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Coercion
 Coercion
The Power to Hurt in International
Politics

Edited by Kelly M. Greenhill

Peter Krause

1
1
Oxford University Press is a department of the University of Oxford. It furthers
the University’s objective of excellence in research, scholarship, and education
by publishing worldwide. Oxford is a registered trade mark of Oxford University
Press in the UK and certain other countries.

Published in the United States of America by Oxford University Press

198 Madison Avenue, New York, NY 10016, United States of America.

© Oxford University Press 2018

All rights reserved. No part of this publication may be reproduced, stored in

a retrieval system, or transmitted, in any form or by any means, without the
prior permission in writing of Oxford University Press, or as expressly permitted
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rights organization. Inquiries concerning reproduction outside the scope of the
above should be sent to the Rights Department, Oxford University Press, at the
address above.

You must not circulate this work in any other form

and you must impose this same condition on any acquirer.

CIP data is on file at the Library of Congress

ISBN 978–0–19–0–84634–3 (pbk.); 978–0–19–0–84633–6 (hbk.)

9 8 7 6 5 4 3 2 1
Paperback printed by WebCom, Inc., Canada
Hardback printed by Bridgeport National Bindery, Inc., United States of America
CONTENTS

Acknowledgments vii
List of Contributors ix
Introduction xi
Kelly M. Greenhill and Peter Krause

PART I | Coercion: A Primer

CHAPTER 1 Coercion: An Analytical Overview 3
Robert J. Art and Kelly M. Greenhill
CHAPTER 2 Intelligence and Coercion: A Neglected Connection 33
Austin Long

PART II | Coercion in an Asymmetric World

CHAPTER 3 A Bargaining Theory of Coercion 55
Todd S. Sechser
CHAPTER 4 Air Power, Sanctions, Coercion, and
Containment: When Foreign Policy Objectives
Collide 77
Phil M. Haun
CHAPTER 5 Step Aside or Face the Consequences: Explaining the
Success and Failure of Compellent Threats to Remove
Foreign Leaders 93
Alexander B. Downes
 PART III | Coercion and Nonstate Actors
CHAPTER 6 Underestimating Weak States and State Sponsors: The
Case for Base State Coercion 117
Keren E. Fraiman
CHAPTER 7 Coercion by Movement: How Power Drove the Success
of the Eritrean Insurgency, 1960–​1993 138
Peter Krause
CHAPTER 8 Is Technology the Answer? The Limits of Combat
Drones in Countering Insurgents 160
James Igoe Walsh

PART IV | Domains and Instruments Other than Force

CHAPTER 9 Coercion through Cyberspace: The Stability-​Instability
Paradox Revisited 179
Jon R. Lindsay and Erik Gartzke
CHAPTER 10 Migration as a Coercive Weapon: New Evidence from
the Middle East 204
Kelly M. Greenhill
CHAPTER 11 The Strategy of Coercive Isolation 228
Timothy W. Crawford
CHAPTER 12 Economic Sanctions in Theory and Practice:
How Smart Are They? 251
Daniel W. Drezner
CHAPTER 13 Prices or Power Politics? When and Why States
Coercively Compete over Resources 271
Jonathan N. Markowitz

PART V | Nuclear Coercion

CHAPTER 14 Deliberate Escalation: Nuclear Strategies to Deter or to

Stop Conventional Attacks 291
Jasen J. Castillo
CHAPTER 15 Threatening Proliferation: The Goldilocks Principle of
Bargaining with Nuclear Latency 312
Tristan Volpe

Conclusion 331
Kelly M. Greenhill and Peter Krause
Index 349

vi | Contents
ACKNOWLEDGMENTS

T his book grew from a shared realization that the foundational scholar-
ship on coercion that we regularly read, taught, and utilized was no longer
adequate to explain much of the behavior we observed in the world around us.
From forced migration in the Middle East and North Africa to cyber threats
from Russia (and targeted sanctions on Russia), and from drone strikes in
South Asia to terrorist attacks across the globe, understanding contemporary
coercive dynamics clearly requires an expansion of our analytical toolbox to
include new concepts, theories, and analyses. We are enormously gratified to
be joined in this endeavor by a diverse array of experts who offer innovative
and penetrating contributions on a diverse array of coercive tools, actors, and
environments. Our editor, David McBride of Oxford University Press, offered
enthusiastic encouragement from the outset, and his and the external review-
ers’ sharp insights helped shape the final product into a more cohesive and
powerful book.
We thank the faculty and researchers of the MIT Security Studies Program,
where we first rigorously studied coercion and learned to appreciate its myriad
shades and manifestations. Kelly M. Greenhill further thanks Tufts University
and the International Security Program (ISP) at Harvard University’s Belfer
Center for their intellectual and financial support of her research and, in the
case of ISP, for its support of the Conflict, Security and Public Policy Working
Group, out of which a number of contributions to this volume grew. She also
thanks her besheryt for providing inimitable daily reminders that effective
persuasion and influence also come in noncoercive packages. Peter Krause
would like to thank all members of his research team, the Project on National
Movements and Political Violence, especially Eleanor Hildebrandt. He also
thanks his colleagues and administrators at Boston College, who provided aca-
demic and financial support for this volume. Finally, he thanks his parents and
sisters who, in addition to a great deal of love, gave him his very first lessons in
the causes, strategies, and effectiveness of coercion.
CONTRIBUTORS

Robert J. Art is Christian A. Herter Professor of International Relations at

Brandeis University.

Jasen J. Castillo is Associate Professor in the Bush School of Government and

Public Service at Texas A&M University.

Timothy W. Crawford is Associate Professor of Political Science at Boston

College.

Alexander B. Downes is Associate Professor of Political Science and

International Affairs at the George Washington University.

Daniel W. Drezner is Professor of International Politics at Tufts University’s

Fletcher School of Law and Diplomacy.

Keren E. Fraiman is a member of the faculty at the Spertus Institute.

Erik Gartzke is Professor of Political Science and Director of the Center for
Peace and Security Studies at the University of California, San Diego.

Kelly M. Greenhill is Associate Professor and Director of the International

Relations Program at Tufts University and Research Fellow at Harvard
University’s Kennedy School of Government.

Phil M. Haun is Professor and Dean of Academics at the US Naval War College.

Peter Krause is Assistant Professor of Political Science at Boston College and

Research Affiliate at the MIT Security Studies Program.

Jon R. Lindsay is Assistant Professor of Digital Media and Global Affairs at the
University of Toronto’s Munk School of Global Affairs.

Austin Long is Senior Political Scientist at the RAND Corporation.

Jonathan N. Markowitz is Assistant Professor in the School of International
Relations at the University of Southern California.

Todd S. Sechser is Associate Professor of Politics at the University of Virginia.

Tristan Volpe is Assistant Professor of Defense Analysis at the Naval

Postgraduate School and Nonresident Fellow at the Carnegie Endowment for
International Peace.

James Igoe Walsh is Professor of Political Science at the University of North

Carolina.

x | Contributors
INTRODUCTION

Kelly M. Greenhill and Peter Krause

F rom the rising significance of nonstate actors to the increasing influence

of regional powers, the nature and conduct of international politics has
arguably changed dramatically since the height of the Cold War. Yet much
of the existing literature on deterrence and compellence continues to draw,
whether implicitly or explicitly, upon assumptions and precepts formulated
in a state-​centric, bipolar world. Although contemporary coercion frequently
features multiple coercers targeting state and nonstate adversaries with non-
military instruments of persuasion, most literature on coercion focuses pri-
marily on cases wherein a single state is trying to coerce another single state
via traditional military means.
This volume moves beyond these traditional premises and examines the
critical issue of coercion in the twenty-​first century, capturing fresh theoreti-
cal and policy-​relevant developments and drawing upon data and cases from
across time and around the globe. The contributions examine intrastate, inter-
state, and transnational deterrence and compellence, as well as both military
and nonmilitary instruments of persuasion. Specifically, chapters focus on
tools (e.g., terrorism, sanctions, drones, cyber warfare, intelligence, and forced
migration), actors (e.g., insurgents, social movements, and nongovernmental
organizations), and mechanisms (e.g., triadic coercion, diplomatic and eco-
nomic isolation, foreign-​imposed regime change, coercion of nuclear prolifer-
ators, and two-​level games) that have become more prominent in recent years
but have yet to be extensively or systematically addressed in either academic
or policy literature.
At the same time, there is also significant continuity in how states wield power
and exercise influence. Strategic and crisis deterrence, threats backed with mili-
tary force, and exercises of state-​on-​state coercive diplomacy are enduring features
of international politics. Consequently, there remains a great deal of relevant wis-
dom in existing scholarship on coercion. Therefore, this volume also features
chapters that proffer novel and innovative theoretical approaches to historical
exercises in coercion and highlight the contemporary implications of historical
cases. An introductory chapter offers an overview of the state of our knowledge
about the theory and practice of coercion and analyzes the extent to which previ-
ous theories and arguments apply to current and future coercion challenges.
The chapters in this volume employ a variety of analytical tools and meth-
ods, including rational choice modeling, deductive theory building and
extension, historical case study analysis, and large-​and medium-​N statistical
analysis to shed new light on an old issue. The authors are equally diverse in
their paradigmatic viewpoints, and several of the contributions wholly defy
ready categorization in this regard. Power and its distribution, institutions,
norms, ideas, and information all play analytically important roles, and several
of the chapters combine these well-​known variables in novel ways. In a similar
vein, some commonly recognized theoretical concepts are deployed in as yet
underappreciated yet analytically quite profitable ways. In sum, while no single
volume of several hundred pages can be truly comprehensive, this book offers
readers a hearty and edifying brew of old and new, of continuity and change,
and of the theory and practice of coercion.
The volume is organized into five sections that speak to our focus on
increasingly relevant actors, tools, and mechanisms in the study of coercion.
Taken as a whole, the contributors approach the topic of coercion with three
key questions in mind: What have we long known and still know to be true
about coercion? What did we once think we knew, but now know needs to be
revised or reconsidered? What did we simply not think about before now? The
next section offers a brief description of each of the chapters within the five
sections and their initial answers, grouped by relevant themes. The final sec-
tion offers some ideas for instructors and others seeking to use this book to get
smart about the power to hurt in today’s world.

A Preview of the Chapters in This Volume

Coercion: A Primer
The volume opens with an introductory essay by Robert J. Art and Kelly M.
Greenhill that lays the groundwork for the chapters that follow by offering
an analytical overview of the state of the art in the study of coercion. Their
chapter is loosely organized around the three key questions that motivate this
volume. Art and Greenhill systematically interrogate the premises that under-
gird our assumptions about coercion and explore issues of continuity, change,
and innovation in our understanding of coercion in the twenty-​first century.
In addition to identifying foundational insights from the traditional (state-​to-​
state, Cold War–​focused) coercion literature, the authors also highlight more
recent, post–​Cold War contributions as well as particular questions and hereto-
fore underexplored topics examined by the contributors to this volume.

xii | Introduction
 In ­chapter 2, Austin Long extends Art and Greenhill’s discussion of coer-
cion by analyzing its understudied yet integral connections with intelligence.
Drawing upon evidence from Iraq to illustrate his key propositions, Long
identifies three central ways in which intelligence and coercion are inextri-
cably linked. First, intelligence provides a coercer with an understanding of
a target’s values, resolve, and capabilities, and thus the capacity to evaluate
whether coercion is feasible. Second, intelligence effectively directs the tools of
coercion—​whether military force or economic sanctions—​at specific elements
of a target’s political, economic, or military assets. Third, intelligence provides
a discrete mechanism of influence—​covert action—​that lies between the overt
use of military force and other nonviolent mechanisms of coercion. In addition
to highlighting the underappreciated role of intelligence, Long sets the stage
for subsequent contributions that focus on the importance of information in
effecting successful coercion.

Coercion in an Asymmetric World

Coercion is often not a confrontation among equals. Instead, stronger states
regularly employ threats and the limited use of force against weaker ones. As
the chapters in this section demonstrate, however, superior strength is insuffi-
cient to guarantee coercive success and, in some cases, can even be an obstacle
to success. The authors in this section reveal that the coercer’s selection of tar-
get and specific policy demands—​often made amid significant uncertainty—​
drive the initiation, dynamics, and outcomes of coercion.
In ­chapter 3, Todd S. Sechser employs rational choice theory to delve into
the dynamic, iterative processes that characterize the bargaining game that is
coercive diplomacy. Sechser develops a model of crisis bargaining to evalu-
ate the strategic choices faced by coercers. He explores how coercers weigh
their desire for gains against the risk of war that inevitably rises when they
make threats and demand concessions of targets, as well as how power and
(often imperfect) information play into these calculations. Sechser’s analy-
sis generates two counterintuitive hypotheses that challenge conventional
wisdom about coercion. First, greater military power emboldens coercers to
make riskier demands, increasing the likelihood of coercion failure. Second,
coercers are motivated to attenuate their demands when target resolve is high,
thereby making coercion success against resolved adversaries more likely. Both
insights underscore the importance of the magnitude of coercers’ demands in
analyses of coercive bargaining.
Focusing on the employment of coercion using both military and nonmil-
itary instruments of influence, in ­chapter 4, Phil M. Haun makes a broadly
generalizable argument about how powerful states can squander their multi-
dimensional coercive advantages over weaker adversaries by treating coercion
as an exercise in brute force rather than as a bargaining game. Using the case
study of the 1994 Kuwaiti border crisis between the United States and Iraq
as a illustrative example, Haun demonstrates how, by failing to modify their

Introduction | xiii
own behavior in response to target concessions, strong states provide (weaker)
targets no incentive to sustainably modify their behavior, leading to coercion
failure, even by the most powerful of states. In such cases, states may accept
coercion failure as the price for an ongoing, successful containment strategy.
In ­chapter 5, Alexander B. Downes explores the puzzle of why compel-
lent threats that demand foreign leaders concede power seem to succeed so
often. Drawing upon data from the Militarized Compellent Threat (MCT) data
set, Downes argues that demands for regime change succeed so often (about
80 percent of the time) because, historically, such threats have largely been
made against highly vulnerable targets, namely when the coercer possesses
crushing material superiority, is geographically proximate to the target, and
the target is diplomatically isolated. However, Downes cautions that before
one concludes that regime change is easy, one should keep in mind that the
conditions that made regime change successful in the past are not features
of most recent attempts to persuade foreign leaders to step down. Thus in an
era in which leaders have grown more willing to issue such demands, they
have grown correspondingly less likely to engender the desired response and
coercive success.

Coercion and Nonstate Actors

Since the end of the Cold War, ongoing civil wars have outnumbered inter-
state wars by about 10 to 1. More people died in terrorist attacks in 2014 than
ever before, and Americans regularly identify terrorism as the most critical
threat to the nation. Nonetheless, we lack critical tools to understand and
address issues associated with the violence perpetrated by nonstate and sub-
state actors because the vast majority of existing studies still focus on states
coercing other states. The chapters in this section help address this lacuna
by exploring how states can coerce terrorists and insurgents via drones
and state sponsors, as well as how insurgents themselves effectively coerce
governments.
In ­chapter 6, Keren Fraiman explores “transitive compellence,” a method
of coercion whereby states that seek to affect the behavior of violent nonstate
actors (VNSAs) do so by targeting the states that host them. The expectation is
that the real and threatened costs imposed by the coercer on the base state will
then persuade the coercee to crack down on the VNSAs, leading to their con-
tainment within, or forceful eviction from, the base state. Fraiman argues that
this trilateral brand of coercion is both more common and more effective than
is generally recognized. This is because the conventional wisdom regarding
base state capabilities and motivations—​that they are both too weak and too
reluctant to take effective action against VNSAs—​is wrong. Rather, many base
states are in fact both capable and willing to effectively coerce VNSAs residing
within their territory.
Nonstate actors are themselves often practitioners of coercion, rather than
simply its targets. In ­chapter 7, Peter Krause explores the question of what

xiv | Introduction
makes nonstate coercion by national movements and insurgencies succeed
or fail. The balance of power within a movement drives its outcome, Krause
contends, and groups’ positions within that balance of power drive their behav-
ior. Although all groups prioritize their organizational strength and survival,
hegemonic groups that dominate their movements are more likely to pursue
the shared strategic objective of regime change and statehood because victory
moves them from the head of a movement to the head of a new state. The hege-
monic group’s dominance enables its movement to successfully coerce the
enemy regime by delivering a single clear, credible message about its objective,
threats, and guarantees that is backed by a cohesive strategy. Krause demon-
strates the viability of his generalizable argument with a longitudinal analysis
of the Eritrean national movement and its decades-​long insurgency against the
Ethiopian government from 1960 to Eritrean independence in 1993.
In ­chapter 8, James Igoe Walsh evaluates the efficacy of drones as instru-
ments of deterrence and compellence, especially in the context of counter-
insurgency operations. Drawing upon evidence from a variety of theaters,
including Pakistan, Afghanistan, and Iraq, Walsh argues that the use of drones
can be a double-​edged sword. On one hand, they offer noteworthy technologi-
cal, force-​protection-​related, and collateral-​damage-​limiting advantages. On
the other hand, the employment of drones often also catalyzes retaliatory and
signaling counterattacks by insurgents and other VNSAs, which can in turn
exercise deleterious effects on counterintelligence campaigns and undermine
efforts at coercion.

Domains and Instruments Other than Force

State-​to-​state coercion still dominates the headlines, but it has increasingly
taken on new forms and is transpiring in new domains. The United States is
actively sanctioning Russia and China in response to increasing cyber attacks.
The European Union (EU) and many Middle Eastern states are struggling,
even teetering, under the political and economic weight of an unprecedent-
edly large influx of migrants and of refugees forced from their homes. At the
same time, regional powers are scrambling to coercively compete over natural
resources in the Arctic and the South China Sea. The chapters in this section
provide powerful new theories and frameworks to explain how states coerce
others using often effective, but understudied, instruments other than force.
In Chapter 9, Jon R. Lindsay and Erik Gartzke analyze the relationship
between cyber means and political ends, an issue that was long neglected in
the popular focus on technological threats. The authors present typologies of
potential cyber harms in terms of costs and benefits and of political applica-
tions of these harms for deterrence and compellence. They then use the latter
to explain why the distribution of the former is highly skewed, with rampant
cyber frictions but very few attacks of any consequence. Specifically, they pro-
pose that a variant of the classic stability-​instability paradox operates to con-
strain cyber conflict: ubiquitous dependence on cyberspace and heightened

Introduction | xv
potential for deception expand opportunities to inflict minor harms, even as
the prospect of retaliation and imperatives to maintain future connectivity
limit the political attractiveness of major harms.
In ­chapter 10, Kelly M. Greenhill explains how, why, and under what con-
ditions (the threat of) unleashing large-​scale movements of people can be
used as an effective instrument of state-​level coercion. This unconventional
yet relatively common coercion-​by-​punishment strategy has been used by both
state and nonstate actors as a tool of both deterrence and compellence. After
outlining the precepts of the theory, Greenhill illustrates this unconventional
instrument in action with a longitudinal study of its serial use by the former
Libyan dictator Muammar Gaddafi against the EU, from 2004 until his deposi-
tion in 2011. The chapter concludes with a discussion of theoretical and policy
implications, observations about how this tool appears to be used increasingly
as an alternative to or complement of military force, and what such develop-
ments might portend both for the future and for its real victims, the displaced
themselves.
Timothy W. Crawford further expands our understanding of the dynam-
ics of coercion in ­chapter 11 with the introduction of the concept of “coercive
isolation.” Coercive isolation refers to an oft employed but undertheorized
nonmilitary instrument of coercive diplomacy that relies on manipulation and
exploitation of shifts in a target state’s alignments and alliances to influence
its cost-​benefit calculations and, by extension, the probability of coercive suc-
cess. After presenting the theory of coercive isolation and the logic that under-
girds it, Crawford offers a plausibility probe of six historical cases, from before
World War I through the end of the Cold War, that illustrate the logic of the
model and its key propositions. The chapter concludes with a discussion of
contemporary theoretical and policy implications of the role played by coercive
isolation in diplomacy in the post-​post–​Cold War world.
In ­chapter 12, Daniel W. Drezner examines the state of the literature on the
coercive power of economic sanctions, with a particular emphasis on the use
of targeted sanctions. Drezner argues that the development of smart sanctions
has solved many of the political problems that prior efforts at comprehensive
trade sanctions created. In many ways, these sanctions are, as advertised,
“smarter,” but there is no systematic evidence that smart sanctions yield bet-
ter policy results vis-​à-​vis the targeted country. When smart sanctions work,
they work because they impose significant costs on the target economy. It
would behoove policymakers and scholars to look beyond the targeted sanc-
tions framework to examine the conditions under which different kinds of
economic statecraft should be deployed.
In ­chapter 13, Jonathan N. Markowitz asks why some states coercively com-
pete militarily over the governance and distribution of natural resources, while
others favor reliance on market mechanisms. In this hypothesis-​generating
contribution, Markowitz argues that the choices states make lie in their domes-
tic political institutions and economic interests, which in turn determine their
foreign policy interests. Specifically, he posits that the more economically

xvi | Introduction
dependent on resource rents states are and the more autocratic their political
institutions, the stronger their preference to seek direct control over stocks
of resources. Conversely, the less economically dependent on resource rents
states are and the more democratic their political institutions, the weaker their
preference to directly control stocks of resources. He presents and demon-
strates the viability of his argument using a combination of deductive theoriz-
ing and historical analysis of recent jockeying over control of maritime seabed
resources in the East and South China Sea, Arctic, and Eastern Mediterranean.

Nuclear Coercion: Regional Powers and Nuclear Proliferation

The field of coercion studies was founded on the analysis of nuclear weapons
in the Cold War, and yet a number of related dynamics remain unexplained
as a consequence of the field’s traditional focus on strong states that already
possess nuclear weapons. The chapters in this section focus on two types of
significant coercive threats by relatively weaker states: the threat of nuclear
weapon use to resist demands and ensure regime survival, and the threat of
acquiring nuclear weapons to compel concessions.
In ­chapter 14, Jasen J. Castillo examines how the acquisition and threatened
use of nuclear weapons can be utilized by weaker states to resist the demands
of their more powerful counterparts. The uniquely destructive power of these
weapons allows conventionally weak states a method of guaranteeing their sur-
vival and, due to the dangers of escalation, a potentially potent countercoercive
tool. Employing an explicitly neorealist perspective, Castillo explores not only
how regional powers may use such weapons as a powerful deterrent but also
how they might theoretically employ them in war should deterrence fail.
In ­chapter 15, Tristan Volpe explores how states can use the threat of nuclear
proliferation as an instrument of coercion. He argues that while the conven-
tional wisdom suggests states reap deterrence benefits from nuclear program
hedging, many use the prospect of proliferation not to deter aggression but as
a means of compelling concessions from the United States. Some challengers
are more successful than others at this unique type of coercive diplomacy, how-
ever. When it comes to cutting a deal, Volpe argues, there is an optimal amount
of nuclear technology: with too little, the threat to proliferate is not credible,
but if a country moves too close to acquiring a bomb, a deal may be impossible
to reach since proliferators cannot credibly commit not to sneak their way to
a bomb. Volpe draws upon the cases of Libya and North Korea to demonstrate
the power of his theory in action.

Conclusion
The concluding chapter by Greenhill and Krause underscores the volume’s
key findings and their theoretical import, identifies policy implications and
prescriptions highlighted by the contributions to the volume, and points to
unanswered questions and directions for further research.

Introduction | xvii
Suggested Ways to Use This Volume

The contributions to Coercion: The Power to Hurt in International Politics were

solicited with a number of theoretical and pedagogical goals and approaches
in mind.
First, the chapters were selected to provide both historical and theoretical
perspectives on contemporary exercises of coercion from around the globe.
While many chapters unsurprisingly offer evidence from North Africa and the
Middle East, given recent history, the book also includes potent illustrations
from East Asia, Southeast Asia, sub-​Saharan Africa, Europe, and North and
South America.
Second, a number of the chapters are designed to speak to ongoing policy
debates. These include the efficacy of sanctions (Drezner and Haun) and other
nonmilitary instruments of influence (Crawford, Lindsay and Gartzke, and
Greenhill); the costs and benefits of using drones (Walsh); conflict over natu-
ral resources (Markowitz); the significance of failed and failing states in our
understanding of the twenty-​first-​century security environment (Fraiman and
Walsh); the virtues and vices of foreign-​imposed regime change (Downes and
Greenhill); the dangers of nuclear (counter)proliferation (Art and Greenhill,
Castillo, Volpe, and Sechser); and the viability of deterring and/​or quashing
terrorist and insurgent activity (Fraiman, Krause, Walsh, and Long).
Third, a number of the chapters apply classic security studies and coer-
cion-​related concepts to new domains. These include but are not limited to
Crawford’s expansion and extension of George and Simons’s “isolation of the
adversary” in his exploration of diplomatic coercion; Krause’s adaptation of bal-
ance-​of-​power theory to intragroup dynamics within insurgencies and national
movements; Lindsay and Gartzke’s application of traditional military force-​on-​
force concepts to the realm of cyberspace; Sechser’s expansion and relaxation
of some long-​accepted tenets about the nature of coercive bargaining and
the significance of coercers’ objectives, some of which are in turn profitably
illustrated in Haun’s case study; and Greenhill’s explication of how and why
cross-​border population movements can be an effective coercion by punish-
ment strategy. Markowitz draws upon traditional theories about institutions,
interests, and state behavior to make predictions about future competition and
conflicts, while Volpe integrates insights about the significance of credible
assurances in facilitating successful coercion to the realm of proliferation.
Fourth, the grouping of the chapters by theme permits instructors to teach
theoretical concepts in a fairly broad-​based way. In addition to the current
groupings of chapters by section, a number of other disparate chapters can
be effectively coupled. These include but are not limited to the study of cross-​
domain coercion (Lindsay and Gartzke, Greenhill, Markowitz, and Haun); the
critical role of information in coercion (Fraiman, Lindsay and Gartzke, Long,
and Sechser); the role of regime type in influencing coercion processes and/​
or outcomes (Downes, Drezner, Markowitz, and Greenhill); and the particular

xviii | Introduction
dynamics of multilateral and multilevel coercion (Crawford, Drezner, Fraiman,
Greenhill, and Krause). Finally, in addition to being an effective stand-​alone
overview of coercion, Art and Greenhill’s introductory essay can be usefully
assigned with any and all of the aforementioned units as a bridge from Cold
War precepts to twenty-​first-​century applications.
In sum, Coercion combines classic tenets with contemporary innovations
and applications. It is intended to connect and synergize scholarship on a
broad array of exciting and timely topics and, in the process, help reinvigorate
a crucial subfield of security studies and foreign policy. The volume has been
designed to appeal to scholars, practitioners, and instructors who engage with
coercion and foreign policy generally and with diplomacy, terrorism, sanc-
tions, protest, refugees, nongovernmental organizations, and proliferation
more specifically.

Introduction | xix
PART I Coercion
A Primer
 chapter 1 Coercion
An Analytical Overview
Robert J. Art and Kelly M. Greenhill

Just as the Cold war spawned a great deal of scholarly study about deterrence,
so too has the unipolar era spawned a great deal of study of compellence.1 The
Cold War featured a nuclear standoff between two superpowers, one in which
the survival of both countries was thought to be at stake. It is not surprising
that deterrence of war, the avoidance of escalatory crises, and the control of
escalation were paramount in the minds of academic strategists and political-​
military practitioners during this period. The bulk of the innovative theoretical
work on deterrence, especially nuclear deterrence, was produced from the late
1940s through the mid-​1960s. Most of the creative works during the subse-
quent years were, and continue to be, refinements of and elaborations on those
foundations.2
With the advent of the unipolar era, the United States found itself freed
from the restraints on action imposed by another superpower and began more
than two decades of issuing military threats against or launching conventional
military interventions into smaller countries, or both: Iraq (1990–​91), Somalia
(1992–​93), Haiti (1994), North Korea (1994), Bosnia (1995), Kosovo and Serbia
(1998–​99), Afghanistan (2001), Iraq again (2003–​11), Libya (2011), Syria (2014–​),
and Iraq yet again (2015–​). Unsurprisingly, strategists and practitioners dur-
ing the unipolar era became focused on various forms of compellence—​
compellent threats, coercive diplomacy, and the limited and demonstrative
uses of force—​and especially on the reasons those forms of compellence, when
employed by the United States, more often than not failed and subsequently

1
We thank Victoria McGroary for invaluable research assistance.
2
For an excellent overview of the state of knowledge about deterrence through the 1970s, see Robert
Jervis, “Deterrence Theory Revisited,” World Politics 31 (1979): 289–​324. For a representative view
of the nature of deterrence today, see Patrick M. Morgan, “The State of Deterrence in International
Politics Today,” Contemporary Security Policy 33 (2012): 85–​107.
required more robust military action for the United States to prevail. As a con-
sequence of the unipolar era’s change of focus, the literature on compellence
burgeoned.3
More recently, and particularly in the aftermath of the game-​changing ter-
rorist attacks on September 11, 2001, there has also been a heightened focus on
nonstate actors (NSAs). Academic works have focused on how NSAs employ
coercion against states and against other NSAs (see, for instance, ­chapter 7);
how states can most effectively deter and compel NSAs (and how such strat-
egies may differ from coercion wielded by states; see ­chapter 6); and how
NSAs attempt to compensate for their relative weaknesses through the use of
asymmetric means (see ­chapters 8–​10). In this period, there has been a nearly
simultaneous increase in the nuance and breadth of scholarship that examines
how coercion works when using tools other than (or in addition to) traditional
military force and by actors other than the unipole. Such tools include targeted
sanctions (see ­chapter 12), cyber weapons (see ­chapter 9), migration or demo-
graphic bombing (see ­chapter 10), and drones (see ­chapter 8). There has also
been a growth in research that examines how coercive tools in one domain (for
instance, cyber) can be used to influence outcomes in another (for instance,
military capabilities), which Erik Gartzke and Jon Lindsay refer to as cross-​
domain coercion.4
While not providing a comprehensive review of all the theoretical and
empirical scholarship on deterrence and compellence to date, this chapter does
highlight the big findings about coercion, and by extension the big gaps in our
understanding of it, as well as summarizes the contributions that the essays in
this volume make to our understanding of coercion. The chapter proceeds as
follows: Part one briefly defines coercion to include both deterrence and com-
pellence, and shows why it can be hard to distinguish between the two in prac-
tice. Part two highlights salient points about deterrence, distinguishes among
four types of deterrence, and discusses why deterrence can fail. Part three out-
lines the key contributions to our understanding of compellence that the past
three decades of scholarship have revealed. Finally, Part four concludes with
two sets of propositions about coercion—​one that summarizes the state of our
current collective knowledge and one that highlights new contributions prof-
fered in this volume.

Coercion

Coercion is the ability to get an actor—​a state, the leader of a state, a terror-
ist group, a transnational or international organization, a private actor—​to do
something it does not want to do. Coercion between states, between states
and nonstate actors, or between nonstate actors is exercised through threats or

3
For a partial list of works on compellence, see note 18.
4
Erik Gartzke and Jon Lindsay, eds., Cross-​Domain Deterrence, unpublished manuscript.

4 | Coercion: A Primer
through actions, or both, and usually, but not always, involves military threats
or military actions. Threats can be implicit or explicit. Coercive action may
also utilize positive inducements. Offering such inducements may increase
chances of success, but coercion is not coercion if it consists solely of induce-
ments. Coercion always involves some cost or pain to the target or explicit
threats thereof, with the implied threat to increase the cost or pain if the target
does not concede.

The Two Faces of Coercion

Coercion comes in two basic forms: deterrence and compellence. Often the
terms coercion and compellence are used interchangeably, but that errone-
ously implies that deterrence is not a form of coercion. This chapter therefore
reserves the term coercion for the broad category of behavior that can manifest
as either deterrence or compellence.
Used this way, deterrence is a coercive strategy designed to prevent a target
from changing its behavior. “Just keep doing what you are doing; otherwise
I will hurt you” is the refrain of deterrence. It operates by threatening pain-
ful retaliation should the target change its behavior. A state issues a deterrent
threat because it believes the target is about to, or will eventually, change its
behavior in ways that will hurt the coercer’s interests. Thus getting an actor not
to change its behavior, when its preference is to change its behavior, is a form
of coercion. Compellence, on the other hand, is a coercive strategy designed
to get the target to change its behavior.5 Its refrain is “I don’t like what you are
doing, and that is why I am going to start hurting you, and I will continue to
hurt you until you change your behavior in ways that I specify.” Compellence,
either through threat or action, is a form of coercion because the target’s pref-
erence is not to change its behavior, but it is being forced to do so. So deter-
rence is a coercive strategy, based on threat of retaliation, to keep a target from
changing its behavior, whereas compellence is a coercive strategy, based on
hurting the target (or threatening to do so), to force the target to change its
behavior. In both cases, the target is being pressured to do something it does
not want to do.

Is It Deterrence or Compellence?
Defining the analytical distinction between deterrence and compellence is
easy; applying the distinction in practice can be more difficult, for two rea-
sons. First, in confrontational situations, there is the eye-​of-​the-​beholder prob-
lem; second, particularly during crises, the deterrer may resort to compellent
actions to shore up its deterrent posture.

5
Thomas Schelling coined the term compellence. See Thomas C. Schelling, Arms and Influence (New
Haven, CT: Yale University Press, 1966), 71.

an analy tical overview | 5

Another Random Scribd Document
with Unrelated Content
 1612.

Pp. 82, 85.

The articles Rawlinson and Reinolds are out of their place at the
latter reference, and should be on p. 82.

P. 85. Smyth, Richard. Add at end:—

The third edition was issued in 1634; see 1634 S.
 1613.

P. 86. Answer.
This is of course by Richard Parkes, as is noted in the first edition (p.
59; 1604, no. 7). “1604 A” is twice an error for “1604 P.”

P. 89. Colmore, l. 3.
For Saactpavl read Sanctpavl.

P. 92. Oxford, Univ. (Justa Funebria), l. 6.

The type is English Roman.

P. 92. Ibid. l. 11.

For preceding art. read art. no. 19.

P. 92. After Oxford, no. 21, insert:—

Panke, John. THE FALL OF BABEL. | By the confusion of
Tongues, directly proouing against the | Papistes of
this, and former ages; that a view of their writings |
and Bookes, being taken, it cannot be discerned by
any | man liuing, what they would say, or how be
vnder-|stood, in the question of the sacrifice of the
Masse, | the Reall presence or Transubstantiation; |
but in explaning their mindes, they fall | vpon such
tearmes, as the Prote-|stants vse and allow. | FVRTHER.
| In the question of the Popes Supremacie is shewed,
how they | abuse an authoritie of the auncient
Father S. Cyprian, a Canon of | the 1. Niceene
counsell, and the Ecclesiasticall historie of Socrates,
and Sozomen: And lastly is set downe a briefe of the
succession | of Popes in the sea of Rome, for these
1600. yeares togea-|ther: what diuersitie there is in
their accompt, what | heresies, schismes, and
intrusions there hath been in | that sea, deliuered in
opposition against their | Tables, wherewith now
adayes they are | very busie, and other thinges dis-
|couered against them. | By IOHN PANKE. | [motto, then
woodcut.]
Impr. 29 a: 1613: sm. 4o: the rest as 1608 P.
The titlepage was not printed at Oxford, the woodcut being
unknown there: the rest is a reissue of the sheets of 1608 P. This
edition has been erroneously dated 1623 in the British Museum
Catalogue of books ... to the year 1640.

P. 95. Smith, l. 5.
For 1684. S. read 1617 S.
 1614.

P. 95. Benefield.
The date of the imprint should be 1614, not 1613.

Pp. 97, 100. N., S. (no. 9).

This article should be headed S., N., and should follow no. 15 on p.
100.

P. 99. Rainolds, l. 8.
For Pica English read Pica Roman.
 1615.

P. 101. Brasbridge. Add at end:—

See 1586 in this Supplement.
 1618.

P. 110. Sanderson, last line.

For ii. 626 read iii. 626.
 1619.

P. 111. Flavel, l. 9.
For Long Primer English read Long Primer Roman.
 1620.

P. 114. James, l. 16.

For Proeomium read Prooemium.
 1621.

P. 115. Burton.
An edition of the Anatomy of Melancholy has been issued in 1893, in
which the editor claims to have verified most of Burton’s quotations.
See also 1640 F (Ferrand).
 1622.

P. 116. Carpenter, last line of page.

For CARPNETARIO read CARPENTARIO.

P. 118. Oxford.
The date of the book (1622) has been accidentally omitted.

P. 118. Rawlinson, l. 4.
For 1662 read 16212.
 1623.

P. 119. Panke.
The words “See 1613 P” are a reference to 1613 in this Supplement.
 1625.

P. 123. Carpenter, l. 7.
For Water read Water.

P. 126. Pemble.
A reference to the 2nd edition, 1629, should have been inserted.
 1628.

P. 138. Casa. The J. W. (de Umbra) is no doubt J.

Wouverus.
 1629.

P. 144. Butler, ll. 5–7.

For the sentence The reference ... Oratoriæ Libri duo, read The
reference to a Rhetorica of this year is to a London edition of the
Rhetorica and Oratoria together.
 1630.

P. 150. Hakewill, l. 2.
For PER=|PETVALL read PER=|PETUALL.

P. 150. Ibid. l. 22.

For Ath. Oxon., 256 read Ath. Oxon., iii. 256.

P. 151. Pemble, l. 6.
For Impr. 84 b read Impr. 84 a.

P. 151. Pinke. Add at end:—

See 1634 P (2nd ed.)

P. 151. Insert:—
Stanley, Henry. [device] | APPENDIX | AD LIBROS OMNES TAM
| VETERIS QVAM NOVI TESTAMENTI. | HENRICUS [device] STANLEY |
OXONIÆ. | M.DC.XXX. |

Impr. as above: 1630: folio: pp. [2 + “529”-“540”]: pp. 529–40

begg. Appendix: Pica (?) Roman. Contents:—p. (1) title: 529–40,
tables, see below.
This set of seven leaves is apparently an experiment to be used for
indexing sermons or comments under the verse of the Bible to which
they refer. They are blank tables in the form “Versus 1 [2, 3, &c. to
18] Vid. L. P. L. ” six times and then “Vid. P. L. ” Eighteen verses
are on each page, and references to L(iber) P(agina) L(inea) were
intended to be filled in. No Latin Bible of folio size of 1629, ‘30 or ‘31
seems to exist, so probably this was intended to be bound up with
some earlier edition. The only copy known is in the British Museum
in MS. Harl. 5932, fol. 45 (Bagford’s collections), and no doubt the
intended publication was abandoned.
 1631.

P. 153. Bible, top line.

The date of imprint (1631) has been accidentally omitted.

P. 155. F., A. (Saints Legacies). Add at end:—

See 1640 S.

P. 155. Felix, l. 1.
For Felıx read Felix.

P. 155. Ibid. ll. 4–5.

bere; quam should be italic.

P. 158. Powel. A copy of the work has now been

seen, as follows:—
Powel, Griffin. ANALYSIS | ANALYTICO-|RVM POSTERIORVM | SIVE
LIBRORVM ARISTO-|telis de Demonstratione, | in qua
singula capita per | quæstiones & responsi-|nes
perspicuè ex-|ponuntur: | adhibitis | QVIBVSDAM SCHOLIIS,
| ex optimis quibusq; interpreti-|bus desumptis,
opera & studio G. | Powel Oxoniensis confecta | &
edita in vsum iuniorum. | Editio secunda. |
[woodcut.]
Impr. 143 a: 1631: (eights) 12o: pp. [16] + 241 + [3]: p. 11 beg.
Analysis cap. 2, 201 strationis Medium: Pica Roman. Contents:—pp.
(1–2) not seen: (3) title: (5–7) dedication to the earl of Essex, dated
“Ex Collegio Iesu oxoniæ Tertio Calend: Martij ... Griffinus Powel”:
(8–14) “Ad Lectorem Academicum”, and “Prolegomena”: (15–16) not
seen: 1–241, the Analysis: (2–3) not seen.
See in body of text (1631 P).
 1632.

P. 161. Widdowes, no. 32, l. 4.

For Impr. 137 read Impr. 107.
 1633.

P. 168. Gerhardus, l. 5.
For Long Primer English read Long Primer Roman.

P. 172. Reusner, l. 9 (only).

In the collation for 198 read 224, with the last page misprinted 198:
and for 34 read 36, making the necessary correction in the List of
Contents.
 1634.

P. 175. Allen, 2nd line of page.

It is the Bodleian Catalogue which ascribes the book to John Allen.

P. 175. Barclay, no. 3.

The date of the imprint (1634) has been accidentally omitted.
 1635.

P. 183. Chaucer, l. 6.
In English Roman Italic the word Roman is superfluous.

P. 183. Ibid, last line.

For sign. 2** read sign. **2.
 1636.

P. 189. Carpenter.
At the end of the technical description a ] should be added.

P. 194. Prideaux, l. 5.
For 40o P. 50 Th. read 4o P. 50 Th.
 1637.

P. 197. Cowper.
The date of the imprint (1637) is accidentally omitted.

P. 200. Prideaux, halfway down.

After Christ’s Resurrection ...” add with impr. 152 b.
 1638.

P. 204. Burton, l. 5 from end.

Perhaps protelata is rather “continued,” although there is no sign of
London printing.

P. 209. Oxford—Statuta. Add:—

A copy of the Statuta Selecta has been seen in which opposite p. 20,
instead of the Encyclopædia is found an undated folio folded
broadside entitled:—SPECULUM | ACADEMICUM: | Quadratura Circuli, |
Sive | Cyclus Prælectorum in Schema redactus.... This table gives a
note of the day of the week, hour, professor, audience and fines, and
bears at the foot “Pag. 20.”, showing that it was intended for (at
least some part of) this edition of the Statuta. In the last line copies
vary between “Vesp.” (as it should be) and “vesp.”
 1639.

P. 212. Dugres.
The date of the imprint (1639) is accidentally omitted.

P. 214. Grotius, 3rd line from end.

For 1722 read 1622.
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