2025 - Manoeuvre Warfare The First Casualty of The War in Ukraine
2025 - Manoeuvre Warfare The First Casualty of The War in Ukraine
Author: Colonel Gianluca Bonci attended the Italian Military Academy in Modena, after which he was
assigned to the signal branch operative units, participating in seven multinational operations. He served
many years as an Army General Staff member in Rome and at the NATO JFTC in Poland. He is the
Doctrine Department Head of the Turin Army Officer School. He contributes to several magazines
specialised in military doctrine and history and has published numerous articles and books.
Lieutenant Colonel Fabio Riggi attended the Italian Military Academy in Modena, where he was assigned
to the branch of artillery. He subsequently served in field and air defence artillery units, participating in
several multinational NATO operations. He is currently employed at the Tactics Competence Centre of
the Turin Army Officer School. Additionally, he contributes to several magazines and websites
sspecialised in military topics and has published numerous articles on military doctrine and history.
The views contained in this article are the authors’ alone and do not represent the views of the Italian
Army and Department of Defence.
Abstract: The Russo-Ukrainian War has revealed major technological and doctrinal implications. Among
these, the big question that arises is whether the manoeuvrist approach, which is one of the
cornerstones of current NATO doctrine, is still relevant and practicable in current and future conflicts.
The most evident trend is how, for the most part, the ground operations in Ukraine are more similar to
the well-known model of attritional warfare rather than the much more celebrated and positively
Published May 16, 2025
regarded one of manoeuvre warfare. Extensive references to examples drawn from military history and
the legacy of Soviet strategic thought and its main theorists contribute to better delineating the exact
nature and mutual interactions between these two above-mentioned concepts.
The conclusion can be drawn that a series of factors, especially related to technology and the
capabilities of the means employed, have led to a general superiority of defence over the attack, in what
one can dare to define as a new "1914 syndrome". This is analogous to what happened in the early
stages of the First World War on the Western Front when this phenomenon led directly to the stalemate
of trench warfare for the following four years. At present, we must have the intellectual honesty to
admit that we are not yet able to formulate proposals or identify solutions to continue to propose the
application of the manoeuvre approach, assuming that it still proves to be practically feasible. To truly
set up a necessary doctrinal development, we will have to wait for the end of the conflict in Ukraine and
have truly in-depth analyses, based on consolidated data and ascertained facts, available.
Bottom-line-up-front: The course of land operations in the Russian-Ukrainian conflict takes on the
character of a series of battles of attrition.
Problem statement: Are there ways to continue pursuing the manoeuvrist approach?
So what?: All organisations responsible for the development of doctrine and training must urgently
address the problem of revising the current land doctrine operations down to the so-defined “Land
Tactical Activities” (NATO ATP 3.2.1.1) based on what emerges from the Ukrainian battlefields.
The dawn of February 24, 2022, showed an astonished world the reappearance of a forgotten ghost: a
great conventional war in Europe. The images of helicopters loaded with assault troops thundering
through the skies and armoured columns pushing toward the heart of Ukraine immediately reminded all
professional observers of the major manoeuvre operations that took place in those same regions during
the Second World War, especially during the large-scale operations conducted in 1943-44. In this view,
examples of the most important campaigns implemented after 1945, such as the fulminating ones
conducted by the Israelis in the Middle East throughout four conflicts or the very brief but intense “100-
hour war” of 1991 in the decisive phase of Operation Desert Storm, are always alive in the current
culture and training of Western armies. Therefore, after the first few weeks, when the operations in
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Ukraine began to take on rather different characteristics from those of the examples described above,
numerous authors, even among the most authoritative, began to show a certain surprise.
A Long Struggle
First, it is worth recalling how the so-called “manoeuvrist approach” is currently one of the cornerstones
of NATO doctrine. In publication AJP-0.1 F “Allied Joint Doctrine”,[1] it is included as one of the tenets of
the alliance philosophy on the conduct of joint campaigns and operations, consequential and integrated
with those of the “Behaviour-Centric Approach” and “Mission Command”. Conceived as an indirect
approach aimed at targeting the conceptual and moral components of the opponent's fighting power
rather than the physical one, it is, at the highest level, described in purely theoretical terms. Specifically
in land operations, the manoeuvrist approach in AJP-3.2 B “Allied Joint Doctrine for Land Operations”,[2]
is again considered as one of the “fundamentals”. It is still directly related to the concept of mission
command. Focusing on the tactical level, the NATO publication ATP-3.2.1 C “Conduct of Land Tactical
Operations”,[3] fully includes the manoeuvrist approach among the pillars on which to base the
planning and conduct of land operations. It links the approach once again to the concept of mission
command and introduces combined arms as a peculiar aspect of tactical land combat. In this case, the
concept is explained in a substantially theoretical and all-inclusive way. On the tactical level of land
operations, especially by referring to the wide range of examples available from the study of military
history, it is possible to state that the term "manoeuvre" cannot be separated from its traditional
meaning: that is, it can be applied fully and successfully through the physical movement of forces more
quickly and more effectively than the opponent. This is what one may learn by studying the campaigns
of the past in which the concept of "manoeuvre warfare" was applied to its fullest extent: one of the
most famous, for example, that of 1805 conducted by Napoleon's Grande Armée in Bavaria.
The deeds of the great “manoeuvrist” commanders of the past illustrate the many good reasons why it
is logical and acceptable to pursue this philosophy of warfare in a determined manner: in this way, it is
possible to win rapidly, economically (in terms of losses and sources), and very often with definitive
results. Among the main theoretical and doctrinal foundations, but also and above all regarding the
applications of this concept on the field, the German “Blitzkrieg” of 1939-41[4] and the “Glubokaya
Operatsiya” (Deep Operations) doctrine, which Marshal Mikhail Tukhachevsky developed and
introduced in the Red Army in the 1930s[5] are worth mentioning.
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At this point, however, recalling the surprise of many military analysts in seeing land operations in
Ukraine slip towards a form very far from those doctrinally described as “manoeuvrist” during the spring
and summer of 2022, it is good to outline an important context. The first aspect to recognise is that
"manoeuvre warfare" was not the only, and on closer inspection, perhaps not even the main theory to
be processed and applied. Over the last two centuries, the exact opposite side of the coin in Europe and
North America, namely "attrition warfare", has perhaps manifested itself more and with greater force.
Certainly, as its counterpart, it has coexisted and dialectically interacted fully with manoeuvre warfare,
often overshadowing it in the actual conduct of conflicts in which the major powers were involved.
According to one of the most important military scholars and theorists of the post-war period, Richard
Simpkin, in his essential work specifically dedicated to this topic, "Race to the Swift",[6] based on a
distorted interpretation of Clausewitz's thought in France, Great Britain and the U.S., what was
recognised and put into practice was mainly the attrition concept. Another important author, Robert
Leonhard, offers some interesting observations in “The Art of Manoeuvre”,[7] his book dedicated to the
same subject. From the very first pages, he underlines how even in the 1990s in the U.S. Army, the
mentality and a good part of the doctrine and technical-tactical procedures were still profoundly
influenced by an orientation towards the concepts of attrition and physical destruction of the enemy,
rather than on the idea of manoeuvre. According to Leonhard, this mentality persisted even after the
“AirLand battle 2000” doctrine had been officially codified and published.
In this broad context of coexistence and dialectic between these two major philosophies, Simpkin
himself recalls how, during a real conflict or campaign, the phases in which manoeuvre operations and
battles take place, and those in which the logic of friction and attrition prevail are both present. They
alternate and influence each other in a dynamic interaction. Finally, while very often the swift and
glorious victories achieved through rapid manoeuvres are certainly better and more acceptable than the
long and exhausting battles of attrition, there are cases in which armies which had theorised and
doctrinally emphasised and elaborated the concept of manoeuvre eventually had to accept the logic of
attrition under the weight of the conditions imposed by the battlefield, often created above all by
technological evolution. This is what happened, for example, on the Western Front in 1914-1915.[8]
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Tukhachevsky Neglected
In the early stages of the so-called "special military operation," the Russian Federation's ground forces
quickly wedged themselves into Ukrainian territory following multiple axes of advance aimed at as many
operational objectives. In northern Ukraine, these objectives were represented by the main urban
centres and the capital, Kyiv. The region of Donbas not yet under the control of the separatist republics,
was another crucial goal. Finally, in the southern part of the country, other important coastal cities, such
as Kherson (at the mouth of the Dnieper), Mariupol, and Berdiansk, were the destination of the
advancing Russian columns. The attempted conquest of the capital, Kyiv, with the consequent dismissal
of the government, was one of the main strategic objectives to be achieved. In the south, the aim was to
establish territorial contiguity between Donbas and Crimea, creating that ‘land bridge’ between the two
regions occupied in 2014 and have been geographically separated since then. The main armoured and
mechanised attacks were coordinated with at least one significant air assault operation: that on the
Hostomel airfield, about 15 km northwest of Kyiv. In those early days of the invasion, how Russian forces
were operating could, in some ways, recall some principles and doctrinal schemes well known. They
derive from the great background represented by the legacy of the Soviet school of military thought
and, in particular, the concept of “Deep Operations”, developed by Tukhachevsky.
However, after the dramatic first hours of the war, when the march of the main attacking combat
formations seemed fast and inexorable, the actual outcome of the various Russian offensive operations
began to appear increasingly uncertain.[9] This development ended, starting in the second half of
March, in a culmination of Russian offensive operations, especially those taking place in northern and
northeastern Ukraine. In the following month, recognising the failure of the attempt to take Kyiv, the
Russian ground forces began to retreat from northern Ukraine, in order to concentrate in the eastern
regions and developed a new offensive in the Donbas region and the port city of Mariupol. Since then,
the rapid manoeuvre operations of the major Russian formations ceased, and a slower, more
methodical offensive began in the Donbas. Their approach during this phase was focused on the
execution of systematic attacks and the intense use of artillery fire. This transition led to a sudden
change. Initially, Russian forces conducted a ground campaign with highly dynamic operations,
attempting to strike and disarticulate primarily the conceptual and moral components of Ukrainian
fighting power. Then, they moved on to a series of deliberate offensives aimed at wearing down and
destroying the enemy forces defending the Donbas: a very rapid transition from a “manoeuvrist
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approach” to a “battle of attrition”, in which the Russian military tried to exploit their relative
superiority in firepower.
The failure of the main Russian offensive operations is certainly the most significant aspect of the first
part of the Russian invasion, which started in February 2022. The Kremlin expected an immediate
collapse of the Ukrainian government and a consequent weak resistance of its armed forces. As a
consequence, the Russian armed forces began their operations based on hasty and deficient planning,
but above all, with insufficient forces for a large-scale invasion of what is the second largest European
nation, with strong and well-trained military forces that had been deeply reformed after the failures
suffered in the previous conflict of 2014.[10] In essence, what the Russians had prepared and expected
to carry out was a repeat of the invasions of Hungary in 1956 and Czechoslovakia in 1968, and certainly
not a “new” Operation Bagration as conducted by the Red Army in 1944. Inevitably, this great strategic
miscalculation has produced serious consequences at the operational and tactical levels. The result, with
the decisive additional contribution of a whole series of technological and tactical factors, has been the
transformation of what should have been a sort of “Blitzkrieg” into a great and exhausting
“Materialschlacht”.
In this regard, some authors[11] have tried to provide an interesting interpretation of what the Russian
forces did in the first weeks of war by referring to another great source of military studies in vogue in
the last century: the Soviet one of the 1920s and 1930s. Imagining what might have been the opinion of
the major Soviet military theorists of that prolific period on this matter, one can refer to the concepts
developed by Aleksandr A. Svechin, Mikail N. Tukhachevsky (the man nicknamed the “Red Napoleon”),
Vladimir K. Triandafillov, and Georgii S. Isserson and formulate some interesting reflections. First of
all, Svechin, in his book ‘Strategy’[12] was the first to define in a coherent and structured way the
concept of "operational" level and art. According to these ideas, accurate economic and military
preparation for war is essential. Consequently, he would probably have disapproved of the lack of such
accuracy demonstrated in the early stages of the invasion. Likewise, in what may appear to be a
prophetic clarification regarding what happened in Ukraine in 2022-2023, mindful of the experience of
the First World War, Svechin also explained how a lack of preparation could easily lead to the deplorable
stalemate of trench warfare. Historical evidence itself demonstrates that this is a situation from which it
is then very difficult to exit by returning to the conduct of rapid and decisive operations. On the other
hand, the man who devised the “Glubokaya Operatsiya” doctrine,[13] Tukhachevsky, together with his
student Isserson, would perhaps have viewed the deep and aggressive advances of Russian armoured
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formations, as well as some air assault operations, above all that on Hostomel, favourably in the very
early days of the “special military operation”.
In February 2022, these operational methods seemed to be aimed at creating that “operational shock”
deep inside the adversary's territory that was one of the basic principles of the theories of
Tukhachevsky. However, like Svechin, he would certainly not have approved the deficient preparation,
especially regarding logistical support. This, he considered essential to feed the great needs of the
offensive operations in depth as he conceived them. Then, and most importantly, the reduced quantity
of forces employed for the initial invasion probably undermined any possibility of developing operations
of this type according to the principles of manoeuvre warfare. As Simpkin admirably explained, also
based on the study of Soviet offensive operations in the Second World War, the basic model of
manoeuvre warfare is the division of forces into two large groups, the “mobile force” and the “holding
force”. In short, to generate that leverage effect that can be decisive, the mobile force acts as a lever
pivoted on the holding force. It then goes on to act on an enemy mass blocked and held back by the
same holding force. Added to this is the concept of “maximum contact”, specific to Tukhachevsky's
theory: attacking the widest possible front and then making deep penetrations breaching the weakest
points.
Still referring to the initial errors that conditioned the early conduct of the conflict, there is another,
more recent and important personality of the great "pantheon" of Soviet military reformers and
theorists: Marshal Nikolai Vassilievich Ogarkov, Chief of the General Staff from 1977 to 1984. He would
have been critical of what happened, having warned in his studies how, in modern warfare, the initial
operations are extremely important.[14]
At the operational and tactical levels, it is possible to identify some important elements precisely after
two and a half years of conflict.[15] Many of these can be included in the list of major confirmations, in a
sort of great return to a past regarding the conduct of large-scale and high-intensity operations. For at
least three decades, we have seen armies, especially Western ones, engaged in peace support
operations or long counterinsurgency campaigns. Now, the war in Ukraine illustrates, in a classic "back
to basics", a whole series of elements already known regarding the conduct of a conventional war.
Among these is the great importance that both armies attribute to artillery in the conflict, especially
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because the Russians and the Ukrainians come from an important Russian-Soviet doctrinal heritage.
Since the time of Peter the Great, it has conceived this component as essential.[16] The perfect
demonstration of this, in the battle order of the brigades, is the presence of single-tube artillery on both
sides of two battalions, and a third unit (a whole battalion for the Russian Army) of multiple rocket
launchers, which is almost double or triple the NATO standard. In the specific context of artillery, a
relevant factor is also the increased lethality provided by the combination of modern fire control
systems (such as the innovative Ukrainian Kropyva system, developed with a commercially derived
technology) and the now consolidated use of UAVs as sensors for targeting and fire observation,
elements already observed and studied in the 2014 conflict.[17] Again, in this context, precision-guided
munitions' importance and confirmed effectiveness has inspired the term “artillery sniping”. At the
same time, the appearance of the HIMARS system supplied to the Ukrainians in the summer of 2022
gave them a deep precision firing capability that proved to be very important in containing and then
blocking the Russian offensives in Donbas.
Other observations to be considered “confirmations” of what was already known about the tactical
context of a large-scale “peer-to-peer” war are certainly the high defensive value of field fortifications
and minefields and, consequently, the need to preserve and improve the engineer capabilities and
assets, including those required for river crossing operations.
Important tactical aspects that seem to recall a true “return to the past” are then derived from the
sudden transition from dynamic and manoeuvre operations to other much slower, methodical ones
focused on the attrition imposed on the enemy. The long, systematic attack, especially by the Russians,
of large urban areas that the Ukrainians had transformed into real strongholds, such as Mariupol,
Bakhmut, and Avdiivka, continued for months until the fall of those cities, has led some authors and this
since 2014, even to indicate a sort of return to “siege warfare”.[18] There has also been a significant
evolution in the tactical solutions introduced by the Russian army.[19] Among these, one of the most
important is using “assault detachments”, a battalion-level formation designed explicitly for the attack
on fortified positions and urban areas. Still, on the subject of organic evolution, it is worth noting, again
on the Russian side, the rethinking of the structure based on the “Battalion Tactical Group” (BTG), a
combined arms formation already present in 2014. In that previous conflict, it proved to be poorly
suited to sustaining operations over a long time. As a result, Russian ground forces are returning to a
traditional structure based on stronger and more homogeneous brigades, regiments and divisions.[20]
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Since the early stages, another debate has developed on the Russian air force's real capabilities and, in
general, to what extent air power contributed to the conflict's outcome.[21] In this regard, the failure to
acquire air superiority and the possibility of the albeit reduced Ukrainian air force continuing to operate
despite the clear Russian numerical supremacy in the skies, was initially highlighted. However, it is good
to place these evaluations in the context of the Russian conception of air forces. In their military
thinking, the Russians have always been more oriented towards a tactical-operational role in support of
ground operations. In contrast, the Western one is historically and doctrinally more oriented towards a
concept of “air superiority” that allows effects also at a strategic level.[22] On the other hand, if the air
war does not seem to have any decisive effects on the conflict, the intense and systematic campaign of
missile attacks, integrated with the use of long-range UAVs, perhaps indicates a tendency to put into
practice some new ideas developed in Russia in recent years. Major General Vladimir Slipchenko
illustrated a concept called “no contact warfare’”, drawn from the study of “Operation Desert Storm”.
According to it, the capabilities to strike the entire depth of a theatre of operations with long-range
precision strike systems and even the entire enemy territory have greatly increased to the point of
making them a comprehensive way of conducting a war, even at the operational and strategic
levels.[23]
In addition to the return of a whole series of tactical factors already known and always important in
warfighting operations, other elements, somehow new, are making an important turning point
regarding the relevance of the manoeuvrist approach.[24] A fact is the ever-increasing pervasiveness
and effectiveness of ISR assets of all types, a reality that precisely from observations in Ukraine has
introduced the concept of a “transparent battlefield”. This has resulted in the ever-increasing difficulty
in achieving surprise at all levels of war: strategic, operational and tactical. At the tactical level, this
phenomenon is dominated by the proliferation and ubiquity of unmanned aircraft systems. Surprise
remains a fundamental element for any offensive operation based on the manoeuvre of forces, the lack
of which can completely undermine the result, as demonstrated in the Ukrainian counteroffensive of
the summer of 2023.[25] The UAS themselves have also become an attacking asset in all respects. In this
case, this extends to different roles in a multi-level dimension, including that of the platoon and
company manoeuvre units, convincing some to speak of the “dronisation” of the infantry. Added to all
this is the ever-increasing rate of urbanisation in many areas of the world. This factor has also made the
plains, the traditional terrain most favourable to the manoeuvre of forces, a rough’ terrain as much as, if
not more so than, other areas. Then, the effectiveness of the most-used weapon systems in defensive
combat is confirmed, such as anti-tank guided missile systems (ATGM) and anti-aircraft missiles (SAM
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and MANPADS). Additionally, artillery seems more lethal in crushing offensives than in supporting them,
as has often happened in the past. This, even before the outbreak of the conflict, led some authors,
perhaps prophetically, to speak of the superiority of defence over offence.[26]
The recent Ukrainian conflict demonstrates that the era of industrial warfare, in all its specificities and
meanings, is still current. The creation and maintenance of a solid industrial and production base, both
in terms of means and materials, ammunition and equipment, and primary resources, therefore,
become decisive factors for the armies in battle and the populations involved. In particular, the
availability of raw materials cannot be limited to wheat, oil and iron for industrial steel production, as
was the case for previous total wars. Considering the current technological levels, it must necessarily
extend, to give an example, also to rare earth and gas. The availability of raw materials and a developed
industrial base are crucial factors for success, and human resources must be added.
Soldiers deployed on very large fronts recall the fate of the Southern Army Group in the Soviet Union
during the Second World War.[27] They need to be supplied daily with all the essentials to live, move,
and fight, with losses, wear and tear, and the consumption of personnel and equipment, and they show
a picture that has disappeared from the international war scene for decades.
In 2022, the purchases by the U.S. Department of Defense (DoD) for 155mm artillery shells (for all
M795, M777 platforms and "extended range" ammunition) were expected to total 174 million dollars.
This is equivalent to approximately 75,000 M795 basic "dumb" rounds, 1,400 XM1113 rounds for M777
and 1,046 XM1113 rounds "extended range" and an additional 75 million for the purchase of "Excalibur"
precision-guided munitions.[28] The volumes of fire delivered, for example, by the Russian army in one
of the hardest and most tragic moments of the conflict (i.e. May 2022), are estimated to be around
7,000 rounds per day.[29] Starting from these data, the entire annual U.S. supply would last, in the best
case, 10 to 14 days.
A similar discussion could be made for other crucial armaments, such as anti-tank and ballistic cruise
missiles. In 2022, the DoD commissioned approximately 2,100 missiles per year from Lockheed Martin,
while the purchase of PRISM, JASSM and Tomahawk cruise missiles stood at 110, 500 and 60 units,
respectively.[30]
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These are some of the main data regarding the significant Western democratic power, the U.S. The
comparison made with European industrial production could be even more merciless. The scenario of a
conventional war of attrition is, therefore, a possibility that Western countries and military leaders must
take seriously into consideration without underestimating or marginalising it as an appendix of "end of
history" theories,[31] nowadays largely overcome by events.
If the competition between democracies and autocracies, even if indirect for now, has entered a military
phase, the West cannot be caught unprepared.[32] To face this challenge, new industrial policies and
substantial investments will be necessary aimed at the technical and qualitative aspects of armaments
and a substantial increase in quantities.[33]
The expansion of the industrial-military base will be a fundamental element in facing and winning a war
of attrition, where the loss rates of vehicles and materials and the ability of countries to replace them
quickly will make the difference on the field, especially in conditions of "technological parity" of the
belligerents. New financial investments, increased production (especially ammunition and anti-tank and
ballistic missiles), production partnerships, research into platform technological standardisation, and
extension of logistical commonality are all aspects that Western military leaders will have to wisely
direct and coordinate as priority requests for the political sphere.
However, wars of attrition and manoeuvre stalemate do not just have tactical or industrial implications.
Attrition also affects human resources. Let us consider the Italian Army with its eleven operational
brigades and 50,000 combat soldiers.
Also in this field, there are therefore urgent measures aimed at increasing the quantity of personnel
whose small numbers - also in this case - were the result of the "Afghanisation"[34] of the most common
operational scenarios in the last 30 years, i.e., low low-intensity counter-insurgency operations.
In this sector, the obstacles to overcome are even greater than expanding and strengthening the
military-industrial base. The abolition of compulsory conscription, the subsequent decades of
antimilitarism and the progressive destruction of the values of patriotism have made the return to
military service a path that is not only politically unviable but also socially unacceptable.
Yet the situation of personnel shortage in the Eastern European conflict, with the progressive expansion
of the conscript classes called to arms, in perfect First World War style, for Ukraine and the continuous
use by the Russian side—despite the large mixed conscription army—of Syrian and Chechen militias or
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paramilitary units, imply the delicacy of aspects linked to the availability, mobilisation, and consumption
of men in a conventional war.
In summary, the correct management and organisation of all the factors analysed constitute the key to
final success. History shows that only those with the most solid industrial base and the largest pool of
resources will prevail, with all due respect to the aspects linked to the compulsive search for manoeuvre
and technological superiority.
Recent conflicts have had immediate repercussions on Italian military education and training. These
consequences are multiple and have affected a lot of sectors and entities.[35] First of all, for basic
military education (Military Academy and Officers School), there has been a great return to history, and
the study of the classics of military literature, with particular attention to case studies focused on
conventional warfare (manoeuvre and attrition), combat in urban environments, and mountain warfare.
Notable was also the progressive shift of the centre of gravity of basic and advanced educational courses
provided by specialist institutes and centres of excellence from crisis response operations and
stabilisation and peacekeeping operations to activities focused on conventional warfighting.
Particular emphasis was also placed on including case studies focused on the planning and conduct of
modern joint-force combat operations, with the widespread and in-depth treatment of the aspects
linked to multi-domain operations. The number and type of seminars and workshops at operational
units and departments have also been increased, with the intervention of mobile training teams
provided by the army's centres of excellence.
The lessons learned from the current theatres of operation also guide the development and updating of
the doctrine, especially those regarding the use of units or particular enablers, such as UAS, in high-
intensity scenarios involving combined arms complexes. The in-depth study of the "ius ad bello" and the
"ius in bello," previously ancillary to the regulations and treaties that regulated the legal framework of
reference for international stabilisation and security operations, was also attributed renewed
importance.
The introduction of wargaming in the officers' training proves to be central to this renewal process,
which aims to stimulate critical thinking and acquire theoretical and doctrinal baggage. It is also based
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on knowledge of the past, which is useful for resolving problems of modern operations linked to high-
intensity scenarios. The search for mobility and fluid and in-depth manoeuvre-precisely to avoid the
enemy's consolidation of fronts and defensive line-is also a priority requirement in training. This
training, as far as possible, considering the limitations linked to the available resources and to certain
absurd environmental constraints on the use of ranges and training areas, increasingly tends towards
the use of combined arms complexes from a joint and multinational perspective.
In this sense, international NATO exercises[36] take on particular value, such as the "Steadfast Defender
2024" or the "Nordic Response 24", which took place in an arctic and mountainous environment and
which saw - on the Italian side - mountain cavalry, artillery and tactical intelligence units engaged. The
latter, which saw the participation of about 20,000 soldiers from 13 different nations, took place in
northern Norway, Sweden and Finland, as well as in the corresponding airspace and sea areas. This
activity confirms the strategic interest of the Alliance for the Scandinavian Far North, also in relation to
the recent entry of Finland and Sweden into NATO. It increases the preparedness of the Nordic countries
and the ability to conduct large-scale joint operations in difficult weather and climate conditions.
More generally, the war events in Ukraine, but also the fighting in Gaza, call for a return to the basics of
the profession of arms. These sectors have so far been neglected or subordinated to primary training
needs, which are instead functional to crisis response operations. In this sense, it will be necessary and
important for infantry units to return to platoon-level trench-digging training and battlefield position-
strengthening work techniques, which proved essential for recent military operations.
The training must also focus on exercises of smaller combined arms units and studies aimed at
maximising the capabilities of the weapon systems currently supplied to the infantry combat units with
a view to “cooperative warfighting” and multipurpose use. The platforms and fields of application
involved in the studies could be multiple, such as - to give an example - the use of the optics of the
targeting system of the "Spyke" anti-tank missile for observation of the battlefield. Or use UAS for
various operational tasks, from reconnaissance to fire observation to point bombing. Exploiting the
operational capabilities of a weapon system in a transversal and, in some ways, "creative" way has
always been implemented in war conflicts. One of the best-known and most effective examples was the
German anti-aircraft piece 88 mm, used with extraordinary effectiveness in anti-tank function.
UAS have become an essential element of modern battlefields, which requires their distribution, use–
and, therefore, training-down to the lowest order levels for units.
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Finally, it will be crucial to introduce the study and management of the behavioural and sociological
dynamics of battle so that young officers can have all the tools to guide their men in combat, manage
stress levels, group dynamics, inevitable moments of discouragement and fear, and get the most out of
their unit.
In short, it is a return to the main aspects of unit command in conventional combat. The Afghanisation
of militaries must give way to a return to the past, especially in military training and education, if we
want to have any chance of facing and overcoming future challenges.
Endnotes
[1] North Atlantic Treaty Organization (NATO) Standardization Office, (AJP-01) Allied Joint Doctrine (ed. F, vers. 1,
December 2022), Allied Joint Publication, Brussels.
[2] North Atlantic Treaty Organization (NATO) Standardization Office, (AJP)-3.2 Allied Joint Doctrine for Land
Operations (ed. B, vers. 1, February 2022), Allied Joint Publication, Brussels.
[3] North Atlantic Treaty Organization (NATO) Standardization Office, (ATP)-3.2.1 Conduct of Land Tactical
Operations (ed, C, vers. 1, February 2022), Allied Tactical Publication, Brussels.
[4] For an in-depth study on these topics, we recommend reading the following volumes: Charles Messenger, The
Art of Blitzkrieg (London: Ian Allan Ltd, 1991); Heinz Guderian, Achtung Panzer (London: Cassel, 1999); Len
Deighton, Blitzkrieg (London: Pimlico, 1996).
[5] For an in-depth study on these topics, we recommend reading the following volumes: Richard Simpkin, Deep
Battle, The Brainchild of Marshal Tuchacevskii (London: Potomac Books, 1996); Richard Simpkin, Red Armour
(London: Potomac Books, 1984); David M. Glantz and Jonathan M. House, When Titans Clashed, How the Red Army
Stopped Hitler (Kansas: University Press of Kansas, 1995); Christopher Paul McPadden, Mikhail Nikolayevich
Tukhachevsky (1893-1937): Practitioner and Theorist of War (Arlington, VA: Institute of Land Warfare, Association
of the United States Army, 2006).
[6] Richard Simpkin, Race to the Swift (London: Potomac Books, 1985), 132.
[7] Robert Leonhard, The Art of Maneuver: Maneuver-Warfare Theory and Airland Battle (New York: Presidio Press,
1992), 26.
[8] Max Hastings, Catastrophe, Europe Goes to War 1914 (London: William Collins, 2014); Robert Foley, “Preparing
the German Army for the First World War: The Operational Ideas of Alfred von Schlieffen and Helmuth von Moltke
the Younger,” The University of New South Wales: War and Society, October 2004, Vol. 22, No. 2, 1-25; Lisa
Haygood, Schlieffen and Germany's Strategic Failure: This We Did Not Foresee (LAP LAMBERT Academic Publishing,
2015).
[9] Jack Watling and Nick Reynolds, “Operation Z: The Death Throes of an Imperial Delusion,” Royal United Services
Institute for Defence and Security Studies, 2022.
[10] Denys Kiryukhin, “The Ukrainian Military: from Degradation to Renewal,” Foreign Policy Research Institute, last
modified August 17, 2018, https://www.fpri.org/article/2018/08/the-ukrainian-military-from-degradation-to-
renewal.
[11] Jon Klug, “Soviet Theory Forgotten: Russian Military Strategy in the War in Ukraine,” Military Strategy
Magazine, Vol. 9, Issue 3, Spring 2024, https://www.militarystrategymagazine.com/volume/9/issue/3/; Stanisław
Koziej, “What Would the Greats Say About War in the 21st Century,” Military Strategy Magazine, Vol. 9, Issue 3,
Published May 16, 2025
this first phase was composed of: 1st Armoured Army (von Kleist), VI Army (von Reichenau), XVII Army (von
Stülpnagel) and XI Army (von Schobert), as well as 2 Romanian armies, the III and IV.
[28] The M982 Excalibur (previously XM982) is a 155 mm extended-range guided artillery shell developed in a
collaborative effort between the U.S. Army Research Laboratory (ARL) and the United States Army Armament
Research, Development and Engineering Center (ARDEC). It is a GPS and inertial-guided munition capable of being
used in close support situations within 75–150 meters (250–490 ft) of friendly troops or where targets might be
prohibitively close to civilians to attack with conventional unguided artillery fire.
[29] Alex Vershinin, “The return of industrial warfare,” Royal United Service Institute, January 17, 2022,
https://www.rusi.org/explore-our-research/publications/commentary/return-industrial-warfare.
[30] Idem.
[31] “The end of history” is one of the key concepts of the analysis of the political scientist Francis Fukuyama:
according to this thesis, the process of the social, economic and political evolution of humanity reached its peak at
the end of the 20th century, an epochal turning point starting from which would be opening a final phase of the
conclusion of history as such. For Fukuyama, the form of state inspired by democratic liberalism is the last possible
for man and also the most perfect: it cannot in fact, degenerate into anything worse, and it itself is not a
degeneration of any other political form. History moves towards progress, and technological and industrial
progress has been ensured, guided and directed by capitalism in the economic sphere. Capitalism has its political
counterpart in liberal democracy because it is better compatible with the government of a technologically
advanced society and because industrialisation produces middle classes that demand political participation and
equal rights.
[32] Alex Vershinin, “The return of industrial warfare,” Royal United Service Institute, January 17, 2022,
https://www.rusi.org/explore-our-research/publications/commentary/return-industrial-warfare.
[33] In this sense, for example, the rearmament plan for a total of 100 billion euros approved in June 2022 by
Germany and the recent 8.5 billion euro orders to produce artillery ammunition which will be used to fill the
empty depots of the Bundeswehr, but to a large extent also to supply Ukraine again, must be interpreted.
“Germania, Scholz prosegue la corsa al riarmo: commessa da 8,5 miliardi in munizioni al colosso Rheinmetall”,
Andrea M. Jarach, Il Fatto Quotidiano, , last modified 21 June 2024,
https://www.ilfattoquotidiano.it/2024/06/21/germania-scholz-prosegue-la-corsa-al-riarmo-commessa-da-85-
miliardi-in-munizioni-al-colosso-rheinmetall-e-la-maggiore-di-sempre/7596384/.
[34] The "Afghanisation" process did not only concern the Italian army but also other Western armies, which have
progressively abandoned the medium and heavy components of the combat forces in favour of the light one, more
expendable in theatres such as Iraq or Afghanistan. This drift also included training, the formulation and
development of doctrine and the procurement of combat materials.
[35] Authors’ professional observation and assessment.
[36] Difesa.it, “Terminata l’Esercitazione NATO Nordic Response 2024”, MoD, last updated March 20, 2024,
https://www.difesa.it/smd/news-italia/terminata-esercitazione-nato-nordic-response-2024/49707.html.