationalising Border Security Research
Table of contents

List of figures #58

List of tables #59

Abbreviations #60

1. Overview of Technical Annex #63

2. Case studies: EU border security research (WP1) #65

2.1. EU-level border security research #65
2.2. EU Member State survey findings #75
2.3. EU industry and academia survey findings #78

3. Case studies: Non-EU border security research (WP2) #80

3.1. US border security research #80
3.2. Canadian border security research #88
3.3. Australian border security research #92
3.4. Border security research in North Africa and Turkey #97

4. Case studies: Operational models (WP3) #100

4.1. European Space Agency #100
4.2. European Institute of Innovation & Technology #105
4.3. Defense Innovation Unit Experimental #108
4.4. Homeland Security Innovation Programs #112
4.5. DHS S&T Centers of Excellence #116
4.6. Small Business Innovation Research #119

Appendix A: List of interviewees #123

Appendix B: List of interview questions #124

Appendix C: Survey outlines #128

Part A: Respondent Background #129
Part B: Wider Context for Border Security Research Management #129
Part C: Research Setup and Implementation #130
Part D: Lessons Learned and Way Forward #133
Part E: Involvement in EU-Funded Research #134
Part A: Respondent Background #136
Part B: Research Setup and Implementation #136
Part C: Lessons Learned and Way Forward #138
Part D: MS-Funded Research (if applicable) #139

Appendix D: Frontex workshop supporting materials #140

Appendix E: Frontex workshop summary #145

References #147

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List of figures

Figure 1.1 Overview of research approach #64

Figure 2.1 Budget allocation per border research theme in FP7 #67

Figure 2.2 H2020 2014–15: Budget allocation under ‘Border Security & External Security’ call   #67

Figure 2.3 Project TRL by Work Programme #67

Figure 2.4 EU research processes #68

Figure 2.5 Border security project funding (Frontex) #70

Figure 2.5 Border security project funding (Frontex) #70

Figure 2.6 EU research and innovation pathway #74

Figure 3.1 DHS S&T annual IPT process and timeline #84

Figure 3.2 USCG annual RTD&E business process and timeline #85

Figure 3.3 US research and innovation pathway #88

Figure 3.4 Canadian research and innovation pathway #91

Figure 3.5 Australian research and innovation pathway #96

Figure 4.1 ESA Business Incubation Centres Network #103

Figure 4.2 The EIT knowledge triangle #106

Figure 4.3 USDR&E proposed organogram and DIUx institutional location #110

Figure 4.4 DIUx project award process #111

Figure 4.5 S&T organogram as of October 2017 #113

Figure 4.6 S&T organogram as of October 2017 #117

Figure 4.7 S&T organogram as of October 2017 #120

Figure C.1 EU MS survey outline #128

Figure C.2 Industry and academic survey outline #135

Figure E.1 Matrix of functional roles #146

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List of tables

Table 2.1 EU Framework Programmes #66

Table 2.2 Summary of findings for EU case study #79

Table 3.1 S&T TRL structure #83

Table 3.2 Budgetary overview for border security research budgets in the US #83

Table 3.3 DHS S&T SVIP OTS programme framework #85

Table 3.4 DIBP organisational structure #93

Table 3.5 Summary of findings for non-EU case studies #97

Table 4.1 Overview of ESA benefits and associated costs #105

Table 4.3 Overview of EIT benefits and associated costs #108

Table 4.2 Countries eligible for the EIT RIS   #108

Table 4.4 Overview of DIUx benefits and associated costs #112

Table 4.5 DHS S&T SVIP OTS programme framework #115

Table 4.6 Overview of HSIP benefits and associated costs #115

Table 4.7 Overview of DHS S&T COE benefits and associated costs #119

Table 4.8 DHS SBIR funding scheme #121

Table 4.9 Overview of SBIR benefits and associated costs #122

Table A.1 List of interviewees #123

Table D.1 Overview of functional roles #140

Table D.2 Descriptions and examples of functional roles #141

Table D.3 Qualitative assessment criteria #143

Table D.4 Quantitative scoring metrics #144

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Challenges and Opportunities for Operationalising Border Security Research

Abbreviations

ABC Automated Border Control EMITS Electronic Mailing Invitation to Tender System
ABC4EU Automated Border Control Gates for Europe ERA European Research Area
ABF Australian Border Force ESA European Space Agency
AEER Air Entry/Exit Re-engineering programme ESCC European Space Component Coordination
ANTSO Australian Nuclear Science and Technology ESPAS European Strategy and Policy Analysis System
Organisation EU European Union
AOI Area Of Interest EUI European University Institute
APP Assessment of Prospective Portfolio EWISA  Early Warning For Increased Situational
AQ Al-Qaeda Awareness
ARC Australian Research Council FFRDC Federally Funded Research and Development
ARI Arab Reform Initiative Centers
ARTES  Advanced Research in Telecommunications FP Framework Programme
Systems FTE Full Time Equivalent
ASPI Australian Strategic Policy Institute FY Financial Year
AT&L Acquisition, Technology and Logistics GAO Government Accountability Office
Aus$ Australian Dollar GSP General Studies Programme
BAA Broad Agency Agreement H2020 Horizon 2020
BAP Business and Activity Proposal HSARPA Homeland Security Advanced Research Project
BIC Business Incubation Centre Agency
BMD Borders and Maritime Security Division HSE Homeland Security Enterprise
bn Billion HSIP Homeland Security Innovation Program
BAO Basic Ordering Agreement HSOAC Homeland Security Operational Analysis Center
BTI Borders, Trade and Immigration Institute HSSEDI Homeland Security Systems Engineering and
Can$ Canadian Dollar Development Institute
CBI Cross Border Institute IAP Integrated Applications Promotion
CBP Customs and Border Protection IBM Integrated Border Management
CBRN Chemical, Biological, Radiological and Nuclear IITT Intended Invitation to Tender
CBSA Canada Border Service Agency IP Intellectual Property
CCTV Closed-Circuit Television IPR Intellectual Property Rights
CG-STIC USCG S&T Transition and Innovation Center IPT Integrated Product Team
COE Centre of Excellence IRCC Immigration, Refugees and Citizenship Canada
CSIRO  Commonwealth Scientific and Industrial IS Islamic State
Research Organisation ISF Internal Security Fund
CSO Commercial Solutions Opening ISR Idea Submission Review
CSS Centre for Security Science ITT Invitation to Tender
CTP Science Core Technology Programme JRC Joint Research Centre
DG Directorate-General KIC Knowledge and Innovation Community
DG CNECT 
Directorate-General for Communications km Kilometre
Networks, Content and Technology KPI Key Performance Indicator
DG HOME Directorate-General for Migration and Home m Million
Affairs M&E Monitoring and Evaluation
DHS Department of Homeland Security MoD Ministry of Defence
DIBP Department of Immigration and Border Protection MoI Ministry of Interior
DIUx Defense Innovation Unit – Experimental MS Member State
DNDO Domestic Nuclear Detection Office MSC Maritime Security Center of Excellence
DoD Department of Defense NATO North Atlantic Treaty Organization
DRDC Defence Research and Development Canada NCBSI National Center for Border Security and
EAC European Astronauts Centre Immigration
ECI European Component Initiative NCGP National Competitive Grants Programme
EFSI European Fund for Strategic Investments NFPOC National Frontex Point of Contact
EIT European Institute of Innovation and Technology NSF National Science Foundation

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 Technical Annex

OTS Other Transaction Solicitation SOW Statement Of Work

OUP Office of University Programs SRC S&T Research Council
PASAG Protection and Security Advisory Group STRAS Science and Technology Resource Allocation
PKK Kurdish Workers Party Strategy
pMS Participating Member State SVIP Silicon Valley Innovation Program
POE Ports of Entry TAB Technical Advisory Board
POV Pre-Operational Validation TEB Tender Evaluation Board
PPP Office of Public and Private Partnerships TEU Treaty on European Union
PSC Public Safety Canada TFEU Treaty on the Functioning of the European Union
QHSR Quadrennial Homeland Security Review TIA Telecommunications and Integrated Applications
R&D Research and Development directorate
R&I Research and Innovation TNP Turkish National Police
RAP Resource Allocation Plan TOR Terms of Reference
RCMP Royal Canadian Mounted Police TRL Technology Readiness Level
RD&I Research, Development And Innovation TRP Technology Research Programme
RDC Research and Development Center TTG Time-to-Grant
RDP Research and Development Partnerships Group TTI Time-to-Inform
RDT&E Research, Development, Test And Evaluation UK United Kingdom
RDU Research and Development Unit US United States
REA Research Executive Agency USCG United States Coast Guard
RFP Request for Proposals USDA&S Undersecretary of Defense for Acquisition and
RIS Regional Innovation Scheme Sustainment
ROM Rough Order of Magnitude USDR&E Undersecretary of Defense for Research and
S&T Science and Technology Engineering
S&T (US) Science and Technology Directorate USST S&T Under Secretary
SBIR Small Business Innovation Research WP Work Package
SIA Strategic Innovation Agenda YOK Turkish Higher Education Council
SME Small to Medium-sized Enterprise

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Challenges and Opportunities for Operationalising Border Security Research
1.Overview of Technical Annex

This Technical Annex presents the study The following chapters focus on the organisations that can support the in-
findings from Work Package (WP) 1 (EU research processes in the European tegration of research outputs into oper-
border security research), WP2 (non- Union (EU) (Chapter 2) and in the US, ational practice. These case studies are
EU border security research) and WP3 Canada and Australia, with a secondary presented in Chapter 4, and focus on
(ways forward for Frontex), and acts as focus on Turkey and three North African the European Space Agency (ESA), the
a repository of evidence and supporting countries – Egypt, Morocco and Tunisia European Institute of Innovation and
document to the main report.1 Figure (Chapter 3). The case studies presented Technology (EIT), Defense Innovation
1.1 overleaf illustrates the research in Chapters 2 and 3 contain the work un- Unit – Experimental (DIUx), Small
approach. dertaken during WP1 and WP2 respec- Business Innovation Research (SBIR), the
In addition to this introduction, this tively, and set out the research pathway Homeland Security Innovation Program
Technical Annex contains the following for each country or region before sum- (HSIP) and US Centers of Excellence (COE).
substantive chapters: marising areas of good practice and chal- The appendices include the list of
▪▪ Chapter 2: An overview of EU border lenges of the research process.2 study interviewees, the interview ques-
security research; While the research process is the tions, the survey outlines and the Frontex
▪▪ Chapter 3: An overview of non-EU main focus of WPs 1 and 2, WP3 fo- workshop material, as well as the work-
border security research; and cuses primarily on research and inno- shop summary.
▪▪ Chapter 4: A summary of six organi- vation (R&I).3 Chapter 4 presents the six
sational models that focus on opera- case studies undertaken as part of WP3,
tionalising research. which focus on functions and roles of

2 A combined summary of areas of good

practice and challenges for research across
all case studies can be found in Chapter 3
of the main report.
1 See Cox et al. (2017). 3 For a full definition, see Cox et al. (2017).

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Challenges and Opportunities for Operationalising Border Security Research

Figure 1.1 Overview of research approach

Data collection Outcomes Analitical process

WP1 & WP2 WP3

Case studies: Case studies: Case studies: Workshop:
EU border Non-EU border Selected External experts
security research security research EU and non-EU (national border guard
(EU organisation and MS) (Relevant authorites in organisations agencies, Frontex
US, Canada, Australia, and other EU
(Including those operating
plus selected industries) institutions)
in defence and space
sectors)

Understanding of Stakeholders’ perception

Landscaping of good practices and challenges
different operational of Frontex role in the
related ato border security research
models context of research

Consultation with internal experts Consultation with internal experts

Creation of R&I pathway for the operationalisation of Development of

Option analysis
border security research organisational functions

Development of
way forward

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2. Case studies: EU border security
research (WP1)

This chapter provides an overview of how the Functioning of the European Union (TFEU), affecting EU borders. These include
border security research is set up, con- which are the two core Treaties of the high levels of migration; human traf-
ducted and operationalised in the EU. European Union setting out the EU’s consti- ficking and smuggling;9 instability in
The following sections outline research tutional basis and providing a legal foun- neighbouring European countries;10 cy-
activities undertaken by institutions at dation for pre-competitive research.5 bercrime; terrorism; and transnational
the EU level (Section 2.1), as well as of- Under TFEU Title XIX (‘Research and organised crime, including drug and
fering a more nationally focused analy- Technological Development and Space’), weapons smuggling, money launder-
sis of research processes in a selection the Treaty outlines the EU’s objective of ing and terrorist financing.11
of Member State (MS) survey partici- ‘strengthening its scientific and techno- A key objective of the European
pant countries (Section 2.2). Both layers logical bases by achieving a European Commission is to increase external bor-
of analysis – the EU-level and the MS- research area in which researchers, sci- der security, while also protecting indi-
level – are structured in a similar way: entific knowledge and technology circu- vidual rights and ensuring that the flow
the strategic context for EU border secu- late freely’. According to the TFEU, this of people and goods is not affected.12 To
rity research is presented, followed by a objective should be supported by four this end, the European Commission has
description of the processes linking this key activities at the EU level: called for the development of ‘common
research and its integration into opera- 1. Implementation of research, tech- high standards of border management’,
tional practice. Finally, a series of lessons nological development and demon- emphasising that ‘all relevant EU and na-
are outlined, relating to the main chal- stration programmes, by promoting tional actors need to work better together
lenges and areas of good practice identi- cooperation with and between re- to tackle cross-border threats’.13 Despite
fied from the literature review, surveys search centres and universities; seeking to consolidate border manage-
and interviews conducted. 2. Promotion of cooperation with third ment into a ‘Union standard’, border
countries and international organi- management is not currently stand-
sations in EU research, technologi- ardised across EU MS and is based on a
2.1. EU-level border security cal development and demonstration; ‘patchwork of sectorial documents and
research 3. Dissemination and optimisation of instruments’,14 which can create chal-
the results of EU research, techno- lenges for interoperability15 and wider
2.1.1. Strategic context logical development and demonstra- cooperation.16 The use of border infor-
tion activities; and mation systems has also raised issues
The EU context differs to that of the other 4. Fostering opportunities for training relating to fundamental rights, data
case studies presented in Chapter 3 due to and mobility of researchers in the EU.6
it being a supranational union with a fo-
9 Frontex (2017).
cus on cooperation between countries. At Border security forms part of two of the 10 European Commission (2015h); European
the European level, Frontex ‘promote[s], ten strategic priorities presented in the Commission (2015a).
coordinate[s] and develop[s] European EU’s 2014 Political Guidelines, namely 11 European Commission (2015h).
12 RAND Europe interview with anonymous
border management in line with the EU those focusing on ‘justice and funda-
EU project coordinator, 2 April 2017;
fundamental rights charter and the con- mental rights’ and ‘migration’.7 As de-
European Commission (2017d, 13).
cept of Integrated Border Management’ scribed in the European Agenda on Security 13 European Commission (2015h, 2–6).
(IBM),4 while individual MS are respon- and the European Agenda on Migration,8 there 14 European Commission (2015a).
sible for managing their own borders. are multiple threats and pressures 15 ‘Interoperability’ refers to the ability of
countries to act together coherently, ef-
With this in mind, border security re-
fectively and efficiently to achieve tacti-
search at the EU level focuses on wider
5 European Union (2012a); European Union cal, operational and strategic objectives.
threats to the EU and collaboration tools (2012b). In the context of border security, it enables
available to enhance security. 6 European Union (2012b). border guard authorities and/or systems
In the EU, research and technologi- 7 Juncker (2014); European Commission to work together to share common proce-
(2016e); European Commission (2015h); dures and each other’s infrastructure, and
cal development are central to the Treaty
European Commission (2015a); RAND to be able to communicate (NATO, 2012).
on European Union (TEU) and the Treaty on
Europe interview with Dragos Voicu, 16 European Commission (2015a); RAND
11 April 2017. Europe interview with anonymous EU
4 Frontex (n.d.-a). 8 European Commission (2017b). project coordinator, 2 April 2017.

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Challenges and Opportunities for Operationalising Border Security Research

protection and privacy due to the per- Table 2.1 EU Framework Programmes
sonal and biometric nature of the in-
formation collected through these Framework Programme Timeframe Budget (billions of €)
systems.17 Horizon 2020 2014–2010 80

FP7 2007–2013 55.9

2.1.2. Research pathway
Source: European Commission (2015e).
Overview of the EU research
landscape automated border crossing points) and Figure 2.2 on the right shows the
MobilePass (a secure, modular and dis- breakdown of funding across these the-
The strategic priorities outlined in the tributed mobile border control solu- matic areas, which fall under the call
2014 Political Guidelines18 inform the EU tion for European land border crossing ‘Border Security and External Security’.27
Framework Programmes (FPs), which points). On the other hand, ‘air bor- Of the three relevant border secu-
are multi-year funding programmes ders’ received the least funding (€3m). rity themes included in the 2014–2015
designed to support research and inno- Individual project budgets ranged from Work Programme, the ‘maritime bor-
vation in the European Research Area just under €1m to over €12m, averaging der security’ theme has the most pro-
(ERA).19 While the European Commission around €6m across 23 projects.21 Border jects assigned (four) as well as the largest
is the main actor responsible for fund- security research projects were part of share of funding (€30m). These projects
ing research and development at the EU the broader €1.4bn ‘Secure Societies’ include work on radar systems and ve-
level, Frontex separately awards border research programme, accounting for hicles for coastal and maritime surveil-
security research projects. The main ac- around 9.5 per cent of its funding.22 lance, as well as aircraft detection. On
tors involved in undertaking border secu- the other hand, the ‘ethical societal di-
rity research in the EU include academic European Commission: Horizon 2020 mension’ theme had one project and €1m
institutions, research organisations, the Within Horizon 2020 (H2020) – the eighth of funding, for a project on human fac-
private sector and industry, and pub- and current Framework Programme – tors in border control. A total of eight
lic bodies.20 border security research falls under border security projects were included
Table 2.1 presents an overview of the ‘Secure Societies – Protecting Freedom in the 2014–2015 Work Programme, with
EU Framework Programmes focusing and Security of Europe and its Citizens’ budgets ranging from €2m to €12m.
on EU Security Research: Horizon 2020 (‘Secure Societies’), which is part of the In 2014–2015, relevant border security
and FP7. wider ‘Societal Challenges’ programme. projects were allocated approximately
Only two H2020 Work Programmes (2014– 12 per cent of the available funding for
European Commission: FP7 2015 and 2016–2017)23 have been released the ‘Secure Societies’ strand of H2020.28
Over the course of the most recent to date, with preparations for the 2018– Technology Readiness Levels (TRLs)29
Seventh Framework Programme (FP7), 2020 Work Programme beginning in 2016 were listed for six of the fourteen pro-
over €146.8 million was allocated to bor- with stakeholder consultations and dis- jects. Of these, four projects were re-
der security research projects across five cussions with MS.24 quired to progress to TRL 5 (‘technology
thematic categories: air borders, border Within the 2014–2015 H2020 Secure validated in relevant environment’),
checks, border surveillance, land borders Societies Work Programme, the max- with one project reaching TRL 7 (‘system
and sea borders. The allocation of fund- imum amount of funding available prototype demonstration in operational
ing across these different areas is shown for border security research projects environment’), and another reaching
in Figure 2.1 on the next page. amounted to €73m25 across five themes: prototype level.30
‘Border checks’ is the thematic area maritime border security, border cross- The 2016–2017 Work Programme has
allocated the most funding (€75m) un- ing points, supply chain security, ex- allocated €55m to ‘border security’. A to-
der the FP7 programme. Projects in ternal security and the ethical/societal tal of eight projects were put forward
this category have included ABC4EU dimension.26 in this Work Programme, with calls re-
(Automated Border Control Gates for lating to information systems, border
Europe), FastPass (a harmonised, mod-
ular reference system for all European
21 European Commission (2016b). 27 European Commission (n.d.-n). It should
22 European Commission (2016b); be noted that some of these calls – such as
17 Chair of the high-level expert group (2016). CORDIS (2014). those referring to supply chain security
18 Juncker (2014); European Commission 23 Funding opportunities under H2020 are and external security – are not directly
(2016e). set out in multiannual Work Programmes, relevant for Frontex.
19 The ERA is a system of scientific research which are prepared by the European 28 European Commission (2015g).
programmes integrating the scientific re- Commission through a strategic pro- 29 TRLs are indicators of the maturity of par-
sources of the EU. The ERA can be likened gramming process integrating EU pol- ticular technologies. There are nine TRLs,
to a research and innovation equivalent of icy objectives in priority-setting activities with TRL 1 being the lowest and TRL 9 be-
the European ‘common market’ for goods (European Commission, n.d.-d). ing the highest (European Commission,
and services. See European Commission 24 European Commission (n.d.-d). 2017d). See Appendix D for further
(n.d.c). 25 European Commission (2015g). explanation.
20 European Commission (2013, 13). 26 European Commission (2015g). 30 European Commission (2015g).

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 Technical Annex

Figure 2.1 Budget allocation per border research theme in FP7 technologies, risk-based screening, de-

2% tection devices, supply chain security

and maritime border security. The TRLs
for all but one of the calls were speci-
16% fied in the Work Programme, with the
lowest requested being TRL 5 (‘technol-
Air borders ogy validated in relevant environment’),
the highest being TRL 8 (‘system com-
Border checks plete and qualified’), and the majority
listed as TRL 7 (‘system prototype demon-
Border surveillance
24% 51% stration in operational environment’).32
Figure 2.3 on the left illustrates the var-
Land borders iance in project TRL between the differ-
ent H2020 Work Programmes.
Sea borders
7% Identification and prioritisation of
Source: European Commission (2016b). research topics

Figure 2.4 presents the processes and

Figure 2.2 H2020 2014–15: Budget allocation under ‘Border Security & External agencies involved in research prioritisa-
Security’ call 31 tion, proposal submission, grand admin-
istration and monitoring and evaluation
(M&E) in the EU. The steps discussed in
11% the following sections relate to the setup
of H2020 border security research.
Maritime border security In order to identify and prioritise
research topics for future H2020 Work
Border crossing points Programmes, the European Commission
and the H2020 national representatives
25% Ethical/societal dimension first consult a wide range of stakehold-
ers before final decisions are taken by
64% the ‘Secure Societies’ programme com-
mittee.33 This consultation phase tends
to take place one to two years before the
Work Programme is launched.34 There
Source: European Commission (2015g). are 19 Advisory Groups in total, compris-
ing representatives from industry, re-
search and civil society who contribute
to topic identification.35 Border security
research falls under the Protection and
Security Advisory Group (PASAG), which
Figure 2.3 Project TRL by Work Programme is led by the Directorate-General (DG) for
4 Migration and Home Affairs (DG HOME),
2014 - 2015 with DG Communications Networks,
2016 - 2017 Content and Technology (DG CNECT) as
the associated DG.36 PASAG experts are
3

31 Data relating to calls on supply chain se-

curity and external security was not in-
2 cluded in this analysis.
32 European Commission (2016c and 2017d).
33 RAND Europe interview with three repre-
sentatives, European organisation, 3 April
2017.
1
34 RAND Europe interview with three repre-
sentatives, European organisation, 3 April
2017.
35 European Commission (n.d.-l); RAND
0
Europe interview with three representa-
TRL 5 TRL 6 TRL 7 TRL 8
tives, European organisation, 3 April 2017.
Source: European Commission (2015g; 2016c). 36 European Commission (2017c).

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Challenges and Opportunities for Operationalising Border Security Research

Figure 2.4 EU research processes

Identification and Proposal

Monitoring and
prioritisation of Proposal submision selection & grant
evaluation
research topics administration

Eligibility: REA Administrative: REA

PASAG and other Financial and operational Research aspect:
REA
stakeholders capacity: external PASAG and
evaluators independent SMEs

Source: RAND analysis (2017).

representatives of industry, civil de- of research organisations (e.g. EARTO, parts of the Societal Challenges pro-
fence, academia, the civil service, civil IGLO43) or industries (e.g. ASD, EOS),44 as gramme that focus on border security.49
contingencies, and industry research well as from the cPPP (Contractual Public- The REA operates under the supervision
and development (R&D) groups.37 Private Partnership) Strategic Research of, and is accountable to, the European
Other consultation mechanisms used and Innovation Agenda on Cybersecurity Commission. The agency is tasked with
to identify and prioritise research topics and Digital Privacy and the CONNECT implementing the grant management
include discussions with national repre- Advisory Forum.45 The Frontex Research lifecycle, which involves publishing calls,
sentatives from various ministries, public and Development Unit (RDU) has also organising proposal evaluations, prepar-
consultations conducted by the European contributed to this consultation pro- ing grant agreements and monitoring
Commission, and engagements with cess with a set of research proposals, fol- implementation of grant agreements.50
European networks and international lowing discussion with MS and Frontex The REA is responsible for checking
bodies.38 However, the ex-ante evalua- operational departments.46 Four draft the initial eligibility of proposals submit-
tion of the FP7 programme has noted that calls were put forward under the Secure ted. Once eligibility has been certified, a
there was little direct consultation with Societies 2018–2020 Work Programme, of minimum of three external ‘peer review’
EU citizens when setting the research which two focus on border security re- evaluators, who are identified from a
agenda for the ‘Societal Challenges’ pro- search: ‘Boosting the Effectiveness of the pool of experts who have expressed their
gramme and that this was largely based Security Union’ and ‘Fight against Crime interest in being evaluators, conduct a
on a top-down approach.39 and Terrorism, Disaster Resilience, further evaluation of the ‘operational ca-
For example, the consultation pro- Border and External Security’.47 pacity’ presented in the proposals – a cri-
cess informing the ‘Secure Societies’ terion that is not defined clearly in the
2018–2020 Work Programme started in Selection of border security available literature.51 The evaluators who
2016 and is expected to be completed by research projects constitute this independent peer review
October 2017.40 According to the European panel are selected on the basis of their ex-
Commission, this process has drawn on The EU funds research and development pertise in relation to the proposal topic,52
the contributions of: PASAG, EU MS ad- by issuing calls for proposals on the ba- and scores are assigned to the proposal
ministrations, civil society organisations sis of the Work Programmes and then based on a set of evaluation criteria on
(through the SecurePART FP7 project),41 awarding grants to collaborative projects. financial and operational capacity.53 The
security-related networks (e.g. ENLETS, Within the EU, the Research Executive award criteria relate to ‘excellence’, ‘im-
ENFSI, EFRIM, RAN)42 and associations Agency (REA) has implemented parts of pact’, and ‘quality and efficiency of the
the FP7 and H2020 programmes,48 and implementation’.54
it is currently managing nearly 20 per
37 European Commission (2017c).
38 RAND Europe interview with three rep-
cent of the H2020 budget, which includes 49 REA (2016).
resentatives, European organisation, 3 50 REA (2016).
April 2017; RAND Europe interview with 51 REA (2016); RAND Europe interview with
anonymous Frontex representative, 19 43 European Association of Research and anonymous EU project coordinator, 2 April
April 2017. Technology Organisations (EARTO), 2017; RAND Europe interview with anon-
39 European Commission (2015c). Informal Group of RTD Liaison Offices ymous EU institution, 24 April 2017.
40 RAND Europe interview with anonymous (IGLO). 52 European Commission (2017c);
EU institution, 24 April 2017. 44 AeroSpace and Defence Industries REA (2016).
41 SecurePART (2017). Association of Europe (ASD), European 53 RAND Europe interview with anonymous
42 European Network of Law Enforcement Organisation for Security (EOS). EU project coordinator, 2 April 2017; RAND
Technology Services (ENLETS), European 45 European Commission (n.d.-j). Europe interview with anonymous EU in-
Network of Forensic Science Institutes 46 RAND Europe interview with Dragos stitution, 24 April 2017.
(ENFSI), European First Responder Voicu, 11 April 2017. 54 For an expanded explanation of these
Innovation Managers Meeting (EFRIM), 47 European Commission (n.d.-j). award criteria, see European Commission
Radicalisation Awareness Network (RAN). 48 REA (2016). (2016c).

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 Technical Annex

Evaluators first score the proposals in- Scrutiny Working Group comprising ex- Part of the REA’s role involves col-
dividually, before comparing scores and perts appointed in close cooperation with lecting information on project results
arriving at a consensus for each propos- the relevant Programme Committee and and implementation, and feeding rec-
al.55 Proposals are then discussed at a national security authorities. This work- ommendations back to the European
panel review meeting, where they are ing group determines the level of sensi- Commission in order to inform the de-
benchmarked and ranked by the evalu- tivity of proposals and checks whether velopment of future work programmes.69
ators.56 H2020 rules and regulations al- all security aspects are being handled Despite efforts made during FP7 to re-
low participants to submit a complaint appropriately. There are three possible duce the administrative burden, it has
and request a re-evaluation of their pro- outcomes of this review process: (1) clas- been noted that externalising project
posal. Complaints are handled through sification is not necessary; (2) classifica- management to the REA has contrib-
a system whereby committee members tion is necessary; and (3) the proposal is uted to increased fragmentation of pro-
reconvene to discuss the case and, where rejected on the grounds that it is too sen- ject implementation.70
appropriate, recommend that the pro- sitive to be funded.62 A new set of key performance indica-
posal be re-evaluated.57 tors (KPIs) were created for H2020 pro-
The highest-ranking proposals become Monitoring and evaluation jects. The KPIs in the Societal Challenges
eligible for funding, and enter the ‘grant theme take into account:
finalisation process’.58 The REA gathers The REA (along with the European ▪▪ Number of patent applications and
administrative, legal and financial infor- Commission, in specific cases such as patent awards
mation from the contracting organisation Pre-Operational Validation (POV) pro- ▪▪ Number of prototypes and testing
and finalises the funding agreement.59 jects in which research services are activities
According to H2020 guidelines, there jointly procured by a number of national ▪▪ Number of joint public-private pub-
should be a maximum of five months authorities in charge of border security)63 lications
between proposal submission and partic- manages: ▪▪ New products, processes and meth-
ipants being informed of the evaluation ods launched for commercialisation.71
results (also known as ‘Time-to-Inform’ […] monitoring of the execution of the project
(TTI)). The entire process between H2020 activities planned and involves, where Frontex
appropriate, scientific expert reviewers as well as
proposal submission and grant signature
ex-ante checks on the participants’ cost claims.64
(‘Time-to-Grant’ (TTG)) lasts a maximum Frontex also funds border security re-
of eight months (reduced from 12 months search, albeit on a lesser scale than
under the FP7 programme).60 Ex-ante controls focus on providing the European Commission Framework
In addition to being assessed on their an assessment of a project’s progress Programmes and with a different legal
financial offering, technical proposal against its initial objectives, ensuring basis.72 The research projects funded
and organisational capacity, H2020 pro- the validity of the declared project costs through Frontex are not assigned to
posals also have to pass a number of eth- and checking compliance with the ‘le- clear categories, but can be broadly
ics and security checks. In particular, gality and regularity requirements’.65 66 clustered within the themes of ‘border
the REA is responsible for checking that During the course of a project, periodic checks’ and ‘border surveillance’.73 These
the proposed research meets ethical re- reports are sent to the project officer projects focus mainly on high-tech re-
quirements, that participants (i.e. fu- within the European Commission, and search.74 Frontex has funded research
ture beneficiaries of the grant) are not include a technical and financial over- projects since 2009, with annual funding
involved in ‘serious administrative errors view on the project to date.67 Other sub- increasing between 2009 and 2015, as il-
or fraud’, and that they are not ‘subject ject matter experts are also involved in lustrated in Figure 2.5 overleaf.75 Project
to pending legal proceedings for admin- the ex-ante monitoring of actions.68 budgets range from €20 000 to €60 000.76
istrative errors or fraud’.61
Proposals focusing on informa-
tion that is EU-classified under the 62 European Commission (n.d.-o). 69 REA (2016).
63 The European Commission is also respon- 70 European Commission (2015c).
European Commission’s internal Rules of
sible for the management of research pro- 71 European Commission (2015f); European
Procedure are subject to a ‘security scru-
jects classified as sensitive at the EU level. Commission (2015c).
tiny’ review. This process, which applies 64 REA (2016). 72 RAND Europe interview with Dragos
to most parts of the Secure Societies pro- 65 ‘Ex-ante’ is defined as monitoring un- Voicu, 11 April 2017.
gramme, is coordinated by a Security dertaken at the beginning or during the 73 RAND Europe interview with Dragos
course of the project. Voicu, 11 April 2017.
66 This includes financial statements, certif- 74 RAND Europe interview with Dragos
55 European Commission (n.d.-f); icates on financial statements and timely Voicu, 11 April 2017.
REA (2016). submission of project deliverables. Source: 75 Amalgamation of data taken from the
56 REA (2016). REA (2016); RAND Europe interview with 2009 – 2016 Governance Documents
57 REA (2016). Dragos Voicu, 11 April 2017. (Contracts Awarded). Source: Frontex
58 REA (2016). 67 European Commission (n.d.-i). (2017).
59 European Commission (n.d.-d). 68 European Commission (n.d.-f); RAND 76 Amalgamation of data taken from the
60 REA (2016); European Commission Europe interview with three representa- 2009 – 2016 Governance Documents
(2015g). tives of a European organization, 3 April (Contracts Awarded). Source: Frontex
61 REA (2016). 2017. (2017).

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Challenges and Opportunities for Operationalising Border Security Research

300 0002.5 Border security project funding (Frontex)77

Figure for research proposals under 7 of the 8
calls relating to border security.87 While
250 000 ‘end user engagement’ is not an explicit
part of the H2020 definition of ‘impact’
(see Box 2.1), the European Commission
200 000
is placing increasing emphasis on the
importance of involving end users in re-
150 000
search as a means of achieving impact.
Impact is an important component of the
100 000
H2020 proposal review stage, with H2020
proposals being required to describe pro-
50 000 jects’ ‘expected impact’.88

0 Box 2.1 Definition of ‘impact’ in H2020

2009 2010 2011 2012 2013 2014 2015 proposal guidance
Source: Frontex (n.d.-b).78
In its guidance to H2020 proposal eval-
Research projects funded by Frontex criteria for research projects relate to: un- uators, the European Commission de-
are mainly outsourced and coordinated derstanding of context; study objectives fines ‘impact’ as:
by its RDU, which consults with in- and approach; methodology and work […] the extent to which project outputs should
house personnel, Frontex Operational plan; quality, relevance and clarity of contribute to the expected impacts described
Departments and MS border guard ex- technical proposal; project team experi- for the topic, to enhancing innovation ca-
perts.79 The RDU consists of four sections: ence; resource allocation; and feasibility pacity and integration of new knowledge,
to strengthening the competitiveness and
technology assessment, innovation, of project timeframes.83 Scoring tends to
growth of companies by developing and de-
technical assistance and harmonisa- place more importance on technical qual- livering innovations meeting market needs,
tion. These sections are responsible for ity than on price, with 65 per cent typi- and to other environmental or social im-
the management and delivery of inter- cally allocated to the former and 35 per pacts, as well as the effectiveness of the ex-
nal projects. For example, personnel cent to the latter.84 Contracts awarded ploitation measures.89

involved in technology assessment are re- by Frontex typically last between six and
sponsible for organising tests, trials and nine months.85 Article 37 (‘Research and This definition of ‘impact’ applies to
demonstrations related to border sur- Innovation’) of the Frontex Regulation the whole H2020 programme and is
veillance equipment and technologies. requires that research findings are dis- not specific to the Secure Societies pro-
Project officers within Frontex seminated to relevant stakeholders, in- gramme, which includes research aimed
are tasked with developing Terms of cluding the European Parliament, the at ‘strengthening security through bor-
Reference (TORs) and coordinating a con- European Commission and MS.86 der management’. The first interim eval-
sultation process on the TOR that involves uation of H2020 is due by December 2017
Frontex stakeholders and MS representa- 2.1.3. Pathways to impact and preliminary feedback from stake-
tives.80 This process is conducted through holder position papers has highlighted
a series of discussions, consultations, The official description of H2020 places concern regarding the lack of clarity
meetings and analysis.81 Procurement emphasis on active end user involvement around how ‘expected impact’ is de-
follows EU procurement legislature in research projects, with end users con- fined, with stakeholders stating that
and timelines.82 Frontex’s assessment tributing to activities ranging from the ‘H2020 lacks a systematic, comprehen-
identification of research topics to the co- sive and overarching system to assess
ordination of research projects in order research impacts.’90 Several respondents
77 Projects included in this analysis are based
to ensure that research outputs are tai- have also raised concerns regarding the
on an independent analysis by the authors
of research commissioned by Frontex be-
lored to the operational needs of border lack of clarity around the definition of
tween 2009 and 2015. Contracts awarded security authorities. For example, under ‘impact’ and the expected timeline for
for services and goods were not included the 2016–2017 H2020 Work Programme, impact, which could differ depending
for the purpose of this analysis. the participation of border guard author-
78 Projects are included in this analysis based
ities is a mandatory eligibility criterion
on an independent analysis by the authors
of research commissioned by Frontex be- 87 European Commission (2016c).
tween 2009 and 2015. 83 RAND Europe interview with Dragos 88 European Commission (n.d.-j); European
79 RAND Europe interview with Dragos Voicu, 11 April 2017. Commission (n.d.-k); RAND Europe inter-
Voicu, 11 April 2017. 84 RAND Europe interview with Dragos view with anonymous EU project coordi-
80 RAND Europe interview with Dragos Voicu, 11 April 2017. nator, 2 April 2017.
Voicu, 11 April 2017. 85 RAND Europe interview with Dragos 89 European Commission (2014).
81 RAND Europe interview with Dragos Voicu, 11 April 2017. 90 European Commission (n.d.-h), with ma-
Voicu, 11 April 2017. 86 RAND Europe interview with Dragos terial analysed based on the overviews on
82 See European Union (n.d.). Voicu, 11 April 2017; European Parliament position papers (ETH Zurich, IMPACT EV
(2016). consortium, 8 Danish universities).

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 Technical Annex

on the theme of the research.91 However, user uptake could have been improved by projects in which end users were closely
given that the H2020 programme and its researching solutions with greater opera- involved.
evaluation are ongoing, it is too early tional applicability and involving end us-
to assess how effectively H2020 projects ers more effectively.99 It was noted that Box 2.2 End user project involvement:
have been implemented. end user engagement in FP7 projects was PERSEUS
Many of the later FP7 projects have yet generally achieved by involving them on
to be completed (the typical duration of a project advisory boards and at dissemi- PERSEUS (Protection of European
project being four years). However, an ex- nation events.100 The evaluation found seas and borders through the intelli-
post evaluation of the FP7 programme has that the extent and nature of end user in- gent use of surveillance) was an FP7
already been conducted and additional in- volvement in FP7 research varied across project that ran from 2011 to 2015.109
formation regarding ongoing FP7 projects projects. The aim of the project was to create
will be included in the upcoming interim In response to these findings, H2020 an ‘integrated European system for
evaluation of H2020.92 The FP7 evaluation has emphasised the importance of in- maritime border control’110 in order
noted that efforts have been made un- volving end users in research projects. to support the monitoring of illegal
der FP7 to enhance innovation and to One of the eligibility criteria for pro- migration activities, transnational
bring research results closer to market jects is the inclusion of at least three crime and goods smuggling.111 The
uptake93 through an increased focus on end user entities in the project team.101 project resulted in the creation of
prototypes, tests and demonstrations.94 The process for ‘validating’ end users has a common situational picture, en-
Lessons learned from FP7 and applied also been simplified to incentivise end hanced vessel detection, improved
to H2020 also relate to making research user participation in H2020 research.102 detection and identification of small
publications more openly accessible and Despite these steps to simplify the pro- aircraft and boats, and increased in-
carrying out M&E of EU-funded research cess, one interview said that end users formation sharing between actors
projects in a more systematic way.95 still lack familiarity with the FP7 and including Frontex, National Contact
Study interviewees have noted that H2020 programmes, particularly the fi- Centres and the European Maritime
despite these efforts, several demonstra- nancial rules, which can create barriers Safety Agency.112
tion projects have fallen short of effective for end user participation.103 PERSEUS involved a number of end
implementation in the market due to a Two ongoing projects, the FP7 pro- users including the Spanish Guardia
lack of dissemination and support for im- ject ABC4EU and the H2020 project Civil, the Greek Ministry of National
plementation.96 While a demonstration BODEGA,104 have both involved end us- Defence and the Portuguese Ministry
of research products often takes places ers throughout the research process in of Internal Administration,113 as well
at the end of FP7 projects, there is of- a variety of ways. ABC4EU, which aims as other international participants
ten little practical follow-up. One inter- to harmonise Automated Border Control such as the North Atlantic Treaty
viewee said that this is partly because the (ABC) gates at the EU level,105 involves Organization (NATO) Science and
European Commission lacks the man- end users in its end user integration Technology (S&T) Organisation. As
date and the funding for monitoring and groups and an end user community.106 part of the project, demonstrations
further developing research results after BODEGA, on the other hand, is not were conducted through five exercises
the completion of EU-funded studies.97 driven by the creation of a technology; which required the approval and par-
The final evaluation of the ‘Security’ rather, it explores the human factors in ticipation of these national authori-
research strand of the Framework border checks.107 In this case, results are ties responsible for border surveillance
Programme found that while FP7 aimed drawn from end user involvement in data at sea. These demonstrations also in-
to involve end users in research projects collection exercises such as surveys.108 volved industry representatives from
to help promote research uptake, it has Boxes 2.2 and 2.3 present PERSEUS companies including Saab and Airbus.
not been entirely successful in achiev- and SeaBILLA as examples of completed Over 40 different technologies were
ing this goal.98 Evaluators noted that end tested at the demonstrations, many
99 Technopolis (2015). of which had a TRL between 7 and 9.114
91 European Commission (N.d.-h), with ma- 100 Technopolis (2015).
Some of the solutions developed have
terial analysed based on the overviews on 101 RAND Europe interview with anonymous
now been put into practice, expand-
position papers (ETH Zurich, IMPACT EV EU project officer, 26 June 2017.
consortium, 8 Danish universities). 102 RAND Europe interview with anonymous ing beyond the maritime surveillance
92 European Commission (2016d); European EU project officer, 26 June 2017. domain.115
Commission (2015c). 103 RAND Europe interview with anonymous
93 European Commission (2015c). EU project officer, 26 June 2017.
94 European Commission (2015c). 104 ‘BOrdDErGuArd – Proactive Enhancement 109 CORDIS (2017); CORDIS (n.d.).
95 European Commission (2015c). of Human Performance in Border Control’. 110 Copernicus. (n.d.-b).
96 RAND Europe interview with three repre- 105 RAND Europe interview with anonymous 111 CORDIS (2017).
sentatives of an European organisation, EU policy official, 21 March 2017. 112 CORDIS (2017).
3 April 2017. 106 CORDIS (2016a). 113 RAND Europe interview with anonymous
97 RAND Europe interview with EU policy of- 107 RAND Europe interview with anonymous EU policy official, 21 March 2017.
ficial, 21 March 2017. EU project officer, 26 June 2017; BODEGA 114 RAND Europe interview with anonymous
98 RAND Europe interview with Triantafyllos (n.d.-a). EU policy official, 21 March 2017.
Karatrandos, 20 April 2017; Technopolis 108 RAND Europe interview with anonymous 115 RAND Europe interview with anonymous
(2015). EU project officer, 26 June 2017. EU policy official, 21 March 2017.

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Box 2.3 End user project involvement: SeaBILLA To promote the operationalisation of re-
search results, the FP7 evaluation rec-
The FP7 Sea Border Surveillance (SeaBILLA) project was established to enhance ommended improving ‘programme-level
sea border surveillance capabilities through close engagement with end us- support for dissemination’ of research
ers.116 The aims of the project were to create an ‘architecture for cost-effective findings and creating ‘mechanisms to
sea border surveillance systems at the European level’, to improve interoper- support the application of project re-
ability across MS, and to reduce the information gap arising from heterogene- sults’.124 The evaluation also found that
ous surveillance systems, legislation and modes of operation across Europe.117 research projects should have a clearer
End users including participants from the Maritime Analysis and Operations implementation and exploitation plan,
Centre – Narcotics (MAOC-N) and selected sea border authorities from MS (in- and that project results should be linked
cluding Italy, France, Spain, the Netherlands and the United Kingdom (UK)) to commercialisation.125 For example,
were involved from the inception of the project in developing sea border sur- where projects have a coordinator with
veillance mechanisms.118 The project reported that end users contributed to good market knowledge, this is said to
SeaBILLA in various ways, including through participation in workshops and improve the operationalisation of re-
live demonstrations.119 search results.126 FastPass is an exam-
Project results were disseminated through project meetings, demonstrations ple of such a project (see Box 2.5).
and workshops. The successful uptake of results is partly attributable to the According to one study interviewee,
close involvement of end users in this project, as well as to the fact that the another key factor that can help bring
technology was developed to be compatible with current systems.120 Moreover, project results to the operationalisation
the Intellectual Property Rights (IPR) defined prior to the project allowed for stage is a high level of end user engage-
open collaboration between partners in order to ‘maximise the potential for ment.127 End users’ buy-in during project
collaboration on the exploitation of results’ (see Sections 2.1.5 and 4.3.5 for fur- demonstrations and workshops is said
ther discussion of IPR).121 SeaBILLA results have been operationalised, enhanc- to be important for benchmarking pro-
ing interoperability and information sharing among European Commission ject outcomes against other tools used
agencies and national authorities tasked with border surveillance.122 by border guards.128
In this regard, the POV CLOSEYE
Box 2.4 End user project involvement: EWISA123 project has been identified as a ‘game
changer’. CLOSEYE is the first example
The FP7 project Early Warning For Increased Situational Awareness (EWISA) is a of a research project paving the way to an
pre-operational validation project related to security of land borders, for which MS initiative supported by the Internal
the public tender has been finalised. The end users include the Romanian bor- Security Fund (ISF) borders fund.129 As
der police, Finnish border guards and the Spanish Guardia Civil. The aim of Box 2.4 shows, CLOSEYE is an example
this project is to provide a common concept on how surveillance of land bor- of a project that interviewees considered
ders should be undertaken. The project emphasises the importance of a com- to have had a tangible impact on bor-
mon approach and perspective. der security operations. CLOSEYE led to
A public tender on research and the development of solutions was initi- the award of a follow-up project (ESPIAS)
ated, and has since been finalised. Once it has been developed, the solution in December 2016, which focuses on
will be implemented, tested and evaluated in four locations for six months. helping improve border surveillance by
Industry is involved in the process as they will train the border guards with strengthening cooperation between MS
a common training programme. The border guards will be able to use the so- under the EUROSUR framework.130 This
lutions for six months, after which these will be evaluated and a cost analy- project was awarded through ISF fund-
sis will be performed. The results of the evaluation will then be presented to ing under the call ‘HOME/2015/ISFB/AG/
Frontex and other EU institutions. ESUR’.

116 CORDIS (2015). 124 Technopolis (2015, 86).

117 SeaBILLA (n.d.); Technopolis (2015). 125 Technopolis (2015).
118 SeaBILLA (n.d.); Technopolis (2015). 126 RAND Europe interview with anonymous
119 SeaBILLA (n.d.). EU policy official, 21 March 2017.
120 CORDIS (2015). 127 RAND Europe interview with anonymous
121 CORDIS (2015). EU policy official, 21 March 2017.
122 CORDIS (2015). 128 RAND Europe interview with anonymous
123 RAND Europe interview with Pantelis EU policy official, 21 March 2017.
Michalis and George Leventakis, 30 129 CLOSEYE (n.d.).
August 2017. 130 European Commission (n.d.-m).

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Frontex Box 2.6 Project with a tangible impact: 2.1.4. Summary

FastPass
Frontex seeks to achieve impact by or- Figure 2.6 overleaf provides a visual sum-
ganising information exchange sessions FastPass is an FP7 project that ran mary of the EU R&I pathway, including
and workshops with end users, indus- from 2013 to 2017 and focused on cre- the various associated factors, stakehold-
try, academia and other stakeholders ating a harmonised, modular ap- ers and inputs.
involved in the delivery of research pro- proach for system for all European
jects.131 Frontex sits on the advisory board automated border crossing points.138 2.1.5. Lessons identified
of some EU-funded projects to help en- The aim of FastPass is to enhance effi-
sure that the research conducted reflects ciency of border controls while main- A number of areas of good practice and
border guards’ requirements and the taining security. In order to do so, enduring challenges can be identified
wider operational context.132 FastPass gathered a large network of from the EU case study analysis. These
stakeholders that are part of the ABC are presented below.
Box 2.5 Project with a tangible impact: value chain to develop a harmonised
CLOSEYE133 approach to ABC gates, including Good practices
‘system and component producers,
CLOSEYE (Collaborative evaLuation research institutions, governmen- Interviewees reported increased involve-
Of border Surveillance technologies tal authorities, infrastructure op- ment of end users in the H2020 research
in maritime Environment bY pre-op- erators, and end users’.139 FastPass process compared to the FP7 process. End
erational validation of innovativE so- also drew on continuous end user users were said to be more closely in-
lutions) is an FP7 project that aimed inputs, for example taking into ac- volved in coordinating research projects
to provide: count border guards’ and travellers’ and in defining the Work Programmes,
requirements and evaluations when while their role in previous Framework
[…] the EU with an operational and technical developing and testing technologies. Programmes was often limited to that
framework that increases situational aware- Various technologies were opera- of observers or meeting participants.143
ness and improves the reaction capability
tionalised through this project, in- Study interviewees noted that increased
of authorities surveying the external bor-
cluding next-generation sensors, end user involvement has enhanced mar-
ders of the EU.134
software and algorithms for biom- ket visibility,144 improving the relation-
End users were closely involved in etric identification, innovative sce- ship between the supply and demand
the setup and management of this narios for different types of border sides and increasing engagement be-
project. These stakeholders were con- crossing which rely on a common tween research providers and end users.
sulted, provided project advice, acted harmonised architecture, and a ho- However, there is scope for continued
as project partners and helped define listic risk methodology for threat improvement. While end users have
the specifications for joint develop- assessment.140 The technologies de- been more involved in security research,
ment.135 According to interviewees, veloped through FastPass have re- the FP7 Security programme evaluation
the project has demonstrated how portedly been ‘quite successful’141 in notes that their role should be better es-
novel solutions can be used in the terms of their exploitation, having tablished as a requirement throughout
operational context.136 However, de- been put into use at Vienna Airport, the whole Work Programme cycle, in-
tailed information regarding the pro- Piraeus Port and the Moravita land cluding the topic selection, proposal,
ject’s impact on operational practice border crossing point.142 Additionally, project and dissemination stages.145 To
was not forthcoming from the inter- the results from FastPass were re- support this objective, the FP7 evalua-
views conducted to date. The project portedly instrumental in informing tion recommends improving processes
closed in February 2017 and the re- the design and delivery of the H2020 for supporting engagement and articu-
search results are ‘on the way to be- project BODEGA, which is underway lation of research needs.146
ing operationalised’.137 at the time of writing.
Challenges

131 RAND Europe interview with Dragos 138 CORDIS (2016b).

Voicu, 11 April 2017. 139 FastPass (n.d.-b). Despite increased efforts under FP7 and
132 RAND Europe interview with Dragos 140 FastPass (n.d.-b). H2020 to strengthen links between bor-
Voicu, 11 April 2017. 141 RAND Europe interview with anonymous der security research and operational
133 RAND Europe interview with anony- EU project officer, 26 June 2017.; FastPass
practice, challenges remain in relation
mous EU institution, 24 April 2017; RAND (n.d.-b).
142 RAND Europe interview with anonymous
to the operationalisation of research
Europe interview with anonymous EU pol-
icy official, 21 March 2017. EU project officer, 26 June 2017.; FastPass
134 CLOSEYE (n.d.). (n.d.-b). 143 RAND Europe interview with anonymous
135 RAND Europe interview with anonymous EU institution, 24 April 2017; Technopolis
EU institution, 24 April 2017. (2015).
136 RAND Europe interview with anonymous 144 RAND Europe interview with anonymous
EU policy official, 21 March 2017. EU institution, 24 April 2017.
137 RAND Europe interview with anonymous 145 Technopolis (2015).
EU institution, 24 April 2017. 146 Technopolis (2015).

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Challenges and Opportunities for Operationalising Border Security Research

Figure 2.6 EU research and innovation pathway

Adaption by users Research outputs Project specification

& selection

How: End user project involvement Who: DHS, S&T, COEs, USCG
(QHSR,IPTs, STRAS, USCG RTD&E), Need identification How: IPTs, STRAS, ISR, APP
System Analysis, ISR, CG-STIC Innovation & prioritisation
and Working Group
Who: DHS: S&T, USCG
How: QHSR (study groups, steering
INNOVATION committee, senior leadership meetings), RESEARCH
STRAS, IPTs (R&D monitoring, technology
review platform), portfolio review, ISR
Impact

No official DHS definition of ‘impact’ Inputs to research

Study team interpretation: successful
transition of R&D products to operational
Budget: S&T: $55m,
deployment Evaluation Research process
USCG: $18m for FY2017

Who: RDC (within USCG

RDT&D), external implementers

+ Inclusive consulting processes

+ Funding availability
ENABLING FACTORS
- Oversight and coordination
- Operational transition of R&D

Department of Homeland Security: Science and Technology Directorate, Coast Guatd;

KEY STAKEHOLDERS
Centres of Excellence (COEs) academia and industry

Strategic context: Border security is part of ‘homeland security’ umbrella concept

and is 1 of 10 of its missions
CONTEXTUAL FACTORS Challenges: Terrorism, migration, cybersecurity, illegal border-crossing, transnational
crime, nuclear threats, climate change

findings.147 Several interviewees stated proposals are not always sufficiently account not only end user requirements,
that the links between project findings aware of practitioner needs and the but also a number of considerations in-
and uptake in the European market were wider operational context.149 As a result, cluding efficiency, affordability and the
unclear and that too often research did the type of research conducted is not al- compatibility of research-based solutions
not lead to tangible change in opera- ways operationally focused or immedi- with the field and technology already in
tional measures.148 ately applicable for end users. According use.151 To ensure applicability of the re-
Several factors are said to contribute to one study interviewee, high-TRL re- search outputs for end users, it is im-
to this disconnect between research search is most useful for border guards portant to ensure end users’ continuous
and operational practice. At the pro- in the context of their day-to-day work.150 involvement throughout the research
posal stage, for example, the border se- However, as outlined in Section 2.1.2, pathway so that they can identify any
curity experts responsible for evaluating few H2020 Work Programmes to date potential issues with research products
have included projects with a high TRL, and systems from a practitioner perspec-
147 Technopolis (2015); RAND Europe inter-
with most being set at TRL 5. To have ap- tive before they are too far developed.152
view with Dragos Voicu, 11 April 2017;
RAND Europe interview with anonymous
plicability for end users, it is important
FP7 project coordinator, 31 March 2017; for border security research to take into 151 RAND Europe interview with anonymous
RAND Europe interview with Triantafyllos Frontex representative, 19 April 2017;
Karatrandos, 20 April 2017. 149 RAND Europe interview with anonymous RAND Europe interview with anony-
148 RAND Europe interview with Dragos Voicu, FP7 project coordinator, 31 March 2017. mous EU institution, 24 April 2017; RAND
11 April 2017; RAND Europe interview with 150 RAND Europe interview with anonymous Europe interview with Peter Ryman, 20
anonymous FP7 project coordinator, 31 Frontex representative, 19 April 2017; RAND September 2017.
March 2017; RAND Europe interview with Europe interview with Pantelis Michalis & 152 RAND Europe interview with Peter Ryman,
Triantafyllos Karatrandos, 20 April 2017. George Leventakis, 30 August 2017. 20 September 2017.

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Another issue relates to the inflexibil- However, it should be noted that this ob- importance.163 Respondents highlighted
ity of EU funding models, which are set servation was made by one interviewee; similar challenges to their borders,
within the wider European Commission further research would be required to namely illegal migration, illegal bor-
legal framework. According to one in- validate this statement. der-crossing164 and forms of cross-border
terview, current funding opportunities A further barrier to the development crime including stolen vehicle traffick-
for research projects often lack the flex- of EU-funded border security research ing, goods smuggling, drug smuggling165
ibility to meet the different needs of end relates to the Framework Programme and human trafficking.166
users.153 While EU-funded research tends intellectual property (IP) laws, under National border guard agencies were
to span multiple years, there is not yet a which researchers retain IPR to the re- identified as the main type of actor re-
rapid funding mechanism that addresses search products, which can constrain sponsible for funding border security re-
the emergent ‘short-term needs of end border guards from developing the re- search across respondent countries.167
users’.154 Nonetheless, there are several search further and applying it in prac- Other actors mentioned include
follow-on funding mechanisms that are tice in cases where they have not been academia,168 industry, and small and me-
reportedly designed to take research pro- directly involved in the research itself. dium-sized enterprises (SMEs).169 ‘Wider
jects towards application in the field, This approach contrasts with the US government’170 and ‘private institu-
although their effectiveness could not approach (see Section 3.1), whereby all tions’171 were also noted. In one case, co-
be determined by the RAND study team property developed through US-funded operation with partners from academia
based on the data available. These mech- programmes is federally owned.159 and industry is reportedly an important
anisms include InnovFin, The European factor for ensuring that research is rele-
Fund for Strategic Investments (EFSI), re- vant and that customised solutions can
gional and national funds, InvestHorizon 2.2. EU Member State survey be developed rapidly.172 Other countries
and Progress TT, which are part of the findings rely on funding from their Ministry of
‘Industrial Leadership’ pillar of H2020.155 Interior (MoI), Ministry of Defence (MoD)
The EU Framework Programmes lack An electronic survey was distributed and other government departments.173
funding to directly support the commer- to National Frontex Points of Contact
cialisation and implementation of re- (NFPOC) in all 28 EU MS by Frontex (see 2.2.2. Research pathway
search findings.156 To address this lack Appendix C). This survey focused primar-
of funding for commercialisation, one ily on border security research funded Overview of the EU MS research
study interviewee suggested that the at the national level (see Sections 2.2.1 landscape
Framework Programmes could be more to 2.2.3) and also examined respondent
closely linked to other funding mecha- countries’ involvement in EU-funded re- In three respondent countries,174 border
nisms relating to border security, such search (see Section 2.2.4). With a 39 per security research is reportedly charac-
as the ISF, which is a €3.8bn fund for cent response rate (11 of 28 MS),160 the terised by an even distribution of high-
2014–2020 designed to promote the im- findings presented in this section are and low-technology projects.175 In one of
plementation of the Internal Security not representative of the state of play these countries, independent research
Strategy and external border manage- of border security research across all EU funded by the national border guard
ment.157 Budgetary issues also relate to a MS; rather, they are intended to provide tends to draw mainly on social sci-
perceived lack of coordination of fund- a snapshot of approaches adopted by the ence approaches, while high-tech re-
ing mechanisms across the EU. At pre- participating nations. search is most common in ‘development
sent, there appears to be no centralised
overview of the funding mechanisms 2.2.1. Strategic context
163 Participants were presented with three
offered both at the EU and MS levels.158
options for this question: ‘high impor-
Almost all MS respondents stated that tance’, ‘medium importance’ and ‘low im-
border security was of high strategic im- portance’ (see Appendix C).
153 Technopolis (2015). portance in their countries,161 while one 164 6 respondents (Surveys B, C, D, E, F, G).
154 Technopolis (2015). 165 5 respondents (B, C, E, F, G).
respondent162 rated it as being of medium
155 European Commission (n.d.-a). 166 1 respondent (Survey E).
156 Technopolis (2015); RAND Europe in- 167 6 respondents (Surveys B, C, D, E, F, G).
terview with three representatives of a 168 4 respondents (Surveys B, C, E, F).
European organisation, 3 April 2017; 169 2 respondents (Surveys B, F).
RAND Europe interview with anonymous 170 2 respondents (Surveys E, F).
EU institution, 24 April 2017. It should be 159 RAND Europe interview with anonymous 171 1 respondent (Survey E).
noted that this is a constraint that does not Frontex representative, 19 April 2017. 172 1 respondent (Survey B).
affect all EU funding programmes. For ex- 160 7 NFPOC provided completed survey re- 173 2 respondents (Surveys D, G).
ample, EU MS reportedly only use half of sponses (Surveys A-G); 3 NFPOC (Surveys 174 3 respondents (Surveys B, C, D).
the ISF funding available to them (RAND H-J) informed the study team that they do 175 ‘High-technology research’ refers to com-
Europe interview with Frontex represent- not perform activities related to border se- plex technology applied and demonstrated
ative, 19 April 2017). curity research; and 1 NFPOC (Survey K) in its final form, while ‘low-technology re-
157 RAND Europe interview with Triantafyllos was unable to complete the survey due to search’ refers to low complexity technol-
Karatrandos, 20 April 2017. other work commitments. ogy where scientific research begins to be
158 RAND Europe interview with Triantafyllos 161 6 respondents (Surveys B, C, D, E, F, G). translated into applied research and devel-
Karatrandos, 20 April 2017. 162 1 respondent (Survey A). opment (see Appendix D).

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projects’ – a type of research not defined Selection of border security ▪▪ Initial impact evaluation206
by the MS survey respondent but which research projects ▪▪ Operational impact207
the RAND study team understands to re- ▪▪ Publications208
fer to more applied research with an op- While some national processes for award- ▪▪ Technological, operative or educa-
erational focus.176 By contrast, three of ing border security research contracts are tional innovation209
the other respondent countries mainly internal to the border guard agencies,187 ▪▪ Research conclusions.210
undertake high-tech projects in the field other countries hold ‘public auctions’188
of border security research.177 or do not have a different process to that 2.2.3. Pathways to impact
used for other tendering work.189
Identification and prioritisation of Criteria used to evaluate proposals The main stakeholders involved in the
research topics include relevance of the research,190 practical implementation of border secu-
cost effectiveness,191 applicability and rity research differ by country, but these
In most respondent countries, research usability,192 impact potential,193 main­ten­ actors tend to include the Ministry of
topics are identified by the national bor- ance costs,194 quality of the consortium,195 Interior and national border guard agen-
der guard agency.178 However, the prior- project risks,196 type of research (funda- cies. Respondent MS have various pro-
itisation of research topics tends to draw mental/applied)197 and research quality cesses and practices in place to improve
on wider government participation, in- (academic standards).198 When asked the operationalisation of research find-
volving the Ministry of Interior179 as well about how much weight was assigned ings, including active communication
as the Ministries of Defence, Security to ‘impact potential’ when evaluating between researchers and end users (bor-
and Justice.180 proposals, it was reported that this was der guards),211 active participation of end
The types of research topics selected not the most important criterion for some users in research projects,212 and system-
depend on the security situation, the respondents,199 while others considered it atic integration of research results into
operating environment and an assess- highly important.200 While two respond- operational practice.213
ment of future needs.181 Respondents C ents noted that the relative weighting Most respondents viewed their na-
and F specified that they have a Research of technical and financial scoring is de- tional border security research processes
Strategy and an Integrated Border Management pendent on the research project,201 an- as ‘effective’ in terms of the integration
Strategy, respectively, and that their re- other respondent specified that techni- of findings into operational practice,214
search projects are based on these cal components are weighted at 60 per while one respondent assessed its pro-
strategies. cent compared to 40 per cent for finan- cesses as being ‘very effective’.215 While
With one exception,182 all respondents cial components.202 these responses are based on a self-eval-
stated that they always consider the ‘im- uation, various explanations were pro-
pact potential’ of border security research Monitoring and evaluation vided for these positive assessments. In
projects when identifying and prioritis- one respondent country, research pro-
ing research topics. However, ‘impact Across the respondent MS, research pro- cesses were said to be effective given
potential’ is measured in different ways jects are monitored both on a contin- the small size of the country and re-
across MS. In one case, ‘impact’ is meas- uous203 and an annual basis.204 In two search system, which was said to facil-
ured prior to the project through an as- cases,205 a progress report maps the ac- itate collaboration between researchers
sessment of the quality of the proposal,183 tivities outlined in the proposal to the and end users.216 Other systems focus
while in all other cases impact is meas- achievement of project goals. Indicators on enhancing the knowledge of end
ured upon completion of the project. used to evaluate research projects users such as border police officers and
Indicators of successful impact include include: on ensuring that they use state-of-the-
more efficient operations following op- art technologies.217 However, a number
erationalisation of research findings,184 of shortcomings of existing processes
the provision of positive end user feed- 187 2 respondents (Surveys B, C). were also identified, particularly in re-
back concerning the new devices or tech- 188 1 respondent (Survey D). lation to the gap between research and
189 1 respondent (Survey G).
nologies produced,185 and the financial operationalisation.218 One respondent
190 3 respondents (Surveys A, B, D).
impact of research-based solutions ap- country noted a time lag between the
191 3 respondents (Surveys A, E, G).
plied in the field.186 192 4 respondents (Surveys B, C, E, F).
193 1 respondent (Survey B). 206 1 respondent (Survey B).
194 1 respondent (Survey B). 207 1 respondent (Survey B).
176 1 respondent (Survey C). 195 2 respondents (Survey C, E). 208 1 respondent (Survey C).
177 3 respondents (Surveys E, F, G). 196 1 respondent (Survey E). 209 1 respondent (Survey C).
178 4 respondents (Surveys B, C, E, G). 197 2 respondents (Surveys E, G). 210 1 respondent (Survey G).
179 3 respondents (Surveys B, C, D). 198 1 respondent (Survey E). 211 1 respondent (Survey B).
180 1 respondent (Survey E). 199 3 respondents (Surveys B, C, G). 212 2 respondents (Surveys B, C).
181 4 respondents (Surveys A, B, F, G). 200 2 respondents (Surveys D, E). 213 1 respondent (Survey G).
182 1 respondent (Survey B). 201 2 respondents (Surveys B, G). 214 5 respondents (Surveys B, C, E, F, G).
183 1 respondent (Survey C). 202 1 respondent (Survey D). 215 1 respondent (Survey D).
184 1 respondent (Survey E). 203 2 respondents (Surveys B, G). 216 1 respondent (Survey B).
185 1 respondent (Survey F). 204 1 respondent (Survey C). 217 1 respondent (Survey F).
186 1 respondent (Survey G). 205 2 respondents (Surveys D, E). 218 1 respondent (Survey E).

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conception of an idea and the end of a Another EU MS border police force Challenges
research project, stating that end users has also participated in EU-funded re-
need implementable results and com- search, including the aforementioned A lack of resources was the most fre-
mercialisable findings to be produced FastPass; ABC-Gates, which also focuses quently mentioned challenge facing the
much more quickly.219 While most re- on harmonising border control gates;228 respondent MS.237 MS mentioned limited
spondents viewed their processes as ‘ef- and MobilePass, which has developed funding available for research,238 as well
fective’, one respondent assessed their mobile land border crossing point equip- as a lack of financial incentives for bor-
border security research management ment.229 This border police force has un- der guard recruitment239 and wider man-
as ‘not very effective’ as research results dertaken on-site testing for MobilePass power shortages.240 Another key area for
often remain on paper because border equipment, stating that this type of new improvement mentioned by several re-
guards are not obligated to implement technology allows them to process trav- spondents relates to the need for research
recommendations.220 ellers more quickly and securely, increas- objectives to be more clearly defined.241
ing border agencies’ ability to focus on It can also be difficult to balance re-
2.2.4. Involvement in EU-funded ‘intelligence-oriented border control’. search approaches with operational
research Despite wide-ranging involvement priorities,242 particularly when there is
in EU-funded projects, one respondent a time lag between the approval of a re-
Involvement in H2020, FP7 and other EU- noted that information on project results search project and its eventual operation-
funded research is not uniform across could be disseminated more effective- alisation. Furthermore, it was pointed
MS respondents. While three of the re- ly.230 On the operationalisation side, one out that a lack of interagency coopera-
spondent countries221 do not participate respondent stated that research-based tion means that national authorities are
in H2020 or FP7 projects on border secu- solutions are not developed on an indus- not always kept up to date with changes
rity, two are active participants.222 trial scale, and that project results need at the EU level.243 As a result, there is not
The national border guard of one re- further testing to ensure their success- always a good understanding at the MS
spondent country has participated in ful integration at borders.231 Improving level of wider border security research ac-
H2020 proposals in 2015 and 2016, and these two aspects could help countries tivities taking place across the EU.
is currently involved in a H2020 project integrate H2020 and FP7 research find- While respondents acknowledged
on border management technologies ings into operational practice. some good practices at the EU level, such
as part of a national expert network.223 as Frontex’s Master’s Degree in Strategic
While this border guard authority moni- 2.2.5. Lessons identified Border Management, they also said that
tors the results of H2020 projects, it has more could be done by Frontex and the
not yet implemented any of those re- Good practices EU more broadly to facilitate informa-
sults. Another national border guard has tion exchange.244 Suggestions for im-
been an active member of consortia for A number of good practices were noted provement in this area included having
EWISA,224 EUCISE2020 (a project relating by respondents. Two respondent coun- a website or database featuring all border
to ‘pre-operational Information Sharing tries highlighted the importance of hav- research projects being conducted in the
between the maritime authorities of ing strong stakeholder networks in place EU and setting up a Frontex-coordinated
the European States’),225 BODEGA,226 between end users, industry, research- network of MS agencies involved in bor-
and FastPass.227 The latter project was ers and government.232 Having one main der security research.245 This has already
evaluated through on-site demonstra- agency in charge of the research pro- been done in the area of key trends and
tions, with the next generation of ABC cesses was highlighted as a useful way of challenges in the wider policy context,
gates under development. The respond- establishing a single, clearly defined vi- through the European Strategy and
ent country highlighted how these eval- sion, set of objectives and decision-mak- Policy Analysis System (ESPAS).246 One
uations and further research serve to ing process,233 as well a good situational respondent country also noted that bilat-
‘embed the most important social and awareness of border security research eral or multilateral exchanges between
technological innovations of the project being undertaken across the country.234 border guards are helpful knowledge-
in our development work’. Respondents also noted the value of effi- sharing mechanisms.247 At the na-
cient internal research,235 with character- tional level, respondents noted that a
istics such as short timeframes between reduction of the administrative burden
219 1 respondent (Survey C). contract award and project start-up.236
220 1 respondent (Survey G). 237 1 respondent (Survey B).
221 3 respondents (Surveys A, D, G). 238 4 surveys (Surveys B, C, D, E).
222 2 respondents (Surveys B, C). ‘Respondent 239 1 respondent (Survey F).
E’ did not provide a reply to this set of 228 ABC4EU (n.d.). 240 1 respondent (Survey B).
questions. 229 See MobilePass (n.d.). 241 3 respondents (Surveys D, E, G).
223 1 respondent (Survey B). 230 1 respondent (Survey B). 242 2 respondents (Surveys E, G).
224 CORDIS ( 2014). 231 1 respondent (Survey F). 243 1 respondent (Survey C).
225 European Common Information Sharing 232 2 respondents (Surveys B, C). 244 1 respondent (Survey C).
Environment for Maritime Suveillance in 233 2 respondents (Surveys A, E). 245 1 respondent (Survey C).
Europe (EUCISE) (n.d.). 234 2 respondents (Surveys B, C). 246 European Strategy and Policy Analysis
226 BODEGA (n.d.-b). 235 2 respondents (Surveys C, D). System (n.d.).
227 See FastPass (n.d.) 236 1 respondent (Survey B). 247 1 respondent (Survey A).

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would facilitate management of border Mission Group for Security, a grouping research provider has sole responsibil-
research, and that ongoing evaluation of various organisations involved in se- ity for M&E,259 or whether it is a com-
of end users’ needs would help improve curity matters.252 bination of the sponsor organisation,
the operationalisation of border secu- In terms of the research topics them- the research provider or an independ-
rity research.248 selves, respondents stated that these ent assessor.260
should be more dynamic in order to en- Continuous project M&E by the user
able quick response to evolving threats.253 community and end users was seen as
2.3. EU industry and academia Suggestions for improving the identifica- important, as was the involvement of ex-
survey findings tion of research topics included mapping ternal experts (for example through an
and identifying the needs of end users, advisory board) who can provide advice
In order to complement the findings reviewing best practices used abroad and and recommendations.261 Respondents
from the EU MS survey, an additional new developments by industry, and re- agreed that M&E is expected to guaran-
survey was sent out to industry and ac- questing feedback from travellers.254 tee the usability of the solution, the high
ademia (see Appendix C). The survey quality of the work, and the fulfilment
focused primarily on border security re- Selection of border security of the relevant professional and scien-
search funded at the EU level, looking research projects tific requisites.262
at the research pathway, impact and op-
erationalisation of research, as well as Respondents generally had a good un- 2.3.2. Pathways to impact
lessons learned. Frontex circulated this derstanding as to who selects border se-
survey to 52 of their contacts from indus- curity research projects (the European In response to the question on how re-
try and academia, with a 10 per cent re- Commission, based on scores provided by search findings are operationalised, re-
sponse rate (5 of 52 contacts). Due to the external experts). However, one pointed spondents provided a variety of answers.
low level of response, the survey findings out that the experts’ evaluation of pro- They highlighted the use of prototypes,
are not representative of the experiences posals can sometimes be seen as subjec- the participation of end users in dem-
of all industry and academic partners tive, as there may only be a small pool onstration and validation, and interop-
in EU-funded border security research. of experts on a given border security re- erable tools and systems that enable the
Instead, these responses are treated as search topic and this can increase the products of all the partners to be oper-
additional expert stakeholder input on chance of conflicts of interest.255 In terms ated together.263
the research pathway. of the assessment criteria used to select Respondents also highlighted several
the projects, most respondents were areas that could prevent or slow down
2.3.1. Research pathway aware of the European Commission’s the operationalisation of research out-
focus on assessing impact, methodol- puts. These revolve around:
Identification and prioritisation of ogy and the implementation approach.256 ▪▪ A lack of effective planning at the
research topics Respondents also stated that the finan- start of the proposal or project, in-
cial elements were generally not as cluding for projects that have a low
Overall, even among the limited number prominent as the technical elements – TRL;264
of survey respondents, there was a de- especially where proposals do not ex- ▪▪ A lack of requirements to operation-
gree of variation in levels of knowledge ceed the budget threshold provided in alise the output, which undermines
of processes for identification and prior- the call.257 One respondent, however, the shared interest within the con-
itisation of research topics. In particular, felt that the financial aspect of calls is sortium in operationalising project
respondents seemed to be more aware of not sufficiently prioritised in the assess- outputs;265 and
how research topics are identified than ment, and that this implies that when ▪▪ A lack of foresight as regards the costs
how they are prioritised.249 Nonetheless, scoring proposals, the exploitation plan of adopting and maintaining the new
industry respondents stated that indus- of the results is not a priority.258 systems or products.266
try is generally consulted regarding re-
search topics.250 Respondents stated Monitoring and evaluation Additionally, operationalisation of
that while stakeholder groups are con- a product may require another tender
sulted, there is still scope for more di- All respondents had different answers process,267 and may lead to a lack of will-
alogue between the various parties.251 as to who they thought was responsible ingness on the part of authorities and
One of the respondents stated that sev- for M&E, highlighting a lack of clarity
eral working groups in the area of re- on that aspect of the research pathway.
search and technology seek to promote Responses varied as to whether the 259 1 respondent (Survey O).
this kind of stakeholder involvement. 260 3 respondents (Surveys L, M, N).
These include the informal Integrated 252 1 respondent (Survey N). 261 1 respondent (Survey N).
253 2 respondents (Surveys L, O). 262 2 respondents (Surveys L, M).
254 1 respondent (Survey M). 263 2 respondents (Surveys M, N).
248 1 respondent (Survey D). 255 1 respondent (Survey M). 264 1 respondent (Survey O).
249 3 respondents (Surveys L, M, O). 256 3 respondents (Surveys L, M, N). 265 1 respondent (Survey N).
250 4 respondents (Surveys L, M, N, O). 257 3 respondents (Surveys L, M, N). 266 1 respondent (Survey M).
251 1 respondent (Survey L). 258 1 respondent (Survey M). 267 1 respondent (Survey M).

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Table 2.2 Summary of findings for EU case study

Needs
Border security Key identification Project specification Inputs to Research Pathways to
context stakeholders and prioritisation and selection research process impact
EU Strategic context: European Who: Secure Who: Secure Societies Budget: Who: How: End user project
Border security Commission: Societies programme programme committee, FP7 Academia, involvement (e.g.
(Sections is part of 2 of 10 ▪▪ DG HOME committee, PASAG, REA. – €146.8m (total); industry, REA, consortium leads,
2.1–2.3) strategic priorities ▪▪ Frontex Joint Research H2020 DG HOME, project advisors);
in Political Guidelines. ▪▪ REA. Centre (JRC), EU MS, How: Proposal eligibility 2014–15 – €73m; public sector increased focus on
research, industry. checks, external H2020 organisations. prototypes, tests and
Challenges: Academia and evaluation, proposal 2016–17 – €55m. demonstrations.
Migration, industry. How: Stakeholder scoring, panel meeting,
instability, consultation; ‘top- grant finalisation process, Challenges: Lack
terrorism, organised down’ approach. ethics and security checks. of clarity around
crime, cybercrime. ‘impact’ criteria; lack
What: Clustered by TRL of uptake; lack of
and thematic area. Higher funding; IPR.
TRL research requested
under H2020 (most calls
set at TRL 7 under H2020
2016–17).

end users to adopt the new systems or ▪▪ Lack of strategic foresight around bor- for greater responsiveness to cur-
products.268 der security research: Respondents rent events, with clearer and more
noted duplication of research calls tangible outcomes. Look to exploit or
2.3.3. Lessons identified within FP7 or H2020 on certain prod- continue developing high-technology
ucts or technologies, as well as a lack solutions used in other domains that
Good practices of consistency between calls.273 This is could be applicable to border securi-
tied to the perception that there is a ty.278 Interoperability and standardi-
Respondents noted a number of good lack of strategic vision as to the types sation between and within projects
practices in the following areas: of research conducted and the prior- should also be encouraged.279
▪▪ The setup of H2020 projects: For ex- itisation of research.274 ▪▪ Consortium model and IPR: Place
ample, projects provide a space for a ▪▪ The consortium model: Large con- additional emphasis on a proposal’s
dialogue between the research pro- sortia, despite the complementarity exploitation plan in the assessment
vider and the end users, which helps of talent they bring, can potentially phase, focusing for example on the
projects respond to the needs of the slow down the transition from re- willingness of the research provider to
end users.269 search to operationalisation due to make the research results available.280
▪▪ The collaborative aspect of H2020: the complexity of managing so many ▪▪ End users: Improve the dialogue be-
This helps improve interaction be- partners.275 tween the research provider and the
tween the various stakeholders (in- ▪▪ IPR: IPR issues can affect the adoption end user at various junctures dur-
dustry, academia, end users, the of the results. This issue is also closely ing the research process (for exam-
European Commission) that hold a tied to the consortium model above, ple when identifying and prioritising
variety of skills, which in turn leads as large consortia can make it diffi- research topics) during both the cre-
to the creation of novel ideas.270 cult to reach a commercial agreement ation of the call specifications and
▪▪ Other good practices in EU-funded with regard to proprietary rights be- the course of the project.281 Provide
research include a thorough develop- tween the various parties, thus re- longer demonstrations, carried out
ment of risk mitigation techniques stricting the operationalisation of by the end users themselves, rather
through proposals,271 and a thorough certain results.276 than small pilot applications.282
identification and prioritisation of ▪▪ End users: There is a lack of clarity
research topics through consultation around end users’ needs, as well as a Table 2.2 provides a summary of the find-
with a range of stakeholders.272 lack of participation of end users dur- ings presented above.
ing the course of projects.277
Challenges
Respondents suggested the following as
Respondents also raised a number of means of addressing these challenges:
challenges in the following areas: ▪▪ Strategic foresight: Have faster
turnaround projects, which allow

268 3 respondent (Surveys M, N, O). 273 1 respondent (Survey O). 278 1 respondent (Survey O).
269 1 respondent (Survey L). 274 1 respondent (Survey O). 279 1 respondent (Survey N).
270 2 respondents (Surveys M, N). 275 1 respondent (Survey O). 280 1 respondent (Survey M).
271 1 respondent (Survey L). 276 3 respondents (Surveys M, N, O). 281 1 respondent (Surveys L, O).
272 1 respondent (Survey N). 277 2 respondents (Surveys L, O). 282 1 respondent (Survey O).

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3. Case studies:
Non-EU border security research (WP2)

3.1. US border security The latest QHSR from 2014 confirms per cent between 2012 and 2018.290 These
research these missions and articulates a series drivers can create opportunities for in-
of related goals and activities.287 With creased movement of unauthorised mi-
3.1.1. Strategic context regard to securing and managing bor- grants and illegal goods.
ders, these include:288 Among the drivers identified as hav-
In the United States (US), border secu- ▪▪ Securing US air, land and sea borders ing an impact on homeland security in
rity and related efforts fall under the and approaches, and preventing ille- general and on border security in par-
umbrella term ‘homeland security’. gal import, entry, export and exit; ticular, the 2014 QHSR also highlights
Different definitions have been produced ▪▪ Safeguarding and expediting law- some that have only recently emerged
over the years, but homeland security is ful trade and travel by safeguarding or are currently emerging. These driv-
generally understood to refer to national key nodes, conveyances and path- ers include: (i) the diffusion of informa-
efforts to ensure a homeland that is safe, ways, managing the risk of people tion and communications technology;
secure, and resilient against evolving and goods in transit, maximising (ii) natural disasters, pandemics and cli-
threats and hazards.283 The concept was compliance with US trade laws, and mate change; (iii) the interdependence
introduced after the 11 September 2001 promoting US economic security and and aging of critical infrastructure sys-
terrorist attacks, and led to the reorgani- competitiveness; tems and networks; and (iv) threats con-
sation of federal border security agencies ▪▪ Disrupting and dismantling trans- nected to terrorism, the cyber domain,
under a new entity, the Department of national criminal organisations and biological concerns, nuclear concerns
Homeland Security (DHS), which is re- other illicit actors by identifying, and transnational crime.291
sponsible for securing borders and expe- investigating, disrupting and dis-
diting lawful trade and travel.284 mantling transnational criminal or- 3.1.2. Research pathway
Since 2010, DHS has been man- ganisations, and by disrupting illicit
dated by Congress to produce a series actors, activities and pathways. Overview of the US research
of Quadrennial Homeland Security Reviews landscape
(QHSRs). These documents provide an Border security also forms an important
overview of the US homeland security part of other homeland security missions The transition from the pre-2002 piece-
strategy over the short and long term, such as those for the prevention of terror- meal approach to homeland security
offering guidance on US strategic prior- ist attacks, the strengthening and effec- management to the current DHS-centred
ities, policies, programmes, assets, ca- tive administration of the immigration system entailed a rationalisation and
pabilities and budgetary requirements.285 system and the prevention of unlawful centralisation of border security tasks
The 2010 QHSR identifies three key con- immigration, and the safeguarding and and functions. This process involved
cepts that form the foundation of US securing of cyberspace.289 breaking down longstanding ‘stovepipes’
homeland security: security, resilience, The 2014 QHSR further highlights the of activity, including in research work.292
and customs and exchange.286 These con- importance of border security by identi- Within DHS, three bodies have re-
cepts in turn shape five core missions fying drivers of change affecting the stra- sponsibility for conducting border and
that all actors involved in homeland se- tegic environment. One such driver is maritime security related research:
curity are tasked with supporting: (i) the increasing flow of people and goods 1. Science and Technology Directorate
preventing terrorism and enhancing se- across US borders. Lawful US exports and (S&T)
curity; (ii) securing and managing bor- imports increased by 72 per cent and 36 2. US Coast Guard (USCG)
ders; (iii) enforcing and administering per cent, respectively, between 2005 and 3. Domestic Nuclear Detection Office
immigration laws; (iv) safeguarding and 2012. Similarly, lawful travel to the US (DNDO).293
securing cyberspace; and (v) ensuring re- grew by 36 per cent over the same period,
silience to disaster. and is forecast to grow by a further 25 290 DHS (2014).
291 DHS (2014).
283 Reese (2013). 292 For further information on the pre-2002
284 Haddal (2010); US DHS (2010) (hereafter approach, please see Haddal (2010).
‘DHS’). 287 DHS (2014). 293 GAO (2013); RAND Europe interview with
285 Kahan (2015); DHS (2010; 2014). 288 DHS (2014). anonymous US representatives, March
286 DHS (2010). 289 DHS (2014). 2017.

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Other DHS components, such as Customs (‘Chemical and Biological Defense’, Box 3.1 Multidisciplinary research
and Border Protection (CBP), have also al- ‘Cyber Security’, ‘Explosives’, ‘Resilient projects: an Apex Program with border
located resources to activities linked to Systems’), HSARPA runs a series of cross- security relevance
border security research. However, these cutting Apex Programs and the Apex
bodies appear to focus more closely on Technology Engines. Apex Programs are The Apex Air Entry/Exit Re-engine­
the management of technology acqui- high-profile multidisciplinary research ering (AEER) programme is a multi-
sition – an area that is beyond the scope efforts that span different thematic areas year initiative that aims to transform
of the study.294 Given the focus of this aimed at developing technical capabilities the international arrivals process and
study and the DNDO’s narrow focus on and cost-saving processes.299 Box 3.1 on implement a biometric capability in
nuclear detection capabilities, the fol- the right provides an overview of an Apex order to verify the departure of for-
lowing pages discuss S&T and USCG’s Program with border security relevance. eign nationals leaving from US air-
research activities of relevance to bor- Furthermore, the Apex Technology ports of entry.
der security research. Engines function as technology and ex- S&T and CBP collaborate to deliver
pertise platforms building a knowledge AEER and are working to identify, de-
Science and Technology Directorate base and networks to serve the needs of velop, test and evaluate new opera-
S&T is the primary organisation for re- S&T and DHS. The objectives of the en- tional concepts in order to enhance
search within DHS. It is responsible for gines are to: (i) increase return on in- CBP traveller-screening processes.
a research, development and innovation vestment by benefitting multiple Apex In particular, AEER aims to lever-
(RD&I) programme that conducts activi- projects; (ii) reduce redundancy of Apex- age commercially available technol-
ties around basic and applied research, only solutions; (iii) accelerate impact of ogies, re-engineer current processes
development, demonstration, testing Apex and other S&T research projects; and introduce new operational capa-
and evaluation with a customer-focused and (iv) increase agility by adjusting to bilities to:
and output-oriented approach.295 RD&I changing Apex needs. In practice, Apex ▪ Increase security while facilitat-
activities focus on six ‘thrust areas’,296 in- Engines harness subject matter exper- ing trade and travel
cluding border security. Within S&T, the tise and capabilities across DHS to pro- ▪ Implement operational capa-
Homeland Security Advanced Research vide continuous support for the needs of bilities required by US federal
Project Agency (HSARPA) focuses on iden- DHS bodies and of the broader homeland legislation
tifying, developing and transitioning security enterprise. The Apex Engines ▪ Support the US National Travel
technologies and capabilities that are include: 300 and Tourism Strategy.
relevant to DHS missions and deploy- ▪▪ Behavioral, Economic, and Social
able in homeland security operations. Science Engine (BESS-E), which Programme delivery involves four
HSARPA comprises five divisions focus- provides analysis of the social and interconnected tasks: technology
ing on different thematic areas, includ- behavioural implications of new tech- identification, operations analysis,
ing the Borders and Maritime Security nologies, programmes and policies; business case analysis and stake-
Division (BMD).297 ▪▪ Communication and Networking holder engagement. AEER has en-
S&T and BMD research activity in re- (CN-E), which provides integrated gaged industry actors to conduct
lation to border and maritime security communications and networking a market survey of commercially
focuses on technologies and solutions solutions in order to ensure inter- available technologies. To identify
to: 1) secure the borders, territorial wa- operability across different network the best-performing technologies
ters, ports, terminals, waterways, and platforms; for integration into CBP processes,
sea transportation system of the US; ▪▪ Data Analytics Engine (DA-E), which the AEER programme employs three
and 2) prevent the illicit movement and provides expertise and tools for pro- phases of evaluation: laboratory test-
illegal entry or exit of people, weapons, jects to leverage emerging storage, ing, scenario-based testing and field
dangerous goods and contraband, and security, computation and analytics trial testing. A sub-set of technolo-
to manage the risk posed by people and technologies in order to support de- gies identified are then used to eval-
goods in transit.298 To create synergies and cision making for homeland security uate the cost-effectiveness of entry
encourage cross-thematic research be- systems, missions and operations. and biometric exit concepts of oper-
tween BMD and other HSARPA divisions ▪▪ Identity Access and Management ations. Finally, results of technology
(IDAM-E), which provides capabili- testing and an analysis of operational
ties to give individuals and systems a impacts inform a rigorous business
294 DHS (2016c).
digital identity, credentials, authen- case analysis. Supporting the CBP in
295 Shea (2014).
tication and authorisation; its acquisition activities, business
296 With the term ‘thrust area’, S&T identi-
fies the six issue areas under which RD&I ▪▪ Manufacturing Engine (M-E), which case analysis examines feasible tech-
activities are clustered. These are: APEX, provides expertise to inform efficient nology solutions on the basis of per-
Border Security, CBE Defense, Counter transition from project conception to formance, cost and risk.301
Terrorist, Cyber Security/Information
full-scale manufacturing;
Analytics, and First Responder/Disaster
Resilience. Source: DHS S&T (2015c).
297 GAO (2013); DHS (2016a). 299 DHS (2017b; 2017d).
298 DHS (2017b; 2017d). 300 DHS (2015a; 2017b; 2017d). 301 DHS (n.d.-b).

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▪▪ Modelling and Simulation Engine employs a three-stage review process to systems engineering resource, provid-
(MS-E), which provides expertise and select COE recipients. These stages are: ing them with rapid access to deep tech-
a repository for mission-based mod- (i) a scientific quality review of bids by nical expertise.309 HSOAC works with all
els, and modelling and simulation a panel of peers external to DHS; (ii) an DHS components, providing unique ca-
tools; and internal relevance review of bids by a pabilities through early-stage activities,
▪▪ Situational Awareness and Decision panel of DHS subject matter experts; and portfolio planning and analysis, policy
Support (SANDS-E), which pro- (iii) site visits by a team of DHS subject development, acquisition planning, and
vides S&T and Apex projects with as- matter experts. When applicable, the re- support for the transition of products
sured and secure access to databases, view process also entails an assessment into government operations or licens-
knowledge repositories, modelling of past performance by COE hosts bid- ing for use by others.310
and simulation tools, and situational ding for their centre’s renewal.305 S&T caters for a wide array of clients
awareness products. Each COE is led by a university in col- and components within DHS and the
laboration with partners from other in- broader homeland security enterprise,
Furthermore, S&T manages a ‘University stitutions, agencies, laboratories, think focusing on a range of land borders, mar-
Programs’ function that supports critical tanks and the private sector. DHS S&T itime borders, and port of entry issues.311
homeland security-related research and COEs are organised as a network, bring- While S&T classifies technology accord-
education across US colleges and univer- ing together hundreds of US universities ing to 9 TRLs (see Table 3.1), its research
sities, with the aim of fostering exper- and institutions working on developing priorities are normally clustered by the-
tise, building a new scientific workforce customer-driven tools and technologies matic area. Priorities pursued during fi-
of homeland security experts, and de- for stakeholders of the homeland secu- nancial year (FY) 2016 and FY2017 include:
veloping strategic partnerships among rity enterprise. COEs looking at issues ▪▪ Air cargo screening
universities and public agencies.302 pertaining to homeland security and bor- ▪▪ Cargo forensics
Within S&T, the University Programs der security include:306 ▪▪ People screening
function is managed by the Office of ▪▪ The Borders, Trade and Immigration ▪▪ Cargo and conveyance security
University Programs (OUP) through Institute (BTI): BTI is led by the ▪▪ Land and sea air cargo scanning
three initiatives:303 University of Houston and focuses on ▪▪ Air based technologies
▪▪ Centers of Excellence (COEs) Pro­ developing technology-based tools, ▪▪ Tunnel detection and surveillance
gram, which aims to harness exper- techniques and educational pro- ▪▪ Port and coastal surveillance
tise from US academic institutions to grammes for border management, ▪▪ Port resiliency
support research efforts and deliver immigration, trade facilitation, and ▪▪ Small dark vessel detection
tools, technologies, knowledge prod- targeting and enforcement of trans- ▪▪ Arctic communications technologies.312
ucts, training and expertise for the national borders. The BTI COE was as-
homeland security enterprise; signed to the University of Houston in Table 3.2 provides an overview of the
▪▪ Workforce Development Initiatives, 2015 with an initial grant of $3.4m.307 budgetary allocation for border secu-
which aim to educate and train home- ▪▪ The National Center for Border rity-related research over the course of
land security professionals; and Security and Immigration (NCBSI): FY2015 and FY2017 in S&T and USCG. The
▪▪ Minority Serving Institutions Pro­ The NCBSI is co-led by the University budget request for the S&T RD&I func-
grams, which aim to build a diverse of Arizona and the University of Texas tion for FY2017 was for $436 860m and
homeland security workforce through at El Paso. The NCBSI’s activities fo- 102 full time equivalent (FTE), account-
the COEs. cus on developing technologies, tools ing for 57.6 per cent of the total direc-
and methods to balance immigration torate budget request ($758 743m, 481
COEs are sponsored by the OUP and are and commerce with effective border FTE). From the RD&I budget allocation,
selected through a competitive process. security. 21 per cent of funds ($90 014m, 21 FTE)
Funding opportunities for COEs are ad- were earmarked to support the DHS mis-
vertised on the website of the Grants. S&T also manages and is the executive sion of securing and managing US bor-
gov programme,304 and are open to US- agency of two Federally Funded Research ders.313 With regard to border security as
accredited universities and colleges. and Development Centers (FFRDCs), the a specific S&T RD&I thrust area, FY2017
Applicants are also encouraged to part- Homeland Security Systems Engineering saw a budget request of $55 999m, mark-
ner with industry. A 2017 call for a new and Development Institute (HSSEDI) ing a 71.3 per cent increase from FY2016
DHS COE on Cross-Border Threat Screening and the Homeland Security Operational ($32 684m) and covering 12.8 per cent of
and Supply Chain Defense indicates that S&T Analysis Center (HSOAC).308 HSSEDI was the overall S&T RD&I budget.314
established to ensure that all DHS
components could access a centralised
302 DHS (2017b; 2017d).
303 DHS (n.d.-c). 309 DHS S&T (n.d-b).
304 Grants.gov is a US e-government initiative 305 Grant reference: DHS-16-ST-061-CBTS-Lead. 310 DHS S&T (n.d-c).
operating under the governance of the US 306 DHS (n.d.-d); University of Houston 311 DHS S&T (2015a).
Office of Management and Budget. For fur- (2017a). 312 DHS (2017d).
ther information, please refer to Grants. 307 DHS (2015b). 313 DHS (2017b; 2017d).
gov (n.d.). 308 DHS S&T (n.d-a.). 314 DHS (2017b; 2017d).

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Table 3.1 S&T TRL structure

System
Basic Technology Technology viability and
research Applied research development demonstration System development System test and launch operations
Technology
TRL-1 TRL-2 TRL-3 TRL-4 TRL-5 TRL-6 TRL-7 TRL-8 TRL-9
deployment
Basic Technology Critical Validation in lab Validation System System Actual system Actual sys- Actual system
principles concept function or environment in relevant prototypes prototypes in completed tem proven commences
observed/ application characteristic environment in relevant operational and qualified through with regular
reported formulated proof of environment environment through test successful and sustained
concept and demonst- mission op- operation (to be
ration erations cleared by S&T)

Source: DHS (2017d).

Table 3.2 Budgetary overview for border security research budgets in the US and the public more broadly. Activities
run under the QHSR include:
FY2015 FY2016 FY2017 ▪▪ Eight study groups with independ-
Organisation $ (m) FTE $ (m) FTE $ (m) FTE ent experts and representatives
S&T RD&I function 479 564 114 454 883 106 436 860 102 from 42 DHS directorates, held over
S&T border security thrust area 51 100 - 32 684 - 55 999 - a five-month period, to analyse
USCG RDT&E function 17 892 87 18 019 96 18 319 96 DHS missions and issues related
Source: DHS (2017b; 2017d). to DHS strategic management, na-
tional risk assessment, planning and
US Coast Guard per cent of the USCG’s overall budget capabilities;
The USCG is the principal US maritime ($10 321bn) and FTE (49 694). The budget- ▪▪ A steering committee with DHS leads
law enforcement authority. It is incor- ary request for FY2017 is consistent with and external facilitators meeting on
porated into DHS as a standalone agency FY2016 ($18 019m, 96 FTE, 0.16 per cent a weekly basis to ensure consistency
with a mission to protect the public, of the overall USCG budget and FTE) and and integration of findings from dif-
the environment, and US economic for FY2015 ($17 892m, 87 FTE, 0.17 per cent ferent study groups; and
interests in the maritime regions, in- of the overall USCG budget and FTE).318 ▪▪ DHS senior leadership meetings to
cluding ports, waterways, coasts and in- review findings from study groups.
ternational waters.315 The USCG runs a Identification and prioritisation Furthermore, QHSR provides plat-
research, development, test and evalua- of research topics and project forms and processes to capture input
tion (RDT&E) programme that comprises selection from other agencies and stakeholders.
an Office of RTD&E and a Research and These include:
Development Center (RDC).316 The USCG A number of processes and procedures ▪▪ Sub-interagency policy committees,
RTD&E programme focuses on providing are in place within DHS to identify re- gathering interagency input as study
support for strategic decision making, search priorities for border security. As a groups contents are developed;
enhancing acquisition, capital invest- first step, the QHSR allows DHS to take ▪▪ A strategy coordination group, bring-
ment and mission execution, and test- stock of homeland security, to define the ing together strategy and policy plan-
ing and evaluating activities supporting nature and purpose of key homeland se- ners from across the interagency
USCG operations. The RDC is the sole fa- curity missions, and to identify the tools community throughout the review;
cility authorised to conduct RTD&E in necessary to pursue these missions.319 ▪▪ A final interagency vetting process
support of the USCG, although it col- While the QHSR is not a research-specific before the review is submitted to
laborates on an ad hoc basis with pro- process, the strategic vision outlined in Congress; and
fessionals in the public and private this document is important in informing ▪▪ Traditional and online platforms for
sectors.317 There are six RTD&E priority and shaping the priorities and plans of submission of papers and inputs by
research focus areas: (i) unmanned sys- DHS components and the broader home- governmental and nongovernmen-
tems; (ii) Arctic operations; (iii) sensor land security enterprise, including re- tal stakeholders, including the gen-
optimisation, automation and visuali- search entities.320 The QHSR is the result eral public.321
sation; (iv) intelligence and cyber; (v) of an inclusive consultation process that
waterways management and environ- brings together a number of stakeholders In addition to the QHSR, S&T has devel-
mental response; and (vi) operational from DHS, US Federal agencies, govern- oped a number of processes to keep its
performance improvement modelling. mental and nongovernmental entities, portfolio of work strategically aligned
The budget request for the USCG with the needs of DHS components and
RDT&E in FY2017 was $18 319m and 96 318 DHS (2017b; 2017c). other actors in the homeland security
FTE, equivalent to approximately 0.2 319 US DHS (2010; 2014); RAND Europe inter- enterprise.322 The Science and Technology
view with anonymous US representatives,
Resource Allocation Strategy (STRAS) is a
March 2017; Shea (2014).
315 Haddal (2010). 320 RAND Europe interview with anonymous
316 USCG RDC (2016), DHS (2017b; 2017c). US representatives, March 2017; DHS S&T 321 DHS (2010; 2014).
317 USCG RDC (2016), DHS (2017b; 2017c). (2015b). 322 DHS S&T (2015a; 2015b).

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Figure 3.1 DHS S&T annual IPT process and timeline

Source: DHS (2017d). g & to Support Contionou
n Sharin s Imp
matio rove
Infor men
t

Sub-IPTs SRC
Active Active

IPT Process IPTs USST/S1

Re-Initialed Active Review
Aug - Sep Dec - Jan 15th

May - July Oct - Nov 15th Jan 15th - March

Confirm priority Convene sub-IPTs Convene IPTs Convene SRC to vote Prepare SRC report and
mission for current on priority gaps vote for internal and
cycle; establish new IPTs Recieve validated Submit prioritized gaps (Dec 1st) JRC review
as needed capability gaps from to the SRC by
JRC November 15th Convene TAB and Revise Report to address
Confirm IPT/sub-IPT conduct following-up USST recommendations
members and leads Submit capability gaps review and SRC voting,
to IPTs by october 1st as needed Send Final Report to S1 by
Develop or updtate March 31st to inform RAP
guidance and charters process

coordinated framework that ensures that and coordinating DHS research efforts in provides a visual overview of this year-
S&T efforts are aligned with operational priority mission areas, linking research long process.
requirements. STRAS records the work activities with the work of the DHS Joint While the DHS QHSR and S&T IPT
of operational components323 and first Requirements Council to close existing processes contribute to priority identi-
responders to identify capability gaps technology capability gaps. Through fication and setting within the USCG,
and chart a course of action for filling the IPTs, S&T (i) promotes a standard- the USCG RTD&E program also relies on
these gaps.324 Since 2010, S&T also runs ised approach to identifying and tracking internal documents and procedures to
an annual portfolio review process orig- research efforts; (ii) centralises mecha- identify research priorities and select pro-
inally developed by Fortune 500 compa- nisms for gathering and reporting prior- grammes. Interviewees consulted as part
nies and deployed by laboratories of the ity gaps; and (iii) provides a technology of this study emphasised the role that
US Department of Defense (DoD). The review platform to identify and mitigate USCG internal strategy documents have
portfolio review helps ensure that S&T overlap and duplication of research efforts in setting the agenda for research and ca-
research efforts are aligned with stra- within DHS. IPTs work on both basic and pability development (e.g. USCG Western
tegic priorities, as well as with emerg- applied research, and on development. Hemisphere Strategy, USCG Arctic Strategy, USCG
ing and highest-priority needs of DHS The IPT system comprises: (i) sub-IPTs Cybersecurity Strategy).328
components.325 tasked with data collection and initial Furthermore, the USCG employs an
To respond to Government Account­ capability gap identification; (ii) IPTs, Idea Submission Review (ISR) process that
ability Office (GAO) feedback on shortfalls performing a centralised, refined prior- allows for RTD&E project ideas to be sub-
of the DHS research-management and ity ranking of technology gaps identified mitted by a variety of USCG members and
oversight mechanisms, S&T launched by sub-IPTs; and (iii) the S&T Research stakeholders across different operating
R&D Integrated Product Teams (IPTs) in Council (SRC), performing the final prior- levels. This process represents the first
2015.326 IPTs are tasked with identifying ity ranking for research investment with step towards transitioning a research idea
the support of a Technical Advisory Board into the USCG and is used to ensure that
(TAB).327 Recommendations from IPTs are USCG RTD&E efforts are aligned with op-
323 ‘Operational components’ refer to the
agencies and divisions that comprise DHS
then reviewed by the S&T Under Secretary erational needs and existing technologi-
(see DHS, n.d-a.). (USST) who makes recommendations to cal gaps. Following the initial phase of
324 DHS S&T (2015b). the Secretary of Homeland Security to in- the ISR, which allows for submission
325 RAND Europe interview with anony- form the DHS Resource Allocation Plan of ideas in the September–January pe-
mous US representatives, March 2017;
(RAP) for the following FY. Figure 3.1 riod, prospective projects and ideas are
Shea (2014).
326 Maurer (2014); DHS (2017e); RAND Europe
interview with anonymous US represent- 328 RAND Europe interview with anonymous
atives, March 2017. 327 DHS (2017e). US representatives, March 2017.

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Figure 3.2 USCG annual RTD&E business process and timeline

Collect Inputs Provide project Develop full

ISR APP
[Spetember -
[January] [April]
slate guidance project plans
January] [Late April] [May - June]

Project
Prioritise Approve
Review PEPs execution
portfolio portfolio
[Early July]
[Mid July] [August]
begins
[October]

Source: USCG RDC (2016).

reviewed by senior stakeholders during Table 3.3 DHS S&T SVIP OTS programme framework
the Assessment of Prospective Portfolio
(APP) phase in April.329 Prospective Phase Funding Duration Output
projects are reviewed and ranked by Phase 1 $50k–200k 3–6 months Proof-of-concept demo

Programme Offices before being reviewed Phase 2 $50k–200k 3–6 months Demo pilot-ready prototype
Phase 3 $50k–200k 3–6 months Pilot-test prototype in operation
at senior level and scored with a multi-
Phase 4 $50k–200k 3–6 months Test in various operational scenarios
level voting process. After this, a number
of projects are selected for development Source: DHS (n.d.-f).
into full project plans before a final round
of review carried out by USCG Domain One mechanism used by S&T to stim- One example of a HSIP regional pro-
Leads and Branch Chiefs, who assess fea- ulate proposal submission and select re- gramme is the Silicon Valley Innovation
sibility and the availability of resources search projects for implementation is the Program (SVIP). The SVIP was launched
to implement the proposed projects. DHS Small Business Innovation Research by S&T in 2015 and aims to link the DHS
Projects proposed for implementation Program. DHS SBIR was launched in and other homeland security stakehold-
are then reviewed by the USCG’s upper 2004 to increase the participation of US ers with Silicon Valley companies. The
management for sign-off and budget allo- small businesses in federal research pro- goal of the SVIP is to develop a shared
cation before implementation commenc- grammes and stimulate industry to pro- understanding among DHS and Silicon
es.330 Figure 3.2 provides an overview of vide innovative solutions for homeland Valley actors of homeland security re-
the timelines and steps involved in the security. Programme Managers in each quirements, and of how innovation
USCG annual RTD&E business process.331 S&T Division, including BMD, develop corridors can help address homeland
The priority-identification processes solicitations which are advertised on security issues. Companies engaging
described above are linked closely to an annual basis through the DHS SBIR in the SVIP can submit proposals un-
the project award phase of S&T and the submission portal.334 Solicitations are der Other Transaction Solicitation (OTS)
USCG’s work. An interviewee consulted designed to address the needs of DHS calls, which are scheduled to release up
as part of this study suggested that there operational components.335 to $800 000 over a 24-month period.337
is no single approach in place within S&T Another programme used by S&T to Table 3.3 above provides an overview of
for awarding projects. However, it was engage with industry and stimulate the OTS funding mechanism.
emphasised that S&T relies primarily on proposal submission is the HSIP. The DHS COEs can also fund research pro-
external implementers for conducting HSIP is used to fund innovative start- jects. Between 2015 and 2017, BTI has
its research activities and projects.332 By ups in order to solve challenges shared advertised three Requests for Proposals
contrast, all RTD&E activities funded by by homeland security and commercial (RFPs) to fund research programmes
the USCG are undertaken by its Office of investors. Through the HSIP, S&T lever- focusing on borders, trade and immi-
RTD&E and RDC.333 ages private sector investment to accel- gration. Funding released under these
erate the transition of new technological RFPs ranged from $325 000 to $3 000 000
329 USCG RDC (2016); RAND Europe inter- solutions into operational use by DHS (with a cap of $500 000 per project). In
view with anonymous US representatives, components and other stakeholders of its RFPs, BTI outlines a number of pro-
May 2017.
the homeland security enterprise. Under posal topic areas and research questions
330 USCG RDC (2016); RAND Europe inter-
the HSIP framework, S&T runs regional to be investigated, which are coherent
view with anonymous US representatives,
May 2017. events and programmes across the US to with the initial COE funding solicita-
331 USCG RDC (2016); RAND Europe inter- engage with innovators, non-traditional tion issued by DHS. Organisations eli-
view with anonymous US representatives, DHS partners and other stakeholders.336 gible to bid for these RFPs include US
May 2017.
colleges, universities, and for-profit
332 RAND Europe interview with anonymous
and non-profit organisations. Proposals
US representatives, March 2017. 334 Please see DHS (n.d.-e).
333 RAND Europe interview with anonymous 335 DHS (n.d.-e).
US representatives, May 2017. 336 DHS (n.d.-f). 337 DHS (n.d.-f).

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submitted are then assessed by mem- officers to ensure the alignment of re- entails the application by S&T of ana-
bers of the academic and DHS commu- search efforts with customers’ needs.341 lytical techniques (e.g. systems analy-
nity through a Scientific Quality Review In 2012, the GAO also found that DHS sis and engineering support) to assist
and a Relevance Review process. Under had limited capacity to take stock of and end users and operational components
the Scientific Quality Review process, report on all of its ongoing research ac- in identifying existing capability gaps,
proposals are rated from 1 to 5 (poor to tivities beyond DHS components with an and assessing the risks and opportuni-
excellent) against a number of criteria. explicit research mandate.342 Further to ties inherent in their work and missions.
Percentage-weighting factors are then this report, in 2014 the GAO emphasised Through this process, S&T aims to im-
applied to each criterion, as indicated in that steps had been taken by DHS to mit- prove the efficiency and effectiveness
parenthesis below, to calculate the over- igate shortcomings in its evaluation and of end users’ work, suggesting poten-
all scientific quality rating:338 coordination mechanisms, particularly tial enhancements through changes to
▪▪ Originality and/or innovativeness (25%) through the development of clearer guid- processes, training and technology.345
▪▪ Proposed approach/methodology (25%) ance and definitions around research ef- With regard to the USCG, study in-
▪▪ Qualifications of personnel and suit- forts. However, the GAO also noted that a terviewees and the literature reviewed
ability of facilities (15%) specific policy outlining research roles and both emphasise that the inclusive nature
▪▪ Costs (10%). responsibilities, as well a process for over- of the ISR process supports the transi-
seeing and coordinating research with tion of RTD&E products to operational de-
Similarly, the Relevance Review involves other offices, had yet to be developed.343 ployment.346 Furthermore, the USCG S&T
scoring proposals from 1 to 5 (poor to ex- Transition and Innovation Centre (CG-
cellent) against two additional criteria. 3.1.3. Pathways to impact STIC) was launched to more closely co-
These are then weighted and combined ordinate the efforts of the USCG and S&T
to calculate the overall relevance score. There are several mechanisms used at var- and to create a culture of end user-focused
The factors considered are: ious stages of the research pathway in or- innovation within both bodies. CG-STIC
▪▪ Mission relevance (75%) der to foster impact, which in this context runs an Innovation Council and a series
▪▪ Communicating/transitioning re- is taken to mean the successful transition of Working Groups to develop its under-
sults (25%). to operational deployment of research standing of end user needs. On the basis
products. The QHSR, IPTs, STRAS and of this understanding, it tailors existing
Monitoring and evaluation the USCG RTD&E business process all fea- technologies to fit end user requirements
ture mechanisms to help capture opera- and to improve the delivery of operation-
The literature and interviews provided tional input from end users of research. ally relevant and affordable technologies
limited data on evaluation practice for These mechanisms not only ensure that and solutions to operational components
border security research efforts. A report resources are allocated in a way that is of the homeland security enterprise.347
issued in 2013 by the US GAO found that cognisant of operational needs, but also Boxes 3.2 and 3.3 on the next page
evaluation practice for border- and mari- help end users develop a sense of involve- provide an overview of two instances of
time-related research could be improved, ment in ongoing research, thus facilitat- achieved and expected impact and opera-
and that research customers reported ing the adoption of research outputs in an tional results from research activities per-
mixed views on the impact of DHS’s bor- operational setting. For example, within formed by S&T. This section takes impact
der and maritime research project de- S&T, the STRAS underpins the develop- to mean the successful filling through re-
liverables.339 The GAO emphasised the ment of highly collaborative projects and search of a technology gap connected to
positive impact of customer-engagement stimulates cooperation between S&T, the border and maritime security manage-
mechanisms set in place by DNDO and project customer, and external partners ment. Within the USCG, impact is also
USCG to gather and evaluate feedback and stakeholders. This occurs through expected to comprise (i) alignment of re-
from customers and determine the im- quarterly meetings involving represent- search outputs with overarching strate-
pact of their research efforts. A similar atives from S&T, operational components gies; (ii) customer and sponsor support
mechanism was found to be missing and other departments. Stakeholder in- and buy-in; and (iii) development of com-
from S&T, although a later GAO report put at these meetings is used to steer ac- petencies and leverage.348
indicates that steps have been taken to tivities and ensure that research efforts
obtain feedback and evaluate results of are focused on operational needs.344 3.1.4. Summary
border and maritime research work.340 To promote uptake of research prod-
Among these measures was the devel- ucts, S&T also employs a System Analysis Figure 3.3 on page 88 provides a visual
opment of a new project management process. While very little information summary of the US R&I pathway, includ-
guide for S&T staff members, includ- regarding this process could be identi- ing the various associated factors, stake-
ing templates for customer surveys and fied through the literature review and holders and inputs.
actions to be performed by S&T project interviews conducted, System Analysis
345 DHS S&T (2015b).
346 RAND Europe interview with anonymous
338 University of Houston (2017b; 2017c); 341 GAO (2013). US representatives, May 2017; USCG RDC
DHS (2017f). 342 Maurer (2014). (2016).
339 GAO (2013). 343 Maurer (2014). 347 USCG RDC (2016).
340 GAO (2013). 344 DHS S&T (2015b). 348 USCG RDC (2016).

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Box 3.2 Achieved impact: An S&T Project with operational application sudden changes in the threat landscape
to be quickly captured and investigated
As part of its work on land and sea cargo screening, HSARPA’s BMD con- through research work.351 In the US con-
ducted a ‘Rail Scanner Relocation’ project in Brownsville, Texas. Through text, the S&T STRAS, QHSR, IPTs and the
this project, the S&T created and transitioned into operational use the first USCG RTD&E processes exemplify this
data-link for sharing rail-scanning data connecting US and Mexican border au- flexible approach to need identification.
thorities. This data-link provides real-time X-ray data to the US Customs and These mechanisms ensure that opera-
Border Protection authority and to its Mexican counterpart, operating on the tional needs and emerging priorities
Brownsville-Matamoros International Bridge. The project is reported to have are captured in a flexible and dynamic
helped combat illicit trafficking activities across the US-Mexico land border.349 way before the allocation of resources
to projects takes place. Based on differ-
Box 3.3 Planned impact: An ongoing S&T project with a clear operational ent timelines, these processes facili-
transition path tate a continuous capturing of research
needs. This continuous approach is par-
DHS recognised that its agencies and divisions have insufficient ability to ticularly important given the dynamic
identify, prioritise, characterise and share actionable information and intel- nature of the threat landscape and op-
ligence on maritime threats in a tactically relevant manner. To address this erational context.352
issue, S&T launched a ‘Port and Coastal Surveillance’ project. This project sup- Employing a variety of research-
ports maritime situational awareness and helps foster a DHS ‘unity-of-effort’ funding mechanisms can help ensure
approach by establishing a capability that allows DHS to (i) access more data that expertise within academia and in-
sources, including space based sensors; (ii) make available decision-support dustry can be drawn upon. The use of
tools to translate available data into actionable information and intelligence; flexible, industry-specific funding mech-
and (iii) share actionable information and intelligence across different stake- anisms such as the HSIP, the SVIP and
holders of the homeland security enterprise. the SBIR helps ensure that DHS can stim-
S&T expects that this project will improve the operational effectiveness of DHS ulate industry partners, including in-
components active in the port and coastal surveillance space, enhancing the novative start-ups that may normally
department’s awareness in the maritime domain. In particular, S&T expects operate outside of the Homeland Security
to see (i) improved measurement of illegal activities, leading to a better under- space, to work on homeland security-re-
standing of implications stemming from changes to resource allocations and lated issues. The use of funding mech-
strategies pursued; (ii) improved assessment of risks in the port and coastal sur- anisms targeting academic institutions
veillance space; and (iii) improved alignment of resources-to-risk for ongoing and think tanks, such as those under-
and future operations, both at the tactical and strategic levels. This project was pinning the S&T COEs and FFRDCs, helps
launched inFY2012 with a budget of $3 134m, continuing in FY2013 ($6 684m), DHS to harness academic expertise while
FY2014 ($7.25m), FY2015 ($9.5m), FY2016 ($6 686m), and FY2017 ($10.75m). also building a diverse homeland secu-
As of 2017, the project has led to the installation, testing and evaluation of rity workforce.
Coastal Surveillance System operational nodes at strategic locations across the Running evaluations of research
US. The pilot of this product involves USCG sectors (e.g. San Diego, Los Angeles processes and results is considered to
Long Beach) and other state-level authorities (e.g. Maryland Natural Resource have produced positive results. The US
Police). Technical tests and demonstrations have also been conducted in differ- system for border security research has
ent locations. It is now expected that during the current FY new operational benefitted from evaluation and inclusive
nodes will be deployed, new technical demonstrations performed, and sys- consulting processes. For example, DHS
tems tested in an open-ocean setting. The operations of the project prototype launched the IPTs in response to a GAO
‘Integrated Maritime Domain Enterprise’ and ‘Coastal Surveillance System’ are finding regarding DHS’s limited super-
also expected to be transitioned to the USCG and to the Customs and Border vision and coordination mechanisms for
Protection forces during this FY.350 research activities.353 Set up as a direct
result of the recommendations from the
GAO evaluation, IPTs are reported to have
mitigated duplication of research efforts
3.1.5. Lessons identified the interviews and literature review con- and stove-piping across the Department,
ducted as part of this study. providing a centralised and standardised
Although there are few publicly availa- platform for the identification and pri-
ble evaluations of US processes and in- Good practices oritisation of research needs across key
itiatives for managing border security issue areas. The establishment of IPTs
research, a number of lessons learned Study interviewees emphasised the im- and the results achieved highlight the
and good practices can be identified from portance of retaining a flexible and dy-
namic approach to the identification
351 RAND Europe interview with anonymous
of needs and priorities, with one inter-
US representatives, March 2017.
349 DHS (2016b). viewee noting that it is essential to al- 352 DHS S&T (2015b).
350 DHS (2017d). low needs and priorities emerging from 353 GAO (2013).

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Challenges and Opportunities for Operationalising Border Security Research

Figure 3.3 US research and innovation pathway

Adaption by users Research outputs Project specification

& selection

How: End user project involvement Who: DHS, S&T, COEs, USCG
(QHSR,IPTs, STRAS, USCG RTD&E), Need identification How: IPTs, STRAS, ISR, APP
System Analysis, ISR, CG-STIC Innovation & prioritisation
and Working Group
Who: DHS: S&T, USCG
How: QHSR (study groups, steering
INNOVATION committee, senior leadership meetings), RESEARCH
STRAS, IPTs (R&D monitoring, technology
review platform), portfolio review, ISR
Impact

No official DHS definition of ‘impact’ Inputs to research

Study team interpretation: successful
transition of R&D products to operational
Budget: S&T: $55m,
deployment Evaluation Research process
USCG: $18m for FY2017

Who: RDC (within USCG

RDT&D), external implementers

+ Inclusive consulting processes

+ Funding availability
ENABLING FACTORS
- Oversight and coordination
- Operational transition of R&D

Department of Homeland Security: Science and Technology Directorate, Coast Guatd;

KEY STAKEHOLDERS
Centres of Excellence (COEs) academia and industry

Strategic context: Border security is part of ‘homeland security’ umbrella concept

and is 1 of 10 of its missions
CONTEXTUAL FACTORS Challenges: Terrorism, migration, cybersecurity, illegal border-crossing, transnational
crime, nuclear threats, climate change

important contribution that evaluations possible in research planning process- aimed at addressing this requirement.
can make to improving the work of a de- es.356 This would help ensure that re- The interviewee suggested that a pro-
partment or function.354 search priorities are selected and funds longed lag between these two phases
allocated in a way that takes operational could lead to the development of research
Challenges requirements into consideration, facili- products addressing operational needs
tating buy-in for research outputs from that have since changed or disappeared.358
Strengthening the link between re- their potential end users. In this con-
search departments or activities and text, the USCG ISR was seen as a positive
end users was identified by interview- mechanism, allowing for the submis- 3.2. Canadian border security
ees as a priority area for further devel- sion of research projects and ideas from research
opment in the US context.355 To facilitate across the USCG organisation.357
the operationalisation of research prod- One study interviewee also high- 3.2.1. Strategic context
ucts, it was suggested that operational lighted the importance of reducing the
actors should be involved as early as time gap between need identification In Canada, border management is con-
by operational components and the sidered a strategically important issue,
launching of a research programme particularly in relation to border secu-
rity and maintaining the flow of people
and goods across its 6 000-mile border
354 DHS S&T (2015b); GAO (2013). 356 RAND Europe interview with anonymous
355 RAND Europe interview with anonymous US representatives, March 2017.
US representatives, March 2017; RAND 357 USCG RDC (2016); RAND Europe inter-
Europe interview with anonymous US rep- view with anonymous US representatives, 358 RAND Europe interview with anonymous
resentatives, May 2017. March 2017. US representatives, May 2017.

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 Technical Annex

with the US.359 Key threats to Canadian quality of the road and transport infra- projects with high TRL potential.373 While
border security include drug smuggling, structure has lagged behind.366 much of this technological research by
growing activity in the Arctic sea lanes Despite the perceived importance of the CBSA Science and Technology branch
and an increase in illegal border cross- border security in Canada, the level of focuses on technology that is a few years
ings.360 As well as strengthening border funding for border security research is from deployment at the borders, some
management against these threats, the much lower in Canada than in the US of this research also focuses on technol-
Canadian government continues to pri- (see Section 3.1). One study interviewee ogy that is more than five years from op-
oritise cross-border trade, as the US is observed this, noting that border secu- erational deployment.374 More broadly,
Canada’s largest trading partner.361 rity has not been treated as a research border security research funded by PSC
Further challenges to Canada’s bor- priority in Canada.367 Another inter- in Canada is divided into three types:
ders are ethical, technical and infra- viewee reported that very few research academic studies, technological devel-
structural. For example, the challenge projects are focused directly on borders, opment and technological application.
of finding a balance between enhanc- with many projects focusing on broader Research funded in Canada tends to be
ing domain awareness (security), while issues such as explosive detection for the outcome-oriented and focus on the stra-
promoting cross-border flows of people air transport industry, biometric tech- tegic, operational and tactical aspects of
and goods (economy) has raised eth- nology or closed-circuit television (CCTV) border security.375 While there is little in-
ical concerns relating to data protec- for security applications.368 formation in the public domain regard-
tion, privacy and the use of intrusive ing specific funding of border research
surveillance technology.362 While pre- 3.2.2. Research pathway projects, one study interviewee pointed
clearance of containers through the out that as well as federal funding for re-
‘Beyond the Border’ programme363 and Overview of the Canadian research search from PSC and other federal agen-
the maintenance of ‘sterile’ secure sup- landscape cies, a number of smaller projects under
ply chains364 are designed to speed up Can$25 000 are allocated sole-source
the flow of goods and cross-border trade, At the strategic level, Public Safety funding by local authorities and other
these initiatives have also created tech- Canada (PSC) is the overarching min- individual organisations.376
nical challenges. In the case of ‘sterile’ istry tasked with leadership and co-
secure supply chains, the cost of intro- ordination of border policy.369 Four Identification and prioritisation of
ducing such measures and their associ- organisational actors are primarily re- research topics
ated technology has proved too high for sponsible for the operational manage-
many supply companies.365 In relation to ment of the Canadian border: the Canada With regard to border security research,
infrastructure, the level of cross-border Border Services Agency (CBSA); the Royal PSC meets with the CBSA, RCMP and
road transportation has increased sig- Canadian Mounted Police (RCMP); IRCC on an annual basis to enquire about
nificantly in recent decades, while the Immigration, Refugees and Citizenship their priorities and operational inter-
Canada (IRCC); and Transport Canada. ests.377 PSC then establishes a longlist
CBSA manages the various land, water of priorities and synthesises these into
and air ports of entry (POE),370 RCMP is a document, which is then issued in the
359 RAND Europe interview with DRDC CSS
responsible for the wider ‘open’ spaces form of calls for proposals. Universities
representatives, 19 April 2017; RAND
Europe interview with Phil Lightfoot, 19 on the border,371 IRCC facilitates the ar- or research organisations submitting
April 2017; RAND Europe interview with rival of immigrants and provides protec- proposals are required to collaborate with
Canadian representative, 21 April 2017; tion to refugees,372 and Transport Canada a ‘champion’ or border guard agency on
RAND Europe interview with Christian
focuses specifically on traffic corridors. the proposed project. That agency (or
Leuprecht, 21 April 2017; RAND Europe in-
Interviewees reported that most bor- one of its departments) is responsible
terview with Joel Sokolsky, 25 April 2017.
360 RAND Europe interview with Canadian rep- der security research funded in Canada for funding allocation and champions
resentative, 21 April 2017; RAND Europe emphasises operationally focused the research project. This is intended to
interview with Christian Leuprecht, 21 ensure that the projects are delivered and
April 2017.
to improve outcomes and accountability.
361 RAND Europe interview with Phil
The operational partner agency can also
Lightfoot, 19 April 2017; RAND Europe 366 RAND Europe interview with Canadian
interview with Canadian representative, representative, 21 April 2017.
21 April 2017. 367 RAND Europe interview with Canadian 373 RAND Europe interview with DRDC CSS
362 RAND Europe interview with DRDC CSS representative, 21 April 2017. representatives, 19 April 2017; RAND
representatives, 19 April 2017. 368 RAND Europe interview with Phil Europe interview with Phil Lightfoot, 19
363 Ferguson (2017). Lightfoot, 19 April 2017. April 2017.
364 The use of ‘sterile’ secure supply chains 369 For details on PSC, see Public Safety 374 RAND Europe interview with Phil
involves transport companies complying Canada (2017). Lightfoot, 19 April 2017.
with technological and security measures 370 For details on the CBSA, see Canada Border 375 Previous details in this paragraph are from
to ensure that goods and cargo cannot be Services Agency (CBSA) (2017). RAND Europe interview with Christian
accessed or tampered with, allowing them 371 For details on the RCMP, see Royal Leuprecht, 21 April 2017.
to be pre-screened and checked before ar- Canadian Mounted Police (RCMP) (2017). 376 RAND Europe interview with Canadian
rival and transit at the border. 372 For details on IRCC, see Immigration, representative, 21 April 2017.
365 RAND Europe interview with Canadian Refugees and Citizenship Canada (IRCC) 377 RAND Europe interview with Christian
representative, 21 April 2017. (2017). Leuprecht, 21 April 2017.

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fund salaries, ensuring that the research project.384 One study interviewee noted the POE can now be operated full-time,
projects are staffed appropriately.378 that a key problem with evaluating bor- remotely, and without a CBSA officer
der research is the shortage of ‘outcome present.388
Selection of border security measures’ given the border’s flexible na- According to study interviewees, the
research projects ture and the large number of variables in- Canadian approach to the setup and man-
volved. Larger federally funded research agement of border security research is
Much of this border security research projects are evaluated mainly on the basis based on collaboration between federal
funding has been coordinated through of economic data focusing on, for exam- agencies, business and academia, along
the Defence Research and Development ple, whether a technological solution is with innovation that utilises the latest
Canada (DRDC) Centre for Security Sci- developed and delivered within the pro- technologies and develops new concepts
ence (CSS) programme.379 When ‘cham- ject budget. In the case of the ‘Beyond the and ideas.389 This gives the government
pion’ border guard agencies request Border’ programme, the Auditor General access to a wide range of expertise and
funding to support technical research, produces regular reports which are sub- enhances understanding of border secu-
the CSS is responsible for evaluating mitted to Parliament.385 When research rity threats and priorities. 390 However,
these proposals against various crite- projects are completed, a technical report interviewees provided few specifics to
ria.380 The CSS works with other depart- is often distributed to stakeholders, and substantiate these claims, with no con-
ments to set research priorities and to other communications materials (such as crete examples of how this collaboration
promote developments in S&T. Accord- summaries or presentations) are also pro- works in practice. Interviewees also noted
ing to a study interviewee, the DRDC duced and shared with interested parties. that there should be greater consultation
has been effective in bringing commu- with the academic community, high-
nities of practice together from federal 3.2.3. Pathways to impact lighting the Cross Border Institute (CBI)
border agencies, business (particularly at the University of Windsor, Ontario,
transport) and academia.381 Despite Within the DRDC-CSS programme, the as one of the few academic programmes
overall funding challenges, the finan- implementation of research outputs in that focuses on border security in Canada
cial resources that the CSS can leverage the field by border guards is viewed as and that has established partnerships
for individual projects can incentivise a measure of success.386 However, inter- with public agencies, private firms, in-
collaboration between research organ- viewees pointed out that the decision to dustry groups and community groups.391
isations in the private, academic and deploy a technology or to implement the
government spheres.382 recommendations of border security re- 3.2.4. Summary
search ultimately rests with operational
Monitoring and evaluation agencies such as the CBSA or RCMP, and Figure 3.4 on the right provides a visual
that the role of the CSS is only to gener- summary of the Canadian R&I pathway,
Interviewees reported that CSS M&E activ- ate the evidence for decision makers in including the various associated factors,
ities for funded research include the track- those agencies.387 stakeholders and inputs.
ing of deliverables, biannual reporting There are a number of examples of re-
updates, and regular meetings between search undertaken by the CBSA Science 3.2.5 Lessons identified
the project manager, researchers and in- and Technology branch being translated
dustry representatives involved in project successfully into operational practice. Good practices
delivery to check progress against pre- One such case mentioned by a study in-
viously agreed milestones.383 Evaluation terviewee involved a POE in a remote area The collaborative research approach of
of projects by the CBSA Science and could not be permanently manned. In re- the DRDC CSS Programme was viewed
Technology branch is usually conducted sponse, the CBSA Science and Technology by several interviewees as a positive ex-
through feedback from stakeholders via branch began work on a remote system ample of border security research man-
surveys of the border guards and officials using video, which can be controlled from agement, although the interviewees did
utilising the technology. However, there hundreds of kilometres away. This tran- not provide specific examples of how this
is no formal evaluation of each completed sition from the initial research pilot to collaboration works in practice.392 CSS
deployment phases lasted around one
year, before the system was trialled and 388 RAND Europe interview with Phil
378 Details in this paragraph are from fully implemented another year later. The Lightfoot, 19 April 2017.
RAND Europe interview with Christian rapid development of the system from 389 RAND Europe interview with Christian
Leuprecht, 21 April 2017. Leuprecht, 21 April 2017.
concept to deployment has meant that
379 RAND Europe interview with Canadian rep- 390 RAND Europe interview with Joel Sokolsky,
resentative, 21 April 2017; DRDC. (2014). 25 April 2017.
380 RAND Europe interview with DRDC CSS 384 RAND Europe interview with Phil 391 RAND Europe interview with Joel Sokolsky,
representatives, 19 April 2017. Lightfoot, 19 April 2017. 25 April 2017; RAND Europe interview with
381 RAND Europe interview with Phil 385 RAND Europe interview with Canadian Canadian representative, 21 April 2017.
Lightfoot, 19 April 2017. representative, 21 April 2017; DHS (2017a). 392 RAND Europe interview with DRDC CSS
382 RAND Europe interview with Phil 386 RAND Europe interview with DRDC CSS representatives, 19 April 2017; RAND
Lightfoot, 19 April 2017. representatives, 19 April 2017. Europe interview with Phil Lightfoot, 19
383 RAND Europe interview with DRDC CSS 387 RAND Europe interview with DRDC CSS April 2017; RAND Europe interview with
representatives, 19 April 2017. representatives, 19 April 2017. Canadian representative, 21 April 2017.

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Figure 3.4 Canadian research and innovation pathway

Research outputs Project specification

& selection

Who: DRDC CSS, CBSA, RCMP

Need identification How: Assesses budget, timeline,
Adaption by users
& prioritsation feasibility, impact

How: Cross-sector consultation Who: Public Safety Canada, CBSA,

RCMP, IRCC
INNOVATION How: Annual meeting focused on RESEARCH
operational priorities, longlisting, annual
call for proposals
Inputs to research
Impact

Budget: Unknown
No official PSC/DRDC/CBSA definition. Other: Required involvement of ‘champion’
Study team interpretation: successful lead operational agency
transition of R&D products to operational
deployment Evaluation Research process

Who: DRDC CSS, CBSA

+ Federal and local funding

ENABLING FACTORS + Involvement of ‘champion’ lead
operational agency in projects

Public Safety Canada, Defence Research and Development Canada (DRDC) – Centre foe Security Science
KEY STAKEHOLDERS (CSS) Programme, Canada Border Services Agency – Science and Technology Branch, RCMP, IRCC,
Academia and industry

Strategic context: Border menagement is strategically important, especially given US cross-border trade
CONTEXTUAL FACTORS
Challenges: Drug smuggling, illegal border-crossing

covers a broad spectrum of security, resil- helping ensure that research is informed should carry out more consultation
ience and critical infrastructure research by an understanding of operational with the academic community to en-
of a technical nature. This relates to ‘first needs, priorities and wider context. This sure that finite resources for research
responders’ and Chemical, Biological, focus on the end users of research ensures are invested efficiently, but also sug-
Radiological and Nuclear (CBRN) threats, that any research proposals or technolog- gested that this deficiency is a common
and brings together organisations in the ical solutions are designed to be practical characteristic of government-academic
private, academic and public sectors to and useful to the operators implement- relations in most countries.396 An asso-
conduct border security research. While ing them.394 ciated challenge relates to resource al-
this is said by interviewees to be achieved location: while substantial resources
through collaborating as project part- Challenges are now being allocated to improving
ners and generating evidence for decision cross-border infrastructure, such as the
makers, the specific methods of collabo- The need for greater federal funding CAN$4.8bn397 construction of the Gordie
rating and supporting decision makers for border research, particularly in Howe International Bridge between
are not clear from the evidence available the academic field, was highlighted Windsor and Detroit, far less has been
to the RAND study team.393 as being a key challenge in Canada.395 allocated to longer-term border security
The required involvement of a ‘cham- Consequently, one study interviewee research and its implementation.398
pion’ lead operational agency in con- said that the Canadian government
ducting federal CSS research facilitates
396 RAND Europe interview with Joel Sokolsky,
links between academia and end users,
394 RAND Europe interview with Phil Lightfoot, 25 April 2017.
19 April 2017. 397 Can$ – Canadian dollar.
393 RAND Europe interview with DRDC CSS 395 RAND Europe interview with Canadian 398 RAND Europe interview with Canadian
representatives, 19 April 2017. representative, 21 April 2017. representative, 21 April 2017.

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End users’ resistance to the intro- and tobacco has also continued to grow programme was set at the start of each
duction of new technology was per- and is linked to organised crime gangs financial year, research functions are
ceived by one study interviewee as being in Australia and the funding of terror- now more deeply embedded in each of
part of the problem of translating border ist organisations abroad.405 In particu- the policy teams within the Department.
research into operational practice.399 The lar, international tobacco smuggling Furthermore, the focus and scale of re-
interviewee said this is a challenge be- has recently been identified as an area search projects have shifted. Several
cause end users are operationally focused of high financial yield for criminals and interviewees noted that much of the
‘generalists’ with a variety of tasks to un- is the focus of substantial organisational research traditionally produced in this
dertake.400 This operational focus means effort by law enforcement agencies in sphere tended to be long-term, based on
that while Canadian border agencies Australia.406 quantitative analyses and focusing on
have proved adept at crisis management, Actors working to breach the coun- topics such as migration trends.409 With
their day-to-day focus has made it more try’s borders are reportedly becoming the recent change in approach, research
difficult to integrate longer-term technol- more resilient, adaptable and sophis- projects are designed to be increasingly
ogy into their activities.401 One study in- ticated in response to efforts by law en- operationally focused and responsive to
terviewee viewed this as part of a wider forcement. The forces of globalisation emerging issues, with individually com-
issue, noting that technology develop- and the increasing cross-border move- missioned pieces of research with shorter
ments occur much more quickly than ment of people, goods and cash, as well turnarounds becoming more common
the public administration and protocol as developing and converging technolo- than long-term research relationships
changes required to regulate them.402 gies and emerging international mar- producing multiple deliverables.410
kets, have all created opportunities for
organised crime. Online international 3.3.2. Research pathway
3.3. Australian border security trade in both licit and illicit goods has
research also grown exponentially in recent Overview of the Australian research
years, with the ABF again identifying landscape
3.3.1. Strategic context firearms, tobacco and drugs as key il-
licit markets.407 DIBP is the main actor in border security
There are numerous border security chal- In the Australian context, public di- research in Australia. The Department
lenges facing Australia, with the level of alogue and research on border security is divided into six Groups: Policy,
priority assigned to each shifting from is evolving rapidly. In 2015, the ABF was Corporate, Intelligence and Capability,
year to year. The issue of irregular mi- established as the operational arm of the Visa and Citizenship Services, Support,
gration, encompassing matters such as Department of Immigration and Border and Operations. Research may be con-
people smuggling, human trafficking Protection (DIBP), which itself was re- ducted internally or commissioned from
and organised visa fraud, is an ongo- organised and renamed in 2013. DIBP external research organisations such as
ing concern – one which is intrinsically is responsible for immigration, citizen- universities and think tanks. Most re-
linked to regional and international ge- ship, trade and customs, offshore mar- search comes through the Policy Group,
opolitical events such as instability and itime security and revenue collection. although some of the more technical re-
conflict, and global health and social cri- The ABF is responsible for offshore and search is commissioned or conducted by
ses. Balancing the security of Australia’s onshore border control enforcement, in- the Intelligence and Capability Division.
borders with the legitimate movement of vestigations, compliance and detention Table 3.4 presents this organisational
people is therefore a key strategic prior- operations in Australia, with relevant structure.
ity.403 The Australian Border Force (ABF) policy, regulatory and corporate support Much of the research produced or
has noted the growing scale and com- delivered by DIBP. According to the ABF, commissioned by the Department is
plexity of trade and travel patterns, as its creation as ‘the new front-line oper- not publicly available, although a suite
the range of goods being traded interna- ational agency within the Department’ of research outputs on topics related
tionally increases along with the poten- reflects ‘a greater focus on the border as to migration is available online and is
tial for biosecurity hazards and economic a strategic national asset’.408 In mid-2017, also utilised for a significant amount
risks.404 Illicit trade in drugs, firearms the Department fundamentally changed of cross-governmental research, for ex-
its approach to the commissioning and ample with the Department of Social
management of research. Whereas previ- Services.411 There is scant reference to
399 RAND Europe interview with Phil ously a formal department-wide research
Lightfoot, 19 April 2017.
400 RAND Europe interview with Phil 409 RAND Europe interview with Dr John
Lightfoot, 19 April 2017. 405 McKenzie (2016). Coyne, 20 March 2017; RAND Europe in-
401 RAND Europe interview with Phil 406 RAND Europe interview with two terview with two Australian representa-
Lightfoot, 19 April 2017. Australian representatives, 24 July 2017. tives, 24 July 2017.
402 RAND Europe interview with Canadian 407 Australian Government – Department 410 RAND Europe interview with Australian
representative, 21 April 2017. of Immigration and Border Protection representative, 30 March 2017; RAND
403 Coyne (2015). (n.d.-a). Europe interview with two Australian
404 Australian Government – Department 408 Australian Government – Department representatives, 24 July 2017.
of Immigration and Border Protection of Immigration and Border Protection 411 RAND Europe interview with two
(n.d.-a). (n.d.-b). Australian representatives, 24 July 2017.

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Table 3.4 DIBP organisational structure

Department of Immigration and Border Protection

Secretary of the Department of Immigration and Border Protection ABF Commissioner

Group Policy Corporate Intelligence and Capability Visa and Citizenship Services Support Operations
Division Strategic Policy Executive Intelligence Visa and Citizenship Border Maritime Border
and Planning Management Management Command
Immigration and Corporate Services ICT Refugee and Humanitarian Border Force Strategic Border
Citizenship Policy Visa Management Capability Command

Traveller, Customs People Major Capability Community Protection Children, Detention,

and Industry Policy Community Compliance
and Settlement and Removals
Services
International Finance Identity and Biometrics Digital Transformation Detention Services Investigations
and Channels
Legal Visa Reform Taskforce OSB JATF
Integrity,
Security and Assurance
Health Services
and Policy
Enterprise Strategy,
Reform and
Performance

Source: DIBP (2017).

research in ABF’s annual and corporate staff exchange; use of equipment; for 6–12 months every year. One inter-
reports, although these do mention and negotiated arrangements specific viewee stated that research produced
the Department’s migration research to each partner, including joint grant by think tanks brings particular value
programme. applications, establishment of cen- because the institutions enjoy greater
There are a number of other govern- tres of excellence and participation freedom to operate and are more aware
ment departments and research organ- in research networks. In addition, of the public discussion on these is-
isations conducting or commissioning the Commonwealth Scientific and sues than DIBP.414 In addition, a num-
research related to border security. Industrial Research Organisation ber of Australian universities produce
The Australian Research Council (ARC) (CSIRO) carries out a wide range of research in this space and engage in stra-
is a Commonwealth entity which ad- scientific research activities to assist tegic partnerships undertaking specific
vises the Federal Government on research Australian industry and encourage or research projects with DIBP.
matters, and allocates research funding facilitate the application or utilisation As DIBP is the most significant player
to researchers at Australian universities of the results of such research. DIBP’s in border security research in Australia,
through the National Competitive Grants Intelligence and Capability Division re- it will be the focus of this section’s anal-
Program (NCGP). The NCGP comprises cently established a partnership with ysis of the setup and management of
two funding programs: ‘Discovery’, CSIRO’s new technical research unit research.
which supports fundamental research Data61, and one project undertaken
in innovation, and ‘Linkage’, which fa- within this partnership is seeking to Identification and prioritisation of
cilitates national and international col- put together a mathematically sound research topics
laboration and research partnerships programme for cargo sampling.
between key stakeholders such as gov- Research institutes such as the As noted above, DIBP has fundamentally
ernment, business, industry and end Australian Strategic Policy Institute changed its approach to research in re-
users. Where potential research pro- (ASPI) and the Lowy Institute also pro- cent months. Under this newly estab-
jects relate to topics around immigra- duce border security research through lished process, the Thought Leadership
tion or border protection, the ARC may funding from the Australian govern- section of the Statistics and Information
approach DIBP for guidance or co-spon- ment. These may be for specifically com- Governance branch, which sits within
sorship of the project, or contributions missioned projects or for broad-ranging the Policy Group, takes the lead in fa-
such as making Department staff avail- research activities such as discussion pa- cilitating the identification and prior-
able for workshops.412 pers and other forms of outreach aimed itisation of research topics. At the same
The Australian Nuclear Science and at informing public discourse on border time, the Department is seeking to make
Technology Organisation (ANTSO) of- security.413 The Lowy Institute is also en- research functions more deeply embed-
fers a number of research partnerships, gaged in a strategic partnership with ded in each policy areas. In practice, this
including: joint research appointments; DIBP for the commissioning of research means that identification of research
joint supervision of research students; and the secondment of a DIBP employee needs happens within these areas on an

412 RAND Europe interview with two 413 RAND Europe interview with Australian 414 RAND Europe interview with Australian
Australian representatives, 24 July 2017. representative, 30 March 2017. representative, 30 March 2017.

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ongoing basis, allowing a degree of flex- a specific research allocation from the researchers, although occasionally, for
ibility in picking up projects as and when Government, and the amount of fund- specific technical pieces of work, con-
the need for them arises. Following the ing spent on research varies year by year tracts management is handled within
identification of a research topic, a pro- according to decisions made within the the relevant business area.423
cess of engagement and consultation Department about research and opera-
takes place with leadership across DIBP, tional needs. As a result, information Monitoring and evaluation
managed by the Thought Leadership sec- about the size of the Department’s re-
tion, and consensus is reached on tak- search budget is not publicly available. DIBP does not have a formal evaluation
ing forward a research proposal to the However, two interviewees estimated programme for its research. However,
Secretary of the DIBP. that annual research funding would typ- quality assurance provisions are usu-
Two study interviewees noted that ically be in the high six figures or low ally built into contracts with com-
alongside the changes to the process of seven figures.416 Another interviewee missioned research organisations.
identifying and prioritising research stated that budgets for individual pro- Interviewees noted that these provisions
topics, the type of research prioritised jects range from around Aus$50 000417 for vary depending on the type of project
by DIBP has changed. Previously, the smaller activities into the millions of dol- being conducted and the business area
Department’s research agenda was set lars for more substantial, multi-year re- which commissioned it.424 For example,
at the start of each financial year and search studies.418 Where the Department for the Future Capability Assessment
related to topics of relevance at that commissions an external organisation to and Engagement Section within the
point in time, and commissioned pro- conduct the project, a budget is set out Intelligence and Capability Group, it
jects were long-term, often running in the invitation to tender. was reported that M&E is performed by
to 12 or 18 months. As a result, by the However, a decision may be made a board of Deputy Commissioners and
time project outputs were delivered, to conduct the research internally if Commanders. As part of this process,
interviewees reported that they had of- Department staff have access to the re- monthly reports are submitted on budget
ten ceased to be relevant to the needs of quired resources and networks to con- expenditure, progress relative to sched-
the Department. The interviewees re- duct the study. For example, DIBP has ule, and risks and benefits related to the
ported that the current focus for identi- collated some of the largest and most project, along with weekly project up-
fying and prioritising research topics is complex datasets in the Australian gov- dates.425 In general, when quality as-
on producing policy research which is ernment, and utilises these where possi- surance provisions are being developed,
current and operational. Research top- ble.419 Internal research capacity is also a the Thought Leadership section coordi-
ics are more tightly scoped and can be factor: some policy areas such as migra- nates across Department stakeholders
delivered through individual, concise tion and citizenship tend to have more and gathers inputs on measuring the
pieces of research rather than through capacity than border protection. Two in- quality of the project and the relevance
long-term relationships producing occa- terviewees noted that an increasingly and utility of its findings.426
sional papers over the course of a number part of a policy officer’s role is to con- One study interviewee reported that
of years. Where research partnerships duct research, particularly as research for M&E of ASPI research activities for
are still in place, DIBP can request spe- resources are relatively constrained and the Department, a biannual meeting
cific research projects during the life of commissioning studies externally may at programme level is held with the
the partnership, rather than commit- be too costly.420 Typical project time- entire DIBP executive, during which
ting to long-term projects.415 lines are now between three and six project progress is discussed in depth.
months, with a small number of multi- Representatives from ASPI also meet
Selection of border security year studies.421 with senior members from the execu-
research projects DIBP does not have a centralised re- tive on a monthly basis for management
search contracts-management team.422 and project updates.427
Once the consultation process has con- Typically, the Thought Leadership
cluded and topics for research have section manages commissioned re- 3.3.3. Pathways to impact
been identified, the Secretary of the search and relationships with external
DIBP makes the final decisions about Interviewees stated that the impact po-
which research proposals will be selected tential of a research proposal is the first
for commissioning. The Secretary also 416 RAND Europe interview with two consideration in deciding whether to
makes the final decision on the budget Australian representatives, 24 July 2017.
417 A$ – Australian dollar.
allocated to specific projects, following
418 RAND Europe interview with DIBP repre- 423 RAND Europe interview with two
initial discussions and recommenda-
sentative, 29 March 2017. Australian representatives, 24 July 2017.
tions from leadership within the Policy 419 RAND Europe interview with two 424 RAND Europe interview with Australian
Group. Overall, DIBP’s research fund- Australian representatives, 24 July 2017. representative, 30 March 2017
ing is carved out of the Department’s 420 RAND Europe interview with two 425 RAND Europe interview with Australian
Australian representatives, 24 July 2017. representative, 29 March 2017.
operational budget rather than from
421 RAND Europe interview with DIBP repre- 426 RAND Europe interview with two
sentative, 29 March 2017. Australian representatives, 24 July 2017.
415 RAND Europe interview with two 422 RAND Europe interview with Australian 427 RAND Europe interview with Dr John
Australian representatives, 24 July 2017. representative, 30 March 2017. Coyne, 20 March 2017.

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take it forward,428 and that there is in- level, and presentations on reports and Box 3.2 Case study: Operationalisation
creasing emphasis on shaping policy re- policy recommendations at the policy of border security research
search on topics with implications for level, where staff may informally review
the way the Department operates and the results of the study.434 Smartgate is an automated border
the achievement of specific policy out- Beyond the connection between re- control system which uses the infor-
comes.429 When identifying and prior- search and policy, few links are made be- mation in passports and facial biom-
itising research topics, the DIBP Policy tween research and impact, as it is the etrics technology to perform checks,
group focuses on topics’ impact. While impact of policy more broadly which is usually conducted manually by ABF
‘impact’ does not appear to have been as- assessed by governments. For example, officers, on arriving and departing
signed a formal definition by the Policy no direct connection is made between a international passengers. In devel-
group, one study interviewee offered a piece of research and its financial im- oping this technology, the now dis-
definition that is presented in Box 3.3. pact: it is the impact of the policy that solved Customs and Border Protection
However, a number of study inter- is assessed, rather than that of the indi- Services conducted a feasibility study
viewees commented that ‘impact po- vidual pieces of research that informed on automated departures processing,
tential’ is not measured in terms of it. However, in translating research into with a technology panel of 16 vendors
specific outcomes.430 It was reported that operational practice, one interviewee offering different biometric options.
the Future Capability Assessment and emphasised the need to have senior Tests were conducted in a Canberra
Engagement section has no formal pro- personnel within DIBP who can review laboratory, followed by live trials of
cesses to facilitate the impact of border research, assess its implications, con- the technology in Brisbane airport.437
security research, but rather considered sider how it can be operationalised, and In 2014, DIBP received Aus$50.1m
impact to be a matter of ongoing engage- then take forward recommendations to of funding to expand the use of de-
ment and keeping relevant stakehold- government.435 parture SmartGates. Between July
ers informed about research activity.431 2015 and June 2016, 77 departure
As the vast majority of border security 3.3.4. Summary SmartGates were rolled out and they
research is focused on policy outcomes, are now operational at all eight of
the Policy group is the predominant body Figure 3.5 overleaf provides a visual sum- Australia’s international airports. As
within DIBP in terms of implementing mary of the Australian R&I pathway, in- of 30 June 2016, approximately 6.9m
the outputs of research projects funded cluding the various associated factors, departing travellers had been success-
by the Department. Within the Policy stakeholders and inputs. fully processed through the gates,
group, research projects tend to inform with around 85 per cent of all eligi-
the development of a policy, which can 3.3.5. Lessons identified ble travellers using the SmartGates.
then be taken to Cabinet.432 Within Arrival SmartGates are also available
the Future Capability Assessment and There are mixed views on the effective- at these airports for use by travellers
Engagement section, a report is produced ness of Australian approaches to the with ePassports from eight countries.
at the conclusion of a research activity management of border security research, Automated border processing may
for the senior sponsor, who can then de- which may reflect the period of transi- support border agencies in managing
termine whether they wish to take the tion that DIBP is undergoing. The fol- high traveller volumes and facilitat-
research further.433 lowing paragraphs extract a number of ing a faster and less intrusive border
As regards externally funded re- useful lessons from this case study. process for travellers deemed to be of
search, ASPI’s Border Security Program low risk.438
engages with DIBP on multiple levels Box 3.1 DIBP Policy group definition of
to maximise the impact of its research ‘impact’ Good practices
activities. This includes, for example,
executive sessions at the governmental According to one study interviewee, Interviewees noted the positive effects
the DIBP Policy group measures the of embracing organisational and cul-
impact of research topics according tural change within DIBP. In particu-
428 RAND Europe interview with Australian
to: (i) the extent to which the piece of lar, greater openness to innovation in
representative, 30 March 2017; RAND
Europe interview with two Australian research becomes a basis for policy; research, the development of responsive
representatives, 24 July 2017. and (ii) the extent to which it is in- research plans, and flexible engagement
429 RAND Europe interview with two fluential and elicits a response from with academia and think tanks for fresh,
Australian representatives, 24 July 2017.
relevant policy stakeholders and the objective analysis were all highlighted by
430 RAND Europe interview with Australian
Australian public.436 interviewees as positive developments.439
representative, 30 March 2017; RAND
Europe interview with two Australian
representatives, 24 July 2017. 437 Griffith (2014).
431 RAND Europe interview with DIBP repre- 434 RAND Europe interview with Dr John 438 Department of Immigration and Border
sentative, 29 March 2017. Coyne, 20 March 2017. Protection (DIBP) (2016).
432 RAND Europe interview with Australian 435 RAND Europe interview with Australian 439 RAND Europe interview with Dr John
representative, 30 March 2017 representative, 30 March 2017. Coyne, 20 March 2017; RAND Europe in-
433 RAND Europe interview with DIBP repre- 436 RAND Europe interview with Australian terview with two Australian representa-
sentative, 29 March 2017. representative, 30 March 2017. tives, 24 July 2017.

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Figure 3.5 Australian research and innovation pathway

Adaption by users Research outputs Project specification

& selection

How: Project inform policy development, Who: DIBP Secretary

which is then taken to Cabinet, senior How: Assessments of how research fits in
engagement Need identification with DIBP priorities, budget, whether
& prioritisation in-house or external

Who: Business areas within DIBP

INNOVATIONHow: Engagement with DIBP leadership, RESEARCH
facilitated by Thought Leadership section,
identification of research areas
Inputs to research
Impact

Budget: Overall budgets vary by year,

‘Impact’ measured in accordance with the up to aus$2 million. Individual study
extent to which research becomes basis budgets vary significantly
for policy, and extent to which it is
influential and elicts response from policy Evaluation Research process
stakeholders and public
Who: Universities, think tanks,
consultants, DIBP in-house
+ Organisational culture research

and structure
+ In-house research
+ Engagement with
academia/think tanks
ENABLING FACTORS
- Managing organisational change

KEY STAKEHOLDERS Departament of Immigration and Border Protection, Minister for Immigration,
Cabinet, academia, think tanks and industry

Strategic context: ABF set up in 2015, marking greater strategic focus on border ma nagement
CONTEXTUAL FACTORS Challenges: Regular and irregular migration, trade in illicit goods, terrorism, conflicts, biosecurity
hazards, economic risks

Beyond the recent change in the for challenges as they emerge, reportedly relevant to border security, and that can
Department’s approach to research, in- resulting in an increase in the impact offer research services tailored to the
terviewees saw these developments as of their research. Furthermore, the in- Department’s evolving requirements.
functions of strong engagement at the terviewees stated that even in the short Engagement with academia can take
senior leadership level in encouraging space of time since the new approach to a number of forms. For example, the
innovation, research partnerships and research was initiated, they have seen National Security College, based at the
secondments with think tanks to drive more innovation and variety in the re- Australian National University, runs
up interest in research,440 as well as in- search ideas put forward within DIBP.442 an executive development programme
creased emphasis on strong research Interviewees also reported that DIBP where junior and senior leaders under-
backgrounds in the Department’s re- is engaging more closely with aca- take courses in executive development
cruitment activities.441 Two interviewees demic institutions and thought lead- in national security. According to one
also reported that the faster pace of re- ers in Australia.443 Across the country, study interviewee, the interaction may
search topic identification and commis- there are now a number of well-re- teach managers how they can make use
sioning has proved effective in preparing garded public policy schools within of the academic environment and the
universities that cover a range of issues agencies which are engaging with aca-
demics, and develop relationships with
440 RAND Europe interview with Dr John these institutions.444 As noted above, the
Coyne, 20 March 2017; RAND Europe in- 442 RAND Europe interview with Dr John Department is moving towards fund-
terview with Australian representative, Coyne, 20 March 2017.
ing think tanks and policy institutes not
30 March 2017; RAND Europe interview 443 RAND Europe interview with Dr John
with DIBP representative, 29 March 2017. Coyne, 20 March 2017; RAND Europe in-
441 RAND Europe interview with Dr John terview with two Australian representa- 444 RAND Europe interview with Dr John
Coyne, 20 March 2017. tives, 24 July 2017. Coyne, 20 March 2017.

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Table 3.5 Summary of findings for non-EU case studies

Needs
Border security Key identification Project specification Inputs to Research Pathways to
context stakeholders and prioritisation and selection research process impact
US Strategic context: Department Who: DHS: S&T, Who: DHS: S&T, USCG, COEs. Budget: Who: RDC How: End user
(Section 3.1) Border security is of Homeland USCG. How: No single S&T S&T – $55m; (within USCG project involvement
part of ‘homeland Security How: QHSR (study approach in place for USCG – RDT&D), (QHSR, IPTs, STRAS,
security’ umbrella (DHS): groups, steering awarding projects – IPTs, $18m for external im- USCG RTD&E);
concept and is 1 of ▪▪ S&T committee, STRAS, ISR, Assessment of FY2017. plementers. System Analysis; ISR;
5 of its missions. ▪▪ USCG senior leadership Prospective Portfolio, HSIP, CG-STIC Innovation
Challenges: Academia and meetings, strategy SVIP, SBIR. and Working Groups.
Terrorism, industry. coordination group, What: While S&T classifies Challenges: Work
migration, sub-interagency technologies according to remains to be done
cybersecurity, illegal policy committees); 9 TRLs, research priorities are to strengthen links
border-crossing, STRAS; IPTs clustered by thematic area. between research
transnational crime, (research monitoring, and end users; time
nuclear threats, technology review gap between need
climate change. platform); portfolio identification and
review; ISR. research programme
launch.
Canada Strategic context: ▪▪ Public Who: Public Safety Who: DRDC – CSS, CBSA, Budget: Who: How: Cross-sector
(Section 3.2) Border management Safety Canada, CBSA, RCMP. Unknown. DRDC – consultation.
is strategically Canada RCMP, IRCC. How: Proposal selection Other: CSS, CBSA, Challenges: Only
important, especially ▪▪ DRDC – CSS How: Annual assesses budget, timeline, Required academia, so much research
given cross-border ▪▪ CBSA – S&T meetings focused feasibility, impact. involvement ‘champion’ providers can do
trade with the US. Academia and on operational in project of operational as the decision
What: CSS and CBSA project
Challenges: Drug industry. priorities, longlisting reportedly prioritise ‘champion’ to operationalise
smuggling, illegal of priorities, annual operational partners. research rests with
operationally focused
border crossings. call for proposals. research with high TRL agency. operational agencies.
potential.
Australia Strategic context: ▪▪ DIBP Who: Business areas Who: DIBP Executive Budget: Who: How: Projects inform
(Section 3.3) ABF set up in ▪▪ Minister for within DIBP. Committee, Secretary Unknown. Universities, policy development,
2015, marking Immigration How: Engagement of the DIBP. think tanks, which is then taken
greater strategic ▪▪ Cabinet with senior How: DIBP releases request consultants, to Cabinet; senior
focus on border ▪▪ Academia DIBP leadership, for tender; proof of concept; DIBP engagement.
management. and industry preliminary research ‘impact’ as a key assessment research- Challenges: Beyond
Challenges: conducted internally, criterion. management connection between
Terrorism, capability plan, ad apparatus. research and policy,
What: An increasing focus on
migration, conflict, hoc identification of shorter-turnaround studies few links between
biosecurity hazards, research areas. with greater responsiveness research and impact.
economic risks. to emerging issues.

only through commissioned research, or are focused mainly on longstanding the interviewees stated that particular
but also through seed money and grants academic debates in border security business areas see a real need to be able
which the organisations can use to fund rather than on driving forward innova- to commission expert external advice
projects aimed at informing public dis- tion – although interviewees again noted as the need arises, but funding for this
course on border security through discus- ongoing efforts to change these practices must be found from within operational
sion papers and other forms of outreach. and use research more effectively.448 On budgets.451
a related point, ensuring policy rele- Table 3.5 provides a summary of the
Challenges vance and impact was also highlighted findings presented above.
as an area for improvement,449 with in-
One interviewee suggested that the DIBP terviewees reporting increased focus on
is still not well integrated internally in why research is commissioned, what it 3.4. Border security research in
terms of managing and achieving im- is intended to deliver, and how to make North Africa and Turkey
pact from its research programme,445 al- the best use of it.450 Interviewees also
though another interviewee emphasised noted the resource constraints under A high-level overview of border secu-
that organisational restructuring is on- which the DIBP operates, and the chal- rity research activities and structures
going.446 Furthermore, it was reported lenge of making the most of a relatively in North Africa and Turkey is presented
that research findings are often used small research allocation. In particular, in Boxes 3.5 and 3.6, respectively. While
only to inform existing processes,447 the RAND study team had hoped to gain
greater insight into the conduct and im-
448 RAND Europe interview with Dr John
445 RAND Europe interview with Dr John Coyne, 20 March 2017. plementation of research in these coun-
Coyne, 20 March 2017. 449 RAND Europe interview with Dr John tries, the limitations of the available
446 RAND Europe interview with DIBP repre- Coyne, 20 March 2017. RAND Europe evidence meant that very little analysis
sentative, 29 March 2017. interview with DIBP representative, 29
was possible in this regard.
447 RAND Europe interview with Dr John March 2017; RAND Europe interview with
Coyne, 20 March 2017; RAND Europe Australian representative, 30 March 2017.
interview with DIBP representative, 29 450 RAND Europe interview with Australian 451 RAND Europe interview with two
March 2017. representative, 30 March 2017. Australian representatives, 24 July 2017.

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Box 3.3 Border security research in North Africa

The implementation of border security measures in Egypt, Morocco and Tunisia is of critical relevance to Europe. 452
This significance is clear in three main areas of concern for those countries: refugee migration, terrorism and organ-
ised crime. Much of the regional instability contributing to these three issues emanates from Libya and its porous bor-
ders with neighbouring countries. In addition to the problems posed by terrorism and the migration of refugees, North
African countries lie on major smuggling and trafficking routes from Sub-Saharan Africa, the Sahel and North Africa,
and across the Mediterranean into southern Europe.453
These threats have had an impact not only with North Africa, but also on southern Europe. In response to these threats,
most North African countries’ borders have been highly militarised, with the main actors involved in border protection
being the army and various other border guards, gendarmes and police.454 For example, efforts to secure the Libyan bor-
der455 include a 70km ditch between Tunisia and Libya and the installation of CCTV along the border.456
The army and security forces in Egypt and Tunisia have primary responsibility for identifying and prioritising bor-
der security research topics.457 However, given the frequency and severity of the on-the-ground border management is-
sues they face, one study interviewee reported that these actors do not have the time, resources or political inclination
to set up and manage a large portfolio of border security research.458 According to one study interviewee, the little re-
search that is commissioned in North Africa tends to focus on ‘hardware’ or ‘technology’, rather than on ‘softer’ social
science approaches.459
As a result, there are said to be few specialists in the domain of border security research in most North African coun-
tries, aside from historians, psychologists and sociologists working to create think tanks. An example of one such think
tank is the Arab Reform Initiative (ARI), which produces research and policy analysis, as well as supporting Arab schol-
ars in the region financially.460
However, these endeavours are reportedly impeded by national funding shortages and a lack of individuals specialising
in this field of research, resulting in much of the border research being completed in collaboration with European part-
ners and funders, such as the EU’s FP7 and H2020 projects (see Section 2.1).461 An example of EU-funded joint European and
North African research is the European University Institute (EUI) Robert Schuman Centre’s support for the BORDERLANDS
project.462 This FP7 project examines relations between the EU and North African countries, exploring the processes by
which the EU extends its legal and functional borders, rules and practices to North Africa. There appears to be no infor-
mation available concerning the impact of BORDERLANDS given that it is a relatively recent project running from 2011
to 2016. Additional challenges affecting the conduct and management of border security research include interruptions
to funding streams, limited access to research findings and issues regarding research management.463
In terms of improving border security research management in North African countries, one interviewee suggested
that border security research should be assigned more funding, more think tanks should be established to increase the
expertise available, and research should not be led only by national Ministries of Defence or Ministries of Interior.464
Another lesson concerns the importance of increasing collaborative research on border security involving researchers
from across North Africa and Europe.465

452 See for example Limam and Del Sarto (2015).

453 See Hanlon and Herbert (2015).
454 For a detailed examination of North African countries’ border security forces, see Hanlon & Herbert (2015, 29–41).
455 RAND Europe interview with Egyptian representative, 29 April 2017.
456 RAND Europe interview with Faycal Cherif, 25 April 2017.
457 RAND Europe interview with Egyptian representative, 29 April 2017; RAND Europe interview with Faycal Cherif, 25 April 2017.
458 RAND Europe interview with Faycal Cherif, 25 April 2017.
459 RAND Europe interview with Faycal Cherif, 25 April 2017.
460 See for example Jrad (2015).
461 RAND Europe interview with Faycal Cherif, 25 April 2017.
462 See for example Limam and Del Sarto (2015).
463 RAND Europe interview with Egyptian representative, 29 April 2017; RAND Europe interview with Faycal Cherif, 25 April 2017.
464 RAND Europe interview with Faycal Cherif, 25 April 2017.
465 RAND Europe interview with Egyptian representative, 29 April 2017; RAND Europe interview with Faycal Cherif, 25 April 2017.

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Box 3.4 Border security research in Turkey

Following the attempted coup in Turkey in July 2016.466 many police and military officials, civil servants and academics
have been dismissed from their jobs, leading to reluctance to discuss border security and related research. This politi-
cal climate has also been fostered by an earlier communiqué released by the government’s Higher Education Council
(YOK) in April 2015 stating that academics require permission from ‘relevant ministries’ in order to conduct any survey
or fieldwork concerning Syrian refugees.467 It appears that such developments will have profound implications for the
commissioning and conduct of border research in Turkey for the foreseeable future.468
According to a study interviewee, an IBM organisation was established in 2013 but it has reportedly not been very
visible in the field.469 The Turkish Army currently has primary responsibility for securing the Turkish border, which
is highly militarised. The Army is supported at POE and other locations by the Jandarma (Gendarmerie) and Turkish
National Police (TNP). Many other government agencies are also involved in border management, including the Ministry
of Economy for Trade, the Ministry of Health, and Customs.470
These organisations face various issues along long and very porous borders, particularly those with Iraq and Syria. As
well as the security threats posed by Islamic State (IS), al-Qaeda (AQ) affiliate groups and the Partiya Karkeren Kurdistan
(PKK – Kurdish Workers Party), these agencies face significant cross-border challenges relating to drug smuggling, other
forms of organised crime, and the arrival of over 3 million refugees from Iraq and Syria.471
Due to the sensitivity of the political situation, there is currently very little research being conducted on border secu-
rity issues. Researchers do not have access to government data, which creates challenges for maintaining an up-to-date
understanding of the security situation. Even when contact is established with officials or policymakers, the post-coup
dismissals have led to a high turnover of personnel, meaning that it is difficult for continuous relationships to be estab-
lished. Additionally, many academics, researchers and officials are now said to be applying a measure of self-censorship.472

466 Al Jazeera (2016).

467 Kayaoglu (2015).
468 RAND Europe interview with Turkish representative, 3 May 2017.
469 See Sert (2013).
470 Republic of Turkey, Ministry of Customs and Trade (n.d.).
471 European Commission (2017e).
472 RAND Europe interview with Turkish representative, 3 May 2017.

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4. Case studies:
Operational models (WP3)

This chapter provides an overview of how 4.1.2. Vision the order of priority of programmes in
different organisations, including those the course of their implementation.478
outside of the border security domain, Mission
seek to operationalise research findings. Leadership and membership
The six case studies include two European ESA’s mission is to provide and promote,
examples (European Space Agency and for exclusively peaceful purposes, coop- ESA is an intergovernmental organisa-
European Institute of Innovation and eration among European states in space tion with 22 pMS from across Europe.479
Technology) and four from the US research, technology and applications, In addition to its headquarters, ESA
(Defense Innovation Unit Experimental, with a view to their being used for scien- maintains several sites in a number of
Small Business Innovation Research, tific purposes and for operational space European countries:
Homeland Security Innovation Programs application systems.475 ▪▪ The European Astronauts Centre (EAC)
and DHS S&T Centres of Excellence). The in Cologne, Germany;
following sections provide summaries of Objectives ▪▪ The European Space Astronomy Centre
the case study organisations and of their (ESAC) in Villanueva de la Canada,
vision and governance, before exploring To fulfil its mission, ESA is tasked with Spain;
the types of activities they undertake to designing a unified space policy and a ▪▪ The European Space Operations Centre
support innovation. These activities re- related industrial policy, recommending (ESOC) in Darmstadt, Germany;
late to the functional roles mapped onto space objectives to participating Member ▪▪ The ESA centre for Earth Observation
the R&I pathway provided in Chapter 2 States (pMS) and integrating national (ESRIN) in Frascati, Italy;
of the main report.473 programmes into the activities of the ▪▪ The European Space Research and
European programme. Technology Centre (ESTEC) in Noord-
wijk, the Netherlands;
4.1. European Space Agency 4.1.3. Governance ▪▪ The European Centre for Space
Applications and Telecommunications
4.1.1. Summary Organisational governance (ECSAT) in Harwell, United Kingdom;
and
The European Space Agency is the co- ESA is governed by a Council, which ▪▪ The ESA Redu Centre in Redu, Belgium.
ordinating entity for European civil- provides basic policy guidelines within
ian space activities. First established which ESA develops the European space ESA is headed by a Director General who
in 1975, ESA has its headquarters in programme.476 Each pMS is represented is elected by the Council every four years.
France but also maintains a number of on the Council and has one vote, irrespec- Individual research sectors are headed by
sites across Belgium, Germany, Italy, tive of its size or financial contribution.477 Directorates that report directly to the
the Netherlands, Spain and the United The Council is responsible for approving Director General.480
Kingdom. ESA is responsible for the de- activities and programmes by a major-
sign and delivery of the European space ity of all pMS, and determining – by a
478 ESA (2010).
programme with the goal of defining and unanimous decision of all pMS – the level 479 ESA comprises Austria, Belgium, Czech
implementing a long-term space policy of resources to be made available to ESA Republic, Denmark, Estonia, Finland,
that allows Europe to remain competitive for the coming five-year period. Another France, Germany, Greece, Hungary,
in the field of space technology.474 While function of the Council is to adopt an- Ireland, Italy, Luxembourg, the Neth-
erlands, Norway, Poland, Portugal, Ro-
ESA conducts a range of activities, the nual ESA work plans and to determine
mania, Spain, Sweden, Switzerland and
following sections discuss programmes the United Kingdom. Slovenia is an Asso-
and initiatives that upon review were ciate Member, and Canada takes part in
found to be most relevant for the scope some projects under a cooperation agree-
and objectives of this study. 475 ESA (2007). ment. Bulgaria, Cyprus, Malta, Latvia,
476 Bonnet et al. (1994). Lithuania and Slovakia have cooperation
477 However, a pMS does not have the right to agreements with ESA, and discussions
473 A full description of these functional roles vote on matters concerning programmes are under way with Croatia. See European
is presented in Appendix D. in which it does not take part. Source: ESA Space Agency (2017a).
474 Turner (2009). (2010). 480 European Space Agency (2017a).

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Organisational funding role of ‘honest broker’485 within its stake- was not their main rationale they are
holder community as it engages with discussed under different FCs.
The ESA space science programmes and and facilitates interactions among us- The TRP is a mandatory ESA pro-
general budget are funded through fi- ers of space technologies, pMS and the gramme which was established to
nancial contributions from all pMS. private sector.486 ESA also fulfils other promote the undertaking of so-called
Individual pMS contributions are cal- functions, for example providing train- ‘blue-sky’ research (i.e. scientific re-
culated on the basis of countries’ gross ing and education through its EAC,487 search where ideas are first developed,
national product. In 2017, ESA’s total and hosting innovation through its ESA with a focus on creativity and challeng-
budget amounted to €5.75bn, support- Business Innovation Centre.488 ing established approaches, and then put
ing the work and activities of a world- In the area of space applications, ESA through proof-of-concept testing only at
wide staff of 2 200.481 is also mandated to conduct operational a later stage). The TRP is designed to help
ESA has a policy of cooperation with activities under conditions defined by ESA plan and define future space mis-
various partners based on the assump- the Council by a majority of pMS. In sions and activities. The programme is
tion that pooling resources and sharing these cases, the Agency may offer its fa- structured around a two-year work plan
work will increase the effectiveness of cilities for use by the operating agencies for technology development sustained
its programmes.482 In cases where pMS concerned and ensure the launching, through two initiatives. The first ini-
vote unanimously, ESA can cooperate placing in orbit and control of opera- tiative is the Innovation Triangle Initiative,
with other international organisations tional application satellites. which supports disruptive innovation ef-
and institutions and work with govern- The following sections discuss a num- forts for space applications led by indus-
ments, organisations and institutions ber of ESA’s mandatory and optional ac- try and academia. The second initiative is
of non-pMS. This cooperation can take tivities, which were selected due to their the Programme Space Technology Advancements
the form of non-pMS or international relevance to the scope and objectives of by Resourceful, Targeted & Innovative Groups of
organisations participating in ESA pro- this study. Large-scale programmes such Experts & Researchers (StarTiger), which fo-
grammes, with detailed arrangements as those discussed necessarily entail a cuses on prototyping advanced technolo-
for this cooperation being defined by the range of smaller activities that pertain gies.489 Procurement plans under the TRP
Council by a two-thirds majority of pro- to multiple FCs presented in Appendix are made on an annual basis. Contracts
gramme participants.483 D of this report. To facilitate navigation under these initiatives are assigned on
of the case study, the following sections an open, competitive basis to industry
4.1.4. Activities present programmes under the single and academia. Invitations to tender are
FC to which the programme or initia- issued continuously throughout the year
ESA’s work includes a range of manda- tive most directly contributes. Where on ESA’s Electronic Mailing Invitation to Tender
tory activities in which all pMS partic- relevant, the text also highlights other System (EMITS) web portal. Through the
ipate, and optional activities involving FCs to which the programme or initia- TRP, ESA aims to strengthen European
all pMS except those that formally de- tive contributes and how. competitiveness. Technologies devel-
clare that they are not interested in par- oped through the TRP and its associated
ticipating.484 For mandatory activities, Funding initiatives are reportedly successful in
ESA has a delivery and coordination role. reaching and penetrating wider mar-
In terms of delivery, ESA is directly re- ESA runs a range of programmes and in- kets spanning beyond Europe. The pro-
sponsible for delivering technological itiatives which entail the provision of gramme is reported to have produced
research, educational activities and a direct research, development and inno- some of ESA’s most advanced technol-
scientific programme. ESA’s coordina- vation funding to stakeholders involved ogies, including, for example, the ad-
tion role involves collecting and dissemi- in the space domain (O6.1). The follow- vanced ion engines propelling the Bepi
nating information concerning existing ing paragraphs provide a succinct over- Colombo mission to Mercury.490
gaps and duplication of activities, and view of the ESA Technology Research The CTP is a mandatory ESA pro-
providing assistance for the harmonisa- Programme (TRP), the ESA Science Core gramme which focuses on developing
tion of national and international pro- Technology Programme (CTP), and the in advance the critical enabling technolo-
grammes. The Agency also performs the ESA Integrated Applications Promotion gies required for the planning and under-
(IAP). Other programmes and initiatives taking of ESA’s future science missions.
discussed in the following sections also While the early stages of technology de-
entail the provision of direct funding for velopment leading up to experimental
research and development, but since this validation are carried out through ESA’s
481 ESA (2017o)
TRP, the CTP applies new technologies
482 For example, ESA signed an Administrative
Arrangement with the EDA in 2011 in or- developed to the specific technical re-
der to explore the added value and contri- 485 An honest broker is an organisation that quirements of future science missions.
bution of space assets to the development actively seeks and encourages partner- CTP-funded activities advance technol-
of European capabilities in the area of cri- ship-oriented relationships with exter-
ogies to higher stages of technological
sis management and the Common Security nal actors. See Freeman et al. (2015).
and Defence Policy. See EDA (2017). 486 ESA (2010).
483 ESA (2010). 487 ESA (2017b). 489 ESA (2017c).
484 ESA (2010). 488 ESA BIC (2017). 490 ESA (2017d).

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maturity, up to full-scale engineering focuses on the development of tech- Projects funded under the IAP go
models fully tested in appropriate en- nologies and systems for which needs through two to three phases of imple-
vironmental conditions. The process of and requirements have been identified mentation. First, a Kick-start phase may
scientific and technological development in close partnership with future users be advertised through a competitive call.
involves the conduct of detailed studies and customers.496 The IAP touches on Under the Kick-start phase, up to approx-
which define future mission concepts a wide range of issue areas, including imately €65k can be provided to industry
and identify relevant technology require- health, safety, development, energy and implementers to perform a rapid scan,
ments. CTP activities are then initiated transport.497 over a period of 3 to 4 months, of oppor-
for all platform and payload technologies Projects under the IAP are contracted tunities for adapting space technologies
for which ESA has responsibility. The CTP through two mechanisms: direct nego- to other purposes in a given market seg-
focuses on the development stage, which tiations between ESA and potential im- ment.500 ESA funds kick-start activities
moves technologies from embryonic con- plementers, and a permanent call for at a 100 per cent rate.501
cepts to tailored products catering to spe- proposals under which requirements Following the Kick-start phase, or as
cific mission requirements and which are for different thematic areas are adver- a first step for issue areas where needs
feasible on technical, financial and pro- tised on a quarterly basis. Projects un- or opportunities have been identified by
grammatic levels. The CTP operates on a der the IAP are funded by ESA at different ESA or in cooperation with other stake-
three-year cycle, but has its technology levels of co-funding, with a view to fu- holders, a Feasibility Study is undertaken.
plan revised on an annual basis. CTP pro- ture users and clients of the product or Feasibility studies last on average up to 9
posals are issued continuously through- technology to be developed providing months and have a value of up to €150k.
out the year on ESA’s EMITS web portal at least 50 per cent of the funding re- ESA provides 100 per cent funding for
(for further details on this see the section quired during the advanced phases of a feasibility studies that it initiated auton-
below on information sharing) and are project’s implementation. To facilitate omously, and between 50 and 70 per cent
available to all European firms on a 100 stakeholder buy-in and sponsorship, re- for those stemming from direct negotia-
per cent funding basis.491 As CTP research quirements and needs presented under tions with potential implementers. The
is contracted out to industry, the pro- thematic calls are first identified by ESA goal of feasibility studies is to explore the
gramme strengthens the European space through a survey of needs and require- technical and economic feasibility of de-
sector’s capacity for innovation and pre- ments of potential project stakeholders, veloping a product or service on the ba-
cision engineering. ESA’s track record of including public entities and operational sis of existing space technologies, as well
science missions also provides evidence agencies such as European Civil Aviation as of identifying risks and opportuni-
of the CTP’s success: to date, only one of authorities, Eurocontrol, the European ties associated with such endeavours.502
more than 20 ESA science missions has Defence Agency and Frontex.498 In par- Feasibility studies that are deemed
had to be cancelled.492 ticular, stakeholders are invited to pro- successful in terms of their results and
The IAP focuses on developing oper- vide through standardised templates an findings are then continued under the
ational services and products catered overview of their operational capacity Demonstration phase. Demonstration-phase
to the needs of a wide array of users by in their domain of interest, highlight- projects vary significantly in their dura-
adapting and using space technology as- ing current operational limitations and tion and scope according to their under-
sets and products. The IAP is managed by desired improvements to be achieved lying complexity. Projects usually last
the Telecommunications and Integrated over the course of a 2-year timeframe.499 between 1 and 2 years and receive fund-
Applications (TIA) directorate of ESA and Where addressing needs and require- ing between €700k and €2m. For projects
is part of the TIA’s broader Advanced ments through the adapting of exist- at this phase, the ESA may provide up to
Research in Telecommunications ing space technologies could lead to the 50 per cent of the funding required. The
Systems (ARTES) programme.493 The over- development of a commercially sustain- goal of Demonstration-phase projects
arching goal of the ARTES programme able product or service, those needs and is to develop a technology or system up
is to develop space-based applications, requirements are presented by ESA under to the pre-operational stage. Following
services and solutions for the needs of thematic calls. As such, activities per- this, it is anticipated that if a commer-
European citizens and society at large.494 formed under this phase of the IAP also cially sustainable product has been de-
In line with this, the main objective of contribute significantly to ESA’s role as veloped, industry and users associated
the IAP is to achieve positive socio-eco- an honest broker, as IAP activities facil- with the project will be able to continue
nomic impact through the development itate cooperation and interaction among the development of the technology or
of commercially sustainable products, a range of operational agencies and in- service with support from internal and
based on pre-existing space and terres- dustry stakeholders. external funds.503
trial/in situ systems.495 The programme
500 RAND Europe interview with anonymous,
496 RAND Europe interview with anonymous, 26 October 2017.
491 ESA (2017e). 26 October 2017. 501 RAND Europe interview with anonymous,
492 ESA (2017e). 497 UK Space Agency (2017). 26 October 2017.
493 ESA (2017f). 498 RAND Europe interview with anonymous, 502 RAND Europe interview with anonymous,
494 ESA (2017f). 26 October 2017; ESA (2017f). 26 October 2017.
495 RAND Europe interview with anonymous, 499 RAND Europe interview with anonymous, 503 RAND Europe interview with anonymous,
26 October 2017; UK Space Agency (2017). 26 October 2017. 26 October 2017.

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 Technical Annex

Information sharing Figure 4.1 ESA Business Incubation Centres Network

Stakeholders interested in working

with ESA can find relevant information ISA Business Incubation Centre
through a centralised repository of in-
formation on funding opportunities
(role 3.1). The ESA EMITS web portal504
has been operational since the 1980s with
the objective of guaranteeing the prin-
ciple of fair competition and access to
ESA’s procurement from all interested BIC Finland
parties.505 The EMITS portal provides in-
dustry, research institutions, universi- BIC Sweden
ties and ESA pMS delegations with the BIC Estonia
following services:
1. List of current Intended Invitations
to Tender (IITT): Listed IITTs consist
of a summary of the work to be car-
ried out, an estimated price range,
BIC Noordwijk
the planned publication date and the
BIC Ireland BIC Flanders
initiating services within ESA. This BIC Harwell BIC Prague
BIC Damstadt
list is updated at least once a month.
BIC Wallonie Redu BIC Bavaria
2. List of current Invitations to Tender
(ITT): Each listed ITT contains a sum- BIC Austria
mary of the project and its associated BIC Switzerland
technical, administrative and con-
tractual requirements. BIC Sud France
3. ESA standard administrative and
technical reference documenta- BIC Barcelona BIC Lazio
tion and relevant information for
BIC Madrid Region
industry: Documents presented in BIC Portugal
this section provide private sector ac-
tors with guidance on how to develop
their tenders in compliance with ITTs
and ESA’s requirements.
SOURCE: European Space Agency (2017g).
4. Industry Web Portal: This service pro-
vides industry with a wide range of
information on how to do business overview of the centres’ location across At the BICs, entrepreneurs and start-ups
with ESA through forums, news, a the continent. receive a wide range of incentives and
directory of companies working with ESA BICs run open calls for proposals support, including:
ESA, and publications. which allow potential beneficiaries to 1. Cash incentives and funding: These
submit project ideas at any time. While may include cash incentive schemes
Hosting innovation procedures and requirements for joining for product and service design, pro-
BICs are specific to each centre, bidding totyping, market studies and IP pro-
ESA hosts innovation by running a net- procedures broadly entail a five-step pro- tection, as well as access to a range
work of Business Incubation Centres cess, comprising the following:507 of funding sources, including ESA’s
(BICs) (role 5.3) across Europe. The BICs 1. Engagement with the relevant BIC Open Sky Technologies Fund. In light
initiative was launched with the aim of Support Manager; of the provision of direct cash incen-
stimulating and working with entrepre- 2. Submission of required Business and tives and funding, this stream of
neurs and young (i.e. less than 5 years Activity Proposal (BAP) documenta- BICs’ activities also pertains to ESA’s
old) start-ups that have ideas for adapt- tion; portfolio of work under the funding
ing and transferring a space technology 3. Review of submitted BAP documenta- FC discussed above.508
or system to a non-space commercial en- tion by the Tender Evaluation Board 2. Access to technical expertise and
vironment.506 Figure 4.1 provides a visual (TEB); facilities: This may include access
4. Oral presentation by bidder and Q&A to laboratory space, rooms, work-
with TEB; and shops, ‘hot labs’, high specification
5. Invitation to contract negotiation. science equipment, test facilities, and
504 ESA emits. 2017.
505 ESA EMITS (2017).
506 ESA (2017g). 507 See for example ESA BIC Harwell (2017). 508 ESA BIC (2017).

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hands-on business-development sup- industry through workshops, visits and such as generic robotic operations,
port and advice.509 hearings, and thus contributing to over- rendezvous and docking, Russian
3. Business support: This may include all honest broker activities performed language, human behaviour and
access to investor readiness work- by the agency. The majority of GSP stud- performance.517
shops, as well as more access to tar- ies are undertaken by companies of all 2. Advanced training: This 16-month
geted support in areas such as (i) sizes and by academia under the techni- training provides astronauts with an
research and development; (ii) busi- cal guidance of ESA staff.514 Set up and initial knowledge of the International
ness planning; (iii) legal and finance; supported by the GSP, ESA’s Advanced Space Station’s elements and how to
(iv) market research and strategy; (v) Concept Team operates a specific tool conduct experiments on board.518
team building and human resources; named Ariadna to facilitate access to 3. Increment-specific training: This
and (vi) investor readiness.510 the GSP for the academic world. This is 18-month training phase is launched
4. Networking and community: This achieved by performing collaborative re- once astronauts are assigned to a
includes access to a wide array of net- search projects between the Advanced space mission. In this phase, all crew-
working events targeting BICs’ ‘incu- Concepts Team and selected academic members prepare for their mission
batees’, alumni, investors and other partners.515 training together.519
stakeholders.511
Training and education Honest broker
According to ESA, the BICs initiative sup-
ports more than 140 start-ups each year, One the activities conducted by ESA per- An important role performed by ESA
and since its inception it has already re- tains to the provision of education and through the programmes discussed in
sulted in the establishment of more than training for astronauts through the previous sections is that of honest bro-
500 start-ups and the creation of thou- European Astronaut Centre (role 3.4). ker, facilitating coordination, coop-
sands of jobs.512 The EAC was established in 1990, houses eration and the development of links
a team of more than 100 professionals between pMS, industry, academia and
Thought leadership and is located in Cologne, Germany. ESA itself (role 4.2). For example, as ev-
The centre is also supported in its ac- idenced in previous paragraphs, net-
To support its efforts in the area of tivities by specialists from the German working and coordination activities are
thought leadership, ESA conducts re- Aerospace Centre (DLR), the French space embedded in a variety of programmes,
search in house (role 2.1) through its agency (Centre national d’études spa- including the IAP and the BICs. These
General Studies Programme (GSP). The tiales – CNES), and industry. The EAC is are also embedded in the European
GSP interfaces with all of ESA’s pro- tasked with selecting and recruiting new Component Initiative, to be discussed
grammes and functions as a ‘think ESA astronauts, planning and schedul- in the following section.
tank’ that lays the groundwork for the ing their tasks and assignments, and
agency’s future activities. The GSP is de- preparing and implementing astronaut Requirements identification and
signed to help formulate the overall ESA training programmes for space missions setting
strategy, to study the feasibility of new to the International Space Station.516
mission concepts ready for selection, to Training provided by EAC is structured A number of programmes and activi-
prepare the case for new optional pro- around the following components: ties undertaken by ESA entail the iden-
grammes, and to analyse trends and test 1. Basic training: An initial 16-month tification of innovation opportunities
new working methodologies. Covering course, which comprises of four (role 1.1) and the analysis of operational
a broad range of topics, studies tend to phases: (i) an Introduction phase, pro- needs and requirements of potential
last 1 to 2 years, and 30 to 50 new studies viding orientation about major space- clients, customers, and stakeholders
are typically initiated during each cycle faring nations, space agencies, major of its programmes (role 1.2). Among
of 1 to 2 years. The GSP encourages inter- manned and unmanned space pro- those discussed in previous sections,
disciplinary work, for example through grammes, and space law and inter- the IAP entails a phase of engagement
the biannual internal Call for Study Ideas governmental agreements governing with potential beneficiaries and part-
and through its requirement for GSP pro- the worldwide cooperation in space; ners of the work to be commissioned be-
posals to involve representatives from at (ii) a Fundamentals phase, which pro- fore calls for proposals are issued. This
least three different ESA directorates.513 vides basic knowledge on various activity provides ESA with an overview
One of the GSP’s objectives is to obtain technical and scientific disciplines; of emerging needs and requirements
a balanced level of participation between (iii) a Space Systems and Operations phase, and envisioned solutions that the pro-
industry and experts in all pMS, with which provides a detailed overview of gramme could help tackling over the
GSP activities drawing on the inputs of all ground systems and Space Station course of a 3-to-4-year window to achieve
on-board systems; and (iv) a Special
skills phase, which focuses on skills
509 ESA BIC (2017).
510 ESA BIC (2017).
511 ESA BIC (2017). 514 ESA (2017i). 517 ESA (2017j),
512 ESA BIC (2017). 515 ESA (2017n). 518 ESA (2017k).
513 ESA (2017h; 2017i). 516 ESA (2017b). 519 ESA (2017l).

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its goal of having a tangible, positive so- Table 4.1 Overview of ESA benefits and associated costs
cio-economic impact.520
In addition, ESA launched the Benefits Costs
European Component Initiative (ECI) in ▪▪ Actively engaging with the users of space ▪▪ Running of the ECI, coordinating inputs and
technologies provides ESA with a feedback views from all of ESA pMS to identify innovation
2004. The ECI seeks to develop a European loop to ensure its programmes and efforts opportunities and consolidate overview of
industrial base for delivery of critical are directed towards existing needs and emerging needs and requirements.
requirements of the stakeholder community. ▪▪ Running of coordination and engagement
technologies needed for space missions activities as part of a wide array of the ESA’s
with a view to diminishing Europe’s de- programmes and initiatives – these activities
may include networking events, outreach efforts
pendence on non-European component and appointment of programme ambassadors to
suppliers. The ECI pursues this objec- increase awareness about ESA’s efforts.

tive by identifying critical space tech- ▪▪ Positive socio-economic impact is achieved ▪▪ Running of the BICs, maintaining a European-
by hosting innovation through incubation wide network of expert centres and facilities
nologies and developing capabilities to networks and application programmes. These providing business support, financial
manufacture them in Europe. The in- activities provide ESA with the capacity to foster incentives, and a community to engage with to
economic growth, facilitating the development entrepreneurs and young start-ups active in the
itiative is an open cooperative project of technology start-ups and companies across field of space technology.
with ESA and partner national space Europe. ▪▪ Running of IAP programme to identify
opportunities for converting space technologies
agencies, with each drawing on their into commercially sustainable services and
own funding to participate. Beginning products.
▪▪ Performing in-house research to be a thought ▪▪ Conducting in-house research through the GSP,
in 2005, the ECI initially involved con-
leader in the space domain provides ESA with an in-house think tank focusing on a broad
solidating end user requirements for in- an opportunity to lay the groundwork for its range of interdisciplinary work.
future activities, and influence developments in
dustry and implementing activities to
the space domain and industrial space policy at
advance components’ technology levels pMS level.
up to space-qualified status. This activ-
ity was performed through the European
Space Component Coordination (ESCC), and associated costs that characterise PhD levels, provide training, and host in-
a body representing stakeholders from ESA’s approach and programmes dis- novation through co-location centres.524
component manufacturers to prime cussed above.
contractors. The second phase of the 4.2.2. Vision
ECI commenced in 2008. At the begin-
ning of 2011, approval was given for a 4.2. European Institute of Mission
third phase, which focuses on provid- Innovation & Technology
ing longer-term access to strategic com- The EIT’s mission is twofold:
ponents and technologies. Members of 4.2.1. Summary 1. Expand Europe’s competitiveness in
the European space components indus- the global economy and support em-
try and equipment manufacturers can The European Institute of Innovation ployment opportunities and sustain-
participate in ESCC working groups or & Technology was created in 2008. It able economic growth through the
contact ECI project officers to propose fu- is part of H2020 and the Innovation development of networks between in-
ture technologies and indicate emerging Union, which looks to increase European novators, researchers, universities,
needs and requirements that ECI activ- competitiveness globally,522 but is an businesses and other stakeholders;
ities could focus on in the near future. independent body with its own organi- and
The ECI initiative reportedly contributed sational and funding model. The EIT was 2. Create an environment and mindset
to turning Europe from a net importer founded as a way of promoting innova- within Europe that fosters creativity,
of components into a net exporter over tion across Europe by increasing collab- innovation, entrepreneurship and the
the course of a decade.521 oration between academic institutions, space to develop and thrive.525
businesses and researchers through a
4.1.5. Results Knowledge and Innovation Community Objectives
(KIC).523 KICs are centres of excellence
ESA is the coordinating entity for around specific topics of importance European Commission research has
European civilian space activities. It is to Europe and are comprised of group- shown that Europe ‘lacks an innova-
responsible for the design and delivery ings of businesses and academic and tion culture’,526 and linkages are not al-
of the European space programme with research institutions which can access ways present to help develop ideas into
the goal of defining and implementing a direct EIT funding through calls for pro- products or services. The EIT was set up
long-term European space policy that al- posals. While the EIT provides strategic with the goal of creating these linkages
lows Europe to remain competitive in the direction and sets thematic priorities, by increasing innovation, enhancing
field of space technology. Table 4.1 pro- the KICs build networks, create educa- entrepreneurship and supporting tal-
vides an overview of the main benefits tional programmes at the Master’s and ent throughout Europe. To do so, the

520 RAND Europe interview with anonymous, 524 EIT (n.d.-a).

26 October 2017. 522 EIT (n.d.-b). 525 EIT (n.d.-b).
521 ESA (2017m). 523 EIT (n.d.-b). 526 European Court of Auditors (2016).

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Figure 4.2 The EIT knowledge triangle respective chief executive, and they pos- funding from private sources, national
sess the autonomy to ‘define their legal or regional funding, or other EU fund-
Education
status, internal organisation and work- ing, such as through the H2020 pro-
ing methods’,531 as well as their business gramme or the European Structural and
plan. This model provides the KICs with Investment Funds.538
the flexibility to respond rapidly to new
challenges and changing environments. 4.2.4. Activities
The KICs are given seven years’ funding
to deliver their goals, with annual mile- The EIT’s activities mainly revolve around
stones along the way, and as explained in funding, hosting innovation, provid-
Section 4.2.4, they are expected to source ing training and education, and being
funding from various private and public an honest broker. However, many of the
Research Innovation
sources. Each KIC has various locations activities tend to overlap with each other.
Source: Adapted from Technopolis (2012). across Europe,532 including a head office, The following paragraphs discuss these
its own management system and a net- four activities in greater detail, highlight-
EIT uses the ‘knowledge triangle’ (see work of partners. ing how they relate to the functional roles
Figure 4.2), a framework to increase col- presented in Appendix D of this report.
laboration between education, research Leadership
and innovation stakeholders. Through Funding
its KICs, the EIT aims to connect dif- The appointed members of the Governing
ferent communities, set up new com- Board serve a mandate of 4 to 6 years, The main activity and purpose of the
panies and promote economic growth, and are identified through a call for ex- EIT is to provide direct R&I funding for
and educate a new generation of entre- pressions of interest. The representative the creation of KICs (O.6.1). KICs are de-
preneurs. The EIT sets the overarching members, who provide the perspective scribed by the EIT as ‘dynamic, cross-bor-
strategies of the KICs, as well as the ac- of the KICs within the Governing Board, der partnerships’.539 Through the KICs,
tivities that contribute to the knowledge are chosen from a list of candidates from the EIT provides direct research funding
triangle through individual Framework the higher education, research and inno- to a variety of research organisations,
Partnership Agreements and Specific vation partner institutions of the KICs.533 higher education institutions and busi-
Grant Agreements.527 nesses, in consortia, who bid for differ-
Organisational funding ent KICs. The EIT organises bi-yearly calls
4.2.3. Governance for proposals on pre-selected topics. As
Both the Strategic Innovation Agenda mentioned in Section 4.2.3, the strate-
Organisational governance (SIA)534 and the EIT’s Regulation define gic direction and topics for the KICs are
the framework for the EIT’s operation be- chosen by the EIT Governing Board.540
The EIT has a Governing Board providing tween 2014 and 2020. Ahead of the start Each specific prospective KIC ‘set[s] their
‘strategic leadership and overall direc- of a new European funding period, the objectives, develop[s] a business model,
tion of the operational activities imple- EIT submits a draft SIA to the European and devise[s] a structure to deliver the
mented by the EIT Headquarters’.528 The Commission, where the strategic direc- results’.541 The role of the KICs is to ‘help
Governing Board is made up of 15 people, tion is determined.535 As a part of H2020, with developing innovative services
with 12 appointed as members and 2 as the EIT has received over €2.4bn for the and products, setting up new compa-
representative members. The Governing 2014 to 2020 period. This money goes to- nies, and training a new generation of
Board decides, independently and au- wards the development of KICs and grant entrepreneurs’.542
tonomously, on the KICs to be put for- funding.536 The award criteria are set by the
ward in the call for proposals, and it is The EIT’s funding model involves Governing Board and encompass certain
responsible for their selection, evalua- funding newly created KICs. According admissibility, eligibility, exclusion, se-
tion and subsequent support.529 There is to the model, ‘the EIT’s financial contri- lection, and financial and operational
also an Executive Committee comprised bution does not exceed 25 per cent (on
of the EIT Governing Board Chairperson average) of an Innovation Community’s 538 EIT (n.d.-k).
and three appointed Governing Board overall resources over the Innovation 539 European Commission (n.d.-p).
members. Its role is to support the ac- Community’s lifetime’.537 KICs should 540 The analysis of future KIC themes is car-
ried out through the submission of a draft
tivities of the Governing Board and the become financially independent, seeking
Strategic Innovation Agenda by the EIT and
implementation of strategic decisions.530 consultation with the wider innovation
In terms of the KICs, these are set up 531 EIT (n.d.-a) community (i.e. academic institutions,
as their own legal entity, each with their 532 See EIT (n.d.-m). research centres and businesses). Further
533 EIT (n.d.-c). detail on the selection of KIC themes
534 Official Journal of the European Union is available on pp.902–903 of the 2013
527 EIT (n.d.-a). (2013). Strategic Innovation Agenda. Source: Official
528 EIT (n.d.-c). 535 EIT (n.d.-e). Journal of the European Union (2013).
529 EIT (n.d.-c). 536 EIT (n.d.-d). 541 EIT (n.d.-f).
530 EIT (n.d.-c). 537 EIT (n.d.-k). 542 European Commission (n.d.-p).

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capacity criteria.543 Proposals are also next evaluation stage, which involves aggregate each individual KIC’s activi-
scored on technical evaluation criteria, hearings with the EIT Governing Board. ties and knowledge flow.554 Each KIC has
which include: The Governing Board evaluates propos- several hubs – having a physical location
▪▪ Strategy: Strategic approach, KIC als against the three criteria (strategy, is important in order to facilitate inter-
partnership innovation potential, operations, impact) above. These points actions among members of each KIC,
synergies; are added to the points allocated by the and the functioning of the knowledge
▪▪ Operations: KIC leadership team and Panel of Experts, and the proposal with triangle (see Figure 4.2). The co-location
operational structure, KIC business the highest number of points is chosen centres are usually part of existing build-
model and financial plan; and for funding.549 ings or offices of KICs’ core partners.555
▪▪ Impact: Impact and KIC score- To date, six KICs have been set up KICs also make use of their co-location
card, dissemination of results and on the topics of food, climate, digital, centres as a base for implementing EIT
communication.544 health, raw materials and sustaina- RIS activities (described in the section
ble energy. A further two KICs are be- below on training and education) and
Box 4.1 Example of a recently awarded ing tendered out on the topics of urban act as platforms for ‘interaction and
KIC: EIT Food mobility and added value manufactur- brokerage, as well as a channel for the
ing. KICs are granted funds from the EIT sharing of knowledge and good prac-
The EIT was looking to set up a KIC on a yearly basis. In 2018, the amount tices related to KTI [Knowledge Triangle
on the topic of ‘Sustainable Supply available for KICs to apply for will be be- Integration] acquired by the KICs’556 for
Chain from Resources to Consumers’, tween €1.5m and €4m.550 the EIT RIS.
and EIT Food was advertised in the
2016 Call for Proposals. The winning Hosting innovation Training and education
consortium is composed of 50 part-
ners across 13 countries. The aim of The EIT has a number of different ac- The EIT and its KICs facilitate knowledge
EIT Food is to ‘engage consumers in tivities aimed at hosting innovation, transfer (role 3.3) and deliver training
the change process, improve nutri- such as hosting prize competitions (role (role 3.4) by providing education pro-
tion and make the food system more 5.2) and hosting ‘co-location centres’ – grammes at Master’s and PhD level, in
resource-efficient, secure, transpar- or innovation incubators – within the order to promote a mindset of innova-
ent, and trusted.’545 The EIT awarded KICs (role 5.3). These include the KICs, tion and entrepreneurship. The EIT also
the consortium a start-up grant of the EIT Awards551 and the EIT Regional looks to share knowledge on innovation
‘up to €4m to ensure that it is fully Innovation Scheme (see section below and entrepreneurship to countries or re-
operational as soon as possible.’546 on training and education). Through gions that do not have this basis.
This KIC could also receive around these activities, the EIT fosters inno-
€400m in funding from the EIT over vation and seeks to promote an entre- KIC education programmes
the next years, as well as funding preneurial mindset. The EIT Awards Through the KICs, the EIT has devel-
from the private and public sectors. are annual awards recognising entre- oped educational programmes with a
Specifically, it aims to support the preneurship, promoting innovation and heavy emphasis on entrepreneurship
establishment of 350 start-ups and celebrating European success. These are skills and innovation knowledge, which
train over 10 000 Master’s and PhD awarded to start-ups, innovative projects are tailored to the European innovation
graduates in the next seven years; and young entrepreneurial talent across system. These are Master’s and PhD pro-
‘develop 290 new or improved prod- Europe with prize money ranging from grammes, offered by the higher edu-
ucts, services, and processes by 2024; €15 000 to €50 000.552 cation institutions of each respective
and decrease greenhouse-gas emis- KICs themselves host innovation in KIC. These graduate programmes are
sions in the European food system the development of new services, pro- delivered in conjunction with various
by 40 per cent by 2030.’547 cesses and products, helped by the inter- businesses and research centres part of
change of ideas through the knowledge the KIC, and these degrees offer ‘inter-
Proposals that reach or exceed the thresh- triangle.553 This process is also helped by national and cross-sectorial mobility
old of 70 per cent of points allocated by the existence of ‘co-location centres’, experiences, as well as applied innova-
the Panel of Experts548 will proceed to the an EIT invention which take the form tion and entrepreneurship education’.557
of regional innovation hubs used to The EIT-labelled degrees are monitored
by the EIT in terms of their ‘quality
543 See EIT (2017a).
and consistent implementation across
544 EIT (n.d.-g). 549 EIT (2017b).
KICs’.558
545 EIT Food (n.d.). 550 EIT (2017a).
546 EIT (2016). 551 EIT (n.d.-l).
547 EIT Food (n.d.). 552 EIT CHANGE Award for EIT Masters or
548 The 2016 Panel of Experts involved 6 eval- PhD programme graduates; EIT Innovators 554 EIT (n.d.-f).
uators, of which 4 were thematic subject Award for innovation teams within KICs; 555 EIT (n.d.-f).
matter experts and 2 were ‘horizontal’ ex- and EIT Venture Award for ‘successful 556 EIT (2017a).
perts. These are high-level, independent entrepreneurial start-ups.’ Source: EIT 557 EIT (n.d.-h).
external experts, covering the Knowledge (n.d.-l). 558 Official Journal of the European Union
Triangle. Source: EIT (n.d.-g). 553 EIT (n.d.-f). (2013).

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EIT Regional Innovation Scheme Table 4.3 Overview of EIT benefits and associated costs
The EIT RIS is included in all KICs’ activ-
ities. Each KIC designs its own EIT RIS, Benefits Costs
including objectives and activities. In ▪▪ The EIT and its KICs are helping to overcome ▪▪ Evaluations have noted accountability issues
the ‘fragmented European innovation landscape’ raised by the European Commission due to
this way, organisations and individu- by bringing together the various stakeholder the EIT’s comparatively complex operational
als in RIS countries (see Table 4.2 below) communities.562 This helps improve the chances framework, which runs differently to that of the
of operationalisation of research results. European Commission and H2020. This results
can work in partnership with KICs and from the EIT’s difference in governance style
access specific services and expertise.559 due to its novel model, which aims to promote
flexibility.565
Specifically, the EIT RIS aims to encour-
▪▪ KICs provide excellent research and innovation ▪▪ Due to its relatively autonomous status, the EIT
age countries that have no participating hubs. The 2008 evaluation found that the receives little oversight from external bodies
organisations in the existing KICs and process for selecting the winning KIC has such as the European Commission and the
been shown to be effective and has delivered European Council on how the EIT governing
are ‘moderate and modest innovators’.560 consortia of strong reputation and excellence.563 team prioritises the institution’s strategic
Through the EIT RIS, the EIT looks to direction. This has brought up issues around the
transparency of the EIT’s decision making.566
share information and good practices ▪▪ The co-location centres, a concept invented by ▪▪ KICs’ lack of transparency relating to their
on innovation and entrepreneurship op- the EIT, have been very successful, as they offer governance undermines public trust in how
a physical innovation hub, facilitating exchanges funding is allocated to each KIC. For example,
portunities in Europe, increasing overall between different types of stakeholders and there have been cases where a consortium
cooperation and ‘know-how’ in the field enabling the creation of networks, which is the member has also been part of the committee
ultimate goal of the EIT’s KICs. scoring proposals and selecting the projects.567
of innovation and entrepreneurship. The
▪▪ There is little robust reporting, monitoring and
creation of the EIT RIS is a way of enhanc- evaluation of the KICs’ performance, and no
ing local innovation eco-systems in ar- overview of their impact. The lack of substantive
monitoring structures and defined KPIs means
eas that do not have a high reported level that it is hard to make an overall assessment of
of innovation or entrepreneurship. This the value of the EIT and its KICs.568

endeavour is set to help widen partici-

pation in KIC activities, and in the long students, innovators, businesses, en- 4.3. Defense Innovation Unit
term, strengthen ties and networks be- trepreneurs and researchers through Experimental
tween businesses, researchers and other its KICs. It also serves to facilitate co-
stakeholders across Europe. ordination and cooperation between 4.3.1. Summary
KICs and organisations and individu-
Table 4.2 Countries eligible for the als in countries less used to innovation US defence policy in the modern era has
EIT RIS 561 through the EIT RIS. Overall, the EIT been characterised by a focus on the de-
forms and supports an innovative and velopment of strategies to counter op-
H2020 Association entrepreneurial community through ponents’ strengths through the use of
EU Member States European Countries the EIT Alumni community for all KIC alternative means, in order to tip the
Bulgaria Albania students and alumni, effectively creat- balance of military capability in favour
Croatia Armenia
ing a pool of people the EIT can draw of US forces. In the context of the US
Cyprus Bosnia and Herzegovina
upon, and reinforcing innovation across defence establishment, innovation, re-
Czech Republic Faroe Islands
Estonia Former Yugoslav
Europe.564 search and development have therefore
Republic of Macedonia relied on targeted ‘offset strategies’. US
Greece Georgia 4.2.5. Results defence offset strategies are policy ap-
Hungary Moldova proaches entailing a clearly articulated
Italy Montenegro
Since the EIT has been set up, it has un- problem space, and a high degree of in-
Lithuania Serbia
dergone several evaluations and audits. dustrial collaboration and competition
Malta Turkey
Overall, these have shown that the EIT supported through federal funding. Most
Poland Ukraine
Portugal has been filling a gap in the European recently, the so-called Third Offset Strategy
Slovakia R&I cycle, and that the KICs have brought was launched with a view to delivering
Slovenia a number of benefits. However, there military capability over the next 5 to
Spain have been areas where the EIT has been 15 years and using current and future
Romania viewed less favourably, as shown in Table technology through a series of focused
4.3 above. programmes.569
Honest broker In this context, the Quadrennial
Defense Review conducted by the DoD
The EIT plays the role of an honest bro- 562 European Commission (n.d.-p).
ker by bringing together academics, 563 Ecorys (2011).
564 EIT (n.d.-i). 569 The first offset was a ‘large scale expan-
565 Ecorys (2011); European Court of Auditors sion in the number of U.S. nuclear weap-
559 EIT (n.d.-j). (2016). ons and their roles in military operations’,
560 According to the European Innovation 566 Ecorys (2011). while the second offset relied on key tech-
Scorecard. See European Commission 567 European Court of Auditors (2016). nologies, such as stealth, information net-
(2017g). 568 Ecorys (2011); European Court of Auditors works and ‘a new strategy of deep attack’.
561 EIT (n.d.-j). (2016). Source: Goure (2016).

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in 2014 identified innovation as a cen- Objectives As part of this plan, DIUx will be re-
tral line of effort in the US national located within the USDR&E, moving
defence strategy. The 2014 QDR empha- To achieve its mission, DIUx aims to the programme leadership and report-
sised in particular the steady erosion of function as a bridge between the DoD ing to the USDR&E. The AT&L restruc-
asymmetric technological capabilities and commercial actors at the cutting turing programme was still a proposal at
enabling the US to maintain a decisive edge of technological developments, the time of writing this report and fur-
military advantage over its adversaries be they defence contractors, large civil- ther changes to DIUx’s organisational
and peer competitors. ian corporations or start-ups. Through governance and location may have oc-
In 2015, the US Secretary of Defense its projects, DIUx focuses on applying curred since.577
established the Defense Innovation Unit small modifications to proven technolo-
Experimental. This was done in recogni- gies, with a view to delivering capability Leadership and membership
tion that the DoD was unable to outpace within 1 to 5 years to tackle current mil-
innovation and technological develop- itary problems and shortfalls.574 In par- DIUx is led by a Managing Partner who
ments independently, and that com- ticular, the programme revolves around oversees a four-person board. The ar-
mercial investments now propel the five focus areas:575 rangement of the DIUx leadership
majority of groundbreaking technolog- 1. Artificial intelligence, to leverage structure was inspired by those of the
ical developments.570 DIUx is designed artificial intelligence and machine innovative start-ups that the programme
to provide funding, in the form of non- learning for operational impact; aims to engage and work with.578 DIUx
dilutive capital,571 for both traditional 2. Autonomy, to adopt and counter au- maintains offices in Silicon Valley,
and non-traditional defence contractors, tonomous systems, with a focus on Boston, Massachusetts, and Austin,
to carry out prototype projects with a human-machine interaction and scal- Texas. It has a team of approximately
view to leveraging commercially based able teaming; 50 professionals including civilian and
innovation for defence purposes. Projects 3. Human systems, to counter emerging active duty personnel, as well as reserves
funded by DIUx have direct relevance to biological threats while enhancing and contractors.579
enhancing the mission effectiveness of survivability, training, biomedical
military personnel and the supporting protection and performance; Organisational funding
platforms, systems, components, or ma- 4. Information technology, to make
terials proposed to be acquired or devel- combat information open and acces- DIUx’s funding stems from the overall US
oped by the DoD. sible for operational forces; DoD budget for Research, Development,
5. Space, to develop on-demand ac- Test, and Evaluation activities.580 During
4.3.2. Vision cess to space, persistent satellite ca- its first year of activity, in the 2016 US fis-
pabilities and broadband space data cal year (1 October 2015 to 30 September
Mission transfer. 2016) DIUx awarded projects to contrac-
tors for a total of $36m. For the 2017 US
Traditional DoD procurement practices 4.3.3. Governance fiscal year, budget appropriations for
are characterised by high barriers to en- DIUx were lowered from an initial re-
try and long timelines for contracting. Organisational governance quest of $30m to $10m.581 DIUx’s funding
Furthermore, the DoD has historically activities are discussed in greater detail
relied on a quasi-monopsonistic busi- In a bid to provide DIUx with an agile in the section below, but it should be
ness approach572 that further discourages decision-making mechanism and access noted that for projects awarded through
participation in public procurement by a to the highest level of decision making DIUx, it is expected that DoD customers
range of companies which rely on com- within the DoD, since May 2016 DIUx has bear most of costs using resources from
mercial customers to rapidly realise a been structured as a standalone organi- the DoD RTD&E budget.582
large return on investment. The mission sation reporting directly to the Secretary
of DIUx is to accelerate the development, of Defense.576 However, following orders
procurement and integration of commer- from Congress, the DoD established a
cially derived disruptive capabilities into plan to be implemented by 1 February
the US DoD.573 2018 to split the existing Undersecretary
of Defense for Acquisition, Technology
and Logistics (AT&L) into two smaller
organisations: the Undersecretary of
Defense for Research and Engineering
570 DIUx (2016).
571 Non-dilutive financing does not require (USDR&E), and the Undersecretary of
the sale of a company’s shares, and Defense for Acquisition and Sustainment
hence does not cause dilution of existing (USDA&S). 577 DoD (2017).
shareholdings. 578 Mehta (2016).
572 This refers to the fact that the DoD was 579 DIUx (N.D.-b; 2016).
often the single buyer controlling a large 574 DIUx (n.d.-a). 580 Thomas (2017).
portion of the defence market. 575 DIUx (n.d.-a). 581 Thomas (2017); DoD (2017b, 261).
573 DIUx (2016). 576 Mehta (2016); DoD (2017). 582 DIUx (2016).

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Figure 4.3 USDR&E proposed organogram and DIUx institutional location

 Sets and advances technology/innovation Under Secretary of Defense  Kill Chain Analysis
(US and threat)
agenda for DOD to dominate battlespace (Research and Engineering)
 Red-Teaming and
Vulnerability Analisis
(Technology/Concepts)

Defence Science Strategic Intel  Global Technology Tracking

MDA
Board Analysis Cell  Technology Forecasting

 Strategic Technology Assistant Secretary of Defense Assistant Secretary of Defense  Developmental

Objectives and Investments (Research and Technology) (Advanced Capabilities) Prototyping
Strategy  Experimentation/
 Foundational Research and Concept Development
Innovative Approaches for DASD DASD  Joint Enduring
Warfighting Challenges Operational Needs ( JEON)
(Mission Engineering & Integration) (Mission Engineering & Integration)
 Affordable & Assured & CCMD Support
Technology Development  Developmental Planning
 Global Technology and Mission Engineering
Outreach and Leverage DASD DASD Analysis (assured
(academic/commercial/ (Laboratories and Personnel) (Prototyping & Experimentation) integration of capability)
govermment/international)  Asquisition Program
 Laboratory Infrastructure Support
and Workforce Policy  Open Architecture/Cyber
DARPA Strategic Capabilities Office
Security Policy &
(SCO)
Standards
 Non-traditional Rapid
Acquisition Pathways
DIUx
SOURCE: DoD 2017.

4.3.4. Activities the Commercial Solutions Opening (CSO). In practice, the DIUx operates through
The CSO brings together aspects of solic- a multi-step investment model that
Funding itation methods used in traditional US broadly follows six stages, as illustrated
Broad Agency Announcements (BAAs) in Figure 4.4 on the next page.
The core of DIUx’s activities revolves with those of a prototype instrument, The first two stages of the DIUx project
around providing non-traditional583 the Other Transaction authority. OTs are award process are described in greater
US DoD vendors and contractors with legally binding instruments that can be detail below, under the FCs to which
funding (O6.1) and facilitating access used for a wide array of research and pro- they most closely pertain. This section
to existing funding resources (O6.2) totype projects. OTs can best be defined by describes procedures in place for the re-
to develop innovative technology solu- describing what they are not. OTs are not quest for initial proposals, the pitch, the
tions, or adapt existing ones, to tackle standard procurement contracts, grants request for full proposals and the award-
current challenges and military capabil- or cooperative agreements. As such, and ing of contracts.
ity gaps.584 DIUx can opt to provide co-fi- as opposed to standard BAAs, OTs are usu-
nancing from its own investment budget ally not subject to US federal laws and Request for initial proposals
for projects, but normally expects DoD regulations (e.g. Federal Acquisition Following completion of the Problem
customers to bear most costs through the Regulation) that apply to government statement identification and market sur-
broader DoD RTD&E budget.585 procurement contracts, and thus offer vey phases, DIUx issues a request for ini-
DIUx provides non-dilutive funding. To more flexible contracting opportunities. tial proposals. Solicitations are posted by
do this, DIUx moved away from traditional The DIUx CSO relies on OTs for awarding DIUx as Areas of Interest (AOIs) on its web-
funding mechanisms and developed an prototype projects. These are defined by site.587 AOIs briefly describe problems to
innovative acquisition mechanism called DIUx as follows: be solved or particular technologies that
DIUx is interested in, rather than de-
 prototype project can generally be described
A tailed specifications and requirements.
583 DIUx defines a non-traditional contrac- as preliminary pilot, test, evaluation, DIUx maintains that keeping AOIs broad
tors as ‘(…) an entity that is not currently demonstration, or agile development activity
performing and has not performed, for
enables it to receive a broader spectrum of
used to assess the viability, technical feasibility,
at least the one-year period preceding the possible solutions from vendors. As such,
application, or military utility of a technology,
solicitation of sources by the DoD for the process, concept, end item, system, methodology, AOIs may comprise just a few sentences
procurement or transaction, any contract or other discrete feature. The quantity or tenure or paragraphs, explaining in simple lan-
or subcontract for the DoD that is subject should be limited to that needed to effectively guage, rather than specialist jargon, the
to full coverage under the cost accounting assess the prototype.586
standards (…)’. See DIUx (2016).
584 DIUx (2016).
585 DIUx(2016). 586 DIUx (2016). 587 DIUx (n.d.-d).

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 Technical Annex

Figure 4.4 DIUx project award process

Problem
statement Request Request
Market Contract
and for initial Pitch for full
survey award(s)
desired proposals proposals
end-state

Source: RAND Europe elaboration on DIUx (2016).

problem or technology of interest. AOIs invitation to continue to the next phase. Request for full proposals
are posted on the DIUx website for a var- In traditional US defense contracting, Successful pitches trigger the issuing of
iable period of time, spanning from a companies whose proposals are not se- a Request for Prototype Proposal, inviting the
week to several months.588 Proposals lected may request and be entitled to a company to submit a full proposal. Once
presented under this phase should con- full debriefing explaining the rationale this is issued, DIUx schedules a kick-
sist of no more than 5 pages or 15 slides, behind this decision. Since DIUx only re- off meeting with the company, the DoD
presenting only information about the quests minimal information from com- customer(s) and the Agreements Officer.
company bidding and the technology of panies at the initial proposal stage, DIUx At the kick-off meeting, companies are
relevance. Proposals are submitted di- does not provide significant feedback be- introduced to contracting mechanisms
rectly through the DIUx website, rather yond a rejection letter following this first to be employed (i.e. OTs), what should
than the standard website for US federal evaluation. Under this phase, DIUx is- be in the proposal, and how the nego-
business procurement.589 sues its feedback to bidders within 30 tiation process works. Additionally, the
In this phase, DIUx evaluates a com- days of reception of initial proposals.592 DIUx will provide an initial model OT to
pany’s solution brief based on four companies, allowing them to become
factors:590 Pitch familiar with the base terms and con-
1. Relevance: Is the company’s submis- Following the request for initial pro- ditions of the project agreement to be
sion relevant to the posted AOI? posals, successful bidders are invited entered as they develop their proposal.594
2. Technical merit: Can the company’s to present a pitch for their proposals to An important function of the kick-off
proposed solution feasibly address the DIUx, mirroring the mechanism em- meeting is to introduce the concept of
AOI? ployed in the world of venture capital. collaborative design. While traditional
3. Business viability: Is the company The pitch is delivered to the DIUx lead- government solicitations require little to
strong enough to effectively accom- ership, relevant DoD customers and the no contact between the vendor and the
plish this work? contracting office, either in person, via customer, the CSO enables a different
4. Innovation: Does the solution rep- videoconference or by phone. During the approach. Rather than the government
resent a unique, innovative or previ- pitch, bidders present their technolo- independently developing the project
ously under-utilised solution? gies and potential projects in greater Statement of Work (SOW), the vendor
detail. Within this engagement, DoD develops the SOW in collaboration with
The evaluation team is generally led by customer(s) and the DIUx discuss po- DIUx and the DoD customer(s). This col-
DIUx and comprises problem and tech- tential uses and project structures with laboration results in a prototype project
nical experts from both DIUx and rele- bidding companies. During the pitch, and scope that is best designed to meet
vant DoD customers. Initial proposals are companies are also required to indi- the needs of both parties. An important
evaluated against the four factors listed cate a rough order of magnitude (ROM) part of the collaborative design effort en-
above, but not against other bids. Since cost and schedule for their proposals. tails reaching an agreement on payment
AOIs are broad and do not contain spe- Following the pitch, the evaluation team milestones and tranches of the project.
cific work that companies must propose re-evaluates the company on the crite- Different contractors may require or pre-
to conduct, bids are evaluated indepen- ria listed above, as well as against the fer different schedules (e.g. a large pro-
dently. Under each AOI, DIUx may de- following:593 ject payment may be needed up-front
cide to award any number of contracts, 1. Cost: Does the ROM cost meet the to meet investor deadlines or to pay for
or award no contracts.591 government’s allocated budget? heavy capital expenditures).595
Based on the results of the evaluation, 2. Schedule: Does the ROM schedule Once the final SOW has been de-
bidders will either receive a non-selec- meet the government’s timeline? signed, the DIUx evaluation team does
tion letter from the Agreements Officer 3. Data rights: Are there any data not review the full proposal for techni-
providing a short summary of why the rights issues to be cognisant of mov- cal merit, but rather issues a recommen-
solution brief was not selected, or an ing forward? dation that the company and proposal
meet the statutory requirements for an
OT award. The rationale behind this is
588 DIUx (2016).
589 DIUx (2016).
590 DIUx (2016). 592 DIUx (2016). 594 DIUx (2016).
591 DIUx (2016). 593 DIUx (2016). 595 DIUx (2016).

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that the SOW is the result of a shared Table 4.4 Overview of DIUx benefits and associated costs
agreement between the service provider
and its customers. The evaluation team Benefits Costs
does perform an analysis to ensure that ▪▪ As of September 2017, DIUx has awarded ▪▪ Adoption of the ad hoc CSO procedure and
approximately $184​ ​million​ ​for​ ​59​ ​pilot​ ​ OT contracting mechanism to stimulate
the proposed price is acceptable to the contracts and​ ​2​ ​follow-on​ ​production​ ​contracts​ ​ engagement by target communities.
government. In this phase, DIUx bal- in the areas of autonomy, artificial intelligence, ▪▪ Integrated teams bringing together stakeholders
human systems, information technology and and dedicated project managers from DIUx, DoD
ances consideration around the need space. Furthermore, as October 2017, DIUx customers and DoD contracting authorities are
for the government to avoid overpaying handed off two pilot projects with commercial required to oversee and manage all phases of
firms. This includes a $750m, five-year contract a proposal and project to completion.
for any service with the need to move at with the US Army.600 ▪▪ Employment of a collaborative design approach
speed, work within industry (not govern- ▪▪ These results suggest that since its establishment enabling DIUx, DoD customers and commercial
DIUx has successfully linked the DoD with suppliers to jointly define and develop prototype
ment) norms, and balance price against private, non-traditional DoD contractors at project SOWs.
other variables.596 the forefront of technological developments, ▪▪ Employment of ad hoc payment schedules for
facilitating access by DoD components to projects providing, where necessary, resources
innovative commercial solutions for military upfront to cover capital-intensive acquisitions.
Contract award challenges and addressing capability gaps. ▪▪ Flexible IP arrangements that leave IP ownership
to implementers and move the DoD away from
Once the final evaluation is complete, its traditional monopsonistic business model.
the terms and conditions of the pro- ▪▪ DIUx has the ability to access over a short ▪▪ Compressed decision-making procedures with
ject OT are negotiated with the com- timeframe technology innovators and developers limited time for internal feedback loops and
to mitigate an existing operational need or oversight for decision-making procedures – this
pany. DIUx aims to negotiate, award capability gap. is offset by the adoption of a contract award
and sign a contract, and begin project system which embeds flexibility and a tranche-
based project design, providing DIUx and DoD
work, within a maximum of 60 days.597 customers with flexibility to reverse or adjust
Since DIUx does not control all of the decisions taken upon the initiation of a project.

required knowledge or funding to fully

execute a project at once, DIUx projects on the next page. Prior to posting an AOI, be a person experienced in working
are usually structured in tranches com- DIUx leverages its networks of contrac- with fast-paced commercial contrac-
prising discrete pieces of work. When a tors and implementers to understand the tors who operate in the technology
tranche of a project has been completed, potential scope of the existing commer- development and innovation field.
DIUx may decide to continue or discon- cial market to answer to the AOI posted
tinue the project. This agile approach al- and the vendors who may respond to it. While DIUx project managers will be re-
lows for quick exits with minimal losses During this phase, DIUx also works with sponsible during project delivery for the
in the case of non-performance, while its network to reach out to communities administrative aspects of the project, the
still maintaining a flexible development and encourage non-traditional vendors DoD customer project managers are ex-
approach that can accommodate modi- to respond to its solicitation.601 pected to manage the technical aspects
fications.598 Furthermore, through its of the prototype project.
contract, DIUx maintains a flexible IP ap- Requirements identification and
proach, as many of the technologies ac- setting 4.3.5. Results
quired through OTs are also commercial
products sold to commercial customers Finally, DIUx facilitates the analysis of DIUx is an organisation within the US
(i.e. not only sold to defence).599 operational needs (role 1.2) during the DoD that functions as a bridge between
Problem statement and desired end-state phase DoD components and commercial ac-
Honest broker of the investment process presented in tors at the cutting edge of technologi-
Figure 4.4. During this phase, an armed cal developments. Through its projects,
The work performed by DIUx under service branch of the DoD may approach DIUx aims to deliver military capabili-
the Funding FC also has relevance for DIUx with a problem or identified im- ties within 1 to 5 years, leveraging new
DIUx’s role under the honest broker provement opportunity. This is then or existing technologies that may be
functional roles. In particular, the col- elaborated in a requirement specification adapted for DoD requirements and pur-
laborative SOW process presented above articulating a concise problem statement poses. Figure 4.4 provides an overview
facilitates coordination and cooperation and the desired end state. To be consid- of the main benefits and associated costs
between DoD customers and industry ered for a DIUx project, the requesting that characterise the DIUx approach and
(role 4.2), especially non-traditional de- DoD customer is required to make two programme discussed above.
fence contractors. commitments:
Further to this, DIUx contributes to 1. Adequate funding for the project
the delivery of role 4.2 responsibilities duration 4.4. Homeland Security
during the Market survey phase of the in- 2. A client project manager to oversee Innovation Programs
vestment process presented in Figure 4.4 the delivery of the project and work
alongside the DIUx and contractor pro- 4.4.1. Summary
ject managers – this should preferably
596 DIUx (2016).
The Homeland Security Innovation
597 DIUx (2016).
598 DIUx (2016). 600 Mehta (2017); DIUx​​(n.d.-c). Programs is a programme which is run
599 DIUx (2016). 601 DIUx. 2016. by the DHS S&T and was launched in

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 Technical Annex

Figure 4.5 S&T organogram as of October 2017

Chief Scientist Chief of Staff

(OCS) Under Secretary for S&T (COS)
(OUS) Office of Corporate
Knowledge Menagement and
Process Improvement Office Deputy Under Secretary Communications Executive
(KPO) (OCC) Secretary
(ESEC)

Director of Director of
Associate General Counsel
Finance and Budget Administration and Support
(AGC)
(FBD) (ASD)

Director of Support to
Director of Homeland
the Homeland Security Capability Development Director of Research and
Security Advance
Enterprise and Support Development Partnerships
Research Projects
First Responders (CDS) (RDP)
(HSARPA)
(FRG)

Capability Development Interagency Office

Office for Interoperabillity Border and Maritime (IAO)
Office ofSupport
System Engineer
and Compatibility Security Division
(OSE)
(CDS)
(OIC) (BMD)
International Cooperative Programs Office
(ICPO)

Technology Chemical and Biological Operational and

Clearinghouse/R-Tech Defense Division Requirements Analysis Office of National Labs
(TCR) (CBD) (ORA) (ONL)

Plum island Animal Disease Center

(PIADC)
National Urban Security Office of
Cyber Security Division
Technology Labolatory Test & Evaluation
(CSD)
(NUSTL) (OTL) National Bio and
Agro-Defense Facility
(NBAF)

Transportation
Office of Resilience Explosives Division Security National Biodefense Analysis and
(OFR) (EXD) Laboratory Countermeasures Center
(TSL) (NBACC)

Chemical SecurityAnalysis Center

(CSAC)
Standards
2015.602 The HSIP aims to generate inno- (STN)
vation and leverage new technological Office of Public-Private Partnerships
solutions to address challenges faced by (PPP)
DHS operational components and other
actors in the broader homeland security engaged in standard DHS procurement Small Business Innovation Research
(SBIR)
enterprise (HSE). To achieve this, the procedures.
HSIP focuses on delivering a range of ac-
Long Range Broad
tivities comprising education, funding Objectives Agency Announcement
and testing work. (LRBAA)
To fulfil its mission, the HSIP aims to:603
4.4.2. Vision 1. Cultivate relations with technology
SAFETY Act Office
innovators and investors;
Mission 2. Fund innovative start-ups and stim-
ulate proposal submission by private Office of University Programs
(OUP)
The HSIP’s mission is to generate inno- sector actors otherwise unlikely to en-
vation and help solve some of the most gage with standard DHS procurement
difficult challenges faced by DHS and procedures; and FFRDC Program Management Office
the HSE. The HSIP aims to do this by 3. Accelerate the transition of new tech-
leveraging innovative products and ser- nological solutions into use by DHS
vices, developing relations with start-ups operational components and other HSSEDI/HSOAC

and technology innovators not usually users in the HSE.

SOURCE: DHS (2017); DHS (n.d.-g).
602 DHS (n.d.-f). 603 DHS (n.d.-f).

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Challenges and Opportunities for Operationalising Border Security Research

4.4.3. Governance regarding the programme budget could (Phase 1), to those entailing testing in
be identified.608 Further details on the different operational settings and meant
Organisational governance funding provided by the HSIP to exter- to result in a commercially viable prod-
nal contractors and the mechanisms uct (Phase 4). A study interviewee noted
The HSIP is run by the S&T under its Office employed for assigning this funding that because the programme was only
of Public and Private Partnerships (PPP). are available in Section 4.4.4 (Funding) recently established, it is not yet possi-
The PPP is located within the Research below. ble to identify examples of projects hav-
and Development Partnerships Group ing completed Phase 3 and Phase 4 of the
(RDP), which is tasked with providing 4.4.4. Activities funding scheme and having made a full
DHS and the wider HSE with access to transition into operational use.611
science-based capabilities and solutions. Activities undertaken by the HSIP can be Table 4.5 on the right provides an
To do so, the RDP sponsors research, de- clustered under three main headlines:609 overview of the OTS funding mecha-
velopment and innovation activities such 1. Educate: Activities under this head- nism employed by the HSIP.
as those of the SBIR. In its work, the RDP line aim both to educate start-ups Projects funded by the HSIP cover a
engages with a wide range of stakeholder about DHS and HSE needs and re- number of issue areas relevant to home-
communities, comprising private sector quirements, and to generate feed- land security, spanning from Internet of
actors, academia, national laboratories, back from technology innovators and Things security to active cyber defence
other governmental departments and funders about developing ways for for financial services, wearable technol-
agencies, and international partners. working in partnership. ogies and small unmanned aircraft sys-
Figure 4.5 provides an overview of the 2. Fund: Activities under this headline tems.612 Projects funded by the HSIP also
DHS S&T organogram, highlighting the aim to provide funds to innovative look at border- and maritime-specific is-
location of the SBIR within it.604 start-ups and other private sector ac- sues. For example, a recently launched
tors that would normally be outside project aims to enhance airport pas-
Leadership and membership the scope of DHS activities. senger processing through the develop-
3. Test: Activities under this headline ment of a smartphone-based interview
The programme has a small labour foot- aim to facilitate a quicker transition capability which allows the remote ver-
print and is run primarily through a of new technological solutions into ification of travellers’ identity using bi-
team of five individuals. The team com- operational use by operational com- ometric information and behavioural/
prises a Program Manager, two contrac- ponents and other actors in the HSE. trend analysis.613
tors located in Washington D.C. and two A study interviewee emphasised that
contractors based in Silicon Valley.605 The following paragraphs discuss HSIP an important aspect of HSIP funding ac-
In addition to these, as indicated by a activities in greater detail. However, tivities are the streamlined bidding pro-
study interviewee, an important role in rather than focusing on the headlines cedures developed to cater to the needs
the success of the HSIP is played by so- presented above, this section highlights of start-ups and technology innovators
called ‘champions’.606 These are contact how HSIP activities relate to the func- usually accustomed to engaging with
points within DHS operational compo- tional roles presented in Appendix D of venture capitalists, rather than govern-
nents and other DHS actors who liaise this report. mental tendering procedures.614 Thanks
with the HSIP team, facilitating a num- to HSIP procedures, the contracting of
ber of activities. For example, champions Funding external providers requires approxi-
can assist in the identification of depart- mately 45 days, as opposed to standard
ments or offices best suited to participate A pivotal element of HSIP activities is DHS tendering procedures that can take
in the pilot testing of an innovative tech- represented by the provision of direct between 9 and 12 months before a project
nology, or aid with the translation into funding (role 4.2) to innovative start-ups is launched. The first step in the HSIP
clear technology requirements of exist- and other technology innovators and pri- bidding process is the submission of a
ing challenges faced by individual DHS vate sector actors that are normally out- short (10 pages maximum) application
components and HSE actors.607 side the reach of DHS RD&I programmes. responding to a problem set and pub-
Companies engaging in the HSIP can lished by the HSIP. In this application,
Organisational funding submit proposals under OTS calls, which bidders are invited to highlight what
are scheduled to release up to $800 000 an existing innovative technology or ap-
Funding for HSIP activities stems from over a 24-month period.610 The HSIP proach can deliver, and how this could
the S&T budget; no detailed figures funds projects at different maturity lev- be adapted to cater to DHS or HSE needs
els, ranging from projects aiming to de- outlined in the problem. Following this,
liver a proof-of-concept demonstration
604 DHS (2015c).
605 RAND Europe interview with anonymous, 611 RAND Europe interview with anonymous,
14 September 2017. 608 For further details on this, please see 14 September 2017.
606 RAND Europe interview with anonymous, Robertson et al. (2017). 612 DHS (n.d.-f).
14 September 2017. 609 RAND Europe interview with anonymous, 613 DHS (n.d.-f).
607 RAND Europe interview with anonymous, 14 September 2017. 614 RAND Europe interview with anonymous,
14 September 2017. 610 DHS (n.d.-f). 14 September 2017.

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 Technical Annex

shortlisted bidders are invited to deliver Table 4.5 DHS S&T SVIP OTS programme framework
an ‘elevator pitch’ presentation, either
in person or via video teleconferencing, Phase Funding Duration Output
with up to 15 minutes for questions and Phase 1 $50k–200k 3–6 months Proof-of-concept demo

discussion. Following this presentation, Phase 2 $50k–200k 3–6 months Demo pilot-ready prototype
Phase 3 $50k–200k 3–6 months Pilot-test prototype in operation
a decision is made by the HSIP team on
Phase 4 $50k–200k 3–6 months Test in various operational scenarios
the same day on whether or not to fund
a project. Since December 2015, the HSIP Source: DHS (n.d.-f).
has advertised 9 calls for proposals, re-
ceiving a total of approximately 220 Table 4.6 Overview of HSIP benefits and associated costs
applications from both US and interna-
tional companies, and providing fund- Benefits Costs
ing of approximately $4m. ▪▪ Access to start-up and venture capitalist ▪▪ Adoption of ad hoc procedures and contracting
communities otherwise not interested in other mechanisms to stimulate engagement by target
DHS programmes. communities.
Honest broker ▪▪ Need to adapt to start-up culture and approach
throughout engagement with this community.
▪▪ Potential lack of IP ownership and/or adoption
A number of activities undertaken by of other contractual measures to accommodate
start-up requirements.
the HSIP pertain to the honest broker
▪▪ Access over a short timeframe to technology ▪▪ Compressed decision-making procedures with
functional roles. The HSIP works to fa- innovators and developers to address an existing limited time for internal feedback loops.
cilitate coordination and cooperation operational need. ▪▪ Access to champions and/or liaison officers
across different operational components
between (role 4.2) and bring together providing details of needs and access to suitable
(role 4.1) start-ups, investors, and DHS departments for piloting and testing.
▪▪ Exposure to and increased understanding ▪▪ Greater risks to delivery as compared to
and HSE actors and components. To
of DHS’s internal functioning for start-ups contracting with large, top-tier companies – this
achieve this, the HSIP regularly under- interested in branching into homeland security may require greater focus from project managers
issues. to facilitate the development and delivery of
takes the following:615
▪▪ Increased attractiveness to venture capitalists of projects.
1. Organising events showcasing indi- start-ups that successfully delivered work for a
governmental programme such as the HSIP.
vidual DHS operational components:
these are designed to facilitate inter-
action between start-ups and DHS op- sector stakeholders is the Silicon Valley understanding of ways to overcome those
erational components, establishing Innovation Program. The SVIP is one barriers to cooperation, for example:617
links among them and facilitating of the HSIP’s regionally focused pro- 1. Streamlining the bidding procedure
a reciprocal understanding of opera- grammes which aims to link DHS and for responding to calls for proposals,
tional challenges and potential tech- other homeland security stakeholders making the HSIP process akin to those
nological innovations. with Silicon Valley companies. The goal employed by venture capitalists; and
2. Organising industry days upon pub- of the SVIP is to develop a shared un- 2. Adopting adjustment measures con-
lication of a call for proposals: these derstanding among DHS and Silicon cerning IP ownership upon project
are events designed to provide start- Valley actors of homeland security re- conclusion (e.g. renouncing IP own-
ups and industry actors interested in quirements, and of how innovation cor- ership and adjusting requirement to
responding to a call for proposals with ridors can help address HSE issues.616 the reception of a technical report)
an opportunity to have face-to-face to increase the appeal of HSIP’s calls
interactions and discussions in or- Requirements identification and for start-ups.
der to better understand the problems setting
outlined in the call, the operational Furthermore, a study interviewee em-
context, and the solution required by Education and stakeholder engage- phasised that an important aspect of
DHS components. ment activities undertaken by the HSIP the HSIP’s establishment was an initial
3. Participating in strategic events and in its role as a honest broker also have period of engagement which was con-
engagements: activities such as (con- implications for the programme’s abil- ducted before the programme was offi-
ferences and technology days are de- ity to identify innovation opportuni- cially launched. This allowed the HSIP to
signed to raise awareness about the ties and understand how to exploit make adjustments to its approach and
HSIP, and engage more broadly with them (role 1.1). In particular, a study maximise its ability to engage and gain
industry, start-ups, and venture interviewee emphasised how engage- access to technology innovators.618
capitalists. ment and education activities conducted Lastly, by maintaining links with
with start-ups and venture capitalists so-called champions across different
An example of a programme run by allowed the HSIP to obtain a better un- DHS components and HSE actors (see
the HSIP that aims to facilitate co- derstanding of barriers to cooperation
ordination among DHS and private between DHS and these stakeholders.
617 RAND Europe interview with anonymous,
It was suggested that HSIP gained an
14 September 2017.
615 RAND Europe interview with anonymous, 618 RAND Europe interview with anonymous,
14 September 2017. 616 DHS. (n.d.-f). 14 September 2017.

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Section 4.4.3), the HSIP continuously Objectives tanks and the private sector. DHS S&T
analyses operational needs of DHS ac- COEs are organised as a network, bring-
tors (role 1.2) and can facilitate access to To fulfil its mission, the S&T COE pro- ing together hundreds of US universi-
and understanding of this information gramme pursues a number of objectives, ties and institutions. Currently, there
among start-ups and venture capitalists which are consistent with those of the are 9 COEs and 5 Emeritus COEs active.
interested in working on HSE issues.619 OUP. Specifically, COE-relevant objec- Emeritus COEs are COEs that no longer
tives of the OUP are to:622 receive base funding from the OUP but
4.4.5. Results 1. Build a stable community of home- can continue to advertise their affilia-
land security researchers and educa- tion and receive funding from DHS op-
The HSIP is designed to facilitate engage- tors at US colleges and universities; erational components through DHS Basic
ment and access to private sector actors 2. Foster a homeland security culture Ordering Agreements (BOA).625 Current
who normally would not engage with within the academic community COEs looking at issues pertaining to bor-
standard DHS RTD&I programmes and through research and educational der and maritime security include:626
funding opportunities. Table 4.6 pro- programs; ▪▪ Borders, Trade and Immigration
vides an overview of the main benefits 3. Generate and disseminate knowledge Institute: BTI is led by the University
and associated costs that characterise and technical advances to advance the of Houston and focuses on developing
the HSIP programme. homeland security mission; technology-based tools, techniques
4. Integrate homeland security activi- and educational programmes for bor-
ties across agencies engaged in rele- der management, immigration, trade
4.5. DHS S&T Centers of vant academic research; and facilitation, and targeting and en-
Excellence 5. Develop a permanent science and en- forcement of transnational borders.
gineering workforce for homeland The BTI COE was established in 2015
4.5.1. Summary security. with an initial grant of $3.4m to a
consortium led by the University of
The DHS S&T funds and manages a 4.5.3. Governance Houston and comprising more than
programme for academic Centers of 25 academic, industry and govern-
Excellence. DHS S&T COEs comprise a Organisational governance ment experts.627
network of US academic institutions ▪▪ National Center for Border Security
tasked with developing multidiscipli- The OUP is tasked with managing the and Immigration: The NCBSI is co-
nary, customer-driven science and tech- DHS S&T University Programs function, led by the University of Arizona and
nology solutions for real-world homeland which comprises three initiatives:623 the University of Texas at El Paso. The
security challenges. By funding COEs, ▪▪ COEs, which aim to harness exper- NCBSI’s activities focus on developing
the DHS S&T also aims to facilitate the tise from US academic institutions technologies, tools and methods to
development of cadres of new experts to support research efforts and de- balance immigration and commerce
and researchers engaged in homeland liver tools, technologies, knowledge with effective border security.
security issues and cognisant of opera- products, training and expertise for ▪▪ Maritime Security Center of Ex-
tional requirements and challenges.620 the homeland security enterprise; cellence (MSC): The MSC is led by
▪▪ Workforce Development Initiatives, the Stevens Institute of Technology.
4.5.2. Vision which aim to educate and train home- Its activities aim to enhance mari-
land security professionals; and time domain awareness and to de-
Mission ▪▪ Minority Serving Institutions velop strategies to support Marine
Programs, which aim to build a di- Transportation System resilience
The mission of the DHS S&T COEs pro- verse homeland security workforce and educational programs for cur-
gramme is aligned with that of the S&T through the COEs. rent and aspiring homeland secu-
Office of University Programs through rity practitioners.
which it is managed. In particular, the Figure 4.6 on the next page provides an
OUP’s mission is to strengthen US sci- overview of the DHS S&T organogram, Organisational funding
entific leadership in homeland secu- highlighting the location of the OUP
rity research and education, to foster within it.624 Funding for DHS S&T COEs stems from
the development of a broader home- the broader DHS S&T budget.628 A study
land security science and engineering Leadership and membership interviewee indicated that annual
workforce, and to develop strategic part-
nerships among universities and public Each COE is led by a university, in col- 625 RAND Europe interview (August 2017);
agencies.621 laboration with partners from other in- Homeland Security University Programs
stitutions, agencies, laboratories, think (n.d.-a).
619 RAND Europe interview with anonymous, 626 DHS (n.d.-d); University of Houston
14 September 2017. (2017a).
620 RAND Europe interview with anonymous, 622 SBIR (n.d.-a). 627 DHS (2015b); BTI (n.d.-a).
1 August 2017; DHS (n.d.-g). 623 DHS (n.d.-c). 628 For further details on this, please see
621 DHS (n.d.-c). 624 DHS (2015c). Robertson et al. (2017).

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 Technical Annex

Figure 4.6 S&T organogram as of October 2017

Chief Scientist Chief of Staff

(OCS) Under Secretary for S&T (COS)
(OUS) Office of Corporate
Knowledge Menagement and
Process Improvement Office Deputy Under Secretary Communications Executive
(KPO) (OCC) Secretary
(ESEC)

Director of Director of
Associate General Counsel
Finance and Budget Administration and Support
(AGC)
(FBD) (ASD)

Director of Support to
Director of Homeland
the Homeland Security Capability Development Director of Research and
Security Advance
Enterprise and Support Development Partnerships
Research Projects
First Responders (CDS) (RDP)
(HSARPA)
(FRG)

Capability Development Interagency Office

Office for Interoperabillity Border and Maritime (IAO)
Office ofSupport
System Engineer
and Compatibility Security Division
(OSE)
(CDS)
(OIC) (BMD)
International Cooperative Programs Office
(ICPO)

Technology Chemical and Biological Operational and

Clearinghouse/R-Tech Defense Division Requirements Analysis Office of National Labs
(TCR) (CBD) (ORA) (ONL)

Plum island Animal Disease Center

(PIADC)
National Urban Security Office of
Cyber Security Division
Technology Labolatory Test & Evaluation
(CSD)
(NUSTL) (OTL) National Bio and
Agro-Defense Facility
(NBAF)

Transportation
Office of Resilience Explosives Division Security National Biodefense Analysis and
(OFR) (EXD) Laboratory Countermeasures Center
(TSL) (NBACC)

Chemical SecurityAnalysis Center

(CSAC)
Standards
funding for individual COEs varies, rang- (STN)
ing on average between $2.5m and $5m Office of Public-Private Partnerships
per year.629 COEs are sponsored by the (PPP)
OUP and are selected through a compet-
itive process. Funding opportunities for the interviewee stressed that engage- Small Business Innovation Research
(SBIR)
COEs are advertised on the website of the ment and brokering activities conducted
Grants.gov programme630 and are open to by academic institutions as part of their
Long Range Broad
US-accredited universities and colleges. COE mandate can help them to obtain Agency Announcement
Applicants are also encouraged to part- additional work and contracts from DHS (LRBAA)
ner with industry. operational components interested in
In addition, a study interviewee the mission area of the COE.631
SAFETY Act Office
emphasised that successful COEs and A 2017 call for a new DHS COE on Cross-
Emeritus COEs may benefit from hav- Border Threat Screening and Supply Chain Defense
ing a privileged channel for engage- indicates that the S&T employs a three- Office of University Programs
(OUP)
ment with DHS operational components stage review process to select COE recip-
through the receipt of additional fund- ients. Review stages are: (i) a review of
ing for additional projects. In particular, the scientific quality of bids by a panel FFRDC Program Management Office
of peers external to DHS; (ii) an inter-
629 RAND Europe interview with anonymous, nal relevance review of bids by a panel
1 August 2017.
of DHS subject matter experts; and (iii) HSSEDI/HSOAC
630 Grants.gov is a US e-government initi-
ative operating under the US Office of
Management and Budget. For further in- 631 RAND Europe interview with anonymous, SOURCE: DHS (2017); DHS (n.d.-g).
formation please refer to Grants.gov (n.d.). 1 August 2017.

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site visits by a team of DHS subject mat- ▪▪ Mission relevance (75%) broader HSE.637 COEs perform this func-
ter experts. When applicable, the review ▪▪ Communicating/transitioning re- tion in both indirectly and directly.
process also entails an assessment of past sults (25%). On an indirect level, the undertaking
performance by COE hosts bidding for a of research and development projects
COE’s renewal.632 A study interviewee emphasised that through COEs provides both graduate
COEs are well placed to conduct or co- and undergraduate students enrolled in
4.5.4. Activities ordinate R&D projects of a conceptual universities involved in COEs to contrib-
and abstract nature. For example, the ute to homeland security related pro-
Funding study interviewee suggested that issues jects, developing their knowledge and
akin to algorithm development, business understanding of real-world homeland
After receiving funding from the DHS process reform and data visualisation security issues and requirements.638 COEs
S&T, COEs can also independently ad- are most suited to COEs.634 Equally, the perform this activity in a more direct
vertise calls for proposals and provide same interviewee stressed that the dif- way by taking part in Workforce Development
funding for research and development ferent business model and pace of work Initiative activities organised by the OUP.
projects (O6.1) that are consistent with that characterise academia may repre- In particular, COEs contribute to:639
the mission outlined in their funding sent a risk or barrier to the delivery of 1. Summer internships: Under this in-
solicitation. For example, between 2015 work. In particular, the interviewee sug- itiative, graduate and undergraduate
and 2017, BTI has advertised three RFPs to gested that universities’ pace of work students can participate in an intern-
fund research programmes focusing on may result in drawn-out delivery pro- ship lasting up to ten weeks during
borders, trade and immigration. Funds cesses, as compared to those of private the summer period. During intern-
released under these RFPs ranged from sector actors, thus requiring more fo- ships, participants conduct research
$325 000 to $3m (with a cap of $500 000 cused engagement and monitoring by in DHS mission-relevant areas, either
per project). In its RFPs, BTI outlined programme managers through a variety at US federal research facilities or at
a number of proposal topic areas and of techniques and stimuli.635 COEs.
research questions relevant to the ini- 2. Military Service Academies Program:
tial COE funding solicitation issued by Information sharing This programme provides faculty
DHS. Organisations eligible to bid for and student teams from US military
these RFPs include US colleges, univer- Universities, colleges and other stake- academies with the opportunity to
sities, for-profit and non-profit organisa- holders interested in responding to ei- conduct research at universities af-
tions. Proposals are assessed by members ther COE funding solicitations or calls filiated with COEs or participate in
of the academic and DHS community for proposals issued by COEs can find rel- field studies sponsored by DHS. The
through a Scientific Quality Review and evant information through a centralised programme aims to increase research
a Relevance Review process. Under the repository of information on funding collaborations between DHS and the
Scientific Quality Review process, pro- opportunities (role 3.1). The Homeland DoD, targeting senior cadets and
posals are rated from 1 to 5 (poor to ex- Security University Programs web portal636 pro- midshipmen.
cellent) against a number of criteria. vides information about such funding
Percentage-weighting factors are then opportunities, as well as a repository of Honest broker
applied to each criterion, as indicated in resources on existing COEs, their pro-
parenthesis below, to calculate the over- jects, COE-related events, and projects’ The COE programme also facilitates the
all scientific quality rating:633 results and achievements. In addition to coordination and cooperation between
▪▪ Originality and/or innovativeness (25%) this, each of the existing COEs provides academia, industry and governmental
▪▪ Proposed approach/methodology (25%) further information and details about its stakeholders (role 4.2). This occurs at
▪▪ Qualifications of personnel and suit- activities, projects and RFPs through its two levels. Firstly, at a higher level, calls
ability of facilities (15%) individual website. for the establishment of COEs encour-
▪▪ Costs (10%). age universities and colleges to partner
Training and education with industry and private sector stake-
Similarly, the Relevance Review involves holders and representatives as they pre-
scoring proposals from 1 to 5 (poor to ex- An important element of the COE model pare their bid.
cellent) against two additional criteria. is the provision of training and edu- Secondly, individual COEs undertake
These are then weighted and combined cation (role 3.4) to facilitate the de- several activities aimed at facilitating in-
to calculate the overall relevance score. velopment of a diverse, highly capable teraction, cooperation and coordination
The factors considered are: technical workforce for DHS and the with other stakeholders from the HSE.

634 RAND Europe interview with anonymous, 637 Homeland Security University Programs
1 August 2017. (n.d.-b).
632 Grant reference: DHS-16-ST-061-CBTS- 635 RAND Europe interview with anonymous, 638 RAND Europe interview with anonymous,
Lead. 1 August 2017. 1 August 2017; BTI (n.d.-a).
633 University of Houston (2017b; 2017c); DHS 636 Homeland Security University Programs 639 Homeland Security University Programs
(2017f). (n.d.-c). (n.d.-b).

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 Technical Annex

Table 4.7 Overview of DHS S&T COE benefits and associated costs development and innovation funds, with
the goal of helping to build a strong na-
Benefits Costs tional economy. To that end, the S&T
▪▪ DHS can have access to a pool of skilled ▪▪ The pace and rhythm of academic life may lead SBIR works to facilitate participation in
researchers and academics at a comparatively to longer delivery timelines as compared to
low cost to investigate a wide array of real- standard private sector companies contracted procurement activities by small US com-
world homeland security challenges. by DHS. panies at the forefront of innovation and
▪▪ Skills and resources available to academic
implementers suggest the programme may be technological development that can help
more suitable for abstract and conceptual issues tackle and mitigate some of the chal-
and challenges, rather than issues requiring the
development of resource-intensive technological lenges faced by DHS and the HSE more
or hardware solutions. broadly.644
▪▪ The programme fosters the development of a ▪▪ Resource investment for running of initiatives
broader scientific and engineering workforce and programmes targeting graduate and
engaged with homeland security issues and undergraduate students to facilitate their Objectives
cognisant of operational constraints and engagement with homeland security.
requirements.
To fulfil its mission, the S&T SBIR pur-
▪▪ Academic institutions involved with COEs can ▪▪ Costs associated with organisation and running
use interface opportunities associated with of stakeholder engagement activities, both by sues a number of objectives, which are
this programme to secure additional work and DHS and COE managers, to facilitate interaction
consistent with those of the governmen-
contracts with DHS components and other HSE with operational components and other
actors. potential clients from HSE. tal SBIR initiative. Specifically, the SBIR
initiative’s objectives are to:645
1. Stimulate technological innovation;
COEs work with their DHS programme associated costs that characterise the 2. Meet federal R&D needs;
managers to facilitate frequent engage- DHS S&T COEs programme. 3. Foster and encourage participation in
ment with DHS stakeholders, especially innovation and entrepreneurship by
operational components, both on the women and socially or economically
COE site and during field visits.640 Such 4.6. Small Business Innovation disadvantaged persons; and
engagement activities may also involve Research 4. Increase private sector commercial-
industry representatives and academic isation of innovations derived from
partners, depending on the topics and 4.6.1. Summary federal R&D funding.
objectives of engagements. There are The Small Business Innovation
two key objectives of stakeholder meet- Research programme is run by DHS 4.6.3. Governance
ings. Firstly, they are designed to help through the S&T and the DNDO as part
COEs gain insights on the needs and re- of the US government’s broader SBIR ini- Organisational governance
quirements of operational components tiative. The SBIR initiative was launched
and other HSE actors. Secondly, attend- in 1982 by the US government in an ef- The SBIR is run by the S&T under the PPP.
ing stakeholders, who in this context fort to facilitate participation in govern- The main purpose of this office is to de-
are seen as potential end users, have mental procurement activities by small velop and implement programmes that
an opportunity to learn about the pro- companies (i.e. those with fewer than identify technologies, evaluate them
gress of COEs’ research. In this regard, 500 employees) at the forefront of inno- and facilitate their commercialisation
these meetings may also be seen to ful- vation and technological developments. as products or services. The PPP is located
fil a technology demonstration func- The DHS joined the SBIR programme in within the RDP. The RDP is tasked with
tion (role 5.1), helping COEs to showcase 2004, becoming one of 11 government providing DHS and the HSE more broadly
their products and results, and helping agencies engaged in the initiative.642 In with access to science-based capabilities
them identify, with support from stake- light of the relevance of the S&T’s areas and solutions. To do so, the RDP sponsors
holders, potential challenges or oppor- of work to Frontex, this case study will research, development and innovation
tunities for the transition to operational focus on the functioning of the S&T SBIR activities such as those of the SBIR. In
use of COEs’ work.641 programme. its work, the RDP engages with a wide
array of stakeholder communities, com-
4.5.5. Results 4.6.2. Vision prising private sector actors, academia,
national laboratories, other governmen-
The DHS S&T COEs are designed to de- Mission tal departments and agencies, and in-
velop a network of US academic insti- ternational partners. Figure 4.7 overleaf
tutions working to develop (i) science The mission of the S&T SBIR programme provides an overview of the DHS S&T or-
and technology solutions for real-world is aligned with that of the broader SBIR ganogram, highlighting the location of
homeland security challenges; and (ii) a initiative.643 It aims to support scien- the SBIR within it.646
new workforce of homeland security ex- tific excellence and technological inno-
perts and scientists. Table 4.7 provides vation through investment in research,
an overview of the main benefits and
644 RAND Europe interview with John Pucci,
642 Please see DHS (n.d.-e). 15 September 2017; SBIR (n.d.-a).
640 Maritime Security Centre (2016). 643 RAND Europe interview with John Pucci, 645 SBIR (n.d.-a).
641 Maritime Security Centre (2016). 15 September 2017. 646 DHS (2015c).

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Challenges and Opportunities for Operationalising Border Security Research

Figure 4.7 S&T organogram as of October 2017

Chief Scientist Chief of Staff

(OCS) Under Secretary for S&T (COS)
(OUS) Office of Corporate
Knowledge Menagement and
Process Improvement Office Deputy Under Secretary Communications Executive
(KPO) (OCC) Secretary
(ESEC)

Director of Director of
Associate General Counsel
Finance and Budget Administration and Support
(AGC)
(FBD) (ASD)

Director of Support to
Director of Homeland
the Homeland Security Capability Development Director of Research and
Security Advance
Enterprise and Support Development Partnerships
Research Projects
First Responders (CDS) (RDP)
(HSARPA)
(FRG)

Capability Development Interagency Office

Office for Interoperabillity Border and Maritime (IAO)
Office ofSupport
System Engineer
and Compatibility Security Division
(OSE)
(CDS)
(OIC) (BMD)
International Cooperative Programs Office
(ICPO)

Technology Chemical and Biological Operational and

Clearinghouse/R-Tech Defense Division Requirements Analysis Office of National Labs
(TCR) (CBD) (ORA) (ONL)

Plum island Animal Disease Center

(PIADC)
National Urban Security Office of
Cyber Security Division
Technology Labolatory Test & Evaluation
(CSD)
(NUSTL) (OTL) National Bio and
Agro-Defense Facility
(NBAF)

Transportation
Office of Resilience Explosives Division Security National Biodefense Analysis and
(OFR) (EXD) Laboratory Countermeasures Center
(TSL) (NBACC)

Chemical SecurityAnalysis Center

(CSAC)
Standards
Leadership and membership (STN)
Office of Public-Private Partnerships
The DHS SBIR programme is run from (PPP)
within the S&T PPP. A study interviewee
emphasised that an important element Organisational funding Small Business Innovation Research
(SBIR)
of the management of the S&T SBIR pro-
gramme is coordination and coopera- Funding for SBIR activities stems from
Long Range Broad
tion with SBIR programmes run by other the S&T R&D budget. A study interviewee Agency Announcement
governmental agencies. In particular, indicated that 3.2 per cent of the S&T’s (LRBAA)
it was indicated that calls for proposals annual R&D budget is currently ear-
and projects are designed with a view to marked for SBIR activities.648 Further
SAFETY Act Office
generating synergies and maximising details on the funding provided by the
the benefits of resources used, tackling DHS SBIR to external contractors and
challenges and issues that are shared the mechanisms employed for assign- Office of University Programs
(OUP)
or have implications for multiple stake- ing that funding are available in Section
holders (e.g. DHS and DoD).647 4.6.4 below.
FFRDC Program Management Office

HSSEDI/HSOAC
648 RAND Europe interview with John Pucci,
15 September 2017. For further details on
647 RAND Europe interview with John Pucci, this, please see Robertson et al. (2017). SOURCE: DHS (2017); DHS (n.d.-g).649
15 September 2017. 649 DHS (n.d.-g).

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 Technical Annex

Table 4.8 DHS SBIR funding scheme submit proposal that is too ambitious
or unrealistic to be suitable for funding
Phase Funding Duration Output under Phase II.655
Phase I Up to $100k 6 months Concept feasibility paper Furthermore, a study interviewee
Phase II Up to $1M 24 months Prototype demonstration suggested that topics put forward in SBIR
Phase III External to DHS NA Commercial product or service
solicitations should not provide overly
Source: RAND Europe interview (September 2017). detailed specifications of problems faced
or requirements pursued. It was argued
4.6.4. Activities Table 4.8 above provides an overview that this may draw boundaries around
of the funding mechanism employed by issues, barring submission from innova-
Funding the DHS SBIR. tors who may have identified opportuni-
Projects funded by the DHS SBIR ties or challenges that had not initially
A fundamental element of the SBIR’s ac- cover a number of issue areas relevant been taken into consideration.656 It was
tivities is the provision of direct fund- to homeland security. Study interviewees also emphasised that SBIR solicitations
ing (O6.1) to small companies that are suggested that non-classified issues of a are usually tailored to address forward-
at the forefront of innovation and tech- technical nature and with clearly scoped looking needs and requirements, rather
nological developments, but would requirements are better suited for this than current ones, since products and
otherwise be unable to compete with type of programme than broader RD&I services emerging from SBIR projects
primes under larger DHS procurement matters.651 For example, one interviewee come to fruition only after a period of
initiatives. stressed that several challenges faced by 3 to 4 years.657
The SBIR funding mechanism is struc- first responders had been successfully
tured around three phases. The first tackled or mitigated through solutions Information sharing
two phases are supported by the SBIR stemming from SBIR funding.652 The S&T Small companies interested in re-
through direct funding or co-funding. SBIR presents success stories from pro- sponding to SBIR solicitations are pro-
The third phase covers the final transi- jects that completed Phase III through vided with a centralised repository
tion of a product or service to commer- online publications.653 of information on funding opportu-
cial sustainability. This phase is not Topics for SBIR solicitations are de- nities (role 3.1) by both the S&T SBIR
supported by SBIR through funding, veloped by S&T programme managers programme and the broader SBIR ini-
but companies undertaking Phase I and to address the needs of DHS operational tiative. The S&T SBIR maintains an on-
Phase II projects are supported through components, as well as first responders. line programme portal658 which provides
training, mentoring and other activities Solicitations usually cover topics relevant information about current and past so-
in their search for funding. to the work of a range of S&T divisions, licitations, news and events connected
In Phase I of SBIR funding, over the including:654 to the programme, details of awarded
course of six months, implementers are ▪▪ Borders and Maritime Security funds, statistics about the programme,
required to develop a concept feasibility Division and a repository of resources for compa-
paper demonstrating how a new tech- ▪▪ Chemical and Biological Defense nies interested in learning about and
nological solution could be developed Division joining the bidding process.
or adapted to respond to an operational ▪▪ Cyber Security Division Similarly, a government-wide SBIR
challenge faced by a DHS component. ▪▪ Explosives Division online portal is available.659 This portal
Projects that successfully complete Phase ▪▪ First Responders Group. provides similar information about the
I can then compete for Phase II fund- broader SBIR initiative, as well as links
ing. Under Phase II, over the course of A study interviewee stressed that an and references to agency-specific SBIR
24 months, implementers are required important lesson learned through- portals, such as the DHS example dis-
to complete the development of a func- out the first years of the DHS SBIR pro- cussed above.
tioning prototype of their service or prod- gramme was the need to design better
uct. Phase III targets the achievement benchmarking and monitoring mecha- Hosting innovation
of commercial sustainability of prod- nisms to ensure a higher rate of transi-
ucts and services developed. The SBIR tion between Phase I and Phase II of the Part of the work of the S&T SBIR pro-
programme does not provide funding programme. Measures were therefore gramme entails the running of tech-
to cover this phase of work; however, taken to minimise the risk that com- nology demonstrations (role 5.1) with
a number of activities described in the panies may pursue SBIR funding and a view to presenting a product or service
sections below are designed to maxim- purposely deliver only up to Phase I, or
ise exposure of SBIR-supported compa- 655 RAND Europe interview with anonymous,
nies to venture capitalists and increase 651 RAND Europe interviews with anonymous, 1 August 2017.
their likelihood of success in obtaining 1 August 2017 and with John Pucci, 15 656 RAND Europe interview with anonymous,
September 2017. 1 August 2017.
funding required for Phase III work.650
652 RAND Europe interview with anonymous, 657 RAND Europe interview with John Pucci,
1 August 2017. 15 September 2017.
650 RAND Europe interview with John Pucci, 653 DHS (2016d). 658 DHS SBIR (n.d.).
15 September 2017. 654 DHS (n.d.-h). 659 SBIR (n.d.-b).

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Challenges and Opportunities for Operationalising Border Security Research

Table 4.9 Overview of SBIR benefits and associated costs and others interested in high-tech-
nology research and development.662
Benefits Costs Furthermore, study interviewees iden-
▪▪ Access to small businesses at the forefront of ▪▪ Greater risks to delivery as compared to tified additional benefits companies par-
innovation and technological developments contracting with large, top-tier companies –
otherwise unable to compete in larger DHS this may require greater focus from project ticipating in the SBIR and engaging in
procurement programmes and initiatives. managers to facilitate the development and such events, including:663
delivery of projects.
▪▪ Access and exposure to internal DHS
▪▪ Ability to tackle forward-looking issues through ▪▪ The scope of problems to be tackled needs to be
innovative approaches and solutions that well defined and scoped upon project launch. work and mechanisms, facilitat-
translate into commercial products or services. ▪▪ Need to identify emerging requirements for ing understanding among external
which DHS components or HSE stakeholders will
have an appetite over a 3-to-4-year period. firms of the department’s work and
▪▪ Exposure to and increased understanding of ▪▪ Greater risks to delivery as compared to functioning;
DHS internal functioning for small businesses contracting with large, top-tier companies – this
▪▪ Increased trust from and exposure to
interested in HSE issues. may require greater focus from project managers
▪▪ Increased attractiveness to venture capitalists of to facilitate the development and delivery of venture capitalists and other funders
small businesses that have successfully delivered projects.
who are more likely to fund compa-
work for a governmental programme such as ▪▪ Provision of ad hoc training to small businesses
SBIR. with limited knowledge and understanding of nies with a successful track record of
upscaling and transition towards a commercially
work with government departments
successful and sustainable product or service.
through the SBIR; and
▪▪ Training opportunities and develop-
prototype to convince stakeholders and to achieve the successful commerciali- ment support provided throughout
potential investors about its relevance sation of their products and ensure the contract delivery by SBIR programme
and feasibility. These activities represent continued development and sustainabil- officers and managers engaging with
the culmination of projects conducted ity of results achieved with SBIR fund- a firm.
as part of Phase II of SBIR funding dis- ing through Phase III.
cussed above. 4.6.5. Results
Honest broker
Training and education The S&T SBIR programme is designed run
The facilitation of coordination and co- as part of the broader DHS SBIR and US
A study interviewee indicated that a operation between small companies, governmental SBIR initiative. It aims to
number of companies engaged in the DHS operational components, and in- facilitate engagement in governmental
SBIR programme receive training and vestors (role 4.2) represents an impor- procurement activities by small compa-
education (role 3.4) as part of their work tant aspect of the S&T SBIR’s work. A nies at the forefront of technological de-
with the S&T. In particular, companies study interviewee emphasised that the velopments and innovation more broadly
and implementers may be asked to par- programme actively contacts relevant that would otherwise be unable to com-
ticipate in a six-week course organised businesses, informing them of upcom- pete in standard procurement activities.
by the National Science Foundation ing calls and requirements of DHS com- Table 4.9 provides an overview of the
(NSF) called Innovation Corps (I-Corps).660 ponents.661 As part of such efforts, events main benefits and associated costs that
I-Corps is designed to provide imple- and webinars are hosted to engage with characterise the S&T SBIR programme.
menters working on an S&T SBIR pro- the small businesses community, inves-
ject with a better understanding of how tors, technology-oriented entrepreneurs

662 DHS (n.d.-i).

663 RAND Europe interviews with anonymous,
660 RAND Europe interview with John Pucci, 661 RAND Europe interview with John Pucci, 1 August 2017; RAND Europe with John
15 September 2017; NSF (n.d.-a). 15 September 2017. Pucci, 15 September 2017.

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Appendix A: List of interviewees

We are grateful to the numerous border informed the conclusions of this study. anonymised in Table A.1 and through-
security practitioners, policy officials, Where consent has been given, their out the report in certain cases where
industry representatives and academic names and/or affiliations are listed in interviewees have asked to remain
experts who took part in interviews and the table below. Contributions have been anonymous.

Table A.1 List of interviewees

Name Organisational affiliation Case study expertise Date of interview

Anonymous EU policy official EU 21 March 2017

Anonymous FP7 project coordinator EU 31 March 2017

Anonymous EU project coordinator EU 3 April 2017

Anonymous (3 representatives) European organisation EU 3 April 2017

Dragos Voicu Research officer, Frontex EU 11 April 2017

Anonymous Academic expert, Finland EU 13 April 2017

Anonymous Frontex EU 19 April 2017

Lilian Gaichies & Eric Lebegue COO and CEO advisor, StreamWIDE EU 19 April 2017

Triantafyllos Karatrantos Senior researcher, Centre for Security Studies (KEMEA) EU 20 April 2017

Anonymous (2 representatives) EU institution EU 24 April 2017

Anonymous EU Project Officer EU 26 June 2017

Dr John Coyne Head of Border Security, Australian Strategic Policy Institute Australia 20 March 2017

Anonymous Australian Department of Immigration and Border Protection Australia 29 March 2017

Anonymous Anonymous Australia 30 March 2017

Anonymous (2 representatives) Anonymous US 24 March 2017

Anonymous (2 representatives) Anonymous US 5 May 2017

Anonymous (2 representatives) Defence Research and Development Canada – Centre for Security Canada 19 April 2017
Science

Phil Lightfoot Canada Border Services Agency Canada 19 April 2017

Christian Leuprecht Royal Military College of Canada Canada 21 April 2017

Anonymous Anonymous Canada 21 April 2017

Joel Sokolsky Royal Military College of Canada Canada 25 April 2017

Anonymous Anonymous Turkey 3 May 2017

Anonymous Anonymous Egypt 29 April 2017

Faycal Cherif Institut Supérieur d’Histoire de la Tunisie Contemporaine. (ISHTC) Tunisia 25 April 2017

Anonymous EU Project Officer EU 26 June 2017

Anonymous (2 representatives) Anonymous Australia 24 July 2017

Anonymous Anonymous US 1 August 2017

Pantelis Michalis & George Centre for Security Studies (KEMEA) EU 30 August 2017
Leventakis

Anonymous Anonymous US 14 September 2017

Peter Ryman Swedish Coast Guard EU 20 September 2017

John Pucci DHS SBIR Program Director, DHS Science and Technology Directorate US 15 September 2017

Anonymous Anonymous EU 26 October 2017

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Challenges and Opportunities for Operationalising Border Security Research

Appendix B: List of interview questions

This appendix provides an outline of the countries and regions. Box B.1 pre- project coordinators in order to fo-
types of questions asked during the re- sents the protocol used for EU inter- cus on the operationalisation of EU-
search interviews. The interviews were viewees as an illustrative example of funded research. Box B.2 outlines the
semi-structured, which means that the the interview questions used during additional set of questions developed
RAND study team used the list of ques- the study. While the discussion was for these interviewees.
tions as a guide to touch on the key top- framed around the same topics across ▪▪ The WP3 protocol focuses on case stud-
ics relevant for this study, rather than the case studies, the questions were ies of selected EU and non-EU organ-
following a rigid protocol. tailored to the specific regional focus isations in order to develop a better
Three interview protocols are pre- of the interview. understanding of different opera-
sented in this appendix: ▪▪ In response to comments from the tional models (see Box B.3).
▪▪ The WP1–2 protocol focuses on border Steering Committee, additional WP1
security research in the case study interviews were conducted with EU

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 Technical Annex

Box B.1 List of interview questions: EU

Part A: Introduction Part D: Lessons Learned and Way Forward

▪ 
Study team introduction and study context. 7. Perceived Effectiveness of Border Security Research
▪ 
Do you have any questions about the study before we Management Approaches:
begin? ▪ 
How effective do you consider border security
▪ 
Please could you start by tell us briefly about your research management approaches in the EU (in
role, describing how your professional background terms of how well research findings are integrated
and interests relate to EU border security research? into operational practice)?
▪ 
Why do you consider these approaches effective/
Part B: Wider Context for Border Security ineffective (as applicable)?
Research Management 8. Benefits of Border Security Research Management
1. Contextual factors: Approaches:
▪ 
What are the main border security challenges ▪ 
In your view, what works well in the setup and
affecting the EU at present? [e.g. illegal border crossings, management of border security research in the EU?
smuggling, cross-border crime] ▪ 
Why does this work well?
▪ 
How much strategic importance is assigned 9. Shortcomings of Border Security Research
to border security in the EU? How is ‘border Management Approaches:
security’ ranked among the EU’s policy priorities? ▪ 
In your view, what works less well in the setup
[Prompts: high (i.e. top 3 policy priorities), medium (i.e. top 3–10 and management of border security approaches
policy priorities), low (i.e. not in top 10 policy priorities)] in the EU?
▪ 
Who are the main actors (types of organisation) ▪ 
Why does this work less well?
involved in commissioning border security research? 10.Lessons Learned:
[Prompts: national border guard agency, wider government, ▪ 
How can the ways in which border security research
industry/SMEs, academia, other (please specify)]. is managed be improved?
▪ 
What are the main challenges affecting the conduct ▪ 
Are you aware of ‘good practices’ applied elsewhere
and management of border security research in your that could help improve EU processes? [Prompts: other
country? [e.g. interruptions to funding streams, poor access to countries, sectors, organisations]
research findings, inadequate research management]
Part E: Interview Close
Part C: Research Setup and Management ▪ 
Are there any further comments or observations that
2. How are border security research topics identified you would like to make?
and prioritised in the EU? [Prompts: who (main stakeholders ▪ 
Can you think of anyone else it would be useful
involved), how (relevant processes and associated timelines/costs) for us to talk to in this area? Is there any relevant
3. How are border security research projects selected literature that you would suggest we look at?
in the EU? [both in terms of specification and award] ▪ 
Thank you for your time and insights. If we have
[Prompts: who, how] any further questions or clarifications, would you be
4. What are the main inputs to border security happy for us to contact you again?
research? [Prompts: budget management, key actors,
Terms of Reference]
5. How is the progress of border security research
projects monitored and evaluated? [Prompts: who, how]
6. How are the findings of EU border security research
implemented in practice? [Prompts: who, how]

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Challenges and Opportunities for Operationalising Border Security Research

Box B.2 presents the protocol used for the additional EU in-
terviews conducted to further explore the operationalisation
of EU-funded research.

Box B.2 List of interview questions: EU additional interviews

Introduction Checklist (see Q5)

▪▪ Research team introduction and study context ▪▪ Sharing information on R&D opportunities
▪▪ Do you have any questions about the study before we ▪▪ Facilitating access to DHS/NATO funding instruments
begin? ▪▪ Bringing government, industry, academia and other ac-
▪▪ Please could you tell us briefly about your current role tors together
and responsibilities? ▪▪ Conducting in-house R&D
▪▪ Providing debt and risk sharing schemes
Interview Questions ▪▪ Hosting an innovation incubator for ventures
1. Please describe your involvement in [specific FP7/H2020 ▪▪ Delivering support to industry to assist them in taking
project]. their innovations to market
2. How far were the results of this project adopted into your ▪▪ Using DHS/NATO procurements and contracts to ‘pull’ in-
operational practice? novative solutions from the market
a. [If yes]: Please describe the impact of this research on ▪▪ Running demonstrations for innovative research and
your operational practice. What factors have enabled this technologies
change? ▪▪ Running prize competitions or ‘grand challenges’ to stim-
b. [If no]: What factors have prevented you from operation- ulate research solutions to challenges
alising the research results? ▪▪ Delivering training on research and innovation for DHS/
3. Are you aware of any EU-funded projects where research NATO officials
results have been successfully operationalised? [If yes]: ▪▪ Other: [Please describe]
Please elaborate.
4. In your view, are there ways in which EU-funded research Interview Close
could be more effectively operationalised? Please elaborate. ▪▪ We have now covered the questions we wanted to ask
5. How do you think Frontex could facilitate the adoption of you. Do you have any further comments or observations?
EU-funded research into practice? What role could they ▪▪ Can you recommend any relevant literature sources that
play in this process? [Prompts: see checklist below] we should consult as part of this study?
▪▪ If we have further questions, can we get back to you?

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 Technical Annex

Box B.3 outlines the interview protocol that was used to guide
the WP3 interview discussions.

Box B.3 List of interview questions: Case studies

Introduction Checklist (see Q3)

▪▪ Research team introduction and study context ▪▪ Sharing information on R&D opportunities
▪▪ Do you have any questions about the study before we ▪▪ Facilitating access to DHS/NATO funding instruments
begin? ▪▪ Bringing government, industry, academia and other ac-
▪▪ Please could you tell us briefly about your current role tors together
and responsibilities? ▪▪ Conducting in-house R&D
▪▪ Providing debt and risk sharing schemes
Interview Questions ▪▪ Hosting an innovation incubator for ventures
This interview will focus on Centers of Excellence (COE), Small ▪▪ Delivering support to industry to assist them in taking
Business Innovation Research (SBIR), Apex Programmes and their innovations to market
Technology Engines, Homeland Security Innovation Programs ▪▪ Using DHS/NATO procurements and contracts to ‘pull’ in-
(HSIP) and other US/NATO models of potential relevance to novative solutions from the market
Frontex. For each model: ▪▪ Running demonstrations for innovative research and
1. Please describe the model and how it works in practice. technologies
2. Who is responsible for its implementation? ▪▪ Running prize competitions or ‘grand challenges’ to stim-
3. What are the model’s main functions? [Prompts: use check- ulate research solutions to challenges
list in Box 1] ▪▪ Delivering training on research and innovation for DHS/
4. What are the key challenges faced by DHS/NATO in de- NATO officials
livering these functions? ▪▪ Other: [Please describe]
5. How far does this model help integrate research into op-
erational practice? Please elaborate, providing examples Interview Close
where possible. ▪▪ We have now covered the questions we wanted to ask
6. How effective do you consider this model in fostering re- you. Do you have any further comments or observations?
search and innovation? What are its main advantages? ▪▪ Can you recommend any relevant literature sources that
[Prompts: bringing actors together, sharing information, providing ac- we should consult as part of this study?
cess to DHS funding, funding innovative R&D] ▪▪ If we have further questions, can we get back to you?
7. If you had the opportunity to set up a new research and ▪▪ Thank you very much.
innovation platform, which elements of this model would
you replicate, and what would you do differently?

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Appendix C: Survey outlines

This appendix presents the outlines of the surveys sent to EU

MS and to industry and academic representatives.

EU MS survey

As illustrated in Figure C.1, this survey was designed to con-

sider all of the steps of the research pathway. Parts A to D fo-
cus on research funded and conducted at the national level,
and Part E focuses on the involvement of the respondent coun-
try in EU-funded research.

Figure C.1 EU MS survey outline

MS-funded research EU-funded research

Part A: Part C: Part E:

Part B: Part D:
Respondent Research setup and H2020/FP7
Wider context Lessons learned
background Implementation involvement

Q1: Contextual
factors affecting Q2: Overview of Q7: Benefits of Q11: H220/FP7
research setup and R&D landscape approaches engagement
menagement

Q3: Identification Q8: Shortcomings of

of research areas approaches
Source: RAND analysis (2017).

Q4: Selection of Q9: Improvement of

projects approaches

Q5: Monitoring and Q10: Improvement of

evaluation approaches

Q6: Pathways to
impact

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 Technical Annex

Part A: Respondent Background

Name [Please enter text here]

Organisational affiliation [Please enter text here]

Country [Please enter text here]

Contact details [Please enter text here. Please note that these contact details will only be used for any points of clarification regarding your completed
(email and telephone) survey.]

Attribution preference [Please could you confirm your preference regarding how your data is attributed in the report and any resulting publications:
Option 1: ‘Full attribution’: being named and quoted;
Option 2: ‘Partial anonymity’: only your organisational affiliation (role, organisation – please specify) being associated with your quotes;
Option 3: ‘Full anonymity’: your data being used without reference to your name or organisational affiliation.]

Part B: Wider Context for Border Security Research Management

Question 1 asks you to describe the contextual factors affecting how border security research is set up and managed in your country.

1. Contextual Factors

1.1. How much strategic importance is assigned to ‘border security’ in your country?

□ High (i.e. in the top 3 policy priorities)

☐ Medium (i.e. in the top 3–10 policy priorities)

☐ Low (i.e. not in the top 10 policy priorities)

[Further comments: please elaborate on how ‘border security’ is ranked among your country’s policy priorities.]

1.2. What are the main border security challenges facing your country (e.g. illegal border crossings, cross-border crime)?

[Please enter text here]

1.3. Who are the main actors (types of organisation) involved in commissioning border security research?

□ National border guard agency

☐ Wider government

☐ Industry/SMEs

☐ Academia

☐ Other (please specify below)

[Further comments: Please enter text here]

1.4. Are there any contextual factors (e.g. economic, political or legal factors) that affect the way that border security research is set up, delivered and
integrated into operational practice?

[Please enter text here]

1.5. What are the main challenges affecting the conduct and management of border security research in your country (e.g. interruptions to funding
streams, poor access to research findings, inadequate research management)?

[Please enter text here]

1.6. Other comments:

[Please enter text here]

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Challenges and Opportunities for Operationalising Border Security Research

Part C: Research Setup and Implementation

Question 2 asks you to outline how research topics are identified and prioritised in your country.

2. Identification and Prioritisation of Research Topics

2.1. Who are the main stakeholders involved in the identification and prioritisation of border security research topics, and what are their roles and
responsibilities?

[Please enter text here]

2.2. How are research topics relating to border security selected and prioritised, and what are the associated timelines?

[Please enter text here]

2.3. Are these research topics clustered into themes (e.g. by institutions, by threat, by technology)? If ‘yes’, what are they?

☐ Yes

☐ No

[Further explanation: please enter text here]

2.4. How would you estimate the balance of high-tech, low-tech, and non-technological & social sciences research commissioned in your country?

☐ Mostly high-tech (i.e. complex technology applied and demonstrated in its final form)

☐ Mostly low-tech (i.e. low complexity technology where scientific research begins to be translated into applied research and development)

☐ Mostly non-technological (e.g. social sciences)

☐ Even distribution across the three areas

[Further explanation including estimated proportion of each type of research: please enter text here]

2.5. Is the ‘impact potential’ of border security research considered when identifying and prioritising research topics?

☐ Always

☐ Mostly

☐ Sometimes

☐ Rarely

☐ Never

[Further explanation: please enter text here]

2.6. How (if at all) is ‘impact potential’ measured?

[Please enter text here]

2.7. Other comments

[Please enter text here]

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 Technical Annex

Question 3 asks you to describe how specific research projects within each overarching research topic are selected and awarded in your country.

3. Selection of Border Security Research Projects (Specification and Award)

3.1. Who are the main stakeholders involved in the selection of border security research projects, and what are their roles and responsibilities?

[Please enter text here]

3.2. What is the process for awarding border security contracts in your country, and what are the associated timelines?

[Please enter text here]

3.3. Please give examples of the kinds of assessment criteria used to evaluate research proposals.

[Please enter text here]

3.4. How much importance (if any) is assigned to the ‘impact potential’ of research proposals when evaluating proposals?

[Please enter text here]

3.5. In general, how are technical vs. financial offerings weighted when assessing research proposals?

[Please enter text here]

3.6. Other comments:

[Please enter text here]

Question 4 asks you to provide an overview of the main elements of border security research in terms of funding, personnel and research requirements.

4. Elements of Border Security Research

4.1. Terms of Reference (TOR): Who are the main stakeholders involved in turning technical requirement into TORs in your country, and what are their
roles and responsibilities?

[Please enter text here]

4.2. TOR: What processes are in place for turning technical requirements into TORs, and what are the associated timelines and costs?

[Please enter text here]

4.3. Key actors: Who are the main actors involved in setting up, contributing to and delivering border security research projects, and what are their roles
and responsibilities (e.g. project management, monitoring and evaluation (M&E), etc.)?

[Please enter text here]

4.4. Key actors: How do these different actors (e.g. researchers, external stakeholders, sponsors) contribute to research? What processes are in place to
help them fulfil their roles and responsibilities (project management, M&E, etc.)?

[Please enter text here]

4.5. Budget management: Who are the main stakeholders involved in the management of border security research funding, and what are their roles and
responsibilities?

[Please enter text here]

4.6. Budget management: How is border security research funding managed in your country, and what are the associated timelines and costs?

[Please enter text here]

4.7. Other comments

[Please enter text here]

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Question 5 asks you to describe how the progress of border security research projects is monitored and evaluated.

5. Monitoring and Evaluating the Progress of Border Security Research Projects

5.1. Who are the main stakeholders involved in monitoring and evaluating the progress of border security research projects, and what are their roles and
responsibilities?

[Please enter text here]

5.2. How are border security projects monitored and evaluated in your country, and what are the associated timelines and costs?

[Please enter text here]

5.3. Which indicators are used to monitor and evaluate project progress? How is ‘research impact’ measured?

[Please enter text here]

5.4. Other comments

[Please enter text here]

Question 6 asks you to explain how border security research findings are integrated into operational practice in order to achieve impact.

6. Practical Implementation of the Findings of Border Security Research

6.1. Who are the main stakeholders involved in the practical implementation of the findings of border security research, and what are their roles and
responsibilities?

[Please enter text here]

6.2. What processes are in place to help border security research achieve impact?

[Please enter text here]

6.3. Other comments

[Please enter text here]

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 Technical Annex

Part D: Lessons Learned and Way Forward

Question 7 asks you to assess how effective you consider border security research management to be in your country.

7. Perceived Overall Effectiveness of Border Security Research Management

7.1. In general, how effective do you consider border security research management in your country (in terms of how well research findings are
integrated into operational practice)?

☐ Very effective

☐ Effective

☐ Ineffective

☐ Very ineffective

[Further explanation: please enter text here]

7.2. Why do you consider these approaches effective/ineffective (as applicable)?

[Please enter text here]

7.3. Other comments

[Please enter text here]

Question 8 asks you about what works well in the management of border security research.

8. Benefits of Border Security Research Management

8.1. In your view, what works well in the setup and management of border security research in your country?

[Please enter text here]

8.2. Why does this work well?

[Please enter text here]

8.3. Other comments

[Please enter text here]

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Question 9 asks you about what works less well in the management of border security research.

9. Shortcomings of Border Security Research Management

9.1. In your view, what works less well in the setup and management of border security research in your country?

[Please enter text here]

9.2. Why does this work less well?

[Please enter text here]

9.3. Other comments

[Please enter text here]

Question 10 asks you to suggest how the management of border security research in your country could be improved.

10. Lessons Learned

10.1. How can the ways in which border security research is managed be improved?

[Please enter text here]

10.2. Are you aware of ‘good practices’ applied in other countries, sectors or organisations that could help improve approaches in your country?

[Please enter text here]

10.3. Other comments

[Please enter text here]

Part E: Involvement in EU-Funded Research

Question 11 asks you to describe your engagement with Horizon 2020 (H2020) and/or FP7 research projects.

11. H2020/FP7 Engagement

11.1. Please describe your country’s involvement in H2020 and/or FP7 border security research projects.

[Please enter text here]

11.2. How (if at all) are H2020/FP7 research findings integrated into operational practice in your country? Please provide an example.

[Please enter text here]

11.3. How could H2020/FP7 research findings be operationalised more effectively in your country in the future?

[Please enter text here]

11.4. Other comments

[Please enter text here]

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 Technical Annex

Industry and academia survey

As illustrated in Figure C.2, this survey’s design was similar

to that of the EU MS survey, and considered all steps of the
research pathway. Parts A to C focus on research funded and
conducted at the EU level, and Part D focuses on the involve-
ment of the respondent in MS-funded research.

Figure C.2 Industry and academic survey outline

EU-funded research MS-funded research

Part A: Part B:
Part C: Part D:
Respondent Research setup and
Lessons learned MS-funded research
background Implementation

Q1: Involvement Q6: Benefits of Q9: Involvement

in research approaches in research

Q2: Identification Q7: Shortcomings of

of research areas approaches

Q3: Selection of Q8: Improvement of

projects approaches

Q4: Monitoring and

evaluation

Q5: Pathways to
impact

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Part A: Respondent Background

Name [Please enter text here]

Organisational affiliation [Please enter text here]

Country [Please enter text here]

Contact details [Please enter text here. Please note that these contact details will only be used for any points of clarification
(email and telephone) regarding your completed survey.]

Attribution preference [Please could you confirm your preference regarding how your data is attributed in the report and any resulting publications:
Option 1: ‘Full attribution’: being named and quoted
Option 2: ‘Partial anonymity’: only your organisational affiliation (role, organisation – please specify) being associated with your quotes;
Option 3: ‘Full anonymity’: your data being used without reference to your name or organisational affiliation.]

Part B: Research Setup and Implementation

Question 1 asks you to describe your organisation’s involvement in EU-funded research.

1. Involvement in Border Security Research

1.1. Please describe your organisation’s involvement in H2020, FP7 and/or other EU-funded border security research projects.

[Please enter text here]

Question 2 asks you to outline how ‘areas’ of border security research (e.g. maritime security, border crossing points, etc.) are selected and prioritised in the EU.

2. Identification and Prioritisation of Research Areas

2.1. Are you aware of how research topics are identified in the EU, and is it always clear why particular areas have been prioritised?

[Please enter text here]

2.2. To what extent are industry, academia and ‘end users’ (i.e. border guards) consulted regarding their needs and priorities in order to inform the
selection of research areas?

[Please enter text here]

2.3. In your view, how should border security research areas be identified and prioritised? Are there selection criteria that you think could be helpful?

[Please enter text here]

2.4. Are existing border security research areas clustered into themes (e.g. by institutions, by threat, by technology)? If ‘yes’, what are they?

☐ Yes

☐ No

[Further explanation: please enter text here]

2.5. How would you estimate the balance of high-tech, low-tech, and non-technological & social sciences research commissioned in the EU?

☐ Mostly high-tech (i.e. complex technology applied and demonstrated in its final form)

☐ Mostly low-tech (i.e. low complexity technology where scientific research begins to be translated into applied research and development)

☐ Mostly non-technological (e.g. social sciences)

☐ Even distribution across the three areas

[Further explanation including estimated proportion of each type of research: please enter text here]

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Question 3 asks you to describe how specific projects within these overarching research areas are selected and awarded in the EU.

3. Selection of Border Security Research Projects

3.1. Which stakeholders are responsible for the selection of border security research projects, and what are their roles and responsibilities?

[Please enter text here]

3.2. What is the process for being awarded border security contracts in the EU, and what are the associated timelines?

[Please enter text here]

3.3. Please give examples of the kinds of assessment criteria used to evaluate research proposals.

[Please enter text here]

3.4. How much importance (if any) is assigned to the ‘impact potential’ of research proposals when these are being evaluated?

[Please enter text here]

3.5. In general, how are technical vs. financial offerings weighted when research proposals are being assessed?

[Please enter text here]

Question 4 asks you to describe how the progress of border security research projects is monitored and evaluated in the EU.

4. Monitoring and Evaluation (M&E) of Project Progress

4.1. Who is responsible for monitoring and evaluating the progress of border security research projects in the EU?

☐ The research provider (please elaborate below)

☐ The sponsor organisation (please elaborate below)

☐ Independent evaluation (please elaborate below)

☐ N/A – no M&E

[Please enter text here]

4.2. Please describe the M&E activities conducted by these stakeholders.

[Please enter text here]

Question 5 asks you to explain how border security research findings are integrated into operational practice in order to achieve impact.

5. Pathways to Impact

5.1. How (if at all) are the findings of EU-funded research projects put into operational practice? Please provide examples.

[Please enter text here]

5.2. Are there any processes in place to help border security research funded in the EU achieve impact?

[Please enter text here]

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Part C: Lessons Learned and Way Forward

Question 6 asks you about what works well in the setup and management of border security research.

6. Benefits of Border Security Research Setup and Management

6.1. In your view, what works well in the setup and management of border security research in the EU?

[Please enter text here]

6.2. Why does this work well?

[Please enter text here]

Question 7 asks you about what works less well in the setup and management of border security research.

7. Shortcomings of Border Security Research Management

7.1. In your view, what works less well in the setup and management of border security research in the EU?

[Please enter text here]

7.2. Why does this work less well?

[Please enter text here]

Question 8 asks you to suggest how the setup and management of border security research in the EU could be improved.

8. Lessons Learned

8.1. How can the ways in which border security research is set up and managed be improved?

[Please enter text here]

8.2. Are you aware of ‘good practices’ applied in other countries, sectors or organisations that could help improve approaches in the EU?

[Please enter text here]

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Part D: MS-Funded Research (if applicable)

Question 9 asks you about your organisation’s involvement in MS-funded research and about the main types of organisation involved in funding research
at the national level.

9. Involvement in Border Security Research

9.1. Please describe your organisation’s involvement in MS-funded border security research projects.

[Please enter text here]

9.2. What are the main types of organisation involved in commissioning border security research at the national level?

☐ National border guard agency

☐ Wider government

☐ Industry/SMEs

☐ Academia

☐ Other (please specify below)

[Please enter text here]

9.3. How (if at all) are the findings of MS-funded research integrated into operational practice? Please provide examples.

[Please enter text here]

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Appendix D: Frontex workshop

supporting materials

This appendix presents the materials (‘functional roles’) that Frontex may de- assessment criteria and scoring guidance
used as a basis for discussion at the cide to implement. used by workshop participants (Table D.3
stakeholder workshop held at Frontex The research team developed the sup- and Table D.4), and the participant work-
on 5 September 2017, which was part porting materials ahead of the work- sheet for answering the mission state-
of WP3’s data collection methodology. shop, which include an overview of ment question (Box D.1). It should be
This workshop aimed to assess vari- functional roles for a Frontex-led R&I noted that the functional roles have been
ous options for the establishment of a platform (Table D.1). This table corre- updated throughout the main report and
Frontex-led R&I platform. The overall ob- sponds to the functional roles included in in this technical annex following the
jective of the workshop was to support Chapter 4 of the main report. Other sup- stakeholder workshop at Frontex, and
an improved understanding of the ben- porting material includes an expanded in response to feedback from the RAND
efits and limitations of different models table with descriptions and examples expert group.
of functional roles (Table D.2), the

Table D.1 Overview of functional roles

Theme Functional role Name of functional role

Coordinating requirement identification 1.1 Performing horizon scanning to identify security threats and innovation opportunities
and setting 1.2 Analysing the operational needs of end users
1.3 Other (please specify)

Providing thought leadership 2.1 Conducting research in-house

2.2 Influencing policy developments
2.3 Other (please specify)

Facilitating information provision and 3.1 Centralising information on R&I opportunities

knowledge transfer 3.2 Sharing information on operational impacts of research
3.3 Facilitating knowledge transfer
3.4 Delivering training and education for MS border guards
3.5 Other (please specify)

Provide an ‘honest broker’ function 4.1 Facilitating coordination and cooperation between industry, academia, policy officials and
4.2 practitioners

4.3 Supporting coordination and cooperation between industry, academia, nations and investors
(e.g. venture capitalists)
Other (please specify)

Hosting innovation 5.1 Running technology demonstrations

5.2 Running prize competitions or ‘grand challenges’
5.3 Launching an innovation incubator
5.4 Other (please specify)

Facilitating access to funding 6.1 Providing direct R&I funding

6.2 Facilitating access to available funding instruments
6.3 Using Frontex procurements to ‘pull’ innovative solutions from the market
6.4 Other (please specify)

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Table D.2 Descriptions and examples of functional roles

Functional Example(s) of relevant innovation model(s)

Theme role Name Description of functional role (Source: RAND Research for Frontex and EDA, 2017)
Coordinating 1.1 Performing Systematically examining information in US: DHS S&T. S&T provides analysis and recommendations
requirement horizon scanning order to identify innovation opportunities on viable technologies, products and services to advance
identification to identify and potential risks and threats relating homeland security capabilities. To do this, DHS draws on
and setting security threats to security, the environment and the horizon-scanning activities and a ‘technology scouting’664
and innovation political climate, which allows for better process to research and evaluate specific technology
opportunities preparedness and decision making. landscapes by sifting through global data on technology
and market environments.

1.2 Analysing the Engaging end users in research planning US: Science and Technology Resource Allocation
operational needs in order to help ensure that priorities are Strategy (STRAS). This Strategy facilitates cooperation
of end users set and funds allocated in a way that takes between S&T and end users through quarterly meetings
operational requirements into consideration. focused on ensuring that R&D efforts remain focused on
This input can be captured through various operational requirements.
mechanisms, including meetings and an US: R&D Integrated Product Teams (IPTs). Within DHS,
analysis of capability gaps. IPTs are tasked with identifying and coordinating DHS R&D
efforts in priority mission areas, linking R&D activities with
the work of the DHS Joint Requirements Council to close
existing technology capability gaps.
US: USCG Idea Submission Review (ISR). The ISR process
allows for project ideas to be submitted by USCG member
and is used to ensure that USCG research, development,
test and evaluation programme (RDT&E) efforts are aligned
with operational needs and existing technological gaps.
Canada: annual meetings between Public Safety Canada
and operational agencies (Canada Border Services Agency,
Royal Canadian Mounted Police and Immigration, Refugees
and Citizenship Canada)

Providing 1.3 Other E.g. harmonising border guard and market N/A
thought (please specify) requirements.
leadership
2.1 Conducting Participating in research and innovation, US: DHS Science and Technology Directorate (S&T).
research in-house whether through actively leading research S&T is the primary organisation for R&D within DHS,
projects or contributing to research activities with responsibility for the RD&I programme that involves
in a more secondary, supportive capacity. conducting basic and applied research (among other
activities, e.g. testing and evaluation). ‘Border security’ is
one of its areas of focus.
EU: Frontex. Frontex is tasked to contribute to R&I
activities relevant for border control. However, research
projects are mainly outsourced and coordinated by its
Research and Development Unit (RDU).

2.2 Influencing policy Providing independent advice and US Defense Innovation Board. Set up in 2016, the Board665
developments recommendations to key decision makers on is a 15-member panel introduced in order to ‘inject a
innovative means to address future security culture of innovation into the Pentagon’. The mission of
challenges. the DIB666 is to provide the Secretary of Defense with
independent advice and recommendations on innovative
means to address future challenges. Proposals put forward
include the appointment of a Chief Innovation Officer to
serve as a POC for innovation efforts across the DoD, and
the creation of a COE for Artificial Intelligence and Machine
Learning.

2.3 Other N/A N/A

(please specify)

Facilitating 3.1 Centralising Presenting information regarding R&I Gap identified by Frontex study interviewees. Study
information information on funding in a consolidated and easily interviewees found that more could be done to facilitate
provision and R&I opportunities accessible way, e.g. on a single webpage information exchange across MS and organisations
knowledge or on an openly accessible database. This involved in border security research, particularly given that
transfer can help raise awareness regarding R&I there is currently no centralised website or database with
opportunities among research stakeholders, information about all border security research activities
industry representatives and end users, both across the EU and its MS.
at the EU and MS levels.

3.2 Sharing Systematically communicating information Gap identified by Frontex study interviewees. While
information on how research results have been MS participation in EU-funded research remains high,
on operational integrated into operational practice after EU MS survey respondents reported that MS often lack
impacts of the end of each project, e.g. through press access to information regarding project results that could
research releases, briefings and other communications help national border guards integrate these lessons into
activities. This is aimed at increasing operational practice.
awareness among end users of the
operational benefits of EU-funded research.

664 DHS (2016e).

665 Mehta (2016).
666 United States Federal Register (2017).

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Functional Example(s) of relevant innovation model(s)

Theme role Name Description of functional role (Source: RAND Research for Frontex and EDA, 2017)
Facilitating 3.3 Facilitating Systematically capturing lessons learned Frontex. Through projects, workshops and conferences,
information knowledge during project implementation and after the RDU aims to facilitate engagement and exchange of
provision and transfer project completion to build a repository of information between border management authorities
knowledge good practices, as well as inefficiencies, with and providers of research, including research institutes,
transfer a view to supporting MS and other relevant universities and industry.
(cont.) authorities in the setup and management of NATO. NATO has set up a Joint Analysis and Lessons
future research and innovation. Learned Centre aimed at capturing lessons in a systematic
way and, among other activities, manages the NATO
Lessons Learnt Portal (NLLP).

3.4 Delivering Delivering training for end users on the use US: DHS COE. COEs are a network of universities
training and of newly developed technologies to support conducting research to address homeland security
education for end the uptake and operationalisation of tools, challenges. Among other functions, COEs deliver training,
users technologies and other solutions developed knowledge products and expertise for the homeland
through R&I. security enterprise.
ESA. In the EU, the ESA provides education and training for
astronauts through its European Astronaut Centre (EAC).

3.5 Other N/A N/A

(please specify)

Providing 4.1 Facilitating Cultivating relationships between research, EU: Frontex. Through projects, workshops and
an ‘honest coordination industry, policy officials and end users conferences, the RDU aims to facilitate engagement and
broker’ and cooperation in order to help develop greater cross- exchange of information between border management
function between industry, sector partnerships. This involves moving authorities and providers of research, including research
academia, policy away from more contractual customer/ institutes, universities and industry.
officials and supplier relationships to an increased focus US: DHS COEs. Funding opportunities for COEs are open
practitioners on innovation in partnership towards a to US universities and colleges (encouraged to partner
shared endeavour. These relationships with industry) and are designed to support DHS-specified
would be encouraged by an ‘honest broker’ homeland security requirements.
organisation, which would also identify
opportunities for these partnerships.

4.2 Supporting Supporting innovation by coordinating US: Defense Venture Catalyst Initiative (DeVenCI).
coordination the actions of third parties, rather than by DeVenCI supports R&D by coordinating the actions of third
and cooperation directly funding or performing the work. parties, rather than by directly funding or performing the
between industry, For example, facilitating regular interactions work. DeVenCI facilitates regular interactions among the
academia, nations among the members of the private venture members of the private venture capital community, small
and investors capital community, small innovative innovative companies. DeVenCI has focused on facilitating
(e.g. venture companies and end users. the purchase of field-ready products and services by DoD,
capitalists) rather than on the discovery and development of new
capabilities.

4.3 Other E.g. delivering support to industry to assist N/A

(please specify) them in taking their innovations to market.

Hosting 5.1 Running Presenting a prototype or incomplete EU: H2020. The Treaty on the Functioning of the European
innovation technology version of a future system, put together Union (TFEU) states that implementing research and
demonstrations as proof of concept with the purpose of technological demonstrations should be conducted in order
showcasing the possible applications, ‘to achieve a European research area’. Demonstration of
feasibility, performance and method of a research products often takes place at the end of H2020
new technology. Demonstrations can be run (and FP7) projects.
for potential investors, researchers or end Canada: Technology Demonstration Program (TDP).667
users in order to test the technology and Launched in 2013 and managed by Innovation, Science and
convince these stakeholders of the viability Economic Development, the TDP funds 1+ large-scale R&D
of the chosen approach. It also presents an projects per year, with a focus on conducting industrial
opportunity to gather end user feedback research and technology demonstration.
and make adjustments to the prototype or
concept to better deliver value to end users
and increase the probability of successful
commercialisation.

5.2 Running prize Running innovation competitions to US: DARPA Grand Challenges: a cash prize competition
competitions or encourage industry experts to attempt to for US autonomous vehicles, funded in 2004 and 2005 by
‘grand challenges’ solve innovation challenges. By offering the Defense Advanced Research Projects Agency – the
financial or other incentives (‘prizes’), these most prominent research organisation of the US DoD.
initiatives can help entrepreneurs grow their Other DARPA prize challenges include: Urban Challenge
business ideas, connect them to investors (2007), Network Challenge (2009), Chikungunya Challenge
and global markets, and strengthen their (2014–15) and Robotics Challenge (2012–15).
innovative capabilities for the benefit of
industry, end users and wider society.

667 Government of Canada (2017).

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Functional Example(s) of relevant innovation model(s)

Theme role Name Description of functional role (Source: RAND Research for Frontex and EDA, 2017)
Hosting 5.3 Launching an Hosting an innovation ‘incubator’ or ‘hub’ NATO Cyber Incubator. Launched in 2015, this ‘incubator’
innovation innovation on an organisation’s premises, which can is a pilot project to test ways of strengthening pre-
(cont.) incubator strengthen innovative capacity by bringing competition cooperation between industry (including
together key stakeholders from academia, SME), academia and NATO’s technical community into
industry and end users and by offering skills defining challenges and investigating innovative solutions
training and key infrastructure (e.g. labs, IT for cyber defence. Activities include demonstration projects,
tools). An incubator can also be virtual (i.e. discussion forums and interactive workshops.
run online).

5.4 Other E.g. a science park (also called a ‘university N/A

(please specify) research park’ or ‘science and technology
park’), which is located in close physical
proximity to universities, government and
private research bodies in order to share
knowledge and promote innovation.

Facilitating 6.1 Providing direct Providing grants, subsidies, subsidised EU: Horizon 2020 (H2020): the largest EU R&I programme,
access to R&I funding loans and equity financing for R&D, with around €80bn of funding available over seven years
funding often (although not always) offered on a (2014–2020), with €73m available for border security
competitive basis. Non-competitive funding research projects in 2014–2015 under ‘Secure Societies’.
can also be offered through, for example, EU: Frontex-funded research. Frontex has funded
sole source mechanisms where the funding is research projects since 2009, with annual funding
intended for a unique technology or where it increasing from 2009 to 2015. These projects are mainly
has to be allocated within a short timeframe. outsourced and coordinated by Frontex’s Research and
Development Unit (RDU).
US: Department of Homeland Security (DHS) Centers
of Excellence (COE). COEs are a network of universities
conducting research to address homeland security
challenges. Among other functions, COEs award research
funding (e.g. recent funding opportunity668 announced by
the Borders, Trade and Immigration Institute (BTI)). There
are currently 12 centres, 10 of which are active, with each
focused on a unique homeland security need.

6.2 Facilitating Raising awareness on how to access EU European Defence Agency (EDA)669. The EDA aims
access to funding opportunities. For each funding at raising awareness across the European Defence
available funding programme, this involves providing details Technological and Industrial Base on how to access EU
instruments regarding its purpose, activities, timeframe, funding opportunities, with a particular focus on European
budget, eligibility, and application process. Structural and Investment Funds, the new EU COSME
(Competitiveness of Enterprises and SMEs) Programme and
H2020.

6.3 Using Providing funding for R&I projects designed US: Rapid Innovation Fund (RIF). Provides a collaborative
procurements to to address short-term, high-priority end vehicle for small businesses to provide DoD with innovative
‘pull’ innovative user requirements that need to be addressed technologies that can be rapidly inserted into acquisition
solutions from the quickly. programs that meet specific defence needs. Administered
market by the Office of the Secretary of Defense (OSD) Assistant
Secretary of Defense for Research and Engineering (ASD
R&E) and Office of Small Business Programs (OSBP).

6.4 Other E.g. debt-sharing schemes (which encourage N/A

(please specify) innovation by reducing the risk to lenders
and investors, e.g. through partial cover of
losses).

Table D.3 Qualitative assessment criteria

Criterion Definition
Feasibility The ease with which Frontex can implement each option670 in practice

Impact How far each option will increase the likelihood of research and innovation improving operational practices

Stakeholder appeal The attractiveness of each option to key stakeholders with decision-making power and access to resources

668 DHS (2017).

669 EDA (2017).
670 At the external stakeholder workshop, ‘functional roles’ were referred to as ‘options’. In Appendices D and E, the use of the term ‘option’
refers to the functional roles described throughout the main report and elsewhere in this Technical Annex.

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Table D.4 Quantitative scoring metrics

1 2 3 4
General definition Very low Quite low Quite high Very high

Feasibility Very low feasibility, i.e. it Quite low feasibility, i.e. Quite high feasibility, i.e. Very high feasibility, i.e. the
would be almost impossible to the option would require the option would require option is readily implementable.
implement the option. major changes for it to be minor changes for it to be
implemented. implemented.

Impact Very low impact, i.e. the option Quite low impact, i.e. the option Quite high impact, i.e. the Very high impact, i.e. the
will not increase the likelihood is fairly unlikely to increase option is likely to increase option is likely to increase
of research and innovation the likelihood of research the likelihood of research and the likelihood of research and
improving operational practices. and innovation improving innovation bringing minor innovation bringing major
operational practices. improvements in operational improvements in operational
practices. practices.

Stakeholder appeal Very low stakeholder appeal, Quite low stakeholder appeal, Quite high stakeholder appeal, Very high stakeholder appeal,
i.e. the option is highly unlikely i.e. the option is quite unlikely i.e. the option is quite likely i.e. the option is very likely
to attract the support of key to attract the support of key to attract the support of key to attract the support of key
stakeholders. stakeholders. stakeholders. stakeholders.

Box D.1 Frontex’s mission statement

What role should Frontex be play-

ing in the field of research, devel-
opment and innovation for border
security? What do you see as be-
ing the added value of Frontex in
this field?

In answering the first part of the ques-

tion, please consider what Frontex
should (1) continue to do, (2) stop
doing, (3) start doing, or (4) do dif-
ferently in the context of research,
development and innovation.

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Appendix E: Frontex workshop summary

This appendix provides an overview of Summary of discussion experts in MS conducting these projects,
the stakeholder workshop held on 5 and to continue to build relationships
September 2017, before summarising the While functional roles scored highly with them. Participants also felt that
discussions that took place. Relevant ref- across the board, some roles scored more Frontex could offer help with procure-
erence materials, including the tables of favourably than others. However, it ment procedures, for example by pro-
functional roles and a description of the should be noted that participants tended viding a checklist. Role 3.1, ‘centralise
scoring approach applied at the work- to conflate ‘familiarity’ with ‘feasibility’, information on R&I opportunities’, was
shop, are presented in Appendix D. in that they often gave high feasibility highly rated – particularly on feasibility –
scores to those roles that they were par- as participants felt that if this entailed
Workshop overview ticularly familiar with.675 the creation of a database it would not
The first theme, requirements and be too difficult to implement. Regarding
On Tuesday 5 September 2017, RAND identification setting, and its two func- role 3.2, ‘share information on the opera-
Europe organised a workshop at Frontex tional roles, ‘perform horizon scanning tional impacts of research’, opinion was
to assess various options671 for the estab- to identify security threats and innova- divided. While impact was highly rated,
lishment of a Frontex-led R&I platform. tion opportunities’ (1.1) and ‘analyse the feasibility scores ranged between 2 and 4.
There were approximately 28 participants operational needs of border guards’ (1.2), ‘Deliver training and education for
in attendance throughout the day. The were highly rated. Regarding thought MS border guards’ (role 3.4) was highly
majority of the participants were MS rep- leadership, there was divergence in opin- rated overall. While some participants
resentatives from border guard agencies. ion between participants. Role 2.1, ‘con- stated that industry should be under-
Other participants included represent- ducting research in-house’, was poorly taking product training and education
atives from Frontex and the European received by participants. They agreed as they develop the technology, the par-
Commission. that Frontex should not develop tools or ticipants suggested that Frontex should
The workshop opened with a brief technologies, but instead it should lever- also provide baseline training. Other par-
overview of the study and workshop ob- age its existing knowledge from external ticipants said that Frontex could help
jectives. Participants were then divided research outputs. Based on this, par- MS with the testing of border secu-
into three groups for sessions one and ticipants said that Frontex could create rity technologies and also help ensure
two. Session one, ‘Functional options for knowledge, risk analyses and overviews that the output meets end user needs.
a Frontex-led R&I platform’ involved par- of past and current work. However, par- Participants said training is already be-
ticipants developing a mission statement ticipants found the ‘influencing policy ing delivered and its impact is high. Role
for a Frontex-led R&I platform and as- developments’ role (2.2) feasible and im- 3.3, ‘facilitate knowledge transfer’, re-
sessing a set of functional roles through pactful, stating that by having an influ- ceived mixed scores: while feasibility
qualitative discussion.672 In session two, ence on policy developments, Frontex was high, views on impact varied, as
‘Ranking of functional options’, partici- could better help connect operational participants stated that this depended
pants were asked to rank the functional needs with the European Commission on MS knowledge and priorities.
roles according to their ‘feasibility’673 and policy context. Participants also said that Under the honest broker theme, par-
‘impact’.674 Session three, ‘Challenges, having Frontex in that role would help ticipants gave high ratings to the two
opportunities and practical considera- Frontex spend money more effectively as functional roles, ‘support coordination
tions’, summarised the main discussion they have an in-depth understanding of and cooperation between industry, ac-
points and the preferred functional roles border security research. ademia, nations and investors (e.g.
of each group. Under information sharing, partic- venture capitalists)’ (4.2), and ‘faciliate
ipants stated that convening expertise coordination and cooperation between
671 Functional roles are also referred to as ‘op-
and disseminating findings is very im- industry, researchers, policy officials
tions’ in Appendices D and E (see previous
portant for Frontex and can help avoid and practitioners’ (4.1). Participants
footnote).
672 Functional roles are outlined in Table 1. duplication of project work. They also agreed that Frontex needs to play the
673 ‘Feasibility’ was defined as ‘the ease with said that it was good for Frontex to know role of a convenor and communicator.
which Frontex can implement each option The groups said that while Frontex ful-
in practice’.
fils this requirement already, there is a
674 ‘Impact’ was defined as ‘how far each 675 It should be noted that the numbers in this
risk of Frontex being solicited directly
option will increase the likelihood of re- appendix correspond to the updated num-
search and innovation improving opera- bering of functional roles, as presented in by industry and becoming disconnected
tional practices’. Appendix D. from the needs of MS.

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Participants noted that hosting inno- Figure E.1 Matrix of functional roles
vation should be focused on the specific
needs of MS and end users. While role
5.1, ‘run technology demonstrations’,
scored highly on feasibility and impact,
roles 5.2 and 5.3, ‘host prize competi-
tions’ and ‘launch an innovation incu- Quadrant 3 Quadrant 1
bator’, scored poorly in comparison. One Low impact High impact
reason given by participants was that High feasibility High feasibility
‘prize competitions’ and ‘innovation in-
cubators’ are not Frontex’s core business.
Another reason related to logistical is-
sues, or example the possibility that a
Feasibility
jury would need to be set up to assess the
competition, and that MS may not want
to share new developments more widely.
Regarding funding, participants
broadly saw Frontex as a coordinator and
facilitator to help MS find new funding. Quadrant 4 Quadrant 2
Participants rated role 6.1, ‘provide di- Low impact High impact
rect R&D funding’, quite highly. Role Low feasibility Low feasibility
6.2, ‘facilitate access to available fund-
ing instruments’ was also seen as impor-
tant, with suggested ways of improving
this including the creation of a website
and more proactive dissemination of in-
formation to MS (e.g. through newslet-
ters). Participants noted that to deliver Overall, the matrix (see Figure E.1) Questions and comments
these tasks, Frontex would need to invest showed that participants saw most func-
in human resources to identify and dis- tional roles as having high impact and According to one participant, the reason
seminate information, and also to work high feasibility for a Frontex-led R&I plat- why grand challenges scored more poorly
closely with the European Commission form. In particular, information shar- than other functional roles could be due
to obtain information early on. They also ing, influencing policy developments, to a lack of familiarity. This participant
pointed out that not all MS would be ea- being an honest broker, providing train- observed that grand challenges can be
ger to share the results of their projects. ing and education, and requirements very impactful, can incentivise the in-
Regarding role 6.3, ‘use Frontex procure- identification and setting all were ranked volvement of small- and medium-sized
ments to ‘pull’ innovative solutions from highly by participants. Participants enterprises, and can be an indirect way
the market’, some participants felt that appeared to place less importance on of stimulating the market and creating
this overlooked the fact that MS need tai- Frontex being directly involved in con- new ideas. According to the participant,
lor-made solutions to respond to their ducting in-house research; rather, they grand challenges can also help to develop
unique context and border challenges. felt that Frontex should focus its efforts certain products and technologies faster
in this area on leveraging research con- and with lower budgets, as well as set-
ducted externally. ting a baseline for future research.

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