THE UNITED REPUBLIC OF TANZANIA

JUDICIARY

IN THE HIGH COURT OF TANZANIA

SONGEA SUB-REGISTRY

AT SONGEA

LAND APPEAL NO. 000006851 OF 2025

(Arising from the District Land and Housing Tribunal for Songea at Songea in
Land Application No. 91 of 2019)

CHRISTOPHER CLADIUS KIHWILI as the Administrator

of the Estate of the Late JOSEPH CLADIUS KIHWILI.………..….… APPELLANT

VERSUS

ELIAS SALVATORY GAMA as Administrator

of the Estate of the Late Salvatory Gama…………………………….RESPONDENT

JUDGMENT

29th May & 12th June, 2025.

KAWISHE, J.:

The appellant hereinabove dissatisfied with the decision of the

District Land and Housing Tribunal for Songea at Songea in Land

Application No. 91 of 2019 approached this court by way of petition of

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appeal impugning the said decision. He raised seven grounds of appeal as

follows-

1. That the Honorable Chairman erred both in law and in facts in holding that the
testimony of the Applicant (the Appellant herein) was hearsay evidence without
considering the fact that the Applicant was suing as Administrator of the estate
of his late further.

2. That the Honorable Chairman erred both in Law and in facts in holding that the
Applicant has failed to prove his appeal on the required standard for failing to
testify clearly on the boundaries of the suit land without considering the
pleadings filed by the Applicant which stated clearly the boundaries of the suit
land hence arriving into a wrong decision.

3. That the Honorable Chairman erred both in law and in facts by pronouncing
Judgment/Decision without explaining the right of appeal to the Parties.

4. That the Honorable Chairman erred both in law and in facts in holding that the
testimony of the Applicant (the Appellant herein) was hearsay evidence without
considering the fact that the Applicant was suing as Administrator of the estate
of his late further.

5. That the Honorable Chairman erred both in law and facts in concluding that the
Applicant was welcomed in the suit land by the Respondent without any proof
thereto hence arriving at a wrong decision.

6. That the Honorable Chairman erred both in law and in facts for failure to
evaluate properly the evidence given by the Applicant and based his decision on
the weak testimony of the Respondent.

7. That the Honorable chairman erred in law in ruling that the suit land is measured
50 acres by only considering the testimony of the Respondent without measuring
the said land hence arriving at a wrong decision.
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He prayed that the judgment and order of the District Land and Housing

Tribunal for Songea at Songea in Land Application No. 91 of 2019 be

quashed and set aside, an order for trial de novo, costs of the appeal and

any other order this court deems just and fit to grant. This appeal was

resisted by the respondent.

When the appeal was called for hearing, the appellant appeared in

person unrepresented while the respondent had the legal services of Mr.

Dickson Ndunguru learned counsel. The appeal was argued orally.

Invited to submit on the appeal, the appellant informed this court

that he has seven grounds of appeal and he submitted in seriatim.

On the first ground of appeal, he submitted that, he was not

contented with the judgment of the District Land and Housing Tribunal (the

trial Tribunal). That the trial Tribunal held that the evidence he tendered

was not correct. That it was hearsay evidence. He lamented that the trial

Tribunal did not consider that the appellant sued as an administrator of the

estate of the late Claudius Joseph Kihwili.

The appellant contended that he was born on the disputed land in

1965. He added that he grew up while his father was owning the disputed

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land in that area. That he testified on his own knowledge and not on

hearsay. He insisted that he is an eye witness. He averred that his father

was an indigenous. That, from 1955 his father owned the disputed land

from that time and he cultivated part of it. That there was no dispute until

2019 when the dispute arose. He stated the type and number of the trees

available in the disputed land.

Submitting on the second ground of appeal, the appellant contended

that, the trial Tribunal erred in law by stating that the appellant failed to

verify or testify on the boundaries of the disputed land. He faulted the trial

Tribunal for not considering the document attached by the appellant which

shows clearly the boundaries of the disputed land hence arrived at a wrong

decision. The appellant claimed that he testified on the boundaries of the

disputed land. That in the North it borders the respondent’s late father

Kasian Gama. In the West it borders Stephan Luoga and Thomas Mapunda

(deceased) their families use the farms. In the South it borders Erneus

Kihwili and Emilian Gama. In the East it borders Likukila River. He insisted

that the finding of the trial Tribunal that he did not state the boundaries of

the disputed land is not true. He blamed the trial chairman for visiting the

locus in quo without inviting the appellant.

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 Reverting to the third ground of appeal, the appellant claimed that

the trial tribunal chairman erred in law and facts, by deciding without

stating the right to appeal to the parties. That he was not given the right to

appeal in case he was dissatisfied with judgment.

Regressing to the fourth ground of appeal, the appellant alleged that,

the trial chairman erred in law and fact for visiting the locus in quo in the

absence of the appellant and later on decided wrongly on the disputed

land. In his view, it was a violation of the law. That, later on, they visited

the locus in quo. He added that, he showed the boundaries of the disputed

land.

The fifth ground of appeal he alleged that the trial tribunal erred in

law and fact by deciding that the appellant was given the disputed land by

the respondent without considering the evidence given in writing hence

decided wrongly. The appellant averred that his late father was not given

the disputed land by any person. That, he was there since his youth. That,

he got the disputed land measuring 70 acres by clearing the bush and

cultivating. He contended that, there was no written document to prove

that the respondent gave the land to his late father. He averred that the

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chairman depended on weak evidence to decide the matter. That it was

oral evidence only. The appellant stated that in 1960s, the respondent was

a child and still schooling. He claimed that the respondent was a child, thus

he could not give his father the disputed land.

Submitting on the sixth ground of appeal, the appellant avowed that,

the trial tribunal erred in law and fact by failing to evaluate the evidence

given by the appellant and decide depending on weak evidence of the

respondent. That the respondent’s evidence was weak as he was too

young to own the disputed land. attacking the judgment of the trial

chairman, he averred that the trial Tribunal wrongly decided that the late

his father borrowed land from Salvatory Gama. That, again, the same

states that his father borrowed land from Kasian Gama. That it shows that

Salvatory gave his father the land. On the other hand, states that his father

got land from Kasian Gama. Thus, it is a contradictory judgment.

Propounding on the seventh ground of appeal, the appellant argued

that, the trial chairman erred in law by stating that the disputed land

measures 50 acres by considering the respondent’s evidence without the

measuring the disputed land hence decided wrongly. That the disputed

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land, as he stated it measures 70 acres. That in his plaint it showed the

disputed land measures 70 acres and Mr. Salvatory signed the plaint. That,

by signing, the respondent agreed that it measures 70 acres. He prayed

that his appeal be allowed with costs.

Retorting on the grounds of appeal Mr. Dickson Ndunguru, learned

advocate for the respondent submitted that, the first ground of appeal is

baseless. He disproved the appellant’s submission by stating that his

evidence was hearsay as shown in the trial Tribunal’s proceedings. The

learned counsel added that, the appellant stated before the trial Tribunal

that the he was told the information he gave to trial Tribunal. He referred

this court to page 2 and 7 of the trial Tribunal’s judgment.

Disputing the second ground of appeal, Mr. Ndunguru, averred that,

the ground is baseless. He invited this court to read page 7 of the trial

Tribunal’s proceedings which shows that upon visiting the locus in quo the

boundaries were different from what the appellant stated in his plaint and

the evidence. He referred page 3 of the trial Tribunal’s judgment which

shows the same.

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 Reacting to the third ground of appeal, the learned counsel

contended that the ground is baseless too. He averred that on page 10 of

the judgment, the trial chairman stated that the parties have a right to

appeal to the High Court Songea.

Countering the fourth ground of appeal, Mr. Ngunguru argued that,

the ground has no merit. His reason being that the trial chairman required

him and Mr. Benard Mapunda, the appellant’s learned counsel in the trial

Tribunal to inform their clients on the visit to locus in quo. Mr. Ndunguru

claimed that, Mr. Mapunda delayed in informing the appellant. He added

that, the chairman rectified the challenge which occurred by adjourning

and scheduled the re-visit on another day. Thus, the discrepancy was

cleared.

Mr. Ndunguru challenged the fifth ground of appeal where the

appellant stated that, his father cleared the bush. He averred that is not in

the proceedings. He alleged that, he cross examined the appellant and

responded that the land belonged to Jivila Gama prior to his father coming

there. That the appellant agreed that his parents came from Litisha Village

to Liganga. That they resided at the land of Jivila Gama. In his view, there

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as an invitation as the chairman found out. He continued to argue that, the

appellant stated that the grave of his father was in the disputed land. That,

trial Tribunal upon visiting the disputed land did not find the grave. That

the same is shown in the proceedings. That, the grave was the main issue

for the trial Tribunal to visit the locus in quo. To strengthen his argument,

he referred this court to page 6 of the judgment.

Responding to the sixth ground of appeal, the learned counsel stated

that, the respondent’s evidence was weak. That he was supposed to prove

his allegation. That, the respondent stated that the appellant’s father was

invited. That, the appellant never stated how the land moved from Jivila

Gama to Claudius Kihwili. That, the respondent testified that Jivila Gama

was his grandfather. He added that, there was no evidence to show that

Cladius was allocated the land by village or bought the same. Instead it

was testified that he was invited. He refuted the appellant’s assertion that

his father Cladius cleared the bush since it never featured in the pleadings

or evidence. That no evidence showing how he owned the land. That, the

appellant just stated it at this level of appeal.

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 Contradicting the seventh ground of appeal Mr. Ndunguru argued

that, it was the duty of the claimant to prove the size of the disputed land

and not the trial Tribunal to measure it. That, it was the respondent who

proved the case to the required standard on the boundaries and

neighbours. He asserted that, the appellant’s evidence was contradictory.

That, the appellant stated that there was a grave in disputed land but upon

visiting the locus in quo, there was no a grave. That, he named neighbours

who are his relatives, but he never called them to testify before the trial

Tribunal. He prayed that the appeal be dismissed with costs.

In his rejoinder, Mr. Christopher the appellant, stated that it is not

true that the chairman cleared the error on visiting the locus in quo. That,

he did not go to the locus in quo with the tribunal, he went there alone. He

refuted to have testified on the issue of grave. That, it was Florence Mbena

in support of the respondent, who testified about the grave.

He faulted the trial Tribunal’s judgment stating that it shows that in

1975 they returned the disputed land to Kassian Gama. Then, how the

disputed land came back to Kihwili up to 2019. He stated that on the

boundaries of the disputed land, the neighbours were not stated there.

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That, they brought new people to be neighbours. He reiterated his

submission in chief.

I have paid full attention to the submissions made by both parties

and perused the records available, it is now the court’s time to determine

on the merits of the appeal or otherwise. The main issue to be answered is

whether this appeal has merits. I will determine the grounds of appeal in

the sequence the parties did by starting with the first to the last ground.

The appellant’s complaint on the first ground is to the extent that the

trial Tribunal held that his evidence was hearsay. That the trial Tribunal did

not consider that he sued as an administrator of the estate of the late his

father. The respondent’s learned counsel Mr. Dickson Ndunguru in

response contended that, the ground is baseless as the appellant testified

before the trial Tribunal that he got the information from his father. The

learned counsel supported the trial Tribunal’s finding that the appellant’s

evidence was hearsay hence weak than that of the respondent. It has to

be noted that, even the respondent is an administrator of the estate of the

late his father. At this juncture, I feel it is imperative to state albeit briefly

what is hearsay evidence. Hearsay evidence can be defined as third

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person's assertions narrated to a court by a witness for the purpose of

establishing the truth of that which he asserts. That, he is not the author of

the evidence. He reports on what he heard from another person. That the

witness is not the one who saw or heard the matter he is testifying on.

Section 62 of the Evidence Act (Cap 6 R.E 2022) provides that oral

evidence must in all cases be direct. Whatever that is not direct is hearsay

and therefore inadmissible, as direct evidence is the best evidence. This

position was well accentuated by the Court of Appeal in the case of Daimu

Daimu Rashid @ Double D vs Republic (Criminal Appeal No. 5 of 2018)

[2019] TZCA 366 (4 November 2019) where the Court held that-

“Since hearsay evidence is inadmissible then we proceed to discard it

from the record.”

The position of the Court of Appeal in the authority cited affects the

evidence of the appellant in his application before the trial Tribunal. His

hearsay evidence lacked evidential value. It was proper for the trial

Tribunal to hold so. However, the trial Tribunal relied on the evidence of

the respondent who also at page 19 of the trial Tribunal’s proceedings

testified- ‘Taarifa nilizotoa nimezipata kupitia baba yangu kama msimamizi

wa mirathi ya Salvatory Gama.’ Literally, translated into English, the

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information I gave, I got the same through my father as the administrator

of the estate of Salvatory Gama. This was hearsay evidence too. It should

have been discarded by the trial Tribunal as it lacked evidential value. To

this point, the appellant and the respondent were not witnesses fit to the

provisions of section 62 of the Evidence Act (supra). No one among them

was an eye witness during the acquiring of the disputed land. The first

ground of appeal lacks merit, it dismissed.

As to the second ground of appeal, the appellant claimed that, the

trial Tribunal erred in law by stating that the appellant failed to verify or

testify on the boundaries of the disputed land. He lamented that, he stated

the boundaries of the disputed land correctly. He asserted that in the North

it borders the respondent’s late father Kasian Gama. In the West it borders

Stephan Luoga and Thomas Mapunda (deceased). In the South it borders

Erneus Kihwili and Emilian Gama. In the East it borders Likukila River. Mr.

Ndunguru refuted the submission and invited this court to read page 7 of

the trial Tribunal’s proceedings which shows that upon visiting the locus in

quo the boundaries were different from what the appellant stated in his

plaint and the evidence. He added that the same is depicted at page 3 of

the trial Tribunal’s judgment. These antagonistic submissions moved me to

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peruse the proceedings and the judgment of the trial Tribunal. Glancing at

page 7 of the proceedings I could not see what the learned counsel

submitted. It has only a coram and prayers for adjournment. However, I

came across page 11 of the typed proceedings where the appellant

testified as SM1. On the boundaries he testified that, in the North the

disputed land borders Kasian Gama. In the South it borders Elineus Kihwili.

In the West it borders Stephan Luoga. In the East it borders Lipukila River.

His evidence was corroborated by SM2 and SM3 who testified the same

except the name Ernest which has been written as Ernest Kihwili, Ernest

Joseph Kihwili and Elineus Kihwili. SM2 and SM3 recorded as Ernest Kihwili.

They both referred him to be bordering the disputed land in the South.

This inconsistency requires the attention of this Court to ascertain if it went

into the root of the matter. It is a settled law that a contradiction,

discrepancy or omission has to be determined if it is minor or it goes to the

root of the matter. In evaluating discrepancies, contradictions and

omissions, it is undesirable for a court or tribunal to pick out sentences and

consider them in isolation from the rest of the statements. The court has to

decide whether the inconsistencies and contradictions are only minor, or

whether they go to the root of the matter. This finds its back up in the
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case of Dickson Elia Nsamba Shapwata and Another vs Republic

(Criminal Appeal 92 of 2007) [2008] TZCA 17 (30 May 2008). Considering

the position of the authority cited, in my view, it is a minor discrepancy

which do not go to the root of the matter.

On the boundaries, the respondent (DW1) in his examination in chief

stated that, the dispute land measures 50 acres. In the North, it borders

Mhauka Mapunda, South, it borders Emilian Gama, West it borders Thomas

Mapunda, and in the East, it borders River Lukukila. DW2 testified the

same on the boundaries, save for the name Mkauka which DW1 was

recorded as Mhauka. As I stated earlier in the evidence of the appellant, it

is a minor contradiction and it does not go to the root of the matter.

When the trial Tribunal visited the locus in quo, the appellant was

recorded on the boundaries to be in the South, it borders a road and

Emilian Gama, in the East bordered by a River, in the North bordered

Kasian Gama and in the West, bordered Thomas Mapunda, the road to

Lukumburu. Whereas, the respondent was recorded on the boundaries

that, in the South it borders road and Emilian Gama, in the East, it borders

a River, and in the West, it borders Thomas Mapunda, the road to

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Lukumburu and Salvatory Kasian Gama. Comparing to the appellant’s

evidence in examination in chief before the trial Tribunal, there is a

contradiction. In his testimony he told the trial Tribunal that in the South, it

borders Elineus Kihwili while in locus in quo he showed the disputed land

borders a road and Emilian Gama. In the West, he testified that the

disputed land borders Stephan Luoga while in locus in quo he showed that

in the West, it borders Thomas Mapunda and the road to Lukumburu. This

a contradiction which lowered the standard of his evidence. I am inclined

to the learned counsel’s submission that the appellant could not identify

the boundaries of the disputed land to the required standard. The second

ground of appeal is unmeritorious.

On the third ground of appeal the appellant claimed that the trial

tribunal chairman erred in law and facts, by deciding without stating the

right to appeal to the parties. The learned counsel opposed the allegation

by stating that at page 10 of the judgment the trial Tribunal right to appeal

is stated. I have perused the judgment and found that the right of appeal

was explained at page 10 of the judgment as submitted by the learned

counsel. The same was stated at page 37 of the typed proceedings where

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the right of appeal was explained. This ground is baseless and it is

dismissed.

Regressing to the fourth ground of appeal the appellant alleged that,

the trial chairman erred in law and fact visiting the locus in quo in the

absence of the appellant and later decided wrongly on the disputed land.

In his view it was a violation of the law. Mr. Ndunguru argued that, the

trial chairman informed the advocates for the parties on the visit of locus in

quo but the appellant’s learned counsel Mr. Bernard Mapunda did not

inform him. He contended that the discrepancy was rectified by re-visiting

the locus in quo with the parties. The contentious issue is about the trial

chairman visiting locus in quo in absence of the appellant.

In our jurisdiction, it is a trite law that, vising the locus in quo is not

mandatory but it happens under exceptional circumstances. The

circumstances upon which the court may decide to visit the locus in quo

were set in the case of Avit Thadeus Massawe vs. Isdory Assenga,

Civil Appeal No. 6 of 2017 [2020] TZCA 365 (TanzLII). In the cited case

the court while referring to the decision made in the case of Evelyn Even

Gardens NIC LTD vs The Hon. Minister, Federal Capital Territory

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and Two Others, in Suit No. FCT/HC/CV/1036/2014; Motion No.

FCT/HC/CV/M/5468/2017 in which factors to be considered before the

Court decides to visit the locus in quo were stated. The factors include;

One, where such a visit will clear doubts as to the accuracy of a piece of

the evidence when such evidence is in conflict. Two, where the location of

the disputed land, the extent, boundaries and boundary neighbour, and

physical features on the land are not clear. Three, in land disputes where

it manifests that there is a conflict in survey plan and evidence of the

parties as to the identity of the land in dispute. Four, to eliminate minor

discrepancies as regard to the physical condition of the land in dispute. The

court emphasized that, the aim of visiting the locus in quo is not to afford a

party an opportunity to make a different case from the one he led in

support of his claims. In the present appeal the parties gave a differing

evidence on the boundaries. Thus, the visit in the locus in quo was

necessary. It was meant to identify the boundaries of the disputed land.

The appellant’s complained that the trial chairman went to the locus

in quo in absence of the appellant. It was not disputed by Mr. Dickson

Ndunguru, respondent’s learned counsel. However, he was quick to submit

that the discrepancy was rectified by revisiting the locus in quo involving
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the appellant. The complaint by the appellant that he was excluded in first

visit of locus in quo holds water. Page 33 of the trial Tribunal typed

proceedings shows on the coram of 12th July, 2024 the chairman, assessors

and the respondent were present in the visit of locus in quo while the

appellant was absent. In absence of the appellant, the proceedings show

that the respondent identified the boundaries to be in the West there is a

road to Lukumburu then follows the farm of Menrad Thomas Mapunda, in

the North is bordered by Theodori Mapunda Mhaule who is a deceased

called Heral Msalewa, in the East there is Likukila River, and in the South is

the road separating the appellant’s piece of land and Bosco Michael Gama.

On 26th July, 2024 the appellant was present before the trial Tribunal,

the particulars recorded on the previous visit were discarded and scheduled

for another visit of locus in quo. However, the trial Tribunal is silent on the

information gathered from the locus in quo on 12th July, 2024. Only to

order for revisit to the locus in quo on 14th August, 2024 when the Tribunal

was composed for the assessors’ opinions. In my view, this is a peculiar

procedure as the chairman was set to receive the assessors’ opinions on

the information gathered in absence of the appellant from locus in quo.

The chairman addressed the assessors that instead of receiving their

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opinions they had to go the locus in quo because the appellant went into

his office and complained. This means that, if the appellant could not go

into his office and complain, he would have received the assessors’

opinions and compose judgment which lacked the information of the

appellant at locus in quo. This by itself tells that the conduct of the hearing

of the application before the trial Tribunal had a lot of meanders.

On 14th August, 2024 the trial Tribunal visited locus in quo. The

respondent identified the boundaries of the disputed land to be South there

is road and Emilian Gama, while in the previous visit he stated in South

there is the road separating the appellant’s land and Bosco Michael Gama.

This identification of boundaries differed in the two visits of locus in quo.

Whereas in his examination in chief he stated that in South there is Emilian

Gama (udakwa) at page 19 of the proceedings. In the previous visit, he

told the trial Tribunal that, in North it borders Theodori Mapunda Mhaule

while, in the second visit he told the trial Tribunal in the North it borders

Salvatory Gama. Further, in his examination in chief he testified that in the

North the disputed land borders Mhauka Mapunda. This another

contradiction in the evidence of the respondent. These discrepancies have

an impact on the evidence of the respondent. I am saying so basing on the

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general principles governing proving suits, specifically civil cases which are

anchored in the Evidence Act (supra). The first principle is found under

section 110 (1) and (2) of the Evidence Act (supra). It states that, a

burden of proof is upon a person who asserts on the existence of certain

facts. This principle was discussed by the Court of Appeal in the case of

Barelia Karangirangi vs Asteria Nyalwamba, Civil Appeal No. 237 of

2017 (unreported) where the court held inter alia that-

"At this juncture, we think it is pertinent to state the principle

governing proof of case in civil suits. The general rule is that he who
alleges must prove."

The second principle is on the standard of proof. This is founded

under the provision of section 3 of the Evidence Act (supra), that the prove

of suits in civil cases is on the balance of probabilities. This principle was

conversed by the Court of Appeal in Wolfango Dourado vs Tito Da

Costa, Civil Appeal No. 102 of 2002 (unreported). The Court held that-

“Whoever alleges a fact, unless it is unequivocally admitted by the

adversary has to prove it, albeit on the balance of probability."

Also, the Court of Appeal in the case of Godfrey Sayi vs Anna

Siame as Legal Representative of the late Mary Mndolwa, Civil

Appeal No. 114 of 2012 and Barelia Karangirangi vs Asteria

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Nyalwamba (supra) (both unreported) emphasized on the standard of

prove in civil cases. Land cases are among the civil suits and their

determinations are guided by the two principles stated above.

Guided by the authorities cited hereinabove, the proof in the land

application before the trial Tribunal was supposed to be on the balance of

probabilities. Meaning that the party with heavier evidence to be

considered to have proved the case. At page 7 of the trial Tribunal’s

judgment, the honourable chairman held that, the appellant lied to the

tribunal on the boundaries of the disputed land. With due respect, even the

respondent lied thrice to the trial Tribunal on the boundaries of the

disputed land. He had three versions. That is, in the examination in chief,

the first of locus in quo and the second visit of the locus in quo. He was

not consistent in identifying the boundaries as I have shown earlier. The

essence of a visit of locus in quo is to iron out some discrepancies in the

evidence including size of the disputed land among others. To the contrary

the visit of locus in quo in the application which gave birth to this appeal

multiplied the discrepancies in evidence of the parties. This is a serious

contradiction tainting their reliability.

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 The appellant among other prayers, he prayed that this court be

pleased to order for trial de novo by the District Land and Housing Tribunal

for Songea at Songea, before another Chairman. Verily, the discrepancies

the appellant complained of are multitude to the extent that, this court

cannot close its eyes and proceed. From the way the case was conducted

before the trial Tribunal, the application was not properly determined. Both

parties gave hearsay evidence, both parties were not consistent in the

boundaries of the disputed land. Yet, the trial Tribunal concluded that the

respondent proved his case to the required standard. It is my humble view

that, the trial Tribunal was supposed to address the contradictions in the

evidence adduced before it. This ground is allowed. In that, the issue

raised is answered in the affirmative. This ground suffices to dispose of the

appeal. I find it not calling for determination of the remaining grounds of

appeal as they will serve no purpose. Thus, the appeal is allowed.

Consequently, the proceedings, judgment and orders of the Trial

Tribunal of Songea at Songea in Land Application No. 91 of 2019 are

quashed and set aside. For the interest of justice, I find it just to order trial

de novo before another chairman. The file be remitted to the trial Tribunal

and be placed before another chairman with a new set of assessors. The
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application be heard expeditiously as it can be. Given the circumstances of

the proceeding of the matter I make no orders as to costs.

It is so ordered.

DATED and DELIVERED at SONGEA this 12th day of June, 2025.

E. L. KAWISHE

JUDGE

COURT: Judgment delivered in the presence of the appellant Mr.

Christopher Cladius Kihwili and in the absence of the respondent and his

advocate.

Right of appeal explained.

E. L. KAWISHE

JUDGE

12/06/2025

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