THE GEOPOLITICAL

ECONOMY OF SPORT

This is the frst book to defne and explore the geopolitical economy of sport –
the intersection of power, politics, money, and state interests that both exploit
and shape elite sport around the world.
Russia’s invasion of Ukraine, the global response, and the consequent
ramifcations for sport have put the geopolitical economy of sport front and centre
in both public debate and academic thinking. Similarly, the Winter Olympics
in Beijing and the FIFA World Cup in Qatar illustrate the political, economic,
and geographic imperatives that shape modern sport. This book brings together
studies from around the world to describe this new geopolitical economy of sport,
from the way in which countries use natural resource revenues, accusations of
sport washing, and the deployment of sport for soft power purposes, to the way
in which sport has become a focus for industrial development. This book looks at
the geopolitical economy of sport across the globe, from the Gulf States’ interests
in European soccer to Israel seeking to build a national competitive advantage
by positioning itself as a global sports tech start-up hub, and the United States
continuing to extend its economic and cultural infuence through geopolitical
sport activities in Africa, Latin America, and the Indian subcontinent. This book
captures a pivotal moment in the history of sport and sport business.
This is essential reading for any student, researcher, practitioner, or policymaker
with an interest in sport business, the politics of sport, geopolitics, soft power,
diplomacy, international relations, or international political economy.

Simon Chadwick is Professor of Sport and Geopolitical Economy at Skema

Business School in Paris, France, where he is also a member of its Publika think
tank and Director of its Global Executive MBA in Sport. Chadwick’s work
combines his global interests in sport, geography, politics, and economics, meaning
that his current research is focused on, for example, ownership and sponsorship
in football by state-owned corporations. He has worked extensively in sport with
clubs, governing bodies, commercial partners, and governments.

Paul Widdop is Senior Lecturer at the University of Manchester, UK. His research
explores social and economic networks around the consumption and production
of sport. He has published widely in the areas of sport and culture including articles
in the Journal of Consumer Culture, Cultural Sociology, Cultural Trends, Electoral Studies,
and the Journal of Political Marketing.Widdop serves on the editorial board of several
academic journals and is co-founder of the Football Collective, a learned society of
academics researching impacts of football on society.

Michael M. Goldman is Professor with the Sport Management Program at the

University of San Francisco, USA, while also working with the Gordon Institute
of Business Science in South Africa. He works with students, managers, and
clients to enhance their abilities to acquire, grow, and retain proftable customers
and fans.
THE GEOPOLITICAL
ECONOMY OF SPORT
Power, Politics, Money,
and the State

Edited by Simon Chadwick, Paul Widdop,

and Michael M. Goldman
Designed cover image: Maksym Tymchyk
First published 2023
by Routledge
4 Park Square, Milton Park, Abingdon, Oxon OX14 4RN
and by Routledge
605 Third Avenue, New York, NY 10158
Routledge is an imprint of the Taylor & Francis Group, an informa business
© 2023 selection and editorial matter, Simon Chadwick, Paul Widdop
and Michael M. Goldman; individual chapters, the contributors
The right of Simon Chadwick, Paul Widdop and Michael M. Goldman
to be identifed as the authors of the editorial material, and of the
authors for their individual chapters, has been asserted in accordance
with sections 77 and 78 of the Copyright, Designs and Patents Act 1988.
All rights reserved. No part of this book may be reprinted or reproduced
or utilised in any form or by any electronic, mechanical, or other
means, now known or hereafter invented, including photocopying and
recording, or in any information storage or retrieval system, without
permission in writing from the publishers.
Trademark notice: Product or corporate names may be trademarks
or registered trademarks, and are used only for identifcation and
explanation without intent to infringe.
British Library Cataloguing-in-Publication Data
A catalogue record for this book is available from the British Library
Library of Congress Cataloging-in-Publication Data
Names: Chadwick, Simon, 1964- editor. | Widdop, Paul, editor. |
Goldman, Michael M., editor.
Title: The geopolitical economy of sport : power, politics, money
and the state / edited by Simon Chadwick, Paul Widdop and
Michael M. Goldman.
Description: Abingdon, Oxon ; New York, N.Y. : Routledge, 2023. |
Includes bibliographical references and index. |
Identifers: LCCN 2022057046 | ISBN 9781032390611 (hardback) |
ISBN 9781032390598 (paperback) | ISBN 9781003348238 (ebook)
Subjects: LCSH: Sports and international relations. | Sports--Political
aspects. | Sports--Economic aspects. | Sports and state. | Nationalism
and sports. | Geopolitics.
Classifcation: LCC GV706.35 .G465 2023 | DDC 306.4/83--dc23/
eng/20230109
LC record available at https://lccn.loc.gov/2022057046
ISBN: 978-1-032-39061-1 (hbk)
ISBN: 978-1-032-39059-8 (pbk)
ISBN: 978-1-003-34823-8 (ebk)
DOI: 10.4324/9781003348238
Typeset in Bembo
by Deanta Global Publishing Services, Chennai, India
CONTENTS

List of Contributors ix

1 Introduction: Towards a Geopolitical Economy of Sport 1

Simon Chadwick, Paul Widdop, and Michael M. Goldman

PART I
Russia and Ukraine 7

2 Athletes’ Early Responses to the War Against Ukraine 9

Leo Goretti

3 Sport Sanctions Against Invasive Russia 20

Daryl Adair

4 What Future for Putin’s Sport Power? 29

Lukas Aubin

5 Governance Dysfunction in World Sport: Issues Raised by

the Confict in Ukraine 36
Sergey Altukhov

6 Public Remembering of Sochi 2014 at a Time of War:

The Kremlin’s Soft Disempowerment through Sport 42
Vitaly Kazakov
vi Contents

7 Transnational Leagues and Their Role in Projecting Soft Power 49

Olivier Jarosz, Konstantin Kornakov, and Adam Metelski

PART II
China 65

8 The International Paralympic Committee, Beijing

2022 Winter Paralympic Games, and the Invasion of Ukraine 67
Verity Postlethwaite

9 Israel’s Winter Sports Diplomacy and Beijing 2022 75

Yoav Dubinsky

10 The Global Sporting Power Elite: Eileen Gu 85

Donna Wong and Yue Meng-Lewis

11 China’s Moves to Infuence the Geopolitical Economy of

Sports: The Three Axe Strokes 93
Lingling Liu and Dan Zhang

12 Making of (Not Only) a Sports Superpower: The Chinese

Dream 101
Abhishek Khajuria

13 Chinese Super League: Soft Power, Investment, and

Sustainability 108
Ricardo Gúdel and Emilio Hernández

14 Doing Sports Business in China: Still a Slam Dunk? 116

Jonathan Sullivan and Tobias Ross

PART III
The Gulf and South Asia 125

15 Qatar and the 2022 FIFA World Cup: Soft Power, State
Branding, or Nation Building? 127
Kristian Coates Ulrichsen

16 Geopolitics of Sport in the MENA Region 134

Mahfoud Amara and Sara Mehanna Al-Naimi
 Contents  vii

17 Sport and Saudi Arabia: Mimetic Isomorphism, Soft Power,

and Disempowerment 141
Nicholas Burton and Michael L. Naraine

18 Sport Washing and the Gulf Region: Myth or Reality? 148

Simon Chadwick and Paul Widdop

19 Geopolitics of Cricket in India 155

Mohit Anand

PART IV
Africa 163

20 Africa in the Global Football Business Complex 165

Gerard A. Akindes

21 The NBA’s Partnership with Rwanda 173

Michael M. Goldman and Jeffrey W. Paller

PART V
Football 183

22 The Politics of Alternative Football: Curious Friends 185

Steve Menary

23 The Conjunctural Politics of the 2026 FIFA Men’s World

Cup: United 2026 191
Adam S. Beissel

24 The Attempted Reshaping of the Turkish Football

Landscape under the AK Party: A Transaction Cost
Economics Explanation 203
Steven H. Seggie

25 Football and the City: A Sports Place Branding Perspective

of Barcelona and Manchester 210
Xavier Ginesta and Carles Viñas

26 The European Super League and Football’s Privatization 217

Alexey Kirichek
viii Contents

PART VI
Motorsport 225

27 Sport Governance, Geopolitical Change, and Organizational

Resilience: The Case of Fédération Internationale de
l’Automobile (FIA) 227
Hans Erik Næss

28 The Geopolitics of Money Versus Morals: Location,

Location, Location of the Formula 1 Race Calendar 235
Tim Dewhirst

29 The End of Oil?: Formula One’s Changing Face 242

Josh Rayman

PART VII
Peace, Diplomacy, and Society 251

30 Sport, Geo-Politics, and the Peace Process 253

Grant Jarvie

31 Sports Diplomacy in the Pacifc Region and the

Sino-Australian Great Game 262
Stuart Murray and Tony Yang

32 Sports, Race, and Cosmopolitanism 271

J.P. Singh

33 Transgender Sport Bans Come for Elite Sport: Federations’

New Attempt to Defne Womanhood 277
Sydney Bauer

PART VIII
Implications 285

34 What the Cases of Gazprom, the NBA, and Qatar Mean for
Sport Industry Decision-Makers 287
Simon Chadwick and Paul Widdop

Index 295
LIST OF CONTRIBUTORS

Daryl Adair is Associate Professor of Sport Management at the Business School,

University of Technology Sydney, Australia. Daryl is interested in sport history, poli-
tics, and policy, with an eclectic engagement in contemporary issues as they pertain
to sport and society. He is on the editorial boards of Sport and Society, Journal of Sport
History, and Performance Enhancement and Health.

Gerard Akindes is Adjunct Faculty at Northwestern University, Qatar, and New

York University, USA. In Qatar, he worked as senior insight and research man-
ager for the Josoor Institute, a legacy programme of the FIFA World Cup Qatar
2022. He co-created an annual conference on sports in Africa (the 15th was held
at Nelson Mandela University, South Africa, in June 2021). He also co-founded
SportsAfrica Network, an African sports scholars and practitioners organization.

Sarah Muhanna Al-Naimi is Researcher at the Diplomatic Institute at the Ministry

of Foreign Affairs, Qatar, and is a PhD student in “Gulf Studies” at Qatar University.
Her academic and research vocation is to explore Qatar’s foreign policy, demon-
strate how non-traditional tools enabled branding Qatar’s image regionally and
internationally.

Sergey Altukhov is Professor and Director of the Institute of Sports Management

and Law in the Higher School of Law and Administration of the NRU HSE, Russia.
He is the Academics Director of the International Sport Management Master pro-
gramme at this university. His main research interests deal with good governance in
sport and geopolitics in sport. He is Visiting Professor at the Russian International
Olympic University, a member of the Council for Professional Qualifications in
Sports, and a member of the Expert Council for Physical Culture, Sports and
Tourism of the Russian Parliament.


x List of Contributors

Mahfoud Amara is Associate Professor of Sport Social Sciences and Management

in the Physical Education & Sport Science Department, College of Education at
Qatar University, Qatar. His work focuses on sport, business, culture, politics, and
society in the MENA region, and sport, cultural diversity, and Muslim communi-
ties in the West. He has been invited as speaker and expert to a number of working
groups, international conferences, symposia, panels, and lecture series/webinars.

Mohit Anand is a Professor in International Business and Strategy at the EMLYON

Business School, France. Dr. Anand has over 17 years of experience in industry
and academia. Within the fields of International Business and Strategy, his research
interests include Emerging Markets, Innovation, and BOP studies. While his
focus area of study is inclined towards Microinsurance and Frugal and Reverse
Innovation, more recent areas of interest also include Geopolitics in Asia, Regional
Trade Blocs, and Public Policy Innovations. He has been a visiting faculty member
at Shri Ram College of Commerce (SRCC), the University of Delhi, and ESCE
(Paris). Previously he was Associate Professor at FORE School of Management
(New Delhi) where he also headed the “Centre for Emerging Markets”. Several of
his papers have been published and presented in leading international journals and
conferences. In 2018, he received Milliman Fellow in Microinsurance at ILO-ITC
Impact Insurance Academy, Turin, Italy.

Lukas Aubin is Senior Research Fellow at the French Institute for International
and Strategic Affairs (IRIS), Doctor in Slavic studies, specialist in the geopolitics of
Russia and sport, and member of the Multidisciplinary Research Center (CRPM)
of Paris Nanterre-University of Paris Lumières, France. His studies mainly focus on
the new geopolitical issues of Russia and sport. He is also interested in the question
of sovereignty within the post-Soviet space.

Sydney Bauer is a Freelance Journalist who has covered the Olympic Movement
for the past decade. She began her work at Around the Rings and was based in
Rio de Janeiro for the final year of preparations for the 2016 Olympics. Having
covered every Olympics since London 2012, she is reporting in a freelance capacity
on understanding how sporting bodies’ growing political power intersects with the
world at large, specifically when it relates to marginalized communities.

Adam Beissel is Assistant Professor of Sport Leadership & Management at Miami

University, Ohio, USA. Adam’s scholarship interrogates the geopolitical economy of
sport. His primary research interests include: the economics of sport mega-events,
geopolitics of sport, sport stadiums and urban development, social and economic
(in)justice in college sport, sports labour markets, and global athletic migration
and sport globalization. Beissel is currently working on two research projects criti-
cally examining the political economy of the 2023 FIFA Women’s World Cup in
Australia and New Zealand and the 2026 FIFA Men’s World Cup jointly hosted by
Canada, Mexico, and the United States.
 List of Contributors  xi

Nicholas Burton (PhD, Coventry University) is an Associate Professor in the

Department of Sport Management at Brock University. His research explores sport
business and marketing strategy, with particular interest in sponsorship management,
social media marketing and user engagement, and sport’s geopolitical positioning.

Timothy Dewhirst is Professor in the Department of Marketing and Consumer

Studies and Senior Research Fellow in Marketing and Public Policy at the Gordon
S. Lang School of Business and Economics at the University of Guelph, Canada.
He has held visiting scholar positions at the University of California, San Francisco,
University of Sydney, in Australia, and Hanyang University in South Korea. He
is Associate Editor of the journal Tobacco Control, and he serves on the Editorial
Review Board for the Journal of Public Policy & Marketing. Additionally, he served
as an invited expert for the WHO with respect to Article 13 guidelines, con-
cerning cross-border advertising, promotion, and sponsorship of the Framework
Convention on Tobacco Control (FCTC).

Yoav Dubinsky is Instructor of Sports Business in the Lundquist College of Business,

at the University of Oregon, USA. His research focuses on sports, nation brand-
ing, and public diplomacy. Dubinsky covered or researched four summer Olympic
Games as an accredited journalist from Beijing, London, Rio de Janeiro, and Tokyo;
attended the Lausanne 2020 Winter Youth Olympic Games; and lectured at the
International Olympic Academy in Olympia, Greece.

Xavier Ginesta is Associate Lecturer in Media Studies and Sport Communication

at the University of Vic-Central University of Catalonia (UVic-UCC), Spain. His
PhD thesis is about Sport Corporate Communication in LaLiga, and he has been
a research fellow of the Olympics Studies Center at the Autonomous University
of Barcelona, Spain. He is currently a member of the TRACTE Research Group
at the UVic-UCC, where he works on sports place branding and sport diplomacy.

Leo Goretti is Senior Fellow in the Italian Foreign Policy Programme at the Istituto
Affari Internazionali (IAI), Rome, Italy, and co-editor of The International Spectator,
the peer-reviewed English-language journal of IAI. He holds a PhD in history from
the University of Reading, UK.

Ricardo Gúdel is Associate Lecturer of Business Management and International

Trade at the University of Valladolid, Spain. He is also a member of the International
Trade Chair and the Asian Studies Centre of the Faculty of Commerce. Gúdel is
currently a PhD candidate, and his thesis focuses on studying the development and
internationalization of football industries in Asia. In recent years, he has developed
his professional activity in foreign trade and the sports field, working as a grassroots
football coach at Real Valladolid. His research focuses mainly on overseas sports
industries, and the cultural impact on business management.
xii List of Contributors

Emilio Hernández is Coordinator of the China Department of the Asian Studies

Centre at the University of Valladolid, Spain, and Lecturer at the Faculty of
Commerce. He has worked and researched in China for two years in the tourism
and trade sectors. His research also focuses on the Chinese sports industry, out-
bound Chinese tourism and its economic impact, international trade with China,
and intercultural relations in companies and organizations.

Olivier Jarosz has over ten years of experience in research and development activi-
ties in the European Club Association (ECA), where he was also the Head of Club
Affairs and Club Management Programme Director. He was one of the architects
of the UEFA Women’s Champions League reform and cooperated with clubs all
over the world. He has been a guest of over 200 football clubs in Europe, the
United States, Asia, and the Middle East. Olivier is the author of many publications
on football, concerning youth academies, women’s football as well as club manage-
ment and strategy.

Grant Jarvie is Professor and Chair of Sport at the University of Edinburgh, UK.
He is Visiting Professor with the University of Toronto, Canada, and has held senior
positions in both universities and the sports industry. He is Vice-Convener of the
Iona Community and a director with Scottish Football Clubs.

Vitaly Kazakov is an ESRC Postdoctoral Fellow in the School of Arts, Languages

and Cultures at the University of Manchester, UK. His research interests include
media events, social media, nation projection, and soft power. Previously, he has
worked as a Lecturer in Politics at the Universities of Liverpool and Manchester,
Postdoctoral Research Associate at the University of Manchester, and as a journalist
and communications specialist in Canada and Russia.

Abhishek Khajuria is a PhD candidate at the Centre for European Studies in the
School of International Studies at Jawaharlal Nehru University, India. Apart from
European politics (including electoral politics) and Indian foreign policy, he has a
deep interest in sports which include the political role of sports and the economic
aspects of sports and hopes to contribute to the field of geopolitical economy of
sport.

Alexey Kirichek lectures in the Football Business Academy (Switzerland), European

Sport Business School (Valencia), and Russian International Olympic University
(Sochi, Russia). He is a member of Marketing Committee of Football Union
of Russia and Consultant in the international sports projects including football
grassroots events, sponsorship activations, and strategic development. His research
interests include sports marketing, sport sponsorship, football management, and fan
engagement.
 List of Contributors  xiii

Konstantin Kornakov is a club football expert with an analytical mind, a systematic

approach to solving football’s strategic challenges, and a keen interest in knowledge
sharing and multidisciplinary methods, with a combined experience of almost two
decades in the football industry in club operational and advisory roles.

Lingling Liu is a Sports Business Specialist with a long history of working in the
sports industry on international relations, PR and communications, sponsorships,
market research, and media operations in mega-events such as the Olympics and
FIFA World Cup. She was a columnist for Sport Business International, and she
recently founded Sports DAO Ltd. to bring blockchain strategy to sports projects
and organizations.

Steve Menary is an author, journalist, and researcher. A regular contributor to

World Soccer magazine and Play the Game for more than 15 years, he is also a CIES
Havelange scholar and has lectured at the universities of East London, Southampton
Solent, and Winchester and the Sport Business Centre at Birkbeck, University of
London, UK.

Yue Meng-Lewis is Senior Lecturer (Associate Professor) in Digital Marketing at

the Open University Business School, UK. Her research interests focus on inter-
national communication strategy, sports and digital marketing, and the esports eco-
system. Her publications have appeared in the European Journal of Marketing, Journal
of Business Research, International Journal of Human Resource Management, Information
Technology & People, as well as other international journals.

Adam Metelski is Assistant Professor at the Poznań University of Economics and

Business, Poland. A former professional basketball player with experience in the
United States and Europe, he has graduated from five universities in economics,
psychology, and sociology.

Stuart Murray is Associate Professor in International Relations and Diplomacy at

Bond University, Australia; Global Fellow at the Academy of Sport, the University
of Edinburgh, UK; Honorary Member of the Centre for Sports Law, Policy and
Diplomacy at the University of Rijeka, Croatia; and Adjunct Research Fellow at
Griffith University Australia. He regularly advises governments, international insti-
tutions, and non-state actors on a broad range of matters relating to diplomacy,
international affairs, and sport. He is also the co-founder of Sports Diplomacy
Alliance, a global advisory and accreditation business that specializes in harnessing
the power of sport to generate commercial, diplomatic, and social impact.

Hans Erik Næss is Professor of Sport Management at Kristiania University College,

Norway. He is the author of several books on motorsports, politics, and organiza-
tional development.
xiv List of Contributors

Michael L. Naraine (PhD, University of Ottawa) is an Associate Professor in the

Department of Sport Management at Brock University. His primary research
explores digital sport management and marketing, specifically the strategy, engage-
ment, and analytics of new developments in the sport business landscape.

Jeffrey Paller specializes in civic engagement, democratic accountability, and sus-

tainable development in African cities. He curates the newsletter This Week in
Africa.

Verity Postlethwaite is an early career researcher with extensive industry and

higher education research experience. Her main interests and experiences are
around how sport and other cultural entities have been used to govern society,
with a specialty in international sporting events, inclusion, and international sports
governance. Recent outputs include an integrative review of sport diplomacy in
Sport Management Review.

Josh Rayman is a visual journalist and creative software developer based in London.
His work has been published by the New Statesman, The Times and the BBC, spe-
cialising in election graphics. He competed as a racing driver for karts and cars for
many years.

Tobias Ross is Doctoral Researcher in the School of Politics and IR, University of
Nottingham, UK, as well as a consultant for international sports marketing projects.

Steven H. Seggie is Associate Professor of Marketing at ESSEC Business School,

France, where he is also the Academic Director of the Weekend EMBA. He does
research, teaching, and consulting on interorganizational relationships, innovation,
and sport, particularly football. He previously hosted a football programme on the
nationally syndicated radio station Lig Radyo in Turkey. He is a member of Morton
Club Together, the biggest shareholder in Greenock Morton Football Club.

J.P. Singh is Professor of Global Commerce and Policy at the Schar School of
Policy and Government, and Richard von Weizsäcker Fellow with the Robert
Bosch Academy, Germany. He works at the intersection of technology, culture, and
political economy in global contexts. Singh has consulted or advised international
organizations such as the British Council, UNESCO, the World Bank, and the
World Trade Organization, and conducted field research in 36 countries. In 2022,
the International Studies Association named him a distinguished scholar in inter-
national communication.

Jonathan Sullivan is Associate Professor in the School of Politics and IR, and Head
of China Programmes in the Asia Research Institute, University of Nottingham,
UK.
 List of Contributors  xv

Kristian Coates Ulrichsen is Fellow for the Middle East at Rice University’s Baker
Institute for Public Policy, USA. His research spans the history, political, and inter-
national political economy, and international relations of the Gulf States and their
changing position within the global order.

Carles Viñas is Associate Serra Hunter Lecturer at the University of Barcelona

(UB), Spain. His main research interests are sport, hooliganism, and political move-
ments. He is a member of the International Historical Studies Centre Research
Group (GREC-CEHI) at UB.

Donna Wong is Associate Professor in Graduate School of Sport Sciences at

Waseda University, Japan. Her research focuses on the managerial aspects of sport.
She has researched and published extensively on sports mega-events, digital sports
media, and esports. She is holder of both the International Olympic Committee
Postgraduate Research Grant and FIFA Research Scholarship. Additionally, her co-
authored research on esports with Dr Meng-Lewis has won the Best Paper award
at the 2019 Annual European Association for Sport Management Conference. She
is currently working on her research on digital sports as well as the legacy of the
2020 Tokyo Olympic Games.

Tony Yang is Assistant Teaching Fellow at Bond University, Australia, and is cur-
rently undertaking his PhD research in regard to “China’s sports diplomacy”.Yang
has experience in several football clubs from China, England,Australia, and Portugal,
and has completed two postgraduate programmes: Master of Sport Management
from De Montfort University, UK, and Master of International Relations from
Bond University, Australia.Yang is also a qualified and active football referee regis-
tered in the Football Queensland.

Dan Zhang is Lecturer in Marketing and Advertising with Coventry University,

UK, and wrote for Sport Business International as a freelance Chinese journalist.
1
INTRODUCTION
Towards a Geopolitical Economy of Sport

Simon Chadwick, Paul Widdop, and Michael M. Goldman

In late 2021, reports emerged that a Chinese female professional tennis player –
Peng Shuai – had posted a message on social media claiming that she had been
coerced into a sexual relationship with one of her country’s senior government
ofcials. The post was rapidly deleted, and stories then began to circulate that the
athlete had disappeared. Many people, including fellow professional tennis play-
ers, began demanding to know what had happened to Peng. Shortly afterwards,
the International Olympic Committee president – Thomas Bach – appeared
in photographs, apparently in a video call with the missing athlete. This was
immediately questioned by observers and critics, though Bach was presumably
mindful of the potential for a large-scale boycott of the impending 2022 Winter
Olympics in Beijing. Calls for a boycott of the event had been a predominant
feature of the run-up to the event, notably in response to China’s treatment of
its Uyghur community. Whatever the IOC president’s motives or intentions, the
Women’s Tennis Association, an organization founded and based in the United
States, subsequently announced that it would be suspending its tournaments in
China following the Peng episode. In due course, Peng re-appeared in public,
though many remained unconvinced that she was in control of her own liberty
and free to speak openly. Nevertheless, the tennis player was eventually seen in
the front row at an Olympic freestyle skiing event in Beijing, at which Eileen
Gu won the gold medal. Gu herself comes with an interesting story: born and
raised in the United States to a Chinese mother and estranged American father; a
rising star in possession of naming rights deals with the likes of Red Bull, at the
same time competing for China and being seen as an instrument of propaganda
for the Chinese state.
Once the Beijing Winter Olympics had ended, though even before the Winter
Paralympics had started, Russia invaded Ukraine. Within days, the global sport
community had responded, with Russian athletes, teams, and governing bodies

DOI: 10.4324/9781003348238-1
2 Simon Chadwick, Paul Widdop, and Michael M. Goldman

being suspended from participation and membership. The response of European

football’s governing body – UEFA – was especially notable. Its men’s Champions
League competition had been sponsored for nearly a decade by Russian state-
owned Gazprom, which had been using its sponsorship portfolio for polit-
ical purposes. At the same time, its chairman had been sitting on the board
of UEFA’s executive committee as a result of his position as president of the
Russian Football Union. He had also been president of the Russian football club
Zenit Saint Petersburg, itself owned by Gazprom, playing in a stadium owned
by the gas corporation, located in a city in which Gazprom has its headquarters.
Furthermore, with little more than four months to go, the men’s Champions
League Final was scheduled to take place at the Gazprom-owned venue. In
response to Russia’s military action, UEFA unilaterally terminated its Gazprom
sponsorship, switched the upcoming match to Paris, and suspended Russia and
its teams from all UEFA competitions.
At the end of 2022, Qatar stages the FIFA men’s football World Cup – a tour-
nament that has been hugely controversial in its organization. Less than 5 percent
the size of Britain, Qatar has been linked to corruption scandals within FIFA,
with critics claiming that it is an undeserving host of football’s biggest national
team competition. Yet Qatar is a gas- and oil-rich state that is going through
a period of economic, political, and social transformation, driven by its long-
planned staging of the World Cup. What some have seen as nation building on
an epic scale, others have dismissed as ostentation driven by vanity. As the gov-
ernment in Doha has sought to project soft power through football, a popular
discourse has arisen that frames Qatar as a sport washer. Though the country has
worked hard to position itself as a more progressive Gulf nation (albeit under-
pinned by traditional Islamic values), critics highlight what they see as an archaic
labour market system that has resulted in the exploitation and death of count-
less migrant workers. Yet Qatar is now a prominent and legitimate member of
the global sport community, having staged many of sport’s biggest international
events and gained decision making infuence within sport’s governing institu-
tions. At the same time, the likes of its state-owned airline – Qatar Airways –
have established an impressive array of sport sponsorship properties. Yet at the
same time, other sponsors will have stayed away from any association with the
World Cup, fearing adverse consequences of being associated with the country
in any way.
Adding to this chronology, there are numerous other examples of where sport,
economics, politics, and geography interconnect and infuence one another. In
early 2022, Houthi drones attacked an industrial facility close to the Jeddah
Formula 1 circuit in Saudi Arabia. A retaliatory strike against the country, the
Houthis were responding to the kingdom’s military actions in Yemen. F1 driv-
ers were so concerned that they considered boycotting the race, which would
have had signifcant economic, political, and legal consequences for a multitude
of the sport’s stakeholders. In both 2020 and 2021, the British government’s
attempts to facilitate the Saudi Arabian Public Investment Fund’s acquisition of
 Introduction 3

Premier League club Newcastle United whilst establishing a fan-led review of

club ownership were as confused as they were striking. Nonetheless, the British
government illustrated the economic and political signifcance of English foot-
ball, something that has been accumulated over decades and confers a global
competitive advantage in football upon Great Britain. Or one can refer to the
case of Colin Kaepernick and his taking the knee, which simultaneously became
a socio-political matter as well as a business and commercial one. Upon the death
of George Floyd, taking the knee became an important symbol of solidarity and
demand for change across the world. All of which has thrust the issue of race into
the spotlight of global sport ever since.
In these examples drawn from little more than a period of a few years, sev-
eral things immediately become clear. Firstly, that the world (and, indeed, the
world of sport) is densely interconnected, meaning that it is often impossible to
create a demarcation between matters of geography, politics, and economics. At
one level sport has become an important focal node of networks underpinned
by a quest for power and control over important resources. At another level,
sport has become the means to an end for countries, businesses, and others
that are seeking to achieve goals that extend way beyond it. Sport is undoubt-
edly shaped by and is therefore an outcome of geography, both physical and
human. One need only think of nations that perform well in alpine sports to
understand such a statement. That Qatar and Saudi Arabia are spending lavishly
on sport is fuelled by the oil and gas deposits that sit beneath their countries.
Though people rail against sport and politics mixing, during the frst quarter
of the 21st century the two appear to be synonymous or in symbiosis rather
than being remote from one another. Diferent ideologies increasingly under-
pin the organization and governance of sport, whilst countries compete with
each other to successfully formulate strategy and policy in sport. For instance,
South Korea was the frst country in the world to adopt an esports strategy
intended to position it as one of the world’s leading industrial hubs. Such policy
and strategy typically have an economic dimension, whereby contribution to
national income, job creation, the generation of tax revenues, and the promo-
tion of exports in sport becomes as important as sports themselves. One need
only consider that the US NBA basketball competition is thought to have gen-
erated upwards of $500 billion in China alone is a testament to the economic
signifcance of sport.
For the purposes of this book, we defne the geopolitical economy of sport
as being:

The way in which nations, states, and other entities engage in, with or
through sport for geographic, political and/or economic reasons in order
to build and exert power, and secure strategic advantages through the con-
trol of resources within and via networks of which sport is a constituent
part.
(Chadwick, 2022a)
4 Simon Chadwick, Paul Widdop, and Michael M. Goldman

The editors recommend that readers who may wish to familiarize themselves
with the origins and features of geopolitical economy read the above article,
though one may also fnd other articles by Chadwick (2022b) and Chadwick
and Widdop (2021) to be helpful. The purpose of this book is, nevertheless,
not to address issues in its conceptualization. Rather, it is intended to high-
light instances and issues that we believe should be classifed as being geopoliti-
cally economic in nature. In conjunction with formative commentaries about
it, this text is implicitly an assertion that this new way of conceiving sport is of
paramount importance at this stage’s history. Though we acknowledge the 19th-
century utilitarian traditions of sport research and appreciate the contribution of
neoclassical economics to understanding sport management in the 20th century,
this book is intended as a bold assertion that a new conceptualization of sport – a
new discipline in which people can engage in scholarly activity – needs to be
adopted. It is anticipated that this book will make an important contribution in
this regard. It is important that the reader notes both the multidisciplinary nature
of sport’s geopolitical economy and the diversity of its constituent members.
It is important for the reader to note that although this book does contain a
plethora of chapters focusing on countries and states, they are not the extent of its
geographic constituency. Cities, communities, and even individual athletes are
amongst the other constituents we assert are part of sport’s geopolitical economy.
Likewise, governments, sovereign wealth funds, and sport governing bodies are
amongst the political constituents. While sponsors, broadcasters, and apparel
providers are just a small selection of the economic constituents. It is important
to note too that, in spite of the mention above of the likes of China and Qatar, the
geopolitical economy of sport is not exclusively an Asian phenomenon – it encap-
sulates the world. Ideology, diplomacy, and soft power are as much characteristics
of Brazilian, Canadian, or Nigerian sport as they are of sport in China, India,
or Japan. Equally, sport and the countries of Europe, and those in Oceania and
elsewhere, are shaped by and are an infuence upon the geopolitical economy.
The reader may wish to note that this book has adopted the following themes,
into which chapters have been placed:

● Russia and Ukraine;

● China;
● The Gulf and South Asia
● Africa;
● Football;
● Motorsport;
● Peace, diplomacy, and society;
● Implications.

References
Chadwick, S. (2022a), How 2022 will epitomise sport’s burgeoning geopolitical
economy. Institut de Relations Internationales et Strategiques, 21st January, accessed via
 Introduction 5

https://www.iris-france.org/164078-how-2022-will-epitomise-sports-burgeoning
-geopolitical-economy/.
Chadwick, S. (2022b), From utilitarianism and neoclassical sport management to a
new geopolitical economy of sport. European Sport Management Quarterly, 22 (5), pp.
685–704.
Chadwick, S., and Widdop, P. (2021), The geopolitical economy of sport – A new era
in play. Asia and the Pacifc Policy Forum, 13th January, accessed via https://www
.policyforum.net/the-geopolitical-economy-of-sport/.
PART I

Russia and Ukraine

2
ATHLETES’ EARLY RESPONSES TO
THE WAR AGAINST UKRAINE
Leo Goretti

“No War in Ukraine”: so read the sign held up by Ukrainian skeleton racer
Vladyslav Heraskevych after he fnished one of his runs at the Beijing Winter
Olympics on 11 February 2022, amidst warnings that a Russian attack against
Kyiv was imminent.1 Less than a month later, on 5 March, while war was raging
across Ukraine, Russian gymnast Ivan Kuliak took the podium at an Artistic
Gymnastics World Cup event in Doha wearing the infamous “Z” symbol, associ-
ated with support for the Russian military.2 Through their gestures, Heraskevych
and Kuliak used international sports events to deliver opposing political messages
– one for peace, the other for war – that were widely reported in the media and
reached beyond their respective sports’ audiences. Heraskevych’s and Kuliak’s
actions were sensational but far from isolated: within a few weeks of the invasion,
a signifcant number of elite athletes – not only Ukrainian and Russian, but also
third-country nationals – took a public stand on the war, in most cases against it.
Athletes’ public responses to the war on Ukraine are the latest chapter in the
long history of athletes’ agency – defned as the “capacity to act” for social and
political purposes.3 They highlight the role and limits of athletes’ agency in an
era marked by greater attention to humanitarian and human rights considera-
tions on the one hand, and rising international tensions and fragmentation of
global governance on the other.4

A New Era of Athletes’ Agency?

Due to their public relevance and global media attention, major sports events such
as the Olympics can ofer a uniquely spectacular platform for athletes to make
statements about wider sociopolitical issues.5 This is especially the case for highly
emotional events such as medal ceremonies, which have provided the stage for
some of the most iconic examples of athletes’ agency: frst and foremost, Tommie

DOI: 10.4324/9781003348238-3
10 Leo Goretti

Smith and John Carlos’s black-glove salute at the 1968 Mexico Olympics.6 These
on-feld enactments of agency openly defy the self-professed “apolitical” and
“neutral” nature of sport that has been part and parcel of the Olympic move-
ment since its inception. Indeed, they bring to light political and social cleavages,
undermining the belief that sport is pure recreation; furthermore, at the inter-
national level, they may highlight geopolitical tensions, thereby threatening the
unity and the status quo of international sport. Not surprisingly, international
sports organizations such as the International Olympic Committee (IOC) have
long been at pains to prevent and sanction on-feld exercise of agency, leading
to a number of successive regulations, the most recent being Rule 50.2 of the
Olympic Charter, mandating that “No kind of demonstration or political, reli-
gious or racial propaganda is permitted in any Olympic sites, venues or other
areas”.7
Historically, elite athletes taking a public stand have constituted a minor-
ity, even more so on-feld. In recent years, however, an increasing number of
sportspeople have publicly supported anti-racism, anti-discrimination, gender
equality, and social justice initiatives. Especially after the wave of protests in
response to the murder of George Floyd in late spring–summer 2020, the gesture
of taking a knee before the start of matches, following the example of NFL quar-
terback Colin Kaepernick, has become fairly widespread among elite athletes,
especially from North America.8
Hence, pressing questions about athletes’ freedom of expression have emerged,
leading the IOC to ask its Athletes’ Commission “to explore whether a greater
appetite exists among athletes worldwide to express themselves […] during the
Olympic Games”.9 A comprehensive survey administered to over 3,500 elite ath-
letes from 185 diferent National Olympic Committees highlighted that 42 per
cent of respondents deem it appropriate to have an opportunity to “express their
individual views on political issues and other topics” in the media during the
Games, while only 16 per cent fnd it appropriate to do so on the medal podium
and 14 per cent on the feld of play. Nonetheless, having an opportunity for “uni-
fed messaging around inclusion and solidarity on the feld of play” is welcomed
by 46 per cent of respondents.10 Notably, athletes’ responses vary signifcantly
according to nationality: while 40 per cent of US athletes support “Allowing
physical gestures in an Olympic venue, as a way to demonstrate or express a
view”, barely 10 per cent of Russian and 4 per cent of Chinese respondents
fnd it important.11 Furthermore, the Team USA Council on Racial and Social
Justice provided detailed recommendations to the IOC Athletes’ Commission,
asking, among other things, to “Establish a no-punishment-policy for protests
and demonstrations that are aimed at promoting human rights/social justice ini-
tiatives and advancing the human rights mission of the Olympic and Paralympic
movements”.12
The IOC consultation did not lead to a change in Rule 50.2; however, on
the occasion of both the Tokyo 2020 and the Beijing 2022 Olympic Games, the
Athletes’ Commission published dedicated “Rule 50 Guidelines”. The Guidelines
 Athletes’ Early Responses to the War Against Ukraine 11

clarifed that athletes “have the opportunity to express their views” in a number
of instances during the Games, not only when speaking to the media, but also
“on the feld of play prior to the start of the competition”, provided that the ges-
ture is “consistent with the Fundamental Principles of Olympism”, not aimed at
any specifc target and not disruptive to the Games.13
Overall, already before the outbreak of the war in Ukraine, the number of
elite athletes publicly expressing their views or taking a stand on sociopoliti-
cal issues – that is, exercising their agency – seemed to be on the rise.14 This
prompted a response by international sports organizations that, while reasserting
the principle of sport’s neutrality, partly relaxed their rules regarding athletes’
activism. Russia’s aggression against Ukraine, which was launched during the
“Olympic Truce”15 only a week before the Beijing Winter Paralympics were due
to commence, triggered a new wave of statements and gestures by elite athletes.
In contrast to anti-racist and anti-discrimination stances, which usually focused
on domestic (especially US) matters, pro-peace (or pro-war) demonstrations
directly involved issues of international politics. As such, they injected geopoliti-
cal tensions into international sports, piercing the veil of its alleged neutrality
and universalism.

Elite Athletes and the War on Ukraine

In the early days following Russia’s invasion of Ukraine, a substantial number
of elite sportspeople expressed themselves against the war through interviews,
public statements, and/or social media. Several of them went beyond generic
declarations of solidarity and came out in support of a ban on teams and indi-
viduals ofcially representing Russia in international sports, even threatening
to walk out of matches and competitions had international sports organizations
failed to do so. This attitude was not limited to Ukrainians – many of whom
quickly left the sports grounds to join the fght against the invaders16 – but was
shared by other (overwhelmingly Western) athletes: among the most prominent
examples was the Polish men’s football team, which on 26 February released a
statement via social media in agreement with the Polish Football Association,
expressing their intention not to compete against Russia in the upcoming World
Cup qualifers. The Polish were soon joined by the Swedish and Czech teams,
leading FIFA to eventually ban Russia from all its competitions, including the
World Cup.17
In the frst week of the war, the primary focus of athletes’ initiatives was on
the upcoming Paralympic Games. On 27 February, a joint statement by several
Ukrainian elite athletes – the frst signatory being Vladyslav Heraskevych – and
Global Athlete – an “athlete start-up movement aiming to inspire and drive
change across the world of sport”18 – was released, calling for the immediate
suspension of the Russian and Belarusian National Olympic and Paralympic
Committees, as well as a blanket ban on all Russian and Belarusian athletes from
international sport, due to the violation of international law and the Olympic
12 Leo Goretti

and Paralympic Charters by the two countries. A video message making similar
demands and featuring Ukrainian Olympians was also released via social media.
In the next days, the joint statement was signed by dozens of other sportspeople,
both active and retired, in a personal or collective capacity, reaching a total of
over 160 signatories on 2 March: among them, athletes from Ukraine, Russia,
Belarus, and another 13 (overwhelmingly Western) countries.19
For its part, under joint pressure from Western afliates, national govern-
ments, and public opinions, the IOC took action on 24 February (“strongly
condemn[ing] the breach of the Olympic Truce by the Russian government”),20
on 25 February (urging the relocation of all events due to be held in Russia
and Belarus),21 and on 28 February (recommending to all sports federations the
outright exclusion of Russian and Belarusian athletes “[i]n order to protect the
integrity of global sports competitions and for the safety of all the participants”).
As an alternative to the ban, international sports federations were advised to
allow the participation of Russian nationals “only as neutral athletes or neutral
teams”.22 This approach was adopted in many events where athletes compete
in personal capacity rather than as national representatives (such as the ATP
and WTA tennis circuits) and was also the initial decision of the International
Paralympic Committee (IPC) towards the Beijing Games.23 The IPC, however,
was soon forced to backtrack and exclude Russian and Belarusian players amidst
growing tensions in the Paralympic village and signals that entire teams would
walk out of competitions and matches featuring Russian athletes.24 While paral-
lel pressure from national committees and governments was certainly key, there
is little doubt that the frm stance taken by several elite athletes contributed sig-
nifcantly to the introduction of the bans.
Notably, the IOC’s recommendation to ban Russian athletes was framed
by IOC President Thomas Bach not as a sanctioning measure, but rather as a
“protective” one, which was also supposedly aimed at preventing the potential
“politicisation of sports competitions by athletes or teams, some of them being
encouraged by third parties”.25 According to this narrative, allowing the partici-
pation of Russian representatives would imply the risk of turning athletes and
teams into geopolitical players, bringing confict and tensions into the sporting
felds; an outright exclusion of Russian sportspeople would therefore be less of a
violation of sport’s neutrality than allowing them to play against Ukrainian and
Western athletes.
One may argue that this approach discounted the agency of Russian sport-
speople in using international events to express dissenting views on the war.
To be sure, in the early days of the war, several Russian athletes (especially
tennis players) made pro-peace declarations and gestures, on-feld, during press
conferences, or via social media: the best-known example was perhaps Andrey
Rublev, writing, “No War Please” on the TV camera during the Dubai Tennis
Championships on 25 February 2022, while the 2021 French Open fnalist
Anastasia Pavlyuchenkova tweeted that she was “not afraid to clearly state [her]
position […] against war and violence. Personal ambitions or political motives
 Athletes’ Early Responses to the War Against Ukraine 13

cannot justify violence”.26 Unlike Pavlyuchenkova’s, however, most of these

statements remained fairly generic and came short of criticizing their country’s
government: this was the case, for example, of ice hockey superstar Alexander
Ovechkin, who called for “no more war” during a press conference but, when
asked whether he still supported Vladimir Putin, simply replied that “he is my
President”.27 As the war progressed, the tightening authoritarian grip of Putin’s
regime substantially limited the space for dissent in Russian sport,28 although
with notable exceptions.29 In contrast, a number of Russian athletes toed the
ofcial line and publicly supported the war: from the aforementioned episode
involving Ivan Kuliak to the attendance of numerous high-profle Russian
sportsmen and sportswomen – some of them donning jackets with the Z symbol
– at the rally celebrating the eighth anniversary of the annexation of Crimea on
18 March.30
The issue of athletes’ agency, and its limits, resurfaced with the blanket
ban on Russian and Belarusian athletes announced by the organizers of the
Wimbledon Championships in April. The ban was not compliant with the
ATP’s policy of allowing participation of Russian players under neutral fag
and was immediately criticized as a potential form of “discrimination based
on nationality” by the Association.31 Wimbledon’s organizers justifed their
decision by pointing to “the importance of not allowing sport to be used to
promote the Russian regime and […] broader concerns for public and player
(including family) safety”. The latter remark hinted at possible retaliation by the
Kremlin against dissenting athletes and their families, which, in the organizers’
view, made it impossible to ask for assurances about Russian players’ opposition
to Vladimir Putin’s regime, as had initially been suggested by the UK sports
minister.32 Unlike the earlier bans, Wimbledon’s decision was not supported
by international sports organizations and seemed to drive a wedge between
Ukrainian and other Western players. Ukraine’s Marta Kostyuk, for example,
repeatedly lamented the silence of Russian players about their country’s war
of aggression and welcomed the ban.33 Instead, top Western athletes, such as
Rafael Nadal and Andy Murray, opposed the ban initially, although they did
not ultimately boycott the event.34
One of the reasons for the strong controversy behind the Wimbledon
ban is its direct impact on a number of Russian players (like Andrey Rublev
and Anastasia Pavlyuchenkova) who had previously taken a stand against the
war. As tennis legend Martina Navratilova – who escaped from Communist
Czechoslovakia to the United States in 1975 – noted, penalizing players who
had “actually spoken out against the war at some potential personal cost”
looked “hypocritical”, especially considering that countries with a “ques-
tionable human rights record” had been systematically “validated” by being
granted the organization of mega sports events in the recent past. In her view,
the Wimbledon ban highlights once more how deeply “politics and sport are
intertwined”. 35
14 Leo Goretti

Conclusion: Potential and Limits of Athletes’

Agency in a Fragmented World
Much to the chagrin of those who would like them to simply ‘shut up and drib-
ble’, elite athletes can leverage their fame and media attention to make powerful
statements about social and political issues at both the domestic and international
levels. When athletes take a stand on issues pertaining to the sphere of inter-
national politics, such as an armed confict or the violation of human rights in
another country, however, this implies the risk of heightened confrontation and
fragmentation in international sport, undermining its self-professed neutrality
and unity. Therefore, international sports organizations have historically tried
to minimize the potential disruption of athletes’ agency, as evidenced by their
frm handling of anti-Israel boycotts at the Olympics and other international
events.36
In the case of Russia’s aggression against Ukraine, however, this was not the
case. Not only were athletes’ public stances against the war not sanctioned,37
they efectively played a role in the decision of international sports organiza-
tions to introduce sanctioning measures against Russia and Belarus. To be sure,
this was only possible due to the concurrent pressure from Western federations,
governments, and public opinions denouncing a major violation of interna-
tional law and of Olympic values (frst and foremost, the Olympic truce). In
efect, the public stance taken by Western federations and governments on the
matter arguably facilitated and enhanced Western athletes’ agency, and vice
versa.
Signifcantly, the eventual ban on Russian athletes and teams from most
international sports competitions was explicitly motivated by an attempt to
prevent further politicization of international sport. Ivan Kuliak’s infamous
behaviour in Doha somehow hints at the level of tension that the presence of
individuals and teams ofcially representing Russia (and its pro-war propaganda
machine) may cause; at the same time, the exclusion of tennis players who
had previously opposed the war from Wimbledon 2022 highlights how such
bans may also suppress potential opportunities for dissenting Russian athletes
to express agency. This is not to overlook, however, that the primary factor
constraining the latter has undoubtedly been increased domestic authoritarian-
ism in Russia.
Indeed, to properly understand its potential and limits, athletes’ agency must
be situated within structural boundaries set at both the domestic (regime type,
foreign policy, sports policy) and international levels (international environ-
ment, rules, and politics of international sports organizations). These boundaries
can facilitate, enhance, constrain, or even suppress athletes’ agency altogether.
Overall, greater attention to human rights among sportspeople and the gen-
eral public, as well as rising international tensions and ongoing fragmentation of
global governance,38 suggests that athletes’ agency in international sports may be
destined to become more and more salient in the coming years.
 Athletes’ Early Responses to the War Against Ukraine 15

Notes
1 CNN (2022).
2 Pavitt (2022); BBC (2022).
3 Braun et al. (2019), 788. Relatedly, and with specifc reference to athletes’ activism,
see Totten (2016); Magrath (2022).
4 Chadwick and Widdop (2021).
5 Boykof (2014), 41–44; Kilcline (2017), 4.
6 Boykof (2017), 8–9.
7 Boykof (2014), 51–57; International Olympic Committee (2021b), 94.
8 Ghani (2022); Haislop (2022); The Guardian (2020).
9 International Olympic Committee (2021a), 2.
10 Publicis Sport & Entertainment (2021), 10, 18.
11 Ibid., 41, 51, 53.
12 Team USA Council on Racial and Social Justice (2021).
13 International Olympic Committee (2021c), 3; International Olympic Committee
(2022e), 3.
14 Lubbers (2021).
15 The Olympic Truce, supported by a resolution of the United Nations General
Assembly, is a period running from the seventh day before the start of the Olympic
Games until the seventh day following the end of the Paralympic Games, during
which states are invited “to promote and strengthen a culture of peace and har-
mony” and, if involved in armed conficts, “to boldly agree to true mutual ceasefres”
(United Nations 2022).
16 Jack (2022).
17 McLaughlin (2022); Czech Football National Team (@ceskarepre_eng) (2022); FIFA
(2022).
18 Global Athlete (2022b).
19 Global Athlete (2022a); Global Athlete (@GlobalAthleteHQ) (2022). The author is
grateful to Jasmine Wu for her support in collecting these data.
20 International Olympic Committee (2022d).
21 International Olympic Committee (2022c).
22 International Olympic Committee (2022b).
23 International Tennis Federation (2022); International Paralympic Committee
(2022).
24 Pells (2022); Heroux (@Devin_Heroux) (2022).
25 International Olympic Committee (2022a).
26 Holmes (2022); Newman (2022).
27 CTV News (2022).
28 Reuters (2022b).
29 The Insider (2022); Badshah (2022).
30 AP News (2022).
31 Association of Tennis Professionals (2022a); Association of Tennis Professionals
(2022b).
32 Wimbledon (2022); Reuters (2022a).
33 Kostyuk (@Marta_Kostyuk) (2022); Sessions (2022).
34 Boren (2022).
35 Schmitz et al. (2022).
36 Close et al. (2021); Reiche (2018), 35–39.
37 The sign fashed by Vladyslav Heraskevych during the men’s skeleton fnal, for exam-
ple, was defned by IOC sources as “a general call for peace” and thus was not sanc-
tioned (Reynolds 2022).
38 Acharya (2016), 453–460.
16 Leo Goretti

Bibliography
Acharya, Amitav (2016). ‘The future of global governance.’ Global Governance 22, no. 4:
453–460. DOI: 10.1163/19426720-02204001.
AP News (2022). ‘Russian Olympians face backlash after Vladimir Putin rally.’ 23 March.
https://apnews.com/article/russia-ukraine-putin-winter-olympics-sports-skating
-22860075081be288ceb96f328b226ca2.
Association of Tennis Professionals (2022a). ‘ATP statement on decision to ban Russian
& Belarusian players.’ ATP Tour, 20 April. https://www.atptour.com/en/news/atp
-statement-wimbledon-british-grass-swing-april-2022.
Association of Tennis Professionals (2022b). ‘ATP statement on removal of ranking points
at 2022 Wimbledon.’ ATP Tour, 20 May. https://www.atptour.com/en/news/atp
-statement-removal-of-ranking-points-wimbledon-2022.
Badshah, Nadeem (2022). ‘Ex-Russian football captain Igor Denisov condemns invasion
of Ukraine.’ The Guardian, 15 June. https://www.theguardian.com/uk-news/2022/
jun/15/former-footballer-igor-denisov-condemns-russias-war-in-ukraine.
BBC (2022). ‘Russian gymnast Ivan Kuliak investigated for wearing pro-war symbol
on podium next to Ukrainian.’ 6 March. https://www.bbc.com/sport/gymnastics
/60641891.
Boren, Cindy (2022). ‘Rafael Nadal, Andy Murray oppose Wimbledon ban of Russians,
Belarusians.’ The Washington Post, 2 May. https://www.washingtonpost.com/sports
/2022/05/01/rafael-nadal-rips-wimbledons-ban/.
Boykof, Jules (2014). Activism and the Olympics. Rutgers University Press. https://www
.rutgersuniversitypress.org/activism-and-the-olympics/9780813562018.
Boykof, Jules (2017). ‘Protest, activism, and the Olympic Games: An overview of key
issues and iconic moments.’ The International Journal of the History of Sport 34, no. 3–4:
162–183. https://doi.org/10.1080/09523367.2017.1356822.
Braun, Benjamin, Schindler, Sebastian, and Wille, Tobias (2019). ‘Rethinking agency
in international relations: Performativity, performances and actor-networks.’ Journal
of International Relations and Development 22: 787–807. https://doi.org/10.1057/s41268
-018-0147-z.
Chadwick, Simon, and Widdop, Paul (2021). ‘The geopolitical economy of sport.’ Policy
Forum, 13 January. https://www.policyforum.net/the-geopolitical-economy-of-sport/.
Close, David, Barnes, Taylor, and Najiim, Aqeel (2021). ‘Algerian Olympian withdraws
from games due to potential matchup with Israeli competitor.’ CNN, 24 July. https://
edition.cnn.com/2021/07/24/sport/algerian-olympian-withdrawal-israel-intl/index
.html#:~:text=(CNN)%20Algerian%20judo%20athlete%20Fethi,can%20ofer%20
the%20Palestinian%20cause.%22.
CNN (2022). ‘Ukrainian skeleton star goes from Winter Olympics to war zone in weeks.’
23 March. https://edition.cnn.com/videos/sports/2022/03/23/vladyslav-heraskevych
-skeleton-ukraine-spt-intl.cnn.
CTV News (2022). ‘“Please, no more war”: Alex Ovechkin addresses Russian invasion’.
YouTube, 25 February. https://www.youtube.com/watch?v=vYoQfeed1-Q.
Czech Football National Team (@ceskarepre_eng) (2022). ‘The Czech FA executive
committee, staf members and players of the national team agreed it’s not possible
to play against the Russian national team in the current situation, not even on the
neutral venue.’ Twitter, 27 February. https://twitter.com/ceskarepre_eng/status
/1497875324947865605.
FIFA (2022). ‘FIFA/UEFA suspend Russian clubs and national teams from all
competitions.’ 28 February. https://www.ffa.com/tournaments/mens/worldcup/
 Athletes’ Early Responses to the War Against Ukraine 17

qatar2022/media-releases/ffa-uefa-suspend-russian-clubs-and-national-teams-from
-all-competitions.
Ghani, Faras (2022). ‘Black lives matter: Should sports and politics mix?’. Al Jazeera,
6 July. https://www.aljazeera.com/features/2020/7/6/black-lives-matter-should
-sports-and-politics-mix.
Global Athlete (2022a). ‘Open letter to IOC and IPC from Ukrainian athletes.’ 5 March.
https://globalathlete.org/our-word/open-letter-from-ukraine-athletes.
Global Athlete (2022b). ‘What is global athlete.’ https://globalathlete.org/about.
Global Athlete (@GlobalAthleteHQ) (2022). ‘Global Athlete has been asked by the
Ukrainian Athletes to post this video addressed to the #IOC and #IPC.’ Twitter, 28
February. https://twitter.com/GlobalAthleteHQ/status/1498284091892023297.
Haislop, Tadd (2022). ‘Colin Kaepernick kneeling timeline: How protests during the
national anthem started a movement in the NFL.’ The Sporting News, 13 September.
https://www.sportingnews.com/us/nf/news/colin-kaepernick-kneeling-protest
-timeline/xktu6ka4diva1s5jxaylrcsse.
Heroux, Devin (@Devin_Heroux) (2022). ‘Here are the Latvian wheelchair curling
coaches. Today they told me about how the team would not to take to the ice to play
Russia if they stayed at the Paralympics.’ Twitter, 3 March. https://twitter.com/Devin
_Heroux/status/1499396948109176836.
Holmes, Tracey (2022). ‘With Russian athletes speaking out against the Ukraine
invasion, what good would banning them Do?’ ABC News, 28 February. https://
www.abc.net.au/news/2022-02-28/russian-athletes-against-war-in-ukraine-ffa-ioc
-measures/100866956.
International Olympic Committee (2021a). Athlete Expression Consultation: IOC Athletes’
Commission Report. Lausanne. https://olympics.com/athlete365/app/uploads/2021/04
/IOC_AC_Consultation_Report-Athlete_Expression_21.04.2021.pdf.
International Olympic Committee (2021b). Olympic Charter. Lausanne. https://stillmed
.olympics.com/media/Document%20Library/OlympicOrg/General/EN-Olympic
-Charter.pdf?_ga=2.124487945.2023251344.1656669469-1710853960.1647007559.
International Olympic Committee (2021c). Rule 50.2 Guidelines: Olympic Games Tokyo
2020. https://olympics.com/athlete365/app/uploads/2021/07/Rule-50.2-Guidelines
-Olympic-Games-Tokyo-2020-Final.pdf.
International Olympic Committee (2022a). ‘Give peace a chance.’ Olympics.com, 11
March. https://olympics.com/ioc/news/-give-peace-a-chance.
International Olympic Committee (2022b). ‘IOC EB recommends no participation of
Russian and Belarusian athletes and ofcials.’ Olympics.com, 28 February. https://
olympics.com /ioc/news/ioc-eb -recommends-no-participation-of-russian-and
-belarusian-athletes-and-ofcials.
International Olympic Committee (2022c). ‘IOC EB urges all International Federations
to relocate or cancel their sports events currently planned in Russia or Belarus.’
Olympics.com, 25 February. https://olympics.com/ioc/news/ioc-eb-urges-all-ifs-to
-relocate-or-cancel-their-sports-events-currently-planned-in-russia-or-belarus.
International Olympic Committee (2022d). ‘IOC strongly condemns the breach of the
Olympic Truce.’ Olympics.com, 24 February. https://olympics.com/ioc/news/ioc
-strongly-condemns-the-breach-of-the-olympic-truce.
International Olympic Committee (2022e). Rule 50.2 Guidelines: Olympic Winter Games
Beijing 2022. https://olympics.com/athlete365/app/uploads/2021/11/Rule-50.2
-Guidelines-Olympic-Winter-Games-Beijing-2022-Nov-2021.pdf.
18 Leo Goretti

International Paralympic Committee (2022). ‘IPC makes decisions regarding RPC and
NPC Belarus.’ Paralympic.org, 2 March. https://www.paralympic.org/press-release/
ipc-makes-decisions-regarding-rpc-and-npc-belarus.
International Tennis Federation (2022). ‘ITF suspends Russia, Belarus from ITF
membership and team competition.’ ITF Tennis, 1 March. https://www.itftennis.com
/en/news-and-media/articles/itf-statement-itf-suspends-russia-and-belarus-from-itf
-membership-and-international-team-competition/.
Jack, Victor (2022). ‘From ballerinas to boxers, Ukrainian sports stars sign up to fght
Russia.’ Politico, 9 March. https://www.politico.eu/article/ukraine-sports-stars
-ballerina-boxer-fght-russia/.
Kilcline, Cathal (2017). ‘Sport and protest: Global perspectives.’ The International Journal
of the History of Sport 34, no. 3–4: 157–161. https://doi.org/10.1080/09523367.2017
.1373001.
Kostyuk, Marta (@Marta_Kostyuk) (2022). ‘Dear tennis community, Ginetta Sagan
once said, ‘Silence in the face of injustice is complicity with the oppressor.’ This
could not be any more true right now.’ Twitter, 20 April. https://twitter.com/marta
_kostyuk/status/1516757492516196354.
Lubbers, Payne (2021). ‘Olympic athletes are testing rules and taking a knee for BLM.’
Bloomberg, 29 July. https://www.bloomberg.com/news/articles/2021-07-29/black
-lives-matter-racial-justice-protests-take-stage-at-tokyo-olympics-2021#xj4y7vzkg.
Magrath, Rory (ed.) (2022). Athlete Activism: Contemporary Perspectives. London: Routledge.
McLaughlin, Luke (2022). ‘Poland and Sweden will refuse to play Russia in World Cup
2022 playofs.’ The Guardian, 26 February. https://www.theguardian.com/football
/2022/feb/26/poland-will-refuse-to-play-russia-in-world-cup-2022-playof-robert
-lewandowski.
Newman, Richard (2022). ‘‘I am in complete fear’: Russian Anastasia Pavlyuchenkova
condemns Moscow’s assault on Ukraine’. Eurosport, 28 February. https://www
.eurosport.com/tennis/i-am-in-complete-fear-russian-anastasia-pavlyuchenkova
-condemns-moscows-assault-on-ukraine_sto8821882/story.shtml.
Pavitt, Michael (2022). ‘Russian gymnast Kuliak faces disciplinary action after
displaying symbol linked to Ukrainian war.’ Inside the Games, 6 March. https://www
.insidethegames.biz/articles/1120185/kuliak-disciplinary-action-war-symbol.
Pells, Eddie (2022). ‘Athletes force a change in ban of Russians at Paralympics.’ AP News,
3 March. https://apnews.com/article/russia-ukraine-sports-europe-beijing-vladyslav
-heraskevych-409d6e5467b6f024a52b69b0368b0a05.
Publicis Sport & Entertainment (2021). Athlete Expression Consultation: Quantitative
Research Result. https://olympics.com/athlete365/app/uploads/2021/04/21042021
-Athlete-Expression-Consultation-PSE.pdf.
Reiche, Danyel (2018). ‘Not allowed to win: Lebanon’s sporting boycott of Israel.’ Middle
East Journal 72, no. 1 (Winter): 28–47. https://doi.org/10.3751/72.1.12.
Reuters (2022a). ‘Medvedev Wimbledon hopes could hinge on political assurance –
UK Minister.’ 15 March. https://www.reuters.com/lifestyle/sports/medvedev
-wimbledon-hopes-could-hinge-political-assurance-uk-minister-2022-03-15/.
Reuters (2022b). ‘Russia fghts back in information war with jail warning.’ 4 March.
https://www.reuters.com/world/europe/russia-introduce-jail-terms-spreading-fake
-information-about-army-2022-03-04/.
Reynolds, Tim (2022). ‘Ukrainian fashes ‘No War in Ukraine’ sign after competing.’ AP
News, 11 February. https://apnews.com/article/winter-olympics-skeleton-vladyslav
-heraskevych-sign-3866f2f1c193d00f147752fee965ca68?utm_source=Twitter&utm
_campaign=SocialFlow&utm_medium=AP.
 Athletes’ Early Responses to the War Against Ukraine 19

Schmitz, Robin, Fuller, Jason, and Kenin, Justine (2022). ‘Tennis legend Martina
Navratilova talks about Wimbledon’s ban on Russian players.’ NPR, 27 April. https://
www.npr.org/2022/04/27/1095100365/tennis-legend-martina-navratilova-talks
-about-wimbledons-ban-on-russian-players.
Sessions, George (2022). ‘Marta Kostyuk: I stand with Wimbledon in its decision to ban
Russian players.’ Independent, 24 June. https://www.independent.co.uk/sport/tennis/
marta-kostyuk-harriet-dart-elina-svitolina-england-wta-b2108666.html.
Team USA Council on Racial and Social Justice (2021). Recommendations for IOC Rule
50/IPC Section 2.2. https://olympics.com/athlete365/app/uploads/2021/02/Team
-USA-Council-on-Racial-and-Social-JusticeIOC-Rule-50-and-IPC-Section-22
-Recommendation-FINAL-02012021.pdf.
The Guardian (2020). ‘Taking a knee: Athletes protest against racism around the world –
In pictures.’ 27 August. https://www.theguardian.com/sport/gallery/2020/aug/27/
nba-strike-athletes-kneeling-black-lives-matter-protest.
The Insider (2022). ‘Ex-Russia football captain calls on Putin to stop war.’ 15 June. https://
theins.ru/en/news/252225.
Totten, Mick (2016). ‘Sport activism and protest.’ In Alan Bairner, John Kelly and Jung
Woo Lee (eds.), Routledge Handbook of Sport and Politics. Taylor and Francis.
United Nations (2022). Solemn Appeal made by President of the General Assembly in Connection
with the Observance of the Olympic Truce. https://www.un.org/pga/76/2022/01/20/
solemn-appeal-made-by-the-president-of-the-general-assembly-in-connection-with
-the-observance-of-the-olympic-truce/.
Wimbledon (2022). ‘Statement regarding Russian and Belarusian individuals at the
Championships 2022.’ Wimbledon.com, 20 April. https://www.wimbledon.com/
en_GB/news/articles/2022-04-20/statement_regarding_russian_and_belarusian
_individuals_at_the_championships_2022.html.
3
SPORT SANCTIONS AGAINST
INVASIVE RUSSIA
Daryl Adair

Vladimir Putin’s invasion of Ukraine in 2022 extended the Russian incursion

of Crimea in 2014. However, whereas the annexation of Crimea was “quietly”
achieved in a matter of days (Simpson, 2014), Putin’s so-called Special Military
Operation has become a drawn-out martial confict (Mackinnon, 2022). NATO
countries reacted by providing Ukraine with military equipment, thereby assert-
ing a defensive posture. For ordinary Russians, the most consequential NATO
response has been economic sanctions (Valentine, 2022). The intent is to pres-
sure Putin to withdraw troops without direct NATO military involvement
(Marlow, 2022). Even the perennially neutral Switzerland, a country outside
both the European Union and NATO, has imposed economic sanctions against
Russia (Revill, 2022; Wintour, 2022). As we will now see, international sport
has also featured sanctions against Russia, though this has overwhelmingly been
at the behest of sport organizations rather than governments.
The deployment of sport sanctions during war is not unprecedented, though
they have been applied inconsistently. After World War I, the Central Powers
were not invited to the 1920 Olympics, while in the wake of World War II,
Germany and Japan were not invited to the 1948 Games. However, whereas
in 1920 the IOC supported the exclusion of aggressor nations (Mallon and
Bijkerk, 1998), it did not do so in 1948 – the Organising Committee for the
XIV Olympiad London took that position (New York Times, 1947). Indeed, by
contrast to 1920, the IOC tried to insist that Japan – which (unlike Germany)
had applied to send a team to London – be accepted (Vrchoticky, 2021). Johannes
Edstrom, the IOC president, complained to Games’ organizers: “I am surprised
that you take this attitude three years after the war has ended. We men of sport
ought to show the way for the diplomats” (Rosenwald, 2021). Seven decades
later, the IOC is again wrangling with the impact of war on sport and questions

DOI: 10.4324/9781003348238-4
 Sport Sanctions Against Invasive Russia 21

about eligibility for athletic competition. But it is more complex because Russia’s
invasion of Ukraine is ongoing.
At the closing ceremony of the 2022 Winter Olympics in Beijing, IOC President
Thomas Bach spoke of the “unifying power” of the Olympic Games and urged
the world to “give peace a chance” (IOC, 2022b). A backdrop to his message
was the IOC’s expectation that nations abide by the aspirational Olympic Truce;
indeed, a UN resolution to that efect had already been signed by 193 member
states, including Russia (IOC, 2021). Yet, as Bach was speaking in Beijing on
20 February, Putin was contemplating an invasion of Ukraine (Talmazan et al.,
2022), consistent with his dream of restoring territory lost to “historical Russia”
after the collapse of the Soviet Union (Osborn and Ostroukh, 2021).
When Putin sent in his troops four days after the Beijing Games, Bach was
incensed. The IOC Executive Board met immediately, announcing three ver-
dicts. First, awards of the Olympic Order would be retracted from anyone with
“an important function in the government of the Russian Federation or other
government-related high-ranking position”, which impacted both Putin and
his deputy (IOC, 2022a). Second, both Russian and Belarusian athletes should
not be invited or allowed to participate in international competitions, while
sport federations were advised to not contribute to any sport event in Russia
or Belarus. Third, where at short notice it was not possible to exclude athletes
or teams from those countries, they must not compete under the auspices of
their nation – they should be classifed as “neutral” competitors (IOC, 2022a).
Rather than the Russian fag, the only permitted symbol was that of the Russian
Olympic Committee.
How did the IOC justify sanctions? First, Russia, by invading Ukraine, and
Belarus, whose government supported Russia, had violated the Olympic Truce
(Associated Press, 2022).
Second, the war would negatively impact competition integrity in sport.
While athletes from Russia and Belarus could routinely travel to take part in
sport events, competitors from Ukraine may well be prevented from doing so
because of impediments wrought by the invasion of their country. There was
also the thorny prospect of Russian and Ukrainian athletes pitted against each
other in sport competition during a time of war (Gillespie, 2022).
The impact of the IOC’s edict was swift. Nearly 100 international sport
federations followed the IOC lead, with most of them excluding Russians and
Belarusians from competition. Some sports federations still allowed athletes and
teams from those countries, though under the IOC proviso they are designated
“neutral” competitors. However, Russian and Belarusian sport ofcials were
mostly unafected by sanctions, with only 7 of 40 international federations sus-
pending them. This was consistent with the IOC’s own approach, whereby the
national Olympic committees of both Russia and Belarus were permitted to
operate as normally (Weinrich, 2022).
Meanwhile, the Beijing Paralympics, which had been slated to accept neutral
athletes from Russia in the wake of the 2016 doping scandal, changed its tune
22 Daryl Adair

after many athletes declared they would withdraw from the program rather than
compete against representatives of Russia or Belarus. Hence, no Paralympian
from either of those countries was permitted to take part (Pells, 2022). Putin and
his deputy Dmitry Chernyshenko were furious with what they took to be the
pro-NATO politicization of sport by the IOC and IPC. Chernyshenko argued
that countries had “wiped their feet” on the Olympic Charter, using sanctions
to unfairly discriminate against Russia by defying the right to free participation
in sport. After the rebuf, Russia quickly staged its own Paralympic event, “We
are together. Sport”, with participation by Belarus, Armenia, Kazakhstan, and
Tajikistan (RT, 2022b).
With Russia now excluded from many international sport competitions
(for details, see Colucci and Cottrell, 2022; Katsarova, 2022), various substi-
tute events were organized for locals. In a nostalgic twist, the Spartakiad, made
famous during the Soviet era when the country refused to take part in the
“bourgeois” Olympics (Riordan, 1998), was revived in modern form – crucially,
with participation from Russian-annexed Crimea. This all-Russian event is a
multi-sport festival, featuring some of the world’s best swimmers and gymnasts,
along with competitions in volleyball, cycling, taekwondo, and golf ( Jack, 2022).
Another key initiative has been the Solidarity Games, focusing on swimming,
diving, and artistic aquatics, which began in Kazan in July this year (Solidarity
Games, 2022b). That event, while intended to provide meaningful competition
for Russian athletes prevented from taking part in FINA World Championships,
has a further purpose – to involve other nations. Thus far there are sixteen mem-
ber countries, including regions from the former Soviet Union but also a spatter-
ing from other continents, such as Venezuela, Sudan, and Vietnam. No surprise
that Russia dominated the medal count at the July meet, though the presence of
competitors from a handful of other countries ofered the appearance of an invi-
tational contest staged in Russia rather than a closed, parochial event (Solidarity
Games, 2022a). There is no doubt that Russia, while ostracized from numerous
global and European sport competitions, will continue to stage its own events,
thereby seeking to entice countries outside of the NATO alliance to participate
(RT, 2022a, 2022c).
No surprise that twelve Russian sport federations and the Russian Olympic
Committee appealed bans at the Court of Arbitration of Sport (CAS), argu-
ing that sanctions are, in essence, ideologically driven discrimination (Houston,
2022). Before CAS, the two biggest global sports bodies, the IOC and FIFA, had
undoubtedly compared notes and come to a common position. Cleverly, they
had positioned sanctions as “protections”, which Bach described as “measures to
protect the integrity of sport competitions” (Bushnell, 2022), this meaning the
inability of Ukrainians to participate without impediment. Furthermore, FIFA
pointed out that football federations and players from the three countries slated
to play Russia in World Cup qualifying said, “they would refuse to take the
same feld as Russia” (Bushnell, 2022). CAS agreed: its verdict in the FIFA case
focused squarely on the impact of the Russian invasion on sport competitions
 Sport Sanctions Against Invasive Russia 23

and what it described as “the secure and orderly conduct of football events for …
the world” (Colucci and Cottrell, 2022). From that perspective, the presence of
a Russian team would be antagonistic to the collegial purpose of a World Cup
or similar sport event.
For Russian athletes, there is the delicate question of their own position on
their country’s invasion of Ukraine. Ivan Kuliak, a gymnast, made clear his
support by adding a Z symbol to his tunic during a medal presentation at the
World Cup even in Doha. The letter Z is an explicit symbol of support for the
war, appearing on Russian tanks in Ukraine. Brazenly, Kuliak made this ges-
ture while standing beside a Ukrainian competitor (Ingle, 2022a). He later told
reporters that he had “no regrets” doing so and would “even do the same again”
(Ingle, 2022b). Kuliak is now prevented from doing so, for the International
Gymnastics Federation suspended him for 12 months, annulled his bronze
medal, and demanded the return of prizemoney (Sankar, 2022).
Meanwhile, though, Russian athletes bold enough to explicitly oppose their
country’s invasion face the prospect of criticism or even retaliation from Putin
( JAM News, 2022). Ice hockey player Alex Ovechkin, the captain of the NHL’s
Washington Capitals, was able to articulate from the safety of America, where
he publicly pleaded, “please, no more war!” (Holmes, 2022). Yet he was not
prepared to speak directly about the invasion of Ukraine, and his Instagram
profle still features the ice hockey star alongside Putin. Perhaps this is because,
as an observer in the Washington Post theorized, “Ovechkin’s family is in Russia,
which could make them vulnerable. All Russian athletes … [are] in a very com-
promised position if they speak out” (Svrluga, 2022).
For the IOC, a critical element of sport sanctions (which it describes as pro-
tections) is that sport organizations must be in control of that process. While
Næss reminds us that sport is not neutral, and that politics is very much at the
core of how these bodies operate (Næss, 2018), the “autonomy of sport” is jeal-
ously guarded by the IOC (Geeraert et al., 2014). This position is underpinned
by a determination that governments, though they provide funds to sport, should
not “interfere” with the governance of sport organizations (Carpenter, 2013;
Morgan, 2020). A speech by Bach in June 2022 illustrates this view while posi-
tioning it in the context of sport protections. At a meeting of the Association
of Summer Olympic International Federations (ASOIF), Bach insisted that this
group take the lead in terms of its own response to the Ukraine invasion, because
prevarication risked sport “becoming a political tool” of governments (Barker,
2022). Olympic Movement members, he argued, should be the sole judges of
participation eligibility. The autonomy of sport was therefore necessary to pro-
tect it from politicization by state actors (Meier and García, 2019). Grand Slam
tennis, Bach insisted, was a case in point: “In Paris, Russian players can play as
neutral athletes, [though] in London, at Wimbledon, the Government is saying
no way”. He argued that governments should not be “deciding according to their
own political interests, who can take part in a competition and who cannot take
part”. “Today”, he warned gravely, “it is Russia and Belarus, tomorrow it is your
24 Daryl Adair

country” (Barker, 2022). Bach therefore feared that the Russian crisis might be
used as a precursor for nation states to wield power over Olympic bodies.
There is now pressure on the IOC to ban Russia from the 2024 Paris Olympics
(Berkeley, 2022). Such a decision would complement that of UEFA, which has
banned Russia from Euro 2024 (Braidwood, 2022). However, the IOC now wants
to fnd a way to bring back Russian athletes to international sport, which would
have fow-on efects for the Olympics. At the very moment Putin announced the
mobilization of 300,000 troops, the IOC was confecting a position in which the
world of war and the world of sport ought to again be separated. With fanciful
rhetoric, the IOC desired to bring all athletes of the world together and thus to
“emphasise the role of sport as a unifying factor in today’s much-divided world”
(Sheferd, 2022). There was, however, a complicated aspect to this: Bach clari-
fed that “Russian athletes could be allowed back to compete at Olympic Games
… only if they don’t support their country’s war in Ukraine” (Euronews, 2022).
The logistics of this process have yet to be explained, but Bach was not shying
away from the underlying rationale:

This war has not been started by the Russian athletes. But we saw that
some governments did not want to respect anymore the autonomy of inter-
national sports … this is why we’ve had to take these protective measures
to be at least still a little bit in the driving seat and not lose all autonomy.
(El-Shaboury, 2022)

In conclusion, sport sanctions against Russia and Belarus – whether on the

part of the IOC, FIFA, or international federations – have negatively impacted
athletes and teams. Some observers contend that Russian athletes, who have had
no infuence on Putin’s military policy, should not be made scapegoats (Holmes,
2022). Others point out that economic sanctions hurt ordinary Russians, yet
they are also not responsible for Putin’s invasion. War, in that sense, is unfair
(Adair, 2022). Global sport bodies, meanwhile, are trying to navigate a situa-
tion in which one of the world’s athletic superpowers is operating extravagantly
as a military superpower, and thus in a manner that defes both the rule-based
global order (Eilstrup-Sangiovanni and Hofmann, 2019) and the spirit of fair
play inherent to sport.

References
Adair D (2022) Is banning Russian tennis players from Wimbledon the right call?
Available at: https://theconversation.com/is-banning-russian-tennis-players-from
-wimbledon-the-right-call-179551 (accessed 3 October 2022).
Associated Press (2022) Ukraine athletes defend country, demand sanctions against
Russia. Available at: https://www.usatoday.com/story/sports/2022/02/27/ukraine
-athletes-defend-country-demand-sanctions-for-russia/6965665001/ (accessed
1 October 2022).
 Sport Sanctions Against Invasive Russia 25

Barker P (2022) Bach hits out at Wimbledon ban and political interference in Ukraine
response. Available at: https://web7.insidethegames.biz/articles/1124190/bach-asoif
(accessed 10 July 2022).
Berkeley G (2022) Russian sports leaders slam suggestion of possible Paris 2024 ban
by Reedie. Available at: https://www.insidethegames.biz/articles/1125614/russian
-athletes-may-face-paris-2024-ban (accessed 3 October 2022).
Braidwood J (2022) Russia banned from Euro 2024 as international suspension
continues | The Independent. Available at: https://www.independent.co.uk/sport/
football/russia-euro-2024-qualifying-uefa-ffa-b2171299.html (accessed 3 October
2022).
Bushnell H (2022) Court rules for FIFA over Russia, paving way for continued sports
bans amid war. Available at: https://www.msn.com/en-us/sports/olympics/court
-rules-for-f ifa-over-russia-paving-way-for-continued-sports-bans-amid-war/ar
-AAZCaot (accessed 3 October 2022).
Carpenter K (2013) IOC, national governments and the autonomy of sport: An uneasy
relationship – LawInSport. Available at: https://www.lawinsport.com/topics/item
/ioc-national-governments-and-the-autonomy-of-sport-an-uneasy-relationship
(accessed 3 October 2022).
Colucci M and Cottrell S (2022) Sport and Diplomacy in the Aftermath of the Russia Ukraine
War. A Sports Law and Policy Centre and Lawinsport Joint Survey. Available at: https://
tinyurl.com/2p8rhskm.
Eilstrup-Sangiovanni M and Hofmann SC (2019) Of the contemporary global
order, crisis, and change. Journal of European Public Policy 27(7): 1–13. DOI:
10.1080/13501763.2019.1678665.
El-Shaboury Y (2022) Paris 2024: Russian athletes who do not support invasion of
Ukraine could be allowed to compete. Available at: https://www.eurosport.co.uk
/olympics/paris-2024-russian-athletes-who-do-not-support-invasion-of-ukraine
-could-be-allowed-to-compete-ioc_sto9167117/story.shtml (accessed 3 October
2022).
Euronews (2022) Russian athletes “could be allowed back in Olympics” says IOC chief.
Available at: https://www.euronews.com/2022/09/30/russian-athletes-could-be
-allowed-back-in-olympcs-says-ioc-chief (accessed 3 October 2022).
Geeraert A, Mrkonjic M and Chappelet J-L (2014) A rationalist perspective on the
autonomy of international sport governing bodies: Towards a pragmatic autonomy
in the steering of sports. International Journal of Sport Policy and Politics 7(4): 473–488.
DOI: 10.1080/19406940.2014.925953.
Gillespie T (2022) Ukraine invasion: IOC recommends Russian and Belarusian athletes
should be banned from all international competitions. Available at: https://news
.sky.com/story/ukraine-invasion-ioc-recommends-russian-and-belarusian-athletes
-should-be-banned-from-all-international-competitions-12554151 (accessed
1 October 2022).
Holmes T (2022) With Russian athletes speaking out against the Ukraine invasion, what
good would banning them do? Available at: https://www.abc.net.au/news/2022-02
-28/russian-athletes-against-war-in-ukraine-ffa-ioc-measures/100866956 (accessed
3 October 2022).
Houston M (2022) Twelve National Federations and Russian NOC appeal to CAS over
competition bans. Available at: https://web7.insidethegames.biz/articles/1124864/
russian-olympic-committee-cas-sports (accessed 3 October 2022).
Ingle S (2022a) Russian gymnast with ‘Z’ symbol on podium next to Ukrainian faces
long ban. Available at: https://www.theguardian.com/sport/2022/mar/07/shocking
26 Daryl Adair

-behaviour -russian-gymnast-shows-z-symbol-on-podium-next-to -ukrainian

-winner (accessed 3 October 2022).
Ingle S (2022b) Unrepentant gymnast Ivan Kuliak would show ‘Z’ insignia for Russia
again | Gymnastics | The Guardian. Available at: https://www.theguardian.com/
sport/2022/mar/08/gymnast-ivan-kuliak-says-he-would-show-support-for-russia
-again (accessed 3 October 2022).
IOC (2021) UN General Assembly adopts Olympic Truce for Beijing 2022, highlighting
the contribution of sport to the promotion of peace and solidarity. Available at:
https://olympics.com/ioc/news/un-general-assembly-adopts-olympic-truce-for
-beijing-2022 (accessed 10 July 2022).
IOC (2022a) IOC EB recommends no participation of Russian and Belarusian athletes
and ofcials. Available at: https://olympics.com/ioc/news/ioc-eb-recommends
-no-participation-of-russian-and-belarusian-athletes-and-ofcials (accessed 9 July
2022).
IOC (2022b) IOC president’s speech – Beijing 2022 closing ceremony. Available at:
https://olympics.com /ioc/news/ioc-president-s -speech-beijing -2022 -closing
-ceremony (accessed 9 July 2022).
Jack (2022) Spartakiad marches across the country: Intrigue, tension, drama. Available
at: https://eprimefeed.com/sports/spartakiad-marches-across-the-country-intrigue
-tension-drama/157466/ (accessed 2 October 2022).
JAM News (2022) Persecution of war opponents in Russia is in full swing. Available
at: https://jam-news.net/putin-told-us-to-kill-you-how-opponents-of-the-war-are
-persecuted-in-russia/ (accessed 3 October 2022).
Katsarova I (2022) Russia’s war on Ukraine: Impact on athletes and sports competitions
– European Parliamentary Research Service. Available at: https://epthinktank.eu
/2022/04/21/russias-war-on-ukraine-impact-on-athletes-and-sports-competitions/
(accessed 2 October 2022).
Mackinnon M (2022) How Ukrainian resistance continues to disrupt Vladimir Putin’s
plans to take over. Available at: https://www.theglobeandmail.com/world/article
-russia-ukraine-war-ukrainian-resistance/ (accessed 9 July 2022).
Mallon B and Bijkerk AT (1998) The 1920 Olympic Games: Results for All Competitors in All
Events, with Commentary. Jeferson, NC: McFarland, Inc. Available at: https://books
.google.com.au/books?id=wYIwCgAAQBAJ.
Marlow B (2022) Vladimir Putin will be livid as Russia defaults on its foreign debt.
Available at: https://www.smh.com.au/business/the-economy/putin-will-be-livid
-as-russia-off icially-becomes-an-economic-basket-case-20220628-p5ax3d.html
(accessed 10 July 2022).
Meier HE and García B (2019) Collaborations between National Olympic Committees and
Public Authorities. University of Münster, Germany. Available at: https://tinyurl.com
/4x5yzrwn.
Morgan L (2020) Is it time for the IOC to rethink its rule on Government interference
in NOCs? Available at: https://www.insidethegames.biz/articles/1090027/ioc
-government-interference-nocs (accessed 27 November 2021).
Næss HE (2018) The neutrality myth: Why international sporting associations and
politics cannot be separated. Journal of the Philosophy of Sport 45(2): 1–17. DOI:
10.1080/00948705.2018.1479190.
New York Times (1947) Germany and Japan are banned as participants in ’48 Olympics.
Available at: https://timesmachine.nytimes.com/timesmachine/1947/01/24
/88741838.pdf?pdf_redirect=true&ip=0.
 Sport Sanctions Against Invasive Russia 27

Osborn A and Ostroukh A (2021) Putin rues Soviet collapse as demise of “historical
Russia.” Available at: https://www.reuters.com/world/europe/putin-rues-soviet
-collapse-demise-historical-russia-2021-12-12/ (accessed 10 July 2022).
Pells E (2022) Athletes force a change in ban of Russians at Paralympics. Available at:
https://abcnews.go.com /Sports/wireStory/athletes-force-change-ban-russians
-paralympics-83231629 (accessed 1 October 2022).
Revill J (2022) Analysis: Neutral Switzerland leans closer to NATO in response to
Russia. Available at: https://www.reuters.com/markets/europe/neutral-switzerland
-leans-closer-nato-response-russia-2022-05-15/ (accessed 2 October 2022).
Riordan J (1998) The sports policy of the Soviet Union, 1917–1941. In: Arnaud P and
Riordan J (eds) Sport and International Politics. Routledge, pp. 67–78. Available at:
https://www.taylorfrancis.com/chapters/edit/10.4324/9780203476581-6/sports
-policy-soviet-union-1917–1941-james-riordan.
Rosenwald MS (2021) Japan, Germany were banned from 1948 Olympics after WWII.
Available at: https://www.washingtonpost.com/history/2021/07/23/japan-olympics
-history/ (accessed 10 July 2022).
RT (2022a) Kremlin reveals ‘emphasis’ from Putin amid sporting bans. Available at:
https://www.rt.com/sport/562271-putin-russia-domestic-sports-events/ (accessed
2 October 2022).
RT (2022b) Putin praises Russian Paralympians after Siberian showpiece ends. Available
at: https://www.rt.com/sport/552406-russian-paralympic-games-ban-putin
-beijing/ (accessed 2 October 2022).
RT (2022c) Russia working on new BRICS sports formats – Minister. Available at:
https://www.rt.com/sport/560078-russia-brics-sporting-cooperation/ (accessed
3 October 2022).
Sankar V (2022) Russian gymnast Kuliak appeals against suspension for sporting “Z”
symbol. Available at: https://www.insidethegames.biz/articles/1124227/kuliak
-appeals-against-suspension (accessed 3 October 2022).
Sheferd N (2022) Bach says Olympics can set example to the world as Putin escalates
Ukraine war. Available at: https://www.insidethegames.biz/articles/1128303/putin
-mobilisation-bach-sets-exam (accessed 3 October 2022).
Simpson J (2014) Russia’s Crimea plan detailed, secret and successful. Available at: https://
www.bbc.com/news/world-europe-26644082 (accessed 9 July 2022).
Solidarity Games (2022a) Multidisciplinary International Competitions in Swimming, Artistic
Swimming, and Diving, Kazan (RUS) 2022. Available at: https://dspkazan.com/wp
-content/uploads/2022/09/Bulletin_ENG_-V_16_09_mini.pdf.
Solidarity Games (2022b) Solidarity Games: Swimming, Diving, Artistic Swimming.
Available at: https://sportssolidarity.com/en#game-stages (accessed 2 October
2022).
Svrluga B (2022) Alex Ovechkin’s situation isn’t as simple as ‘Putin is my president.’
Available at: https://www.washingtonpost.com/sports/2022/05/17/alex-ovechkin
-putin-ukraine/ (accessed 3 October 2022).
Talmazan Y, Chistikova T and Williams A (2022) U.S. warns that Russia could attack
Ukraine “at very short notice” as troop buildup grows. Available at: https://www.msn
.com/en-us/news/world/us-warns-that-russia-could-attack-ukraine-at-very-short
-notice-as-troop-buildup-grows/ar-AASVRws (accessed 9 July 2022).
Valentine A (2022) Are sanctions actually hurting Russia’s economy? Here’s what
you need to know. Available at: https://www.npr.org/2022/07/01/1109033582/
are-sanctions-actually-hurting-russias-economy-heres-what-you-need-to-know
(accessed 9 July 2022).
28 Daryl Adair

Vrchoticky N (2021) All the times countries have been banned from the Olympics.
Available at: https://www.grunge.com/452177/all-the-times-countries-have-been
-banned-from-the-olympics/ (accessed 10 July 2022).
Weinrich J (2022) Olympic federations suspend Russian athletes not ofcials. Available
at: https://www.playthegame.org/news/most-olympic-federations-suspend-russian
-athletes-but-ofcials-go-free/ (accessed 1 October 2022).
Wintour P (2022) Switzerland adopts wholesale EU sanctions against Russia. Available
at: https://www.theguardian.com/world/2022/feb/28/switzerland-adopts-wholesale
-eu-sanctions-against-russia (accessed 9 July 2022).
4
WHAT FUTURE FOR PUTIN’S
SPORT POWER?
Lukas Aubin

And the Sports Movement Came Out of Its Apolitism ...

On the 24th February 2022, the world is in shock. At the initiative of Vladimir
Putin, the Russian army has just invaded Ukraine. Kyiv is under siege. Several
million Ukrainians have fed the country at the onset of war, whilst others have
taken up arms to defend themselves and the homeland. Faced with this geopoliti-
cal crisis, the international community is mobilizing. In quick succession, tens or
even hundreds of sanctions are taken against Russia to stop “the special military
operation”, in the words of the Russian president: closure of airspace, increased
control of imports and exports, limitation of Russian visas, sanctions against the
oligarchs, and so on. The West is mobilizing. Diplomatic, economic, and politi-
cal, the sanctions are plural and polymorphic. Among them, sport astonishes by
its ability to mobilize. Indeed, international sports bodies are at the forefront of
sanctions and are rapidly becoming an actor in the confict. For many, these deci-
sions are surprising. Until then, sport shone by its apoliticism and its neutrality
of facade. For example, despite one of the biggest doping cases in sports history,
Russian athletes have continued to compete in major competitions since 2014.
However, in Russia as in many authoritarian or semi-authoritarian countries,
sport is used not in a rational economic logic but in a geopolitical logic of bal-
ance of power. Thus, in light of the politico-economic-sports system built by
Vladimir Putin – the Sportokratura (Aubin, 2021) – the banishment of Russia
from world sport becomes a major political weapon to stop the invasion.
In the days following Russia’s invasion of Ukraine, the IOC, UEFA, Formula
1, and even FIFA quickly called for Russia to be excluded from world sport.
On the initiative of the United Kingdom, on 5 March 2022, 37 nations sign a
joint declaration to prohibit Russia and Belarus from organizing, bidding, or
being awarded international sporting events. Among them, France, Germany,

DOI: 10.4324/9781003348238-5
30 Lukas Aubin

Australia, the United States, and Canada are the main Western nations that wish
to sanction Russia. The press release is clear: “Russia’s unprovoked and unjustif-
able war of choice against Ukraine, permitted by the Belarusian government, is
odious and a fagrant violation of its international obligations”. Unprecedented
in their scope and systematism, these decisions constitute a novelty in the history
of modern sport. Until then, the global sports movement claimed to be neutral
despite an inherently political reality (Defrance, 2000).

Vladimir Putin’s Philosophy of Judo

In this context and aware of this paradox, Vladimir Putin does not hesitate to
use the elements of language of international sports institutions by recalling that
“sport must be apolitical”. Like a judo hold, he uses the strength of his oppo-
nent to his advantage. Thus, he does not hesitate to explain that the exclusion
of Russian and Belarusian athletes following the invasion of Ukraine “not only
violated the fundamental principles of sport, but also openly and cynically vio-
lated the rights fundamental human rights, the Universal Declaration of Human
Rights, adopted by the UN in 1948 – where everything is written. It is not about
the status of the athlete: not about the political, legal or international status of
the country the athlete represents. It is about the man himself. These rights have
been violated”. According to him, these decisions are all Russophobic acts stem-
ming from a modern sport controlled by Westerners, led by the United States.
This discourse, which has been remarkably consistent since the end of
2014 and the beginning of the revelations of Russian doping, constitutes the
common thread of an alternative narrative thought up by the Kremlin. The
objective is to sow doubt as to the legitimacy of international sports bodies.
Therefore, this rhetoric uses the apolitical hiatus on which modern sport is based
to seize it. Abroad, the efects of this strategy are poor. Overall, most states in the
deep south need and use international sports institutions to exist (Qatar, Brazil,
China, etc.). However, on a national scale, this has the efect of further isolating
the Russian population from the rest of the world through the creation of this
parallel information space.

Towards a New Revival of Russian Sport?

However, if Vladimir Putin wants sports to remain politically neutral, he made
it a political weapon when he came to power in 2000. For Putin, sport is an
instrument of power inherited from the Soviet era. He was born in Leningrad,
where he started to play judo very young. Later, when he becomes President, he
explains that his success came thanks to the Soviet Sporting System. He wants to
resuscitate it. In 2002, he calls the legendary retired soviet ice hockey defense-
man who is living in the United States to ofer him to become the head of the
Ministry of sports. Then, he explains that the glory of Russia is based, among
other things, on the sporting victories of the National Team. In 2014, he brings
 What Future for Putin’s Sport Power? 31

back the Soviet training programme called Ready for Labour and Defence
(GTO). Slowly, he builds a new sporting system. Its vertical political-economic-
sports system – the Sportokratura – uses oligarchs, politicians, and athletes to
make Russian infuence efcient throughout the world (Aubin, 2021). Therefore,
at the national level, the stake is more important than it seems because a lot of
people in Russia are still living in between Soviet and post-Soviet world. This
Soviet nostalgia through sports is a strong vector to recreate the West and East
antagonism and to call for the emergence of a multipolar world where Russia
would play a predominant role. For Putin, sport was a means to make Russia one
of the main powers of the planet and a patriotic tool of social control. Since the
24th of February, it is the symbol of a country that has become a pariah.
In this context, the Kremlin is looking for solutions. He found it shortly after
the announcement of Russia’s exclusion from the Paralympic Games in Beijing,
On 5 March 2022, he ordered the organization of a parallel sports competition
in the city of Khanty-Mansiysk, in Western Siberia: “We are together: sport”.
The Deputy Prime Minister of the Russian Federation, Dmitry Chernyshenko,
instructed the Ministry of Sports and the Ministry of Finance, as well as the
town hall of Khanty-Mansiïsk, to implement these alternative Paralympic Games
as soon as possible with the assistance of Armenia, Tajikistan, Kazakhstan, and
Belarus, allies of the Russian regime. The aim, according to Sports Minister
Oleg Matytsin, is to show that Russia is “a strong and self-sufcient sporting
power”. Within the Russian population, a joke then circulated: “Beijing pre-
pared its Paralympic Games in seven years, Khanty-Mansiïsk prepared its own
in seven days”.
The competition took place over four days, from 17 to 20 March. Russian
athletes won in the medal standings against the four other participating states.
In the process, the Deputy Minister of Sports, Odes Baisultanov, clarifed the
Russian vision: “We must develop a national project, we must develop our sport,
including through the BRICS (Brazil, Russia, India, China, and South-Africa),
and the Shanghai Cooperation Organization, so that we can organize interna-
tional competitions.”
Then, on Friday, 18 March, many Olympic medallists took part in the meet-
ing “For a world without Nazism! For Russia! For the President!” in the Luzhniki
stadium in Moscow. All but a coincidence, it is the famous sports commentator
Dmitri Guberniev who is the Ringmaster of this event held in the presence
of 100,000 spectators and broadcast almost live on television. Guberniev did
not hesitate to declare about Russian sportsmen: “There is this kind of profes-
sion: defending the fatherland”. A slogan from a Soviet patriotic flm from 1971,
widely taken up since by the Soviet and then Russian army, and whose use con-
cerning athletes shows the military dimension that was attributed to the world of
sport under Vladimir Putin.
In the aftermath, the second edition of the Pervy Kanal Figure Skating Cup
is brought forward to 25–27 March in Saransk to coincide with the 2022 World
Championships, from which the Russians and Belarusians have been excluded.
32 Lukas Aubin

Again, the goal is to unite the Russian population and athletes around the fag to
avoid their potential defection. As a sign of the importance of the event, the star
Kamila Valieva and the Beijing Olympic champion Anna Chtcherbakova were
present to send a strong message both inside and outside the country. This time,
the organization is only Russian, but the services are world-class.

The Three Scenarios of the Future Russian Sport

Nevertheless, despite all these attempts, the Kremlin does not seem to have
decided on the future of its Sport Power. For the moment, it navigates on sight
and oscillates between maintaining contact with international sports federations,
returning to a Soviet Sports system, or building a new model. Therefore, these
three potential scenarios seem to be taking shape, some of which may potentially
overlap.

The “Return to Normal”

The frst and most likely is the “back to normal scenario”. In other words, inter-
national sports bodies would return to Russia once the situation had calmed
down. The Russian power would then continue to want to participate in
the construction of the current modern sport while knowing that it could be
excluded from it. Consequently, he would again construct an alternative narra-
tive to represent his “power of the imagination” and save appearances with his
own population when a legal decision, a bad sporting result, or a political afair
concerned him. According to this scenario, Russia could therefore both remain
in the concert of sporting nations and retain its otherness at the end of the war.
This scenario has been seen twice in the past. South Africa (1970–1991) and
Yugoslavia (1992–1995) have been banned from the sporting world respectively
because of Apartheid and the war. Both have been reintegrated into another
political form then. Yugoslavia disappeared in 1995 and has been replaced with
Slovenia, Croatia, Bosnia, Serbia, Montenegro, and Macedonia. In South Africa,
the system of institutionalized racial segregation – the Apartheid – was ofcially
over in 1991. In both examples, the sporting institutions decided to reintegrate
the countries after a major systemic change. We could conclude that it will take
a major change in Russia too for sports authorities to re-enter the country. But
since a new era of sport has dawned, it’s very difcult to predict what could be
the future of Russian Sports.

The “Soviet Model”

The second scenario is the “Soviet scenario”. As mentioned by Igor Levitin,
Assistant to the President of the Russian Federation, during the forum “We are
together. Sport” in March 2022, it would consist of withdrawing Russia from
all international sports structures and using the experience of Soviet isolationism
 What Future for Putin’s Sport Power? 33

to rebuild an autarkic and military sports model. The objective would be to use
sport to participate in the defence of the country. According to Levitin:

The events of the past few months show that the law and the spirit no longer
exist today. There are clear violations of the Olympic Charter, which sets
out the prohibition of discrimination. All of these ofenses suggest that we
need to return to the origins of Soviet national sport. During the Soviet
era, our sports had experienced similar sanctions, but despite everything,
we had always maintained a high standard. From now on, international
sport is not so much managed by ofcials as by advertising agencies. We
must return to the system that prevailed in the USSR. There is nothing
wrong with that. This will bring us self-sufciency.

Myth or reality? At a time when Russian sport is excluded from the global sports
movement, the Kremlin is looking for solutions and digging alternately from the
past, the present, and the future.

The “New World Order of Sport”

Indeed, the third scenario is also that of a third voice: it is the “scenario of the
new world order of sport”. As we have seen, in words and in deeds, the option
favoured by the Russian authorities since the start of the invasion remains that of
the creation of an alternative sports centre on a world scale to counterbalance the
international sports federations such as the IOC or FIFA.
Concretely, the idea would be to dispense with, replace, and/or compete with
world sport. In Russia, for example, the idea of splitting the Olympic movement
is gaining ground. It would be a question of separating the Olympic Games in
two: in the West, the Western Games; and in the East, the “traditional” Russian
Games. These Russian Olympics would be held in summer in Crimea and in
winter in Sochi. They would draw their legitimacy from the more or less proven
historical links of these regions with ancient Greece. In 2007, to obtain the
Sochi Olympics, Vladimir Putin had indeed reminded the members of the IOC
that “the ancient Greeks lived in the vicinity of Sochi. I saw there the rock near
Sochi on which according to legend, Prometheus was chained. Prometheus who
gave fre to men, the fre which is ultimately the Olympic fame”. Since then,
the register of myth is regularly used to evoke this Russian region composed of
the Caucasus but also of the Crimean Peninsula. According to Vladimir Putin,
these lands have a sacred character, and they could constitute the theatre of a new
world order of sport.
Within the framework of this scenario, and to weigh politically and sportingly
heavy enough to compete with the Olympic movement, the Russian authorities
are already looking for allies. During the Russian Paralympic Games parallel to
those in Beijing, the Russian authorities invited Armenia, Tajikistan, Kazakhstan,
and Belarus. But Russian ambitions are not limited to these four former Soviet
34 Lukas Aubin

republics. For Matytsine, the objective is to challenge the member countries of

the Commonwealth of Independent States (CIS), emerging countries (BRICS),
and the Shanghai Cooperation Organization (SCO) so that they are stakeholders
in this ambition. These three organizations include several tenors of world sport,
of which China is the fagship. If this Russian project were successful, we could
see the creation of a new world order of sport intended to compete with the his-
torical institutions of modern sport such as the IOC or FIFA.
This strategy would contribute to the creation of a Eurasian sporting micro-
cosm which would confrm the Russian pivot towards the East (povorot na vostok)
began in the 2000s and accelerated since 2014 and the annexation of Crimea.
Already in February 2007, Vladimir Putin denounced American unilateralism
and called for the advent of a “polycentric” world.

The Past as a Model?

To understand the current representations of sport according to Vladimir Putin,
we must delve into the Soviet past. Indeed, the leaders of the USSR have already
tried, with very relative success, to create sporting microcosms parallel to that
ordered by the West.
In 1921, Lenin and Stalin participated in the creation of the Red Sports
International (IRS) to compete with the IOC. The goal is to ofer a proletarian
alternative to the “bourgeois” international sports organizations. It is a question
of forming a reserve of revolutionary fghters, and of organizing the Spartakiads
to supplant the Olympic Games and promote “healthy emulation between the
physical vanguards of the world proletariat” (Le Guellec, 2002). The USSR
organized the frst Spartakiads in Moscow on 12 August 1928, the closing day of
the Amsterdam Olympics. The ambition is clear: to use sport to show the supe-
riority of the Soviet model over the capitalist model whose faults are symbolized
by bourgeois sports competitions. The Russian encyclopaedic dictionary Grenat
explains in its 1932 edition the diferences between the traditional Olympic
Games and the Spartakiads:

The Olympic Games are intended to show the success of physical culture
and to identify record achievements in the feld of purely individualistic
sports. Unlike the Olympic Games in bourgeois capitalist countries, the IRS
organizes international workers’ sports festivals (Spartakiades), which aim to
promote physical culture as a means of healing the proletariat and educating
the workers to their class. (…) Mass performances are ofered here.

A few decades later, during the Cold War, the Friendship Games were organized
by the Soviet authorities to compensate for the boycott of the 1984 Olympics in
Los Angeles. Ofcially, the objective of Amitié-84 is also to give athletes whose
countries are boycotting the LA Olympics the opportunity to display the fruit
of their years of training. However, states around the world can participate. A
 What Future for Putin’s Sport Power? 35

total of 49 countries, including France, are taking part. Unsurprisingly, it was the
USSR that won the competition by winning 126 gold medals. But, more impor-
tantly, 50 world records are beaten there against 11 at the Los Angeles Olympics.
More recently, in 2008, the creation of the Kontinental Hockey League (KHL)
at the initiative of Moscow had the eminently geopolitical objective of casting
the Russian shadow over the post-Soviet space and even beyond. Indeed, the
KHL aimed to bring together the best ice hockey teams from the former USSR,
former Warsaw Pact countries, Scandinavia, and even Central Asia and China.
The winner gets the Gagarin Cup, in reference to the Soviet space conquest.
While Croatia, Latvia, Ukraine, the Czech Republic, Finland, and even China
have joined the competition over the years, the war in Ukraine which has been
going on since 2014 has gradually prompted foreign clubs to leave. Today, only
the clubs of Red Star Kunlun (Beijing), Barys (Nursultan), and Dinamo Minsk
(Minsk) remain to participate in the championship, with 19 Russian clubs.
It is from this perspective that we must understand the current dilemma fac-
ing the Russian authorities. On the one hand, it is a question of continuing to
compete with Westerners on their territory. On the other hand, the Russian
historical and geopolitical position should allow the authorities to create, dis-
seminate, and organize a new world order of sport.
Nevertheless, this desire for asymmetrical expansion on the part of the
Kremlin refects the imbalance that exists between Russian ambitions and the
geopolitical reality of a country that can only count on a few allies. In addition,
the power of international sports institutions is such that it seems illusory to be
able to compete with them on their feld. To enter the new system desired by
Moscow, a country like the People’s Republic of China (PRC), for example,
would have to give up a sports strategy that runs until 2049, with the ultimate
objective of hosting and winning a football World Cup to celebrate the cente-
nary of the establishment of the PRC. Would it risk being banned from FIFA to
satisfy Vladimir Putin? It’s unlikely.
At a crossroads, Russian sport has an uncertain fate. To exist, the authorities
seek new geopolitical solutions. The resurrection of the myth of the new world
order of sport is for the moment akin to a fantasized ambition, while the conse-
quences of the war in Ukraine on Russian athletes are already very real.

Bibliography
Aubin, L. (2021), La sportokratura sous Vladimir Poutine: une géopolitique du sport russe, Bréal,
Paris.
Defrance, J. (2000), « La politique de l'apolitisme. Sur l'autonomisation du champ sportif
», Politix, 2000/2 (n° 50), p. 13–27.
Guellec (Le), G. (2002), « Les guerres olympiques de l'URSS », Regard sur l'Est, 2002. URL:
https://regard-est.com/les-guerres-olympiques-de-lurss#:~:text=La%20seconde
%20guerre%20mondiale%20va,%2C%20%C3%A0%20Londres%2C%20en%201948.
Viewed 11 May 2022.
5
GOVERNANCE DYSFUNCTION
IN WORLD SPORT
Issues Raised by the Confict in Ukraine

Sergey Altukhov

Introduction
The start of the paramilitary confict in Ukraine unexpectedly became another
important point for assessing the legal status, the depth of management dysfunc-
tions, and politicization of the activities of the International Sports Federations
(ISFs) and the International Olympic Committee (IOC). Within one week,
IOC President – Thomas Bach – condemned the Russian authorities’ actions
in Ukraine and recommended the International Sports Federations to cancel or
postpone all international tournaments that were to be in Russia and Belarus
and to deprive Russian and Belarusian winners and prizewinners of the right to
perform the national anthems and raise the national fags on the pedestal. Mostly
the reaction to these recommendations was predictable but still unambiguous.

IOC Recommendations and Timeline of the Consequences

Putting aside the emotional background of the statements, almost all the ISFs
supported the point of view and suggestions of Thomas Bach. Still there were
some exceptions. For example, the International Aquatic Federation (FINA) and
the International Judo Federation (IJF) refused to impede international starts
for Russian athletes despite the backdrop of general anxiety. The International
Football Federation (FIFA) at the 72nd Congress unexpectedly decided to make
the Russian language one of the six ofcial languages of FIFA. After that, the
Executive Committee of the World Olympians Association (WOA) issued a con-
demnation of the ISF sanctions against Russian and Belarusian athletes, stating
that “the fundamental principles of Olympism, set out in paragraphs 4 and 6 of
the Olympic Charter, must always be respected, and that the right of Olympians

DOI: 10.4324/9781003348238-6
 Governance Dysfunction in World Sport 37

and Athletes, as individuals to participate in sports activities should be supported

and encouraged”.
Following the ofcials’ statements, news of legal decisions began to arrive. On
11 April, the International Luge Federation (FIL) Arbitration Court stated that
the decision to not allow Russian athletes to compete was legally unacceptable.
The FIL executive committee declared they would try to circumvent the deci-
sion of the court about removing the Russians.
The European Table Tennis Union (ETTU) also did not expect that the
ETTU Board of Appeal would rule on the discriminatory exclusion of the
Russian clubs Fakel-Gazprom and UGMK from participation in the semi-fnal
and fnal of the Champions League’s last season.
CAS has registered ten appeal cases of Russian organizations and individu-
als against decisions to suspend Russian athletes from participating in interna-
tional competitions. Appeals were fled by the Russian Olympic Committee, the
Russian Football Union, the Russian Skating Union, the Russian Figure Skating
Federation, the Russian Biathlon Union, the Russian Rowing Federation, the
Russian Rugby Union, the Russian Artistic Gymnastics Federation, Olympic
champion in short track Semyon Elistratov, world champion speed skating cham-
pion Angelina Golikova, Olympic medallists in fgure skating Evgenia Tarasova
and Vladimir Morozov, Olympic champions in artistic gymnastics Angelina
Melnikova and Nikita Nagorny, double mini-trampo world champion Mikhail
Zalomin, judge in artistic gymnastics Vitaly Ivanchuk, and member of the exec-
utive committee of the Jumping Federation on the Russian trampoline Irina
Karavaeva. At this rate, we will see the Olympic Games between lawyers very
soon.

Outline of the Problem

Modern sport is a phenomenon with many meanings and defnitions in his-
torical, sociological, philosophical, economic, legal, and other aspects. Desmond
Morris (Morris, 1981), 40 years ago, described sports as “a cultural-ritual form of
sublimation of baser instincts” and even “a substitute for radical political activ-
ity”. Modern sport has become much more attractive, but, speaking about its
development, all the same “base instincts” and “political activity” are being
replicated – the concentration of resources, the transfer trade in slave athletes,
manipulations to achieve results, doping, etc. Sport eludes an unambiguous def-
nition and causes three hardly compatible aspects of perception: semantic ambi-
guity, ambivalence of values, paradox of goals (Bourg, 2016).
As a result of this kind of age-old evolution, the structure of World Sports
Governance has lined up, like the Solar System, around the International
Olympic Committee (the sun), with the International Sports Federations –
the main copyright holders for all sports – rotating in the orbits. Some of the
ISFs (planets) form the programme of the Olympic Games. Therefore, they are
located closer to the sun and receive a larger supply of energy, while others are
38 Sergey Altukhov

content with the formal recognition of the IOC and exist as conditional comets,
asteroids, and nebulae, occasionally relying on the favour of a heavenly body.
The level of relations between the subjects of international sports, their mutual
infuence, and legal regulation become the key problem of management in such
confguration.
To further discuss dysfunctions in the operation of the ISFs, some clarifca-
tions ought to be made regarding the main element of the system – the IOC.
Firstly, let us turn our attention to the factor of fnancial independence. The IOC
(the sun) is an independent nonproft international organization that feeds its bat-
teries not from galactic energy, but, to a greater extent, from American business.
The IOC quickly responded to the American victory in the Cold War (Altukhov
& Nauright, 2018) at the end of the 20th century and reformatted the business
model of the Olympic movement during the reign of Juan Antonio Samaranch
to the rails of a capitalist economy. The idea of developing the humanitarian
values of Olympism and promoting peace is a thing of the past. Profts, ef-
ciency, revenues, and contracts have become new benchmarks for Samaranch
and his followers Jacques Rogge and Thomas Bach, who, in fact, grew into the
hostages of American politics. The persuasion and infuence of Richard Pound
and his American business partners led to the signing of an incredible agree-
ment, USOC-IOC, in 1990 (15). USOC receives 12.75% of the funds obtained
by the IOC from the television contracts’ sale, plus 20% of the funds transferred
to American sponsors in the IOC. Consequently, the IOC voluntarily agreed to
be dependent on US sponsors and television.
After 19 years, the Assembly of the Association of Summer Olympic
International Federations at the SportAccord Forum, held in Colorado Springs
(the USA), in 2009, demanded the termination of this agreement, and in May
2012, a new USOC-IOC agreement was signed, endorsing the new rules for
the distribution of funds from American companies to the IOC, estimated for
20 years – from 2020 to 2040. Under this agreement, the USOC’s share of
TV revenue is reduced to 7%, and 10% of revenue is transferred from the IOC
sponsorship programme to the USOC (16). Generally speaking, USOC funding
from the IOC has not changed considerably due to the increase in the cost of
TV contracts, while the dependence of the IOC management structure and the
entire Olympic Movement on American stakeholders has remained the key ele-
ment of the business model.
The second aspect is political independence. History knows several prec-
edents when athletes from Germany, Austria-Hungary, the Ottoman Empire,
the Bulgarian kingdom, Japan, South Africa, Yugoslavia, and Afghanistan were
suspended from Olympic starts. But the IOC has never suspended the US ath-
letes for the US military actions in Afghanistan, Yugoslavia, Iraq, or Syria, since
the United States created a legal basis for its actions in advance in the form of
UN resolutions. An additional reason for questioning the legitimacy of the ISFs’
decisions was the fact that the citizens of a country that is a member of the UN
Security Council were removed from professional activity.
 Governance Dysfunction in World Sport 39

Case Analysis
Russian and Belarusian sports found themselves in isolation. In the directives
and recommendations, the IOC refers to the consensus reached on the reso-
lution of the UN General Assembly of 2 December 2021, “Promoting peace
and building a happier life on the planet through sport and the embodiment of
the Olympic ideals”, which approved the Olympic truce. Later, IOC President
Thomas Bach tried to explain his policy as a desire to preserve the integrity of
the sport. According to him, athletes from other countries do not want to par-
ticipate in competitions along with Russian and Belarusian athletes. In addition,
he worries about the safety of the Russian and Belarusian athletes.
In fact, this call by Bach has returned us all to political and ethnic segrega-
tion, when people are artifcially divided into frst and second grades depending
on their citizenship, violating the provisions of the International Convention on
the Elimination of All Forms of Racial Discrimination (1965). Athletes from
Russia and Belarus no longer have equal rights with other athletes. The prohibi-
tions prescribe neutral status for them, neutral equipment and neutral fags and
anthems. These athletes are deprived of their self-identity and isolated from the
global sports community as inferior humans or dangerous animals. Formally
speaking, the IOC did not violate anything at all – they only recommended the
implementation of sanctions on Russia and Belarus, and the decision was made
by the International Federations.
All the ISFs were created to regulate the calendar, enforce the rules and organ-
ize international sport competitions. Over time, their powers have expanded by
spreading their activities and acquiring political infuence (to varying degrees
for each federation) at the global level. In this context, the International Sports
Federations can legitimately be seen as subjects of international sports policy
regimes (Houlihan, 2009).
International Sports Federations are essentially established by self-governing
private norms (Casini, 2015), and position themselves as families. Leo Tolstoy
noted that “all happy families are alike, each unhappy family is unhappy in its
own way” (Tolstoy, 2020). The redoing of the business model of the Olympic
movement according to the canons of the American market has led to changes in
the business processes of the ISF, when, along with positive processes and growth
in income, all the vices of humanity poured into sports – drug use, doping,
match-fxing, fraud, violence, and corruption. Endless scandals, investigations,
arrests, and trials began. Most sports federations were not ready for such misfor-
tunes. The principles of management’s autonomy and activity’s self-regulation
turned out to be insufcient for global decision-making.
In international regime theory, Stephen Krasner’s classic defnition concep-
tualizes regimes as “the implicit or explicit principles, norms, rules, and deci-
sion-making procedures around which the expectations of actors in a given area
of international relations converge” (Krasner, 1982). The activities of the ISF
are not only classifed as international or continental, but also, they are directly
40 Sergey Altukhov

related to the interpenetration of international law, national legislation, and the

soft law of sports regulations. Sports management scholars argue that ISF gov-
ernance structures that have gained a monopoly on the regulation of sports and
competition at the international level are not able to deal efectively with these
challenges (Henry & Lee, 2004; Pieth, 2014).
The confict of form and content emerged against the background of the scal-
ing of the ISFs’ activities and the inability to regulate these activities in any way.
Presumably the concern of the IOC regarding the efectiveness of the ISFs’ man-
agement and the subsequent implementation of the principles of good govern-
ance in the ISFs was related to this. In 2009, the “Basic Universal Principles for
the Good Governance of the Olympic and Sports Movement” (PGG) proposed
by the IOC and in 2016 the “Key Governance Principles and Key Indicators”
(KGP) proposed by the General Assembly of ASOIF, including 28 Summer
Olympic ISFs (ASOIF, 2016a), were adopted. Later KGP was supported by seven
Winter Olympic ISFs.
The taken measures did not achieve the desired efect. The main reason was
the lack of legal status in the relationship between the IOC and the ISFs and
direct subordination. There was no regulator or supervisory body for the ISF
before – there is none now. The IOC’s powers to recognize the status of ISFs
from among the organizations applying for this (Rule 25 of the charter) are suf-
fcient for the dominance of the IOC among the subjects of world sports and the
legal protection of the interests of the Olympic movement at the global level.
The ISFs, in turn, oversee their autonomy and include self-regulation when
there is a risk of governmental interference or reputational costs from the actors
of civil society (Isailovic & Pattberg, 2016; Vogel, 2006). Additionally, there are
no cases in history where any ISF has beneftted from the compliance of other
ISFs. Consequently, the ISFs have no incentive to delegate enforcement powers
to the IOC or anyone else to ensure good governance (Abbott & Snidal, 2000).
Thus, a situation emerges where there are clearly not enough mechanisms and
tools within the system for strategic development in the context of a crisis in the
growth of individual entities. External regulators may well include public over-
sight or governmental sanctions to secure control (Geeraert, 2018).

Conclusion
The rise of the Olympic movement around the world, the growing economic
performance of the IOC, the high popularity, and recognition of the symbols
of Olympism among the globe’s population gradually led to a crisis in the entire
system. This looks intriguing. We observe a lack of hierarchy in the structure of
international regimes. The changing world order right in front of us highlights
the helplessness and vulnerability of the outdated business model of the Olympic
movement and the monopolies of ISFs trying their best to survive.
The introduction of compliance for the ISFs has a barely noticeable efect,
as there is no completely independent external mechanism for monitoring
 Governance Dysfunction in World Sport 41

compliance with the requirements, imposing sanctions, and their implementa-

tion. Various types of sports federations have individual compliance mechanisms.
Compliance can be achieved through co-regulation, where the governance and
persuasion mechanisms of the ISFs are complemented by sanctions from the pub-
lic or civil society.
The main lesson of the globalization of sports is that the social models of the
United States and Europe, recognized as “reference” ones, are not applicable
globally. The confict went beyond economic contradictions. Under these con-
ditions, the priority is not investment or the creation of new markets (sources of
value) – it is the new images and meanings of life.

References
Abbott, K., & Snidal, D. (2000). Hard and soft law in international governance.
International Organization, 54(3), 421–456.
Altukhov, S., & Nauright, J. (2018). The new sporting Cold War: Implications of the
Russian doping allegations for international relations and sport. Sport in Society, 21,
1120–1136.
ASOIF. (2016). ASOIF Governance Task Force (GTF) Report Approved by ASOIF General
Assembly 2016. Lausanne: Author. Retrieved from http://www.asoif.com/sites/
default/fles/basic_page/asoif_governance_task_force_report.pdf
Bourg, J.-F. (2016). Dopage et mondialisation fnancière du sport: ce que nous apprend
l’analyse économique. Drogues, santé et société, 15(1), 66–84.
Casini, L. (2015). The emergence of global administrative systems: The case of sport.
Glocalism: Journal of Culture, Politics and Innovation, 1. https://doi.org/10.12893/gjcpi
.2015.1.4
Geeraert, A. (2018). The limits and opportunities of self-regulation: Achieving
international sport federations’ compliance with good governance standards. European
Sport Management Quarterly. https://doi.org/10.1080/16184742.2018.1549577
Henry, I., & Lee, P. C. (2004). Governance and ethics in sport. In S. Chadwick & J. Beech
(Eds), The Business of Sport Management (pp. 25–41). Harlow: Pearson Education.
Houlihan, B. (2009). Mechanisms of international infuence on domestic elite sport
policy. International Journal of Sport Policy and Politics, 1(1), 51–69. https://doi.org/10
.1080/19406940902739090
https://m.sport-express.ru/newspaper/2009-04-01/7_1/
https://www.championat.com/business/article-3172515-ssha-poshli-na-ustupki-mok
-radi-domashnej olimpiady.html
Isailovic, M., & Pattberg, P. (2016). Private governance. In C. Ansell & J. Torfng (Eds.),
Handbook on Theories of Governance (pp. 468–476). Cheltenham: Edward Elgar.
Krasner, S.D. (1982). Structural causes and regime consequences: Regimes asintervening
variables. International Organization, 36(2), 185–205.
Morris, D. (1981). The Soccer Tribe. London: Jonathan Cape, p. 276.
Pieth, M. (2014). The responsibility of the host country. In M. Pieth (Ed.), Reforming
FIFA (pp. 23–30). Zürich: Dike Verlag.
Tolstoy, L.N. (2020). Anna Karenina. Publisher ACT. –M., p.6.
Vogel, D. (2006). The Market for Virtue: The Potential and Limits of Corporate Social
Responsibility. Washington, DC: Brookings Institute.
6
PUBLIC REMEMBERING OF SOCHI
2014 AT A TIME OF WAR
The Kremlin’s Soft Disempowerment
through Sport

Vitaly Kazakov

Introduction
Academics tend to assign past sporting mega-events (SMEs) into the frm catego-
ries of positive, negative, or mixed with respect to their broad impacts (Thomson
et al., 2018). This is evident when exploring the domain of sporting events’
reputational legacy. Considering the case of the Olympics, the 1936 Berlin
Games are an example of an event remembered commonly with disdain. The
1964 Tokyo Olympics and 1992 Games in Barcelona are among those frequently
evoked when discussing cases of roaring reputational “victories” for their hosts,
while most others have complex symbolic histories. The aim of this chapter
is to explore how a case of a contemporary SME with a negative reputation –
the Sochi Olympic Games – is informed and further shaped by the geopolitical
economy of sport through ongoing public negotiation of the event in the years
after its conclusion.

SMEs and Soft (Dis-)Empowerment

The recently proposed conceptual scale between soft power and “soft disem-
powerment” through sport (Brannagan and Giulianotti, 2018) is a helpful tool to
approach the public interpretation of the legacies of past sporting competitions.
The concept of soft power, used so ubiquitously, refers to the perceived ability of
such events to aid sponsoring states in promoting their interests through attrac-
tion rather than coercion. International broadcasting is one tool used by states
to showcase their SMEs in favourable ways, mimicking or even surpassing the
efect of in-person attendance to global audiences, which can, in turn, contribute
to a state’s soft power (Crilley et al., 2022). Typically, within the broad param-
eters of the geopolitical economy of sport, such an envisioned efect is used to

DOI: 10.4324/9781003348238-7
 Public Remembering of Sochi 2014 at a Time of War 43

justify the investment into hosting major sporting events like the Olympics or
the World Cup. However, the opposite outcome – soft disempowerment – has
been more prominently discussed in recent years, whereby hosting SMEs can
also “upset, ofend or alienate others, leading to a loss of attractiveness or infu-
ence” (Brannagan and Giulianotti, 2015: 706). Qatar has proven to be a case in
point, as this country’s hosting of the 2022 Men’s Football World Cup has drawn
negative international attention to the state’s human rights record, “leading audi-
ences to question the state’s integrity and adding further to its perceived lack of
credibility” (Brannagan and Giulianotti, 2018: 1156; Crilley et al., 2022).
While discussions on soft power, disempowerment, and the less well-devel-
oped concept of sportswashing are becoming more nuanced and plentiful within
the broader study of the geopolitical economy of sport (see Chadwick et al.,
Chapter 1, this volume), one signifcant angle of enquiry is still surprisingly
underdeveloped: namely, the comparative analysis of short-, medium-, and
long-term reputational consequences and the efects of soft power (or other-
wise) linked to the SMEs after they concluded. Much of the literature makes
assessments of such events’ efects before they take place and very shortly after
they conclude. Few scholars ask what becomes of the soft power efect once the
spotlight of international attention moves onto new SMEs and political issues
interlinked with them. This chapter bridges this gap by analysing the case of
the Sochi 2014 Winter Olympics nearly a decade after their conclusion and in
connection to subsequent extreme political turbulence surrounding the Games’
host nation.

The State of Russian Nation Projection

through Sport in 2022
In early 2022, following the bans on the participation of Russian teams and ath-
letes in most international competitions due to the Russian invasion of Ukraine,
the Russian national sports broadcasting network MatchTV aired a promo clip
for the channel with a caption in Russian reading, “sanctions are temporary, vic-
tories are forever”. The clip included footage of high-profle victories of Russian
teams and athletes from the recent past, interspersed with overtly political visu-
als such as the American fag falling from the rafters of a stadium. The visuals,
together with the caption, were a tongue-in-cheek efort to “protect” Russian
athletes and play up past sporting glories, including from the Sochi Olympics.
This clip targeted the domestic audience of the network with an ostentatiously
double-voiced reference to victories not only in stadia but also on the battlefeld
by only showcasing the former and alluding to the latter via overt references to
political conficts. One of the most bafing attempts to project the nation via
sports to international audiences at this time was the Russian sports authorities’
declaration of their interest to bid to host the UEFA 2028 European Football
Championship. Given this statement came in the midst of the Russian invasion of
its neighbour, UEFA promptly shut down this audacious proposal (Braidwood,
44 Vitaly Kazakov

2022). The international sporting community and public took this, at best, as a
delusional attempt at sports diplomacy at a time of war, and at worst as a cynical
and calculated provocation by a hostile state.
Perceptions of such nation projection eforts through sport in the conditions
of an active war in Europe are very much in contrast to those concerning the
Russian SME hosting just under a decade ago. Both the Sochi Games and the
2018 FIFA World Cup, held in Russia, aimed to project an image of a “new”,
cosmopolitan host country to audiences both at home and abroad (Kazakov,
2019). At the end of the Sochi Olympics, for example, a senior Kremlin of-
cial declared that the “Games have turned [Russia’s] culture and the people
into something that is a lot closer and more appealing and understandable for
the rest of the world” (Grohmann, 2014). Despite such optimism, hard power
developments like the annexation of Crimea and the doping scandal – both of
which shortly followed Sochi 2014 – tarnished the immediate legacy and lasting
soft power efects of Russia’s frst post-Soviet SME (Orttung and Zhemukhov,
2017).
In his recent analysis relying on the beneft of hindsight, Richard Arnold
suggested that

the speed and willingness with which Russia sacrifced any soft power
returns from the Sochi 2014 Olympics [suggest] that “soft power” was not
the main reason Russia wanted to host such events, and the prestige of the
event itself was instead the trophy sought.
(Arnold, 2022)

Moreover, further studies explained that unlike other cases, domestic – rather
than foreign – audiences and regime legitimacy were the primary targets of
Russia’s “unique” soft power strategy in hosting SMEs (Grix and Kramareva,
2017; Wolfe, 2021). The apparent short-termism, opportunism, and a sharper
focus on domestic, rather than foreign, audiences in the Kremlin’s pursuit of
SMEs, however, do not negate the need to understand the lasting and ongoing
efects of Sochi and similar events. They remain a site where soft power and
disempowerment efects simultaneously accrue and dissipate over time as new
related developments come to light and the public is reminded of the spectacle
of the past SMEs.
I argued previously that mega-events resist straightforward utilization as tools
of soft power, nation branding, or regime legitimation and do not inevitably
produce desirable efects (Kazakov, 2019); rather, to some degree they live a life
of their own upon their ofcial conclusion. One way to understand the ongo-
ing relevance and political signifcance of past SMEs is to study the way they are
remembered and discussed by members of the public at various points in time in
the SME’s aftermath. Such an enquiry helps to complete the picture of the geo-
political economy of a particular sporting competition and complements analyses
 Public Remembering of Sochi 2014 at a Time of War 45

within other domains that explore SMEs’ impacts in the economic, social, and
political spheres.

The Evolution of Public Memory of Sochi: From 2014 to 2022

The remainder of the analysis in this chapter provides a brief overview of the vol-
atile dynamics in public interpretation of the Sochi Games at three points after
their conclusion: the outbreak of the doping scandal in the immediate aftermath
of the Games, the Tokyo 2020 hacking afair, and the 2022 Russian invasion of
Ukraine. The discussion is based primarily on social media analysis, and as such
is not representative of the public opinion at large, but rather refective of just
one dimension and several platforms, sites, and temporal points of renegotiation
for the symbolic legacy of the SME by various publics. Such an explorative dis-
cussion ofers insights into the ongoing negotiations of the signifcance of a past
SME with a negative reputation.
Any reactions traced need to be judged against the initial vision and message
shared by the sponsors and organizers of the event. To have any positive and last-
ing efect, communications around an event like the Olympics need to craft a res-
onant efect upon the audiences, meaning they are not just noticeable and visible,
but also coherent and persuasive (Liang, 2019). The image of “new Russia” pro-
jected by state-aligned actors in the lead-up to and during the 2014 Games was
that of a respected member of the international community and a great power
capable of efciently organizing a world-class event; one that relies on strong
popular support, a stable political and social order, and a fourishing economy
to succeed (Kazakov, 2019). When the Games ended in February 2014, some
social media analyses showed initial responses to the Olympics were indicative of
a “soft power victory” for Russia. The authors of one such study observed that
some of the initial negative commentary on Twitter in relation to the corruption,
#SochiProblems, and Russian “anti-gay legislature” narratives that were preva-
lent prior to the Games’ kick-of reduced in public conversations over time and
gave way to a more general discussion about sports (Kirilenko and Stepchenkova,
2017). However, this is consistent with the general patterns of reporting on and
discussing other similar sporting events (Liang, 2019). Furthermore, the break-
out of the Crimea afair, the war in Donbas, and the eventual doping scandal all
prompted academics to suggest that the Sochi Games were “quickly forgotten”
(Orttung and Zhemukhov, 2017: 1), and that any prospects of soft power dissolved
(Grix and Kramareva, 2017) immediately following the Games’ conclusion.
My analysis of a popular site of refection on the Sochi 2014 legacy in its
aftermath showed that such assessments oversimplifed the picture. At the time,
I studied public comments users left under the ofcial video recording of the
Sochi 2014 Opening Ceremony, as shared by the ofcial IOC Olympic Channel
YouTube account. By mid-2016 – more than two years after the Games’ conclu-
sion and amid doping scandals and international confict – the YouTube recording
had over 1,600 public comments. My qualitative assessment of these comments
46 Vitaly Kazakov

showed that, contrary to one’s expectation of fnding a community of demo-

cratic polemic about the controversies surrounding the Games, the thread was
rather a community of cosmopolitan afection towards the Games and Russia,
and it refected some of the messaging put out by the Olympics’ organizers. It
may have been the case that the comment thread was moderated by the IOC’s
social media managers and that Russian bots and trolls infated the number of
positive refections on the 2014 Games. However, taken at face value, the com-
mentary amounted to an imprint of a “soft power efect” generated by the Games
which existed in a public domain. For example, “doping” only appeared once in
the English language comments between 2014 and 2016, and none in Russian.
Some users favourably compared the Sochi Ceremony to Rio’s in 2016. Others
expressed afection from around the world, such as “It was a great opening cere-
mony! Love Russia! from China” [sic] (Kazakov, 2019). This online community,
however, did not survive the test of time. Shortly after the initial analysis of the
comments shared, the IOC took down the recording of the full Sochi opening
ceremony broadcast, thus erasing this archive of Sochi’s “soft power afection”.
Many other sites of public negotiation and remembering of Sochi 2014 have
emerged since. The public commentary on the recording of the PyeongChang
2018 Opening Ceremony, for example, drew comparisons and refections on the
Sochi Games. Comments like “Great job South Korea! You guys made good use
of the money for the opening ceremony […] I enjoyed this more than Sochi!”
[sic] were commonplace and indicate the efects of soft disempowerment rather
than any reputational gains for the hosts of the 2014 Games. Another poignant
moment in the public renegotiation of the Sochi memory came in 2020, when
Moscow was accused of sponsoring cyberattacks against the subsequent Olympics
(Wintour et al., 2020). A small-scale analysis of public engagement with this
story and its refection on the Sochi legacy, as expressed through Twitter engage-
ment, helped me to further test the soft (dis-)empowerment dynamics surround-
ing a past mega-event in the conditions of a newly breaking political story. One
assessment (Kazakov, 2021) found that a signifcant proportion of public com-
mentary on Twitter evoking the Sochi 2014 Games refected on the nefarious
nature of actions linked to the Russian government. Specifcally, about a quarter
of all tweets in this sample that mentioned Sochi 2014 blamed the authorities in
Moscow for its interference in the Tokyo Games and other recent cases of dis-
reputable actions on the international stage, including the doping scandal. This
was direct evidence of soft disempowerment through sport and the sponsoring
of SMEs. Another signifcant proportion of messages simply commented on the
sporting competitions at Sochi, or otherwise refected either neutrally or even
positively on the 2014 Olympics and their hosts. This meant that even in the
conditions of a major international scandal implicitly and explicitly linked to a
past mega-event, the efects of soft power and soft disempowerment continued
to co-exist.
Finally, the 2022 Russian invasion of Ukraine provided the most recent and
poignant opportunity to explore how the public remembers the 2014 SME in the
 Public Remembering of Sochi 2014 at a Time of War 47

conditions of active hostility by the former host state, sharply juxtaposed against
their “soft power ofensive” just eight years prior (Rutland and Kazantsev, 2016).
I collected Twitter messages between February and June 2022 that included refer-
ences to Sochi 2014 and its memory or remembering in English and Russian. Here,
a section of the posts still only discussed the sporting results of the Sochi compe-
titions, highlighting that the sporting element of the SME remains a signifcant
mnemonic reference even at a time of war. However, the rest of the engagement
clearly indicated the dynamics of soft disempowerment through the SME, rather
than any positive reputational legacy. One simple metric helped to showcase this.
While the tweets sympathetic towards Russia or its government’s narratives gen-
erated under 50 likes combined from other members of the Twittersphere, those
messages with a negative sentiment towards the Sochi Games, or the Russian
government’s power narratives generated over 5,000 external likes in total.
Soft disempowerment through sport was evident here not only through sim-
ple quantitative metrics, but qualitative ones as well. Some of the same mem-
bers who had previously shown afection towards Russia in 2014 now explicitly
rejected the narratives of “new Russia” that were initially proposed through the
Sochi Games. One such Twitter user wrote,

it is very sad for Russia to think what could have been. 2014 Sochi
Olympics, the magnifcent presentation showing all of Russia’s many peo-
ple, the vastness, beauty, the greatness of her art & science […] Your narra-
tive was excellent. You charmed the world. Sad.

Clearly, the soft power efect existing immediately following the Games turned
into regret in the new geopolitical reality surrounding the host state.

Conclusion
Overall, this chapter highlighted that the efects of soft power and disempower-
ment co-exist at various points in the aftermath of an SME. Both dynamics shape
the geopolitical economy of a particular event and have ripple efects on the
perceptions of other events, sports more broadly, and related political narratives.
The analysis of public memory of past SMEs can therefore help us to trace these
dynamics. While the example of Russia is one of the extremes, in which active
war has all but erased the soft power efect of their SME hosting, it is noteworthy
that Russian authorities are nevertheless still attempting to use sport as a venue
for nation projection activity (as examples of the MatchTV promo and a failed
bid for the 2028 Euros illustrate). In such severe circumstances, however, the
international sporting audience no longer seems to fnd sympathy for this cause.
Ultimately, all SMEs have complex and fuid reputational legacies, and these
need to be studied better as part of our exploration of the geopolitical economy
of sport.
48 Vitaly Kazakov

Bibliography
Arnold R (2022) The most consequential world cup in history? PONARS: Eurasia
PolicyMemo (799).
Braidwood J (2022) Russia banned from making Euro 2028 bid as part of Uefa measures.
The Independent, 2 May. Available at: https://www.independent.co.uk/sport/football/
russia-uefa-euros-2028-bid-b2069982.html (accessed 17/10/2022).
Brannagan PM and Giulianotti R (2015) Soft power and soft disempowerment: Qatar,
global sport and football’s 2022 World Cup fnals. Leisure Studies 34(6): 703–719. DOI:
10.1080/02614367.2014.964291.
Brannagan PM and Giulianotti R (2018) The soft power–soft disempowerment nexus:
The case of Qatar. International Afairs 94(5): 1139–1157. DOI: 10.1093/ia/iiy125.
Crilley R, Gillespie M, Kazakov V and Willis A (2022) ‘Russia isn’t a country of
Putins!’: How RT bridged the credibility gap in Russian public diplomacy during the
2018 FIFA World Cup. The British Journal of Politics and International Relations 24(1):
136–152. DOI: 10.1177/13691481211013713.
Grix J and Kramareva N (2017) The Sochi Winter Olympics and Russia’s unique soft
power strategy. Sport in Society 20(4): 461–475. DOI: 10.1080/17430437.2015.1100890.
Grohmann K (2014) Sochi broke ice of scepticism over Russia. Available at: https://
uk.reuters.com/article/olympics-sochi-kozak/sochi-broke-ice-of-scepticism-over
-russia-deputy-pm-idINDEEA1L02O20140222 (accessed 1/02/2018).
Kazakov V (2019) Representations of ‘New Russia’ through a 21st Century Mega-Event: The
Political Aims, Informational Means, and Popular Reception of the Sochi 2014 Winter Olympic
Games. PhD Dissertation. University of Manchester, UK.
Kazakov V (2021) What does the hacking of the Tokyo Olympics mean for Russia’s
reputation? Commentary, The Royal United Services Institute. Available at: https://rusi
.org/explore-our-research/publications/commentary/what-does-hacking-tokyo
-olympics-mean-russia%E2%80%99s-reputation (accessed 10/04/2021).
Kirilenko A and Stepchenkova S (2017) Sochi 2014 Olympics on Twitter: Perspectives of
hosts and guests. Tourism Management 63: 54–65.
Liang L (2019) Crafting resonance in a sports media event: The Olympic games as a
transnational social drama. Journalism Studies 20(3): 401–422.
Orttung R and Zhemukhov S (2017) Putin’s Olympics: The Sochi Games and the Evolution
of Twenty-First Century Russia. London: Routledge.
Rutland P and Kazantsev A (2016) The limits of Russia’s ‘soft power’. Journal of Political
Power 9(3): 395–413. DOI: 10.1080/2158379X.2016.1232287.
Thomson A, Cuskelly G, Toohey K, Kennelly M, Burton P and Fredline L (2018) Sport
event legacy: A systematic quantitative review of literature. Sport Management Review
22(3): 295–321.
Wintour P, Borger J and McCurry J (2020) Russia planned cyber-attack on Tokyo
Olympics, says UK. The Guardian, 20 October. Available at: https://www.theguardian
.com/world/2020/oct/19/russia-planned-cyber-attack-on-tokyo-olympics-says-uk
(accessed 14/07/2022).
Wolfe SD (2021) More Than Sport: Soft Power and Potemkinism in the 2018 Men’s Football
World Cup in Russia. Lausanne: Verlag Münster.
7
TRANSNATIONAL LEAGUES
AND THEIR ROLE IN
PROJECTING SOFT POWER
Olivier Jarosz, Konstantin Kornakov, and Adam Metelski

Introduction
On Thursday, 13th of December, 2012, in RIA Novosti’s Moscow Ofce, a press
conference is hosted by Sergei Pryadkin, head of the Russian Football Premier
League, together with chiefs of three leading Russian clubs: Alexander Dyukov
of Zenit, Evgeni Giner of CSKA, and Konstantin Remchukov of Anzhi (RIA
Novosti, 2012). What they announce is not quite revolutionary and has been
speculated on for many years by fans of post-Soviet football, but it is neverthe-
less a bombshell of regional and potentially global signifcance – the launch of
preparation for a new unifed football championship of the Commonwealth of
Independent States (CIS), the political heir to the former USSR, which was dis-
mantled just over 20 years before that press conference.
What was outlined over the more than two hours of this media event by the
men captured some of the key narratives of the moment, and was the result of a
convergence in a single space and time of several diferent threads of development
in the modern European football industry, including the increasing commer-
cialization and polarization of European football, fnancial fair play mechanisms,
regional football competitions, and optimal calendars for leagues, as well as
Russia’s own transformation over the post-Soviet period. It was expected that as
a direct result of this media event the Russian and Ukrainian top divisions would
merge to create a mega (or super) league with signifcantly enhanced sporting
and commercial potential compared to the standalone leagues of Russian and
Ukraine.
Today, less than a decade later and armed with the power of hindsight, we
know that this project was doomed to failure from the very beginning for mul-
tiple reasons, not least that within a year and a half from that press conference
at RIA Novosti, Russia was engaging in open hostile actions against Ukraine,

DOI: 10.4324/9781003348238-8
50 Olivier Jarosz, Konstantin Kornakov, and Adam Metelski

including the annexation of Crimea and covert military action in the Donbas
region, which since February 2022 has become overt and increasingly destruc-
tive. Knowing all of this makes it even more fascinating to consider the motiva-
tions of all the sides involved in such a mega project, and compare it to other
transnational competitions to fnd out if political aims can realistically be a good
starting point, or whether business rationale should always set the tone.
All this described above fts in the context of the geopolitical economy of
sport, i.e. “the way in which nations, states and other entities engage in, with,
or through sport for geographic and politico-economic reasons” (Chadwick,
2022a). At this point, it is also worth explaining that soft power is the ability
to get what one wants through attraction (Nye, 2004). In summary, it can be
said that “in so exerting soft power, the goals of nations are myriad, including
the building of political and commercial infuence” (Chadwick, Widdop, and
Burton, 2020). Sport and sport-related mega-events have typically been seen as
one of the tools through which soft power can be projected, but leagues have not
generally been considered in academic research, with preference normally going
to the likes of World Cups and Olympics (Grix and Lee, 2013). But the case of
the United League is clearly worth examining in this dimension, as it came dur-
ing a turbulent period in Russo-Ukrainian political relations that preceded overt
military confict, and sport was being used for political purposes by the Russian
state at the time (Golubchikov, 2017).

Genesis of the United League

Back in 2012, Russian football, and sport in general, was riding high: since
2007, when the Winter Olympics of 2014 were ofcially granted to the Black
Sea resort of Sochi, the Russian football club Zenit won the UEFA cup in a
fnal against Rangers in 2008, the Summer Universiade of 2013 was awarded
to Kazan just two weeks later. In June that same year the Russian National
Team fnished joint third in its best showing in international football for two
decades, and then on 2 December 2010, Sepp Blatter announced the award-
ing of the FIFA World Cup fnals in 2018 to Russia at the home of football in
Zurich.
Actually, in what was a very big year for Russian sport, 2008 also saw the
creation of two of the forerunners of the United League project – the KHL,
or Kontinental Hockey League, modelled on the NHL, and the VTB United
League, which was Russian basketball’s NBA equivalent. The ice hockey project
was long in development, as it was originally proposed by legendary Soviet player
Vyacheslav Fetisov in 2005 when he was heading the Russian Federal agency on
physical culture and sport. The opening KHL season had 21 Russian teams and
a representative each from Belarus, Kazakhstan, and Latvia. Over the years, this
international dimension of KHL expanded, in a similar way to US leagues open-
ing up new franchises, and in the various seasons had competing teams from the
likes of China, Croatia, Czech Republic, Finland, Slovakia, and Ukraine.
 Transnational Leagues and Their Role in Projecting Soft Power 51

The VTB United League was an even more international afair, including
a larger proportion of non-Russian teams on its roster. Similarly, to the KHL,
from an initial focus on top clubs from former Soviet republics (Belarus, Estonia,
Georgia, Kazakhstan, Latvia, Lithuania, and Ukraine), a move was also made
to include teams from other European countries such as the Czech Republic,
Finland, and Poland, although they were also within the USSR’s orbit of infu-
ence during the Soviet period, and came from what was known during that time
as Russia’s “near abroad”. It is worth adding that there are several transnational
sports leagues in the world, and some of them are presented in Table 7.1.
The big Russian strategy of leveraging massive sports events as a serious devel-
opment and marketing tool was clearly making big strides, so much so that it
was even mentioned as one of his top-10 priorities by the then President of the
Russian Federation, Dmitry Medvedev, at his Davos speech in 2011:

Tenth, we have launched the implementation of large-scale infrastructure

projects including having obtained the right to host major sporting events.
This is not just a victory for sports lovers, this is a realistic chance for us to
realize the development of major infrastructure projects that will enhance
the lives of Russian citizens and develop individual regions of Russia, giv-
ing people the opportunity to visit Russia and understand its willingness
to open itself to the world.
(Upbin, 2011)

As Medvedev clearly stated, this strategy was not only about national showman-
ship or positioning Russia back at the top global table of infuencers – it was also
a mechanism of physically developing the country (or parts thereof ) in what Oleg
Golubchikov terms as “spatial governance” (2017). Organizing top club compe-
titions in various sports, able to compete with the best leagues in the world, with
their infrastructure, transport, human resource, fnance, branding, and other
needs, on a transnational level, was “spatial governance” not only domestically
but exported to other countries. All of this was a result of many years of work
and seemed to fall neatly into a consistent thread of using sport, and in particular,
football, to extend Russia’s soft power globally, and in the process confrm the
re-branding of the country as a new, modern, dynamic, and competitive global
power (Bogdanova, 2014).
Russia’s football, in particular, was becoming a boom destination for many
international stars: from Anzhi, who captured former Barcelona striker Samuel
Eto’o in season 2011/12, to Rubin Kazan and last but not least to huge spend-
ers Zenit with big transfers of the likes of Bruno Alves, Hulk, and Axel Witsel,
records were being set and a new gold rush was building up a head of steam
for those clubs, players, and agents that seemed keen to take part. With the
Russian state very keen to continue making use of sport as an important tool
in its political, economic, and social development, it was only a matter of time
that the domestic football competition would also get brought in for scrutiny as
TABLE 7.1 Diferent transnational leagues across the world

Short name Full name Sport Origin Main sponsor Number of countries Teams in Estimation of the main
from the beginning total objective

ABA Adriatic Basketball Basketball Croatia AdmiralBet 10 14 Commercial

Association
A-League A-League Football Australia ISUZU 2 12 Commercial
KHL Kontinental Hockey Hockey Russia SOGAZ 10 22 Mixed
League
MLS Major League Soccer Football USA – 2 28 Commercial
NBA National Basketball Basketball USA – 2 30 Commercial
Association
52 Olivier Jarosz, Konstantin Kornakov, and Adam Metelski

SEHA South East Handball Handball Croatia Gazprom 13 10 Mixed

Association League
VTB VTB United League Basketball Russia VTB 11 10 Mixed
 Transnational Leagues and Their Role in Projecting Soft Power 53

something needing improvement. Despite the obvious development of Zenit’s

success in Europe in 2008 and the emergence of some ambitious clubs, par-
ticularly in the Caucasus and Tatarstan, public attendance was still lagging well
behind European competitors. Market-generated commercial revenues were still
rather low, broadcasting revenue was nowhere near the leading competitions like
the English Premier League, and the spending of Russian clubs on transfers and
coaches was not delivering an acceptable ROI (Sports.ru, 2012). The position of
the Russian league in the UEFA ranking and the average audience at matches
are presented in Table 7.2.
Despite an upturn in transfer spending in the aftermath of the 2008 global
economic crisis, which impacted the existing European football ecosystem espe-
cially by creating the conditions for major changes in club ownership, Russia’s
professional club football was still not competitive enough to challenge the big-
gest European leagues such as the Premier League in England, La Liga in Spain
or even the French Ligue 1, or such prestigious tournaments as UEFA’s conti-
nent-wide Champions League. Unlike ice hockey or basketball, where there
already were local equivalents (for better or worse) of the best leagues globally,
the NHL and NBA, in football, the domestic Russian product both on and of
the feld was of inferior quality even compared to its US equivalent (Kozlovsky,
2015), and this would have been painfully obvious to many eyes.
For the Russian football (and national) authorities this was clearly an issue
to be addressed if they did not want to be completely sidelined by other more
successful sports or sporting events. In the lead-up to 2012, Russian clubs were
trying to fnd some solutions, and the frst big one was to switch the traditional
league calendar from a spring–autumn schedule to an autumn–spring season
with a long winter break in the middle. This allowed the competition to become
synchronized with most of its European counterparts and was also proof that big
change was possible both strategically and operationally. But it was clearly not
enough to satisfy all the big ambitions, and could not deliver the same impact as
hosting an Olympics or World Cup.
Russian club football needed something big: something that could solve all
those issues, and do it in such a way that would be noticed both at home and
abroad. And here, as with many other things in Russian modern history, the solu-
tion was to look at the past, but using all the latest visual and marketing methods:
revisit the idea of the old Soviet football league, which had all the best clubs
from the Soviet republics and had the aura of extremely high-level competition.
Veteran Dynamo Moscow player from the 1950s and 1960s Vladimir Kesarev,
who also participated in that famous press conference in Moscow in December
2012, was probably brought there to say as much: He said nostalgically:

I participated in the USSR championship and can state that the games were
so interesting and so high energy in the attempts to win [by the competing
teams] that today it is rare to see a game like that, which could compete in
interest with those times.
 54

TABLE 7.2 Average attendance in the Russian top football league and Russia’s UEFA country position

Season 2003 2004 2005 2006 2007 2008 2009 2010 11/12a 12/13

Average 11,309 11,560 11,997 12,014 13,127 12,914 12,434 12,375 13,009 13,261
attendance
Russia’s UEFA 10 18 21 13 9 9 6 6 7 7
country
ranking
Source: transfermarkt.de and uefa.com.
a
This was a transition season beginning in March 2011 and lasting until May 2012, comprising two parts, which enabled the Russian league to move from a spring–
Olivier Jarosz, Konstantin Kornakov, and Adam Metelski

autumn league calendar to an autumn–spring season.

 Transnational Leagues and Their Role in Projecting Soft Power 55

Clearly, the calculation was that a combined league should once again produce
such high-energy and competitive games, which would, in turn, generate a
“completely diferent level of product” and one that “could be sold for, say, a
billion US dollars”, according to another participant of the press conference,
Konstantin Remchukov of Anzhi.
A combined league would bring together the best football clubs in Eastern
Europe, including three winners of the UEFA cup: CSKA Moscow, Zenit St
Petersburg, and Shakhtar Donetsk. The theory was simple: a cross-border league
will be more attractive for football fans and that means more interest from TV
and sponsors. There were predictions that more than 30% of the league’s income
would come from selling television rights and a signifcant amount would also
come from selling tickets (Lidster, 2013). The intention to build a Russian–
Ukrainian league in 2013 was very realistic after the league announced its budget,
formed an organizing committee, opened an ofce in the centre of Moscow, and
even created ofcial pages on social media. Gazprom, Russia’s natural gas monop-
oly which owns Russian champions Zenit St. Petersburg and used to (until the
beginning of war in 2022) sponsor the UEFA Champions League, proposed an
impressive €1 billion budget for the Russian–Ukrainian league and could award
an attractive €92m prize for the league’s winner. Interestingly, Gazprom doesn’t
sell anything directly to consumers, instead sells gas to countries (Chadwick,
2022b), so it is best characterized as a G2G (government-to-government) deal.
Undoubtedly the Champions League matches enabled Gazprom unique diplo-
matic and networking opportunities (Chadwick, 2021). In the case of a joint
league of Russia and Ukraine, representatives of Gazprom would have direct
access to representatives of the national and local authorities of Ukraine via the
backdoor of sport. Undoubtedly, it could be an opportunity to exert some infu-
ence on them and entangle them in a network of dependencies – an example
of soft power. This soft power, in turn, may well have been intended to, for
instance, play a role in securing Gazprom’s control over Ukraine’s gas transport
network, which was meant to be unbundled as part of the adherence of Ukraine
to the EU’s Third Energy Package and was actively worked on by the relevant
Ukrainian authorities already in 2012 (Ministry of Energy and Coal Industry of
Ukraine, 2012).
Ukraine’s top clubs FC Shakhtar Donetsk and FC Dynamo Kyiv publicly
expressed their interest in the united Russian–Ukrainian football league but
underlined that it should follow a joint decision among all the clubs in the
Ukrainian Premier League. In the meantime, the president of the Ukrainian
Football Federation – Anatoliy Konkov, expressed a frm “no” to this project.
His main argument was that by taking part in the United League Ukraine will
lose the opportunity to participate in European competitions (Lidster, 2013).
Apart from the more long-term strategic aspects of improving the competi-
tiveness of Russian club football (Russian Football Federation, 2006) and mak-
ing it more economically sustainable (i.e. without signifcant inputs from club
sponsors, which were by that time supporting most, if not all, Russian clubs),
56 Olivier Jarosz, Konstantin Kornakov, and Adam Metelski

there was also another interesting, albeit rather more personal, back story to this
United League concept. It stemmed from a disciplinary action taken against
Zenit St Petersburg for an incident that happened in its match against Moscow
rivals Dynamo, where Zenit fans threw freworks onto the feld, which ended up
injuring Dynamo’s goalkeeper. This led to the Control Disciplinary Committee
of the Russian Football Union awarding the match to Dynamo and punishing
Zenit with a fne and two matches behind closed doors (TASS, 2012). In a rather
unexpected twist, this led Zenit fan and Gazprom CEO Alexei Miller to declare
that Zenit might choose to leave the Russian league and go play somewhere else,
which was openly publicized on Zenit club communication channels. One of the
possible destinations mentioned at the time was the Ukrainian Premier League,
where it was said that Zenit could represent the Crimean city of Sevastopol
(Trushin, 2012).
Bearing in mind the role of sometimes unpredictable individual events on
global-level historical events (see the entire history of the First World War), cou-
pled with UEFA-inspired talk of a change in its long-standing negative approach
to multinational league competitions, which was widely discussed in football
circles at the time and had some potential areas of application such as in the
Baltic region, Balkans, Czech + Slovak leagues, and Belgium + Netherlands,
who knows if Miller’s threat was actually the detonator needed for proceeding
with the Russian-led United League in football in the frst place.

The Committee Begins Its Work

The next important date in the story of the United League was 26 December
2012, when it became publicly known that the person selected to head the pro-
ject was Valery Gazzaev, one of the most well-known football fgures in Russia
and the former USSR at the time. After a successful playing career as a busy
striker for several Soviet club teams, including spells at home-town Spartak
Ordzhonikidze (later to become Spartak-Alania and Alania Vladikavkaz),
Lokomotiv, and Dynamo Moscow as well as caps for the USSR national team,
Gazzaev became a famous head coach who broke Spartak’s early dominance in
Russian football in the 1990s by winning the league title with his boyhood club
Spartak-Alania and then led CSKA Moscow to domestic and European glory in
the early to mid-2000s. Crucially for the project, his CV also included a fairly
recent spell as manager of Dynamo Kyiv, which did not bring much silverware
but enabled him to frm up on contacts in the Ukrainian game.
According to Gazzaev, the creation of this project was supposed to bring a
solution to three key challenges facing Russian football: “First of all, it is to do
with the loss of spectator interest. Secondly, many clubs drop out of the cham-
pionship due to fnancial problems. Many clubs are threatened by Financial Fair
Play”, he claimed in the public interview where he announced his new job.
In parallel, it was also confrmed that the organizational committee was to be
headed by Sergei Pryadkin, with the participation of Dyukov from Zenit, Giner
 Transnational Leagues and Their Role in Projecting Soft Power 57

from CSKA, and Suleiman Kerimov, the owner of Anzhi. Gazzaev also identi-
fied the steps he wanted to take to convince the stakeholders of the worthiness of
the project. He said in his introduction:

First of all, we need to set up the work with national federations, discuss
the format of the new championship, access list to European competitions,
the first division, youth championship. We are building quite a good team
to be able to decide on these matters. And then we will go to the national
and international federations with the idea.

So what was meant to be a joint Russo-Ukrainian project was to be run exclu-

sively by representatives of Russian football! It can therefore be assumed that in a
way it was an attempt to impose Russian imperialism through sport and even to
take the independent status away from Ukraine (Figure 7.1).
Curiously, the announcement of Gazzaev came hot on the heels of an inter-
vention by Russia’s then Minister of Sport, Vitaly Mutko, who had a long trajec-
tory in sports administration, first in Saint Petersburg, where he participated in
the organization of the Goodwill Games in 1994 and headed FC Zenit around
the turn of the new century, and then in Moscow, moving from the presidency of
the Russian Football Premier League to the presidency of the Russian Football
Union, and then the Ministry of Sport itself. According to Mutko, the crea-
tion of the United League was a “fake target” and was an idea that has not been
thought through, taking the attention away from the real problems of Russian
football, which were “clubs losing sponsors, dropping attendances, fan troubles,
transparency of club budgets, development of new talents” (Andreev, 2012).
All of this hinted suspiciously at a conflict, or at least at a lack of shared vision
on how to solve the problems, which were being mentioned by everyone: it
seemed like there was a group of long-time sports administrators who wanted
to operate within the existing pyramid of football and believed that a united
competition would be too difficult to organize (and would probably also threaten
the existing order), and a group led by Miller, Gazzaev, and the biggest Russian
clubs, who saw the recipe of success in the creation of a new combined league

Nostalgia for USSR times

Financial Fair Play pressure on clubs Bigger "domestic" competition with
to improve their business models enhanced football quality and
Example of EPL and other commercial potential, which extends
commercially successful leagues Russia's sphere of influence on
domestic sport in other former
Example of KHL and VTB United Soviet countries that decide to join
Leagues such a league and creates a platform
Power expansion through sport for this Russian-led product to
Changed UEFA attitude to become one of the leading sports
transnational league competitions, competitions globally
willing to explore

FIGURE 7.1 Rationale behind the United League.

58 Olivier Jarosz, Konstantin Kornakov, and Adam Metelski

structure, which would kick-start public interest and guarantee football quality
together with commercial success.
Less than a month later, the former group landed a major punch when Sepp
Blatter, the then FIFA President, visited Saint Petersburg for the opening of the
annual CIS Cup, which was a friendly international tournament between post-
Soviet clubs from across the geography of the collapsed USSR. Blatter, sitting
together with Nikita Tolstykh, the president of the Russian Football Union, was
extremely clear in his assessment of the potential of a new United League: “It’s
impossible. It goes against the principles of FIFA, therefore FIFA would never
support such an idea”, he stated to the media (Kyiv Post, 2013).
On 18 February 2013, the United League group hit back: at an event hosted
by Alexei Miller, the potential competition began to take some shape. Thirty-
two clubs, sixteen each from Russia and Ukraine, were invited. Now it was
becoming clear that this was no CIS league to bring back the USSR competi-
tion – the focus of this project was exclusively Ukraine, but it was going much
deeper than a Superleague between the best clubs of both nations. It was really
a complete merger of professional football of Russia and Ukraine. However,
there was a clear issue emerging with the project: even though all 32 top division
clubs from both Russia and Ukraine were invited to this presentation and meet-
ing of the United League organizational committee, it was graced by 14 out of
16 Russian clubs (Mordovia Saransk and Terek Grozny were the absentees), but
only one Ukrainian club chose to appear: Tavriya Simferopol. The Ukrainian
side was also represented by the executive director of the UPL, Petr Ivanov, but
the major clubs were not there (Ria Novosti, 2013).
Alexei Miller, in the aftermath of the meeting, stated that they were hoping
to be able to begin the new championship as early as in season 2014–15, but
certainly in 2015–16 at the latest (Rsport, 2013), with nine Russian and nine
Ukrainian clubs joining up a lucrative division that would compete with the
Champions League itself. To achieve this kind of speed, the organizers would
need to put everything in place in the space of a few months, since the season
beginning in 2013–14 would have been the last under old domestic rules. So,
Gazzaev set out to convince the parties, especially the missing Ukrainians. And
here it would be appropriate to look at the project through the eyes of both
Russian and Ukrainian clubs, as they remember these events today, and some
quotes are presented in Table 7.3.
Ahead of the meeting in Moscow on 18 February 2013, Gazzaev travelled to
Kyiv on a mission to talk the Ukrainian clubs into supporting the new project
(Aleshin, 2013), but as was evident from the attendance list in the Russian capi-
tal, the Ukrainian side was extremely weary of jumping of the fence, at least
publicly. According to direct participants in those events, the main (and only)
argument from Gazzaev was the expected €1bn fnancial windfall, which was
meant to entice Ukrainian clubs to join by solving all their fnancial problems,
which at the time meant that several clubs had to withdraw from the com-
petition due to lack of funds. This was echoed by FFU Vice-president Sergei
 Transnational Leagues and Their Role in Projecting Soft Power 59

TABLE 7.3 Perspective on the United League from the Ukrainian and Russian sides

Ukrainian club view from inside Russian club view from inside

“The idea to play with Russian clubs “We played regularly with
made sense to have a boost and be more Ukrainian teams and due to
competitive in the UCC”. their high level it made sense to
“Not many details were shared to us, as we play more often”.
understood that there is a political principle “The whole idea has not been
at the genesis”. developed at the origin amongst
“When reforms are made by bureaucrats you the football circles, we were
do not have much concern on football, discovering slice by slice”.
when reforms are made by football
bureaucrats, they do not have much concern
on the commercial”.

Storozhenko later on in the year, in an interview with the Russian sports news-
paper Soviet Sport (Lokalov, 2013). However, those siren calls were enough to
organize a friendly pre-season tournament that included two top clubs from
both Russia and Ukraine during June and July 2013 (LB.ua, 2013a), where the
Ukrainian clubs each received 1/1000th of the promised cumulative revenue of
the future United League for their participation, presumably to demonstrate the
serious nature of the project (LB.ua, 2013b). Not surprisingly, this followed the
template set by the VTB United League in basketball, which also started as a
friendly tournament that evolved into a full-blown ofcial competition.
As the year was progressing, it was becoming clear that the Ukrainian foot-
ball authorities would not support the proposed merger, as Storozhenko and also
FFU President Anatoli Kon’kov clearly stated in their interviews with Russian
media (Interfax, 2013), which seemed more interested in this project than the
Ukrainian side. Even the leaders of Dynamo Kyiv, which would have been one
of the fag bearers of the new competition from the Ukrainian side, were not
convinced (LB.ua, 2013c). The fans of Dynamo were certainly clear in their
rejection of this project: in a statement, they underlined the political nature of
this, termed it a “betrayal of the national interests of the citizens of both coun-
tries [Russia and Ukraine]”, and declared a boycott to the friendly competi-
tion (Fanstyle.ru, 2013). At the same time, the organizational committee led
by Gazzaev progressed with their operational development and frst opened its
headquarters in Moscow in April, located in the rather infamous Lubyanka street
(Airapetov, 2013), which during Soviet times was also home to the KGB organi-
zation, later to be followed by a foothold in Kyiv in October 2013 (TASS, 2013),
just weeks before the outbreak of the Revolution of Dignity. By then, however, it
was becoming clear that the project was not succeeding. In a major press confer-
ence with Russian media in Moscow at the end of September 2013 Gazzaev once
again tried to paint a positive picture, making a public plea – “let’s try it, we are
not risking anything!” he said to the increasingly sceptical journalists, who were
60 Olivier Jarosz, Konstantin Kornakov, and Adam Metelski

also incredulous at the assertion by Gazzaev that this was not a political project
in any shape or form (Sports.ru, 2013).
At the end of November 2013, political events in Kyiv forced football to take
backstage, but Gazzaev was still working on the project and promoting it to the
Russian public (Agapov, 2013). By February 2014, though, as the Revolution
of Dignity triumphed on the streets of Kyiv and Ukrainian President Viktor
Yanukovich was feeing the country, the project was clearly dead in the water.
By summer 2014, when Crimea was already annexed and the Donbas region
was on fre, even the ever-optimistic Gazzaev accepted the project’s defeat (LB
.ua, 2014). In 2022, when the entire country of Ukraine has gone in fames after
open Russian aggression, football in Russia is now at its most isolated since the
early days of the Soviet regime in the 1920s and 1930s, and football in Ukraine is
clinging to life-support, with Shakhtar sufering its second displacement in eight
years, and all competitions being stopped since the invasion. The mirage of the
failed “United League” is now merely a curious footnote of football history, but
also a piece of the jigsaw of this bloody confict.

Conclusion
Sport plays an important political role because through sports countries can build
their soft power, which centres on the ability to get what one wants through
attraction rather than coercion, and which is an exercise directly practised by
nations and their governments to engage in global afairs. What played out ten
years ago as a proposal to merge the Russian and Ukrainian top divisions can be
interpreted as a sports development project of two countries that were being left
behind on the football business front. In this sense, creating a mega league was
the strategy that would enable them to compete with the best in the world on a
sporting and economic level. On a more sinister level, it could also be interpreted
as one of the series of attempts by Russia to “infltrate” Ukrainian society, in this
case through the means of football, which is the most popular global sport. If you
subscribe to the view that it plays an important identity-building role in modern
society, such an attempt can dilute one of the visible features of an independent
state – the domestic football competition. In this narrative, the “United League”
project has a frm place in the line of precursor events that were meant to bring
Ukraine close to Russia’s orbit and eventually lead to it being swallowed up,
beginning from the cultural/sport sports space.
Today from the perspective of the ongoing war between Russia and Ukraine
we can surmise that this was no simple football project: from the line-up of indi-
viduals who were instigating and driving it on the Russian side, to a lack of
consultation within Russian football itself and a lukewarm reaction at best from
the Ukrainians, where public support from the Ukrainian side was never forth-
coming, it never felt right. The lack of any signifcant Ukrainian representatives
in the steering group or Gazzaev’s team made it obvious they were not involved
in the decision-making, which is rather curious for a merger project where two
 Transnational Leagues and Their Role in Projecting Soft Power 61

supposedly independent parties are meant to come together for mutual beneft.
And a €1bn revenue projections were not at all in line with the defciencies of both
the Ukrainian and Russian sport business markets. Having said that, there are
several transnational leagues in the world that have been able to achieve success,
particularly in the case of North America or Australia, and even in Russia, there
are transnational competitions in ice hockey and basketball that have a continued
existence for more than a decade and are recognized as among the best in Europe.
So why did the joint league ultimately fail? Arguably, the answer lies in the fact
that it was a project that did not start with a clear business rationale behind it but
was rather an attempt, on one hand, to recreate something from the past (i.e. the
USSR championship) based on nostalgia, and on the other hand, the political aims
were too obvious but were trying to hide behind a €1bn revenue smokescreen,
which created a sense of growing unease from the Ukrainian side. Ultimately, it
did not have a transparent logic to generate universal support. And when the guns
started to talk, it was obvious the project would not go forward any time soon.
Today, just a decade later and looking beyond the unspeakable human sufering
and misery caused by the war, the consequences of Russian aggression have also
produced a major impact on football in both countries. Crimean football clubs,
who had the only direct representative from amongst all the Ukrainian clubs to
show their face in the Russian pantomime, have been functioning outside of the
global pyramid since 2014 (Homewood, 2014). Russian clubs have been banned
from European competition, and the Russian national football team has not been
able to play in ofcial matches under the auspices of FIFA or UEFA (Reuters,
2022a). It is currently unable to take part in qualifcation for Euro-2024 (Reuters,
2022b), meaning that Russian football will be beyond the pale at least until then.
Ukrainian clubs, especially those from the Donetsk and Luhansk regions, have
also been displaced since 2014, including major ones like Shakhtar Donetsk and
Zorya Luhansk, whilst several teams have lost coaches and players as casualties
of war (Yangoly, 2022), as well as had their infrastructure destroyed (Hunder,
2022). And when thinking about leagues, we may actually be much closer to a
completely diferent United League now, that of Ukraine and Poland, and on
the basis of a Poland and Ukraine combined league, adding the Visegrad league
and the Baltic League you could end up with an Intermarium league, where you
could have other competitions of a roughly similar size, which could also ft into
that pyramid: one group being Belarus/Czech/Hungary and the other Slovakia/
combined Baltic countries – but this is a topic for another story.

Bibliography
Agapov, A. (2013) Valery Gazzaev: ‘Holding the United Cup is Inappropriate’. Available at:
https://m.sport-express.ru/football/osk/news/642664/ (Accessed: 17 June 2022).
Airapetov, V. (2013) The Ofce of the Organizing Committee of the United Championship
Will be Located in Lubyanka. Available at: https://www.sport-express.ru/football/news
/572332/ (Accessed: 17 June 2022).
62 Olivier Jarosz, Konstantin Kornakov, and Adam Metelski

Aleshin, P. (2013) Gazzev Held Negotiations in Kyiv. Available at: https://m.sport-express

.ru/newspaper/2013-02-16/2_2/ (Accessed: 17 June 2022).
Andreev, I. (2012) ‘There is No Motive in the CIS Championship’. Available at: https://www
.gazeta.ru/sport/2012/12/25/a_4905381.shtml (Accessed: 15 June 2022).
Bogdanova, S. (2014) Sochi Winter Olympics 2014: Soft Games Lost. Available at: https://
www.academia.edu/28692171/Sochi_Winter_Olympics_2014_Soft_Games_Lost
(Accessed: 22 May 2022).
Chadwick, S. (2021) Gazprom and its Sponsorship of Football. From Sex Without a Condom
to Major Strategic Threat. Available at: https://www.iris-france.org/154279-gazprom
-and-its-sponsorship-of-football-from-sex-without-a-condom-to-major-strategic
-threat/ (Accessed: 27 March 2022).
Chadwick, S. (2022a) ‘From utilitarianism and neoclassical sport management to a new
geopolitical economy of sport’, European Sport Management Quarterly, pp. 1–20. doi:
10.1080/16184742.2022.2032251/FORMAT/EPUB.
Chadwick, S. (2022b) How 2022 Will Epitomise Sport’s Burgeoning Geopolitical Economy.
Available at: https://www.iris-france.org/164078-how-2022-will-epitomise-sports
-burgeoning-geopolitical-economy/ (Accessed: 27 March 2022).
Chadwick, S., Widdop, P. and Burton, N. (2020) ‘Soft power sports sponsorship – A
social network analysis of a new sponsorship form’, Journal of Political Marketing, 21(2),
pp. 196–217. doi: 10.1080/15377857.2020.1723781.
Fanstyle.ru (2013) Fans of Kyiv Dynamo Call to Boycott the United Tournament. Available at:
https://fanstyle.ru/news/23168-fanaty-kievskogo-dinamo-prizyvayut-bojkotirovat
-obedinennyj-turnir/ (Accessed: 17 June 2022).
Golubchikov, O. (2017) ‘From a sports mega-event to a regional mega-project: The Sochi
winter Olympics and the return of geography in state development priorities’, International
Journal of Sport Policy and Politics, 9(2), pp. 237–255. doi: 10.1080/19406940.2016.1272620.
Grix, J. and Lee, D. (2013) ‘Soft power, sports mega-events and emerging states:
The Lure of the politics of attraction’, Global Society, 27(4), pp. 521–536. doi:
10.1080/13600826.2013.827632.
Homewood, B. (2014) UEFA Bans Crimean Clubs from Russian League. Available at:
https://www.reuters.com/article/soccer-uefa-crimea-idINKCN0JI23U20141204
(Accessed: 21 September 2022).
Hunder, M. (2022) Ukraine Set to Restart Soccer League as War Rages on. Available at:
https://www.reuters.com/lifestyle/sports/ukraine-set-restart-soccer-league-war
-rages-2022-08-22/ (Accessed: 21 September 2022).
Interfax (2013) FFU is Still against Holding the Joint Championship of Ukraine and Russia –
Konkov. Available at: https://interfax.com.ua/news/sport/159679.html (Accessed: 17
June 2022).
Kozlovsky, P. (2015) Why Russia is not America, or Why MLS is Better than RFPL. Available
at: https://www.sport-express.ru/se-money/football/reviews/858743/ (Accessed: 17
June 2022).
Kyiv Post (2013) FIFA Head Dismisses Plans to Resurrect Old Soviet League. Available
at: https://www.kyivpost.com/article/content/sport/ffa-head-dismisses-plans-to
-resurrect-old-soviet-league-319100.html (Accessed: 15 June 2022).
LB.ua (2013a) Dynamo Beat Spartak to Win the United Tournament. Available at: https://
lb.ua/sport/2013/07/08/211182_dinamo_obigrav_spartak.html (Accessed: 17 June
2022).
LB.ua (2013b) Shakhtar and Dynamo Will Receive $1 million Each for Participating in the
Unifed Tournament. Available at: https://lb.ua/sport/2013/07/05/210794_shahter
_dinamo_poluchat_1_mln.html (Accessed: 17 June 2022).
 Transnational Leagues and Their Role in Projecting Soft Power 63

LB.ua (2013c) Surkis: United Championship? This is Not My Parish. Available at: https://lb
.ua/sport/2013/07/08/211296_surkis_obedinenniy_chempionat.html (Accessed: 17
June 2022).
LB.ua (2014) Gazzaev: The Combined Championship has Lost its Relevance. Available at:
https://rus.lb.ua/sport/2014/08/27/277352_gazzaev_obedinenniy_chempionat.html
(Accessed: 17 June 2022).
Lidster, A. (2013) Russia’s Grand Football Designs. Available at: https://www.aljazeera.com
/sports/2013/5/18/russias-grand-football-designs (Accessed: 27 March 2022).
Lokalov, A. (2013) FFU First Vice-President: Blatter Told Me: “A Unifed Championship is
Impossible”. Available at: https://www.sovsport.ru/amp/2:479866 (Accessed: 17 June
2022).
Ministry of Energy and Coal Industry of Ukraine (2012) Order N291. Available at: http://
consultant.parus.ua/?doc=086UBF3FAE&abz=DDPSB (Accessed: 21 September
2022).
Nye, J. (2004) Soft Power: The Means to Success in World Politics. New York: Public Afairs.
Reuters (2022a) CAS Dismisses Appeals by Russian FA and Clubs against FIFA, UEFA
Bans. Available at: https://www.reuters.com/lifestyle/sports/cas-dismisses-appeals
-by-russian-fa-clubs-against-ffa-uefa-bans-2022-07-15/ (Accessed: 21 September
2022).
Reuters (2022b) Russia Excluded from Euro 2024 Qualifcation Draw. Available at: https://
www.reuters.com/lifestyle/sports/russia-excluded-euro-2024-qualifcation-draw
-2022-09-20/ (Accessed: 21 September 2022).
RIA Novosti (2013) Fedun and Miller Attend a Meeting on the Unifed Championship. Available
at: https://rsport.ria.ru/20130218/646063548.html (Accessed: 15 June 2022).
RIA Novosti (2012) A Press Conference Dedicated to the Creation of the CIS Football
Championship was Held at RIA Novosti on December 13. Available at: https://ria.ru/sng
_champ_press_12122012/ (Accessed: 22 May 2022).
Rsport (2013) Miller Announced the Timing of the Unifed Football Championship. Available
at: https://rsport.ria.ru/20130218/646116890.html (Accessed: 15 June 2022).
Russian Football Federation (2006) Football Development Strategy in the Russian Federation
for 2006–2016. Available at: https://www.prlib.ru/item/682629 (Accessed: 22 May
2022).
Sports.ru (2012) Sergei Fursenko: ‘It is Necessary that Clubs Spend as Much as They Earn’.
Available at: https://www.sports.ru/football/135947279.html (Accessed: 17 June
2022).
Sports.ru (2013) ‘Let’s Try! We Don’t Risk Anything.’ How the Unifed Championship Keeps
Coming. Available at: https://www.sports.ru/football/153211693.html (Accessed: 17
June 2022).
TASS (2012) Gazprom Says Zenit Football Club Can Play in Diferent Championship.
Available at: https://tass.com/archive/685905 (Accessed: 22 May 2022).
TASS (2013) Valery Gazzaev: Before Negotiations with UEFA Representatives, it is Necessary
to Meet with the Leadership of the RFU and FFU. Available at: https://tass.ru/arhiv
/739659? (Accessed: 17 June 2022).
Trushin, E. (2012) Miller Launched the Gazprom League. Available at: https://www.gazeta
.ru/sport/2012/11/24/a_4866925.shtml?updated (Accessed: 22 May 2022).
Upbin, B. (2011) Dmitry Medvedev’s Davos Keynote: Complete Transcript. Available at:
https://www.forbes.com/sites/bruceupbin/2011/01/26/dmitri-medvedevs-davos
-keynote-complete-transcript/ (Accessed: 22 May 2022).
Yangoly (2022) Sport Angels – Requiem for the Ukrainian Athletes Died. Available at: https://
yangoly-sportu.teamukraine.com.ua/en/ (Accessed: 21 September 2022).
PART II

China
8
THE INTERNATIONAL PARALYMPIC
COMMITTEE, BEIJING 2022 WINTER
PARALYMPIC GAMES, AND
THE INVASION OF UKRAINE
Verity Postlethwaite

Introduction
The 2nd and 3rd of March 2022 became pivotal 48 hours for the International
Paralympic Committee and elite disability sport, in what is now, given the Russian
invasion of Ukraine, a new era of global sport governance. The timing, and focus
of this chapter, is to consider the immediate run-up to the Beijing 2022 Winter
Paralympic Games and how the International Paralympic Committee (IPC)
handled the situation of Russia invading Ukraine. Notably, the indecision, deci-
sions, and backtracking by the IPC in relation to the inclusion/ability of the
Russian and Belarusian Paralympic teams to compete. Following the descrip-
tion of the decision-making timeline, this chapter will outline three views. The
viewpoints will show diferent ways to interpret the IPC’s handling of this situ-
ation. The frst view will be from international media’s coverage, the second
response from the athletes and National Paralympic Committees, and, fnally,
the Beijing Organizing Committee’s (lack of ) response. Through description
and interpretation this chapter will highlight how the initial invasion period of
the war in Ukraine shaped the governance of elite disability sport and the role
that diferent voices played in the diplomatic aspects of this situation. To ground
this piece, the frst subsection will identify key debates surrounding the area and
conceptualization of para-sport, global sport governance, and diplomacy.

Building on Para-Sport and Global Sport Governance

The modern era of hosting international sports events is often described and
analysed in academic and media debate through the dominant prism of the
International Olympic Committee (IOC) and the Summer Olympic Games
(Postlethwaite et al., 2022). With the growth in status, credibility, and power

DOI: 10.4324/9781003348238-10
68 Verity Postlethwaite

the Olympic Movement has buoyed other events along with it. Most notably
for this piece is the growth in visibility and status of the Paralympic Games.
First hosted in Stoke Mandeville, England, in the late 1940s the Games origi-
nated in interventions by medical doctors after World War II when a signifcant
number of injured soldiers returned from war and approaches to rehabilitating
injuries, especially spinal cord injuries, improved (Brittain, 2016). The frst of-
cial Paralympic Games was hosted by Rome in 1960, and since then there have
been over six decades of event growth, increase in visibility, and tension around
hosting and governing the event (Brittain, 2016; Gold and Gold, 2017; Brittain
and Beacom, 2018; Kerr, 2018). The academic and public debate around the
Paralympic Games is (thankfully) growing in depth and nuance, as its universal
quest to promote equality through sport continues to gain traction in pock-
ets of the global community. Interestingly, for example, the Sochi 2014 Winter
Paralympic Games were heralded as a great success, with the beginning of the
IPC Excellent Program where the organizing committee exchanges knowledge
with previous and prospective hosts (Park and Ok, 2018).
The focus of this chapter is the governance of the Paralympic Games; unlike its
counterpart, the IOC, the IPC does not have an equivalent Olympism or Olympic
Charter philosophy enshrined at the heart of its organization (Chatziefstathiou
and Henry, 2012; Postlethwaite and Grix, 2016), nor does it have a multibillion-
dollar income stream to leverage its infuence on states (Roche, 2017). Instead,
it functions as a more traditional non-governmental international organization
(see Allison and Tomlinson, 2017; Gerard et al., 2019). In the most recent dec-
ades, the IPC has made a conscious efort to formalize its own governance and
strengthen ties with the IOC; for example, as Gold and Gold (2017) trace, there
were formal agreements in the early 2000s to better integrate (but keep dis-
tinct) the Olympic and Paralympic Game bidding and organizing processes. In
2018 the IPC celebrated the long-term agreement with the IOC going through
to 2032 (IPC, 2018); then in 2021 the IPC General Assembly approved the new
IPC Constitution (IPC, 2021) and continues to maintain that “at the IPC we
are very frm believers that sport and politics should not mix” (Houston, 2022).
Consequently, 2022 and the Beijing Paralympic Games were very important for
the leaders of the IPC as they were the frst iteration of Games in the new cycle of
the Constitution and after the signifcantly impacted Tokyo Summer Paralympic
Games due to the COVID-19 global pandemic. Moreover, contrary to their
fundamental principles, sport and politics defnitely did mix!

The Decision-Making Timeline Regarding

the Russian Paralympic Committee and the
National Paralympic Committee Belarus
The Beijing 2022 Paralympic Games, therefore, should have been an oppor-
tunity for the IPC to strengthen its strategic and operational objectives in this
new cycle of its Constitution and growing interconnection with the IOC. Alas,
 The International Paralympic Committee, Beijing 2022 Winter 69

the geopolitical incident involving actions from Russia and President Vladimir
Putin and the invasion of Ukraine in February 2022, days after the end of the
Beijing 2022 Winter Olympic Games and days before the opening ceremony of
the Paralympic Games, caused the IPC to consider and take immediate action to
uphold the safety and integrity of their event. The handling of this situation will
be described briefy in Table 8.1 and then expanded on in the next subsections.

Interpreting the “Handling” of the Situation by

the International Paralympic Committee
The description presented in Table 8.1 outlines the truly extraordinary circum-
stances the IPC found themselves in; in particular they were unable to wait for
the IOC’s response or follow other trends in International Sports Federations’
decision-making. This solo efort put a signifcant amount of pressure on the
governance, leadership, and global community connected to the IPC and the
Paralympic Games. By considering the diferent viewpoints below, this section
will highlight how the initial invasion period of the war in Ukraine shaped
the governance of elite disability sport and the role that diferent voices played
in the diplomatic aspects of this situation. Based on the discussion, it should
be clear that, moving forward, the international media, Paralympic athletes,
National Paralympic Committees, and the event’s organizing committee need
to be consulted by the IPC when making signifcant decisions around extraordi-
nary political decisions and the hosting of the Games. This broader consultation
is necessary as the IPC’s attempt to follow protocol and act through the IPC’s
Board and formal governance processes did not lead to a successful or agreed
outcome.

International Media Response

The pace at which the Russian invasion of Ukraine escalated was incred-
ibly quick; the international media therefore looked for interconnected events
to report on and create content for the omnipresent “breaking news”. The

TABLE 8.1 Signifcant moments around the Paralympics and Russian invasion of Ukraine

Date Signifcance

Thursday, 24th February Russian invasion of Ukraine

2022
Wednesday, 2nd March A/RES/ES-11/1 UN General Assembly Resolution,
2022 aggression against Ukraine
Wednesday, 2nd March Press release from IPC to allow for Russia and Belarus
2022 to compete
Thursday, 3rd March 2022 IPC news conference to “U-turn” and not allow
Russia or Belarus to be present
Friday, 4th March 2022 Start of the Beijing Winter Paralympic Games
70 Verity Postlethwaite

high-profle and global nature of the Paralympic Games made it a useful conduit
for the media to mirror the relations and reactions in the geopolitical settings
through sport. The prospect of Russian and Belarusian teams “mixing” with
other nations was a compelling narrative to report on. As a result, the IPC was
under incredible scrutiny over its real-time reactions and decisions. It can be
observed in the media coverage on the 2nd and 3rd March 2022 that a number of
prominent politicians, ex-elite athletes, sponsors, etc. gave named quotes to the
international media outlets on what the IPC was doing. For example, Sky News
in the United Kingdom had an immediate quote on Thursday, 3rd March, from
the Secretary of State for Digital, Culture, Media, and Sport, Nadine Dorries,
and British Paralympic Association, who directly stated the IPC’s decision was
“wrong … urgently reconsider … disappointed” (Sale, 2022).
This commentary from non-sport and sporting political voices on the IPC
matter is not the norm, as seen in 2015/16 when the Russian doping scandal was
reported on around the Rio de Janeiro Summer Olympic and Paralympic Games
it was the IOC voice and the Olympic Games in focus in the media. Moreover,
the quotes and reporting in 2015/16 were more tempered and delayed as the
situation did not directly connect to a geopolitical fallout. For example, Reuters
and the Japan Times focus on the IOC and the role of the World Anti-Doping
Agency and IOC President Thomas Bach (Grohmann, 2016; Odeven, 2016).
The content of this controversy was covered by the media in a more considered
manner as the sport governing body is seen in the traditional narrative of being
“toothless” and not taking a stand. Whereas, in 2022, the IPC was limited in
its options as it became embroiled in the broader geopolitical debate and people
expected the IPC to take a harsh stance, similar to that of the United Nations
and other international bodies.
It can be argued that the IPC underestimated the amount and intensity of
media attention and content they would receive around their decisions. Further
to this, they did not appear to consult or manage the public relations aspects of
their announcements, which can be illustrated by the dissenting quotes from a
number of, ordinarily, supportive voices for the IPC and Paralympic Games. The
media narrative and headlines of “IPC U-turn” and the quotes from other voices
did not strengthen the standing and credibility of the IPC; instead, they arguably
became a political chess piece for the media and others to use to illustrate and
sensationalize the impact of Russia’s actions in Ukraine (Sale, 2022; Houston,
2022).

Paralympic Athletes and Committee’s Response

The “U-turn” made by the IPC was infuenced most signifcantly by their mem-
bership, i.e., the athletes and the National Paralympic Committees. As described
so far, the IPC’s decision-making initially was informed by their top-down gov-
ernance, allowing the Board to negotiate the frst decision to allow the Russian
and Belarusian athletes to compete. The Board is made up of 14 individuals, 12
 The International Paralympic Committee, Beijing 2022 Winter 71

of whom are elected by the IPC membership every four years at the IPC General
Assembly. The two other members are the Chairperson of the IPC Athletes’
Council and the IPC Chief Executive Ofcer. This Board make-up represents
the IPC’s sponsors/benefactors and its 206 member organizations. In sports gov-
ernance theory, this Board should have found a consensus and way forward that
was representative of the IPC community and more importantly supported by
the wider membership (Allison and Tomlinson, 2017; Gérard et al., 2019).
Unfortunately, this was not the case, and the initial handling by the IPC was
not welcomed or received well by its members. This case is reminiscent of the
international sports events during the Cold War and the South African Apartheid
era when international sport grappled with threats and enactment of boycotts
as a way to use the event to protest on political topics symbolically and actually
(Dichter and Johns, 2014). A key issue for the IPC, and they explicitly note this
in their press release on 2 March 2022, is that they did not have the precedent
or mandate to “suspend or termination of a National Paralympic Committee”
on the grounds of breaching the Olympic Truce (IPC, 2022). This issue returns
to the relative infancy of the Paralympic movement in comparison to the IOC
and Olympic Games. The IOC has an enshrined and heralded Olympic Truce
mandate where war does not interfere with the ability for communities to come
together and participate in sporting competition; further to this the IOC has vast
experiences and learnings from weathering two world wars, the Cold War, and
other heinous political issues since their modern inception in 1896.
The point here, therefore, is less about the error in judgement of the IPC’s
frst decision, but more so it underlines that although the IPC has grown in
governance stature and infuence in the past decade or so, this is still in relative
infancy in comparison to other more established sports organizations and com-
petitions, such as the IOC, Commonwealth Games Federation, or the Fédération
Internationale de Football Association. The IPC does have a strong Handbook,
governance system, and newly accepted Constitution, but this does not neces-
sarily compensate for a relative lack of experience in dealing with incredibly
complex geopolitical issues, such as Russia’s invasion of Ukraine. The IPC will
recover from this and act around enshrining the principles and punishments con-
nected to the Olympic Truce. The next IPC General Assembly will be a fascinat-
ing event, in particular, to see what members take the lead and responsibility for
refecting on this incident and improving the organization further.

Organizing Committee’s (Lack of) Response

The fnal component to raise in this piece is around the un/fortunate role of the
Beijing Olympic and Paralympic Games Organizing Committee (BOCOG). A
growing raft of literature demonstrates the signifcance and potential autonomy
of the organizing committee (see Parent, 2008; Gauthier, 2011) in the hosting
of international sport events, where they can balance the power of the state and
the International Sports Federation to create a successful event. In this case, the
72 Verity Postlethwaite

role of BOCOG is extraordinary as the Chinese Government did not give them
autonomy or the ability to act in any other interest than unilaterally and politi-
cally for China. Keys (2018) has written extensively about the political relation-
ship between event hosting and China. Although beyond the scope of this piece
to account for this in its entirety, it does raise an important point in relation to
the IPC’s decision-making and its lack of support in decision-making from the
organizing committee.
It could be expected that if the Winter Paralympic Games in 2022 had been
hosted by a diferent country, such as Canada, South Korea, and Italy (all recent
previous or next hosts), then the organizing committee could have acted as an
ally for the IPC. Although it is not the organizing committee that can take deci-
sive action, it has the ability to negotiate and communicate with national govern-
ments, the athlete’s village, the accredited press core, etc. to manage the situation.
Given China’s geopolitical positioning in the world and its – neutrality to argu-
ably enabling – position for Russia, the IPC could not rely or use the BOCOG
position to ease the pressure on them to decide and communicate the decision.
There is much debate around the role of the hosting nation and their local/
national governments in infuencing the political nature of the sporting event
(see Postlethwaite et al. 2022 for a review on sports diplomacy and other pieces
in this edited collection for more on sports diplomacy). Ironically, in this case it
is arguably the lack of role and willingness to be involved in decision-making
that hindered the IPC’s options and access to allies in the quest to take the most
accepted course of action around allowing Russia and Belarus teams to compete.
In the coming bid cycles for the Olympic and Paralympic Games, it will
be incredibly interesting to see how this incident and the dynamic between
BOCOG and the IPC may infuence the IPC’s guidance (formally/informally)
around how an organizing committee should behave during a geopolitical cri-
sis. In particular stretching or revising the governing principles around their
“commitment to political neutrality and impartiality” (IPC, 2022). If the IPC
is to learn from what happened in March 2022 it is the need for allies and a split
decision-making platform, notably here the backing of the host nation’s govern-
ment and/or the organizing committee.

Conclusion – Whose Responsibility Is It Anyway?

The origins of the IPC and the Paralympic Games lie in the teeth of war, as World
War II infuenced the creation and growth of the sporting movement. Alas, it is
another war and geopolitical incident in 2022 that has set the momentum of the
organization and movement back. The perceived and framed “U-turn” decision
on 3rd March 2022, the dissenting voices on the handling of the incident, the
lack of allies, and the international press scrutiny all serve to demonstrate the
(mis)shaping of governance of elite disability sport and the role that diferent
voices played in the diplomatic aspects of this situation.
 The International Paralympic Committee, Beijing 2022 Winter 73

Moving forward, the IPC must answer and refect on the question – whose
responsibility is it anyway? This question will challenge the IPC’s Handbook,
Constitution, i.e., formalized governance and diplomatic processes they culti-
vated, against the voices and political opinions of its members and wider com-
mentators, i.e., the informal aspects of governing and diplomatic afairs. The
frst decision by the IPC took the formal governance and the “by the book”
diplomatic approach, yet it had to retreat to a more informal and uncodifed
reaction when there was pressure on it to act in a political, rather than a logical,
way. Refections on the handling of this situation will be needed in the com-
ing years as the IPC (and other sporting bodies and events) will face questions
around reintroducing Russia and Belarus athletes and/or teams. Plus, as other
sport organizations have done in the past (mostly the IOC), a developed under-
standing of who their allies are in international sport and international politics.

References
Allison, L. and Tomlinson, A. (2017) Understanding International Sport Organisations:
Principles, Power and Possibilities. Abingdon: Routledge.
Brittain, I. (2016) The Paralympic Games Explained. 2nd edn. Abingdon: Routledge.
Brittain, I. and Beacom, A. (eds.) (2018) The Palgrave Handbook of Paralympic Studies.
Basingstoke: Palgrave Macmillan.
Chatziefstathiou, D. and Henry, I. (2012) Discourses of Olympism: From the Sorbonne 1894
to London 2012. Basingstoke: Palgrave Macmillan.
Dichter, H.L. and Johns, A.L. (eds.) (2014) Diplomatic Games: Sport, Statecraft, and
International Relations since 1945. Lexington, Kentucky: University Press of Kentucky.
Gauthier, R. (2011) International sporting event bid processes, and how they can be
improved. The International Sports Law Journal, 3(1–2), pp. 3–15.
Gérard, S., Legg, D. and Zintz, T. (2019) The governance of the paralympic movement:
An institutional perspective. In Research Handbook on Sport Governance. Cheltenham,
UK: Edward Elgar Publishing.
Gold, J.R. and Gold, M.M. (2017) The paralympic games. In Gold, J.R. and Gold, M.M.
(eds.), Olympic Cities: City Agendas, Planning and the World’s Games, 1896–2020. 3rd
edn. Abingdon: Routledge, pp. 114–137.
Grohmann, K. (2016) Russia escapes IOC blanket ban for Rio Olympics. Reuters, 24th
July 2016. Available at: https://www.reuters.com/article/us-sport-doping-russia
-idUSKCN1040N7 (Accessed 30th June 2016).
Houston, M. (2022) Paralympic athletes from Russia and Belarus banned from competing
at Beijing 2022 after IPC U-turn. Inside the Games, 3rd March 2022. Available at:
https://www.insidethegames.biz/articles/1119989/russia-belarus (Accessed 24th
April 2022).
International Paralympic Committee (2018) IOC and IPC to partner until 2032.
Available at: https://www.paralympic.org/news/ioc-and-ipc-partner-until-2032
(Accessed 30 August 2018).
International Paralympic Committee (2021) IPC members approve new constitution
at General Assembly. Available at: https://www.paralympic.org/news/ipc-members
-approve-new-constitution-general-assembly (Accessed 30 January 2022).
74 Verity Postlethwaite

International Paralympic Committee (2022) IPC makes decision regarding RPC and
NPC Belarus. Available at: https://www.paralympic.org/press-release/ipc-makes
-decisions-regarding-rpc-and-npc-belarus (Accessed 5th March 2022).
Kerr, S. (2018) The London 2012 paralympic games. In Brittain, I. and Beacom, A.
(eds.), The Palgrave Handbook of Paralympic Studies. London: Palgrave Macmillan, pp.
481–505.
Keys, B. (2018) Harnessing human rights to the Olympic games: Human rights watch and
the 1993 ‘stop Beijing’ campaign. Journal of Contemporary History, 53(2), pp. 415–438.
Odeven, E. (2016) IOC’s decision on Russia a disgrace. Japan Times, 30th July 2016.
Available at: https://www.japantimes.co.jp/sports/2016/07/30/general/iocs-decision
-russia-disgrace/ (Accessed 30th August 2016).
Parent, M.M. (2008) Evolution and issue patterns for major-sport-event organizing
committees and their stakeholders. Journal of Sport Management, 22(2), pp. 135–164.
Park, K. and Ok, G. (2018) 2018 PyeongChang paralympic games and the South Korean
political intention. In Brittain, I. and Beacom, A. (eds.), The Palgrave Handbook of
Paralympic Studies. London: Palgrave Macmillan, pp. 555–77, at 574.
Postlethwaite, V. and Grix, J. (2016) Beyond the acronyms: Sport diplomacy and the
classifcation of the International Olympic Committee. Diplomacy & Statecraft, 27(2),
pp. 295–313.
Postlethwaite, V., Jenkin, C., and Sherry, E. (2022) A gendered focused review of sports
diplomacy. In Molnár, G. and Bullingham, R. (eds.), The Routledge Handbook of Gender
Politics in Sport and Physical Activity. Abingdon: Routledge, pp. 137–148.
Postlethwaite, V., Jenkin, C. and Sherry, E. (2022) Sport diplomacy: An integrative
review. Sport Management Review, online frst, pp. 1–22.
Roche, M. (2017) Mega-Events and Social Change: Spectacle, Legacy and Public Culture.
Oxford: Oxford University Press.
Sale, Ian (2022) Ukraine invasion: Russian and Belarusian athletes to compete as neutrals
at Winter Paralympics. Sky News, 2nd March 2022. Available at: https://news.sky.com
/story/ukraine-invasion-russian-and-belarusian-athletes-to-compete-as-neutrals-at
-paralympics-12555512 (Accessed 7 March 2022).
9
ISRAEL’S WINTER SPORTS
DIPLOMACY AND BEIJING 2022
Yoav Dubinsky

Introduction
The Israeli–Arab dispute often overshadowed Israel’s participation in interna-
tional sports, resulting in boycotts, exclusions, protests, competitions cancelled,
postponed, or moved abroad, and even terrorism (Dubinsky, 2021). The cen-
trality of the confict manifested as well through the Olympic Movement with
boycotts or athletes withdrawing when drawn to compete against Israelis, pro-
tests against Israel and calls for exclusion, and of course the Munich Massacre
– the terror attack by Palestinians kidnapping and murdering 11 Israel athletes,
coaches, and referees during the 1972 Munich Olympic Games (Dubinsky, 2021;
Dubinsky and Dzikus, 2021). The massacre and its commemorations are part of
the socialization process of Israeli Olympic athletes (Dubinsky and Dzikus, 2019).
Yet, when it comes to winter sports, the narrative about Israel’s participation is a
diferent one. As seen in Table 9.1, Israeli athletes have been participating in the
Winter Olympic Games since Lillehammer 1994 (National Olympic Committee
of Israel, n.d.(, including six in the Beijing 2022 Winter Olympic Games (National
Olympic Committee of Israel, 2022). Additionally, in Beijing 2022, an Israeli
athlete competed in the Winter Paralympic Games for the frst time (Burke,
2022). This chapter discusses Israel’s use of winter sports for nation branding and
public diplomacy purposes through Beijing 2022. The chapter uses Fan’s (2010)
nation branding framework, including political branding through public diplo-
macy lenses, cultural branding through national identity lenses, export branding
through country-of-origin and product-country-image lenses, and place brand-
ing through tourism-destination-image lenses. Despite not being a winter sports
country and not winning any medals in the Winter Olympic Games as of Beijing
2022, Israel sees value in participation. Participating in the Winter Olympics
portrays Israel outside a polarizing armed dispute, telling a story about Jewish
immigration and the possibilities of building bridges between East and West.
DOI: 10.4324/9781003348238-11
76 Yoav Dubinsky

TABLE 9.1 Israel at the Winter Olympic and Paralympic Gamesa

Winter Olympic Number of Athletes Sports Notable Landmarks

and Paralympic
Games

Lillehammer 1 Figure skating First participation (Michael

1994 Shmerkin, fgure skating)
Nagano 1998 3 Figure skating First pair competition
(Galit Chait and Sergei
Sakhnovski, ice dancing)
Salt Lake City 5 Figure Best achievement on ice
2002 skating, (6th place Chait and
Speed Sakhnovski)
skating
Turin 2006 5 Figure First snow-event
skating, participation (Mikahil
Alpine ski Renzhin, men’s slalom
and men’s giant slalom)
Vancouver 2010 3 Figure Israeli siblings Roman and
skating, Alexandra Zaretsky stake
Alpine ski to the music of Schindler’s
List as a tribute to family
members killed in the
Holocaust
Sochi 2014 5 Figure Held memorial service
skating, commemorating the
Alpine Munich Victims with the
ski, Speed Jewish Community
skating
PyeongChang 10 Figure Largest Israeli delegation,
2018 skating, frst team competition
Alpine (fgure skating)
ski, Speed
skating,
Skeleton
Beijing 2022 7 (6 Olympic, Figure First participation in the
1 Paralympic) skating, Winter Paralympic Games
Alpine (Sheina Vaspie, Para-
ski, Speed alpine ski)
skating
a
Data in Table 9.1 and Table 9.2 was taken from ofcially published information by the National
Olympic Committee of Israel, the International Olympic Committee, or media coverage refer-
enced in this chapter. See the references list for the sources.
 Israel’s Winter Sports Diplomacy and Beijing 2022 77

Political Branding
Political branding (Fan, 2010) pertains to public diplomacy – communication
with foreign publics to try and achieve a more favourable image that will serve
foreign policy goals (Cull, 2010). Because of the long history of boycotts, exclu-
sions, and protests against Israel, for Israel, participating in international sports
events and marching in the opening ceremony with the Israeli fag has a normal-
izing signifcance of being acknowledged as a legitimate country among others
(Dubinsky, 2021). With that said, the ongoing criticism and calls for boycott-
ing the Olympics in China due to human rights violations and sports-washing
(Chadwick, 2022; Dubinsky, 2022b) challenge Israel’s positionality in Beijing
2022. Amid the silent boycotts Israeli athletes face and a history of exclusions
and political interferences, Israeli sports has a policy of competing against any-
one regardless of political diferences, trying to both create a practical path to
compete in international sports and normatively position itself as inclusive and
non-discriminative (Dubinsky, 2021). Joining the US-led Moscow 1980 boy-
cott was an exception (Dubinsky, 2021). When questioned about the diplomatic
boycotts against China, the National Olympic Committee of Israel reafrmed its
policy of focusing on the athletic competitions and leaving international politics
to other actors (Somfavli & Ayad, 2022). This policy might not be aligned with
the growing waves of athletes’ activism and their demand for more freedom
of speech, especially as athletes use their platform to support Palestinian causes
(Dart, 2022) and the International Olympic Committee allowing some forms of
protests during the Olympic Games (International Olympic Committee, 2021).
Yet, focusing on the Israeli–Arab dispute will not do justice with the Israeli
winter delegations to Beijing. The majority of athletes who represented Israel
since 1994 in the Winter Games were not born in Israel and lived and trained
in diferent countries. So, the impacts of boycotts, or even the collective trauma
of the Munich Massacre, are less central in their socialization process. Israel’s
winter sports traditions have mostly been shaped by Jewish athletes, coaches,
and administrators who immigrated from Eastern Europe and by the support
of the North American Jewish community. Due to the lack of elite-level facili-
ties in Israel, the country’s top fgure skaters train and develop in New Jersey,
under national coach and Israeli-born three-times Olympian Galit Chait and
the guidance of the head of the Israeli Ice Skating Federation (Peled, 2017) –
her father Boris Chait. Boris was born in Moldova, immigrated to Israel in the
1970s, and resides in the United States, where he develops Israeli fgure skating
along with his wife and daughter (Peled, 2017; Rakovsky, 2022). There are few
ice-skating rinks in Israel that meet international regulations, including Canada
Centre in the northern city of Metula – which was built thanks to contribu-
tions and donations from the Canadian Jewish community (Canada Centre,
n.d.). These internal challenges and melting pots create a unique fusion of East
and West coming together through Israeli winter sports culture. For example,
fgure skater Evgeni Krasnopolski was born in Kyiv in 1988 when Ukraine was
78 Yoav Dubinsky

still under the Soviet Union, immigrated to Israel at the age of three, moved to
train under Chait in New Jersey when he was 20, and competed with 3 difer-
ent American Jewish female partners in Sochi 2014, PyeongChang 2018, and
Beijing 2022 (National Olympic Committee of Israel, n.d.; Talshir, 2014). So, in
the case of Beijing 2022, with Western countries applying diplomatic boycotts
against China, and Russia invading Ukraine during the Paralympic Games and
violating the Olympic Truce (Dubinsky, 2022b; IOC News, 2022), such a fusion
between Eastern Europe and North America with Middle Eastern favour is the
unique diplomatic value proposition Israel ofers to the Winter Olympic Games.

Cultural Branding
From the sociological lens of nation branding, Fan (2010) uses cultural branding
to refer to national identity. The social identity theory argues that individu-
als see themselves as part of a collective, adopting social characteristics of their
collective social groups (David and Bar-Tal, 2009). Nation identity is a specifc
case of a collective identity, in which the identity is also constructed by nation-
ality, shared history, culture, symbols, religions, etc. Israel’s participation in the
Winter Olympic Games is unique, as it portrays a diferent narrative about Israeli
identity and Judaism. As seen in Table 9.2, out of the seven athletes who repre-
sented Israeli in Beijing 2022, only Winter Paralympian Sheina Vaspi was born
in Israel, while all the Winter Olympians were born elsewhere.
Jewish athletes who immigrated to Israel at a young age or were naturalized
as teenagers or adults received Israeli citizenship through the Law of Return – an
Israeli law enabling every Jewish person to receive Israeli citizenship and to make
Aliyah (immigrate to Israel) and return to their Jewish Homeland (Dubinsky
and Dzikus, 2019). While it is not uncommon that countries naturalize athletes
to represent them in the Olympics (Brownell, 2022), in the case of Israel the
naturalization process is tied to the country’s identity and to diplomatic goals to
connect between the State of Israel and the Jewish Diaspora. Although the win-
ter delegations do not go through the same socialization process as the summer
ones around the commemoration of the Munich Victims (Dubinsky and Dzikus,
2019), in Sochi 2014 the delegation held a memorial service with members of
the local Jewish community and IOC representatives (Aharoni, 2014). This also
shows the signifcance of connecting the delegation and the Jewish Diaspora,
with the Israeli diplomatic narratives. Yet, overplaying the signifcance of Israel
in the Winter Olympics and over-naturalizing also leads to domestic backlash.
Before PyeongChang 2018, when Israel sent a full fgure skating team, sports
administrators took pride in being among the best in the world, which was
received with criticism and even cynicism by Israeli media as most athletes were
not born in Israel and train abroad (Peleg, 2017).
There is no one template for who represents Israel and why. Krasnopolski and
speed skater Vladyslav Bykanov made Aliyah as children in the early 1990s from
Ukraine after the collapse of the Soviet Union, grew up in Israel, speak Hebrew,
 Israel’s Winter Sports Diplomacy and Beijing 2022 79

TABLE 9.2 Israeli Athletes in the Beijing 2022 Winter Olympic and Paralympic Games

Athlete Year/Place of Sport Comments

Birth

Barnabas Szollos 1998/ Alpine ski 6th place in combined downhill

Budapest, in Beijing 2022 – tied best
Hungary achievement for Israeli athlete
in Winter Olympics. Trains in
Austria.
Noa Szollos 2003/ Alpine ski Won silver and bronze medals in
Budapest, the Lausanne Winter Youth
Hungary Olympic Games – the frst
Israeli medals in any Olympic
winter competition. Trains in
Austria.
Alexei Bychenko 1988/Kyiv, Figure Represented the Ukraine until
Ukrainian skating 2009. Represented Israel in
SSR three Winter Olympics. Trains
in New Jersey.
Hailey Kops 2002/New Figure First Orthodox Jew to represent
York City, skating Israel in the Winter Olympics.
NY, USA Studied in a Jewish seminary
in Jerusalem. Trains in New
Jersey.
Evgeni 1988/Kyiv, Figure Made Aliyah at the age of 3.
Krasnopolski Ukrainian Skating Served in the Israeli military.
SSR Represented Israel in three
Winter Olympics. Trains in
New Jersey.
Vladislav 1989/Lviv, Speed Made Aliyah in 1994, grew up in
Bykanov Ukrainian skating Israel, and served in the army.
SSR Represented Israel in three
Winter Olympics. Trains in the
Netherlands.
Sheina Vaspi 2002/Yesud Para-alpine First Israeli to compete in
HaMa’ala, ski the Winter Paralympic
Israel Games. Born to a Hasidic
family. Withdrew from
one competition in Beijing
2022 because of Shabbat.
Trains in Colorado.

and served in the Israeli army (Deuel, 2015; Talshir, 2014). Alexei Bychenko rep-
resented Ukraine until 2009 before receiving Israeli citizenship in 2010 (Burack,
2022). All three represented Israel in Sochi 2014, PyeongChang 2018, and
Beijing 20222. Alpine skiers Barnabas Szollos and his younger sister Noa Szollos
moved to represent Israel after the family had disputes with the Hungarian Ski
Federation (Aharoni, 2020). Both siblings made an impact on Israeli winter
80 Yoav Dubinsky

sports: Noa winning silver and bronze medals in the Lausanne 2020 Winter
Youth Paralympic Games before making her senior’s Winter Olympic debut in
China, and Barnabas fnishing in the sixth place in the combined downhill ski
competition in Beijing 2022 – equalling the best place of an Israeli athlete in the
Winter Olympic Games (National Olympic Committee of Israel, n.d.).
Beijing 2022 also showed some of the diferent complexities in diferent
streams of Judaism. Hailey Kops became the frst Orthodox Jew to compete
in the Winter Olympics (Burack, 2022). Kops classifes herself as a “modern
Orthodox Jew” (Rakovsky, 2022) when explaining how she balances religious
traditions and the demands of her sport that requires physical contact with her
male partner Krasnopolski, wearing what in Orthodox eyes might be considered
a revealing outft, and at times competing on Shabbat. Israeli-born Para-alpine
skier Sheina Vaspi became the country’s frst athlete to compete in the Winter
Paralympic Games, fnishing 15th in the giant slalom (Burke, 2022). Vaspi, com-
ing from a Hasidic family, competes wearing a skirt out of modesty and does not
ski on Shabbat. In Beijing 2022 she had to withdraw from the women’s slalom
event for religious reasons after it was rescheduled to Saturday due to the weather
conditions (Burke, 2022). Israel has a rich history in the Paralympic Games,
going back to the strong connection with the Jewish founder of the Movement,
Dr Ludwig Guttman, hosting the Games in Tel-Aviv in 1968, and developing
innovative rehabilitation centres for soldiers (Dubinsky, 2021). Thus, Israel’s par-
ticipation in Beijing 2022 also manifests nuances and complexities in Jewish and
Israeli identities with diplomatic implications.

Export Branding and Place Branding

From business management and marketing lenses, nation branding is often ana-
lyzed through two facets: (a) export branding as a product-based approach also
referred to as country-of-origin or product-country-image and (b) place brand-
ing as a tourism-based approach which is also referred to as tourism-destina-
tion-image (Fan, 2010). In the product-based approach, Israel has been trying
to rebrand itself as a start-up nation, creating a bypassing message to the Israeli–
Arab dispute by emphasizing its developed technology and history, and cul-
ture of adaptation and innovation. Dubinsky (2022a) uses the term “sport-tech
diplomacy” to refer to the growing sport-tech ecosystem in Israel, to align such
branding attempts with diplomatic goals. In winter sports, Intelligym patented
technologies that were used in Israeli Air Force simulators and applied them
to neuroscience technologies to improve athletes’ cognitive skills, especially
in soccer and ice hockey, working with some of the most prestigious leagues
and federations, including USA Hockey and Hockey Canada (Intelligym, n.d.).
One example regarding the Olympics was with Replay Technologies which
developed multidimensional video recording and was purchased by Worldwide
Olympic Partner Intel who enjoys category exclusivity in 3D, virtual reality, and
other forms of innovative broadcasting (Gilead, 2021; International Olympic
 Israel’s Winter Sports Diplomacy and Beijing 2022 81

Committee, 2021). Yet, in August 2021, a few days after the closing ceremony of
Tokyo 2020, Intel announced they were removing its video sports technologies
from its portfolio (Gilead, 2021). Regarding the 2022 Winter Olympics, Israeli-
founded live streaming company LiveU took pride in supporting the broadcast-
ing of the Games from Beijing 2008 to Beijing 2022 (Wasserman, n.d.).
From a place branding and a tourism-based approach (Fan, 2010), the brand-
ing of Israel is limited as athletes train and compete abroad, the country lacks
the infrastructure to host signifcant internationally attractive competitions that
will draw tourists and media, and have very few snow-days to become a tour-
ism venue for winter sports enthusiasts. There was some use of winter sports
through ice hockey in the Maccabiah Games – the quadrennial international
multi-sport event for Jewish people that is nation branding and public diplomacy
oriented (Dubinsky, 2021). Israel also does not have Olympic Houses (Dubinsky,
2021) – rented venues in the host city where countries hold events for diferent
stakeholders and also expose their music, food, culture, and products (Dubinsky,
2021). Yet, due to the strict COVID-19 measures in Beijing, this was not a real-
istic possibility anyway. About Israeli music, Israeli rhythmic gymnasts often use
Israeli and Hebrew songs in their routines in the Olympics, which can also be
done in fgure skating, yet that was not the case in Beijing 2022. In past Winter
Olympics, some Israeli skaters competed to music with historical and cultural
heritage, such as the soundtrack of Schindler’s List as a tribute to family members
murdered in the Holocaust and to the signifcance of Yom HaShoah – the annual
Holocaust Memorial Day in Israel, or to the much happier and upbeat Jewish
folk song “Hava Nagila” (Krieger, 2010; Olympics, 2019). So, from business
lens, despite not being a winter sports country, Israeli technology continued to
add some authenticity to the country’s sport-tech diplomacy and the country’s
start-up nation branding around Beijing 2022, but from a tourism-destination
approach, cultural diplomacy attempts were missing.

Conclusion
Israel’s participation in the Winter Olympic Games, including in Beijing 2022,
tells a diferent story about the country, not embodied in the Israeli–Arab dis-
pute, terrorism, occupation, or accusation of Apartheid policies. Implications
of the Israeli–Palestinian confict or even the branding attempts of Israel as a
start-up nation through sport-tech diplomacy are marginal. Israel’s participa-
tion in Beijing 2022 pertains mostly to the identity and complexities of Israel
as a self-defned Jewish state and homeland for Jewish people. Through this
melting pot, there are diplomatic implications such as manifesting a fusion of
East and West into politically charged Games and navigating diferent streams,
branches, and traditions of Jewish identities. Yet, Beijing 2022 also confronted
Israel with the question of diplomatic boycotts against a sports-washing country
amid the growing support for athletes’ activism (Chadwick, 2022; Dart, 2022;
Dubinsky, 2022b). Despite continuing the tradition of participating in each
82 Yoav Dubinsky

Winter Olympics since 1994 and making its Winter Paralympic Games debut,
with zero medals won, Israel is not one of the most recognized winter sports
countries. In fact, from broader international relations lenses, Israel’s participa-
tion in Beijing 2022 might not be much diferent than dozens of other countries
who marched in the ceremonies, competed peacefully, and returned safely with-
out major achievements or incidents. In the politically charged climate and under
the restrictive conditions of Beijing 2022, normalization is a favourable outcome
for Israel’s nation branding and public diplomacy.

References
Aharoni, O. (February 2, 2014). Sochi: A memorial service was held for the Munich
Victims. Ynet. Retrieved from https://www.ynet.co.il/articles/0,7340,L-4486319,00
.html [Hebrew].
Aharoni, O. ( January 12, 2020). Blue white: On Israel’s most surprising achievement
ever. Ynet. Retrieved from https://www.ynet.co.il/articles/0,7340,L-5658010,00
.html [Hebrew].
Brownell, S. (March 25, 2022). Citizenship swapping at the Beijing 2022 Winter
Olympics. Georgetown Journal of International Afaris. Retrieved from https://gjia
.georgetown.edu/2022/03/25/citizenship-swapping-at-the-beijing-2022-winter
-olympics%EF%BF%BC/.
Burack, E., JTA. (February 3, 2022). Skating to the sounds of “Schindler’s List”: The
Jewish athletes in the Winter Olympics. Ynet. Retrieved from https://www.ynet.co.il
/judaism/article/s17i00gfrk [Hebrew].
Burke, P. (March 12, 2022). Vaspi forced to miss slalom at Beijing 2022 after schedule
change cause clash with Shabbat. Inside the Games. Retrieved from https://www
.insidethegames.biz/articles/1120436/vaspi-beijing-2022-slalom.
Canada Center. (n.d.). English. Retrieved from https://www.canada-centre.co.il/html5/
sbs.py?_id=9709&did=1165&G=.
Chadwick, S. (2022). From utilitarianism and neoclassical sport management to a new
geopolitical economy of sport. European Sport Management Quarterly, 1–20. https://doi
.org/10.1080/16184742.2022.2032251.
Cull, N. J. (2010). Public diplomacy: Severn lessons for its future from its past. Place
Branding and Public Diplomacy, 6, 11–17. https://doi.org/10.1057/pb.2010.4.
Dart, J. (2022). From Ferguson to Gaza. Sport, political sensibility, and the Israel/
Palestine confict in the age of Black lives matter. European Journal for Sport and Society,
19(2), 151–169. https://doi.org/10.1080/16138171.2021.1917183.
David, O., & Bar-Tal, D. (2009). A sociopsychological conception of collective identity:
The case of national identity as an example. Personality and Social Psychology Review, 13,
354–379. https://doi.org/10.1177/1088868309344412.
Deuel, E. (March 14, 2015). Ice man: Vladislav Bykanov conquers Europe. Ynet. Retrieved
from https://www.ynet.co.il/articles/0,7340,L-4636737,00.html [Hebrew].
Dubinsky, Y. (2021). From start-up nation to sports-tech nation? A SWOT analysis of
Israel’s use of sports for nation branding. International Journal of Sport Management and
Marketing, 49(1/2), 49–75. https://doi.org/10.1504/IJSMM.2021.114168.
Dubinsky, Y. (2022). Sport-tech diplomacy: Exploring the intersections between the
sport-tech ecosystem, innovation, and diplomacy in Israel. Place Branding & Public
Diplomacy, 18(2), 169–180. https://doi.org/10.1057/s41254-020-00191-2.
 Israel’s Winter Sports Diplomacy and Beijing 2022 83

Dubinsky, Y., & Dzikus, L. (2021). The 1972 Munich Massacre and Israel’s country
image. Journal of Olympic Studies, 2(1), 90–109. https://doi.org/10.5406/jofolympstud
.2.1.0090.
Dubinsky, Y., & Dzikus, L. (2019). Israel’s country image in the 2016 Olympic Games.
Place Branding and Public Diplomacy, 15, 173–184. https://doi.org/10.1057/s41254-018
-0105-y.
Fan, Y. (2010). Branding the nation: Towards a better understanding. Journal of Place
Branding and Public Diplomacy, 6(2), 97–103.
Gilead, A. (August 19, 2021). Intel shuts down Israeli co Replay Technologies. Globes.
Retrieved from https://en.globes.co.il/en/article-intel-shuts-down-israeli-co-replay
-technologies-1001382306
Intelligym. (n.d.). Intelligym. Retrieved from https://www.intelligym.com/.
International Olympic Committee. ( July 2, 2021a). IOC extends opportunities for
athlete expression during the Olympic Games Tokyo 2020. Olympics. Retrieved from
https://olympics.com/ioc/news/ioc-extends-opportunities-for-athlete-expression
-during-the-olympic-games-tokyo-2020.
International Olympic Committee. (2021b). Olympic Marketing Fact File – 2021 Edition.
International Olympic Committee. Retrieved from https://stillmed.olympics.com/
media/Documents/International-Olympic-Committee/IOC -Marketing -And
-Broadcasting/IOC-Marketing-Fact-File-2021.pdf.
IOC News. (February 28, 2022). IOC EB recommends no participation of Russian
and Belarusian athletes and ofcials. International Olympic Committee. Retrieved from
https://olympics.com/ioc/news/ioc-eb-recommends-no-participation-of-russian
-and-belarusian-athletes-and-ofcials.
Krieger, H.L. (February 19, 2010). Zaretsky’s Olympic dance a tribute to their Holocaust
losses. The Jerusalem Post. Retrieved from https://www.jpost.com/sports/zaretskys
-olympic-dance-a-tribute-to-their-holocaust-losses.
National Olympic Committee of Israel. (n.d.). Journey over Time. Retrieved from https://
olympic.localtimeline.com/index.php?lang=he# [Hebrew].
National Olympic Committee of Israel. (2022). Israeli Olympic Delegation Beijing 2022.
Retrieved from https://www.olympicsil.co.il/wp-content/uploads/2022/01/%D7
%97%D7%95%D7%91%D7%A8%D7%AA-%D7%91%D7%99%D7%99%D7%92%D7
%99%D7%A0%D7%92-2022.pdf.
Olympics. (October 24, 2019). Full men's fgure skating short program | PyeongChang
2018 | throwback thursday. YouTube. Retrieved from https://www.youtube.com/
watch?v=WtfxFNBPKUY.
Peled, S. (December 22, 2017). Eskimo kiss: The Israelis who try to bring a medal in
ice skating. News13. Retrieved from https://13news.co.il/item/news/domestic/ntr
-1278947/ [Hebrew].
Peleg, A. (December 21, 2017). Joke of the year/ Peleg on thursday. Ynet. Retrieved from
https://www.ynet.co.il/articles/0,7340,L-5059888,00.html [Hebrew].
Rakovsky, I. (February 17, 2022). The religious skater came to Israel for a year in
the Midrasha. Now she represents it in the Olympics. Haaretz. Retrieved from
https://www.haaretz.co.il/sport/other/2022-02-17/ty-article-magazine/.highlight
/0000017f-e2e9-df 7c-a5f-e2f bde8d0000 [Hebrew].
Somfavli, A., & Ayad, M. (February 2, 2022). Yael Arad: “Olympics under the
coronavirus? It’s no longer fun”. Ynet. Retrieved from https://www.ynet.co.il/sport/
article/hy9jh1acf [Hebrew].
84 Yoav Dubinsky

Talshir, U. (February 7, 2014). Who dares to tell Krasnopolski he is not Israeli? Haaretz.
Retrieved from https://www.haaretz.co.il/sport/other/2014-02-07/ty-article
/0000017f-db86-db5a-a57f-dbee70320000.
Wasserman, S. (n.d.). From Beijing 2008 to Beijing 2022: Driving the paradigm shift in
live broadcasting. LiveU. Retrieved from https://www.liveu.tv/resources/blog/from
-beijing-2008-to-beijing-2022-driving-the-paradigm-shift-in-live-broadcasting.
10
THE GLOBAL SPORTING POWER ELITE
Eileen Gu

Donna Wong and Yue Meng-Lewis

When I’m in the U.S., I’m American, but when I’m in China, I’m Chinese.
Eileen Gu

Introduction
The famous quote by Eileen Gu (Gu Ailing in Chinese) sums up the epitome
of a modern-day successful elite athlete when asked about her nationality by the
media. Gu, an 18-year-old who became the youngest Olympian champion in
freestyle skiing, enjoyed a meteoric rise to fame with her haul of two golds and
a silver medal in the 2022 Beijing Winter Olympic Games (hereafter Beijing
2022). In addition to her athleticism, what drew international attention was the
San Francisco native’s decision to compete for China instead of the United States
at a time of intense geopolitical tensions. Born to a Chinese mother and an
American father, she claims US citizenship. However, China’s state media had
previously reported that Gu renounced her US citizenship when she became a
Chinese national at 15 (Pretot, 2022). With no government record of her renun-
ciation of US citizenship and yet Chinese law prohibits dual citizenship (The
Economist, 2022), it sparked a raging debate on her nationality and patriotic
allegiance to China and the United States. Gu evaded the question with the
now-famous reply, which settled as the Games closed. This dyadic debate is reig-
nited when the Salt Lake City Winter Olympic Games Bid Committee recently
announced Gu’s ambassadorial role for their bid for the 2030 or 2034 Games
(The Guardian, 2022). This series of events brings into focus the current geo-
political environment elite athletes are experiencing, which needs their careful
management to ensure a sustained successful career. Gu is exemplary of a mod-
ern, successful young athlete caught in the confict between two superpowers as
she navigates her dual identity in the eyes of the public. This chapter examines

DOI: 10.4324/9781003348238-12
86 Donna Wong and Yue Meng-Lewis

the complexities of the geopolitical maelstrom in sport and extrapolates the hall-
marks of a contemporary global citizen of sport through Gu.

Background
Sports labour migration, or switching citizenship for sport, is not unusual at inter-
national sports events (see, for instance, Maguire, 1994, 2009, 2011). Gu’s case is
just a drop in the ocean, which caused a signifcant ripple on three bases. Firstly,
Beijing 2022 took place at the height of political tensions between China and the
United States. The relationship between these two countries has reached a new
low in recent years as Chinese global power grows economically and militarily.
President Trump’s punitive trade measures against China heightened the ten-
sion. The United States also called for and led a diplomatic boycott of the Winter
Games over China’s alleged human rights abuses (Yeung, 2022). Straddling two
countries with her dual identity, Gu’s decision came at a particularly fraught
time. Secondly, the migratory direction of sports labour has conventionally
fown from the East to the West (e.g., Bale and Maguire, 1994; Cornelissen and
Solberg, 2007; Lee and Tan, 2019). However, Beijing 2022 saw the representa-
tion of 30 naturalized athletes in a 176-strong Chinese delegation (Qin, 2022).
Most of these foreign-raised athletes, many of whom are from North America,
have no Chinese ancestry or ties with China. Although sports labour migration
is common in the international sports arena, China is a latecomer to the party.
Fielding its largest-ever contingent of foreign-born Olympic athletes, with Gu
among them, this (reverse) sports migratory fow has taken the world by surprise.
Thirdly, relating to the above, naturalized athletes are not common in China.
Given China’s homogeneity and one of the world’s tightest immigration laws,
the policy move is unusual. China is no stranger in its attempt to acquire inter-
national recognition and participate in global development through sports diplo-
macy (Murray, 2018; Wong and Yue, 2022). China is keen to demonstrate to the
world that it has the capability to attract foreign talents, and Beijing 2022 ofered
a world stage to present a new generation of Chinese athletes. Gu became the
poster girl as China looked to broaden its geopolitics limits and spread its power
globally by wielding soft power beyond its borders through sports diplomacy.
Gu’s role comes with challenges as she undertakes a balancing act in handling the
complications of a dual identity. The following section refects how both parties
have received her rise to fame as she treads the fne line.

Ailing in China
Accolades and praises for Gu poured in when she won her frst gold, followed by
her second and third medals. Chinese celebrated her as the nation’s pride. Her
victory “overwhelmed the Chinese internet”; hashtags related to Gu’s triumph
received more than 300 million views within an hour, which briefy crashed the
Chinese social media as Sina Weibo’s servers1 became overloaded (Wu, 2022).
 The Global Sporting Power Elite 87

In the wake of her success, Gu dominated searches on Weibo, where seven out
of ten most popular topics were on her and her triumph. She has since amassed
over 6.8 million Weibo followers (Gu, n.d.). Her stature in China is refected in
her celebrity status. She is now a household name in China, with her face grac-
ing billboards and the front cover of magazines. In terms of her business value,
before 2021, Ailing had only less than ten sponsors mostly related to skiing (e.g.,
Anta sports, Faction Skis, Oakley). Between 2021 and June 2022, she managed
to amass a rapid succession of endorsement brands, which spanned multiple felds
from sports to cosmetics, food, fashion, and automobile. As a new “top stream”
(顶流)celebrity, she holds sponsorships and endorsement with both Chinese and
global brands. As a top sports idol, Gu represents a new phase of brand endorse-
ment using female athletes in China where the market has previously been domi-
nated by male entertainment celebrities (Xiao, 2022).
Gu’s newfound fame in China also led to the rise of the “Gu Ailing phenome-
non”, where public discussion surrounding her triggered a novel way of thinking
about global citizens (Cheng and Cheng, 2022). The “Gu Ailing phenomenon”
relates to widespread discussion on her personal life, study, training, competi-
tions, etc., which dominated Chinese social media discussion topics. China’s
social media users and media comments have responded most positively to her
and her sporting performances. There was also an outpour of public adulation
over her Chinese heritage – her strong Beijing accent and fuent Chinese, being
academically gifted, and success as a model (Qin, 2022). Gu is perceived as a role
model for female athletes in China, and also for raising the profle of skiing in
China, which is still a nascent sport and inspiring Chinese youths to pursue the
activity (Wong, 2022). In particular, Gu’s success in both sports and academic
areas was the centre of all discussions. There are people who attributed Gu’s
success to her American educational background. Gu’s success enabled Chinese
to notice and appreciate the American educational philosophy where an integra-
tion of sports training and academic education is encouraged, compared to the
Chinese system (Xu and Chai, 2022). In addition, this also leads to a general
refection and instigated debates on China’s existing sport talents education and
sport elite selection (Fan et al., 2022).
In short, Gu represents the perfect Chinese American, one Chinese people
can all be proud of and root for. Narratives from the Chinese ofcials focused on
Gu’s Chinese heritage and her patriotism while carefully avoiding the issue of her
nationality. She is recognized as an overseas Chinese who belongs to the nation,
like other Chinese in China. She has become a symbol of the Chinese dream, with
the Chinese government claiming her as one of their own. This is echoed by Gu
herself when she proclaimed that “I have very, very deep roots in China” during
an interview with the state media CCTV (Chi, 2022). Chinese media portray her
as a patriotic athlete, praised for winning glory for her motherland. Amidst Gu’s
success, there remained criticisms, particularly over her portrayal as a patriotic
symbol. Hu Xijin, the infuential former editor-in-chief and currently a column-
ist for the state-run Global Times newspaper, is sceptical and commented that her
88 Donna Wong and Yue Meng-Lewis

success should not be seen as the “glory of China”; instead, it should be viewed as
the “glory of China’s Olympic team”. He cautioned Chinese media against glori-
fying Gu on patriotic grounds over her future allegiance as legal complications are
ultimately challenging to bypass. Hu warned that any political components associ-
ated with her achievements should be minimized as “China’s national honour and
credibility should not be put at stake in the case of Gu Ailing” (Bloomberg, 2022).

Eileen in America
Walking a tightrope between two cultural identities brings its own challenges.
Gu came under fre in the United States for her decision to represent China. Fox
News labelled Gu “ungrateful, for her to betray, turn her back on the country
that not just raised her, but turned her into a world-class skier with the train-
ing and facilities that only the United States of America can provide” (Colton,
2022). Similar sentiments were also found under social media posts for other
naturalized Chinese athletes like ice hockey player Jake Chelios (Yeung, 2022).
Conservative media in the United States have generally portrayed her as a traitor
for turning down the honour of being a Team USA member. They viewed Gu’s
representation as immoral, suggesting that her identity had to be binary – either
an American or a Chinese, but not both. Some were also sceptical and believed
her decision was mercenary to cash in on the lucrative business opportunities it
ofered (Wolken, 2022). However, her move also won the support of Chinese
Americans, who felt that Gu’s experience resonated with them, articulating the
duality of their lived experiences. Some were inspired by the ease with which
she could negotiate her dual identity and navigate the intense political friction
between the two countries. Supporters also viewed the doubt over her allegiance
as an uncomfortable reminder of the stereotypes of Asian Americans as perpetual
foreigners during a fraught time when anti-Asian hate crimes were at an all-time
high across the United States (Wong, 2022).
Despite the right-wing criticism, Gu’s sporting achievements and multicul-
tural background made her a marketer’s dream. Her duality represents a particu-
larly ideal proposition for international brands seeking a share of the Chinese
market and the Chinese counterparts eyeing international exposure. As someone
who straddles two cultures, her unique appeal cuts through both China and the
West. In addition to Chinese brands, Gu has contracts with over 30 international
brands as brand ambassadors. Many are based in the United States, including
Tifany & Co., Victoria’s Secret, Oakley, and Estée Lauder. Experts have put Gu
among the ranks of the world’s highest-earning female athletes among the likes
of Naomi Osaka and Serena Williams (Yang et al., 2022).

Eileen Gu Ailing: The Face of Global Sporting Power Elite

Just as the political proxy fght came to a close with the conclusion of Beijing
2022, Salt Lake City’s bid committee for the 2030 or 2034 Winter Olympics
 The Global Sporting Power Elite 89

revealed in June that Gu has signed on to work for the bid as an ambassador. The
announcement divided opinions among social media users in both China and
America. The inspiration from or controversy over her divided loyalties elicited
reactions ranging from support (e.g., role model) to criticism (e.g., fexible citi-
zenship) of her latest role (Wade, 2022).
In announcing her role with Salt Lake, Gu explained that her appointment
with the bid committee was a “beautiful example of globalism” (Wade, 2022).
This nicely sums up the changing face of sports labour migration in an increas-
ingly globalized society, which is a clear departure from Bale and Maguire’s
(1994) seminal work three decades ago. Gu’s meteoric rise, particularly in a time
of heightened geopolitical tensions between two countries, brought out what
athletic talent migration means in the contemporary era. Firstly, the migration
patterns are nothing new, but the migratory fow of athletic talent between ori-
gin and destination is changing – from Anglo-Saxon countries to the East. It
appears to be closely interwoven with the broader global development process
as a rising China transforms the global political order. Secondly, international
sporting events have become a platform for nationalistic projection, more so than
ever, with the rise of nationalism. Athletes are now (re)presented and assessed
through the lens of geopolitics. The increased melding of politics and sports
ushered in a shift whereby athletes were previously expected to eschew overt
political debates. Now, there is seemingly an expectation that they should take
a stand and speak out on political issues. Thirdly, national identity continues to
be a fuid construct, which can be readily transformed and drawn on. National
identities appear to be in fux and do not appear as cohesive as they are some-
times represented. Switching citizenship or taking up the role of an ambassador
for an Olympics to be organized in a nation other than their own country is not
uncommon. For example, Taiwanese American tennis player Michael Chang
was an ambassador for China’s bid for the 2008 Olympic Games. Yet Gu’s deci-
sion came under intense scrutiny, aptly described in news coverage as “navigat-
ing two cultures, judged by both of them” (Har and Dilorenzo, 2022).
Gu has steadfastly maintained an apolitical stance and neutral duality in nego-
tiating the delicate bilateral tensions. Instead, she showcased her intercultural
competence, focused on inofensive topics, and presented herself as a bridge-
builder, a global ambassador, and a role model for winter sports. With her athletic
and international commercial success, the carefully curated public persona has
generated a perfect storm of elements that made her an impressive prototype of
a global sporting power elite.

Conclusion
The media narratives and reception of Gu in both China and the United States
have shed important light on the debate regarding globalization, national iden-
tities, and the geopolitics of sport. Globalization induced a set of complexities
in society, which, in turn, left a signifcant impact on the sporting world (Lee,
90 Donna Wong and Yue Meng-Lewis

2010). Gu’s global success demonstrates that the complexity of the globalized
world does not always match up neatly with geopolitics. While the Olympic
Games could be celebrating the sporting achievements and contributions of
Chinese American athletes (e.g., Nathan Chen and Zhu Yi, both US-born
Chinese ice skaters) for their bridging role to both countries, it has turned out
to be otherwise. Gu’s representation in particularly tense political circumstances
refects biases and misgivings on the identity diaspora, particularly over Chinese
American identity. What Gu also represents is a new phenomenon – where the
world is used to the Americans beneftting from the infux of sporting talents
from around the world, China has joined the game. With time, the world will
be accustomed to it, and Gu is not that unusual. Gu’s arrival to the international
sports arena also reveals the dilemma for international movement of elite ath-
letes. For the ingress party, the international fow of elite athletes plays a positive
role in promoting the economic development of a specifc sport, and (hopefully)
leaves a positive impact on the existing cultural and political ecology through
media and public debates and discussion. For the egress party, the international
outfow of elite athletes helps the nation gain more international attention and
recognition, and improve their political status and infuences (Huang, 2013).
Nevertheless, at the same time, the outfow of local elite athletes may lead to the
loss of international competitiveness in the exporting nation. For these “global
athletes” or “borderless athletes” (Chiba et al., 2001), there may be a danger of
receiving a backlash from two countries owing to their multiple identities and
how well they ft in and play these roles.

Note
1 Sina Weibo is a Chinese microblogging website, one of the largest social media plat-
forms with monthly active users of 582 million in March 2022.

References
Associated Press (2022, June 8). Chinese freeski star Eileen Gu to join Salt Lake City’s
Winter Olympic bid. The Guardian. Retrieved from https://www.theguardian.com
/sport/2022/jun/08/eileen-gu-usa-salt-lake-city-winter-olympics-bid (Accessed
8 June 2022).
Bale, J., & Maguire, J. (Eds.) (1994). The Global Sports Arena: Athletic Talent Migration In
An Interdependent World. London: Routledge.
Bloomberg (2022, February 14). China warned against treating Eileen Gu like a patriot.
Time. Retrieved from https://time.com/6147844/eileen-gu-nationality/ (Accessed
10 May 2022).
Cheng, Z., & Cheng, B. (2022). Spiritual call of the future of the Olympic Games – A
multiple interpretation of the spirit of the Beijing Winter Olympics. Journal of Xi’an
Institute of Physical Education, 39(3), 257–262.
Chi, J. (2022, February 3). Freestyle ski star Gu Ailing a super idol among Chinese young
people for representing true spirit of sport. The Global Times. Retrieved from https://
www.globaltimes.cn/page/202202/1251377.shtml (Accessed 3 May 2022).
 The Global Sporting Power Elite 91

Chiba, N., Ebihara, O., & Morino, S. (2001). Globalization, naturalization and identity:
The case of borderless elite athletes in Japan. International Review for the Sociology of
Sport, 36(2), 203–221.
Colton, G. (2022, February 2). Eileen Gu's sponsors show 'the corrupt and weak
corporations of America': Cain. Fox News. Retrieved from https://www.foxnews
.com/media/eileen-gu-ski-us-china-corruption-citizenship (Accessed 10 May 2022).
Cornelissen, S., & Solberg, E. (2007). Sport mobility and circuits of power: The dynamics
of football migration in Africa and the 2010 World Cup. Politikon, 34(3), 295–314.
Fan, K., Wu, S., Lu, Y., Yang, H., Lin, Z., & Wang, Z. (2022). Causerie of the phenomenon
of Gu Ailing. Journal of Sports and Science, 43(2), 33–42.
Gu Ailing [@青蛙公主爱凌]. (n.d.). Followers [青蛙公主爱凌]. Sina Weibo. Retrieved
from https://weibo.com/u/3639470012 (Accessed 1 June 2022).
Har, J., & Dilorenzo, S. (2022, February 13). Eileen Gu: Navigating two cultures, judged
by both of them. NBC Los Angeles. Retrieved from https://www.nbclosangeles.com/
news/sports/beijing-winter-olympics/eileen-gu-navigating-two-cultures-judged-by
-both-of-them/2826793/ (Accessed 3 May 2022).
Huang, L. (2013). Analysis on the international movement of soccer players on the focus
of debate and dilemma. Zhejiang Sport Science, 35(5), 1–6.
Lee, S. (2010). Global outsourcing: A diferent approach to an understanding of sport
labour migration. Global Business Review, 11(2), 153–165.
Lee, J. W., & Tan, T. C. (2019). The rise of sport in the Asia-Pacifc region and a social
scientifc journey through Asian-Pacifc sport. Sport in Society, 22(8), 1319–1325.
Maguire, J. (1994). Sport, identity politics, and globalization: Diminishing contrasts and
increasing varieties. Sociology of Sport Journal, 11(4), 398–427.
Maguire, J. (2009). ‘Real politic’ or ‘ethically based’: Sport, globalization, migration and
nation-state policies. In Steven J. Jackson and Steven Haigh (Eds.), Sport and Foreign
Policy in a Globalizing World (pp. 109–124). London: Routledge.
Maguire, J. A. (2011). Power and global sport: Zones of prestige, emulation and resistance.
Sport in Society, 14(7–8), 1010–1026.
Murray, S. (2018). Sports Diplomacy: Origins, Theory and Practice. London: Routledge.
Pretrot, J. (2022, February 8). Freestyle skiing-China's golden Gu dodges U.S. passport
question. Reuters. Retrieved from https://www.reuters.com/lifestyle/sports/freestyle
-skiing-golden-girl-gu-sidesteps-citizenship-question-2022-02-08/ (Accessed
1 May 2022).
Qin, A. (2022, February 16). The Olympians caught up in the U.S.-China rivalry. The
New York Times. Retrieved from https://www.nytimes.com/2022/02/16/world/asia/
olympics-china-american-athletes.html (Accessed 16 May 2022).
The Economist (2022, February 17). Olympic skier Eileen Gu sparks a debate about dual
nationality. The Economist. Retrieved from https://www.economist.com/china/2022
/02/17/olympic-skier-eileen-gu-sparks-a-debate-about-dual-nationality (Accessed
1 May 2022).
Wade, S. (2022, June 8). Chinese Olympian Eileen Gu working for Salt Lake Games
bid. Associated Press. Retrieved from https://apnews.com/article/eileen-gu-winter
-olympics-sports-china-beijing-b1549a2c689f 7086af97993dfcadadc3 (Accessed
3 May 2022).
Wolken, D. (2022, February 8). Opinion: Eileen Gu's life gets more complicated after
winning gold at Olympics for China. USA Today. Retrieved from https://www
.usatoday.com/story/sports/columnist/dan-wolken/2022/02/08/chinese-american
-eileen-gu-enters-culture-war-consciousness-gold/6701680001/ (Accessed 1 May
2022).
92 Donna Wong and Yue Meng-Lewis

Wong, A. (2022, February 18). Why Chinese Americans are talking about Eileen Gu. The
New York Times. Retrieved from https://www.nytimes.com/2022/02/18/nyregion/
eileen-gu-chinese-american.html (Accessed 3 May 2022).
Wong, D., & Meng-Lewis, Y. (2022). Esports diplomacy–China’s soft power building
in the digital era. Managing Sport and Leisure. DOI: 10.1080/23750472.2022.2054853.
Wu, H. (2022, February 8). Praise for Eileen Gu after gold medal win breaks Chinese
social media. NBC Sports. Retrieved from https://www.nbcsports.com/washington
/beijing-2022-winter-olympics/praise-eileen-gu-after-gold-medal-win-breaks
-chinese-social (Accessed 3 May 2022).
Xiao, M. (2022). Gu Ailing: From winter Olympics “gold medallist” to “marketing
icon”? Sales and Marketing, 3, 20–22.
Xu, Y., & Chai, Y. (2022). The enlightenment of the growth pattern of ethnic Chinese
athletes in XXIV Olympic Winter Games to the development concept of sports
education integration in China – Take Eileen Gu for example. Journal of Sports and
Science, 43(3), 50–55.
Yang, J., Yu, E., & Bachman, R. (2022, February 13). Eileen Gu is dominating the Beijing
Olympics—In skiing and sponsorships. Wall Street Journal. Retrieved from https://
www.wsj.com /articles/eileen-gu-beijing -olympics-sponsorships-11644757027
(Accessed 13 May 2022).
Yeung, J. (2022, February 8). Eileen Gu is the poster child for a new type of Chinese
athlete. But one wrong move could send her tumbling. CNN. Retrieved from https://
edition.cnn.com/2022/02/07/china/eileen-gu-olympics-foreign-athletes-mic-intl
-hnk/index.html (Accessed 3 May 2022).
11
CHINA’S MOVES TO INFLUENCE THE
GEOPOLITICAL ECONOMY OF SPORTS
The Three Axe Strokes

Lingling Liu and Dan Zhang

Introduction
In the past three decades, China has risen from a self-efacing “developing coun-
try” profle to the world’s No.2 economy. The status of its sports has grown pro-
portionally to wedge frmly into the top three medal rankings of the Olympic
summer and winter games. The combined economic and athletic competencies
are not about size and scale only but also carry qualitative dimensions. Since
its founding in 1949, Communist China has attached sports to politics (Hong
and Xiaozheng, 2002; Zhouxiang, 2016). Academics have evidenced the links
between Chinese sports and the nationalism ideology (e.g., Jinxia, 2005; Shen,
2020; Zhang, Hong, and Huang, 2018). The global signifcance of Chinese
sports has reached a new level after the successful staging of the 2008 Beijing
Olympics. While continuing to hone and display its sporting prowess, China has
advanced its economic interests and political agenda in this feld.
This chapter contends that China has deliberately and successfully used sports
and their peripheral dealings reinforced by the state’s economic might to pro-
mote and defend national interests for benefcial geopolitical results. Chadwick
(2022) calls for scholarly activities in sports to pay attention to the geopoliti-
cal economy of sport. Among many implications of the geopolitical economy
of sports, this chapter discusses how China means to use sports as the basis for
achieving national competitive advantage.
The Three Axe Strokes is a Chinese idiom describing an ancient war hero’s
attack strategy. Legends say that he charged at the enemy, roaring and swear-
ing intimidatingly, then struck his axe three times. He might have defeated the
enemy at the count of three. Or else he would evaluate the result and quickly
decide whether to continue or run away. The Three Axe Strokes of General

DOI: 10.4324/9781003348238-13
94 Lingling Liu and Dan Zhang

Cheng Yaojin (AD 589–665) suggest seemingly simple tactics with careful efec-
tiveness calculations.
China’s ofensives to advance its geopolitical advantages in the sports world
ft the analogy of General Cheng’s Three Axe Strokes. This chapter fnds out
that the three deliberated moves are sponsorships, acquisitions, and mega-events
used as the cutting edges. We will frstly posit a brief analysis of the geopolitical
contentions that China deals with regionally, continentally, and globally. Then
we will describe and analyze China’s sports expansion using the three moves
persistently over the past 15 years and evaluate the efectiveness. Finally, we sug-
gest that China aimed at Europe to have developed the power and infuence in
what Chadwick (2022) defned as the geopolitical economy in sports. However,
it faces challenges in sustaining what it has achieved.

Geopolitical Pinch Points

China has consistently intertwined the state ideology and politics together
with sports. It has used sports to rule the people (Brownell, 1995; Hong and
Zhouxiang, 2012). Externally, it is not surprising that sports also refect China’s
geopolitical positions.
In East Asia, China maintains irksome relationships with its neighbours. Such
political relationships are contentious because Japan, South Korea (Republic of
Korea), Taiwan, North Korea (Democratic People’s Republic of Korea), and
China have diferent and conficting political and social systems. And there is a
complex matrix of economic competition between these nations.
However, the primary geopolitical sports contention is between China and
Taiwan, over which the Chinese Communist Party has claimed to have govern-
ing sovereignty. So far, China and Taiwan have managed to coexist in sports
arenas, with the latter using the name and fag of the Chinese Taipei Olympic
Committee. In addition, China has rallied the international sports governing
bodies to ensure that Taiwan does not appear as an independent nation. The
ultimate plan is for the Chinese NOC to be the sole representative of China and
Taiwan, although this is unlikely to happen soon.
In East Asia, China, Japan, and South Korea also engage in sports-related
rivalry due to the historical trauma of brutal wars (Mangan et al., 2013).
Continentally across Asia, China’s position in the geopolitical economy of sports
demonstrates a pattern that it contends against the sports nations that are friendly
with the United States. This contention is even more evident if the countries
happen to be good or better at the sports that directly compete against China. In
the case of football in the Asia-Pacifc region, Japan, South Korea, and Australia
ft this rival profle perfectly. As a counter-example, India and China are direct
geopolitical competitors. However, India is not close to the United States, and its
sporting routes do not cross with China’s. Therefore, the two countries have had
few conficts or tensions in the sporting arenas.
 China’s Moves to Influence the Geopolitical Economy of Sports 95

Globally, Chinese sports aim to challenge the US dominance in sports. The

aim is consistent with the Chinese government’s agenda of catching up with
America around 2025 (Nye Jr, 2010). However, China has not directly entered
the sports markets in the Americas. Instead, the strategy is to export Chinese
infuence to Africa and Europe. In Africa, China implements the method of
building sports stadiums in exchange for resources, the so-called Sports Stadium
Diplomacy (Dubinsky, 2021; Will, 2012). Chinese sports investors have been
active in the European market during the frst decades of the 21st century.
The Chinese sports ofcials have been the second force after the athletes to
be involved in sports governance bodies headquartered in Europe and Asia. In
South America, it is relatively quiet, as China does not seem to have much to
export in terms of football.

Three Axe Strokes

The Chinese government has the ambition of becoming the world’s largest
sports economy by 2025 (Chadwick, 2015). The aspiration has driven policies
and strategies to build and expand its global geopolitical and economic infu-
ences. China knows that to conquer the world of sports, it must aim to win over
Europe, where most of the world’s sports governance, investors, and infuencers
are based. There have been three moves aiming at this purpose. The common
denominator under these three moves is China’s economic power and fnancial
resources.

Big Sponsors
The frst move is to ofer sponsorships to sports brands, organizations, and indi-
viduals. Afuent Chinese brands and companies, including the e-commerce
giant Alibaba, in the elite The Olympic Partner (TOP) program, and Wanda
Group, a real-estate developer and a FIFA Partner, seem to lead and drive the
initiatives. They, however, comply with the central government’s directives of
encouraging domestic businesses to “go overseas”. Such sponsorships reached
an apex in 2018, exemplifed by the seven Chinese brands sponsoring the FIFA
World Cup (Manoli, Anagnostou, and Liu, 2022). Industry data indicate that
between 2015 and 2019, the sponsorship spending by Chinese brands grew by
8.9% yearly and will contribute to a third of the future global growth from
2021 to 2030 (Beyond Next, 2021).
The motivations for the Chinese brands to be global sports sponsors could not
all be commercial. Companies like Alibaba have international business agenda,
so it made sense. However, before it acquired Infront Sports & Media in 2015
and the Ironman triathlon series in 2020, Wanda Group only operated domesti-
cally inside China. An argument for the sponsorships is that the intended returns
on investment were to enhance the brand equity for China and its infuences on
sports. Evidence indicates that sponsorships in sports such as football help states
96 Lingling Liu and Dan Zhang

build soft power (Krzyzaniak, 2018). Chadwick, Widdop, and Burton (2022)
identifed the connection between sponsorship soft power and national branding
across a few states. There is no reason for China to plan and behave diferently.

Shopping Spree
Academics have noticed China’s moves to invest in sports assets internationally and
have interpreted the moves as a part of the country’s fnancial-backed sports diplo-
macy (e.g., Dubinsky, 2019; Hong and Xiaozheng, 2002; Miller, 2010) to advance
the country’s global infuence. The activeness of such moves spiked around the
mid-2010s, a couple of years after Xi Jinping took the leadership of China and
rolled out the Belt and Road Initiatives (BRI), which means to export Chinese
infuences to Europe and Africa via direct investments (Li et al., 2021). Between
2014 and 2017, Chinese foreign direct investment projects frequently took to the
front lines of sports business news. Buyers put AC Milan, Liverpool, Infront Media,
Ironman, etc. into their shopping trolley. With the idea that Chairman Xi Jinping
was a football fan, Chinese billionaires aimed at football clubs as the most-wanted
merchandise. In particular, the Wanda Group was the most active. It purchased
a 20% stake in Spain’s Atletico Madrid for US$52 million in 2015. According to
Bloomberg data, Chinese businesses spent at least US$1.7 billion on sports assets
in 2015, mostly in soccer. The following year, the Chinese state-backed fnancial
conglomerate Everbright Group ofered Liverpool FC US$1.24 billion, the most
notable instance of Chinese overseas direct investment in sports (Turzi, 2020).
The shopping spree carried political and economic ramifcations. Taking over
the valuable and infuential sports assets would, in turn, infuence the related
stakeholders such as fans, media, and governance bodies. Schweizer, Walker, and
Zhang (2019) pointed out the political connections of the cross-border acquisi-
tions by Chinese enterprises. In the sports arena, the buyers appeared to have
used their fnancial assets to buy infuence in the politics, culture, and society
as a form of soft power push (Lee and No, 2022; Shambaugh, 2015). One of
the unspoken goals is to build up the representation of the Chinese infuence in
global and continental sports governance organizations.
The building of fnancial diplomacy in sports took a break after 2017 when
the Chinese fnancial regulators tightened the supply of foreign currencies. The
tightening measure was due to the more enormous geopolitical tensions between
China and the United States after President Donald Trump took ofce. The
Trump administration’s trade sanctions squeezed China’s US dollar reserve from
its 2014 peak to a bottom in 2017. The Chinese government, in turn, scrutinized
the billionaires moving cash assets ofshore in the name of shopping for the sports
soft power.

Mega-events
Despite the controversies surrounding human rights, pandemic control, and press
freedom (Dooley, 2022; Ross et al., 2021), hosting the Beijing 2022 Olympic
 China’s Moves to Influence the Geopolitical Economy of Sports 97

Winter Games demonstrated China’s lure to the global sporting community to

have mega games hosted here. Shortly before Beijing 2022, Yu Zaiqing, vice
president of the International Olympic Committee (IOC) from China, said that
China has at least ten cities capable of hosting the Olympic Games. He hoped
that China would continue to bid for the Olympics to improve the country’s
international status and increase its global infuence (Xinhua, 2022).
China has hosted a starry collection of international, continental, and regional
games on its soil (Fitzgerald and Maharaj, 2022) with consistent extravaganza
displays. However, it would not be a complete collection without the FIFA
World Cup. There is a mutual courtship between China and FIFA, as evidenced
by Xi Jinping telling FIFA President Infantino in 2017 about his dream of host-
ing the football World Cup. FIFA tested the water by awarding the 2021 Club
World Cup to China but had to cancel it amid the pandemic crisis. Neither side
is very keen. The speculated reason for China not being in a rush to get a World
Cup is the potential embarrassment by the country’s impotent national team,
which is unlikely to pass the frst round (RFI, 2022). The real reason may be that
China does not see hosting the World Cup would make it more infuential in
football politics than its Asia-Pacifc competitors. These competitors are Japan,
South Korea, Australia, and a few Middle East countries, including Qatar, which
recently hosted the 2022 World Cup.

The Human Factor

China has successfully projected an image of a big spender over the past two
decades. Whether the three axes have helped it achieve the intended purposes
and whether the momentum would sustain and develop further await further
research. But China’s weight and infuence on the global sports felds are increas-
ing. The Beijing 2022 evidenced this with the behaviours of the IOC President
during the Games. The president of the world’s leading sports governance organ-
ization prioritized two task items during the Games: frstly, to praise Beijing and
to endorse the claims that the successes and legacies of the Winter Olympics have
made China a winter sports country; and secondly, to soothe the public anger
surrounding a tennis player’s accusations of sexual assaults by a former Chinese
state leader. His ceremonial and complimentary role-playing refected the host
country’s infuences.
The economics underwrite the geopolitical power and infuences in sports
that China now possesses in Europe and Africa. Therefore, China must sustain
its economic might and cash fow to fnance the advancements in the days to
come. However, there are worrying signs that the country’s draconic pandemic
control measures since January 2020 have put its economy, productivity, supply
chains, and purchasing power in a doldrums, contributing negative values to
what is a global “pandemic depression” (Reinhart and Reinhart, 2020). If the
downturns continued, China would have to tighten the cash supplies to fnance
its soft power push and fnancial diplomacy in sports. It would be interesting to
98 Lingling Liu and Dan Zhang

see the countermeasures and how China would fnance its global advancement
of sports interests.
It is more intriguing when geography factors in with the intrinsic human
and physical geography elements (Goudie, 2017; Massay, 1999). The geopo-
litical economy of sports refers to activities associated with human geography
(Chadwick, 2022) as countries, places, and people commonly are (Marston,
Jones, and Woodward, 2005). Notably, we have noticed that when human fac-
tors are considered, China has a shortcoming in providing the needed human
resources to sustain its ambition to infuence and even take over the global sports
power. It is in dire need of candidates to represent the country in international
sports organizations. Nothing can be more accurate than what the IOC Vice
President Yu Zaiqing from China explained how the government intended to
change the rules of global sports. He said that to gain the right to speak, Chinese
representatives must frst enter the international organizations before it is possible
to participate in the process of “making the constitutions and amending the con-
stitutions” (Xinhua, 2018). In the past three decades, China managed to have a
dozen ofcials appointed to leadership positions in IOC, federations, and regula-
tory bodies such as the World Anti-Doping Agency. However, before they could
assume and perform infuential roles, many had to prioritize developing lan-
guage skills over diplomacy and people skills. There is little research on Chinese
ofcials’ roles and functions in world sports governance and decision-making
organizations. It would be a worthy research question to fnd out how Chinese
participation in international sports governance bodies functions as agents of
geopolitical economy infuences in sports. For China, this is a critical human
factor for furthering and sustaining the efectiveness of its used-and-tested Three
Axe Strokes tactics.

References
Brownell, S. (1995) Training the Body for China: Sports in the Moral Order of the People’s
Republic. University of Chicago Press. Chicago.
Chadwick, S. (2015) China’s Strategy for Sport Yields Intriguing Research Opportunities.
Sport, Business and Management: An International Journal, 5(3). https://doi.org/10.1108/
SBM-05-2015-0017 (Accessed: 26 June 2022).
Chadwick, S. (2022) From Utilitarianism and Neoclassical Sport Management to a New
Geopolitical Economy of Sport. European Sport Management Quarterly, 22(5), pp. 685–
704. Available at: https://doi.org/10.1080/16184742.2022.2032251 (Accessed: 30 June
2022).
Chadwick, S., Widdop, P. and Burton, N. (2022) Soft Power Sports Sponsorship - A
Social Network Analysis of a New Sponsorship Form. Journal of Political Marketing,
21(2), pp. 196–217. Available at: https://doi.org/10.1080/15377857.2020.1723781
(Accessed: 10 July 2022).
Dooley, B.D. (2022) Sportswashing: The 2022 Beijing Olympics. In SAGE Business
Cases. SAGE Publications: SAGE Business Cases Originals. Available at: https://dx
.doi.org/10.4135/9781529607987 (Accessed: 20 June 2022).
 China’s Moves to Influence the Geopolitical Economy of Sports 99

Dubinsky, Y. (2019) From Soft Power to Sports Diplomacy: A Theoretical and Conceptual
Discussion. Place Branding and Public Diplomacy, 15(3), pp. 156–164. Available at:
https://doi.org/10.1057/s41254-019-00116-8 (Accessed: 22 June 2022).
Dubinsky, I. (2021) China’s Stadium Diplomacy in Africa. Journal of Global Sport
Management, ahead-of-print, pp. 1–19. Available at: https://doi.org/10.1080/24704067
.2021.1885101 (Accessed: 29 June 2022).
Fitzgerald, T. and Maharaj, B. (2022) Mega-Event Trends and Impacts. In N. Wise and
K. Maguire (eds.), A Research Agenda for Event Impacts. Edward Elgar Publishing (pp.
181–192). Available at: https://doi.org/10.4337/9781839109256.00022 (Accessed: 20
June 2022).
Goudie, A.S. (2017) The Integration of Human and Physical Geography Revisited. The
Canadian Geographer, 61(1), pp. 19–27. Available at: https://doi.org/10.2307/621938
(Accessed: 20 June 2022).
Hong, F. and Xiaozheng, X. (2002) Communist China: Sport, Politics and Diplomacy.
International Journal of the History of Sport, 19(2–3), pp. 319–342. Available at: https://
doi.org/10.1080/714001751 (Accessed: 15 June 2022).
Hong, F. and Zhouxiang, L. (2012) Representing the New China and the Sovietisation of
Chinese Sport (1949–1962). International Journal of the History of Sport, 29(1), pp. 1–29.
Available at: https://doi.org/10.1080/09523367.2012.634982 (Accessed: 16 June 2022).
Jinxia, D. (2005) Women, Nationalism and the Beijing Olympics: Preparing for Glory.
International Journal of the History of Sport, 22(4), pp. 530–544. Available at: https://doi
.org/10.1080/09523360500122830 (Accessed: 20 June 2022).
Krzyzaniak, J.S. (2018) The Soft Power Strategy of Soccer Sponsorships. Soccer and
Society, 19(4), pp. 498–515. Available at: https://doi.org/10.1080/14660970.2016
.1199426 (Accessed: 12 June 2022).
Lee, S. and No, S. (2022) China’s Overseas Financial Direct Investment (ODI) in
European Football Clubs: Revisiting ODI in the Context of Sport Industry. Journal
of Global Sport Management, 7(3), pp. 391–405. Available at: https://doi.org/10.1080
/24704067.2020.1805163 (Accessed: 20 June 2022).
Li, J. et al. (2021) Foreign Direct Investment along the Belt and Road: A Political
Economy Perspective. Journal of International Business Studies, 53(5), pp. 902–919.
Available at: https://link.springer.com/content/pdf/10.1057/s41267-021-00435-0
.pdf (Accessed: 11 June 2022).
Mangan, J.A. et al. (2013) Rivalries: China, Japan and South Korea – Memory, Modernity,
Politics, Geopolitics – And Sport. International Journal of the History of Sport, 30(10), pp.
1130–1152. Available at: https://doi.org/10.1080/09523367.2013.800046 (Accessed:
14 June 2022).
Manoli, A.E., Anagnostou, M. and Liu, L. (2022) Marketing, Sponsorship and
Merchandising at FIFA World Cups. In S. Chadwick, P. Widdop, C. Anagnostopoulos
and D. Parnell (eds.), The Business of the FIFA World Cup. Routledge (pp. 190–202).
Abingdon.
Marston, S.A., Jones III, J.P. and Woodward, K. (2005) Human Geography without
Scale. Transactions – Institute of British Geographers (1965), 30(4), pp. 416–432.
Massey, D. (1999) Space-Time, Science and the Relationship Between Physical
Geography and Human Geography. Transactions – Institute of British Geographers (1965),
24(3), pp. 261–276.
Miller, K. (2010) Coping with China’s Financial Power: Beijing’s Financial Foreign
Policy. Foreign Afairs, 89(4), pp. 96–109.
Nye, J.S. (2010) American and Chinese Power after the Financial Crisis. The Washington
Quarterly, 33(4), pp. 143–153.
100 Lingling Liu and Dan Zhang

Reinhart, C. and Reinhart, V. (2020) The Pandemic Depression: The Global Economy
Will Never Be the Same. Foreign Afairs, 99(5), p. 84.
RFI. (2022) After Holding Two Olympic Games, China Aims at the World Cup
but the National Football Level Is Too Poor. Available at: https://www.rf.fr/
cn/中国/20220221-举办了两届奥运会之后 -中国瞄准世界杯但欠国足水平太差
(Accessed: 20 June 2022).
Ross, M., Arkin, Z., Hui, F., Lhamo, C., Biao, T., Heine, M., Peel, A., Lenskyj, H.J.,
Field, R., Nzindukiyimana, O. and Misener, L. (2021) Critical Commentary: A Call
to Boycott the 2022 Beijing Olympic Games and Establish Minimum Human Rights
Standards for Olympic Hosts. Journal of Emerging Sport Studies, 6. Available at: https://
journals.library.brocku.ca/index.php/jess/article/download/3589/2727 (Accessed:
26 June 2022).
Schweizer, D., Walker, T. and Zhang, A. (2019) Cross-Border Acquisitions by Chinese
Enterprises: The Benefts and Disadvantages of Political Connections. Journal of
Corporate Finance, 57, pp. 63–85. Available at: https://doi.org/10.1016/j.jcorpfn.2017
.12.023 (Accessed: 20 June 2022).
Shambaugh, D. (2015) China’s Soft-Power Push: The Search for Respect. Foreign Afairs,
94(4), pp. 99–107.
Shen, L. (2020) Olympic Strategy, Nationalism and Legitimacy: The Role of Ideology
in the Development of Chinese Elite Sports Policy in the First Reform Decade,
1978–1988. International Journal of the History of Sport, 37(sup1), pp. 26–40. Available at:
https://doi.org/10.1080/09523367.2020.1737021 (Accessed: 28 June 2022).
Turzi, M. (2020) The China-Argentina Strategic Soccer Play. Peace Review, 32(4), pp.
496–503. Available at: https://doi.org/10.1080/10402659.2020.1921410 (Accessed:
28 June 2022).
Will, R. (2012) China’s Stadium Diplomacy. World Policy Journal, 29(2), pp. 36–43.
Xinhua. (2018) Xinhua News Agency’s Exclusive Interview With IOC Vice Chairman
Yu Zaiqing: To Strive for the Right to Speak Internationally, We Must Promote the
Reform of Sports Associations. Available at: http://sports.xinhuanet.com/c/2018-02
/24/c_1122448678.htm (Accessed: 28 June 2022).
Xinhua. (2022) Interview with Yu Zaiqing, Vice Chairman of The International
Olympic Committee and Vice Chairman of The Beijing Winter Olympics Organizing
Committee. Available at: http://www.news.cn/sports/2022-01/18/c_1128272260
.htm (Accessed: 26 June 2022).
Zhang, H., Hong, F. and Huang, F. (2018) Cultural Imperialism, Nationalism, and the
Modernization of Physical Education and Sport in China, 1840–1949. International
Journal of the History of Sport, 35(1), pp. 43–60. Available at: https://doi.org/10.1080
/09523367.2018.1500460 (Accessed: 29 June 2022).
Zhouxiang, L. (2016) Sport and Politics: The Cultural Revolution in The Chinese Sports
Ministry, 1966–1976. International Journal of the History of Sport, 33(5), pp. 569–585.
Available at: https://doi.org/10.1080/09523367.2016.1188082 (Accessed: 20 June
2022).
12
MAKING OF (NOT ONLY) A
SPORTS SUPERPOWER
The Chinese Dream

Abhishek Khajuria

Introduction
Over the years, China has proved its might in the world of sports. It has con-
sistently been fnishing near the top spots at the Olympics and the Asian games
while it continues to train athletes in world-class training facilities to continue
that spree. But winning medals and fnishing near top spots is not the only objec-
tive. There are other aims as well which China wishes to achieve through strate-
gies like stadium diplomacy, football mission, and hosting of mega events which
will be covered in this chapter from the lens of the geopolitical economy of sport.

Stadium Diplomacy
For over six decades, China has been practising the “art” of what is called “sta-
dium diplomacy” in journalistic and academic circles. It started in 1958 when
the Chinese decided to fund the construction of the National Sports Stadium in
Ulaanbaatar, Mongolia (Amaresh, 2020). One of the most recent examples of
this policy is the joint venture for building the Lusail Stadium in Qatar for host-
ing the FIFA World Cup 2022 (Chadwick, 2016a). This policy of the Chinese
government hasn’t remained confned to one single region, but has covered the
globe. Chinese-built stadiums are now found throughout the South Pacifc,
Latin America, and the Caribbean, Africa, and Asia (countries like Indonesia
and Cambodia) (Kellison and Cintron, 2017, p. 121). The capacities range from
a couple of thousand to 50,000 (in some cases, even 60,000-seater stadiums).
The purposes are varied, from recreational facilities to holding big international
events like the Africa Cup of Nations (AFCON), among others (Kellison and
Cintron, 2017, pp. 121–122). These have been portrayed as symbols of friendship
between China and the recipient countries. Thus, it comes to the mind that if a

DOI: 10.4324/9781003348238-14
102 Abhishek Khajuria

country needs a stadium, the process might be a pretty straightforward one. Ask
China and enter into an agreement for the type of stadium you need and get it
done. However, it isn’t that straightforward.
What seems simple on the face of it has, in fact, a lot of layers accompanying
it. Building and donating and, in some cases, part-funding stadiums form an
important part of the Chinese aid programme, though it might not form a big
portion of the aid when it comes to numbers. Stadiums form only 5 per cent of
the total projects of the Chinese aid while, when it comes to construction aid, the
number is 12.69 per cent (Kellison and Cintron, 2017, p. 122; Xue et al., 2019,
2). But where these stadiums outshine other projects like bridges and highways
for example is that stadiums are those grandiose monuments which stand out and
their importance in terms of visibility should never be underestimated. They
play the role of landmarks and mark an era for a particular country or commu-
nity. They are intimately connected to the social, political, and cultural lives of
the communities they are situated in (Xue et al., 2019, 1). They also have a mul-
tiplier efect in terms of the economic activity they are able to generate around
them in varied ways. Thus, it can be said that stadiums “convey a sense of citizen
health, political equality and emancipation” (Xue et al., 2019, 1).
The reason that countries (especially in Africa) opt for what can be called “sta-
dium aid” from China is that unlike Western countries and fnancial institutions
led by them, Chinese aid doesn’t stress on and ask for changes in internal political
and economic conditions of the country concerned, however terrible those may
be (Xue et al., 2019, 2). This way authoritarian leaders and other states in precari-
ous economic conditions can get the job done without having to answer anyone.
This helps to placate the public (in terms of increased employment and economic
activity) and for the autocrats to get their images whitewashed. However, noth-
ing comes for free, and the Chinese also seek to derive some beneft from their
“generous” donations of stadiums. One thing which immediately comes to mind
is the immense soft power which they gain and which goes beyond the heads
of states and percolates to the masses in addition to looking the other way when
it comes to China’s human rights issues. Soft power, then, gives rise to “smart
power” (the former when combined with hard power) which China employs to
extract concessions from the recipient countries (Dubinsky, 2021, p. 4). One such
instance of this has been that China has used this tool in the pursuance of its “One
China” policy. So, it has demanded from the benefciary to cut diplomatic rela-
tions from Taiwan in exchange for China getting the stadiums built (Amaresh,
2020; Dubinsky, 2021, p. 4). When Costa Rica ended diplomatic relations with
Taiwan and recognized China in 2007, there was a free trade agreement signed
between the two (Dubinsky, 2021, p. 4). The newly built Costa Rica National
Stadium by the Chinese costing around 100 million dollars was inaugurated in
2011 (Amaresh, 2020). However, Kiribati’s case was a bit diferent. There the
Chinese were working on constructing the Betio Sports Complex. But a scandal
emerged regarding the Chinese ambassador donating money to an organization
linked to the then President Teburoro Tito (Kellison and Cintron, 2017, p. 128).
 Making of (Not Only) a Sports Superpower 103

Though Tito won the election in 2003, within a year, he had to leave ofce due
to a vote of no-confdence against him. His replacement, Anote Tong, initi-
ated diplomatic ties with Taiwan, with the consequence being the Chinese stop-
ping the work on the sports complex (Kellison and Cintron, 2017, p. 128). The
Taiwanese then completed the complex instead.
Voting in multilateral institutions in favour of China is another important fac-
tor which should be remembered when looking at stadium building by China in
other countries. Associated with that only is the inclusion of Wushu in the Dakar
Youth Olympics 2026 which the International Olympic Committee (IOC) had
repeatedly rejected over the years. This came as a result of the larger sports diplo-
macy by the Chinese in addition to the stadium diplomacy as a result of which
Wushu has become very popular throughout Africa (Dubinsky, 2021, p. 10).
Chinese stadium diplomacy has a resource or, we should say, an economic
dimension as well. This type of diplomacy always takes place as part of the wider
process of agreements with the benefciary nations where Chinese stranglehold
on their resources is ensured apart from the access to markets by the help of the
stadiums which have been referred to as “trojan horses” (Dubinsky, 2021, p. 5;
Amaresh, 2020). In many African countries, stadium construction has coincided
with increase in trade volumes both ways which then again has led to increase in
the number of stadiums being constructed (Dubinsky, 2021, p. 5). The Chinese
appetite for raw materials and energy has been increasing every year due to a rap-
idly growing economy and a burgeoning middle class. Thus, it is no coincidence
that some of the countries in Africa where the constructions in the last two dec-
ades have taken place have quite a lot of ofshore oil reserves: Angola, Equatorial
Guinea, and Gabon (Ross, 2014). A case in point is Guinea-Bissau, where con-
struction has been returned with the right to explore the sea and forest of the
country (Amaresh, 2020). Same goes for countries like Ecuador and Angola,
important oil exporters to China (Kellison and Cintron, 2017, p. 130). Such pro-
jects also help to absorb the excess Chinese labour which might lie idle back
home. A combination of all this is intended to aid China in its bid to challenge the
United States and rise as a superpower where the soft power which China would
accumulate through such projects combines with the resources gathered needed
to build the economy required to challenge the United States and the wider West.
However, there are certain negative implications associated with stadium
diplomacy by the Chinese. Poor treatment of African workers where less wages
are paid with no provision of insurance is one such (Dubinsky, 2021, p. 12).
Apart from that, the quality of infrastructure constructed hasn’t been up to the
mark in many cases. The locations of the stadiums have also come under scru-
tiny, rendering them unusable ultimately, thus gaining the title “white elephants”
(Dubinsky, 2021, pp. 12–15). The criticism on the grounds of resource exploita-
tion has remained a constant throughout.
Hence, from the perspective of the geopolitical economy of sport, stadium
diplomacy has worked well for China so far. It has boosted its One China policy,
got access to resources, built a reserve of soft power all around the world, and has
104 Abhishek Khajuria

efectively hidden its human rights issues. Though criticisms have been there, by
the look of things at present, it has placed it in a good stead in pursuance of its
geopolitical as well as geoeconomic goals.

China: The Football Mission

China is steadfastly pursuing its football mission under the leadership of President
Xi Jinping. His dream is to see his country becoming a football superpower (an
important component of becoming the actual superpower). The “football devel-
opment plan in the medium and long term (2016-2050)” points out “football is
a sport of global infuence” and that “the realization of the dream of becoming a
football power” would be a clear demonstration of the “great rejuvenation of the
Chinese nation” and a source of “national pride” ( Junior and Rodrigues, 2017, p.
121). Its three main goals are: for China to qualify, host, and win the FIFA World
Cup, all by 2050 (the male team).
There has been lot of activity on the football front from the Chinese frms all
around the globe during the past decade (even before the declaration of the plan),
which has contributed to the goals of the plan only. Stakes in European clubs
have been bought like the acquisition of Inter Milan by Suning, a 20 per cent
stake in Atletico Madrid in 2015 (17 per cent was sold in 2018), and a 13 per cent
stake in Manchester City by China Media Capital (CMC) for 265 million pounds
(Chadwick, 2016b). The Wanda group also sponsors the Wanda Metropolitano
Stadium of Atletico Madrid. An explanation which has been provided for this
buying spree, especially by Suning and Wanda, is that the push is to create a
vertically integrated global business (Chadwick, 2016b). There, the former’s
e-commerce business and the latter’s entertainment business could very well
complement their football acquisitions. Alibaba has been the sponsor of the FIFA
Club World Cup for the best part of the last decade. All these would immensely
contribute to China’s soft power push and sportswashing. On the other hand,
in the case of CMC, the acquisition should be seen in the context of the overall
ownership of City by the Abu Dhabi United Group. The latter’s oil reserves
could be a signifcant help for the Chinese while the Chinese might ofer some
reciprocity by awarding air routes to Etihad Airways in the medium to long
term (Chadwick, 2016b). The rising ambition of China in football also signals an
attempt at shift in the balance of power in the football world where Qatar and
China seem to be the stalwarts (Chadwick, 2016a).
Back home, huge amounts of money have been pumped into the Chinese
Super League (CSL). Stars of European football have been brought to the
country like Carlos Tevez and Didier Drogba for huge wages in the twilight
of their careers although those like Hulk and Oscar also arrived during their
peak. All this has made China an attractive market for European football and
China has become a fxed destination for pre-season tours of European clubs
(Connell, 2018, p. 8). China has also been announced as the host nation of the
new 24-team Club World Club, again aiding the sportswashing eforts of the
 Making of (Not Only) a Sports Superpower 105

country in addition to the attempts at the realization of economic potential of

the game in the country.
However, achieving the three main goals is not going to be easy. Despite hav-
ing prowess in infrastructure, hosting the World Cup might get difcult due to
increased linkage of awarding the hosting rights of such events with the human
rights practices of the country concerned. On the other hand, when it comes to
qualifying and winning the World Cup, the quality of football played in China still
leaves a lot to be desired. Though clubs are improving, the national team still has a
long way to go. So far, it has qualifed for the World Cup only once, which was in
2002. There, it was eliminated in the group stage after losing all the three matches.

Hosting of Mega Events

In the last 15 years, China has hosted three mega sporting events: Beijing
Olympics (2008), Asian Games Guangzhou (2010), and Winter Olympics Beijing
(2022). The year 2008 was a watershed moment which announced China’s arrival
on the world stage. The Olympics were an exercise in public diplomacy and a
search for soft power. The motive was to brandish its image as a rising power and
“aid its integration and agency in the international system” (Grix and Lee, 2013,
p. 531). While placing the impact of hosting on one side, the fact that China was
able to win the hosting rights was a momentous achievement in itself. It was seen
as a matter of national pride in the country. The successful hosting of the event
added to nation building in the country, a raised level of nationalism (Grix and
Lee, 2013, p. 532). The attempt was less at presenting a changed nation to the
world. Rather, it was a quest to present an alternative model, a diferent system,
to rest of the world and show its success (Grix and Lee, 2013, p. 532). No wonder,
it was not only about becoming a sport superpower. It was defnitely more than
that. But it is also true that the efect on the image of Chinese government was
not very great (Beyrer and Peirce, 2022).
Cut to 2022, for the Winter Olympics, the aims were more or less the same
but “stakes were higher” (Beyrer and Peirce, 2022). The rise in confrontation
with the United States and the wider West, the controversy over the human
rights situation in the country and the elephant in the room, the COVID-19
pandemic, and the focus of the government to show the superiority of the China
model all contributed to the “high stakes”. Then, the diplomatic boycotts by
some Western nations, especially the United States and the United Kingdom,
brought in geopolitics into the games, while any signifcant economic beneft
could not be drawn due to the situation engendered by the pandemic. And any-
way, they did not prove to be a watershed moment as was the case in 2008.

Conclusion
Thus, in conclusion, it can be said that stadium diplomacy and hosting of mega
events have worked (as per the wishes of the Chinese) so far. Stadium diplomacy
106 Abhishek Khajuria

has ensured soft power and access to resources have aided China’s quest for
becoming a superpower. In addition to that, stadiums have been used as enduring
symbols of China’s friendship with the countries that have got these. However,
there have been downsides to stadium diplomacy as well. Questionable quality
of infrastructure, poor working conditions, and the stadiums becoming “white
elephants” have been some of the major criticisms levelled at it. These have been
glossed over though. With regard to hosting of mega events, China has been able
to display the success of an alternative political system and give a renewed push
to its eforts at sportswashing. There has been a marked diference, though, in
the way the Beijing Olympics 2008 and the Beijing Winter Olympics 2022 are
looked at. While the former was a watershed moment and immensely increased
the soft power, the latter came at a time when China is at loggerheads with the
United States and the wider West (in addition to the efects of the pandemic) and
didn’t have the efects like 2008 did. Still, China has proved itself as a capable
host with hosting three mega events in the space of 15 years in addition to several
other sports events. But when it comes to the football mission, the targets are
very ambitious to say the least. Hosting the FIFA World Cup can be relatively
easy but might become difcult in the years to come due to increased scrutiny
over human rights in the country and their linkage to awarding of the hosting
rights. Qualifying and winning the World Cup are even more difcult due to
the quality of football in the country. Added to that, tilting the balance of power
of football in favour of the East is not going to be easy too, whatever the amount
of money is pumped in the game in the country by the Chinese government.
Conquering the most popular game of the world is an important part of the
Chinese power calculus led by a determined leader in Xi Jinping and a confdent
population behind him. So, it has set up nicely for us to watch and judge for our-
selves in a few decades from now about how did the Chinese fare in their quest.

References
Amaresh, P. (2020) China’s Stadium Diplomacy: All that Glitters is not Gold [Online]
Available at: https://diplomatist.com/2020/11/03/chinas-stadium-diplomacy-all-that
-glitters-is-not-gold/ (Accessed 10 June 2022).
Beyrer, P. and Peirce, M. (2022) What Does China Stand to Gain by Hosting the 2022 Winter
Olympics? [Online] Available at: https://www.csis.org/blogs/new-perspectives-asia
/what-does-china-stand-gain-hosting-2022-winter-olympics (Accessed 11 June
2022).
Chadwick, S. (2016a) An East-West One-two for Oil and Power in China and Qatar’s Stadium
Diplomacy [Online] Available at: https://www.scmp.com/sport/china/article/2055715
/east-west-one-two-oil-and-power-china-and-qatars-stadium-diplomacy (Accessed
15 June 2022).
Chadwick, S. (2016b) Xi Jinping’s Vision for Chinese Football [Online] Available at:
https://theasiadialogue.com/2016/11/07/xi-jinpings-vision-for-chinese-football/
(Accessed 10 June 2022).
Connell, J. (2018) ‘Globalisation, Soft Power, and the Rise of Football in China’,
Geographical Research, 56(1), pp. 5–15.
 Making of (Not Only) a Sports Superpower 107

Dubinsky, I. (2021) ‘China’s Stadium Diplomacy in Africa’, Journal of Global Sport

Management, [Online] Available at: https://doi.org/10.1080/24704067.2021.1885101
(Accessed 10 June 2022).
Grix, J. and Lee, D. (2013) ‘Soft Power, Sports Mega-Events and Emerging States: The
Lure of the Politics of Attraction’, Global Society, 27(4), pp. 521–536.
Junior, E.F.L. and Rodrigues, C. (2017) ‘The Chinese Football Development Plan: Soft
Power And National Identity’, HOLOS, 33(5), pp. 114–124.
Kellison, T. and Cintron, A. (2017) ‘Building Stadiums, Building Bridges: Geopolitical
Strategy in China’, in Esherick, C., Baker, R.E., Jackson, S. and Sam, M. (eds.), Case
Studies in Sport Diplomacy. Morgantown: FiT Publishing, pp. 121–135.
Ross, E. (2014) China’s Stadium Diplomacy in Africa [Online] Available at: https://
roadsandkingdoms.com/2014/chinas-stadium-diplomacy-in-africa/ (Accessed
16 June 2022).
Xue, C.Q.L. et al. (2019) ‘Architecture of ‘Stadium Diplomacy’- China-aid Sport
Buildings in Africa’, Habitat International [Online] Available at: https://doi.org/10
.1016/j.habitatint.2019.05.004 (Accessed 10 June 2022).
13
CHINESE SUPER LEAGUE
Soft Power, Investment, and Sustainability

Ricardo Gúdel and Emilio Hernández

Overseas direct investment (ODI) in the football industry is a variable that arises
from diferent possible actions with which clubs and owners try to create value
and obtain an inevitable return on investment. In the last decade, Chinese com-
panies started to invest in sponsorships in European football clubs and competi-
tions (Chadwick et al., 2020) in the partial or total purchase of clubs (Lee & No,
2020) and also in agreements with European leagues for the training of play-
ers, coaches, and referees for the development of national skills (Connell, 2017).
In addition, academics have mainly studied in recent years the transfer market
and the purchase of players by Chinese Super League (CSL) clubs due to their
fuctuations and the attraction of players with high media impact and increased
investment (Cockayne et al., 2021; Liang, 2014; Sullivan, 2021). In this regard,
the Chinese football industry has implemented various strategies for growth with
reforms and national development plans to make such spending more sustainable
(Gündoğan & Sonntag, 2018).
The areas in which Chinese investment is concentrated are included in the
Chinese fve-year plans. Five-year plans are a set of economic and social devel-
opment initiatives that serve to map out China’s strategies for growth over
fve-year periods. China’s fve-year plan ofers a glimpse of the priorities that
central and local governments will adhere to in the next fve years. Plans typi-
cally include numerical growth targets and provide policy guidelines for reforms.
Since the issuance of the 1st Five-Year Plan in 1953, China has published 14 such
documents.
Looking at China’s outward investment in general, it is noteworthy that the
last two fve-year plans, while difering in some respects, share standard features
in this regard. In the 13th Five-Year Plan (2016–2020), a reference to the Belt and
Road Initiative (BRI) appears for the frst time. More signifcant outward invest-
ment, infrastructure activities along the BRI route, and demonstrating actual

DOI: 10.4324/9781003348238-15
 Chinese Super League 109

results through foreign aid are crucial points (United Nations Development
Programme, 2016). The 14th Five-Year Plan (2021–2025) includes a long-term
development goal for 2035 to comply with openness policies in the future,
attract ODI fows, and promote ODI through the BRI, albeit with greater sus-
tainability. Arguably, the main narrative of the 14th Plan is one of continuity,
with some innovations and expanded ambitions (United Nations Development
Programme, 2021).
The most ambitious strategy pursued by the Chinese government, the BRI,
has among its primary objectives sport. China intends to be one of the largest
sports economies in the world. To this end, it has been implementing public poli-
cies to develop its sports industry (Leite Junior & Rodrigues, 2020). This strategy
is equally applicable to the football industry. It is essential to mention the already
well-known Stadium Diplomacy regarding the construction of infrastructures
abroad. Since 1958, China has built more than 140 sports facilities worldwide,
and the amount of investment destined for the African continent stands out
(Vondracek, 2019). In this way, China secures access to certain raw materials and
combats overcapacity in its construction sector ( Jin et al., 2021). Furthermore,
African countries are involved in large-scale projects which, while providing a
sense of development, build structures that do not necessarily improve the qual-
ity of life of the local inhabitants (Dubinsky, 2021).
This fow of investment for the development of the football industry and
sport, in general, has been considered a soft power strategy. However, it can also
be considered, like the BRI, an intelligent power strategy with Chinese char-
acteristics: a combination of cultural and economic power. This approach has
become a country branding strategy and the leitmotif of China’s foreign policy,
encompassing many investments and projects. Infrastructure, fnance, culture,
education, interpersonal relations, political relations between states, and the
football industry are no strangers to such investments. Hard power elements,
such as economic investments, are combined with a soft power strategy, such as
promoting Chinese culture or improving China’s image. It is the perfect vehicle
to propagate its soft power strategy (Brînză, 2018).
If we look at the evolution of the football industry, the lack of sustainability
has been one of the determining factors in the government’s change of strategy
in recent years regarding investments. The expenditure, especially in 2015 and
2016 in terms of the number of player transfers from Europe and partial or total
acquisition of clubs, led to a dangerous fnancial situation due to the maintenance
of high player salaries (Gao & Chappelet, 2021). For this reason, the Chinese
Football Association (CFA) established the penalties for transfer fees and regula-
tions concerning national U-23 players (Yang & Bairner, 2021).
In their article, Xue et al. (2020) position China’s football industry as an
instrument that aligns capital fows with political and fnancial ends aiming
to forge debt relationships. However, this planning led to consequences: the
difculty of club payments and the partial insolvency of the competition. It is
important to note that, since its professionalization in 1994, the real estate sector
110 Ricardo Gúdel and Emilio Hernández

has played a signifcant role in the Chinese football industry (Yu et al., 2017).
Companies such as China Fortune Land Development or R&F Properties have
used their investments in their CSL clubs, Hebei and Guangzhou, respectively,
to secure subsidies from local governments to make profts in the development of
urban land (Hesketh & Sullivan, 2020).
In recent years, numerous authors have extensively studied the real estate sec-
tor in China in the face of the threat of a real estate bubble (Glaeser et al., 2017;
Zhang & Li, 2020; Zhao et al., 2017). Currently, the Chinese real estate sector
represents a third of the Asian giant’s economy. It includes housing, rental, and
brokerage services, industries that produce household appliances, and construc-
tion materials. Nevertheless, this phenomenon is not new. In the country’s major
cities, prices in the sector grew by 13.1% annually from 2003 to 2013 (Fang et
al., 2016). Moreover, the ratio of housing prices to household income is among
the highest globally. According to Rogof & Yang (2020), the average family in
China needs 27 years’ income to buy a standard home.
The main risk today is that there will be a contagion efect and that the banks
will stop lending money to construction companies if they believe the sector
is sinking. In this sense, the bankruptcy of the fnancial problems of the sector
giant Evergrande (the majority shareholder of Guangzhou FC) has led to a trend
change in the Chinese economy. According to this, the Beijing government is
committed to boosting domestic consumption by being less dependent on debt,
with greater control by the Communist Party (Artigas, 2021).
In 2021, 12 of the 16 CSL teams had a real estate or construction company
as one of the majority shareholders (EFI Database, 2022a). Due to this, it is of
great importance to analyze how the real estate bubble could afect the football
industry in China. To get a frst indication of the impact of the real estate bub-
ble on the Chinese football industry, the correlation between the construction
and real estate sectors with the football industry was analyzed using the variables
described below:

● Total investment of CSL clubs in transfers with owners related to real estate
companies (1).
● Total transfer investment by CSL clubs (2).
● Revenues by main activity of Chinese real estate companies (3).
● Operating proft of Chinese real estate companies (4).
● Chinese Net ODI in real estate (5).
● Chinese Net ODI in sport, culture, and entertainment (6).
● Net ODI total for China (7).

For this purpose, data from the “EFI Database” of the Department of Business
Organisation and Marketing and Market Research of the University of Valladolid
(Faculty of Commerce) has been used in the present study. This research analyzes
472 transfers during ten years in the Chinese frst division between the 2011–
2012 and 2020–2021 seasons, both inclusive. Data from the ofcial websites of
 Chinese Super League 111

the Chinese Super League football clubs, the specialized website transfermarkt
.com, and ofcial data from the Chinese government have also been included in
the above-mentioned database.
The real estate and construction sectors have historically, and for obvious
reasons, been related, as evidenced by numerous studies that research them in
conjunction (Ball, 2006; Kaklauskas et al., 2011; Kamenetskii & Yas'kova, 2018).
However, it can be seen in the evolution of Chinese ODI by sector in Figure
13.1 that the pattern of net ODI fow is not similar between the two. The cul-
ture, sports, and entertainment and real estate sectors are the ones that are closely
related in terms of their behaviour during that period.
To complement the information provided by the ODI data and the strength
of the correlation between the variables described above, multivariate analysis
has been carried out by extracting a Pearson Product-Moment correlation coef-
fcient.1 Table 13.1 does not include association values with the variables as ODI
in the construction sector or proft of Chinese construction companies. Results
seemed to show that their correlation would not be relevant.
However, it is essential to consider the results for the real estate sector. The
total investment of clubs with real estate–related owners is highly correlated with
total ODI, real estate ODI, culture, sports, and entertainment ODI, and the total
investment of all clubs over the period 2011–2019. The latter is also highly cor-
related with all three ODI variables, as Table 13.1 shows.
Although correlation does not imply causation, Chinese Stadium Diplomacy
could refect that the construction sector does not seem to be related to the
Chinese football industry. According to Vondracek (2019), the acceleration of
the use of this diplomacy is evident in line with the economy’s growth over the
last decades. A signifcant increase from 2010 to 2016 (8.8 cases analyzed per
year) compared to 1990–2009 (3.3 cases) reveals that China is building more and
more of such infrastructure worldwide if analyzed from a historical perspective.

(USD 10,000)
Construction Real Estate Culture, Sports, and Entertainment

2000000

1500000

1000000

500000

0
2011 2012 2013 2014 2015 2016 2017 2018 2019

FIGURE 13.1 China’s Net ODI by sectors 2011–2020 (EFI Database, 2022b).
112 Ricardo Gúdel and Emilio Hernández

TABLE 13.1 Pearson Product-Moment correlations

1 2 3 4 5 6 7

1 0.97 0.51 0.22 0.76 0.84 0.87

2 0.97 0.42 0,1 0.85 0.94 0.87
3 0.51 0.42 0.9 0.22 0.29 0.7
4 0.22 0.1 0.9 −0.17 0 0.36
5 0.76 0.85 0.22 −0.17 0.88 0.84
6 0.84 0.94 0.29 0 0.88 0.78
7 0.87 0.87 0.7 0.36 0.84 0.78
Source: EFI Database (2022c).

TABLE 13.2 CSL bankrupted clubs and owners

CSL Club Last Main Owners Owner’s Sector Years

Headquarters Active

Beijing Renhe Commercial Hong Kong Agricultural 1995–

Renhe Holdings 2021
Company Limited
Jiangsu Suning.com Co., Jiangsu Household 1994–
Suning Ltd. appliances 2021
Shanghai Hengyuan Shanghai Real estate 2003–
Shenxin Corporation 2020
Yanbian Yanbian Sports Jilin & Government & 1994–
Funde Bureau & Guangdong Insurance 2019
Life insurance
company Funde
Holdings Group
Tianjin Local Football Tianjin Governmental 2006–
Tianhai Association 2020
Liaoning Whowin & Liaoning Liaoning Real Estate & 1994–
Whowin Sport College Local 2020
Source: EFI Database (2022a).

The government has recently sought to increase the sustainability of China’s

investments abroad. However, the succession of infrastructure constructions in
recent years2 suggests that such a policy behaves independently of the investment
in football by CSL clubs and owners over the last decade. The author also associ-
ates this with China’s possible more excellent utility for its interests in the form
of soft power in this type of diplomacy.
The fnancial problems of CSL clubs stemming from the high salaries incurred
and investments made over the last decade have been palpable in the disappear-
ance of several major and even founding clubs from the competition in the frst
season after its professionalization. As shown in Table 13.2, only two of the six
clubs, once participants in the CSL, that have ofcially ceased their activities
since 2019 have a majority shareholder belonging to the real estate sector. Still, it
is essential to note that in the case of Shanghai Shenxin, the main reason for the
 Chinese Super League 113

cessation of activities was disqualifcation by the Chinese Football Association

after they failed to submit the salary and bonus confrmation form before the
2020 season. Regarding Liaoning Whowin, the cause was their failure to pro-
vide evidence to the authorities that they had settled their debts and paid the
employees’ salaries (Reuters, 2022). Nevertheless, it is vital to highlight the cases
of Guangzhou FC and Hebei FC, two clubs with fnancial problems due to their
owners. Both are real estate companies with a signifcant accumulation of debt,
which has almost cost both teams the possibility of not being able to compete
during the CSL 2022 (White, 2021).
Even though the investment of CSL clubs has had a similar trend to the real
estate sector in terms of the amount of investment over the last decade, we can-
not claim that the causes of the fnancial difculties of the teams in the com-
petition are due to the real estate bubble. China is a country deeply indebted
(especially in the private sector). This leverage makes the economy vulnerable,
and we are still at the beginning of the process regarding defaults. It is neces-
sary to analyze each case on a case-by-case basis as clubs whose owners are
not real estate companies have disappeared or had difculties due to fnancial
problems. The construction sector seems not to be closely related to Chinese
football either. Although it is essential to note that, even if there appears to be no
similar behaviour between sectors, any event that leads to fnancial problems in
the sector of the club owners can also provoke fatal consequences for the clubs.
The business lines that the clubs represent for these companies are dispensable
to the extent that they do not involve added proftability or revenue from their
core business.
Furthermore, the consequences of the policies pursued in the Chinese football
industry are still palpable, observable in the evolution of the Chinese ODI in
sport, culture, and entertainment, and the lack of sustainability generated, espe-
cially by the players’ high salaries. The current transfer system has been in place
since 2010. Despite its similarities to European transfer systems, restrictions on
the participation of foreign players,3 and policies to encourage the development
of domestic talent, it has failed to prevent the economic drift of the participating
teams.
The investment fows in the football industry present a mixture of hard power
and soft power strategies through economic acquisition and the transmission of
the values and image of China as geostrategic tools for positioning on the world
stage. In this regard, as a geopolitical tool, the football industry has most likely
prevented the forging of a sustainable development strategy capable of compet-
ing with the top Asian leagues. A high return does not usually accompany such
policies on investment. Moreover, there does not seem to be a strategy of inter-
nationalization and networking of Chinese companies at the level of sponsorship,
acquisitions, or player transfers that have generated or currently generate high
added value to the competition in the short term.
114 Ricardo Gúdel and Emilio Hernández

Notes
1 The closer the correlation between variables is to 1 or –1, the greater the association,
positive or negative, between the variables. A signifcant coefcient was considered
to be ±0.68 or higher.
2 E.g., the construction of Stade Olympique Alassane Ouattara in Côte d’Ivoire by the
Chinese company Beijing Construction Engineering Group inaugurated in 2020, or
the Bingu National Stadium in Malawi by the contractor Anhui Foreign Economic
Construction Group inaugurated in 2017 (StadiumDB, 2022)
3 According to statistics refected in the EFI Database (2022d), the number of foreign
players has decreased over the last decade despite the signifcant increase in invest-
ment during the years in question.

References
Artigas, I. A., 2021. The Evergrande crisis marks a change of model in China. Economic
Alternatives SCCL, Issue 96, pp. 24–25. https://dialnet.unirioja.es/servlet/articulo
?codigo=8152525
Ball, M., 2006. Markets and Institutions in Real Estate and Construction. s.l.: Blackwell
Publishing.
Brînză, A., 2018. The Diplomat. [Online] Available at: https: //thediplomat.com/2018/03
/redefning-the-belt-and-road-initiative/ [Accessed 21 May 2022].
Chadwick, S., Widdop, P. & Burton, N., 2020. Soft power sports sponsorship – A social
network analysis of a new sponsorship form. Journal of Political Marketing, 21(2), pp.
196–217.
Cockayne, D., Chadwick, S. & Sullivan, J., 2021. Chinese football – From a state-led past
to a digital future. Journal of Global Sport Management, 7(3), pp. 345–354.
Connell, J., 2017. Globalisation, soft power, and the rise of football in China. Geographical
Research, 56(1), pp. 5–15.
Dubinsky, I., 2021. China’s stadium diplomacy in Africa. Journal of Global Sport
Management, pp. 1–19.
EFI Database, 2022a. CSL Owners. University of Valladolid: s.n.
EFI Database, 2022b. China’s Net ODI by Sectors and Regions (2011–2020). Universidad
de Valladolid: s.n.
EFI Database, 2022c. Chinese Investment Variables Correlations. Universidad de Valladolid:
s.n.
EFI Database, 2022d. CSL Transfer Market Evolution. University of Valladolid: s.n.
Fang, H., Gu, Q., Xiong, W. & Zhou, L.-A., 2016. Demystifying the Chinese housing
boom. National Bureau of Economic Research, 30, pp. 105–166.
Gao, Z. & Chappelet, J.-L., 2021. Evolution of professional football management in the
People’s Republic of China from 1992 to 2016. Asian Journal of Sport History & Culture,
37(17), pp. 1863–1883.
Glaeser, E., Huang, W., Ma, Y. & Shleifer, A., 2017. A real estate boom with Chinese
characteristics. Journal of Economic Perspectives, 31(1), pp. 93–116.
Gündoğan, I. & Sonntag, A., 2018. Chinese football in the era of Xi Jinping: What do
supporters think?. Journal of Current Chinese Afairs, 47(1), pp. 103–141.
Hesketh, C. & Sullivan, J., 2020. The production of leisure: Understanding the social
function of football development in China. Globalizations, 17(6), pp. 1061–1079.
Jin, C. et al., 2021. Measurement for overcapacity and its infuencing factors on the
construction industry-evidence from China’s provincial data. Environmental Science
and Pollution Research, Issue 28, pp. 7883–7892.
 Chinese Super League 115

Kaklauskas, A. et al., 2011. Crisis management in construction and real estate: Conceptual
modeling at the micro-, meso- and macro-levels. Land Use Policy, 28(1), pp. 280–293.
Kamenetskii, M. I. & Yas’kova, N. Y., 2018. Construction and real estate markets: From
crisis to growth. Studies on Russian Economic Development, 29(1), pp. 35–40.
Lee, S. & No, S., 2020. China’s Overseas Financial Direct Investment (ODI) in European
football clubs: Revisiting ODI in the context of sport industry. Journal of Global Sport
Management, 7(3), pp. 391–405.
Leite Junior, E. & Rodrigues, C., 2020. Belt, road and ball: Football as a Chinese soft
power and public diplomacy tool. In: F. Leandro & P. Duarte, eds. The Belt and
Road Initiative. An Old Archetype of a New Development Model. Singapore: Palgrave
Macmillan, p. 62.
Liang, Y., 2014. The development pattern and a clubs’ perspective on football governance
in China. Soccer & Society, 15(3), pp. 430–448.
Reuters, 2022. Chinese Clubs Risk Relegation, Explusion over Unpaid Wages. [Online]
Available at: https://www.reuters.com/lifestyle/sports/chinese-clubs-risk-relegation
-explusion-over-unpaid-wages-2022-04-04/ [Accessed 3 May 2022].
Rogof, K. S. & Yang, Y., 2020. Peak China housing. National Bureau of Economic Research.
(No. 27697).
StadiumDB, 2022. StadiumDB.com. [Online] Available at: http://stadiumdb.com/
stadiums/ [Accessed 21 April 2022].
Sullivan, J., 2021. Xi’s Soccer dream: Defning characteristics, unintended consequences.
In: J. Sullivan, ed. China’s Football Dream. s.l.: University of Nottingham, pp. 12–17.
United Nations Developemt Programme, 2021. China’s 14th Five-year Plan. Beijing:
United Nations Developemt Programme China.
United Nations Development Programme, 2016. 13th Five-Year Plan: What to Expect from
China. Beijing: United Nations Development Programme China.
Vondracek, H., 2019. China’s stadium diplomacy and its determinants: A typological
investigation of soft power. Journal of China and International Relations, 7(1), pp. 62–86.
White, J., 2021. South China Morning Post. [Online] Available at: https://www.scmp.com
/sport/china/article/3155413/struggling-chinese-side-hebei-fc-thank-fans-amid
-uncertain-csl-future [Accessed 6 May 2022].
Xue, H., Watanabe, N., Chen, R., & Yan, G. (2020). Football (as) Guanxi: a relational
analysis of actor reciprocity, state capitalism, and the Chinese football industry. Sport
in Society, 23(12), pp. 2005–2030. doi:10.1080/17430437.2020.1755959
Yang, S. & Bairner, A., 2021. Can the foreign player restriction and U-23 rule improve
Chinese football? In: J. Sullivan, ed. China’s Football Dream. s.l.: University of
Nottingham, pp. 29–38.
Yu, L., Newman, J., Xue, H. & Pu, H., 2017. The transition game: Toward a cultural
economy of football in post-socialist China. International Review for the Sociology of
Sport, pp. 1–27.
Zhang, X. & Li, H., 2020. The evolving process of the land urbanization bubble:
Evidence from Hangzhou, China. Cities, 102.
Zhao, S. X. B., Zhan, H., Jiang, Y. & Pan, W., 2017. How big is China’s real estate bubble
and why hasn’t it burst yet? Land Use Policy, 64, pp. 153–162.
14
DOING SPORTS BUSINESS IN CHINA
Still a Slam Dunk?

Jonathan Sullivan and Tobias Ross

International sport, like most other sectors, has been attracted by the size, growth
potential, and increasing wealth of the Chinese market since the reform era
began in 1979. For much of the reform period, China’s economy grew at break-
neck speed, numerous economic sectors liberalized, and, post-Tiananmen, Jiang
Zemin (1993–2003) and Hu Jintao (2003–2013) oversaw a comparatively liberal
approach to the management of Chinese society. However, until the 1990s, most
of China’s sport industry was controlled and funded by the state, almost com-
pletely excluding foreign brands. As China became richer, more concerned by
growing health problems (Wu et al., 2017) and interested in the “soft power”
(Giulianotti, 2015) and economic (Liu et al., 2017) potential of sport, interna-
tional sports organizations, leagues, clubs, and adjacent brands were increasingly
welcomed and consequently rushed in, hoping to leverage the purchasing power
of a large and expanding middle class. Further driven by globalization and inter-
national market competition, these entities increasingly looked into global mar-
kets to outplay their competitors (Horne & Manzenreiter, 2004). With Chinese
modernization waxing in international consciousness, symbolized by futuristic
cityscapes and the immaculate Beijing Olympics in 2008, the cost-beneft calcu-
lation for international sport was straightforward.
Chinese sporting preferences do not map exactly onto the mainstream Euro-
American ofering – table tennis, badminton, and gymnastics are among China’s
most popular sports. But the markets for TV, streaming, commercial tie-ups,
merchandising, online shopping, experience packages, sports betting (though
technically illegal), sponsorship, and dense and active digital spaces are lucrative
and relatively untapped. Compared to many western economies, the Chinese
sport industry’s contribution to its national economy is very low and still in its
infancy stage (Liu et al., 2017). For some sports, the Chinese market has been
transformative, often representing a substantial share of their global value, like

DOI: 10.4324/9781003348238-16
 Doing Sports Business in China 117

illustrated in Table 14.1. Snooker, for instance, a sport with minimal traction in
China before the 2000s, now has a multi-tournament swing, multiple Chinese
sponsors, and an exciting generation of young Chinese players with millions of
fans. Other sports have failed to establish themselves, but for every ICC frus-
trated by cricket’s lack of appeal, there is an FIA giddy about a Chinese driver
competing at the Shanghai Grand Prix.
Approaching the end of the frst decade of Xi Jinping’s rule, China is an eco-
nomic and diplomatic superpower and a central component in the globalized
economy, its wealth and middle classes larger than ever. Yet, the promise of
continuing liberalization and progress towards a market economy has stalled,
and sudden and heavy-handed state interventions have become the norm.
Systematically repressive policies have been enacted in Xinjiang, alongside the

TABLE 14.1 Selected international sport activity in China

Entity Entry Activity China Value Global Value

Premier 1992 Youth training; Asia €30–35m €5.13b

League Trophy Cup; (2021/22) (2019/20)
exhibition games, (broadcasting)
shops, experiences
LaLiga 2002 Academy; youth €30–50m €3.11b
tournaments; (2021/22) (2019/20)
marketing joint (broadcasting)
venture; exhibition
games
NBA 1986 NBA China company; >$500m (2019) $8.76b
exhibition games; (2018/19)
Junior NBA
league; academies;
entertainment parks;
shops
WTA 2004 9 major events (2019), >$20m (2018) $102.6m
incl. record prize (2018)
money (Shenzhen);
ofce; major Chinese
sponsors
ATP 1996 4 major events (planned $20m (2015) $107.1m
for 2022); major (broadcasting) (2014)
Chinese sponsors
UFC 2012 Academy, 6 fghts to date; $20m (2021) $930m (2021)
12 fghters (broadcasting)
World 2005 Academy; 6 major £1.13m (2017) £18.4m
Snooker events; 20+ top-100 (streaming) (2017)
players; major Chinese
sponsors
Sources: Deloitte (2021); Escobar (2021); Insider Media Limited (2018); Jiemian News (2017); Sohu
(2017); Sports Business Journal (2015); Statista (2022); Tifosy (2022); Wall Street Journal (2021);
Xue (2018); Yahoo Sports (2021; 2021a).
118 Jonathan Sullivan and Tobias Ross

circumscription of freedoms in Hong Kong and crackdowns across many sectors

of society. “Assertive” policy and posture in foreign afairs has been accompa-
nied by rapid deterioration of China’s foreign relations and image in the west.
International sports entities are adept at sidestepping political tensions, but the
trajectory in China’s relations with the west is increasingly salient.
During Xi’s tenure it has become more difcult to operate in China. The
leeway that foreign operations enjoyed in the past has decreased as a powerful
and confdent China no longer sees the need to give special treatment. The state
and consumers alike are aware of the power yielded by the Chinese market. The
state can restrict or efectively “cancel” foreign sport brands, behoving them to
avoid Chinese “internal afairs” like human rights or repression in Xinjiang,
and to adopt government-approved “politically correct” positions on issues like
Hong Kong or Taiwan. Hyper-vigilant cybernationalists capitalize on any faux
pas that “hurts the feelings of the Chinese people” or “insults China”. Resulting
furores can result in “informal sanctions” (Reilly, 2012) and do irrevocable harm
to brand image (Nyiri, 2009).
Assuaging the Chinese state and Chinese publics is one thing. Doing so with-
out provoking outrage and associated reputational damage “at home” is another.
When the US president declares that China is committing genocide in Xinjiang,
does a sports league want to be seen toeing the Party line? Is a club tainted when
it disowns one of its athletes and makes abject apologies to Chinese netizens? Is
it possible to square being “woke at home” and supportive of authoritarianism
abroad? Adept public relations and the inherent capacity of high-level sporting
competition to mesmerize are powerful assets. But a further complication is the
rise of socially conscious athletes with huge individual platforms. Athletes like
Serena Williams, Lewis Hamilton, Megan Rapinoe, Steph Curry, and Marcus
Rashford possess cultural power and social infuence that transcends sport.
Others, like Enes Kanter, Mesut Özil, and Sonny Bill Williams, have explicitly
contravened Chinese “red lines” to criticize repression in Xinjiang and Tibet.
Two recent case studies illustrate these complexities.

Daryl Morey and the NBA

In October 2019, shortly before the NBA’s pre-season China Games, Houston
Rockets executive Daryl Morey posted from his device in Japan an image in sup-
port of a protest movement in Hong Kong to the American social media platform
Twitter. Thousands of Hong Kong citizens were at that moment on the streets
protesting a proposed extradition bill they believed represented a devastating
encroachment by Beijing on the city’s remaining political freedoms. The protests
were framed by the pro-Beijing establishment in Hong Kong, and throughout
China’s controlled information environment, as violent mob riots facilitated by
malicious “foreign forces”.
Morey’s tweet could not be seen directly in China, because the platform is
unavailable behind the Great Firewall that keeps out unsanctioned information.
 Doing Sports Business in China 119

But many Chinese access the “free internet” using VPNs and salient informa-
tion easily fnds its way into Chinese cyberspaces via domestic platforms. The
Rockets had a substantial following in China, being intrinsically linked to the
Hall of Fame career of Yao Ming, one of China’s biggest sports stars and “soft
power” assets. Yao had helped the Rockets, and the NBA, to become major
players in the Chinese market, so it was unsurprising that Morey’s faux pas was
noticed, shared, and quickly went viral. As usual in such cases, the backlash in
Chinese cyberspace was picked up by state media and opinion leaders, and sub-
sequently government ofcials. Ultimately, it led to the suspension of broadcasts
and streaming, cancelled sponsorship deals and events, and the decimation of
merchandise sales, resulting in revenue losses in excess of $200 million (Escobar,
2021).
China was the NBA’s biggest market outside the United States, and the league
scrambled to implement the corporate crisis-management playbook, issuing
apologies and doubling its eforts to connect with Chinese publics. The NBA
had experienced similar difculties in 1999, following the accidental bombing
of the Chinese embassy in Belgrade by US/NATO forces, which many people
in China believed was deliberate. The team and the league quickly distanced
themselves from Morey’s “personal views”, as did Yao Ming, even as American
publics, media, and politicians voiced their support and criticized the NBA’s lack
of spine (O’Connell, 2021). LeBron James put out a mollifying statement to the
efect that Morey should further educate himself on the issue, a mealy-mouthed
stance at odds with James’ tireless social activism and celebrated championing of
racial justice in the United States.
Joe Tsai, an executive at the Chinese e-commerce giant Alibaba and part-
owner of the Brooklyn Nets, similarly opined that Morey “was not as well
informed as he should have been”. From one perspective this was correct: Morey
should have known that supporting the Hong Kong protests would provoke
trouble in China. Properly informed, he would have recognized that doing busi-
ness in China requires acquiescence or acceptance of certain “facts” and narra-
tives. On the other hand, “informed” by Tsai’s defnition was disingenuous: Had
Morey made the objectively uninformed, but “politically correct”, statement
that (paraphrasing Chinese state media) ‘Hong Kong rioters under the guidance
of foreign black hands are seeking to undermine Chinese sovereignty by foment-
ing a colour revolution,’ he would likely have been lauded in China.
Morey deleted the tweet and apologized, and temporarily remained in his
role. He was subsequently removed, but the Rockets brand was irredeemably
damaged in China. Now president of basketball operations at the Philadelphia
76-ers, Morey remains “cancelled” in China. Streaming partner Tencent has
edited or halted coverage to avoid transmitting political messages on signs or
T-shirts worn by fans at the stadium. Guilty by their association with Morey,
Sixers’ games are unavailable to stream. The Boston Celtics have been black-
listed due to the outspoken human rights activism of Center Enes Kanter, who
wears game shoes supporting Xinxiang, Tibet, and Taiwan. NBA Commissioner
120 Jonathan Sullivan and Tobias Ross

Adam Silver continues to state his support for players’ freedom of expression.
CCTV has now resumed its NBA coverage after an 18-month hiatus.

Peng Shuai and the WTA

In November 2021, Grand Slam doubles champion Peng Shuai posted an earnest
and detailed claim of sexual assault to her personal Weibo account. The allega-
tion was levelled against a recently retired member of the Politburo, i.e. one of
China’s most powerful politicians, 75-year-old Zhang Gaoli, with whom Peng
had once had a consensual relationship. The post quickly disappeared into the
black hole of Chinese internet censorship, and Peng herself disappeared from
public view for several weeks. During that time foreign journalists raised con-
cerns about her whereabouts and wellbeing. Naomi Osaka was one of several
athletes to amplify calls for her safe return. Clumsy attempts by Chinese state
media, and an ignoble intervention by the IOC concerned to avoid bad public-
ity before the Beijing Winter Olympics, failed to assuage growing international
concern. Peng subsequently reappeared, giving scripted media interviews and
choreographed public appearances. Her repeated protestations that she had never
alleged sexual assault, and other incongruous statements, prolonged fears that her
performances were coerced and her freedom contingent.
The WTA response was immediate and unequivocal. Chairman and CEO
Steve Simon was consistent and adamant that WTA operations in China would
be put on pause until both the proximate issue of Peng’s safety was resolved and
the sexual assault allegations were investigated. Lauded by athletes and much
of the international sports community, the WTA’s stance brought it into direct
confict with the Chinese authorities’ narrative that Peng was fne and that the
allegation had not happened or was a misunderstanding. A public accusation
against a high-ranking ofcial, by one of the country’s most famous athletes
no less, was unprecedented. Outside of Party-led purges, the private lives of
elite politicians are strictly taboo. The Party and state information control and
propaganda apparatus went into overdrive. China’s sensitivity and rejection of
outside interference, in combination with the Party’s intense proclivity for self-
preservation (Tsang, 2009), clashed with the WTA’s principled stand and left no
room for compromise. The WTA cancelled its China-based tournaments.
The WTA invested substantially in expanding its China operations since the
frst tournaments were held there in the early 2000s. Shortly before the decision
to pull its tournaments from China, the WTA had signed several long-term deals
with Chinese broadcasters, sponsors, and almost a dozen host cities. It had made
Shenzhen the home of the WTA Finals, with a record-breaking $14 million in
prize money. Supporting women in sport has been a core pillar of the WTA’s
mission since its foundation in 1973 (Szto, 2015). Taking a stand on the apparent
disappearance of a woman athlete, her potential mistreatment by an authoritar-
ian government and the cover-up of a sexual assault would thus appear to be the
requisite response. But given that China accounts for roughly 20–30% of the
 Doing Sports Business in China 121

WTA’s total income (Yahoo Sport, 2021a) and the propensity of other sports
entities, frms, and governments to compromise or capitulate rather than risking
access to the Chinese market, the WTA’s case was unusual. The ATP, for exam-
ple, has signalled its intent to continue “business as usual” in China. Once Peng
reappeared and said in efect, “I’m fne, there’s nothing to see here”, a more cyni-
cal and less principled organization might have backed of and surreptitiously
returned to business as usual.
The Peng case was the frst test of a foreign sports league since the COVID-19
pandemic and the emergence of aggressive “wolf warrior diplomacy” (Sullivan
and Wang, 2022), a rather confrontational style of foreign diplomacy which
is increasingly used under Xi Jinping. It occurred at a moment when there is
widespread global awareness of the repression in Xinjiang, crackdowns in Hong
Kong, intimidation of Taiwan, and the general authoritarian grip being exerted
domestically. In this period, China’s foreign relations environment has signif-
cantly deteriorated, and in western democracies China’s international image has
been tarnished and public opinion turned sharply negative. In this broader con-
text, the WTA was widely lauded for standing up for its athlete and standing by
its principles. American health technology frm Hologic subsequently signed on
as the WTA tour’s new title sponsor, stating that strong support for Peng was a
factor (New York Times, 2022).

Conclusion
The Chinese government welcomed foreign sports because it amplifed the idea
that China was global and modern, while simultaneously helping develop the
domestic sports industry. It was another way to demonstrate to the Chinese peo-
ple that the country had become rich, strong, and respected under the Party’s
guidance. The need for external afrmation of Chinese progress has receded, and
as China has become more self-confdent it is less willing to make concessions
or accept interference in its afairs. Foreign governments, frms, individuals, and
sport either heed that message, or they will pay a price. As the saying goes, “you
can’t eat our rice and smash our pots”. Chinese people love sports, but few love
sports more than they love China; hence, public demand to punish transgressors
who “insult China” will always supersede fans upset at missing broadcasts or
exhibition games.
Market access as a tool of foreign policy is not new (Baldwin, 2020), but we
have not seen a situation where a country has the power to infuence freedom
of speech to the extent that China possesses within and outside its borders. It
isn’t just companies doing business in China that will have to modify their and
their employees’ behaviour. Every sector that deals with Chinese consumers
will be motivated to self-censor to avoid ofending with “uniformed” opinions
that hurt the bottom line. Not even university lecturers feel exempt from the
pressure to conform (Greitens and Truex, 2020). To date, most foreign compa-
nies that have triggered reactions in China for their faux pas have apologized
122 Jonathan Sullivan and Tobias Ross

and tried to make amends. Failure to do so can be devastating and even pre-
cipitate market exit. Companies like Nike, H&M, and Adidas that were subject
to Chinese bans for their statements on Xinjiang Cotton and forced labour
practices in March 2021 experienced substantial revenue losses, lasting repu-
tational damage, and ceded ground to domestic Chinese competitors. While
the Chinese market retains substantial potential, the cost-beneft calculus for
foreign sports entities operating there has become more complicated than the
slam dunk it once was.

References
Baldwin, David A. (2020). Economic Statecraft. Princeton: Princeton University Press.
Deloitte (2021). Annual review of football fnance 2021. Available at: https://www2
.deloitte.com/uk/en/pages/sports-business-group/articles/annual-review-of-football
-fnance.html (accessed 19.04.22).
Escobar, Christopher J. (2021). The billion dollar tweet: Assessing the impact of the
fallout between the NBA and China. Sports Lawyers Journal, 28, 1–18.
Giulianotti, Richard. (2015). The Beijing 2008 Olympics: Examining the interrelations
of China, globalization, and soft power. European Review, 23(2), 286–296.
Greitens, Sheena Chestnut, and Truex, Rory. (2020). Repressive experiences among
China scholars: New evidence from survey data. The China Quarterly, 242, 349–375.
Horne, John and Manzenreiter, Wolfram. (2004). Football, culture, globalisation: Why
professional football has been going East. In Horne, J. & Manzenreiter, W. (eds.)
Football Goes East (pp. 17–34). Abingdon: Routledge.
Insider Media Limited (2018). World Snooker ups prize fund after “unprecedented”
revenue growth. 24 April. Available at: https://www.insidermedia.com/news/
south-west/world-snooker-ups-prize-fund-after-unprecedented-revenue-growth
(accessed 19.04.22).
Jiemian News (2017). 十年世界斯诺克新媒体版权仅卖出千万元，这项运动在中
国还能好吗 [Ten years of World Snooker new media rights have been sold for only 10
million yuan, is this sport still good in China?]. 15 August. Available at: https://www
.jiemian.com/article/1548837.html (accessed 19.04.22).
Liu, Dongfeng, Zhang, James J., and Desbordes, Michel. (2017). Sport business in China:
Current state and prospect. International Journal of Sports Marketing and Sponsorship,
18(1), 2–10.
New York Times (2022). Strong stance on China and Peng Shuai helps land WTA a new
title sponsor. 3 March. Available at: https://www.nytimes.com/2022/03/03/sports/
tennis/wta-hologic-china.html (accessed 15.04.22).
Nyiri, Pal. (2009). From Starbucks to carrefour: Consumer boycotts, nationalism and
taste in contemporary China. Portal, 6(2), 1–25.
O’Connell, William D. (2021). Silencing the crowd: China, the NBA, and leveraging
market size to export censorship. Review of International Political Economy, 29(4),
1112–1134.
Reilly, James. (2012). China’s unilateral sanctions. The Washington Quarterly, 35(4),
121–133.
Sohu (2017). 因欠款超过1亿元，乐视体育ATP转播合同被终止 [LeTV sports’ ATP
broadcast contract was terminated due to arrears exceeding 100 million yuan]. 25
April. Available at: https://www.sohu.com/a/136359894_116132 (accessed 19.04.22).
 Doing Sports Business in China 123

Sports Business Journal (2015). ATP outstrips WTA in revenue growth. Available at:
https://www.sportsbusinessjournal.com/Journal/Issues/2015/11/23/Leagues-and
-Governing-Bodies/ATP-revenue.aspx (accessed 19.04.22).
Statista (2022). National Basketball Association total league revenue from 2001/2 to
2020/1. 3 March. Available at: https://www.statista.com/statistics/193467/total
-league-revenue-of-the-nba-since-2005/ (accessed 19.04.22).
Sullivan, Jonathan, and Wang, Weixiang. (2022). China’s “wolf warrior diplomacy:”
The interaction of formal diplomacy and cyber-nationalism. Journal of Current Chinese
Afairs. DOI: 10.1177/18681026221079841.
Szto, Courtney. (2015). Serving up change? Gender mainstreaming and the UNESCO–
WTA partnership for global gender equality. Sport in Society, 18(8), 895–908.
Tifosy (2022). How the UFC is becoming the ultimate fghting championship. 11
February. Available at: https://www.tifosy.com/en/insights/how-the-ufc-is
-becoming-the-ultimate-fghting-championship-3558 (accessed 19.04.22).
Wall Street Journal (2021). Chinese sponsor distanced itself from women’s tennis before
WTA pulled events from China. 3 December. Available at: https://www.wsj.com/
articles/wta-china-peng-shuai-iqiyi-11638553096 (accessed 19.04.22).
Wu, Sa, Luo, Yufeng, Qiu, Xue, and Bao, Mingxiao. (2017). Building a healthy China
by enhancing physical activity: Priorities, challenges, and strategies. Journal of Sport
and Health Science, 6(1), 125–126.
Xue, Wenting. (2018). 体媒人物: 体媒人物: 新中国体育新闻转播口述史 [Media Figures:
New China’s Oral History of Sports News Broadcasting]. Beijing: Tsinghua University
Press.
Yahoo! Sport (2021). UFC’s fve-year Chinese media deal valued at ‘high eight fgures’
as promotion expands. 24 February. Available at: https://sports.yahoo.com/ufc-fve
-chinese-media-deal-161337967.html (accessed 19.04.22).
Yahoo! Sport (2021a). The WTA’s hundred-million-dollar statement to China. 2
December. Available at: https://uk.sports.yahoo.com/news/the-wt-as-hundred
-million-dollar-statement-to-china-043514815.html (accessed 15.04.22).
PART III

The Gulf and South Asia

15
QATAR AND THE 2022 FIFA
WORLD CUP
Soft Power, State Branding, or Nation Building?

Kristian Coates Ulrichsen

This chapter examines the various factors that lay behind Qatar’s decision to bid
for the 2022 FIFA World Cup and assesses whether the 12-year-long cycle of
preparation and planning met or defed the expectations of Qatari ofcials since
2010. Three opening sections explore the degree to which the hosting of the
FIFA World Cup has been guided by (and intended to contribute to) a desire to
extend Qatari soft power, state branding, or nation building. A common thread
in each of the sections is whether the long 2022 World Cup cycle has supported
or undermined the broader geopolitical objectives of a country and a leadership
that has consistently sought for itself an outsize role in regional and international
afairs.
While Qatar became a fully sovereign state only in 1971, since the 1990s its
leadership (under the hereditary rule of the Al Thani family) has developed the
country’s enormous reserves of natural gas to become a global gas giant that in
2006 surpassed Indonesia as the world’s largest exporter of liquefed natural gas
(LNG) (Roberts 2017: 50). The largest non-associated gas feld in the world
straddles the Qatar–Iran boundary, and shipments of LNG from the Qatari share
of the North Field began in 1996 – one year after the then–Heir Apparent,
Sheikh Hamad bin Khalifa Al Thani, had ousted his father as Emir and assumed
power in Doha (Gray 2013: 94). Qatar’s small landmass and population meant
that, as recently as 2006, the country was labelled a “micro-state” (in one of the
earliest academic studies of its branding and soft power initiatives, which defned
a “micro-state” as one with a population of less than half a million people, as
was the case in Qatar until the late 1990s) (Peterson 2006: 735). One indicator of
the rapidity of growth in this period was the doubling of the population in the
decade to 2007, when it exceeded one million, and subsequent doubling again to
two million by 2013 (Doha News 2013).

DOI: 10.4324/9781003348238-18
128 Kristian Coates Ulrichsen

The decision by FIFA to award the hosting rights to the 2022 World Cup in
2010, at the same time as the rights to the 2018 tournament, has created a signif-
cant backlash for Qatar by providing ample scrutiny of allegations of corruption
in securing the rights and extending the timeframe of the hosting cycle. Not
since the FIFA Congress in England in 1966, when the hosting rights for three
tournaments – 1974, 1978, and 1982 – were decided simultaneously has a host
country had such a long run in the glare of the spotlight. A succession of inves-
tigative reports and even book-length studies have explored in detail the bidding
process for the 2022 World Cup and cast Qatar – and Qatari ofcials – in an
unfattering light, while other journalists and human rights groups have focused
unrelentingly on the conditions faced by migrant workers (cf. Blake and Calvert
2015, Conn 2017, Human Rights Watch 2022).

Qatar’s Pursuit of Soft Power

Beginning in the 1990s, Qatari policymakers have taken advantage of a broader
evolution in the nature and structure of “power” and “infuence” that has ena-
bled small states to overcome the “traditional” constraints faced by the small
states in the international system (Cooper and Momani 2011: 117). Concepts of
power became more multidimensional and relative and derived from the assets
that a state can leverage to shape developments to their advantage as well as the
political decisions of what to do with those assets ( Juneau 2014: 40). Joseph Nye
also pioneered and popularized the notions of “soft” and “smart” power, with
soft power denoting the ability to appeal to and persuade others using the attrac-
tiveness of a country’s culture, political ideals, and policies, and smart power
encompassing the use of both soft power of co-optation and the hard power of
coercion (Nye 2011: xiii).
Nye listed Switzerland and Norway as examples of states adept at “smart”
power. Norway deployed military force in addition to diplomatic and humani-
tarian instruments of power as part of the NATO-led intervention in Libya that
ousted the Gaddaf regime in 2011. Like Norway, Qatar participated in Operation
Odyssey Dawn and Operation Unifed Protector, the two phases of the air campaigns,
and Qatar co-chaired (with the UK) the inaugural meeting of the International
Contact Group on Libya in April 2011 (Henriksen 2016: 135). Writing in 2016,
a team of Qatari and Qatar-based researchers listed Al Jazeera and Qatar Airways
as examples of Qatari “soft” power alongside Qatari mediation in regionwide
confict zones and government-linked initiatives such as Reach Out to Asia and
Education Above All (Al Horr et al. 2016: 355).
The Libya intervention was part of Qatar’s expansive response to the Arab
Spring which included non-stop coverage on Al Jazeera as the uprisings in
Egypt, Libya, and Syria unfolded in early 2011 and sometimes partisan news cov-
erage that led Qatar’s detractors to accuse it of bias toward Islamist movements
(Coates Ulrichsen 2014: 151). While there is no evidence of any link between
the award of the World Cup hosting rights on 2 December 2010 and Qatar’s
 Qatar and the 2022 FIFA World Cup 129

policy responses to the Arab uprisings which began with the self-immolation of
a Tunisian street vendor 15 days later, Qatari decisions in 2011 were taken at a
time when Qatar’s self-confdence was at its zenith after the success of the World
Cup bid. Moreover, the subsequent backlash against Qatar’s Arab Spring-era
“activism”, led by Saudi Arabia and the United Arab Emirates (UAE), dominated
the regional dimension of much of the ensuing decade, with a coordinated with-
drawal of ambassadors from Doha for nine months in 2014 and a far more serious
economic and political boycott of Qatar between June 2017 and January 2021
(Coates Ulrichsen 2020: 10).
It is difcult to conclude that the long cycle of the Qatar World Cup between
2010 and 2022 has contributed positively to the state’s pursuit and projection of
soft power. Media coverage of the run-up to the tournament was overwhelm-
ingly negative as the initial focus on the allegations of corruption during the
bidding process that dominated reporting between 2010 and 2014 gave way
gradually to a spotlight on the conditions faced by the migrant workforce con-
structing the stadia and related infrastructure. The tournament itself became a
target during the 2017–2021 blockade as one prominent Emirati appeared to
suggest that the rupture in relations would go away if the tournament was moved
from Qatar, while suggestions abounded in 2018 about allegedly Saudi-backed
plans for FIFA to bring forward the planned expansion of the tournament from
32 to 48 teams (scheduled for the 2026 World Cup), which would have made it
more logistically difcult for Qatar to host the tournament without involving
neighbouring states (Coates Ulrichsen 2020: 243–244). If the Qatari leadership
perceived in 2010 that hosting the World Cup would raise the bar in a region
already replete with “mega-projects”, it also placed them frmly in the glare of an
unforgiving regional and international spotlight.

State Branding and the 2022 World Cup

Winning the bid to host the 2022 World Cup placed Qatar frmly “on the map”
of global consciousness in ways that went far beyond the state’s early attempts at
branding itself as a mediator in regional confict zones (Kamrava 2011: 540). An
element of state branding has run through Qatari policymaking since the early
2000s when a permanent constitution unveiled in 2003 placed the “peaceful res-
olution” of disputes at the heart of Qatari foreign policy. This was evident as well
in the closure of the Ministry of Information and the creation of Al Jazeera in
1996 which sought to position Qatar as a nation distinct from its regional neigh-
bours, especially Saudi Arabia (Rathmell and Schulze 2006: 52–53). Another
aspect of branding was the multibillion-dollar commitment to developing the
Qatar Foundation and its Education City initiative which attracted world-lead-
ing universities to open branch campuses in Doha (Vora 2017: 4–5).
Sport emerged alongside diplomacy, mediation, Al Jazeera, and educational
initiatives as a key pillar of Qatari eforts to present and narrate itself to the
world. Qatar’s use of sport as a potent tool of branding, able to reach audiences
130 Kristian Coates Ulrichsen

worldwide due to its mass appeal, began well before the bid for the 2010 World
Cup. As early as 1979, the then–Heir Apparent, Sheikh Hamad bin Khalifa,
predicted that Qatar would develop into a specialized hub for athletics, 16 years
before he became Emir (Scharfenort 2012: 217). Qatar also began to bid for and
host sporting events, beginning at the regional level with the Gulf Cup of Nations
(1976, 1992, and 2004), the Asian Football Championships in 1988, before mov-
ing onto the global stage with the FIFA U-20 World Cup (1995), the Handball
World Junior Championships in 1999, the World Weightlifting Championships
in 2005, and the Asian Games – the world’s second-largest multi-sport event
after the Olympic Games – in 2006 (Brannagan and Reiche 2022: 56).
The pace of hosting major sports events – across a wide spectrum of sporting
disciplines and age ranges – picked up considerably in the 2010s when Qatar also
garnered international headlines over the acquisition of Paris Saint-Germain by
Qatar Sports Investment (QSI) and the Qatar Foundation became shirt sponsor
of FC Barcelona. The Qatar Foundation’s tie-up with Barcelona in 2010 was
notable for the fact that it paved the way for Qatar Airways to become Barcelona’s
frst commercial shirt sponsor partner in 2013 (Reiche 2014: 7). Qatar Airways is
one of the most internationally visible Qatari entities that has contributed to the
branding of Qatar on the global stage, and in 2017 it succeeded a regional rival,
Emirates, as FIFA’s ofcial partner airline for the 2018 and 2022 World Cups
(The National 2017).
Qatar’s hosting of the 2019 World Athletics Championships provided a por-
tent of some of the challenges to state branding that have become apparent in the
run-up to the FIFA World Cup, and which may overshadow much of the (west-
ern) reporting of the tournament itself. Media coverage of the World Athletics
Championship was dominated by discussion of the poor attendance and seeming
lack of local interest, which called into question Qatar’s suitability as a tour-
nament host, with one article, representative of the broadly critical coverage,
bluntly entitled “Doha Disaster” (Daily Mail 2019). The general tone of the
reporting of the event served as a reminder that states’ investment in branding
can only go so far in shaping public narratives and media discourse. This became
manifest during the World Cup as well as allegations of “sports-washing” – a
poorly defned term which has gained wide currency in recent years – domi-
nated much of the European reportage (NPR 2022).

Aspects of Nation Building

Qatar became a fully sovereign state in 1971, so the 2022 World Cup cycle
spanned its ffth decade of national development. In 2008, around the same time
that the 2022 bid was being prepared, the Qatari authorities unveiled Vision
2030, a long-range, multi-decade development plan that was in vogue in neigh-
bouring Gulf countries as well (with Bahrain unveiling its own Vision 2030 in
the same year and Saudi Arabia following suit with its 2030 vision in 2016)
(Coates Ulrichsen 2016: 3). Responsibility for drawing up and delivering Vision
 Qatar and the 2022 FIFA World Cup 131

2030 was entrusted to the then-Heir Apparent, Sheikh Tamim bin Hamad Al
Thani, as part of the process of bringing him into signifcant aspects of decision-
making prominence in the period before he succeeded his father as Emir in
2013. Although the launch of Vision 2030 preceded by two years the award of
the hosting rights to the World Cup, much of the urban development and related
infrastructure and investment in human and social capital contained within
Vision 2030 were consistent with the subsequent preparations for the tourna-
ment (Brannagan and Reiche 2022: 37).
To be sure, the success of the World Cup bid in 2010 upended part of
the Vision 2030 timeline just as the economic and trading dislocation of the
2017 blockade necessitated the acceleration of an agricultural and industrial
strategy designed to increase Qatari self-sufciency in certain areas (Al Ansari
2018: 35–36). In addition, the sharp fall in oil and gas prices after 2014 led to
a paring back of budgets in several key areas, including the Qatar Foundation/
Education City ecosystem, as well as in the energy sector. It is also the case that
major infrastructure projects such as the construction of Hamad International
Airport and the Doha Metro would have happened regardless of whether Qatar
hosted the World Cup or not. Entities such as Qatar Airways similarly evolved
into global brands and established Qatar as a regional hub and a critical nexus
in the international political economy of the twenty-frst century irrespective of
2022 (Kamrava 2016: 61).
And yet, the preparations for and hosting of the 2022 World Cup is con-
sistent with the broader focus that Qatari policymakers have, for at least two
decades, placed on establishing Doha as a player in the lucrative global “MICE”
(Meetings, Incentives, Conferences, Exhibitions) circuit (Roberts 2017: 103). A
primary objective for decision-makers in Doha has been to develop niche mar-
kets rather than the uncontrolled, mass-market approach pioneered by Dubai in
the tourism and entertainment sector (Roberts 2017: 139). This is evident in the
growth of a museums and heritage sector in specialist areas such as Islamic Art
and Arab contemporary art and the region’s frst museum focused on the history
and legacy of slavery in the Gulf (Exell 2016: 262).
Although the World Cup is a departure from that norm, in the sense that it is
a mass-market event, the modular design of several of the stadia, enabling their
disassembly and/or downsizing after the tournament is over, reduces the risk
that Qatar will be left with a series of “white elephants” thereafter. Signifcant
investment by the Supreme Committee for Delivery and Legacy in the Josoor
Institute, as its training and educational arm, and Generation Amazing, as a
World Cup legacy entity, further indicates a policy intent to absorb lessons from
the hosting experience to develop and share best-practice information in the
sports and events sectors and channel legacy initiatives in directions that align
with Vision 2030 and Qatar’s regional goals, including sports diplomacy and sus-
tainable development. Their success (or not) will be tested ahead of the prepara-
tions for the 2030 Asian Games in Doha and any potential bids for the (summer)
Olympic Games later in the 2030s.
132 Kristian Coates Ulrichsen

Bibliography
Al Ansari, T. (2018), ‘Food Security: The Case of Qatar,’ in R. Miller (ed.), The Gulf
Crisis: The View from Qatar. Doha: Hamad bin Khalifa University Press, pp. 28–38.
Al Horr, A., Al Thani, G., Evren Tok, M., and Besada, H. (2016), ‘Qatar’s Global-Local
Nexus: From Soft to Nested Power?’ in M. Evren Tok, L. Al Khater, and L. Pal (eds.),
Policy-Making in a Transformative State: The Case of Qatar. London: Palgrave Macmillan,
pp. 1–36.
Blake, H. and Calvert, J. (2015), The Ugly Game: The Corruption of FIFA and the Qatari Plot
to Buy the World Cup. New York: Scribner.
Brannagan, P.M. and Reiche, D. (2022), Qatar and the 2022 FIFA World Cup: Politics,
Controversy, Change. Cham: Palgrave Pivot.
Coates Ulrichsen, K. (2014), Qatar and the Arab Spring. London: Hurst & Co.
Coates Ulrichsen, K. (2016), ‘Economic Diversifcation Plans: Challenges and Prospects
for Gulf Policymakers,’ Arab Gulf States Institute in Washington, policy paper series.
Coates Ulrichsen, K. (2020), Qatar and the Gulf Crisis. London: Hurst & Co.
Conn, D. (2017), The Fall of the House of FIFA: The Multimillion-Dollar Corruption at the
Heart of Global Soccer. New York: Nation Books.
Cooper, A. and Momani, B. (2011), ‘Qatar and Expanded Contours of Small State
Diplomacy,’ The International Spectator: Italian Journal of International Afairs, 46(3), pp.
113–128.
Daily Mail (2019), ‘Doha Disaster: How the World’s Finest Athletes Are Battling for
Golds In Front of a Pitiful Number of Fans at Qatar’s Soulless World Championships
in an Eerily Empty Stadium,’ 2 October.
Doha News (2013), ‘QSA: Qatar’s Population Has Nearly Doubled Since 2007,’ April 7.
Exell, K. (2016), ‘Desiring the Past and Reimagining the Present: Contemporary
Collecting in Qatar,’ Museums & Society, 14(2), pp. 259–274.
Gray, M. (2013), Qatar: Politics and the Challenges of Development. Boulder: Lynne Rienner.
Henriksen, D. (2016), ‘The Political Rationale and Implications of Norway’s Military
Involvement in Libya,’ in D. Henriksen and A.K. Larssen (eds.), Political Rationale and
International Consequences of the War in Libya. Oxford: Oxford University Press.
Human Rights Watch (2022), ‘FIFA: Pay for Harm to Qatar’s Migrant Workers,’ May 18.
Juneau, T. (2014), ‘U.S. Power in the Middle East: Not Declining,’ Middle East Policy,
21(2), pp. 40–52.
Kamrava, M. (2011), ‘Mediation and Qatari Foreign Policy,’ Middle East Journal, 65(4),
pp. 539–556.
Kamrava, M. (2016), ‘Contemporary Port Cities in the Persian Gulf: Local Gateways and
Global Networks,’ in M. Kamrava (ed.), Gateways to the World: Port Cities in the Persian
Gulf. London: Hurst & Co., pp. 43–78.
NPR (2022), ‘How Countries Use Sports to Improve Their Image,’ March 15.
Nye, J. (2011), The Future of Power. New York: Public Afairs.
Peterson, J.E. (2006), ‘Qatar and the World: Branding for a Micro-State,’ Middle East
Journal, 60(4), pp. 732–748.
Rathmell, A. and Schulze, K. (2006), ‘Political Reform in the Gulf: The Case of Qatar,’
Middle Eastern Studies, 36(4), pp. 47–62.
Reiche, D. (2014), ‘Investing in Sporting Success as a Diplomatic and Foreign Policy
Tool: The Case of Qatar,’ International Journal of Sport Policy and Politics, published
online.
Roberts, D. (2017), Qatar: Securing the Global Ambitions of a City-State. London: Hurst &
Co.
 Qatar and the 2022 FIFA World Cup 133

Scharfenort, N. (2012), ‘Urban Development and Social Change in Qatar. The Qatar
National Vision 2030 and the 2022 FIFA World Cup,’ Journal of Arabian Studies, 2(2),
pp. 209–230.
The National (2017), ‘Qatar Airways to Sponsor FIFA World Cup After Vacancy Left by
Emirates,’ July 21.
Vora, N. (2017). Teach for Arabia: American Universities, Liberalism, and Transnational Qatar.
Stanford: Stanford University Press.
16
GEOPOLITICS OF SPORT IN
THE MENA REGION
Mahfoud Amara and Sara Mehanna Al-Naimi

The Middle East and North Africa (MENA) region ofers a number of venues
to refect upon the question of geopolitics and sport. First, its geography located
between the Atlantic Ocean in the west, the Mediterranean Sea, to the Arabian
(or Persian) Gulf. The region is located in two continents: Africa and Asia. North
Africa’s closeness to Europe in the north and sub-Saharan Africa in the south has
its signifcance when studying the North–South power dynamics in sport. The
same is true for the Middle East (The Mashreq), the Levant, and the Gulf region,
with the presence of Israel and Iran. Egypt – and North Sudan to some extent –
being the bridge, somehow, between North Africa and the Middle East. It is not
always a comfortable position to be in, considering the rivalry between Egypt
and other North African countries, namely Algeria, Tunisia, and Morocco. The
countries of the MENA are majority Arab and Muslim, with most countries
having religious and ethnic minorities. The societal make-up of the MENA
region impacts on the norms and value system around sport. We cannot ignore,
in addition to geography and ethnicity, the dimension of demography. It is a
crucial aspect when it comes to sport participation and development of elite sport
in particular. Moreover, the variable of economy and diferent source of revenues
of countries in the region are to be taken into account in shaping countries’
national and international strategy in sport. The aim of this chapter is to explore
some of these diferent aspects to make sense of the geopolitics of sport in the
region, including the specifcity of sport in North African versus the Middle East
contexts and the concept of soft power in the Gulf Cooperation Council (GCC)
countries.

DOI: 10.4324/9781003348238-19
 Geopolitics of Sport in the MENA Region 135

North Africa
History, Modernization, and Internationalization of Sport
The geographical closeness of North African countries to Europe explains the
difusion and modernization of sport which was a product of colonial history
starting from the 19th century, and which ended (at least military) in the 1960s.
Egypt, being the frst to gain independence in 1922, explains its earlier engage-
ment with the emerging modern sport structures, including its frst participation
as an Arab nation in the 1934 FIFA World Cup. French colonialism of Morocco
(including Spanish occupation of its northern part), Tunisia, and Algeria (which
was for 132 years three departments of France) contributed to the difusion of
modern sport by military and European settlers. First through the introduction
of physical education in schools and the formation of sport clubs and leagues. The
beginning of the 20th century, with the globalization and professionalization
of sport, witnessed the integration of indigenous population into the growing
professional sport. Local population, having sensed the signifcance of sport and
its internationalization, started to form sport clubs as a space to express their
nationalist sentiment for independence. A case in point is the FLN national team
established in 1958 in exile by the FLN party, the leader of the Algerian struggle
for independence, to represent the Algerian cause for independence internation-
ally. The other example of sport and internationalization agenda as well as the
use of sport as a platform to express the growing Arab nationalist sentiment is the
boycott by Arab nations of the 1956 Melbourne Olympics, the purpose of which
was to protest against Israel, Great Britain, and France’s attack of Egypt over the
Suez Canal crisis, and President Gamel Abdel Nasser’s support of the Algerian
revolution (Fates, 1994; Amara, 2012; Nauright and Amara, 2018).
The independence of countries in North Africa in the 1960s was consolidated
by their adhesion to international sport federations and the International Olympic
Committee. Moreover participation in regional/continental and international
sport competitions became a means to strengthen their nation-state building,
and position in the bipolar world, divided between eastern and western blocs.
This was followed by an active strategy to host regional and international sport
events (Pan-African, the Mediterranean, and Francophonie Games, to name but
a few). An example of this strategy is the successive (unsuccessful) bids of Egypt
and Morocco to host the FIFA World Cup. The 2022 FIFA World Cup in Qatar
is the frst mega sport event to be hosted by a Middle Eastern and a majority Arab
and Muslim country.

Sport Migration and Women Sport

The geographical closeness to Europe, the southern Mediterranean, and sub-
Saharan Africa has contributed in shaping the narrative around sport and migra-
tion in North Africa, the region being a transit for players, including from
sub-Saharan Africa, to European professional leagues (and football leagues in
136 Mahfoud Amara and Sara Mehanna Al-Naimi

particular). The region is in the midst of international geography of sport migra-

tion characterized by the infux of players to Europe, and the import of European
coaches to North African domestic leagues and national teams. Many selected
players for national teams in North Africa are playing in Europe or holding dual
nationality. This provokes a debate in domestic leagues in North Africa about the
rationale for football development as only few players from domestic leagues are
selected for the national team. Selection of players and athletes in football and in
other sports from the North African diaspora in Europe to play for national teams
of their country of origin poses the question of belonging. Players with mixed
cultural background are under pressure to be accepted in both societies. For
these players accepting to play for the country of origin is a way to honour their
parents. It is also an opportunity for these players to have an international career
and raise their value as professional players in the international sport market.
The other important dimension is that of gender question and women sport in
particular. The ranking of nations from North Africa in the Olympics would not
be the same without women athletes’ performance in international sports com-
petitions. Their participation in sport is a refection of geopolitical debates about
their body which go back to the colonial era. This includes colonial orientalist
narrative about North African (Arab and Berber) women’s body as revealed in
orientalists’ painting and photography. Participation of Arab and Muslim women
in (western-dominated) sport is usually explained as a form of their emancipation
and liberation from traditions and patriarchy. The same narrative has been repro-
duced post-independence by secular governments in North Africa. Women sport
continues to be at the centre of debate about secularalization and Islamization
(in opposition to westernization) of North African societies. It is also positioned
in relation to international movement of feminism and post-feminism, as well as
commodifcation, mediatization, and embodiments of women athletes (Walseth
and Fasting, 2003; Amara, 2012; Sehlikoglu, 2014).

Elite Sport
Countries in North Africa, Tunisia, Morocco, and Algeria, in particular, have
been active in participating in international sport competitions and the inte-
gration of decision-making positions within continental and international sport
organizations. The striking example is that of Egyptian Hassan Mostafa, the
president of the International Handball Federation since 2000. The other key
fgure of women sport in the region is Ms Nawal El Moutawakel, the frst Arab
Muslim to win a gold medal in the Olympics (the 1984 Los Angeles Olympics
Games). She is member of the Executive Board (2008–2012 and 2020–) and
IOC Vice President (2012–2016). She chaired and participated in a number
of IOC Commissions. Considering aspects of demography and national GDP
Tunisia with about 11 million inhabitants has outperformed other North African
countries’ sport performance at regional and international levels. The best per-
formance for Morocco and Algeria internationally has been in football which
 Geopolitics of Sport in the MENA Region 137

receives more funding from the state due to its political signifcance, and in
track and feld. The six medals (three by female athletes) in the 2021 Tokyo
Olympics is considered to be the best performance of Egypt since 1936. Egypt
is also known for its international performance in squash and handball. There
has been a tradition in Morocco in the past in producing good professional ten-
nis players, the example of Younes El Aynaoui highest ranking in ATP of 14 in
2003 and Hicham Arazi’s highest ranking of 22 in 2021. The fourth position in
Women Tennis’s Association by Ons Jabeur from Tunisia is the best performance
in international tennis so far. The other sports where North African athletes are
showing good performance for both male and female are boxing and martial arts
(e.g. judo, taekwondo, and karate).
Elite sport ofers another venue to address geopolitics of sport and power
relation between the so-called centre and periphery. Elite sport system is domi-
nated in terms of access to fnancial resources, corporate money, as well as sport
science provision for athletes, equipment, and sport venues, by industrial coun-
tries. Countries in North Africa, as do other developing countries, have limited
opportunities to compete at the highest level in collective and individual sports.
Qualifcations criteria to international championships are not always in favour of
countries in the so-called Global South. For instance, the qualifcation tourna-
ment to the FIFA World Cup for Africa, with a total of 45 countries, allows only
5 African countries to qualify. The competition can turn into a real battle on
and of the pitch (including in mainstream and social media), thus escalating the
rivalry between North African countries particularly in football which is defned
around historical and political legitimacies. As well illustrated by Rommel (2021)
in his ethnographic work on Egypt in mid-2000 and up to the 2011 revolution,
which is also applicable to other North African countries, football is a primary
concern of political circles, represented by the dominant ruling party and its
close military and business elites.

The Gulf Cooperation Council (GCC)

This part aims to investigate the intersection of sport and geopolitics in GCC
countries. It explores how this connection impacted the conduct of these countries
and the intra-competition among them. It examines this process as witnessed in
several aspects, namely identity, media, economy, and society. A concise overview
of the newcomers in the sport arena in the GCC context can help visualize the
unique features and shifts in the interaction between sport and the GCC’s geo-
politics. Kuwait has been on the frontier of the GCC sports. One could attribute
that to the fact that Kuwait was the frst GCC country to gain its independence
from Britain in 1961 (Crystal, 1989). The Kuwaiti Olympic committee was a pio-
neer in the GCC region, as it was created in 1957 (Bromber et al., 2013). Kuwait
invested in sport and, in particular, football. The Kuwaiti football team, The Blue
Team, was considered one of the top GCC football teams in the 1980s. It holds the
highest record of winning the Gulf Cup, the premier football men’s championship
138 Mahfoud Amara and Sara Mehanna Al-Naimi

organized every two years among the GCC state members, as it won it ten times.
Unfortunately, however, the golden age of Kuwaiti excellence in sports drew to a
close with the Iraqi invasion in the 1990s. After the invasion, the GCC countries
shifted their tools to reposition themselves in the international arena. As a unique
strategy, this projected image functioned as an alternative identity marker, distin-
guishing these countries from unstable states in the broader region. Hosting Sport
Mega-events (SMEs) represents the frst instrument to achieving this purpose.
The starting point for achieving this aim was launched by Bahrain, followed by
the UAE. In 2004 Bahrain started hosting Formula 1 races in Manama in 2004.
In 2009, UAE’s Abu Dhabi began competing with Manama in hosting Formula 1
races, followed in 2021 by KSA and Qatar which signed partnership with Formula
1 to hosting, respectively, Jeddah and Doha Grand Prix.

Competition and Rivalry Inside and Outside Sporting Arena

In 2010, the rivalry among small GCC countries increased with FIFA’s
announcement of Qatar as the upcoming host of the 2022 World Cup. It reached
its peak with the blockade imposed by UAE, Saudi Arabia, Egypt, and Bahrain
on Qatar (2017–2021), based on indictments of Qatar for “supporting terror-
ism”. However, the blockade did not stop Qatar from continuing its prepara-
tions for hosting the 2022 World Cup (Ulrichsen, 2021). The second strategy is
illustrated by the emergence of sport cities and zones in GCC states, such as the
UAE’s Zaid Sport City and Qatar’s Aspire Zone, to name just two. Both of them
are equipped with modern sports infrastructure and high-tech equipment. This
urbanization process demonstrates the GCC states’ desire to fashion themselves
as new destinations for sports enthusiasts. Furthermore, specializing in this type
of tourism helps diversify their hydrocarbon-based economies, which is essen-
tial since hydrocarbon resources still fuel 80% of GCC governments’ revenues
(Mishrif, 2018).
Furthermore, GCC states promoting themselves as recuperative zones for
sport medicine and injuries helps attract foreign investments and well-known
sports stars. Investing in sport abroad demonstrates the third strategy pursued by
GCC countries. The GCC’s involvement in sport investments abroad includes a
harmonious mixture of visible state and non-state actors. The GCC’s non-state
actors involve prominent GCC royals, elite businessmen, and airline companies.
However, this confuence of actors involves other non-revealed actors that inter-
fere with backing up those apparent ones. This might lead to the hypothesis that
an unwritten code of cooperation organizes the relationship between the myriad
of sponsoring GCC actors. Koch (2020) renders the example of when Sheikh
Mansoor Bin Zayed Al Nahyan, a UAE royal family member, managed to take
over Manchester City football Club with Abu Dhabi’s Investment Authority
SWF in 2008. Indeed, GCC airlines, such as Qatar Airways and UAE’s Etihad
and Emirates airlines, have been sponsoring several elite European football teams
(Chadwick, 2019; Barzani, 2022).
 Geopolitics of Sport in the MENA Region 139

Between Modernization and Tradition

The rapid transformations that the GCC region has gone through, such as “mod-
ernization, educational reforms, and the infux of wealth from oil revenues”
(Harkness and Islam, 2011, p. 64), have infuenced the diferent segments in
the GCC communities, including females. Through its values, such as fairness
and promotion of social inclusion, sport can be regarded as an agent of social
change. Furthermore, the GCC countries aimed to enhance female inclusion in
their modernization narrative through sport. By advocating the quota of GCC
women’s participation in sport, GCC countries’ reputations for supporting GCC
females’ rights will be enhanced. AlKhalifa and Farello (2021) emphasize that
the GCC’s soft power project has many facets. One of these aspects is increasing
the participation of the GCC females in sport – an originally male-dominated
domain in the GCC Muslim countries. The involvement of GCC females in
sport would shift the image of the GCC states as less oppressive countries towards
females. In a new chapter of a modern and liberal Saudi Arabia in 2018, Crown
Prince Mohammed bin Salman allowed Saudi women to drive and participate in
sports competitions (Lysa, 2020; Ishac, 2020).
On the other hand, sport can also play the opposite role of becoming a space
to express the GCC conservatives’ fear that the participation of GCC females in
sports would demonstrate a form of resistance that can endanger social values of
the GCC societies. After all, the hijab is considered the conventional head cover
for GCC females. As a result, the empowerment of GCC women in sport is
still in its early stages (AlKhalifa and Farello, 2021). In order to create a balance
between the modernity eforts in the GCC states and the traditional societal
values, the ruling elites are utilizing several strategies to legitimize and normal-
ize the participation of females in sports events and athletic competitions in the
eyes of the GCC societies. The encouragement of the least controversial sports
and initiating health-related campaigns manifest some of these government-led
projects.

Conclusion
As highlighted in this chapter, the region of the Middle East and North Africa
ofers a rich context and space to the study and analysis of sport and geopolitics.
The legacy of colonial history and geographical position between east and west
(Mashreq and Maghreb) and location between the south Mediterranean, the horn
of Africa, and the gulf Arabian (Persian) have shaped the engagement of North
African countries with international sport system for nation-state building, iden-
tity formation, sport migration, and elite sport development, in the region and
beyond (within diaspora in Europe). In the GCC region, the impact of geopolitics
and geographical borders on the GCC states can be examined through under-
standing of sport’s soft power. Tracing the shifts and the transformations that the
GCC region has witnessed since the 1990s can help in understanding the com-
plex reality that led to the rise of certain GCC countries as infuential players in
140 Mahfoud Amara and Sara Mehanna Al-Naimi

regional and international sport. Their motives are diverse, but within the spec-
trum of improving their image as modern states and diversifying their economies.

References
AlKhalifa, Hussa and Farello, Anna. (2021). The soft power of Arab women’s football:
Changing perceptions and building legitimacy through social-media. International
Journal of Sport Policy and Politics, 13(2), pp. 241–257.
Amara, Mahfoud. (2012a). Sport, Politics and Society in the Arab World. London: Routledge.
Amara, Mahfoud. (2012b). Veiled women athletes in the 2008 Beijing Olympics: Media
accounts. International Journal of the History of Sport, 29(4), pp. 638–651.
Barzani, Hezha. (2022). Many European Soccer teams are owned by Gulf states. But
why? [online] Available at < https://www.atlanticcouncil.org/blogs/menasource/
many-european-soccer-teams-are-owned-by-gulf-states-but-why/> [accessed 20
June 2022].
Bromber, Katrin, Krawietz, Birgit, and Maguire, Joseph (Eds.). (2013). Sport Across Asia:
Politics, Cultures, and Identities. London: Routledge.
Carl, Rommel. (2021). Egypt’s Football Revolution: Emotion, Masculinity, and Uneasy Politics.
Austin, TX: University of Texas Press.
Chadwick, Simon. (2019). The business of sports in the Gulf cooperation council member
states. In Danyel Reiche and Tamir Sorek (Eds.), Sport, Politics and Society in the Middle
East. Oxford: Oxford Scholarship Online.
Crystal, Jill. (1989). Coalitions in oil monarchies: Kuwait and Qatar. Comparative Politics,
21(4), pp. 427–443.
Fates, Youcef. (1994). Sport et Tiers Monde. Paris: Presses Universitaires de France.
Harkness, G., and Islam, S. (2011). Muslim female athletes and the hijab. Contexts, 10(4),
64–65.
Ishac, Wadih. (2020). Arab countries’ strategies to bid and to host major sport events. In
Fan Hong and Lu Zhouxiang (Eds.), The Routledge Handbook of Sport in Asia. London:
Routledge, pp. 437–446.
Koch, Natalie. (2020). The geopolitics of Gulf sport sponsorship. Sport, Ethics and
Philosophy, 14(3), pp. 355–376.
lrichsen, Kristian. (2021). The impact of the lifting of the blockade on the Qatar World
Cup. [online] Available at < https://cirs.qatar.georgetown.edu/the-impact-of-the
-lifting-of-the-blockade-on-the-qatar-world-cup/> [accessed 19 June 2022].
Lysa, Charlotte. (2020). Fighting for the right to play: Women’s football and regime-loyal
resistance in Saudi Arabia. Third World Quarterly, 41(5), pp. 842–859.
Mishrif, Ashraf. (2018). Challenges of economic diversifcation in the GCC countries.
In Ashraf Mishrif and Yusuf Al Balushi (Eds.), Economic Diversifcation in the Gulf
Region. Volume II: The Political Economy of the Middle East. Singapore: Palgrave
Macmillan.
Nauright, John and Amara, Mahfoud (Ed.). (2018). Sport in the African World. London:
Routledge.
Sehlikoglu, Sertaç and Samie, Sumaya. (2014). Strange, incompetent and out-of-place:
Media representations of Muslim sportswomen during London 2012. Feminist Media
Studies, (15), 3. Published Online.
Walseth, Kirstin and Fasting, Kari. (2003). Islam’s view on physical activity and sport:
Egyptian women interpreting Islam. International Review of Sociology of Sport, 38(1),
pp. 45–60.
17
SPORT AND SAUDI ARABIA
Mimetic Isomorphism, Soft Power,
and Disempowerment

Nicholas Burton and Michael L. Naraine

Introduction
The 21st century has signalled a new era of sport business and management. The
turn of the millennium witnessed a shift away from the corporatization of sport
and towards the geopoliticization of global sport, including state ownership of
global sporting institutions, strategic investments in mega-sporting event owner-
ship by developing economies (e.g., BRICSAM) and rentier states, and extensive
state-funded sponsorship and broadcast investment throughout the sporting eco-
system. Central to this geopolitical era has been sport’s ability to cultivate and
convey soft power for nations. First proposed by Nye (1990, 2004) as a counterbal-
ance to nations’ typical reliance on hard power, soft power is defined as a nation or
individual’s ability to “attract and co-opt [others] to want what you want” (Nye
2004). Soft power in this capacity represents a form of reputational politics and
diplomacy and reflects a nation’s power of attraction (Grix and Lee 2013) – influ-
encing both internal and external perspectives of the state to foster goodwill and
build political, economic, and cultural influence.
This chapter explores soft power and the geopolitical era of sport within the
context of the Kingdom of Saudi Arabia’s (KSA) broadening efforts to cultivate
and exploit soft power. In so doing, the nature of soft power and soft disem-
powerment are discussed, and the mimetic isomorphism behind Saudi Arabia’s
investments and interests in global sport is explored.

Soft Power
Sport as a source of soft power is well established. Nations have sought to
secure the hosting rights of mega-sporting events such as the Olympic Games
and the FIFA World Cup for geopolitical means, seeking to alter both internal

DOI: 10.4324/9781003348238-20
142 Nicholas Burton and Michael L. Naraine

and external audiences’ impressions and perspectives of the nation by aligning

with global sporting bodies and thus growing the nation’s reputation interna-
tionally (Manzenreiter 2010). Examples of such soft power–driven sport host-
ing include China’s hosting of the 2008 Beijing Summer Olympic Games (Grix
and Lee 2013); Brazil’s dual hosting of the 2014 FIFA World Cup and 2016 Rio
de Janeiro Summer Olympic Games (Grix, Brannagan, and Houlihan 2015);
Russia’s political aspirations behind the 2014 Sochi Winter Olympic Games
(Grix and Kramareva 2017); and Qatar’s extensive soft power strategy as hosts of
the 2022 FIFA World Cup (Brannagan and Giulianotti 2015).
Similarly, the growth of state-owned sponsorship and property ownership has
been guided by geopolitical and economic motives, emphasizing the potential for
states to leverage multiple sport stakeholders for strategic gain. Soft power spon-
sorship, as described by Chadwick, Widdop, and Burton (2022), entails the spon-
sorship of a sports property by a state or state-owned corporation with the intent
to promote the nation-state’s attractiveness, culture, or policies. Such agreements
have become commonplace in global sport, affording nations an opportunity to
engage with established and respected sporting bodies, and to enter into diplo-
matic and economic relations with diverse markets. Examples include Dubai-
owned airline Emirates’ vast sponsorship portfolio across European football,
rugby, and tennis; Russian state oil corporation Gazprom’s extensive investments
in German and European football, including partnerships with UEFA and FC
Schalke 04; and Azerbaijan’s former sponsorship of Atlético Madrid.
Such sporting strategies illustrate soft power’s particular focus on reputation
management, attractiveness, legitimacy, and relationship development. Unlike
nation branding or similar constructs of state-identity creation and marketing,
soft power is commonly derived of economic, political, and diplomatic part-
nerships enabling a nation to engage with other nations, major economic or
commercial stakeholders, as well as both internal and external audiences. How
nations have approached the strategic exertion and exploitation of soft power,
however, remains an area in need of greater examination. Which nations are
best suited to leverage sporting partnerships for geopolitical gain? What strate-
gic partnerships and investments afford the greatest reputational benefits? What
external pressures inform countries’ soft power efforts? In these respects, the
example of Saudi Arabia may provide some important insight.

Saudi Arabia and Sport

Amongst the most prominent recent examples of soft power exertion through
sport, Saudi Arabia’s approach has been multifaceted, comprising a diverse array
of property partnerships and event hosting, strategic investment in foreign sport,
and new property creation. Saudi Arabia’s investments have included a 15-year
partnership agreed with Formula 1 which saw the kingdom host its first Grand
Prix (GP) in 2021 in Jeddah, as well as an extensive motorsports sponsorship
portfolio. The kingdom’s relationship with F1 has been reported as being worth
 Sport and Saudi Arabia 143

up to $65 million per year to Formula 1, in addition to state-owned Aramco’s

sponsorship agreement with F1 worth more than $40 million per year to grant
the Saudi oil corporation title sponsor status for the Spanish, Hungarian, and
American GPs (Edmondson 2022). Aramco’s sponsorship portfolio also includes
Aston Martin’s F1 team and the title sponsorship of the Indian Premier League’s
Orange and Purple Caps awards, further diversifying Saudi Arabia’s economic
network beyond the Gulf region.
As well as their investments in motorsports, Saudi Arabia has also partnered
with World Wrestling Entertainment to host and promote events in the kingdom
since 2014, including a marquee pay-per-view event known as “Crown Jewel”;
professional golf circuits on the men’s Asian Tour and Ladies European Tour
(first hosting annual events in 2019 and 2020, respectively); and a $146 million
agreement with the Spanish Football Association to host the Spanish Super Cup
(Dixon 2021).
Perhaps most significant, however, have been the kingdom’s two most recent
developments in their sports strategy: a growing network of Saudi-owned
football clubs globally, including the purchase of England’s Newcastle United
Football Club in October 2021; and the founding of the LIV Golf tour in 2022,
a Saudi-funded men’s professional circuit intended to compete with the PGA
Tour and European Tour. Negotiations with Newcastle’s previous ownership,
the Premier League, and the UK government lasted 18 months, following con-
cerns regarding Saudi sportswashing (the use of sport event hosting, ownership,
sponsorship, and more to improve an actor’s questionable or tarnished reputa-
tion), potential impropriety in the new ownership’s Owners’ and Directors’ Test
which all English club owners must pass, and disputes within the Premier League
and its broadcast partners over Saudi Arabia’s BeOutQ, a pirate channel which
rebroadcast Qatar’s beIN illegally in response to diplomatic tensions between
Qatar and Saudi Arabia.
The creation of LIV Golf has proven similarly fractious, challenging the
PGA Tour’s hegemony in professional golf and attempting to upset the status
quo on the men’s side. Originally proposed as the Saudi Golf League, LIV Golf
was created with the explicit aim of attracting men’s golf ’s top players through
substantial guaranteed event purses and appearance fees, spearheaded by former
great Greg Norman and co-designed by Phil Mickelson. The circuit succeeded
in partnering with the Asian Tour to grant the league legitimacy, and secured
partnerships with championship-level clubs as hosts across the United States and
Europe. Central to its creation and allure to professional golfers has been Saudi
Arabia’s considerable wealth and spending power, including former major cham-
pions Phil Mickelson and Dustin Johnson who received a reported $200 million
and $120 million, respectively, for agreeing to join the new circuit (Ferguson
2022).
Alongside these more prominent investments, high-ranking members of
the royal court have further extended Saudi state-funded involvement in sport
through various club ownership agreements, including Spanish football club UD
144 Nicholas Burton and Michael L. Naraine

Alméria (owned by royal advisor Turki Al-Sheikh), and English club Sheffield
United, French club FB Chateauroux, Belgian team KFCO Beerschot Wilrijk,
Kerala United of India, and Al-Hilal United in the UAE (all owned by Prince
Abdullah bin Mosaad bin Abdul Aziz al-Saud).
These purchases have followed the Saudi state’s 2030 strategic vision, which
specifically outlines sport and the use of sporting properties (both internal
and external to Saudi Arabia) as political, economic, and diplomatic assets to
be employed by the nation and the Saudi royal family. This followed Qatar’s
2020 strategic vision, which described the Qatari royal family and political lead-
ers’ intended use of sport in the nation’s redevelopment and reputation-building
on a global stage. Accordingly, the case of KSA should not solely be viewed as
ambition derived unilaterally, but rather as a strategy strongly influenced by their
Gulf rivals, the UAE and Qatar, and their use of sport to exert greater geopoliti-
cal influence in the region; such an approach is reflective of a form of mimetic
isomorphism and provides a useful lens through which to examine sport’s geo-
political evolution.

Mimetic Isomorphism and Soft Disempowerment

Through Sport
Isomorphism is the process by which entities operating in a similar environ-
ment achieve homogeneity in their practice (Greenwood et al. 2008). Typically,
isomorphism occurs through two stages: (1) an entity surveys its environment
and implements a new practice or behaviour to ascertain competitive advantage
and (2) additional entities in a similar environment implementing the identical
course of action to resemble one another. In sport, isomorphism is well estab-
lished. For example, risk-averse sport organizations are known to follow each
other’s lead, as has been the case with digital advancements like the adoption
of social media (Naraine and Parent 2016). There are three pressures known to
instigate isomorphism, none more applicable in this context than the mimetic
isomorphic pressure. In this regard, entities implement the actions of others in
their environment because they perceive those practices to be successful and seek
to mimic the competitor to stay relevant: the UAE and Qatar initiate new prac-
tices, and the KSA follows suit. With the former states, there has been a tradi-
tion of soft power exertion through sponsorship and club ownership, accelerated
by Qatar’s aggressive pursuit of sport event hosting opportunities. With Qatar’s
relative success in this capacity, it is unsurprising that the latter would embark on
a similar trajectory. Consequently, KSA’s sporting ambitions are as much keeping
up with the Qatari royal family and that nation’s increasing soft power activities
as wanting to chart their own course of sport development, physical literacy, and
entertainment for its citizens.
As well as illustrating the mimetic isomorphism of Gulf States’ geopolitical
strategies in exploiting global sport investments and event hosting, the Saudi
Arabian example equally provides evidence of the tangible risk posed to nations
 Sport and Saudi Arabia 145

in seeking to cultivate soft power – namely, soft disempowerment. First pro-

posed by Brannagan and Giulianiotti (2015), soft disempowerment refers to
those instances where a nation’s attempts at cultivating or manifesting soft power
may instead result in audiences taking offence, grow alienation from that nation,
or cause upset, in turn negatively affecting the nation’s perceived attractiveness.
Such risks have long been component to event hosting: a poorly organized event
brings with it the potential for negative publicity or loss of attractiveness on the
part of a host city or country. However, for nations seeking to employ sporting
events or investments as a geopolitical tool through which to grow international
reputation, these risks are magnified.
Whilst Saudi Arabia’s sporting investments have been strategic as a mecha-
nism for exploiting soft power and achieving geopolitical objectives, in line with
prior efforts by Qatar and the UAE, both the purchase of Newcastle United
and the Saudi investment firm’s creation of new men’s professional golf circuit
(amongst others) have been met with active resistance and forceful opposition
within sport and media. Media, Amnesty International, and athlete participants
have been vocal in condemning the Saudi royal family’s perceived sportswash-
ing, the murder of journalist Jamal Khashoggi, and its efforts to conceal and
cleanse the nation’s human rights record. These concerns have proven valid in
light of Newcastle supporters’ active promotion and celebration of the Saudi
takeover and rejection of criticism regarding human rights and civil liberties
in the country, alongside public statements by pro golfers Phil Mickelson and
Lee Westwood justifying their participation in the Saudi league prioritizing the
financial rewards offered over and above known human rights abuses in the state.
Such rationalizations and justifications exemplify sportswashing and have cast
negative light on Saudi Arabia’s actions within the global press. The widespread
condemnation received is indicative of the risks of attempting to use sport as a
soft power vehicle for nations, and the potential soft disempowerment faced by
states actively seeking to use sport to cleanse their image and redefine their repu-
tation on a global scale.
Soft disempowerment most commonly manifests as a result of three primary
sources: (i) a nation’s contravention of international laws and rules; (ii) that nation
failing to uphold international conventions or standards on global development;
and (iii) the state acting in ways that have direct and negative impacts on other
individual nations or communities of nations (Brannagan and Giulianotti 2018).
In the Saudi context, the state’s active role in the Yemeni conflict, BeOutQ’s
piracy of Qatar’s beIN broadcasts, and long-standing concerns regarding the
country’s treatment of women and marginalized groups each serve to illustrate
Saudi Arabia’s contentious global reputation.
These concerns of soft disempowerment are not unique to Saudi Arabia,
however. Other Gulf nations (e.g., Qatar, the UAE) have faced similar criti-
cism decrying sportswashing and serious issues with the kafala labour system
and women’s rights. Qatari’s winning bid to host the 2022 FIFA World Cup,
for example, resulted in aggressive media coverage and criticism from the
146 Nicholas Burton and Michael L. Naraine

international community regarding the country’s labour rights and treatment of

migrant workers, corruption and collusion within FIFA, and concerns regard-
ing the state’s ability to expend tremendous wealth as a means to paper over its
perceived cracks rather than effectuating actual societal, economic, or political
change (Brannagan and Rookwood 2016). The successes of the state in securing
the World Cup, however, alongside Paris Saint-Germain’s considerable accom-
plishments and the UAE’s ability to leverage Manchester City and City Football
Group for global expansion, suggest that soft disempowerment can be overcome
through investment and reputation management.
Brannagan and Giulianotti (2015) argued that the success of a nation in adopt-
ing a soft power strategy through sport will ultimately depend on their ability
to overcome and address those issues posed by disempowerment, to confront the
challenges highlighted by both internal and external audiences, and to effectuate
change that is conveyed and communicated in a positive light on an interna-
tional stage. For Saudi Arabia, then, in order to mitigate the considerable nega-
tive publicity and allegations of sportswashing attracted by the kingdom’s recent
investments in sport, the nation and its leadership must use sport as a vehicle
through which to effectuate political, economic, and social change within the
country. This could include significant sociocultural and sociopolitical advances
in the nation’s treatment of women and the LGBTQ community, economic and
trade diversification beyond fossil fuels, or a modernization of the nation’s image
through cultural influences such as music or the arts.

Conclusion
The potential loss of attractiveness and diminished reputation is a sizeable risk
for nations seeking to adopt a sporting soft power strategy. Despite Saudi Arabia’s
immense wealth and important standing within the Gulf region as a major eco-
nomic, diplomatic, and cultural driver for both the Arab and Muslim worlds,
engaging with sport on an international stage has invited considerable media and
public scrutiny of Saudi domestic and diplomatic policy. Allegations of sports-
washing and concerns regarding the country’s motives in engaging with sport
event hosting and ownership, and criticism from non-governmental agencies
such as Amnesty International over the nation’s human rights record and its
treatment of women, the LGBTQ+ community, and migrant workers, are indic-
ative of the challenges faced by Saudi leaders and the royal family. However, as
the Qatar and UAE examples have illustrated, soft disempowerment can beget
soft power where progress is achieved – and more importantly – communicated,
or where investment in beloved sporting institutions and events outweighs the
criticisms faced.
 Sport and Saudi Arabia 147

References
Brannagan, P. M. and Giulianotti, R. (2015) Soft power and soft disempowerment: Qatar,
global sport and football’s 2022 World Cup Finals. Leisure Studies 34(6): 703–719.
Brannagan, P. M. and Giulianotti, R. (2018) The soft power-soft disempowerment
nexus: The case of Qatar. International Afairs 94(5): 1139–1157.
Brannagan, P. M. and Rookwood, J. (2016) Sports mega-events, soft power and soft
disempowerment: International supporters’ perspectives on Qatar’s acquisition of
the 2022 FIFA World Cup fnals. International Journal of Sport Policy and Politics 8(2):
173–188.
Chadwick, S., Widdop, P. and Burton, N. (2022) Soft power sports sponsorship – A
social network analysis of a new sponsorship form. Journal of Political Marketing 21(2):
196–217.
Dixon, E. (2021, June 7) Report: Spanish Super Cup staying in Saudi Arabia until
2029. SportsProMedia, https://www.sportspromedia.com/news/spanish-super-cup
-saudi-arabia-hosting-2029-rfef/.
Edmondson, L. (2022, March 31) It’s F1’s ‘duty’ to continue racing in Saudi Arabia, says
CEO Stefano Domenicali. ESPN, https://www.espn.com/f1/story/_/id/33637311/
stefano-domenicali-f1-duty-continue-racing-saudi-arabia.
Ferguson, D. (2022, June 6) Phil Mickelson joins feld for 1st evet of breakaway Saudi-
funded golf tour. CBC News, https://www.cbc.ca/sports/golf/golf-phil-mickelson
-joins-liv-feld-1.6479227.
Grix, J., Brannagan, P. M. and Houlihan, B. (2015) Interrogating states’ soft power
strategies: A case study of sports mega-events in Brazil and the UK. Global Society
29(3): 463–479.
Grix, J. and Kramareva, N. (2017) The Sochi Winter Olympics and Russia’s unique soft
power strategy. Sport in Society 20(4): 461–475.
Grix, J. and Lee, D. (2013) Soft power, sports mega-events and emerging states: The lure
of the politics of attraction. Global Society 27(4): 521–536.
Greenwood, R., Oliver, C., Suddaby, R. and Sahlin-Andersson, K. (2008) Handbook of
Organization Institutionalism. London: Sage.
Manzenreiter, W. (2010) The Beijing Games in the Western imagination of China: The
weak power of soft power. Journal of Sport and Social Issues 34: 29–48.
Naraine, M. L. and Parent, M. M. (2016) “Birds of a feather”: An institutional approach
to Canadian national sport organizations’ social-media use. International Journal of
Sport Communication 9: 140–162.
Nye, J. S. (1990) Soft power. Foreign Policy 80: 153–171.
Nye, J. S. (2004) Soft Power: The Means to Success in World Politics. New York, NY: Public
Afairs.
18
SPORT WASHING AND
THE GULF REGION
Myth or Reality?

Simon Chadwick and Paul Widdop

Introduction
Over the last two decades, countries in the Gulf region have spent consider-
able sums of money investing in sport – domestically, regionally, and globally.
Indeed, the Qatari government has spent US$240 billion on preparing to stage
the 2022 FIFA men’s World Cup; Saudi Arabia’s Public Investment Fund has
instigated the highly controversial LIV golf series, which pays total prize money
of US$25 million per event; Abu Dhabi owns the football club Manchester City,
of the English Premier League, which has spent US$1.7 billion on acquiring
talent; and Bahrain’s sovereign wealth fund owns a 60% stake in the McLaren
Formula 1 team (the other shares being held by Saudi Arabia’s PIF).
Some activist groups, members of the media, and commentators often label
such activities as being sport washing; that is, the deployment of sport by a state
entity for the purposes of laundering a country’s image and reputation. Instead
of seeing human rights abuses, the suppression of minority groups, or aggres-
sive military campaigns, it is said that by investing in sport countries like Qatar
and Saudi Arabia make attempts to distract people’s attentions away from their
crimes, political ideology, and misdemeanours by staging a global sport mega-
event, buying a high-profle sport team, or engaging in a high-profle sponsor-
ship deal.
However, the concept of sport washing is elusive, in that, it hasn’t really
been empirically identifed or validated, and even less is known about the micro
mechanisms that underpin it. Furthermore, beyond accusations that countries
sport wash, there is little work of any systematic note that scientifcally or satis-
factorily examines the supposed phenomenon. As such, it is unclear what forms
sport washing can take, how sport washing works, what motivates countries to

DOI: 10.4324/9781003348238-21
 Sport Washing and the Gulf Region 149

engage in sport washing, and what outcomes can be achieved by countries that
seek to capitalize upon sport washing.
As such, this chapter examines how the term “sport washing” emerged, what
it means, what it involves, and the issues associated with its use.

The Nature of Sport Washing

During British colonial rule in South Africa, it is estimated that as many as
150,000 people were held in concentration camps, of which 28,000 may have
died in the 40 camps the British had constructed. At the same time, the British
government was encouraging its sports teams to visit South Africa, one media
outlet at the time noting that

The Bakers Cup, Suzman Cup, and Godfrey South African Challenge Cup
were national [soccer] competitions that electrifed crowds in Johannesburg
and Durban. Tours by professional clubs from Britain added to the enor-
mous excitement, an atmosphere sustained by popular discourse and
improving sports coverage in the press.

Whether sport was deployed by the British as a means of cultural imperialism, or

either to suppress South Africans or as a means through which to shift attention
away from its infractions and abuses, the current global discourse employed in
this context would surely have seen the British being labelled as sport washers.
Throughout the history of the eighteenth and nineteenth centuries, Britain’s
use of sport in the Indian subcontinent and other commonwealth nations would
perhaps see them as the architects of sport washing, long before oil was found
in the Gulf. In other words, the country may have been using sport (specifcally
soccer, cricket, and rugby) to cleanse its image and reputation by washing away
what the British government didn’t want South Africans and the other citizens
under colonial rule to see or think.
Indeed, there have been other, similar such episodes; for instance, Germany’s
hosting of the 1936 Olympic Games appears to ft the template of what is now
commonly referred to as sport washing. Adolf Hitler seemingly deployed the
event as a means of projecting his political ideology and worldview, burnish-
ing his reputation, and legitimizing his malicious intentions. However, it was
not until the twenty-frst century’s second decade that the term appears to have
frst been used. Indeed, there are specifc contexts within which the label is
commonly applied, notably among autocracies with questionable human rights
records or with signifcant domestic problems that are either ignored or oth-
erwise not satisfactorily addressed, at least to outside observers. Typically, this
has meant that Gulf nations are often described as being sport washers, though
countries such as Great Britain have historically avoided being associated with
what is now often seen as being an insidious, deceitful practice.
150 Simon Chadwick and Paul Widdop

In 2018, the murder of journalist Jamal Ahmad Khashoggi in Saudi Arabia’s

embassy in Istanbul caused a global outcry, which appeared to take even gov-
ernment ofcials in Riyadh by surprise. At the time of writing this chapter (in
2022), the matter is still widely discussed, framing Saudi Arabia in the eyes of
many as a threatening, villainous nation. Later, in early 2020, reports began
to emerge that the country’s sovereign wealth fund PIF was trying to acquire
English Premier League football club Newcastle United. Immediately, the pop-
ular discourse and prevailing narrative began to assert that Saudi Arabia was
seeking to use sport to divert attention from Khashoggi’s killing (amongst other
things). Amnesty International even weighed into the debate, asserting that the
deal was a distraction from human rights abuses. For a variety of reasons, the
purchase of Newcastle United wasn’t completed until October 2021, during
which time debate raged about whether the purchase was an example of sport
washing. Some observed that United fans were weaponized by Saudi Arabia to
represent its interests; indeed, some of the club’s fans attacked critics on social
media, at times aggressively so.
It remains a moot point whether Saudi Arabia deliberately and strategically
intended to use its purchase of Newcastle United as an instrument of sport
washing; there is no scientifcally derived evidence to prove the case either
way. Indeed, more than a cursory analysis of Saudi Arabia’s investments in
sport reveals a country amidst profound socio-economic changes. It is spend-
ing upwards of US$1 trillion on sport and sport-related projects, which would
appear to be an inordinately large amount of money simply for the purposes of
changing people’s perceptions of the country. Sport in Saudi Arabia is seen as
a way of diversifying the country’s economy, of rebranding what many see as
an antiquated nation, and of efecting positive change in spheres such as gender
equality. Within the kingdom there is also a growing health and obesity prob-
lem, and in fact the nation has one of the lowest physical activity levels recorded
globally. There are other domestic reasons for the commitment to engaging in
sport; indeed, through the exposure to and difusion of sport, its population will
become central to the more active lifestyles and healthier living. Therefore, to
reduce a policy commitment by a signifcant regional and international power
to only being sport washing has been somewhat naive and misguided. The issue
of whether sport washing is real or perceived is therefore an important one that
needs to be addressed. Nevertheless, it also warrants observers and analysts con-
templating whether sport washing is a deliberate or a strategic act, or if it can be
unintentional and, therefore, accidental.

The Process of Cleansing

The prevailing popular discourse about sport washing thus far appears to be
rooted in the Global North, particularly Europe. In countries characterized by
liberal democratic values – such as Denmark, Germany, and Great Britain –
the labelling as sport washing of what Gulf nations engage in is perhaps most
 Sport Washing and the Gulf Region 151

vehement. Indeed, it has become a tagline for both media and social commen-
tary. Usage of the term is rather less well established in the United States, where
awareness of it has only recently begun to grow following the Saudi Arabian
Public Investment Fund’s creation of the LIV golf series. Perhaps, this in and of
itself is signifcant. Golf in the United States has a certain cultural capital and
embedded within certain sections of its population – popular with elites and the
transnational classes. Donald Trump, George Bush, and Jef Bezos, amongst oth-
ers, all have signifcant levels of interest in the sport. As the Saudi government
begins to invest in and restructure the game, the country’s intentions have started
to register with US audiences. An awareness of sport washing is becoming estab-
lished in the United States.
In the Gulf itself, indeed across the Global South more generally, there seems
to be little, if any, debate about sport washing. Indeed, Yasir Al-Rumayyan –
Governor of Saudi Arabia’s Public Investment Fund and Chairman of Newcastle
United – has even said that he does not recognize or understand the term.
Rhetoric aside, this does raise two important questions: Firstly, how does one’s
politico-cultural lens shape the deployment of sport washing as a label for another
country’s investments in sport? Secondly, to what extent is use of the term “sport
washing” co-created by activist groups, the media, football fans, and others?
Perhaps the Global North set in motion a self-fulflling prophecy whereby it has
co-created political narratives around sport washing, that wasn’t the intention
of the countries’ use of sport, which then ultimately leads to that country being
accused of using sport to blindside the world.
Both questions are highly pertinent as in the cases thus far mentioned above,
rather than becoming a supposed distraction from malicious acts, investment in
sport by Gulf nations has become prominent in discussions about and analyses of
them. This would appear to contradict what we are told is the purpose of sport
washing, though it does raise further important issues. Though the initial scru-
tiny associated with an investment in sport may shine a spotlight on the country
making that investment, through processes of legitimization and normalization,
there may be a point at which mass attentiveness to suspicions of sport washing
eventually ceases. Indeed, following once vehement criticism of Bahrain’s and
Abu Dhabi’s initial staging of Formula 1 races, both events are far less questioned
and more frmly embedded in the sport’s annual calendar. This implies that a
process of legitimization has taken place, suggesting that rather than seeking to
wash their images or reputations, such countries are instead seeking to attain
legitimacy in the eyes of others. Some observers might alternatively frame sport
washing as soft power projection – a way of engaging key target audiences via
the power of attraction – by demonstrating that you share the same values and
ambitions as they do. For those with an interest in sport washing, it is important
that clarity and understanding exist in any comparisons or distinctions made
between the two phenomena.
Assuming sport washing exists and is a deliberate, strategic act (whilst retain-
ing a notion that it could also be accidental and unintended), the implication is
152 Simon Chadwick and Paul Widdop

that there is a conceptual basis underpinning to its deployment by policymakers.

Put another way, in arguing that sport washing exists also assumes that govern-
ment decision-makers are clear about their motives for undertaking it, who their
target audiences are, how the process of sport washing takes place, and what out-
comes it delivers. Currently, no evidence exists to either prove or disprove any
of these things. The academic literature in this feld is poorly developed, whilst
observers postulating about sport washing have done so without ofering any
detailed, coherent, or systematically collected data. At one level, this casts doubt
upon sport washing’s existence; at another it emphasizes the need for a rudimen-
tary understanding of how it might work. In simple terms an understanding of
human behaviour is required, linking the motives of people with their attitude
formation and, ultimately, their behaviours. Put another way: researchers need
to create and test the validity of models that seek to explain sport washing and
how it works.
Returning to the case of Newcastle United and the club’s acquisition by the
Public Investment Fund, this would mean that in the frst instance Saudi Arabian
government ofcials had an insight into the motives of the club’s fans. That is,
why people from the North-East of England would jump to the defence of and
become advocates on behalf of the Gulf state. In studies of human psychology,
motives shape attitudes – the mindset, outlook, and feelings that people have
towards something. If this is, perhaps, the essence of sport washing, then the
Riyadh government’s purchase of the English club worked from the outset. In
fact, throughout the protracted acquisition process, United fans became some-
thing akin to online warriors fghting on behalf of the Saudi cause, many of them
taking to social media as they sought to advocate on behalf of both the takeover
and the Gulf state.
The Twitter weaponization of Newcastle’s fans, be it deliberate or accidental,
represents a clear opportunity for researchers to establish the role in sport wash-
ing played by social media platforms, and by fans. The journey from attitude
formation to the public display of pro-Saudi Arabian behaviours was a relatively
short one. Indeed, as the takeover neared completion in late 2021, some United
fans took to wearing a Saudi Arabian thobe (white robe) and a ghuthrain (head
covering) on match days. Yet behaviours need not always be so crass and may
extend to the ways in which people talk about a country and the purchase of
products from that country. We speculate that there may even be a country-of-
origin efect associated with the behavioural outcomes of sport washing. This
efect has been widely studied as, when making associations between a country
and the products it produces, there is clear evidence that people’s consumption
behaviours in relation to that country are infuenced by their attitudes towards
it. Considerable doubts must, however, remain about the power of Newcastle
United fans alone and the club itself to efect positive changes in general attitudes
and behaviours towards Saudi Arabia. At best, this surely can be efective only
if it is part of a wider programme of activities aimed at repositioning a country’s
image and reputation.
 Sport Washing and the Gulf Region 153

The “Whataboutery” of Sport Washing

Sport’s current debate about sport washing, one could refer to it as an obses-
sion, is immature and marked by the infammatory language of binary ideolo-
gists intent on asserting their own position rather than understanding a complex
phenomenon. In the Global North, attempts to compare-and-contrast the likes
of colonial-era Britain with twenty-frst-century Qatar are sometimes met with
derision and claims of “whataboutery”. Yet examining the ways in which coun-
tries have deployed sport for political purposes is not an attempt to sidestep seri-
ous issues nor to excuse one country or another for the misdemeanours in which
they have engaged. Instead, it is about establishing a breadth of knowledge and
depth of understanding, which the present diatribe fails to do. Those who make
the most noise about sport washing or else plead ignorance to its existence are
typically both disingenuous: unverifed, unvalidated suppositions do not estab-
lish a phenomenon’s existence, nor its absence. In failing to establish a shared
understanding about sport washing, the next time that a Gulf nation hosts a sport
mega-event, observers in the Global North will rally to the dog whistle call of
popular condemnation. Yet, so long as the likes of Qatar and Saudi Arabia fail
to make satisfactory progress in changing labour market laws or improving the
rights of women, then they expose themselves, perhaps rightly so, to claims of
sport washing.
As researchers and analysts, we must be careful to include other evidence
in our analyses of sport washing. Great Britain has long used sport to engage
important audiences around the world, which its government often labels as
soft power projection. However, with more than one hundred thousand modern
slaves currently living in the country and the government committed to deport-
ing immigrants to Rwanda, it would be remiss of commentators not to examine
the proposition that Britain has always been a sport washing nation. In the same
way, we should not forget Rwanda itself, a country that has been widely accused
of indulging in the practice, most notably through a series of state-led sponsor-
ships with the likes of Arsenal of the English League. Yet little attention has been
paid to the National Basketball Association’s activities in Rwanda or, for that
matter, in Abu Dhabi. Commentators in the Global North may not like it, but
there are grounds also for labelling the United States as a sport washing nation.
However, this chapter is not intended as a litany of speculation or grievance;
instead, it is intended as the basis for asking difcult questions about an impor-
tant matter, something we still know very little about. For the sake of sport, we
must establish a more sophisticated understanding. We never hear about “movie
washing” or “tourism washing”, it is always a problem within sport; hence, it is
important to move on from perpetuating the myths of sport washing to under-
standing the realities. We must strive to remove the term as a catch-all phrase,
with zero grounding in empirical evidence, or understanding of its mechanisms
– that is, if it even actually exists. If not, those commentators in the Global North
who deploy the term face being accused of cultural imperialism or orientalism.
154 Simon Chadwick and Paul Widdop

Bibliography
Chadwick, S. (2018). Sport-washing, soft power and scrubbing the stains. Asia and the
Pacifc Policy Forum. 24th August. Retrieved from https://www.policyforum.net/sport
-washing-soft-power-and-scrubbing-the-stains/
Chadwick, S. (2021). Are nations playing the game of ‘sport washing?’. The Hill. 15th
December. Retrieved from https://thehill.com/opinion/international/585890-are
-nations-playing-the-game-of-sport-washing/
Lauletta, T. (2022). LIV Golf has brought ‘sportswashing’ into everyday conversation.
But what is the Saudi government really doing and why should people care? Insider.
2nd August. Retrieved from https://www.insider.com/what-is-sportswashing-liv
-golf-saudi-government-2022-7
19
GEOPOLITICS OF CRICKET IN INDIA
Mohit Anand

In India, cricket often blurs the lines between passion and obsession. India
has emerged as the key economic player in world cricket which is now
leveraged more than ever towards its political objectives. As the geopoliti-
cal tensions with its nemesis China occurred in 2020, it has its commercial
implications for Chinese mobile company “Vivo” which was replaced as
the title sponsor of the Indian Premier League (IPL) for cricket by the
“TATA” – India’s leading conglomerate. This is refective of the use of
economy of sport as a geopolitical ploy to signal its adversaries that coun-
tries can go above and beyond diplomatic, military, and informational
means to achieve its objectives. Cricket as a sport is an example of the
use of emotive passion, leveraging its massive commercialization and con-
sumption as a geopolitical economy of sport towards its ongoing tensions
with its adversaries.

Celebrated Australian cricketer Steve Waugh commented,

Few nations have a relationship with sport such as India’s connection to

the sport of cricket. The sport has become so ingrained in the culture
that to many it could be considered a religion, with superstars like Sachin
Tendulkar and Virat Kohli reaching almost legendary status amongst their
fellow countrymen.
(Waugh, 2020)

If at all it has to be compared, cricket as a sport can be somewhat attributed to

as to what soccer (or football) is for Brazil. India may not do well in multidisci-
plinary sports like athletics, soccer, and swimming. For example it just won one
gold medal in Tokyo Olympics, but it is a powerhouse in cricket. India has won

DOI: 10.4324/9781003348238-22
156 Mohit Anand

the cricket World Cup twice, in 1983 and in 2011; it also won the inaugural
Twenty20 World Cup in 2007 and the Champions Trophy in 2002 and 2013.
India is consistently ranked among the top competing teams across all three for-
mats of one day, T20, and fve day Test series (ICC, 2022).
The British brought cricket to India in the early 1700s, with the frst doc-
umented instance of cricket match played in 1721 (Clement, 1924). Although
cricket’s origins have been linked to the colonial times, it gained tremendous
popularity and was accepted as a mainstream sport in the country. It has become
much more popular than hockey (the national sport of the country). Ashis Nandy
– a well-known political psychologist and social theorist – rightly pointed out that
“Cricket is an Indian game accidentally discovered by the British”. In his book,
he analyses the origins of cricket and puts forward the theory that cricket was
actually invented by the Indians and then adopted by the British (Nandy, 1989).
Irrespective of its origins, it is without doubt that India has helped popular-
ized and commercialized cricket to a large extent. With almost 1.4 billion people
(1/6th of the world population), cricket commands immense popularity in India
as a sport for the masses. Every park, club, maidan (open spaces), and gully (road-
side alleys) of the country is dotted with children playing cricket. In a country
which is so diverse and multifaceted, where nothing is or can be generalized
about its society, culture, and people, cricket is one rare and common idea that
galvanizes and binds its people like nothing else. Cricket, therefore, draws a lot
of passion and emotion among the people here. In this cricket-obsessed nation,
cricketers like Sachin Tendulkar, M.S. Dhoni, and Kapil Dev are cult fgures, so
much so that many Bollywood movies have been made on their life (e.g. M.S.
Dhoni, 83, Azhar).
Over the past two decades, cricket has ushered in a lot of commercial inter-
ests, raking in billions of dollars from sponsorships, TV and broadcasters, online
streaming rights, royalty fee, etc. It lies at the centre stage of this commerciali-
zation of this often called “gentleman’s game”. Historian Ramachandra Guha
(2002) opined that the live coverage of cricket, as well as India’s success, broad-
ened the sport’s “catchment area” and “got more housewives involved in watch-
ing cricket, as well as more people outside the big cities”. At a time when other
Indian sports were languishing, television made cricket central to the Indian
sport fan’s imagination. BCCI (Board of Control for Cricket in India) is the
governing body for cricket in India. It is the richest and most infuential cricket
board in the world; it is in fact richer than the International Cricket Council
(ICC) – the global governing body for cricket. Estimates suggest that 70% of
global cricket revenues come from the Indian market (Wilson, 2017); this, along
with over a billion-plus viewership of cricket, gives the country and its gov-
erning board an unprecedented power and clout in international cricket. Every
cricket playing nation wants to play with India as it brings in much needed rev-
enues for them as well.
In 2008, BCCI launched the “Indian Premier League” (IPL) – the world’s
most lucrative Twenty20 cricket tournament. It runs annually for two months,
 Geopolitics of Cricket in India 157

usually from March to May, bringing in Indian and foreign cricketers to play
among diferent franchises. IPL brings in more prize money for the winning
team than the ofcial World Cup organized by the ICC. The winner of the
IPL 2021 received $2.60 million while the ICC T20 World Cup 2021 winner,
Australia, got $1.6 million (Ali, 2022). On 15 June 2022, the media rights for
IPL 2023–2027 seasons went for a cumulative fgure of over $6.2 billion after
a three-day online auction saw the league’s broadcast value triple from the last
one in 2017. IPL is now the second most valued sporting league in the world in
terms of per-match value ( Jamkhandikar and Ganguly, 2022). With a combined
per-game value of $15.1 million, the IPL vaults past the English Premier League
($11.23 million per game between 2022 and 2025), Major League Baseball, and
the NBA ($9.57 million and $2.12 million per game, respectively, according to a
2020 estimate). It trails only the NFL, which is believed to average a staggering
$36 million per game with its 11-year deal from 2022 to 2033 (Lavalette, 2022).
In coming years, IPL aims to become the biggest sporting league in the world
in terms of revenue, participation, and performance – said BCCI Honorary
Secretary, Mr Jay Shah (BCCI, 2022). IPL as a “sportainment” is construed to
its potential to provide exciting and titillating space; whether through cheerlead-
ers or through its “30 seconds dugout interviews” in between the play sessions;
blurring the line between leisure, sport, and entertainment. While the IPL is
refective of contemporary Western sports frameworks, it incorporates the highly
stylized visual aesthetic and potent celebrity cachet of Indian cinema culture,
with its match entertainment and team branding (Thakur, 2012, pp. 25–27).
Cricket accounts for almost 85% of the Indian sports economy (Raman,
2020). As evident, this massive economic and commercial weight of cricket is
also refected towards exuding political overtones by leveraging it to address
geopolitical objectives. Here two examples are interesting. The frst example
is about how the Indian cricket board wielded its fnancial muscle on ICC and
other national cricket boards to coerce them to fall in line with their politi-
cal agenda. We saw that during the Kashmir Premier League (KPL), when in
August 2021 the Indian cricket board (BCCI) asked the ICC not to recognize
the Pakistan Cricket Board–promoted KPL, the frst edition of which was played
in Pakistan-administered Kashmir. In its letter, the BCCI expressed concerns
about the status of Kashmir as a disputed territory. The Indian cricket board
also cited the political and diplomatic ties between India and Pakistan which
have been fuctuating post-Independence in 1947. BCCI had issued informal
warnings to all cricket boards around the world that those participating in KPL
would be barred from playing in leagues in India or from having any commercial
connection with the BCCI (Chakrabarty, 2021). Former England spinner Monty
Panesar pulled out of the KPL in 2021, citing “political pressure” and “advice”
from the BCCI, terming his participation in the KPL “too risky a decision” for
him. South African batsman Herschelle Gibbs accused the BCCI of attempt-
ing to prevent him from participating in the inaugural KPL. He added that the
BCCI had also threatened with denying him entry in India if he participated in
158 Mohit Anand

the league (Dawn, 2021). BCCI commented that it was well within their rights
to take decisions with respect to the cricketing ecosystem in India and to defend
its posturing on the disputed Kashmir territory – by accusing Pakistan of using
cricket (sport) as a ploy to achieve political gains.
In October 2021, PCB Chairman Rameez Raja told his country’s Senate
Standing Committee that India’s clout in the ICC, based on the world body’s
sponsorship money generated from India-based multinational companies, was
impacting Pakistani cricket. He said that 50% of the funding for PCB comes
from ICC. The global body gets its 90% of its revenue from India, which nec-
essarily means that Indian business houses run Pakistan Cricket, and that “if
tomorrow the Indian Prime Minister decides he will not allow any funding to
Pakistan, this cricket board can collapse” (Ali, 2022).
The second example is as to how the 2020 border skirmish with China
impacted cricket sponsorship in India. In 2020, the decades-long border dispute
spread across the 3,700-kilometre-long Himalayan range between China and
India precipitated into an armed clash between both the armies for the frst time
in over 45 years. The incident happened at the border post in Galwan Valley
(Union Territory of Ladakh), resulting in the death of 20 Indian soldiers while
China didn’t reveal causalities on its side (it is said to be anything between 20 and
35 as per US and Russian Intelligence) (TASS, 2021).
Despite several rounds of negotiations between Special Representatives, the
dispute is nowhere near a solution. The two sides are carrying out one of the
biggest conventional military build-ups along their borders. In a strong response
to this apparent Chinese aggression, India banned 273 Chinese apps, including
TikTok, PUBG, SHAREit, etc. (Garg, 2022), put restrictions on Chinese invest-
ments, and cracked down on Chinese companies in the country (e.g. Xiaomi)
while also not allowing Huawei’s 5G technology in India. Civil society in India
also called for boycott of Chinese products and companies. The tensions were
further aggravated when China’s People’s Liberation Army’s regimental com-
mander, who had sufered severe injuries during the Galwan clash, became the
torchbearer at the Beijing 2022 Winter Olympics Torch Relay (Pathak, 2022).
India announced a diplomatic boycott of the Games. The Ministry of External
Afairs spokesman commented that “It is indeed regrettable that the Chinese side
has chosen to politicize an event like the Olympics” (Marlow, 2022).
Interestingly, since 2016 the title sponsor of the IPL (Indian Premier League)
was Vivo, a China-based smartphone company. Vivo had a deal of approx. $293
million (Rs 2200 crore) for title sponsorship rights initially from 2018 to 2022.
But as a fallout of the Galwan clash in 2020, there was a lot of criticism of the
BCCI (India’s cricket board) for retaining the sponsorship of Vivo and, amidst
public backlash, calls were made to cancel Vivo’s sponsorship of the IPL. Vivo
was caught on the back foot and eventually walked away from the 2020 IPL
season due to rising anti-China sentiments across the nation and sensing the fact
that in the current environment, sponsoring IPL will do more harm than good
to the their brand (Laghate, 2020).
 Geopolitics of Cricket in India 159

However, the 2021 season saw their return as the principal sponsor, anticipat-
ing that things might have normalized a year after the military stand-of (DNA,
2022). They were far from reality; the sustained heightened tensions between
two Asian giants made sure that the anti-China sentiment was not going any-
where. There were heightened tax scrutinies on Chinese mobile phone makers
in the country. In December 2021, the Indian tax department searched several
handset makers, including Xiaomi and Oppo. Oppo and Vivo are brands owned
by the same parent company—China-based BBK Electronics Corp (Khosla,
2022). The ongoing COVID pandemic and global supply chain issues further
exasperated the troubles for Vivo in India. Hence sponsoring the IPL in India for
Vivo was not a good option, from both a political and a commercial perspective.
On 11 January 2022, the IPL governing council agreed to terminate Vivo’s
sponsorship for the remaining two years after the company requested to exit the
IPL sponsorship deal. The IPL sponsorship in turn was given to TATA (India’s
leading business conglomerate) in 2022 and 2023. BCCI Secretary Jay Shah said:

This is indeed a momentous occasion for the BCCI IPL as the Tata Group
is the epitome of global Indian enterprise with an over 100 year old leg-
acy and operations in more than 100 countries across six continents. The
BCCI like the Tata Group is keen to promote the spirit of cricket across
international borders, and the growing popularity of the IPL as a global
sporting franchise bears testimony to the BCCI’s eforts. We are truly
happy that India’s largest and most trusted business groups has believed in
the IPL growth story and together with the Tata Group, we will look to
take Indian cricket and the IPL forward to greater heights.
(Oinam, 2022)

The majority of IPL stakeholders were happy to see the back of Vivo as most
of them weren't comfortable with a Chinese company on board after the
2020 incident that heightened diplomatic tensions between the two countries. A
BCCI source said:

This was supposed to happen sooner or later as Vivo’s presence was bring-
ing bad publicity for both the league as well as the company. With negative
sentiment around Chinese products, the company had to pull out of the
sponsorship with one season left for the deal to be completed.
(Business Standard, 2022)

Anti-Pakistan or anti-China sentiment is not a new thing in India; what is inter-

esting is the greater leverage of sports (cricket in this case) by the nation state
through its sport entities or institutions as a tactical weapon to feed its political
objectives. Whether it’s wielding of the massive fnancial muscle of the BCCI
to coerce other cricket boards and their players not to participate in the KPL or
Vivo’s exit from the IPL sponsorship, they are consequences of the geopolitical
160 Mohit Anand

friction between nations. Thereby engaging economic and commercial aspects

of the sports that helps to further the political rhetoric.
This chapter refects as to how sports and its economy are not just being used
for achieving commercial objectives, but more and more towards serving politi-
cal intentions behind it. Nations, institutions, businesses, and political leaders are
using sports and their emotive and fnancial clout as a tactical tool to exert power,
control, and/or infuence beyond the sports arena. The example of Vivo suggests
that companies need to be cognizant of their operations and cautiously position
and promote their brand and advertising in a sporting event that might turn out
to be counterproductive. It should, therefore, not be assumed that sports industry
and its ecosystem will be spared from such and similar geopolitical skirmishes. In
coming years we will see greater geopolitical economy of sports. Ultimately, the
politics of sports is intertwined with the economics of sports!

References
Ali, Q.M. (2022) ‘Why Indian money rules world cricket’. South Asia Monitor, 17 Feb.
Available from: https://www.southasiamonitor.org/spotlight/why-indian-money
-rules-world-cricket [accessed 19 June 2022].
BCCI (2022) BCCI Announces the Successful Bidders for Acquiring the Media Rights for
the Indian Premier League Seasons 2023–2027. Available from: https://www.bcci.tv/
articles/2022/news/55555891/bcci-announces-the-successful-bidders-for-acquiring
-the-media-rights-for-the-indian-premier-league-seasons-2023-2027?type=Latest
[accessed 23 June 2022].
Business Standard (2022) Tata Group to Replace Vivo as IPL Title Sponsor from this Year.
Available from: https://www.business-standard.com/article/pti-stories/tata-group-to
-replace-vivo-as-ipl-title-sponsors-from-this-year-122011100691_1.html [accessed
20 June 2022].
Chakrabarty, S. (2021) ‘Those part of PoK league can’t play or work in India: BCCI’.
Indian Express, 1 Aug. Available from: https://indianexpress.com/article/sports/cricket
/those-part-of-pok-league-cant-play-or-work-in-india-bcci-7432438/ [accessed
17 June 2022].
Clement, D. (1924) A History of the Indian Wars. London: Oxford University Press.
DAWN (2021) Former England Cricketer Monty Panesar Pulls Out from Kashmir Premier
League Due to ‘Political Pressure’. Available from: https://www.dawn.com/news
/1638389 [accessed 19 June 2022].
DNA (2022) With VIVO Pulling Out and Handing Rights to TATA, IPL Title Sponsors
from 2008 to 2021. Available from: https://www.dnaindia.com/cricket/photo-gallery
-with-vivo-pulling-out-and-handing-rights-to-tata-ipl-title-sponsors-from-2008
-to-2020-pepsi-dream11-dlf-2927935/vivo-ipl-2021-2927955 [accessed 20 June
2022].
Garg, A. (2022) ‘Garena free fre to TikTok: All the 273 Chinese apps that Indian
govt banned so far’. India Today, 15 Feb. Available from: ps://www.indiatoday.in/
technology/news/story/garena-free-fre-to-tiktok-all-the-273-chinese-apps-that
-indian-govt-banned-so-far-1913141-2022-02-15 [accessed 17 June 2022].
Guha, R. (2002) A Corner of a Foreign Field: The Indian History of a British Sport. London:
Pan Macmillan.
 Geopolitics of Cricket in India 161

ICC (2022) Ranking. Available from: https://www.icc-cricket.com/rankings/mens/

overview [accessed 1 August 2022].
Jamkhandikar, S. and S. Ganguly. (2022) ‘IPL broadcast deal fetches $6.2 bln; Disney,
Viacom18 bag rights’. Reuters, 14 June. Available from: https://www.reuters.com
/lifestyle/sports/disneys-star-pays-302-bln-ipl-2023-27-tv-rights-2022-06 -14/
[accessed 17 June 2022].
Khosla, V. (2022) ‘Tata replaces Vivo as IPL title sponsor for fnal two years’. MINT,
12 Jan. Available from: https://www.livemint.com/sports/cricket-news/tata-replaces
-vivo-as-ipl-title-sponsor-for-fnal-two-years-11641926678280.html [accessed
17 June 2022].
Laghate, G. (2020) ‘Chinese smartphone manufacturer Vivo pulls out as title sponsor
of IPL 2020’. The Economic Times, 5 Aug. Available from: https://economictimes
.indiatimes .com /news /sports /vivo -pulls -out -as -title -sponsor -of -ipl -2020/
articleshow/77358587.cms?utm _source=contentof interest&utm _medium=text
&utm_campaign=cppst [accessed 17 June 2022].
Lavalette, T. (2022) ‘Indian premier league’s jaw-dropping $6 billion broadcast deal
will have major ramifcations in cricket’. Forbes, 14 June. Available from: https://
www.forbes.com/sites/tristanlavalette/2022/06/14/the-indian-premier-leagues-jaw
-dropping-6-billion-broadcast-deal-will-have-major-ramifcations-in-cricket/?sh
=684cd37743e6 [accessed 19 June 2022].
Marlow, I. (2022) ‘India to boycott Beijing Olympic ceremonies over PLA torchbearer’.
Bloomberg, 4 Feb. Available from: https://www.bloomberg.com/news/articles
/2022-02-04/india-to-boycott-beijing-olympic-ceremonies-over-pla-torchbearer
[accessed 23 June 2022].
Nandy, A. (1989) The Tao of Cricket: On Games of Destiny and the Destiny of Games. New
Delhi; New York: Penguin.
Oinam, J. (2022) ‘Indian premier league title rights: Tata group, not Dream11, To replace
Vivo from IPL 2022’. Outlook, 11 Jan. Available from: https://www.outlookindia.com
/website/story/sports-news-ipl-2022-tata-group-to-replace-chinas-vivo-as-indian
-premier-league-title-sponsors/409207 [accessed 28 July 2022].
Pathak, S. (2022) ‘Beijing Winter Olympics: DD Sports not to live telecast opening,
closing ceremonies’. Zee News, 3 Feb. Available from: https://zeenews.india.com
/india/beijing-winter-olympics-dd-sports-not-to-live-telecast-opening-closing
-ceremonies-2433269.html [accessed 23 June 2022].
Raman, S. (2020) ‘Impact of covid-19 on revenues of world cricket and Indian sports’.
Mass Communicator: International Journal of Communication Studies, 14(3), pp. 37–40.
Senate of Pakistan, News Detail (2021) In the Meeting of the Senate Standing Committee on
Inter-provincial Coordination Held under the Chairmanship of Senator Mian Raza Rabbani
on 7th October, 2021. Available from: https://senate.gov.pk/en/news_content.php?id
=4061 [accessed 28 July 2022].
TASS (2021) China, India Commence Withdrawal of Forces from Shared Border – Chinese
Defense Ministry. Available from: https://tass.com/world/1254813 [accessed 23 June
2022].
Thakur, R. (2012) ‘Cultural economy of leisure and Indian Premier League (IPL)’. Dialog
(22) (Spring), pp. 21–29.
Waugh, S. (2020) The Spirit of Cricket, India. Macquarie Park, NSW: SAMS Marketing.
Available from: https://stevewaugh.com.au/
Wilson, J. (2017) ‘India’s share of ICC global revenues adjusted after initial vote’. BBC,
22 June. Available from: https://www.bbc.com/sport/cricket/40374596 [accessed
17 June 2022].
PART IV

Africa
20
AFRICA IN THE GLOBAL FOOTBALL
BUSINESS COMPLEX
Gerard A. Akindes

Introduction
Football is undeniably a colonial legacy in Africa (Alegi, 2010; Darby, 2002).
John Sugden and Alan Tomlinson state that “football came to Africa on the
wings of empires” (1998)). As discussed, the British, French, and Portuguese
introduced football in Africa. From the colonial initiation to the contemporary
football business complex, African football evolved with the political, social, and
economic transformations of the continent.
This chapter discusses the evolution of African football from its early years
until its current position and role in the global football ecosystem where a few
stakeholders such as FIFA, selected European leagues and clubs, the UEFA along
with a few Arabian Gulf nations, transnational broadcasters, and transnational
sponsors constitute the key players. The frst part of the chapter is a brief his-
tory of African football prior to its post-independence entrance on the world
stage. This section of the chapter discusses the post-independence evolution of
African football, its institutions, and how African football reached the world
stage. The third section presents the transformations and aspects of African foot-
ball that positioned African football as a stakeholder in the global football busi-
ness complex. The last section and conclusion describes the power structure and
challenges African football faces as an active member of the globalized football
business complex.

Accessing the Football Global Stage

As stated by Peter Alegi (2010, p. 3), football started in 1862 in Africa, and the
frst recorded football game was played in South Africa between whites in the

DOI: 10.4324/9781003348238-24
166 Gerard A. Akindes

Cape and Natal provinces. By the early twentieth century, football was played in
Algeria, Egypt, and the Belgian Congo (Leopoldville) (Table 20.1).
Despite some initial reluctance from the colonial institutions, football in
Africa difused and rapidly became an integral activity for groups such as the
African-schooled elites, and people in contact with Europeans and the African
elite. Alegi posits that starting in the 1990s, football became part of the grow-
ing urban Africa. Clubs created at that time remain among the most important
clubs in the country. Meanwhile, the game continued to spread among indig-
enous populations and progressively became the most popular sport across the
continent.

Football’s Development Along Political Agendas

The early post-independence years were dominated by establishing local leagues,
national and continental governing bodies, and joining FIFA. Football’s devel-
opment in Africa evolved rapidly (sprouting clubs and leagues) and quickly
became a political instrument. The game primarily ofered a unique platform for
articulating political matters such as anticolonial protest, nation-building, and
anti-apartheid solidarity in South Africa.
In Algeria, the role of football as a political instrument was clearly evident in
the formation of a national team that represented the liberation movement from
French colonial dominance. The “Revolutionary team” was known as the FLN1
XI (Darby, 2002) and quickly became highly popular. This team was one of the
most symbolic roles of football in nation creation and building in Africa. Ghana
(through President Kwame Nkrumah) also used football for nation-building.
Alegi notes, “President Kwame Nkrumah fervently believed in the game's capac-
ity to transcend ethnic, linguistic, regional, religious, and generational barriers”
(2010, p. 57). The Black Stars symbolized the nation and was its ambassador.
At the continent level, the formation of the Conféderation Africaine de
Football (CAF) in Khartoum in February 1957 launched African football to the
global stage. Darby calls the confederation a “critical juncture” in the develop-
ment of football in Africa. In February 1957 four independent nations – Egypt,
South Africa, Sudan, and Ethiopia – formed the Conféderation Africaine. In
1961, South Africa was expelled from the confederation by the CAF congress
preceding the Third African Cup of Nations in Ethiopia. By these actions, the
CAF clearly stated its political stand, and CAF also became the main advocate for
African football’s global representation.
By the early 1960s, many African countries, then independent, had their
local leagues, governing bodies, and national teams, and had become members
of CAF and FIFA. While building national and continental structures, African
countries’ participation in the FIFA World Cup in the 1960s and 1970s was lim-
ited to African individuals playing for France and Portugal during the colonial
era and after. Those players playing for Europeans clubs and national teams were
the main contribution of Africa to the global football labour force.
 Africa in the Global Football Business Complex 167

Contribution to the Global Football Labour Market

As stated above, the frst African players to play in Europe were from the former
colonies of France and Portugal. Although Arthur Wharton is the frst African
to play in England in the late 19th century (Vasili, 1998), the more consistent
presence of African footballers started only in the early 20th century when foot-
ballers such as the Moroccan Larbi, known as Ben Barek (the “Black Bead”), held
a European career in France and Spain. Portugal and Belgium also encouraged
the integration of their colonies’ athletes. For example, in 1954, Mário Esteves
Coluna arrived from Mozambique to play in Portugal. Eusebio Ferreira Da Silva
followed in 1961. These two players, Mário and Eusebio, are still ranked among
the greatest players Portugal has ever had. In Belgium, Paul Bonga Bonga from
the Democratic Republic of Congo (DRC) was recruited in the early 1960s to
play for the Standard de Liege (Akindes & Alegi, 2014). He was considered one
of the best footballers in Belgium and beyond in the 1960s.
During the early years of migration, African footballers played professional
football mostly in a few European countries. However, although some leagues
and clubs became professional in the early 20th century, the business model and
administration of most clubs remained closer to amateur football with paid play-
ers. The transfer of African players was on recommendation. Systematic scout-
ing, agents, and transfer fees paid to the club of origin of the players were not
current practice. Africa supplied players to European football clubs, but in lim-
ited number until the late 1980s. From the 1980s, the competitiveness of African
teams on the football world stage was consistent.2 African teams’ performances at
FIFA World Cups and FIFA Youth World Championships increased the attention
given to African players. As a result, the demand for African talent increased in
European football.

Youth Football Achievements

The introduction by the FIFA of new World Cups (the Under 20 in 1977 and the
Under 17 in 1987) put young African footballers in the global spotlight. Since
the inception of the Under 20 World Cup, African teams have won the Cup
once (Ghana, in 2009), played three fnals, and completed nine semi-fnals. In
the Under 17 competitions, African teams have played nine fnals and have won
fve, all by Nigeria. In addition to the already-visible African players in Europe,
African youth teams on the continent displayed the young talent and the poten-
tial of African football players during these events.

Labour Supply to Global Football

It is signifcant that less than half a century after becoming independent, a few
African nations (Cameroon, Senegal, Egypt, South Africa, Morocco, Algeria,
Ghana, Nigeria, and Côte d’Ivoire) have consistently performed well against
168 Gerard A. Akindes

the best football nations. The successful hosting 2010 FIFA World Cup in South
Africa reinforced the status of African football as an integral part of the global
narrative of football and simultaneously established the African nations that won
some very symbolic victories over European football powerhouses such as France
and Germany as forces to reckon with. The world has taken notice of play-
ers such as George Weah from Liberia, Didier Drogba from Côte d’Ivoire, and
Samuel Eto’o and Roger Milla from Cameroon. African footballers gained in
recognition and value, leading to the “scramble for Africa” as described by Darby
(Darby, 2000).
After Brazil, Africa is the largest transcontinental exporter of players to
European and Asian football (Poli et al., 2022). For African players, it is an
attractive incentive for leaving the continent in order to achieve a successful
career in Europe. Many African players are also motivated by the quest of bet-
ter wages and playing conditions often not available in their home countries,
especially in the sub-Saharan countries, South Africa excepted. Consequently,
African football became a reservoir of talent for clubs in Europe, Asia, and the
United States.
The already existing economic gap between European and African football
amplifed when European television broadcasting rights revenues drastically
increased in the late 1980s to early 1990s (Clarke, 2002). Essentially, European
professional leagues emerged with an increasingly commercialized football and
fourished with an exponential growth in broadcasting rights revenues. In con-
trast, African football on the continent could not build a similar model of highly
professionalized and commercialized football. Given its limited revenue capac-
ity, African football embraced players’ development for more lucrative markets.
Football academies then emerged as a system for football talent detection and
development. Darby, Akindes, and Kirwin (2007) posited that since the early
1990s that the number of academies has increased. One of the frst academies,
the ASEC (Association Sportive des Employés de Commerce) Mimosas foot-
ball academy in Côte d’Ivoire was launched in 1994 and achieved remarkable
TABLE 20.1 The oldest clubs in Africa (2010)

Year Created Club Name Location

1906 Al Alhy Egypt

1907 Zamalek Egypt
1911 Heart of Oak Ghana
1919 Esperance de Tunis Tunisia
1921 Jeanne d’Arc de Dakar Senegal
1921 Mouloudia Algiers Algeria
1930 Canon de Yaoundé Cameroun
1930 Diables Noirs and Renaissance de Congo Brazzaville
Brazzaville
1930 TP Englebert of Lubumbashi and AS Democratic Republic of
Vita Club Kinshasa Congo
1937 Orlando Pirates South Africa
 Africa in the Global Football Business Complex 169

results locally and continentally by 1999 (Darby et al., 2007). As a result of their
success, the young talented players were rapidly recruited by S. K. Beveren, a
Belgian professional football club. After playing for S. K. Beveren, several frst-
class players of the ASEC Mimosa football academy, such as Yaya Toure, Kolo
Toure, and Emmanuel Eboue, were recruited by prestigious highly competitive
and commercialized European football clubs, namely Arsenal FC, Liverpool FC,
Manchester City, and FC Barcelona in England and Spain. More recent exam-
ples of Sadio Mane and Idrissa Gana Gueye, who were respectively detected and
trained by Generation Foot and Diambars academies in Senegal, illustrate the
contribution of African football academies to the value chain of the global football
labour. A study by Rafaele Poli, Loïc Ravenel, and Roger Besson indicates that
Europe as well as Turkey and the United States is a main destination of African
footballers from Nigeria, Ghana, Côte d’Ivoire, and Senegal (2022). Although
less documented and studied, African players in Asia constitute several hundreds
of players in countries like India, Malaysia, Thailand, and Indonesia (Akindes,
2013). North America is now an attractive destination mostly for Ghanaian play-
ers (Poli et al., 2022). African football labour contribution to the labour value
chain of global football business is undeniably a well-established reality.
Football academies provided a more structured labour supply to the global
football labour network. With the increased commodifcation of the game,
including players’ management, academies, scouts, and agents, the recruitment
of African players integrated the value chain of global football labour. In discuss-
ing the labour migration of footballers in Ghana, Darby utilizes the sociology
of development perspective, global value chains (GVC), and economic geogra-
phy global production networks (GPV) (Darby, 2013). Darby explained that the
Ghanaian global value chain operates across six phases, including the formal and
informal academies, the local league, European leagues, and the post-career.
Beyond the Ghanaian case, African footballers who migrated to Europe and
other destinations such as Asia and the United States are part of the GVC and
GPN. In Poli et al. (Poli, 2007), African football players’ trajectories from local
football systems, academies, and clubs, to European football clubs are compared
to commodities to which value-added occurs mainly in European clubs when
transferring from less prominent clubs and leagues to clubs with more fnancial
resources, capacity, and prestige. The recent FIFA Global Transfer Report con-
frms that the value-added of players’ transfer does not occur in Africa (FIFA,
2021, p. 27).3 The strong presence of African countries in the top 25 supplying
countries on the international transfer market (FIFA, 2021, p. 23) is showcased
by television broadcasting, and the media business complex facilitates the global
viewership of their performances.

African Football, Transnational Television, and Sponsorship

Television broadcasting contributed to African football visibility and recognition.
In addition to the presence of African teams and players in global competitions,
170 Gerard A. Akindes

the most popular football event in Africa (the Africa Cup of Nations) is now
shown globally via transnational television broadcasters. According to the
African Confederation of Football, the Africa Cup of Nations had a cumula-
tive global audience of 6.6 billion viewers (Confederation Africaine de Football
(CAF), 2013). In 2013, all the matches of the same competition were streamed
live for the frst time (on ESPN3), and the semi-fnals and fnal were shown on
tape delay (on ESPN Deportes TV). The most recent AFCON, in Cameroon
in 2022, was broadcast in 150 countries (CAF, 2022). Satellite television broad-
casting and the transforming economics of football and media gave CAF an
opportunity to embrace the broadcasting rights economy and generate media
and sponsorship revenues (Alegi, 2010, p. 110).
The AFCON 2022 sponsors and the media rights holders illustrate the global
position of CAF and Africa’ most commercialized competition. Their long-
lasting sponsorship relation with CAF and their operations and business pres-
ence across Africa make the French transnational corporations Orange (ofcial
sponsor) and Totalenergies (title sponsor) logical sponsors of CAF. For the most
recent sponsors Umbro, TikTok, and 1XBET the global reach of the competition
through television broadcasting may have provided a valuable platform to rein-
force their existing transnational sponsorship portfolio while establishing their
brand in Africa. With the exception of “Visit Rwanda”, Rwanda’s government
subsidized sponsorship of Arsenal FC in England and Paris Saint Germain (PSG)
in France, African corporations are not represented on the global sponsorship
ecosystem dominated by transnational corporations with a global business foot-
print or a global deployment marketing strategy.
Transnational satellite broadcasting of football competitions is another facet
of African football participation in the global football business complex. Pay-TV
transnational broadcasters Canal+ Horizons, Supersport, StarTimes, and beIN
Sports are the main suppliers of popular football games and competitions to
African football fans. As discussed by several authors (Akindes, 2013; Alegi,
2010; Owumelechili & Akindes, 2014), access to satellite pay-TV from Canal
Horizons and DStv with Supersport, beIN Sports, and StarTimes has boosted
Africans’ consumption of European football competitions. African football fans
consistently engage with the most prestigious leagues, teams, and competitions,
such as the English Premier League and the Spanish LaLiga.

Concluding Thoughts
African football – after several decades of transformation and growth – is well
established on the world stage, with its players performing in all the major (and
less signifcant) European leagues and in many Asian championships (Akindes,
2013). African footballers claim a fair representation in world competitions.
Despite the undeniable gains and position of African football as part of the
global football business complex narrative, the continent remains numeri-
cally underrepresented at the World Cup. Moreover, South Africa’s successful
 Africa in the Global Football Business Complex 171

hosting of the competition did not alleviate the continent’s rocky football his-
tory and the economic environment of most African countries. The asym-
metrical economic competition for talent and resources between Africa and the
Global North determined the reality of the position of African football in the
global football business complex. African football is mostly present as global
labour supplier, then again at the beginning of the value chain with young
players who migrate. Those young players, also entering the global GVC and
GPN and considered commodities (Darby, 2013; Poli, 2007), generate their
highest value-added once on the European football market. Africa’s signifcant
and substantial successes and achievements in football show a level of progress
and performance. However, despite the success of talented players in the Global
North, African football remains at the peripheral football system to the global
football business complex as mainly a labour supplier with limited fnancial
return to build and reinforce its local leagues, clubs, and competitions. The
achievements and successes of individual players and selected national teams
do not seem to close the economic and structural gap. Macro- and micro-
economic circumstances continue to challenge African football’s capability to
be more than a simple talent supplier and media consumer of the global football
complex.

Notes
1 Front Nation de Libération (National Front of Liberation)
2 For example, in the 1986 FIFA World Cup in Mexico, after Morocco beat Portugal
3–0, Morocco reached the second round. (They lost to Germany 0–1 in the fol-
lowing round.) Cameroon and Ghana, respectively, reached the quarter-fnal of the
FIFA World Cup in 1990 and 2010. Africans won three consecutive Olympic medals:
Ghana in 1992 (silver), Nigeria in 1996 (gold), and Cameroon in 2002 (gold). The
subsequent creation of Youth World Cups has provided an additional showcase for
African footballers.
3 The report states that “only fve of 2021’s top 25 associations in terms of total receipts
from transfer fees came from outside Europe. There were no member associations
from Africa” (FIFA, 2021, p. 27).

References
Alegi, P. (2010). African soccerscapes: How a continent changed the world’s game. Ohio
University Press : Athen, Ohio.
Akindes, G. (2013). South Asia and South-East Asia: New paths of African footballer
migration. Soccer & Society, 14(5), 684-701..
Akindes, G., & Alegi, P. (2014). From Leopoldville to Liège: A conversation with Paul
Bonga Bonga. In Identity and Nation in African Football: Fans, Community and Clubs (p.
288). Palgrave Macmillan, London, England.
CAF. (2022, January 9). Total Energies AFCON 2021 to Be Broadcast in Over 150 Countries
as Africa’s Biggest Event Kicks Of in Cameroon Today. CAFOnline.Com. https://www
.cafonline.com/total-africa-cup-of-nations/news/totalenergies-afcon-2021-to-be
-broadcast-in-over-150-countries-as-africa-s-bigge.
172 Gerard A. Akindes

Clarke, R. (2002). The Future of Sports Broadcasting Rights. SportBusiness Group, London,
England.
Darby, P. (2000). The new scramble for Africa: African football labour migration to
Europe. European Sports History Review, 3, 217–244.
Darby, P. (2002). Africa, football, and FIFA : politics, colonialism, and resistance. F. Cass.
London, England
Darby, P. (2013). Moving players, traversing perspectives: Global value chains, production
networks and Ghanaian football labour migration. Geoforum, 50, 43–53.
Darby, P., Akindes, G., & Kirwin, M. (2007). Football academies and the migration of
African football labor to Europe. Journal of Sport & Social Issues, 31(2), 143–161.
FIFA. (2021). FIFA-Global-Transfer-Report-2021-2022-indd.pdf. FIFA. https://digitalhub
.ffa.com/m/2b542d3b011270f/original/FIFA-Global-Transfer-Report-2021-2022
-indd.
Onwumechili, C., & Akindes, G. (Eds.). (2014). Identity and nation in African football: Fans,
community and clubs. Springer, London, England.
Poli, R. (2007). Migrations de footballeurs et mondialisation: Du système-monde aux
réseaux sociaux. M@ Ppemonde, 88, 12.
Poli, R., Ravenel, L., & Besson, R. (2022). Football Players’ Export: 2017–2022 (p. 6).
CIES Football Observatory. https://www.football-observatory.com/Football-players
-export-2017-2022.
Sugden, J. P., & Tomlinson, A. (1998). FIFA and the contest for world football: Who rules the
peoples’ game? Polity Press; Blackwell Publishers. Cambridge, UK
Vasili, P. (1998). The First Black Footballer, Arthur Wharton, 1865–1930: An Absence of
Memory. F. Cass, Abingdon, England.
21
THE NBA’S PARTNERSHIP
WITH RWANDA
Michael M. Goldman and Jeffrey W. Paller

The National Basketball Association (NBA) is aggressively expanding glob-

ally and has targeted Africa as an emerging market. In collaboration with the
International Basketball Federation (FIBA), the NBA launched the Basketball
Africa League (BAL) as a centrepiece of its ambitions in Africa. Economically,
the NBA identifed seven substantial markets in Africa as the most important –
Angola, Egypt, Kenya, Morocco, Nigeria, Senegal, and South Africa – with a
combined gross domestic product totalling more than $1.5 trillion (Bhasin &
Hoije, 2022). Yet despite these target markets, it launched the inaugural BAL
tournament in May 2021 in Kigali, Rwanda, a country with only 12.95 million
people that has never had a player in the NBA.1 This was even more surprising
given that the NBA touts civil rights, racial equality, and social justice (NBA,
2022), and Rwanda is considered an authoritarian regime accused of eliminat-
ing political opponents, violating human rights, and controlling access to infor-
mation (Reyntjens, 2015). The most recent Amnesty International report on
Rwanda documented continued violations of the rights to a fair trial, freedom
of expression, enforced disappearances, allegations of torture, and excessive use
of force (Amnesty International, 2022). In response to the BAL announcement,
the New York-based Human Rights Foundation appealed to the NBA to deny
the Rwandan government the opportunity to use the NBA’s global infuence to
“whitewash its warmongering, war crimes, crimes against humanity, and illegal
plunder of natural resources” (Zidan, 2021).
Why did the NBA partner with Rwanda to host the inaugural tournament,
and what explains the ongoing partnership between the NBA and Rwanda?
The answer to this question contributes to our understanding of the emerging
geopolitics of sport, and the organizational choices businesses make in global
expansion. We outline three factors that help explain the NBA’s partnership
with Rwanda: (1) Diplomacy and soft power, (2) Governance over politics, and

DOI: 10.4324/9781003348238-25
174 Michael M. Goldman and Jeffrey W. Paller

(3) Personal relationships. We address how these factors contribute to the NBA’s
business decisions, as well as how these factors might inform other sports organi-
zations’ expansion across the world.

Diplomacy and Soft Power

Firstly, the NBA believes that the BAL will improve the livelihoods of African
youth, gender equality, and economic inclusion eforts, which are part of the
sport diplomacy and soft power role the NBA sees itself playing in the world
(Spears, 2021). BAL president, Amadou Fall, partly explained the hosting of the
tournament in Rwanda as an opportunity to “bring people together” (Zirin,
2021). Fall has spoken about the “leadership role wherever we do business in
terms of addressing societal issues”, with the BAL including social justice ini-
tiatives that focus on raising awareness for gender-based violence, supporting
women’s education, growing female participation in basketball, and social eco-
nomic inclusion (Ebanks, 2021). Babatunde Folawiyo, Chairman and CEO of
the Yinka Folawiyo Group and the leader of the strategic investment consortium
in NBA Africa, reinforced this objective: “success will be defned not just by
return on investment but by sustainable and long-term impact on the lives of our
people” (NBA, 2021). In these ways, the NBA’s decision to partner with Rwanda
can be seen as the league’s role in potentially infuencing government and other
stakeholders in Rwanda. The US State Department noted how the NBA’s pres-
ence on the continent can help spread American values:

The expansion of the NBA into Africa only further serves to connect
us socially and economically through the game of basketball. We look
forward to supporting increased access, inclusion, capacity, and opportu-
nity for African sports leaders and youth as we continue building bridges
through sport.
(Tyburski, 2021)

Former US president Barack Obama, who is a strategic partner and minority

owner of the BAL, similarly argued that the NBA “has always been a great
ambassador for the United States”, and that the league would make a substantial
contribution in promoting “opportunity and wellness and equality across the
continent” (Mizelle, 2021; Bhasin & Hoije, 2022). The goal of social responsibil-
ity has been at the forefront of the NBA’s foreign eforts since its earliest invest-
ments in international basketball (Sharp, 2018). Former NBA stars involved see
the Africa initiatives as a chance to give back to their societies. In fact, these
eforts are consistent with basketball’s missionary roots, a game that was invented
at the International YMCA Training School and was spread across the world by
YMCA missionaries (Krasnof, 2017; Gao, 2012).
In launching the BAL, Dikembe Mutombo, a Congolese-American former
NBA player and investor in the BAL, argued that African youth “just need the
 The NBA’s Partnership with Rwanda 175

opportunity and support to achieve great things … the new NBA Africa is the
transformative next step to do just that” (Spears, 2021). Will Mbiakop, Senior
Director at NBA Africa, spoke of the “special boost” that sports and diplomacy
get in Africa, recalling the role of basketball in unifying Angola after its civil war
(Krasnof, 2020). In this way, Mutombo and Mbiakop’s comments demonstrate
the NBA’s potential contribution to the nation- and peace-building mechanism
of soft power (Nygard & Gates, 2013). The NBA’s social development and sport
diplomacy intentions echo calls by US think tank Freedom House that link
long-term corporate success with democracy and call American organizations to
use their substantial leverage to discourage authoritarianism and “promote inclu-
sive and sustainable economic development” (Freedom House, 2021). The NBA
is therefore providing another example of the enabling diplomacy and soft power
of sport, in the same way that the English Premier League has acknowledged
the unique reach and infuence it provides to the UK government (Rofe, 2016).

Governance over Politics

Secondly, the NBA – and many actors in the international community – values
the security, stability, and ease of doing business. Rwanda provides this, as it
touts great progress made in good governance, health, education, and gender
empowerment. This progress is the result of a long and strategic process of post-
Genocide state building led by Rwanda’s president Paul Kagame, who has used
a combination of sportswashing, guilt, and narratives of self-reliance (Beswick,
2013) to transform Rwanda from a poor, rural society to a strong, modernizing
state with the modern capital, Kigali (Straus & Waldorf, 2011).
Kagame’s technocratic approach to governance fts the analytically minded
business practices of NBA’s young and ambitious executives, making him an
ideal brand ambassador and entrepôt to an otherwise foreign and difcult-to-
navigate environment. The relationship between league executives and Rwanda
is similar to that of an international aid agencies and the country. Successful aid
delivery mechanisms are those that receive credible commitments from both the
donor countries and the recipient countries over the long term (Swedlund, 2017).
In this way, donor countries prioritize “cooperation partners” that ofer lasting
and long-term benefts over the moral and ideological factors that conventional
wisdom suggests drive foreign aid. In this way, the international aid agencies
prioritize governance over politics (Lancaster, 2007). Recent evidence suggests
that aid donors tend to focus on technical governance while ignoring political
failures (Winters & Martinez, 2015).
Since 1994, Rwanda has cultivated durable relationships with the interna-
tional aid industry, becoming “aid darlings” in the eyes of many Western coun-
tries. For example, Desrosiers and Swedlund (2019) report on why Canadian
donors’ preferred working with Rwanda is telling: “Rwandan technocratic
leadership continued to feature prominently as a driver. Most Canadian partici-
pants insisted that the Rwandan government’s capacity to ‘get things done’ was
176 Michael M. Goldman and Jeffrey W. Paller

key. Rwanda was described as ‘a development darling’, ‘serious’ about aid”. In

this way, Rwanda makes a good “cooperation partner”, and the NBA’s partner-
ship is consistent with the international aid industry writ large. Global Afairs
writer Howard French made a similar point about Kigali being “such a smoothly
ordered place” that “reporters feel comfortable there, and by the same token,
don’t feel comfortable looking very deeply into anything potentially critical”
(Zidan, 2021).
It appears that the NBA has prioritized stability and technical capacity over
social justice and politics. Victor Williams, NBA Africa’s CEO, referred to the
BAL as part of the NBA’s apolitical efort to further basketball in Africa (Zidan,
2021). Paul Hinks, Co-founder and CEO of New York-based Symbion Power
as well as Chairman for Invest Africa, has a history of working with the NBA
on the continent. In a 2021 op-ed, he echoes the sentiments of many in the
international aid community by writing, “Politics Should Stay Out of the NBA’s
Basketball Africa League”, and continues:

The selection of Rwanda as the location for the BAL fnals is ftting. The
no-nonsense leadership of President Paul Kagame’s administration has
created an enabling environment for investment that makes it among the
top destinations in sub-Saharan Africa for the international investor com-
munity. There is a serious push against corruption, a burgeoning private
sector and foreign investors are welcomed with support from the Rwanda
Development Board. In Rwanda there is predictability and stability – key
fundamentals that attract Foreign Direct Investment.
(Hinks 2021)

Hinks also has a history of conducting business in the country, receiving a

25-year gas concession on Lake Kivu in Rwanda in 2015. Kagame won the
2017 elections in Rwanda with almost 99 percent of the votes, earning a third
seven-year term of ofce, after a constitutional amendment allowed Kagame
to run for three more terms of ofce. Although the US State Department was
disturbed by “irregularities observed during voting”, some analysis suggests that
most Rwandans value the strong leadership Kagame provides: “they uphold their
strongman president who has proven capable of balancing ethnic tensions and
creating a common Rwandan identity” (Fried, 2017).
The order and strong governance that Rwanda provides was particularly
important in the context of the COVID-19 pandemic, when the BAL followed
the example of the NBA’s bio-bubble in 2020. As Amadou Fall explained, the
NBA needed to “move over 500 people of 52 nationalities in the bubble, from
our teams from all 12 countries to the diferent vendors and partners we had to
get to Kigali” (Thomas, 2021). Fall continues, “We are holding the inaugural
BAL season at a single site in Kigali because Rwanda has the infrastructure and
facilities in place to provide the best opportunity for a safe and successful event”
(Zirin, 2021). Rwanda’s commitment to the NBA is clear; Rwanda built a $104
 The NBA’s Partnership with Rwanda 177

million, 10,000-person stadium, the Rwandan government is the biggest spon-

sor of basketball in the country, and the Rwanda Development Board is a foun-
dational sponsor of BAL. These investments signal to the NBA that Rwanda will
be a strong partner for the long term.
Interestingly, the strategic trade-of of governance over politics that the NBA
is making with respect to Rwanda thus far contrasts the choices the NBA has
made to navigate its sensitive relationships in China. In 2019, a social media post
in support of pro-democracy protesters in Hong Kong by Daryl Morey, at the
time an executive with the Houston Rockets, resulted in a suspension of NBA
game broadcasts and other commercial relationships in China. The NBA’s policy
was confrmed by Commissioner Silver, who acknowledged that “there are con-
sequences from freedom of speech; we will have to live with those consequences.
For those who question our motivation, this is about far more than growing our
business” (Riley, 2019). Silver also clearly positioned the NBA: “We wanted to
make an absolutely clear statement that the values of the NBA, these American
values – we are an American business – travel with us wherever we go, and one
of those values is free expression” (Deb, 2019). In April 2021, Silver emphasized
that “engagement is better than isolation” and that a boycott of China because of
“legitimate criticisms of the Chinese system, won’t further the agenda of those
who seek to bring about global change” (Rigdon, 2021). By June 2022, Silver
acknowledged that the NBA had lost hundreds of millions of dollars as a result
of the 2019 incident, but that these losses were acceptable as the “cost of free
speech” (Smith, 2022).

Personal Relationships
Third, personal relationships are key to how the NBA does business, and the
long-term relationship between Paul Kagame and the leagues’ most respected
powerbrokers paved the way to the inaugural tournament. Commissioner Silver
has described the sport industry as an “industry of relationships” (Ourand, 2015).
These relationships are built on trust, charisma, and return on investments, and
resemble the relationships Rwanda has had with the international aid commu-
nity, long considered an “aid darling” (Beswick, 2011). In this context, Toronto
Raptors’ President Masai Ujiri has a decade-long close friendship with Kagame,
who helped open the Giants of Africa camp in Kigali in 2018. At a previous
NBA Africa Summit in Toronto, Ujiri quoted Kagame: “We do not want to
always be victims, we also want to be players” (Ishimwara, 2016). Kagame con-
gratulated his “Brother Masai Ujiri” on his “visionary leadership and determina-
tion” when the Raptors won the NBA Finals in 2019 (Kagame, 2019). Kagame
is also reported to have granted 2.4 hectares in Kigali to Ujiri by presidential
decree in 2021, for the development of a hotel, restaurants, and sporting facilities
(Emmanuel, 2021).
Commissioner Silver commented in 2019 that Kagame “and his family are
very knowledgeable NBA fans”, after the Rwandan president attended an NBA
178 Michael M. Goldman and Jeffrey W. Paller

playofs game in Oakland as a guest of the NBA (Spears, 2019). Kagame also
spoke at the NBA Africa Forum in 2019 on the sidelines of the UN General
Assembly in New York (The New Times Rwanda, 2019). Kagame’s love of bas-
ketball runs deep, having attended a number of NBA events, watched broadcasts,
and posted on social media about his fandom (Himbara, 2021). This relationship
points to the organizational structure and culture of the NBA, demonstrating
how personal networks, friendships, and passion for the game shape the league’s
development.

Conclusion
In spite of the concerning attacks on freedom of expression and human rights
in Rwanda, the NBA has partnered with the Rwandan government to host the
inaugural BAL tournament, and the fnals of the most recent second edition in
Kigali. Our analysis outlined three factors that help explain the NBA’s partner-
ship with Rwanda: (1) Diplomacy and soft power, (2) Governance over politics,
and (3) Personal relationships. While these factors provide an explanation for
the NBA’s decisions, they also raise further questions that the NBA may need to
navigate in the future. For example, what happens when someone in the NBA
is critical of Kagame? Considering the example of the NBA’s relationship with
China, some commentators have questioned the extent to which the NBA is
using its platform to really promote freedom of speech, democracy, and human
rights, or whether the NBA may be limiting expression as it walks the geopoliti-
cal tightrope in its international relationships (Faria, 2022). A strong message of
support for democratic voices in Rwanda by an NBA or BAL player or ofcial
will test the NBA’s commitment to American values of free expression, and the
NBA’s calculation of an acceptable cost. Will the personal relationships involved
be able to smooth over further restrictions of freedoms in Rwanda? How suc-
cessful will the NBA be in exporting American values to Rwanda through bas-
ketball diplomacy?

Note
1 The original pre-COVID inaugural season plan included the semi-fnal and fnal
games in Rwanda, with regular season games in Egypt, Senegal, Nigeria, Angola,
Morocco, and Tunisia. The 2022 season followed a similar structure, with the play-
ofs hosted in Rwanda.

References
Amnesty International. (2022). Amnesty International Report 2021/22: The State of the
World’s Human Rights. https://www.amnesty.org/en/documents/pol10/4870/2022/
en/
Beswick, D. (2011). Aiding state building and sacrifcing peace building? The Rwanda-UK
relationship 1994–2011. Third World Quarterly, 32(10), 1911–1930.
 The NBA’s Partnership with Rwanda 179

Beswick, D. (2013). From weak state to savvy international player? Rwanda’s multi-level
strategy for maximising agency. In W. Brown and S. Harman (Eds.), Africa Agency in
International Politics. Routledge.
Bhasin, K., & Hoije, K. (2022, June 22). The NBA turns to Africa to fuel basketball’s
next era of growth. Businessweek. https://www.bloomberg.com/news/features/2022
-06-22/nba-african-basketball-league-looks-for-next-joel-embiid
Deb, S. (2019, October 17). N.B.A. commissioner: China asked us to fre Daryl Morey.
The New York Times. https://www.nytimes.com/2019/10/17/sports/basketball/nba
-china-adam-silver.html
Desrosiers, M-E., & Swedlund, H. J. (2019). Rwanda’s post-genocide foreign aid relations:
Revisiting notions of exceptionalism. African Afairs, 118(472), 435–462.
Ebanks, J. (2021, December 21). The Basketball Africa League is building its foundation
for the present and future. SLAM. https://www.slamonline.com/the-magazine/the
-basketball-africa-league-is-building-its-foundation-for-the-present-and-future/
Emmanuel, K. (2021, July 23). Masai Ujiri uyobora Raptors yahawe ubutaka na Leta i Kigali:
Menya imishinga ateganya n’umubano we n′u Rwanda. IGIHE. https://mobile.igihe.com/
amakuru/u-rwanda/article/masai-ujiri-yahawe-inkondabutaka-mu-mujyi-wa-kigali
Faria, Z. (2022, June 6). Adam Silver’s latest defense of the NBA’s relationship with China
falls fat. Washington Examiner. https://www.washingtonexaminer.com/opinion/adam
-silvers-latest-defense-of-the-nbas-relationship-with-china-falls-fat
Freedom House. (2021). Reversing the Tide: Towards a New US Strategy to Support Democracy
and Counter Authoritarianism. https://freedomhouse.org/democracy-task-force/special
-report/2021/reversing-the-tide
Fried, B. (2017). President Paul Kagame and Rwandan Democracy. Berkley Center for
Religion, Peace & World Afairs, Georgetown University. https://berkleycenter
.georgetown.edu/posts/president-paul-kagame-and-rwandan-democracy
Gao, H. (2012, February 22). From Mao Zedong to Jeremy Lin: Why basketball is
China’s biggest sport. The Atlantic. https://www.theatlantic.com/international/
archive/2012/02/from-mao-zedong-to-jeremy-lin-why-basketball-is-chinas-biggest
-sport/253427/
Himbara, D. (2021, July 28). Kagame Captured the National Basketball Association –
Obama is Making a Big Mistake to Join the NBA’s Basketball Africa League as a Strategic
Partner. Medium. https://medium.com/@david.himbara_27884/kagame-captured
-the-national-basketball-association-obama-is-making-a-big-mistake-to-join-the
-6e3fec49d26a
Hinks, P. (2021, May 20). Politics should stay out of the NBA’s Basketball Africa League.
U.S. News & World Report. https://www.usnews.com/news/best-countries/articles
/2021-05-20/politics-needs-to-stay-out-of-the-nbas-basketball-africa-league
Ishimwemaria. (2016, February 14). Masai Ujiri Quotes President #Kagame: We Do Not
Want to Always be Victims, We Also Want to be Players [Tweet by @ishimwemaria].
https://twitter.com/ishimwemaria/status/698807199569702912
Kagame, P. (2019, June 14). Heartfelt Congratulations to @Raptors for Your Hard Earned and
Deserved #NBAFinals Win! My Brother Masai Ujiri, You Have Proven What Visionary
Leadership and Determination Can Accomplish. You Made Us Proud! [Tweet by @]. https://
twitter.com/paulkagame/status/1139595214203576320
Krasnof, L. S. (2017, December 26). How the NBA went global. The Washington Post.
https://www.washingtonpost.com/news/made-by-history/wp/2017/12/26/how-the
-nba-went-global/
Krasnof, L. S. (2020). Basketball Diplomacy in Africa: An Oral History from SEED Project
to the Basketball Africa League (BAL). Centre for International Studies and Diplomacy,
180 Michael M. Goldman and Jeffrey W. Paller

SOAS University of London. https://eprints.soas.ac.uk/32907/1/BBDipAF2020

%20Will%20Mbiakop.pdf
Lancaster, C. (2007). Foreign Aid: Diplomacy, Development, Domestic Politics. Chicago: The
University of Chicago Press.
Mizelle, S. (2021). Ex-President Obama joins NBA Africa as strategic partner and
minority owner. CNN. https://edition.cnn.com/2021/07/27/politics/barack-obama
-nba-africa/index.html
NBA. (2021). NBA forms new Africa entity, partners with strategic investors. https://
w w w.nba .com /news /nba -for ms -new -afr ica -entit y -partners -with -strategic
-investors
NBA. (2022). National Basketball Social Justice Coalition. https://coalition.nba.com
Nygard, H. M., & Gates, S. (2013). Soft power at home and abroad: Sport diplomacy,
politics and peace-building. International Area Studies Review, 16(3), 235–243.
Ourand, J. (2015, May 25). Industry of relationships. Sports Business Journal. https://www
.sportsbusinessjournal.com/Journal/Issues/2015/05/25/Sports-Business-Awards/
Sports-Business-Awards.aspx
Reyntjens, F. (2015). Rwanda: Progress or powder keg? Journal of Democracy, 26(3), 19–33.
Rigdon, J. (2021). Adam Silver Talked about Embracing New Technology and the NBA’s
Broadcast Relationship with China. AwfulAnnouncing.com. https://awfulannouncing
.com/nba/adam-silver-talked-about-embracing-new-technology-and-the-nbas
-broadcast-relationship-with-china.html
Riley, C. (2019). NBA chief Adam Silber says proft can’t come before the league’s
principles. CNN. https://www.cnn.com/2019/10/08/media/nba-adam-silver/index
.html
Rofe, J. S. (2016). Sport and diplomacy: A global diplomacy framework. Diplomacy &
Statecraft, 27(2). https://doi.org/10.1080/09592296.2016.1169785
Sharp, A. (2018). Coming to America. Sports Illustrated. https://www.si.com/longform
/2018/nba-international-oral-history/index.html
Smith, K. (2022, June 2). Adam Silver Said the NBA has Lost “Hundreds of Millions of
Dollars” Due to Strained Relations with China. But Silver Added that He Accepts Those
Losses as “The Cost of Free Speech” [Tweet by @KeithSmithNBA]. https://twitter.com
/KeithSmithNBA/status/1532519524557373440
Spears, M. J. (2019, May 2). Rwandan President Paul Kagame Makes Grand Appearance at
Oracle Arena. Andscape. https://andscape.com/features/black-coaches-can-lead-in
-college-baseball-if-aforded-the-opportunity/
Spears, M. J. (2021). Adam Silver announces business entity NBA Africa, backed by
former star player. ESPN. https://www.espn.com/nba/story/_/id/31503611/adam
-silver-announces-business-entity-nba-africa-backed-former-star-players
Straus, S., & Waldorf, L. (2011). Remaking Rwanda: State Building and Human Rights after
Mass Violence. Madison: The University of Wisconsin Press.
Swedlund, H. J. (2017). The Development Dance: How Donors and Recipients Negotiate the
Delivery of Foreign Aid. Ithaca: Cornell University Press.
The New Times Rwanda. (2019, September 24). President #Kagame on Tuesday Attended
the NBA Africa Forum alongside NBA Commissioner Adam Silver, Toronto Rapters President
Masai Ujiri and NBA Africa VP Amadou Fall. The Forum is Held on the Sidelines of the
#UNGA19 [Tweet by @NewTimesRwanda]. https://twitter.com/newtimesrwanda/
status/1176706540780347392?s=21
Thomas, D. (2021). Slam dunk! Inside the NBA’s Basketball Africa League.
African Business. https://african.business/2021/09/trade-investment/
slam-dunk-inside-the-nbas-basketball-africa-league/
 The NBA’s Partnership with Rwanda 181

Tyburski, L. (2021). The Basketball Africa League has arrived: Here’s why it matters.
Atlantic Council. https://www.atlanticcouncil.org/blogs/africasource/the-basketball
-africa-league-has-arrived-heres-why-it-matters/
Winters, M. S., & Martinez, G. (2015). The role of governance in determining foreign
aid fow composition. World Development, 66, 516–531.
Zidan, K. (2021, June 1). The NBA’s alignment with Rwanda’s repressive leader was
headscratching. Guardian. https://www.theguardian.com/sport/2021/jun/01/the
-nbas-alignment-with-rwandas-repressive-leader-was-headscratching
Zirin, D. (2021, April 30). Voices are raised against the NBA launching its new African
league in Rwanda. The Nation. https://www.thenation.com/article/world/rwanda
-basketball-nba/
PART V

Football
22
THE POLITICS OF
ALTERNATIVE FOOTBALL
Curious Friends

Steve Menary

The combination of international football with politics and national represen-

tation has been a problematic concept since the formation of the Federation
Internationale de Football Association (FIFA) in 1904. A number of nations
have joined FIFA, played international football, and then disappeared from
Czechoslovakia, the Soviet Union, and Yugoslavia to East Germany, the Saar,
South Vietnam, and South Yemen.
The entry and withdrawal of these teams at least refected wider accepted
political norms, whereas the development of games played outside of the accepted
framework of international football established by FIFA has understandably been
more difcult to categorize.
The idea of alternative football frst emerged in 2003 with the formation of
the Non-FIFA Board. The name was later changed to the New Federation Board
so that the organization was not defned in opposition to FIFA, but virtually all
of the teams to have taken part on the feld have been based on some form of
resistance. In 2005, Jens Brinch, the international head of the Greenland Sports
Federation, said: “If we all just do what FIFA want, then we are all doing noth-
ing” (Brinch, 2005).
Greenland was, like many of the organizations that initially embraced the
alternative football movement, fairly non-contentious. An autonomous country
within the Kingdom of Denmark, Greenland is isolated by geography rather
than by any political reasons that would at that time have hindered joining
one of FIFA’s confederations. Participation, rather than representation, drove
Greenland, which never fully joined the NF Board but looked to the movement
to overcome the lack of opportunities caused by their remoteness.
Other early members of the NF Board included Monaco, where a population
of 31,400 made trying to compete with any other European countries almost
impossible (CIA, 2022). Monaco is universally recognized as country, but other

DOI: 10.4324/9781003348238-27
186 Steve Menary

early NF Board members had either lost their statehood many years ago or never
achieved this aim.
Occitania covers parts of southern France, Monaco, and Italy and is a widely
recognized region but never achieved statehood. The only stipulation for mem-
bership of the Occitan XI was speaking the Occitan language (Menary, 2007,
p 108).
The identity of the indigenous Sámi people of northern Scandinavia was sub-
ject to repression at home but a wider notion of Lapland – a term the Sámi dis-
like – has softer connotations through its association with Christmas. The Sámi
wanted to keep alive their languages and culture and were early supporters of
the nascent alternative football movement. When Leif Isak Nilut, a Sami thea-
tre director and head of the Football Association of Sápmi, was asked at an NF
Board meeting in 2005 what the criteria for membership of this tribe was, he
responded with an emotional joik, the traditional Sámi singing style (Menary,
2007, p 26).
In Norway, the Sámi people also had funding for a parliament and newspa-
pers in their language and hosted the 2008 VWC and CONIFA’s 2014 World
Football Cup but could only host so many tournaments.
The idea of separating football from politics was an early aim of the NF
Board and its successor organization, the Confederation of Independent Football
Associations (CONIFA), but detaching a need for funding was harder. The NF
Board had originally proposed to be a “waiting room” for teams looking to join
FIFA (NF Board, 2011), but those federations with a realistic prospect of joining
the established football family via membership of one of FIFA’s six confedera-
tions – and the funds that would bring – such as Gibraltar and Kosovo largely
avoided a nascent organization initially based on opposition to the money pot
that was FIFA. In 1998, Sepp Blatter took over as FIFA president and intro-
duced regular payments of $250,000 to all national association members that in
2014 were doubled (Reuters, 2014). These funds ofered more of an attraction
than anything on ofer from the NF Board.
The likes of Gibraltar and Kosovo kept their distance from the alternative
football movement and what little funding they had to themselves. Both would-
be FIFA members knew that engaging in the world of alternative football would
place their aspirations in opposition to international footballing norms. The NF
Board’s need for money to stage tournaments would create tension in the fragile
dynamic of this putative world.
This would be an unspoken, but central, criteria for membership of the
alternative football movement as more contentious teams were embraced from
the Turkish Republic of Northern Ireland (TRNC) – created eight years after
Turkey’s invasion of the top half of the Mediterranean island in 1974 – to those
aspiring for a politically accepted homeland crossing existing boundaries for the
Kurdish people. The more controversial teams invariably had more money from
backers in the wider geopolitical frmament to stage the tournaments that were
a crucial part of the alternative football dream.
 The Politics of Alternative Football 187

The almost universally unrecognized TRNC regime was created through

the invasion of northern Cyprus that killed hundreds of people and displaced
thousands more from the Turkish and Greek Cypriot communities. Only Turkey
recognizes the TRNC, but unlike other NF Board members, the Kıbrıs Türk
Futbol Federasyonu (KTFF) had more than 40 member clubs, ran leagues and
had signifcant funding and stadia that would make feasible the NF Board’s dream
of staging of a frst Viva World Cup (VWC) for unrecognized teams in 2006.
By this time, the NF Board’s acronym had been changed to the New
Federation Board, but a dispute over funding with the KTFF saw the debut VWC
moved to Occitania. The Turkish Cypriots had £135,000 to spend on host-
ing the Equality, Liberty, Fraternity Trophy (Menary, 2007, p.175). Subsidized
fights and accommodation brought eight teams to northern Cyprus including
the Crimean Tatars, Zanzibar, and a team of exiled Tibetans, whereas only three
teams contested the NF Board’s VWC.
In 2012, the Turkish Cypriots made their only appearance in an NF Board
tournament in what would be a high-point for alternative football, but an end
to the original organizers. Iraqi Kurdistan also had sufcient money to stage a
tournament and more than 20,000 saw the hosts beat the Turkish Cypriots. The
NF Board subsequently descended into disarray due to infghting that ended up
in a Belgian court (Play the Game, 2015).
A new body emerged and CONIFA says its aims are to support the “repre-
sentatives of international football teams from nations, de facto nations, regions,
minority peoples and sports isolated territories” (CONIFA, 2022). Those aims
all embrace some form of resistance. CONIFA would be more successful in
engaging with the media and expounding the notion of alternative football and
professed to leave “all politics behind” (CONIFA, 2022), but the fundamental
realities remained. Staging football tournaments cost money, and CONIFA too
would make some curious friends.
In 2017, the body was planning an ambitious 16-team World Football Cup in
London and put the cost at €1.5 million (World Soccer, 2017). While the exact
cost to stage that event in London remains unknown, to make this dream happen
entailed starting a relationship with betting company Paddy Power and brought
betting to a level of football that the Council of Europe’s Macolin Convention
has expressly suggested are better avoided (COE, 2014). This has continued with
crypto betting company Sportsbet.io sponsoring CONIFA events such as the
2020 World Football Cup (Insider Sport, 2019).
These events also needed hosts, and there were only so many putative asso-
ciations in the world with both facilities and funding to put on the events that
CONIFA planned – and would succeed – in staging. More recent invasions and
annexations in would-be countries lacking international support would swiftly
be forgotten in order to let the people play.
The creation of the independent republics Abkhazia and South Ossetia in
2008 came after a violent dispute with Georgia that saw separatists in both
territories – backed with Russian military support – break away to establish
188 Steve Menary

independence that remains largely unrecognized. After Gibraltar had applied

to join UEFA and FIFA despite the opposition of Spain, membership of both
bodies was amended to require recognition from United Nations members (Play
the Game, 2013), but Abkhazia and South Ossetia are only recognized by their
Russian sponsors plus Nicaragua, Venezuela, and Nauru. Tuvalu and Vanuatu
had recognized both breakaway states in 2011 but withdrew this support after
establishing relations with Georgia (TASS, 2018).
The world of alternative football sits outside of the constraints of the glob-
ally recognized political system and ofered both nascent republics an opportu-
nity to promote their independence through a largely unquestioning media. In
2016, Abkhazia hosted CONIFA’s second World Football Cup. The tournament
attracted signifcant media attention and was also the subject of a documentary
flm, Desert Storm, about the Kurdistan team, which took part. Abkhazia was suf-
fciently open to visitors to stage a tournament that generated signifcant support
and also, crucially, was able to provide a budget of around €450,000 (Menary,
2017).
Just as Cypriot objections to the ELF Cup had gone unheard, protests from
Georgia over the participation of Abkhazia and South Ossetia were largely
ignored by the international community, which at this point was doing little or
nothing to confront the expansion of Vladimir Putin’s Russia on many fronts,
including football. In 2016, Abkhazia even expressed a desire to join FIFA,
which, even given the woeful state of the world body, seems unlikely (Interfax,
2016).
Ironically, one of the few obstacles placed in the path of both Abkhazia and
South Ossetia in CONIFA events was the denial of visa to its European Football
Cup in Hungary in 2015 (CONIFA, 2015). The hosts were the Székely Land, an
area of Romania inhabited by a Hungarian-speaking minority. The tournament
was staged in the Hungarian city of Debrecen and, given the relatively close
relationship between the country’s prime minister Viktor Orbán and Putin, this
political snub seems ironic. Doubly so, given that Orbán himself has used foot-
ball to establish a greater sphere of Hungarian infuence and spent around €55
million supporting clubs in regions of neighbouring countries where the popula-
tion speak Hungarian (IJ4EU, 2018).
Alternative representative teams from Hungary have also embraced CONIFA.
In addition to Székely Land, Kárpátalja representing Hungarian speakers in
western Ukraine’s Zakarpattia Oblast and Felvidék in Slovakia have played in
CONIFA’s main or qualifying competitions (CONIFA, 2018). These three
teams along with Délvidék representing Hungarian speakers in Serbia also played
in the 2016 Heritage Cup staged at Szarvas in Hungary.
A mediatized involvement with CONIFA boosted Orbán’s ideal of a Greater
Hungaria, while the participation of Abkhazia and South Ossetia had aided the
notion of an expanded Russian sphere of infuence as the two de facto states
– created with Russia’s support – were able to create a form of independence
through football. Alternative football would soon be used again.
 The Politics of Alternative Football 189

In 2014, pro-Russian separatist groups in the Ukrainian Donbass region

declared their independence through the establishment of “People’s Republics”
in Donetsk and Luhansk. Football became a post-confict tool in attempts to
establish both statelets long before their “independence” was formally recog-
nized by Russia on the eve of the next stage of Putin’s Ukrainian invasion on
24 February 2022 (BBC, 2022).
A team from the so-called People’s Republic of Luhansk had played a friendly
with Abkhazia in 2015, then a few months later lost 4–1 to a representative side
from the Donetsk statelet. Games between Donetsk and Luhansk were included
as qualifers for CONIFA’s 2018 Football World Cup in London. South Ossetia
has also played Luhansk and both Donbas sides drew 1–1 in Yenakiieve in
2016 in a game categorized by CONIFA as a qualifer for their 2018 Football
World Cup, although neither team made it to the fnals in London (CONIFA,
2018).
When the Russian army attempted to enlarge their occupation of the Donbass
and conquer Ukraine in 2022, football was again a tool in the confict and the
sporting isolation of Russia quickly became a prerequisite. All Russian clubs and
national teams were suspended by FIFA four days after the invasion began in
February 2022 (FIFA, 2022).
The notion – in the rest of Europe and North America at least – that a uni-
versally accepted line had been crossed by Russia did not register in the realms of
alternative football. Abkhazia and South Ossetia were both included in CONIFA’s
proposed Euro 2022 tournament. Asked in February 2022 if Abkhazia and South
Ossetia would travel to the proposed host city of Nice in France, CONIFA
President Per-Anders Blind said, “Impossible to say at these dark times … the
majority of the players hold Russian passports” (Menary, 2022).
As Russian involvement in all walks of life became restricted, the concept that
both teams were widely unrecognized extensions of Putin’s empire and should
not appear was not considered. Alternative football was outside the accepted
universal norms that Putin and any de facto states created through his expansion-
ist plans should be censured for the widely acknowledged atrocities in Ukraine.
While alternative football has supported cultural representation and exchanges
in many positive ways, the concept that there should be no borders or limits
has both allowed in unlikely “national” teams such as the English counties of
Cornwall, Surrey, and Yorkshire and, on another extreme, become a vehicle for
contentious teams that are based predominantly on achieving a political aim.

References
BBC. (2022). Ukraine: Putin announces Donetsk and Luhansk recognition. Available at: https://
www.bbc.co.uk/news/av/world-europe-60470900 Accessed 16 June 2022.
Brinch, J. (2005). Interview with author, Shetland Isles 12 July.
CIA World Factbook. Monaco. Available at: https://www.cia.gov/the-world-factbook/
countries/monaco/ Accessed 16 June 2022.
190 Steve Menary

CONIFA. (2015). Looking back and moving forward! Available at: https://conifaofcial
.wordpress.com/2015/07/07/looking-back-and-moving-forward/ Accessed 16 June
2022.
CONIFA. (2018). WFC 2018 qualifcation. Available at: https://www.conifa.org/en/event
/conifa-paddy-power-world-football-cup-2018/wfc-2018-qualifcation/ Accessed
16 June 2022.
CONIFA. (2022a). Who we are. Available at: https://www.conifa.org/en/about/ Accessed
16 June 2022.
CONIFA. (2022b). FAQS. Available at: https://www.conifa.org/en/faqs/ Accessed
16 June 2022.
Council of Europe. (2014). Council of Europe convention on the manipulation of sports
competitions. Available at: https://rm.coe.int/16801cdd7e Accessed 16 June 2022.
FIFA. (2022). FIFA/UEFA suspend Russian clubs and national teams from all competitions.
Available at: https://www.ffa.com/tournaments/mens/worldcup/qatar2022/media
-releases/ffa-uefa-suspend-russian-clubs-and-national-teams-from-all-competitions
Accessed 16 June 2022.
IJ4EU. (2018). Hungarian football funds. Available at: http://www.investigativejourna
lismforeu.net/projects/investigating-hungarian-public-money-in-the-football-clubs
-of-neighboring-countries/ Accessed 16 June 2022.
Insider Sport. (2019). CONIFA names Sportsbet.io as World Football Cup 2020 sponsor.
Available at: https://insidersport.com/2019/12/04/conifa-names-sportsbet-io-as
-world-football-cup-2020-sponsor/ Accessed 16 June 2022.
Interfax. (2016). Abkhazia wants to become FIFA member. Available at: https://interfax.com
/newsroom/top-stories/31973/ Accessed 16 June 2022.
Menary, S. (2007). Outcasts: The lands that FIFA forgot. Studley: Know The Score.
Menary, S. (2017). Information supplied to author by Abkhazia ofcials at 2017 at
CONIFA Euro 2017 tournament in northern Cyprus, June 4.
Menary, S. (2022). Message to author on LinkedIn, February 28.
NF Board. History the N.F.-Board genesis. Available at: https://nf bwebsite.wixsite.com/
nf board/history Accessed 16 June 2022.
Play the Game. (2013). Gibraltar no longer an outcast. Available at: https://www.playthegame
.org/news/gibraltar-no-longer-an-outcast/ Accessed 16 June 2022.
Play the Game. (2015). Non-FIFA football in quarrel. Available at: https://www.playthegame
.org/news/non-ffa-football-in-quarrel/ Accessed 16 June 2022.
Reuters. (2014). FIFA to give “success” payments to member associations. Available at: https://
www.reuters.com/article/uk-soccer-world-ffa-fnances-idUKKBN0EM1RA20
140611 Accessed 16 June 2022.
TASS. (2018). Countries that recognized South Ossetia’s and Abkhazia’s independence.
Available at: https://tass.com/world/1007058?utm_source=google.com&utm
_medium=organic &utm _campaign=google.com &utm _referrer=google.com
Accessed 16 June 2022.
World Soccer. (2017). FIFA-less nations enjoy their moment in the sun. July, p. 37.
23
THE CONJUNCTURAL POLITICS OF
THE 2026 FIFA MEN’S WORLD CUP
United 2026

Adam S. Beissel

Introduction
I have to inform you that the U.S. is on the verge of becoming the soc-
cer power of the world.
FIFA President Gianni Infantino (quoted in
Javers, 2020, para. 1)

On 13 June 2018, the Fédération Internationale de Football Association (FIFA)

awarded the 2026 FIFA Men’s World Cup (FMWC26) to a joint bid of the United
States (US), Mexico, and Canada. FMWC26 will be one of frsts: the frst time
the tournament features a 48-team format, the frst time three countries have
shared hosting rights, and the frst to completely use already existing stadiums
and infrastructure. It will also be the most politically entangled, geographically
sprawling, and commercially lucrative FIFA Men’s World Cup (FMWC) in his-
tory. The North American efort – known as United 2026 throughout the bid-
ding process – proposed an integrated hosting vision and event legacy United as
One aimed at strengthening continental partnership between host nations and
using FIFA’s signature event as a platform to unite the global [football] com-
munity. These political aspirations are made particularly salient given the recent
presidency of Donald Trump, whose hard-line stances on trade and immigra-
tion eroded long-standing political and economic partnerships between the
three countries, and diplomatic relations reached their lowest point in decades.
FMWC26 will be the frst truly regional tournament – a geographic sprawl-
ing, trans-continental competition with matches held in 16 cities across three
North American countries. FMWC26 will span nearly the entire continent –
from Vancouver to Miami, Guadalajara to Boston – and features start-of-the-
art stadiums, a substantial experience hosting large-scale sport spectacles and

DOI: 10.4324/9781003348238-28
192 Adam S. Beissel

international sport mega-events (SMEs), and all the pre-existing infrastructure

and tourist amenities required to accommodate millions of tourists, event specta-
tors, and tournament participants from around the world. Perhaps most impor-
tantly, however, is that FMWC26 will be the largest commercial sport spectacle
in modern history. Economic estimates forecast a staggering $11 billion proft for
FIFA (Das, 2018a) – more than double that of any previous MWC – based on
unprecedented economic certainty from the use of already existing stadiums and
unequalled commercial opportunities that could frmly anchor football markets
in three of the world’s largest 15 economies. Accordingly, FMWC26 promises
to leave an unmatched and unrivalled legacy and impact on the people, markets,
and communities of the entire North American continent.
I’ve been researching and writing on the geopolitical economy of FMWC26
for a while now. In this chapter, I bring together my various research fndings
and observations to concisely discuss the conjunctural politics of the FMWC26 in
order to contextualize the event within the broader historical and cultural con-
juncture. The politics of each sport mega-event is, to note, conjunctural in that
it will be “afected by diferent political circumstances at local, national, regional
and global scales at diferent times and places” (Horne, 2017, p. 331). According
to Horne (2017), there is a politics in, and a politic of, international sport mega-
events such as the Olympic Games and MWC. The former, he argues, focuses
on the internal politics of sporting international non-governmental organizations –
referred to as SINGOs (Allison and Tomlinson, 2017) – such as the International
Olympic Committee and FIFA. This chapter, rather, extends a discussion of
the external politics of 2026 FMWC as they relate to global political economic
forces and relations in combination with, or in confrontation of, local interests
and national political agendas. Specifcally, my interest lies in examining ways
the geographic, political, and economic formations of FMWC26 shape, and are
shaped by, the current geopolitical conjuncture. I detail three primary features
of FMWC26: a promise of political unity, a magnitude of economic certainty, and
an unprecedented commercial opportunity. The chapter concludes by discussing how
FMWC26 relates to sport’s burgeoning geopolitical economy.

Political Entanglements – A Promise of Political Unity

In April 2017, the three governing bodies of Canada, Mexico, and the US of-
cially announced their intent to submit a joint bid for FMWC26 in an efort
to bring the tournament back to the region for the frst time since 1994, when
the US last hosted. The formation of the United 2026 bid partnership and the
development of the United as One strategic hosting vision were owed to inter-
related internal and external contextual forces. As I have discussed elsewhere,
the three internal forces that guided US Soccer’s decision to include Mexico and
Canada in the bid were: practical, strategic, and political. In terms of the practical
reasons for each nation to join forces, the new 48-team, 80-game format required
more state-of-the-art stadiums and modern infrastructure than any previous
 The Conjunctural Politics of the 2026 FIFA Men’s World Cup 193

MWC. Not only did each federation ofer experience and expertise in hosting
world-class sporting events, but the increased number of teams and matches for
FMWC26 necessitated more infrastructure to support larger fan engagement
with in excess of 5.8 million fans expected to attend matches in person and mil-
lions more participating in city-hosted FIFA Fan Fests (United 2026 Bid Book,
2018, p. 8). There were also strategic reasons that guided the joint North American
efort. Following the Qatari scandal, USSF was hesitant to commit the time and
money – estimated at $10 million of a $60 million annual budget in 2022 – to
pursue hosting rights (Murray, 2015). There were also concerns within USSF
that FIFA members would seek retribution via MWC hosting rights after the
US Department of Justice investigation of FIFA’s corruption and a collaborative
North American efort could, potentially, shift focus from the US as the main
tournament benefactor.
Perhaps most importantly, there were political reasons for collaboration. As inter-
rogated shortly, United 2026 bid organizers hoped an integrated hosting strategy
of United as One, and the implied symbolic politics (Black, 2007) of unity, would
outweigh any concerns about negative perceptions of President Donald Trump,
his administration, or American foreign policies. Notwithstanding commercial
and diplomatic relations between the three countries reaching their lowest point
in decades, the United 2026 bid’s vision enabled symbolic reimagining of a truly
international partnership amidst growing diplomatic tensions and rising anti-
American sentiment (Luce, 2018). In developing the unity narrative, organizers
attempted to position the bid as capable of transcending political scruples to pro-
vide a common good through football. The United 2026 bid’s integrated hosting
vision and strategy of United as One was a symbolic reimagining of the US-led
bid as a truly international partnership amidst growing tensions in diplomatic
relations and a growing anti-American sentiment due to the unpopular policies
and spiteful rhetoric of President Trump. From its initial inception, FMWC26
celebrated and promoted political unity to provide a signature event legacy, dis-
tance the bid from President Trump, and ultimately gain support for the bid from
FIFA member associations and the global community.
Of course, this vision of political unity and trans-continental cooperation
became increasingly difcult to maintain as Trump became increasingly involved
himself with FMWC26. Trump emerged as a vocal public supporter of the
United Bid despite his public disagreements with Mexico and Canada, author-
ing several antagonistic statements and Twitter tirades in order to infuence the
bid process. Moreover, the New York Times reported that Trump began writing
letters to FIFA President Gianni Infantino expressing his hosting the event in
“the spirit of continental partnership” (quoted in Das, 2018, para. 17) and assur-
ing FIFA ofcials of visa-free travel, that his Muslim travel ban would not apply,
and agreeing to grant FIFA full tax exemptions on all commercial activity dur-
ing the tournament. As I have written elsewhere with David L. Andrews (2021),
Trump’s seemingly contradictory embracing of the United Bid was an attempt to
advance his particular form of authoritarian populism through the construction
194 Adam S. Beissel

of real and imagined threats to the racial and nationalist dominance of America
and by destabilizing and restructuring the dominant geopolitical order. In his
public sentiments expressing support for the 2026 MWC bid, Trump was able
to advance the ideological and afective elements of Trumpism by establishing
a compelling defnition of the crisis and formulating a proposed conjunctural
resolution.
On the other hand, the United 2026 bid and its United as One strategic
hosting vision were developed to simultaneously address external forces related
to FIFA’s (corporate) rebranding and consolidation of power as football’s global
authority. In specifc terms, the United as One strategic hosting vision articu-
lates global unity, continental partnership, and inclusivity aligned harmoniously
with FIFA 2.0. As I have written elsewhere with Neal Ternes, the release of
FIFA’s new vision, known as FIFA 2.0, followed one of the highest-profle cor-
ruption scandals in modern sports history after the US Department of Justice
indicted 27 football ofcials for wire fraud, racketeering, and money laundering.
Released in 2016 by newly elected FIFA President Gianni Infantino, FIFA 2.0
not only promised to implement a stronger governance structure that would
resist the corruption scandals that plagued the previous administration, but it
promised a new organizational strategy to present a new public purpose for the
beleaguered organization as a progenitor and caretaker of global sporting mar-
ket. Therefore, the United 2026 bid, which promoted cooperation, diplomacy,
and transnational (and, by proxy, global) partnership, provided FIFA an accept-
able altruistic and public project for rehabilitating its public image. Indeed, the
symbolism of FMWC26 would serve as a strategic opportunity for FIFA to con-
solidate the association’s sporting pre-eminence and symbolically (re-)imagine
its purpose as a principal agent for growing the game, positive social change,
and promoting global diplomacy. Thus, the United 2026 bid not only helped
bring FIFA 2.0 to reality, but it also reframed FIFA 2.0’s broad allusions to using
football for the social good as meaning the productive use of the MWC to bring
politically disparate nations together through unity, continental partnership, and
public diplomacy.
Amidst these twofold contexts, FMWC26 and the United as One strategic
hosting vision has become a metonym for shared cultures, economic trade rela-
tions, and transnational government alignment in North America. However,
the United as One vision romanticized the potential for football to bring people
together and transform lives and communities by invoking clichés about the
sport as a global unifer. Notions of continental partnership and global fraternity
sit largely as abstract promises and clichés for political unity building. In harmony
with the recognized ambiguity of sport mega-event legacy constructions, the
hosting vision lacked measurable outcomes for its diplomatic ambitions. More
critically, the vision ignored deeply entrenched cultural diferences, problematic
histories, and the growing contemporary geopolitical divides. Furthermore, the
vision normalized football as inherently positive, while ignoring unequal power
relations, sports’ marginalizing efects, and prevailing sociocultural hegemonies.
 The Conjunctural Politics of the 2026 FIFA Men’s World Cup 195

Contrary to the organizer’s aspiration, from the outset United as One was less
euphemistic than a carefully mediated marketing strategy. While diplomatic and
political aspirations have featured in other SME bids, the use of unity as a politi-
cal legacy was a means for bid organizers to confront and break with Trump’s
discourse and administration and, concomitantly, ofer FIFA a political legacy of
diplomacy extending beyond competition cessation.

Geographic Expanse – A Magnitude of Economic Certainty

FMWC26 proposes the largest geographic reach of any MWC in recent history.
The three host nations combine for a population of 500 million people, 69 Metro
areas >1 million inhabitants, and a GDP of $21.5 trillion (United 2026 Bid Book,
2018, p. 31). Although the US comprises the majority economic weight (in terms
of GDP), both Canada and Mexico rank among the 15 largest global economies
(United 2026 Bid Book, 2018, p. 103). In terms of trade and commercial rela-
tions, the North American Free Trade Agreement (NAFTA) accounts for $1
trillion a year in trade between Canada, Mexico, and the US. The US is the
second most popular tourist destination in the world, with more than 75 million
annual visitors coming from overseas, contributing over $1.5 trillion in tourism-
related spending. Together, the three nations combine for an estimated $20 tril-
lion in total economic output (United 2026 Bid Book, 2018, p. 103). Accordingly,
the United 2026 bid emphasized specifc innovative corporate sectors within
the three nations, including: biotechnology, transportation, and smart cities
(Canada); agriculture, mathematics, and tech innovation (Mexico); and technol-
ogy, pharmaceuticals, aerospace, and media production (US).
The United 2026 bid proposal included 23 candidate host cities with all
the pre-existing stadiums and necessary infrastructure – notably each candi-
date city featured stadiums with capacities of 68,000 or greater – thus avoiding
need for new constructions (United 2026 Bid Book, 2018, p. 21). With more
than 125 FIFA-compatible stadiums in existence across the three nations, the bid
guaranteed FIFA timely delivery of all stadiums, venues, and facilities. Thus, a
tournament of this geographic scale – one which ofered more than a hundred
FIFA-compatible, already existing stadiums – assured a post-scandal FIFA and its
member associations of a level of badly desired economic certainty. Bid organizers
have long argued that not only do these stadium and infrastructure savings pro-
mote economic certainty, but they also enable the event to be an opportunity to
invest energy and resources towards improving and scaling existing and to-be-
developed spaces and programming, and directly impacting the lives of millions
of the countries’ constituents (United 2026 Bid Book, 2018, p. 35). Such assertions
provided an assurance that the tournament would be a commercial success, and
the promise to use existing infrastructure presented FIFA a sign of further cer-
tainty and sustainability. As one journalist noted, the sheer geographic scope and
already existing infrastructure included in the United Bid made it “too big to
fail” (Hall, 2018, para. 19).
196 Adam S. Beissel

The FMWC26 host city selection process followed a particularly unique set
of circumstances. Prior to 2026, the competitive bid process was typically an
inter-nation competition between aspirant hosts in which the host cities were pre-
determined as part of the ofcial bid. Local organizers would include a complete
list of host cities as part of the ofcial bid proposal, and FIFA’s evaluation process
would consider the economic reach and political support of each constituent city
as part of the entire bid’s evaluation. However, FIFA’s evaluation of individual
host cities for 2026 was divided into two separate evaluations, with the host cit-
ies selected multiple years after the nation’s bid rights were confrmed. Thus,
the process for an inter-nation competition between prospective North American
host cities began nearly as soon as United 2026 won the hosting right. Over
the four years between the United 2026 bid’s successful awarding in 2018 and
the announcement of host cities in June 2022, public and private leaders across
North American lined up with tax exemptions, government guarantees, amend-
ments to local laws, and millions of dollars of public and private investments in
the prospect at landing at least some FMWC26 matches. An ofcial FIFA del-
egation, led by FIFA Vice President Victor Montagliani, conducted systematic
visits of all candidate host cities in order to evaluate the city’s existing stadiums
and infrastructure, assess the commercial opportunities, and privately negotiate
with local leaders (Gof, 2021). By staging an internal bid competition – in which
there were more candidate cities than host sites – FIFA was able to negotiate the
most generous terms for staging the event. Not only did this inter-nation com-
petitive bid process allow FIFA to rationally map out the geographic reach and
expanse of the tournament, but also carefully consider the bids that ofered the
most favourable political guarantees, public and private funding, and economic
certainty.
The geographic expanse of the frst FMWC held across three nations became
evident when FIFA announced the FMWC26 host cities in June 2022. At a
public ceremony in downtown Manhattan, FIFA President Gianni Infantino
revealed the host cities at a televised spectacle, with 11 venues chosen in the
US, 3 in Mexico, and 2 in Canada. The host cities are divided into three zones:
Western (Vancouver, Seattle, San Francisco, Los Angeles, and Guadalajara);
Central (Kansas City, Dallas, Atlanta, Houston, Monterrey, and Mexico City);
and Eastern (New York/New Jersey, Boston, Philadelphia, Miami, and Toronto)
(Gof, 2022). Six cities were ultimately unsuccessful in the competitive host-
ing process: Baltimore/D.C., Cincinnati, Denver, Edmonton, Nashville, and
Orlando. The US will host 60 of the 80 matches in the tournament, includ-
ing every game from the quarterfnal onwards. Canada and Mexico will host
10 matches each. As of this writing, FIFA has yet to announce which of the cities
and venues will host matches in the knockout stages, including the fnal, though
it is expected the tournament’s fnal match will be in either New York or Los
Angeles.
More broadly, the reliance on already existing stadiums and facilities across
16 North American cities serves as a risk-averse strategy allowing FIFA to escape the
 The Conjunctural Politics of the 2026 FIFA Men’s World Cup 197

public criticism and backlash associated with strategies of urban placemaking and
the spectacular construction of World Cup space(s). As I have written elsewhere
with Neal Ternes (2022), a seemingly ready-made FMWC26 could avoid any of
the major construction delays, displacement efects, white elephant stadiums, and
sporting Trojan horses that have characterized the hosting of recent MWCs in
South Africa, Brazil, and Russia, and Qatar. Such a risk-averse approach was par-
ticularly attractive to FIFA, whose newly adopted FIFA 2.0-Vision for the Future
framework introduced a new operating model for the Men’s and Women’s World
Cups – a model that sought to enhance revenue generation, decrease operating
expenses, and optimize operational efciencies. Thus, the selection of the United
2026 bid – one that does not require major event-specifc construction – enabled
FIFA to not only decrease the costs associated with hosting FMWC26, but signal
a move away from linkages to global placemaking, ending a historical conjunc-
ture where FIFA prioritized event legacies based on the spectacular construction
of MWC spaces and towards the (re-)imagining and (re-)organization of urban
space. Instead, United 2026 was a timely, cost-certain, and risk-averse proposal
for hosting the 2026 FMWC that could use a large selection of stadiums and
infrastructure spanning the entire North American continent to deliver unprec-
edented economic certainty in a broader efort towards rehabilitating the public
image of FIFA. In other words, the economic certainty of FMWC26 is a practi-
cal means to FIFA’s strategic ends.

Economic Impact – An Unprecedented

Commercial Opportunity
Although the promise of political unity and the magnitude of economic cer-
tainty are certainly important aspects of FMWC26, the event’s signature fea-
ture is the possibility of the largest economic impact in MWC history. The
2026 tournament is expected to demolish MWC attendance records – which
peaked at 3.6 million when it was held in the United States in 1994 – based on
both an increase in the total number of games played and the growth of football’s
popularity in North America. Indeed, FMWC26 ofers FIFA an unprecedented
commercial opportunity to “open the veins” of football commercialism, consump-
tion, and spectatorship throughout North America’s nascent football market(s).
According to estimates, FMWC26 projects a staggering $11 billion proft for
FIFA; more than double that of any previous MWC in history. The revenue
projections include more than $5 billion in television rights fees; $3.6 billion for
sponsorship and licensing; and at least $2.1 billion in ticket revenue (Bradsher
& Panja, 2018). An economic impact study for FMWC26, commissioned by the
Boston Consulting Group (BCG), suggests the event will have a cumulative $5
billion in short-term economic activity, including the creation of 40,000 jobs
and more than $1 billion in incremental worker earnings from the candidate
host cities, for an overall net beneft of $3–4 billion (GRI Referenced Report,
2018). The BCG study further estimated that individual host cities could expect
198 Adam S. Beissel

to see approximately $160–620 million in incremental activity, translating to

a net beneft of approximately $90–480 million per city after accounting for
estimated public costs (United 2026 Bid Book, 2018). Carlos Cordeiro, then-U.S.
Soccer Federation President, proudly proclaimed, “a proft of this magnitude
is unprecedented in any single-sport event in the world … In terms of value,
it could mean $50 million more per association” (quoted in Bradsher & Panja,
2018, para. 10).
Much of the optimism surrounding FMWC26 economic opportunity is
linked to countless opportunities for fans, broadcasters, and commercial partners
across North America. Accordingly, FMWC26 will allow FIFA to extract maxi-
mum value from an unprecedented and untapped market of football tourist-con-
sumers as well as an opportunity to restore and enhance capital networks and fows
with the North American corporate sector. First, North America has experi-
enced seismic participation and fan growth over the past three decades. Mexico’s
frst division Liga MX ranks ffth in the world in attendance, and football in
Canada is growing, particularly following the success of the Canadian Women’s
Soccer team which won gold at the 2020 Summer Olympic Games (Thompson,
2021). Youth football participation in the United States has doubled since the
previous MWC in 1994 and is now played by 4.1 million youth annually, mak-
ing it the most played youth sport in the country (United 2026 Bid Book, 2018).
At present, FIFA estimates there are approximately 250 million football fans in
the three host countries and anticipates 5.8 million tickets will be sold for the
tournament for revenues in excess of $2 billion and a 150% increase in corporate
hospitality sales relative to the most recent FMWC (United 2026 Bid Book, 2018).
The expected global television audience, which is used as a benchmark for pre-
dicting both media and marketing revenues, is expected to increase by around
9% in comparison to the baseline audience of the 2014 FIFA Men’s World Cup
(FIFA Bid Evaluation Report, 2018). In summation, North America is “the most
lucrative region in the world for football”, and staging the competition here will
allow FIFA to expand into new commercial fronts and increase economic pos-
sibilities by deepening commercial connections to existing football enthusiasts.
Secondly, FMWC26 allows FIFA the opportunity to restore and strengthen
commercial and nonproft partnerships with media partners and fnancial insti-
tutions and to create “a culture of innovation for the beneft of FIFA” (United
2026 Bid Book, 2018, p. 10). As United 2026 bid documents point out, North
America is already the biggest sports sponsorship market in the world, with
companies headquartered in the region contributing over 25% of all world-
wide sports sponsorship spending, not including an estimated $40 billion per
annum on media advertising for sports programmes and other sport-oriented
content (United 2026 Bid Book, 2018). FMWC26 ofers integrated partnerships
with advanced technology companies in Silicon Valley, biotechnical industries
in Canada, and petrochemical companies in Mexico to recover from the scan-
dal-induced fnancial losses. To these ends, and from the outset, FMWC26 is
positioned in ways that harmonize with FIFA’s desires to restore and expand
 The Conjunctural Politics of the 2026 FIFA Men’s World Cup 199

its relationships with its US global multinational partners and sponsors (specif-
cally, Visa, McDonalds, Coca-Cola, Budweiser, and Johnson-Johnson), and aid
in securing more lucrative media rights and commercial partnerships. Thus, the
commercial opportunities were at once a mechanism for preserving capital fows
and market growth for FIFA and its corporate partners.
Despite this impressive trajectory for football on the continent, the sport is
understood to have plenty of room to grow in popularity in North America,
particularly the United States. A second MWC hosted in the US, and the
momentous commercial revenue generation by FIFA and host nation football
federations, have been heralded as the “spark” and “catalyst to generating hun-
dreds of millions of dollars that can be invested into making football in the
United States more afordable” (United 2026 Bid Book, 2018, pp. 7–8). As I have
written with Geof Kohe (2021), however, the event legacies related to FMWC26
are almost entirely focused on capital accumulation and wealth extraction by
FIFA, with a few nominal “trickle-down” investments in soccer-related infra-
structure throughout the North American continent that truly lack any clear
plan or coordination. More critically, such trickle-down sporting investment is
balanced by promises of an inspirational sport participation legacy efect that,
while socially palatable, rehearses regurgitated moral axioms that obfuscate cor-
porate opportunism towards new generations of football consumers. In other
words, by opening more facilities, getting more people to play football, and
growing further interest in the game, this process cultivates future consumers
that can be monetized for the primary beneft of FIFA and its member asso-
ciations. So, while opportunity with the FMWC26 could be tied to growing
sports participation and social inclusion among young participants, it is largely
focused on the commercial growth and capital accumulation which can grow
FIFA’s bottom line. And where opportunities for growing sport participation are
acknowledged, they are rather directly linked to cultivating the next generation
of football consumers.

Conclusion: North America, FMWC26, and

the Geopolitical Economy of Sport
2026 will be much, much bigger (than 1994). I think this part of the
world doesn’t realize what will happen here in 2026. The world will be
invading Canada, Mexico and the United States.
FIFA President Gianni Infantino (quoted in
Stejskal, 2022, para. 1)

In this chapter, I have drawn on my previous research to explore the ways in

which the geographic, political, and economic formations of FMWC26 are
constituted by, and constitutive of, the contemporary geopolitical conjuncture.
More specifcally, I have detailed how the conjunctural politics of FMWC26,
including the United 26 bid and United as One strategic hosting vision, are
200 Adam S. Beissel

characterized by the politics of political unity, a magnitude of economic uncer-

tainty, and unprecedented commercial opportunity. These three interrelated fea-
tures of FMWC26 are made particularly relevant given FIFA’s recent history that
involves major scandals, signifcant public criticisms, and recent reform eforts to
rebrand and consolidate its global football empire. Thus, a critical examination
of FMWC26 contributes to a contextually specifc and empirically grounded
understanding of the increasingly interdependent and mutually constitutive rela-
tionship between FMWC26 and FIFA.
More broadly, FMWC26 is uniquely situated within/against the contexts
and conditions of a “new era of play” for contemporary sport culture in which
global-local events, bodies, spaces, and practices “will be shaped by economic
and geopolitical interests much more than in the past” (Chadwick and Widdop,
2021, para. 29). The twin dynamics of globalization and digitalization have con-
tributed to a global sport assemblage in which “geography, politics, and eco-
nomics are interacting with one another giv[ing] rise to the need for a new way
of conceiving sport” (Chadwick, 2022, para. 14). Given recent shifts in global
economic and political power, with Asian and Middle Eastern nations becom-
ing increasingly infuential in sport, FMWC26 represents the ways in which
western liberal democracies have joined forces and responded to shifting eco-
nomic and cultural conditions in order to preserve and extend their sphere of
geopolitical infuence. The three host nations of FMWC26 have symbolically
and materially aligned themselves to leverage North America’s strongest fea-
tures to “open the veins” of one of football’s last remaining untapped markets:
corporate multinational enterprises, commercially saturated consumer markets,
robust spectator-tourist industry, and a spectacular array of built infrastructure
(e.g., stadiums, training facilities, infrastructure). Accordingly, broad appeals to
political unity and continental cooperation are the rather opaque frames through
which the logics of corporate capitalism, conspicuous consumption, and capital-
ist state ideology underpin FMWC26. In so doing, FMWC26 is an opportunity
for western liberal democracies (and their corporate backers) to counteract their
waning political and economic sport interests and combat the growing sporting
infuence(s) of Asian and the Middle Eastern nations. Thus, FMWC26 serves as
a pivotal moment in the ideological contestation for global dominance and infu-
ence in the contemporary geopolitical economy of sport.

Reference List
Allison, L., & Tomlinson, A. (2017). Understanding international sport organisations: Principles,
power and possibilities. Routledge, London. ISBN: 9781315743875.
Beissel, A.S., & Andrews, D.L., 2020. Art of the deal: Donald Trump, soft power, and
winning the 2026 FIFA Men’s World Cup bid. In B. Clift & A. Tomlinson (Eds.),
Populism and the Sport and Leisure Spectacle. Routledge, London, pp. 234–253. ISBN:
9780367356385.
 The Conjunctural Politics of the 2026 FIFA Men’s World Cup 201

Beissel, A.S., & Kohe, G., 2020. United as one: The 2026 FIFA Men’s World Cup hosting
vision and the symbolic politics of legacy. Managing Sport Leisure. Vol. ahead-of-print
No. ahead-of-print. DOI: 10.1080/23750472.2020.1846138.
Beissel, A.S., & Ternes, N., (2022). The empire strikes back: FIFA 2.0, global peacemaking,
and the 2026 FIFA Men’s World Cup United Bid. Journal of Global Sport Management.
September. pp. 1–23. DOI: https://doi.org/10.1080/24704067.2022.2116589.
Black, D., 2007. The symbolic politics of sport mega-events: 2010 in comparative
perspective. Politikon, 34(3), 261–276.
Bradsher, K., & Panja, T., 2018, 9 June. North American World Cup bid projects US$11
billion proft for FIFA. The New York Times. https://www.nytimes.com/2018/05/08/
sports/2026-world-cup.html
Chadwick, S., 2022, 21 January. How 2022 will epitomize sport’s burgeoning geopolitical
economy. GeoSport. Available at: https://www.iris-france.org/164078-how-2022
-will-epitomise-sports-burgeoning-geopolitical-economy/
Chadwick, S. & Widdop, P., 2021, 13 January. The geopolitical economy of sport – A
new era in play. Asia & The Pacifc Policy Society – Policy Forum. Available at: https://
www.policyforum.net/the-geopolitical-economy-of-sport/
Das, A., 2018a, 8 May. North American World Cup bid projects $11 billion proft for
FIFA. The New York Times. Available at: https://www.nytimes.com/2018/05/08/
sports/2026-world-cup.html
Das, A., 2018, 13 June. How 3 letters from Trump might help bring the 2026 World Cup
to the U.S. The New York Times. Available at: https://www.nytimes.com/2018/06/12
/sports/trump-letters-world-cup.html (accessed 13 June 2018).
FIFA Bid Evaluation Report, 2018. Bid evaluation report: 2026 FIFA World Cup. FIFA
.com. Available at: https://resources.ffa.com/image/upload/2026-ffa-world-cup-bid
-evaluation-report.pdf?cloudid=yx76lnat3oingsmnlvzf
Gof, S., 2021, 19 September. D.C. makes its 2026 World Cup pitch to FIFA ofcials:
‘Washington is where you want to be’. The Washington Post. Available at: https://
www.washingtonpost.com/sports/2021/09/19/washington-dc-2026 -world-cup
-inspection/
Gof, S., 2022, 16 June. 2026 World Cup host cities are unveiled, but D.C. and Baltimore
miss out. The Washington Post. Available at: https://www.washingtonpost.com/sports
/2022/06/16/2026-world-cup-host-cities/
GRI Referenced Report, 2018. Prepared in accordance with Global Reporting Initiative
(GRI) Guidelines by United Bid 2026 Committee. FIFA.com. Available at: https://
resources.f ifa.com/image/upload/gri-referenced-report-united-bid.pdf ?cloudid
=msbdtfolv8bozcnvxlda
Hall, M., 2018. Are cities starting to see World Cup hosting duties as a poisoned chalice?
The Guardian. https://www.theguardian.com/football/2018/mar/19/are-cities
-starting-to-see-world-cup-hosting-duties-as-a-poisoned-chalice
Horne, J., 2017. Sports mega-events – Three sites of contemporary political contestation.
Sport in Society, 20(3), 328–340.
Javers, E. [@EamonJavers], 2020, 21 January. FIFA president Gianni Infantino to
President Trump in Davos: “I have to inform you that the U.S. is on the verge of
becoming the soccer power of the world.” [Tweet]. Twitter.com. Available at: https://
twitter.com/eamonjavers/status/1219680016809779201
Luce, E., 2018, 21 June. The rise of a new generation of anti-Americans. The Financial
Times. https://www.ft.com/content/ae6d2aca-7530-11e8-b6ad-3823e4384287
202 Adam S. Beissel

Murray, C., 2015, 11 August. Is the US ready – Or even willing – To host the 2026 World
Cup? The Guardian. http://www.theguardian.com/football/blog/2015/aug/10/is-the
-us-ready-or-even-willing-to-host-the-2026-world-cup
Stejskal, S. [@samstejskal], 2022, 16 June. FIFA president Gianni Infantino: “2026 will
be much, much bigger (than 1994). I think this part of the world doesn’t realize what
will happen here in 2026. … The world will be invading Canada, Mexico and the
United States.” [Tweet]. Twitter.com. Available at: https://twitter.com/samstejskal/
status/1537567610488991752
Thompson, S., 2021, 6 August. Olympic success could be a boost to women’s, girls’ soccer
across Canada. Globalnews.CA. Available at: https://globalnews.ca/news/8092111/
olympic-gold-inspiring-girls-womens-soccer/
United 2026 Bid Book, 2018. Canada, Mexico, and the United States Bid to Host the
2026 FIFA World Cup. FIFA.com. Available at: https://img.ffa.com/image/upload/
w3yjeu7dadt5erw26wmu.pdf
24
THE ATTEMPTED RESHAPING
OF THE TURKISH FOOTBALL
LANDSCAPE UNDER THE AK PARTY
A Transaction Cost Economics Explanation

Steven H. Seggie

On 5 May 1996, a goal in the 82nd minute by Fenerbahce’s Aykut Kocaman was
enough to give Fenerbahce a 2–1 victory in Trabzonspor’s Huseyin Avni Aker
Stadium. Trabzonspor had led the Turkish Super League for more than half of
the season, but with this result they dropped back to second and, although there
were still two weeks of the season left, they fnished two points shy of Fenerbahce
in frst (Turkey Super Lig, 1995/1996 Table). For the 13th time, Fenerbahce were
Super League Champions with Trabzonspor in second and Besiktas in third. Had
results gone diferently this would have been Trabzonspor’s frst league cham-
pionship since 1983–84, but it was not to be. Yet again, one of the big three
Istanbul clubs (Besiktas, Fenerbahce, and Galatasaray) were champions, and this
was not much of a surprise as in the history of the Turkish Super League only
six clubs have been champions with the big three Istanbul clubs dominating
(Ambille, 2021). It would not be until the 2021–22 season that Trabzonspor
would fnally become champions again.
Much has changed in Turkey from the mid-1990s until the present day, and
one area where we have observed massive upheaval is in politics. The 1990s
were not a particularly fruitful period in Turkish politics with a succession of
weak coalition governments, runaway infation, and terrorism dominating the
headlines (Sozen, 2006). On 24 December 1995, national elections were held
which resulted in fve political parties entering Parliament, with no one party
having a majority. It was a particularly traumatic election for the secular elite
in Turkey (Burak, 2011) as the Islamist Welfare Party (RP), led by Necmettin
Erbakan, got the highest number of votes of all the parties, getting just over
21% of all votes. The other four parties that were able to enter Parliament were
Mesut Yilmaz’s right-wing secular Motherland Party (ANAP) with nearly 20%
of the vote, Tansu Ciller’s right-wing secular True Path Party (DYP) with 19%
of the vote, the left-wing secular Democratic Left Party (DSP) of Bulent Ecevit

DOI: 10.4324/9781003348238-29
204 Steven H. Seggie

with nearly 15%, and the left-wing secular People’s Republic Party (CHP) led
by Deniz Baykal with almost 11% (Secor, 2001). This victory for the Welfare
Party came just two and a half years after they had won the elections for mayor
of Istanbul (Recep Tayyip Erdogan) and Ankara (Melih Gokcek).
If we fast-forward to 2022, only one of these political parties, the CHP,
and only one of these politicians, Recep Tayyip Erdogan, can be considered a
major force in politics. Although to state that Erdogan is a major force would
be to do him a disservice as he has been the dominant force in Turkish politics
for the past 20 years. During his time in power, one of his main projects has
been the founding of a New Turkey (Keyman, 2014), a Turkey where citizens
are more conservative, more openly pious, and less secular. As part of this pro-
ject, Erdogan has turned his gaze towards sport, and in particular football, and
attempted to reshape it in line with New Turkey values. It is well documented
that Erdogan was a promising young footballer, and it is even speculated that he
could have become a professional player but for his father not considering it to
be an appropriate career for him (Ege, 2021). Furthermore, football is by far and
away the most popular sport in Turkey, and internationally, football clubs are
one of the most common ways for foreigners, particularly Europeans, to engage
with Turkey as a result of Turkish teams competing in the UEFA competitions.
Therefore, in the same way that the Soviet Union used sporting success for prop-
aganda purposes (Mertin, 2010), Erdogan can use any sporting success on the
football pitch as a proxy for the success of his regime. Erdogan is no stranger to
doing this domestically, regularly meeting with footballers such as Mesut Ozil,
Arda Turan, Ilkay Gundogan, Emre Belozoglu, and others as a way to associ-
ate their success with his. Also, his government is no stranger to using football
in the international arena, previously using it as part of the Turkey–Armenian
reconciliation process in October 2009. As part of this ultimately unsuccessful
reconciliation process, then Turkish President Abdullah Gül and then Armenian
President Serzh Sarkisian attended both the home and away leg of World Cup
qualifying matches between the two countries (Freizer, 2009).

Governance
Once the decision was made to attempt to change football in line with the values
of New Turkey, the big question facing Erdogan and his party, the AK Party, was
one of governance. How exactly should the AK Party govern any relationship
between themselves and football clubs to achieve the objective of having success-
ful clubs aligning with the values of New Turkey? As with any interorganiza-
tional governance decision, the choices are on a continuum from market-based
governance to bilateral governance to vertical integration (Williamson, 1973;
Williamson, 1985). These can be thought of as degrees of closeness or integration
between the AK Party and the football club. Broadly speaking, a market-based
governance solution would be to wait for the clubs (particularly the big three) to
adapt to the values of New Turkey or fnd ways to incentivize such an evolution.
 The Attempted Reshaping of the Turkish Football 205

A bilateral governance solution would involve actively pairing up with some of

the leading clubs through some form of joint management or ownership1 struc-
ture. This could take the form of leading AK Party-afliated businesspeople
becoming directors of the big three Istanbul clubs. Finally, the vertical integra-
tion solution would be for the AK Party to set up its own football club.
Transaction cost economics (TCE) (Williamson, 1973, 1985) talks to how
organizations should govern these relationships given the type and levels of
investment required and levels of uncertainty (Rindfeisch and Heide, 1997).
TCE outlines three governance problems: the safeguarding problem, the adapta-
tion problem, and the performance evaluation problem. I do not have the space
to go into each of these problems in detail here, but sufce to say that in this
context the AK Party was faced with both an adaptation problem and a perfor-
mance evaluation problem. An adaptation problem that existed because of high
levels of unpredictability in the environment. This unpredictability stems from
not knowing how a team will perform, to not knowing how fans will respond,
etc. While a performance evaluation problem exists because it is difcult for
the AK Party to assess the performance of the football club it intends to partner
with, particularly given the ownership and membership structure of these clubs
and the fact that members for the most part may not support the AK Party and
its vision of a New Turkey. Proponents of TCE state that when there are adapta-
tion problems and performance evaluation problems then the solution is vertical
integration (e.g., Anderson, 1985; Williamson, 1998).

Erdogan’s Attempts Pre-2013: A Market-Based

Governance Solution
Erdogan’s initial attempts centred around the big three Istanbul clubs that were
already dominant. He made various attempts to align with these clubs and
control them through a series of diferent measures. His AK Party govern-
ment passed a bill in 2011 (Law No. 6222) that brought in harsh penalties
for crowd violence, and most importantly put match fxing into the realm of
public prosecutors (Irak, 2020). This allowed for the public prosecutor to open
a match fxing case in July 2011 directed against the major clubs and which
led to the arrest and jailing of then Fenerbahce Chairman, Aziz Yildirim.
This court case collapsed partly due to pressure and the protests of Fenerbahce
fans and partly due to the falling out between the Gulen Movement and the
AK Party (ibid.).2 That said, it left a bitter taste in Fenerbahce fans’ mouths
towards the government. Furthermore, in May 2013, Besiktas fans fought with
the police and tensions were rising. Finally, on 27 May 2013, the Gezi Park
protests began, growing from an environmental protest in a fairly nondescript
park in central Istanbul to a nationwide protest against the government. Many
groups were involved in the protests (McGarry et al., 2019), but some of the
most active were football fans, including the Ultras of Besiktas, Fenerbahce,
and Galatasaray. In particular, a leading role was played by the Besiktas Ultras
206 Steven H. Seggie

group, Carsi, partly down to the fact they were “battle hardened” when it
came to confronting the police and also down to their roots as an organization
that wanted to combat injustice (Turan and Ozcetin, 2019). The actions of the
ultras at Gezi Park were likely the fnal nail in the cofn of any attempt by the
AK Party and Tayyip Erdogan to leave the governance to the market. It was
clear that any attempt to incentivize the clubs to adapt to the values of New
Turkey was futile and the market-based governance solution had failed. This
is no surprise, given that TCE predicts that high levels of uncertainty require
high levels of control that were not aforded by the AK Party and Erdogan’s
actions pre-2013.

Erdogan’s Attempts Post-2013: A Vertical Integration

Governance Solution
The failure to get the big three Istanbul clubs on board led Erdogan in search of
a Plan B, and he found it in the name of Istanbul Buyuksehir Belediyesi. This
club was founded in 1990 by the then Social Democratic mayor of Istanbul,
Nurettin Sozen. The club, for the most part, played in the second tier of Turkish
football but had some success on being promoted to the top tier. In 2014 the club
was sold to a group of businessmen close to the AK Party and Recep Tayyip
Erdogan (Wilks, 2019). These businessmen included Goksel Gumusdag (AK
Party Istanbul city councillor and the son-in-law of Erdogan’s wife’s brother)
and Ahmet Ketenci (brother of one of Erdogan’s son’s wives). The club changed
its name to Basaksehir Football Club and from that season onward showed a
remarkable consistency of high-level performance, fnishing fourth in 2014–15
and 2015–16, third in 2017–18, second in 2016–17 and 2018–19, and winning
the title in 2019–20. In that time, the club was able to purchase players such as
Emmanuel Adebayor, Demba Ba, Emre Belozoglu, Gael Clichy, and other top
names. The money for these signings did not come from tickets sold as the club
at best averages just over 5,000 spectators per game (Irak, 2020) and instead likely
came from sponsorship from companies that are close to the government (Wilks,
2019). While it is difcult to know exactly how the club is being fnanced, it is
clear that the club is an AK Party or, more specifcally, a Tayyip Erdogan pro-
ject. As Tayyip Erdogan himself said in an interview on the national broadcaster
TRT in 2019 in response to how well Basaksehir were doing, “I’m very proud of
Basaksehir because Basaksehir is the club I founded.”
So, did this vertically integrated solution create the football club of New
Turkey? It is a difcult question to answer. On the one hand, it is impossible
to argue with the success the club has had on the pitch. When we consider that
this AK Party project really only began in 2014, to become champion within
six years and to be in the top four every year before becoming champion is an
incredible feat. However, this success on the pitch has not been replicated of the
pitch. It is still the big three clubs that have the huge fan bases and crowds at their
games. It is still the big three Istanbul clubs that are known throughout Europe.
 The Attempted Reshaping of the Turkish Football 207

Besiktas, Fenerbahce, and Galatasaray may no longer have a monopoly on suc-

cess, but they still represent Turkish football, and they still do not represent the
values of New Turkey.

2021–22 and the Future

This then brings us up to 2021–22, where yet again the big Istanbul clubs have
failed to win the league and have had an atrocious season for the most part. It
was a particularly bad season for Galatasaray, who fnished 16th, and Besiktas,
who fnished 6th. Fenerbahce managed to fnish 2nd and Basaksehir once
again fnished 4th. The champion? Finally, after all these years, Trabzonspor
became champion. Trabzonspor is the team from Trabzon, an AK Party and
Tayyip Erdogan stronghold known for its nationalism and religious conserva-
tism (Bozok, 2012), two of the values underlying Tayyip Erdogan’s idea of New
Turkey. Tayyip Erdogan’s family moved to Istanbul from Rize, a town only one
hour by car from Trabzon. Furthermore, one of Trabzonspor’s best known sup-
porters is Berat Albayrak (Idil, 2020), ex-Minister of Finance and Treasury for
the AK Party government and son-in-law of Tayyip Erdogan. Maybe a bilateral
governance involving Trabzonspor would have been the most fruitful avenue for
the AK Party and Tayyip Erdogan to follow.

Conclusion
As part of his project to develop a New Turkey, Tayyip Erdogan also wanted to
transform the footballing landscape. Given the uncertainty in the market and
the behavioural uncertainty regarding football teams and their supporters, the
theoretical predictions of transaction cost economics tell us that the best way
to do this would be for the AK Party to have their own football team. Initially
Erdogan and the AK Party tried a market governance solution, but by 2013 it
was clear that this was not working. In 2014, they moved on to a vertically inte-
grated solution that involved businessmen close to Erdogan and his party buying
Basaksehir and using creative funding from sponsors and elsewhere to build a
team capable of winning the Super League in 2019–20. However, it seems that
this project was only partially successful and did not have the desired efect of
the pitch of changing the Turkish football culture. However, with the victory of
Trabzonspor in 2021–22 and the closeness of Erdogan’s son-in-law to the club
we may be observing a third way. Not a market solution, not a vertically inte-
grated solution, but some sort of bilateral governance solution whereby there is
an alliance between Erdogan’s family and Trabzonspor. Trabzonspor could be
the football club that symbolizes Erdogan’s New Turkey.
If Trabzonspor is to be the fagship football club symbolizing a New Turkey,
then to be useful to Erdogan and the AK Party it must be able to symbolize
this both domestically and internationally. Domestically, this seems possible as
it is a club capable of high performance on the feld coupled with a strong
208 Steven H. Seggie

football culture of the feld. Since Trabzon is in Anatolia, Trabzonspor can

position itself as the club of the Anatolian people rather than of the Istanbul
elites. However, internationally it is a bit more difcult as the sine qua non is
for Trabzonspor to be successful in European competition, which has eluded
them thus far. In fact, this season (2022–23) they were unable to reach the group
stages of the Champions League, having been knocked out by FC Copenhagen
in the qualifying round and dropping down to the Europa League. Without suc-
cess on the European stage, Trabzonspor will not be able to play its required role
of demonstrating the strength of New Turkey through success in the interna-
tional sporting arena. Erdogan’s attempts to use football as a tool of international
propaganda for New Turkey have so far fallen short, and given that he is up for
re-election in 2023, it is possible that time is running out and in this project he
has ultimately failed.

Notes
1 Besiktas, Fenerbahce, and Galatasaray are run as associations with one member one
vote and diferent ways for individuals to become members. The members then elect
the directors of the club. As such, directors of the club are not owners in the sense that
they would be in the UK for example. A detailed description of the structures and the
challenges can be found in Guney (2017).
2 Please see Yavuz (2018) and Martin (2022) for a detailed discussion of the relationship
between the Gulen Movement and the AK Party. Both of these authors explain in
some detail how they become frst allies and then bitter enemies.

References
Ambille, I., 2021. ‘Turkish super lig champions’ Interesting Football, 10 May. Available at:
https://interestingfootball.com/turkish-super-lig-champions-list-of-turkish-league
-winners-history/ (accessed 18 June 2022).
Anderson, E., 1985. The salesperson as outside agent or employee: A transaction cost
analysis. Marketing Science, 4(3), pp. 234–254.
Bozok, M., 2012. Constructing local masculinities: A case study from Trabzon, Turkey,
Unpublished Doctoral Dissertation, Institute of Social Sciences, Middle East Technical
University, Ankara, Turkey.
Burak, B., 2011. The role of the military in Turkish politics: To guard whom and from
what?. European Journal of Economic and Political Studies, 4(1), pp. 143–169.
Ege, 2021. ‘Erdogan: Babam onumu kesmese futbolcu olacaktim’ A3Haber, 28 November.
Available at: https://www.a3haber.com/2021/11/28/erdogan-babam-onumu
-kesmese-futbolcu-olacaktim/ (accessed 4 June 2022).
Freizer, S., 2009. ‘Football diplomacy’ International Crisis Group, 15 October. Available
at: https://www.crisisgroup.org/europe-central-asia/western-europemediterranean/
turkey/football-diplomacy (accessed 27 September 2022).
Güney, E., 2017. Supporter ownership in Turkish football. In Football and supporter activism
in Europe (pp. 257–276). Cham: Palgrave Macmillan.
Idil, N., 2020. ‘Politics in stadiums: Fenerbahce fans urge minister Albayrak to keep hands
of football’ Duvar English, 10 February. Available at: https://www.duvarenglish.com
 The Attempted Reshaping of the Turkish Football 209

/sport/2020/02/10/politics-in-stadiums-fenerbahce-fans-urge-minister-albayrak-to
-keep-hands-of-football (accessed 18 June 2022).
Irak, D., 2020. Football in Turkey during the Erdoğan regime. Soccer & Society, 21(6),
pp. 680–691.
Keyman, E., 2014. The AK party: Dominant party, new Turkey and polarization. Insight
Turkey, 16(2), pp. 19–31.
Martin, N., 2022. Allies and enemies: The Gülen movement and the AKP. Cambridge
Review of International Afairs, 35(1), pp. 110–127.
McGarry, A., Jenzen, O., Eslen-Ziya, H., Erhart, I. and Korkut, U., 2019. Beyond the
iconic protest images: The performance of ‘everyday life’ on social media during Gezi
Park. Social Movement Studies, 18(3), pp. 284–304.
Mertin, E., 2010. Participation is not enough. The Soviet Union in the Olympic
Movement. Cahiers de l’INSEP, 46(1), pp. 225–233.
Rindfeisch, A. and Heide, J.B., 1997. Transaction cost analysis: Past, present, and future
applications. Journal of Marketing, 61(4), pp. 30–54.
Secor, A.J., 2001. Ideologies in crisis: Political cleavages and electoral politics in Turkey
in the 1990s. Political Geography, 20(5), pp. 539–560.
Sozen, A., 2006. Terrorism and the politics of anti-terrorism in Turkey. Nato Security
through Science Series E Human and Societal Dynamics, 14, p. 131.
Turan, Ö. and Özçetin, B., 2019. Football fans and contentious politics: The role of
Çarşı in the Gezi Park protests. International Review for the Sociology of Sport, 54(2), pp.
199–217.
Turkey. Super Lig 1995/1996 Table. Available at: https://tribuna.com/en/league/tr-super
-lig/table/1995-1996/ (accessed 15 June 2022).
Wilks, A., 2019. ‘How a small Istanbul team with government links rose to challenge
Turkey’s football elite’ The National, 13 March. Available at: https://www
.thenationalnews.com/world/mena/how-a-small-istanbul-team-with-government
-links-rose-to-challenge-turkey-s-football-elite-1.836402 (accessed 1 June 2022).
Williamson, O.E., 1973. Markets and hierarchies: Some elementary considerations. The
American Economic Review, 63(2), pp. 316–325.
Williamson, O.E., 1985. The Economic Institutions of Capitalism: Firms, Markets, Relational
Contracting. New York: The Free Press.
Williamson, O.E., 1998. The institutions of governance. The American Economic
Review, 88(2), pp. 75–79.
Yavuz, M.H., 2018. A framework for understanding the intra-Islamist confict between
the AK party and the Gülen movement. Politics, Religion & Ideology, 19(1), pp. 11–32.
25
FOOTBALL AND THE CITY
A Sports Place Branding Perspective
of Barcelona and Manchester

Xavier Ginesta and Carles Viñas

Introduction
The link between sport and city brands goes back a long way. In Europe, football
clubs have become actors in global corporate diplomacy that helps to position
their home towns in the competitive international market of tourists, talent,
and investors. The aim of this chapter is to analyze the city brand positioning of
Barcelona and Manchester since they share a vector that unites them and forces
them to constantly compare: their passion for football; and they host three of
the top ten clubs in terms of market value in 2021, according to Forbes: the frst,
FC Barcelona ($4.76B); the fourth, Manchester United ($4.2B); and the sixth,
Manchester City ($4B). For the past 16 years, Manchester United have been
top of the list 11 times (Ozanian, 2021). In 2021, they were also three of the
fve highest-income clubs in post-COVID-19 Europe: Manchester City with
€644.9M, FC Barcelona with €582.1M, and Manchester United with €558M
( Jones et al., 2022).

Conceptual Bases of Place Branding

In today’s world, cities need to position themselves internationally. That is why
studies on place branding, cutting across the disciplines of geography, politi-
cal science, and communication (Govers and Go, 2009; Anholt, 2010), help
us to understand the global impact of clubs. Place brands are defned based on
the infuence they exert on people’s perceptions. Obtaining a unique identity
expressed through a brand ofers recognition and diferentiation to specifc geo-
graphical areas, providing them with a positioning that is decisive in the choice
preferences of users. In this context, cities yield the projection of their identity to

DOI: 10.4324/9781003348238-30
 Football and the City 211

a new symbolic background that is managed, in part, through the transformation

of places into brands (San Eugenio, 2011).
Places, in this global environment, have a growing need to establish their
identities not only for economic needs (tourism, market doctrine, etc.) but also
due to a new demand to strengthen identities in a global society. Some research
(Govers and Go, 2009; Anholt, 2010; San Eugenio, 2011) shows that the logic of
implementing place brands has followed, in most cases, processes that are practi-
cally identical to the creation of commercial brands, adopting as their own the
marketing and communication techniques associated with it (San Eugenio, 2011,
p. 732). However, the creation of place brands at every geographical scale (coun-
try, city, nation, region, destination, among others) must necessarily include
elements that difer from those deployed in the corporate sphere due to two
main reasons. First, the necessary reading of the brand creation process from a
regional and environmentally sensitive perspective, that is, valuing the tangible
and intangible assets of the place. And, second, the public interest that lies behind
such initiatives, which clearly associates the creation of place brands with the
political needs of the area (Rein and Shields, 2007).

Barcelona: Football after the Olympics

The City of Barcelona is still living from its 1992 Olympic success, which led
to an unprecedented transformation: there were signifcant urbanistic changes
that reshape the city, such as the two Ring Roads or the transformation of the
maritime seafront that has been a key element to improve the Catalan tourist
industry since 1992. At the economic level, in 2020 it was ranked, in the world,
the seventh city in terms of foreign investment, the twentieth city in Europe
in terms of tourists (7.1 million), and as one of the ten most creative and cul-
tural cities of Europe. The socio-economic impact of hosting the Mobile World
Congress (MWC) since 2006 should also be highlighted. And with regard to
sports, between 2012 and 2020 it was always among the top ten most valued cit-
ies to host sporting events (Udina et al., 2020).
However, Barcelona today has transformed from being an “Olympic city” to a
great “capital of football” as a result of the international success of FC Barcelona
(between 2006 and 2015 the club won four European Cups) (Kuper, 2021). In
2006, in addition to securing its second Champions League title, it signed the
frst major global sponsorship agreement with UNICEF, an agreement that
ended in 2022 when the club partnered with UNHCR. With its connection
to the United Nations, FC Barcelona linked the main motto of its narrative
(“More than a club”) to the globalization of its football brand (“More than a
club in the world”). Previously, in 2005, it also signed an agreement with the
Catalan regional Government, to contribute to the international promotion of
the brand “Catalonia”. The agreement, which was last renewed in September
2021, associates the joint actions of the Catalan Agency of Tourism and the club
212 Xavier Ginesta and Carles Viñas

with the following illustrative slogan: “If you love FC Barcelona, your destina-
tion is Catalonia”.
The FC Barcelona Experience Tour competes head-to-head with the Dali
Theatre-Museum in Figueres to be the most visited museum of Catalonia. Six
percent of tourists who arrive in Barcelona admit to being mainly attracted by
the international projection achieved by the club (Ginesta, 2022). According to
data from the Barcelona City Council, in the fve years prior to the COVID-19
pandemic, Camp Nou was the third most visited facility in the city (1,661,156
visitors), only surpassed by the Sagrada Família (4,717,796 visitors) and Park
Güell (3,154,349 visitors), the great works of the modernist architect Antoni
Gaudí. In economic terms, the activity of FC Barcelona represents 1.46% of
the city’s GDP and provides 19,451 jobs; in addition, the club’s activities gen-
erate 1.4 million overnight stays a year and represent 19% of the direct added
value of the city’s accommodation, food, and drink, according to data from
PricewaterhouseCoopers (PwC) (FC Barcelona, 2020; Ginesta, 2022).
Given how the city actively participates in international tourist circuits, the
rise of sports tourism, and the impact of the capital of Catalonia as a smart city, in
2018 FC Barcelona and the World Tourism Organisation (UNWTO) presented
the frst edition of the UNWTO Sports Tourism Start-up Competition, an ini-
tiative designed to identify innovative projects with the potential to transform
and revolutionize the sports tourism sector, which is supported by the Qatar
National Tourism Council (QNTC). Furthermore, Leo Messi was appointed
Ambassador for Responsible Tourism of the UNWTO. However, these are the
only two actions that have resulted from this agreement between the club and
the UNWTO.
All this explains how football is creating a “new geography” (Nogué and
Romero, 2012); this is to say that football shapes how people conceptualize their
symbolic appropriation of the territory. Football is a key element to defne peo-
ple’s “sense of place” (Ginesta and San Eugenio, 2022). On the one hand, FC
Barcelona opened its doors to the Emirate of Qatar in 2010 with the frst spon-
sorship agreement with Qatar Sports Investments (QSI). And on the other, RCD
Espanyol, the second football club in Barcelona, has become associated with
the Chinese capital. When Rastar Group sought assets to invest in European
football in 2016, Espanyol caught Chen Yansheng’s attention for two reasons: it
was located in a cosmopolitan city with an international reputation for tourists
and investors; and because it was the direct rival of FC Barcelona. The brand
“Barcelona” was key for the story that the new Chinese owners had to sell inter-
nationally (Ginesta, Sellas, and Canals, 2019).
In the case of Espanyol, the location of its stadium on the outskirts of the
Catalan Capital – one of the largest tourist and airport hubs in Europe – has
also enabled it to have the longest-term sponsorship contract (of all LaLiga) for
a men’s frst team shirt: Riviera Maya, one of the world’s largest sun and beach
tourist destinations, has been part of the club’s pool of sponsors since 2011, and
the current contract runs until 2023.
 Football and the City 213

Manchester: Football and Place Identity

Manchester, the cradle of the Industrial Revolution, is an example of how the
intangibles surrounding sport can conceptualize the narrative of a city (Rein
and Shields, 2007). This past of Manchester has been relegated, in international
tourist circuits, by a discourse that identifes the city with, apart from music, the
origin, evolution, commercialization, and mystique of football ( James, 2019).
As reported by the Manchester Evening News (2018), the city’s tourist circuits
have three mandatory stops: the National Football Museum and the two stadi-
ums of the Premier League: Old Traford (located outside the city, in Greater
Manchester) and the Etihad Stadium (located east of Manchester city centre).
In 2018, Old Traford and the National Football Museum were among the fve
most visited facilities per day. Compared to the previous year, tourists grew by
10% (from 1,191,000 to 1,319,000), while their expenditure contributed £670
million to the city (Cox and Ottewell, 2018). “Manchester is synonymous with
football; it’s written in our DNA”, is openly displayed on the City Council’s
tourism website.
On the one hand, in the city centre the National Football Museum enables us
to understand, from the codifcation of football at the end of the 19th century,
the keys to the construction of the main British stadiums thanks to the ingenu-
ity of the architect Archibald Leitch (1865–1939) at the beginning of the 20th
century (with venues like White Hart Lane and Old Traford), the phenomenon
of hooliganism, and the impact of the Premier League. And because of their
popularity, the major clubs are valuable assets not only for the campaigns of city
marketing but also in geopolitics. Studies on public diplomacy must consider sport
an object of study of the utmost importance (Chadwick, 2022). In this regard,
the image of the Chinese leader Xi Jinping with the then Prime Minister David
Cameron at the entrance of the National Football Museum of Manchester is
fairly representative of the future of football business.
On the other hand, a visit to the stadiums of the two clubs helps us under-
stand why the city can boast of being a frst-class sports tourism destination. First
of all, the route through Old Traford enthrones the romanticism of this sport
and its epic nature. Culturally, since its inception, the Newton Heath LYR (as
Manchester United was originally called)

represents a typical example of the way in which accelerating urbanisa-

tion and industrialisation processes contributed to the physical, spatial and
temporal disciplining of the workers’ leisure time at the end of the 1800s.
There was thus a close connection between Manchester United, industri-
alisation and the working classes.
(Frank, 2013, p. 13)

In a sporting context, the trainer Matt Busby revolutionized British football by

making the Busby Babes the great football reference point of the time, while the
214 Xavier Ginesta and Carles Viñas

Munich Air Disaster of 1958 forged the founding myth of the glory of Manchester
United (Andrews, 2004; Skinner, 2016). Secondly, the Etihad Stadium repre-
sents the opposite: the disneyization of football (Ginesta, 2022) through a fully
experiential visit. To this must be added the evolution of British football towards
the positional play system that Josep Guardiola made famous when he led FC
Barcelona. After achieving a series of successes in domestic competitions since
the Catalan manager signed for the skyblue team (2016), the club launched the
slogan “We play beautiful football” as a new axis of positioning and corporate
identity.
The case of Manchester City represents perfectly the transformation of a local
club into an entertainment multinational. Anna Connell, the daughter of St.
Mark’s church vicar, founded a working men’s club to keep West Gorton work-
ers away from alcohol and violence. However, as James (2019, p. 110) explains,
her infuence on the club’s sporting transformation has not been proven. What
James (2019, p. 113) does acknowledge is that

the growth of regular footballing activities in Gorton appears to have

diverted attention from scuttling for some of the local population, demon-
strating, perhaps for the frst time in the region, how association football
could be positive infuence on the city’s youths.

The club, founded around St. Mark’s Church, is currently part of the City Football
Group (CFG) holding company, which is owned by Abu Dhabi United Group
(78%), China Media Capital (12%), and Silver Lake (10%), and in 2021 became
the highest-grossing football club in the world (€644.9 million) ( Jones et al.,
2022, p. 10).

Final Remarks
The cities of Barcelona and Manchester are a good example of how football has
become an element that inextricably shapes its city brand. Over time, their clubs
have become an attraction for both visitors and investors. At the same time, they
have become an economic driver for these cities, which have clearly beneftted
from their activity, especially those that have repeatedly participated in European
competitions.
Another factor to consider is how the ownership model of these clubs can end
up strengthening the city brand. Although the study of the ownership models
of FC Barcelona, RCD Espanyol, and the two Manchester clubs are not the
subject of this study, we can question whether this might become a determin-
ing factor in this club–city relationship. In our case, while RCD Espanyol and
the two Manchester clubs have the advantage of acting as business corporations
(the frst based in China, another in the United States, and the last one in Abu
Dhabi), at FC Barcelona it is the members who have the fnal say in the club’s
strategic decision-making: for example, the endorsement of the agreement with
 Football and the City 215

UNICEF mentioned above, the signing of new sponsors for the front of the
shirt, the extension of Camp Nou, and its title rights. Therefore, as Ginesta and
San Eugenio (2022) analyzed in a previous research having Girona FC as a study
object – the club belongs to City Football Group – when a new corporation buys
a football club, it needs to deeply understand how fans structure their sense of
place in order to engage with local communities.
Finally, and as an element of future analysis, we believe it is of interest to
refect on how geography afects the impact of a city brand (Nogué and Romero,
2012). Following Marshall (2021) and his idea of how geography conditions the
development of societies, we cannot ignore the fact that its geographical enclave
has given Barcelona a natural competitive advantage that its rivals do not possess,
and that the city began to successfully exploit from the 1992 Olympic Games
onwards, which coincided with FC Barcelona winning its frst European Cup.
The construction of the Barcelona brand has been able to use this privileged
location in the Mediterranean to position itself as one of the European cities with
a greater international focus and projection (with tourists, congresses, trade fairs,
and investment), which has allowed it not to depend exclusively on football to
give international muscle to its brand, as occurs in Manchester where the local
narrative has mythologized it.

References
Andrews, D.L. (ed.) (2004) Manchester United. A thematic study. London: Sage.
Anholt, S. (2010) Places. Identity, image and reputation. Hampshire: Palgrave-Macmillan.
Chadwick, S. (2022) ‘From utilitarianism and neoclassical sport management to a new
geopolitical economy of sport’, European Sport Management Quarterly. First online
publication. doi: 10.1080/16184742.2022.2032251
Cox, C. and Ottewell, D. (2018) ‘More and more tourists are discovering how brilliant
Manchester is with overseas visitors up by 10 per cent’, Manchester Evening News, 25 July.
Available at: https://www.manchestereveningnews.co.uk/news/greater-manchester
-news/more-more-tourists-discovering-how-14948125 (Accessed: 17 April 2022).
FC Barcelona. (2020) Impacte econòmic del Futbol Club Barcelona. Temporada 2018–2019.
Barcelona: FC Barcelona.
Frank, S. (2013) Standing on the shoulders of giants. A cultural analysis of Manchester United.
London: Bloomsbury.
Ginesta, X., Sellas, T. and Canals, M. (2019) ‘Chinese investments in Spanish Football:
A case study of RCD Espanyol new management trends after rastar purchase’,
Communication & Sport, 7(6), pp. 752–770.
Ginesta, X. and San Eugenio, J. de. (2022) ‘Football fans as place ambassadors: Analysing
the interactions between Girona FC and its fan clubs after its purchase by city football
group (CFG)’, Soccer & Society. doi: 10.1080/14660970.2022.2069752
Ginesta, X. (2022). Las multinacionales del entretenimiento. Fútbol, diplomacia, identidad y
tecnología. Barcelona: Editorial UOC.
Govers, R. and Go, F.M. (2009) Place branding: Glocal, virtual and physical identities,
constructed, imagined and experienced. Hampshire: Palgrave Macmillan.
James, G. (2019) The emerging of footballing cultures. Manchester, 1840–1919. Manchester:
Manchester University Press.
216 Xavier Ginesta and Carles Viñas

Jones, D., et al. (2022) Restart. Football Money League. Manchester: Deloitte.
Kuper, S. (2021) Barça. The inside story of the world’s greatest football club. London: Octopus
books.
Marshall, T. (2021). The power of geography: Ten maps that reveals the future of our world.
London: Elliott & Thompson Limited.
Nogué, J. and Romero, J. (eds.) (2012) Las otras geografías. València: Tirant Humanidades.
Ozanian, M. (2021) ‘The world’s most valuable soccer teams: Barcelona edges real madrid
to land at no.1 for frst tim’, Forbes, 12 April. Available at: https://www.forbes.com
/sites/mikeozanian/2021/04/12/the-worlds-most-valuable-soccer-teams-barcelona
-on-top-at-48-billion/?sh=d3ae67416ac5 (Accessed: 23 April 2022).
Rein, I. and Shields, B. (2007) ‘Place branding sports: Strategies for diferentiating
emerging, transitional, negatively viewed and newly industrialised nations’, Place
Branding and Public Diplomacy, 3(1), pp. 73–85.
San Eugenio, J. (2011) La transformació de territoris en marques: El reconeixement i la diferenciació
d’identitats espacials en temps postmoderns. Un estat de la qüestió. PhD thesis. Universitat
Pompeu Fabra.
Skinner, R. (2016) The Busby Babes. Romsey: Urbane Publications.
Udina, T., et al. (2020) Observatori Barcelona 2020. Barcelona: Ajuntament de Barcelona,
Cambra de Comerç de Barcelona.
26
THE EUROPEAN SUPER LEAGUE
AND FOOTBALL’S PRIVATIZATION
Alexey Kirichek

In April 2021, the football world was shocked by a large-scale scandal. Twelve
of the most titled and honoured European football clubs announced that they
would be quitting the UEFA competition system and decided to create an elite
tournament for 20 teams, named European Super League. They believed privati-
zation would bring them more money than being part of the UEFA Champions
League. At the same time, they hoped to play in the Super League while remain-
ing within the system of domestic championships regulated by National Football
Federations. The clubs that remained onboard were promised uncapped solidar-
ity payments of €10 billion for 23 years, which, in their opinion, was much more
than the regular revenues from UEFA. However, within days some of the clubs
withdrew from the Super League, and many questions still remain unanswered
(Brannagan et al., 2021; Wagner et al., 2021).

Privatization of Professional Sports in the World

The entertainment world is ruled by giant media corporations that create amaz-
ing spectacles to satisfy audiences. OTT companies (like Amazon Prime, Netfix,
HBO, Disney) are gradually becoming global media corporations. In search of
new content and social media, these companies began acquiring the rights to
sports spectacles. For example, in 2018, Facebook bought some of the Asian
broadcasting rights to the Spanish La Liga tournament, and the rights to broadcast
matches of the English Premier League in Cambodia, Vietnam, and Thailand for
$66 million per year (Tran, 2018). In addition, Amazon acquired the broadcast-
ing rights to some of the English Premier League matches for Amazon Prime
subscribers. Beyond broadcast rights, Netfix produced sports documentaries
such as “Formula 1: Drive to Survive”, “First Team: Juventus”, and “Sunderland
’Til I Die”. From 2005 to 2007, FC Real Madrid participated in flming Disney’s

DOI: 10.4324/9781003348238-31
218 Alexey Kirichek

“The Goal” series. The next step in creating content for streaming platform
audiences is the exclusive broadcast of signifcant sports events. Until now these
platforms broadcast such events as part of consortiums or purchased only a part of
the packages. The desire to acquire exclusive rights and not share them with
anyone else will infuence the price setting in the sports broadcast market. The
amount of cash on the balance sheets of companies engaged in the streaming
business is substantial. For example, Apple has over $48 billion at the end of
June 2022, and Amazon has over $60 billion at the end of June 2022. Many of
these companies are based in the United States and have been involved in the
subscription broadcast of U.S. sports. For example, starting from the 2022/2023
season, the National Football League (NFL) will earn more than $10 billion
per season (80% more than the cost of the current contract) or €38 million per
game (Belson et al. 2021). Amazon agreed to pay an additional $1 billion to get
exclusive access to the part of the NFL match package in 2021 (Smith, 2022).
The privatization of sports by media corporations is not new. Since the late
1980s, global international media rights to the Olympic Games have been
acquired by U.S. media corporations. These companies became signifcant
partners when the President of the International Olympic Committee (IOC),
Juan Antonio Samaranch, recognized substantial fnancial prospects from coop-
eration with U.S. media companies and completely changed the selling of IOC
TV rights. The income of the IOC was $5.7 billion in the Olympic cycle of
2013–2016 and was dependent (by 40%) on a media contract with the NBC
Universal company (IOC, 2022). These fgures don’t include the regional media
rights that are acquired by the branches of U.S. media corporations. For exam-
ple, the European broadcast rights belong to Eurosport (part of U.S. Discovery
Communications). It should also be noted that half of the sponsors that provide
the IOC with another 18% of income (or $1 billion) are U.S. companies (IOC,
2022). The IOC distributes 90% of its total income to the development of the
Olympic Movement (IOC, 2022), and a signifcant part, 38% or almost $2 bil-
lion, is sent to the international federations and national Olympic committees.
For example, 15 of the 28 international federations from The Association of
Summer Olympic International Federations (ASOIF) have massive income from
the IOC – about 35–96% of their budgets (Weinreich, 2020). Therefore, some of
these international organizations are almost under complete control of the IOC
via money from U.S. broadcasting corporations.
UEFA Champions League is a signifcant football competition’s crown jewel
of European sports. UEFA is responsible for organizing the Champions League
and selling TV and sponsorship contracts. It distributes more than €2.0 billion
(UEFA, 2021) between football clubs participating in the group stage through
the current sporting model. However, this model has “reached its ceiling” if we
compare the audience and their desire to pay for the product with U.S. money
for NFL. Furthermore, sales of the group stage matches could no longer provide
a high income since the groups’ results and the playof list can be predictable
after the toss-up of groups. As a result, the gap between the teams ranked second
 European Super League & Football’s Privatization 219

and third in each group of the UEFA Champions League has signifcantly wid-
ened recently. The growth of the sport’s imbalance between so-called rich clubs
and the UEFA afected their ability to generate more income. “Rich” clubs
had to play with teams from Azerbaijan, Kazakhstan, Belarus, Hungary, and
other countries periodically. Teams from these countries couldn’t provide the
“rich” clubs with extra bonuses in the form of audiences, media, and money;
they received only UEFA money for winning the games with teams from these
“poor” countries. At the same time, Europe’s biggest football teams are becom-
ing trendy in the United States and are desirable for U.S. sports and media com-
panies. Many of Europe’s ageing stars have moved to the Major League Soccer
(MLS) recently and signifcantly impacted MLS business. The U.S. sports market
needs new content.
All of these issues were signs of a pre-revolutionary situation in European
football, as it was still under the control of independent UEFA with relatively
low income for main stars.

European Football: A Bastion of Solidarity

and Oligarchic Competition
In the twenty-frst century, football has taken tremendous steps towards com-
mercialization and enrichment. The background for its rapid development was
laid at the end of the twentieth century, when the UEFA, under pressure from
“big clubs”, completely changed the Champions League from a cup format to
the current structure with a group stage. This was done with a bit of help from
the President of AC Milan, Silvio Berlusconi, who, in the late 1980s, announced
that he would organize other competitions if his club played only two matches in
the European competitions in a season. Another factor that infuenced European
football was big money from TV contracts. It started with the English Premier
League signing the frst big contract with Sky TV. In 1992–1997, under the frst
contract, the League received only 0.6 million GBP from Sky for each match.
But in 2016–2019, the amount was way more signifcant – 10.2 million GBP
per match (Gibson, 2015). For the last 20 years, the elite championships of all
European countries have constantly been growing by 8% annually until 2020.
They started with €4.8 billion in 1999 and reached an astronomical €22.5–23 bil-
lion in 2019, over 10% of which is due to the UEFA competitions. However,
there was also a signifcant stratifcation between “rich” and “poor” European
football countries. Between 2009 and 2018, the share of the Big 5 countries
in the total income increased from 69% to 75%, while the percentage of the
45 countries outside the Big 10 decreased from 16% to 12% (UEFA, 2019, 2020).
European football remains one of the few global and popular sports managed
by an international sports federation, not by the clubs themselves, as in the U.S.
organizational sports model.
The football “ship” managed by the UEFA had to deal with icebergs peri-
odically but bypassed them. For example, in 2000, “big clubs” attempted to
220 Alexey Kirichek

destabilize the European competition system and quit it by organizing the G-14
group. This group was led by the President of Real Madrid, Florentino Perez,
and planned to establish their own competitions. Finally, the reconciliation pact
was signed between the G-14 and the UEFA. The result was the creation of
the European Club Association (ECA), which became the labour union for all
football clubs that represented their interests in negotiations with the UEFA.
The ECA sought to balance UEFA, the big clubs, and the need to demon-
strate solidarity among all European clubs by involving “small clubs” in deci-
sion-making. UEFA constantly looked for compromises for the beneft of the
“rich” clubs but not the disadvantage of the “poor” ones. The Financial Fair Play
rules in 2010 aimed to provide a sustainable balance for football development.
Meanwhile, the “middle” and “poor” clubs were trying to live following these
rules and control their costs, but the “rich” ones were looking for opportunities
to bend the rules, including using fnancial injections made by the owners. As a
result, the attempts of the UEFA to control their budgets failed and mainly led
to fnes and not more severe sanctions (e.g., ban from participation in the UEFA
competitions). As a result, UEFA aimed to balance the growing demands of
“rich” clubs and the necessity to ensure the long-term competitive development
of European football and preserve solidarity with minors. However, “rich” clubs
became giant corporations with turnovers of hundreds of millions of euros (the
biggest is up to €1 billion), and they need more money. The current format of
the Champions League has increasingly failed to satisfy the growing appetites of
the “big clubs”, from both the sports point of view and the media side. This is in
spite of the founding clubs of the new Super League receiving more than €830
million (over 42% of the €1.98 billion in the 2018/2019 season of the Champions
League) (UEFA, 2019). Their motivation can be interpreted as: UEFA, thank
you very much for organizing the great competition, but we want further to
privatize our media and global success in our favour, and we know how to earn
more money.
In the last decade football clubs began to think not as digital companies, and
the CEO of Real Madrid Jose Angel Sanchez has even said, “We a content pro-
ducer” (Marcotti, 2015). Leading European clubs started to earn money outside
home markets by ofering their services and content worldwide – by opening
ofces in China, the United States, etc. In addition, they created their social
media networks to connect with the audiences. Their desire to create content
required investments in new football players, new media, and new projects out-
side the football feld. All of this required new sources of income or investors. As
the most popular sport on the planet, European football also didn’t stand aside
from the infow of foreign investments. One of the frst investors was the Russian
businessman Roman Abramovich, who purchased FC Chelsea. There were no
restrictions on foreign investments in the top fve European football countries.
Investments were welcomed. Gradually, many leading England and European
clubs became the property of foreign investors from the United States, China,
Thailand, etc. For example, Boris Johnson, who sharply opposed the creation
 European Super League & Football’s Privatization 221

of the Super League, seemed to ignore the fact that the top clubs in the Premier
League are no longer English. However, further growth required new drivers.
“Poor” clubs received solidarity payments from participating in the prelimi-
nary rounds of European competitions or through various UEFA development
programs. For nearly half of the elite divisions of the UEFA countries, a quarter
of their revenue is generated by the earnings from the UEFA. For example, in
2019, the budget of all clubs in the Estonian Premier League was €9 million,
30% of which were connected with the UEFA. For the UEFA, solidarity is
the foundation for a long-term and sustainable development of a system within
which “small clubs” are given the role of suppliers of football talent and spar-
ring partners for “big clubs” in exchange for loyalty, rewards, and the small
chance to play in the Champions League. Every year “rich” clubs, like any big
corporations, became more prosperous and looked for new sources to increase
proft for their shareholders. However, at a particular development stage for any
big business (and football is signifcant), the primary source of wealth is power
and the ability to manage it in your own interests. Therefore, only the control
from the “big clubs” over the selling system for commercial and TV rights of
the UEFA Competitions could create new sources of income. The work for the
new UEFA cycle starting from the 2024/2025 season began in 2019/2020 when
UEFA began reforming its competition system. It opened its media contract
and sales ledgers to the ECA elite clubs. Their representatives were allowed to
work in various UEFA committees responsible for managing the competition
system. However, the principle of solidarity and unity, which is fundamental in
the UEFA value system, didn’t imply betrayal.

Super League: The Revolution without

Getting One’s Hands Dirty
The Presidents of Real Madrid, Juventus, and their associates played a two-
way game. On the one hand, through UEFA and ECA committees they advo-
cated for reforms to the system of European competitions and the distribution
of money within one football family. “Rich” clubs get more money, the “poor”
ones get less money, and everybody is happy. On the other hand, they were
seduced by the model that U.S.-based JP Morgan Chase invested in, with a one-
time payment of €350 million to each club for participation in the Super League,
and tried to create a new union of 12 apostles to get even more money for
the exclusive content (Bassam, 2021). Events related to the Super League devel-
oped very rapidly. On Friday, 16 April 2020, the negotiations with the UEFA
were over, but the Super League initiators didn’t get what they required. So, on
18 April, the leaders of these 12 clubs announced the creation of the European
Super League for 20 teams, posted relevant advertisements on their websites, and
created a landing webpage.
These 12 apostles of the new faith, who decided to break the system, had
a loyal audience; the number of their subscribers on social networks was
222 Alexey Kirichek

comparable to the population of our planet. They could reach new sponsors
who would have nothing to do with either FIFA or UEFA and whose primary
business was most likely connected with the U.S., Asian, and Middle Eastern
markets. They could sell their product to American viewers, who were willing
to pay signifcant money compared to European ones for both quality streaming
content and superstars. The only thing left for them was to solve the issue related
to playing football weekly since their suspension was probable from national
championships. The UEFA and FIFA would ban them from their competitions.
The question also involved football players. Which of them would play, what
would they require, etc.?
To succeed with the Super League project, these clubs needed to fully capture
the global media agenda with their project and attract the audience’s attention by
ofering a new football world order with benefts for all participants. However,
the further actions of the “revolutionaries” didn’t correspond to the precepts of
Russian revolutionary Vladimir Lenin. He formulated perhaps one of the vital
revolution principles, “War must be waged for real, or it must not be waged at
all; there must be no something in between”.
The Super League clubs didn’t produce any content with their superstars to
support their idea. Club managers didn’t visit the TV to promote and negotiate
TV contracts. None of the sponsors or broadcasters announced their coopera-
tion with the Super League. The lawyers representing the revolutionaries didn’t
provide any legal comments on statements made by the UEFA, FIFA, and poli-
ticians about the inadmissibility of threats following the laws of the European
Union. Most importantly, the clubs didn’t ofer a transparent solidarity system for
more than 200 European clubs participating in the UEFA competitions yearly.
They had only promised the amount of over €10 billion for 23 years for solidar-
ity. UEFA currently distributes €237.5 million as solidarity payments to clubs
(UEFA, 2021), understandably and transparently guaranteed, and for almost half
of the UEFA countries, this money is nearly 25% of their total income. This
revolution was also not supported by the masses. Football fans showed their soli-
darity with the current system, especially in England, and strongly opposed the
idea of the Super League. Thus, as the revolutionary classicist Vladimir Lenin
also wrote, the entire Super League “revolution was carried out in white gloves”
(no one wanted to get their hands dirty), which means it was destined to fail from
the beginning. In fact, the product called the Super League turned out to be a
rebellion without a clear plan of actions.
Having received no support in Europe (media, fans, politicians, etc.) or from
overseas, these 12 clubs didn’t correctly assess the enemy represented by the
UEFA. They seemed to forget the primary principle of the “poker theorem” for-
mulated by David Sklansky and Mason Malmuth. “Every time you play a hand
diferently from the way you would have played it if you could see all your oppo-
nents’ cards, they gain; and every time you play your hand the same way you
would have played it if you could see all their cards, they lose” (Holodny, 2014).
It is however possible that the Super League was motivated by the desire to reach
 European Super League & Football’s Privatization 223

a new level of relations with the UEFA. Immediately after the Super League
was terminated, the UEFA announced changes to the format of European club
competitions.

To Be Continued …
It would seem that football, which is part of European culture, cut of the sec-
ond attempt since the G-14 to privatize such an excellent game in the interests
of capital. The UEFA punished the perpetrators with a required €15 million
each investment in the grassroots game and 5% of their European revenues in
the 2023/2024 season. It also includes a penalty of €100 million if they violate
the agreement on non-participation in the competitions without approval by the
UEFA (Grez, 2021).
The Super League exposed the edges of fair income distribution between
the “rich” and the “poor” ones and revealed issues of social equality and unity
within the UEFA football family. The attempt to transform the football indus-
try in Europe will likely occur again because European football is a ready-
made product (competitions, superstars, audience) for any media corporation.
However, this product remains the last bastion managed by the international
federation under solidarity principles. And currently, it’s not under the control
of politicians and global media corporations. The question of the privatization of
European football in favour of the “rich” clubs and/or countries is a question of
the price the capitalists are willing to pay. Therefore, the management of sports
competitions in team sports will be carried out not by the international federa-
tions but in favour of media corporations, like in Formula 1, or by the clubs, like
in the American Big Four leagues. Hence, the privatization of sports and football
will continue.

References
Bassam, T. (2021), European Soccer Week | Part four: How likely is a breakaway super
league? Available from: https://smartseries.sportspromedia.com/features/european
-football-super-league-barcelona-jp-morgan-ffa [accessed 25 September 2022].
Belson, K. and Draper, K. (2021), N.F.L. signs media deals worth over $100 billion.
Available from: https://www.nytimes.com/2021/03/18/sports/football/nf-tv
-contracts.html [accessed 25 September 2022].
Brannagan, P.M., Scelles, N., Valenti, M., Inoue, Y., Grix, J. and Perkin, S.J. (2021),
The 2021 European Super League attempt: Motivation, outcome, and the future of
football. International Journal of Sport Policy and Politics, 14, pp. 169–176. Available from:
Taylor & Francis Online [accessed 25 March 2022].
Gibson, O. (2015), Sky and BT retain Premier League TV rights for record £5.14bn.
Available from: https://www.theguardian.com/football/2015/feb/10/premier-league
-tv-rights-sky-bt/ [accessed 25 September 2022].
Grez, M. (2021), UEFA forced to drop disciplinary proceedings against remaining Super
League clubs. Available from: https://edition.cnn.com/2021/09/28/football/uefa
224 Alexey Kirichek

-drops-super-league-disciplinary-case-spt-intl/index.html [accessed 25 September

2022].
Holodny, E. (2014), This man dropped out of Wharton to become the world's authority
on gambling. Available from: https://www.businessinsider.com/wharton-dropout
-became-a-poker-star-2014-7 [accessed 25 September 2022].
International Olympic Committee. (2022), Olympic marketing fact 2022 edition. Lausanne:
International Olympic Committee.
Marcotti, G. (2015), Will Real Madrid stop their showbiz approach to get team back
on track? Available from: https://www.espn.com.sg/soccer/club/real-madrid/86/
blog/post/2448605/read-madrid-face-decision-on-carlo-ancelotti-stars [accessed
4 October 2022].
Smith, G. and Shaw, L. (2022), Amazon breaches TV’s last stronghold with $13 billion
bet on NFL. Available from: https://www.bnnbloomberg.ca/amazon-breaches-tv
-s-last-stronghold-with-13-billion-bet-on-nf-1.1816122 [accessed 25 September
2022].
Tran, K. (2018), Facebook just secured Premier League rights for the next four years.
Available from: https://www.businessinsider.com/facebook-wins-premier-league
-streaming-rights-2018-7 [accessed 25 September 2022].
Union of European Football Associations. (2021), Distribution to clubs from the 2021/22
UEFA Champions League. Nyon: Union of European Football Associations.
Union of European Football Associations. (2020), 2019 UEFA club licensing
benchmarking report. Nyon: Union of European Football Associations.
Union of European Football Associations. (2019a), 2017 UEFA club licensing
benchmarking report. Nyon: Union of European Football Associations.
Union of European Football Associations. (2019b), UEFA Champions League:
Distribution to clubs 2018/19. Nyon: Union of European Football Associations.
Wagner, U., Storm, R. and Cortsen, K. (2021), Commercialization, governance problems
and the future of European Football – Or why the European Super League is not a
solution to the challenges facing football. International Journal of Sport Communication,
14 (3), pp. 321–333. Available from: https://ntnuopen.ntnu.no/ntnu-xmlui/bitstream
/handle/11250/2825286/Wagner.pdf?sequence=4 [accessed 25 September 2022].
Weinreich, J. (2020), How dependent federations are on the revenues of the Olympic
Games. Available from: https://www.jensweinreich.de/2020/04/03/exclusive-how
-dependent-federations-are-on-the-revenues-of-the-olympic-games/ [accessed 25
September 2022].
PART VI

Motorsport
27
SPORT GOVERNANCE,
GEOPOLITICAL CHANGE, AND
ORGANIZATIONAL RESILIENCE
The Case of Fédération Internationale
de l’Automobile (FIA)

Hans Erik Næss

Fédération Internationale de l’Automobile (FIA), the governing body of world mot-

orsport, has since its organizational reshufe in the early 1990s acquired a posi-
tion in the global “zones of prestige” (Maguire, 2011) where sport, business,
and politics mix (Næss, 2020). This position enables them to infuence mat-
ters far beyond the racetrack. Organizationally, however, the FIA still has some
challenges when it comes to integrating social responsibility commitments with
its structural design. Unlike FIFA and the International Olympic Committee
(IOC), which have established independent organs to advise on human rights
policy, the FIA has embedded its social responsibility policy into its existing
organizational chart. At the same time, being loyal to its neutral position as
defned by FIA itself, politically sensitive situations have been dealt with on an
ad hoc basis (Næss, 2020).
After the Russian invasion of Ukraine, there are many reasons to believe that
such a strategy is no longer sustainable. Even though FIA – in contrast to most
other sport governing bodies – allowed Russian athletes and teams to compete
in motorsport under neutral colours, the long-term consequences of “breaking
up with neutrality” are doomed to have a more profound impact than what can
be justifed with a continued ad hoc approach (Lindholm, 2022). Whereas some
of this can be solved by granting greater responsibilities to the FIA Foundation,
an independent entity created in 2001 in order to be the social conscience of the
automotive world, it nevertheless solves only half of today’s challenges because it
does not infuence the key stakeholders in motorsport. Apart from afecting com-
petitors, races, and teams in World Rally Championship (WRC) and Formula
1 with ties to Russia, the FIA as a sport governing body must consider revising
its organizational design to act credibly on political issues in the future.
In order to achieve this, “organizational resilience” is by many deemed as
necessary, here defned as “the ability of an organization to anticipate, prepare

DOI: 10.4324/9781003348238-33
228 Hans Erik Næss

for, respond and adapt to incremental change and sudden disruptions in order
to survive and prosper” (Denyer, 2017, p. 4). Hence, scenario thinking for
leaders and organizations that experience “environmental jolts” (Meyer, 1982;
Linnenluecke, 2017) is advocated as a relevant tool to improve this ability,
according to Hillmann et al. (2018)

In order to promote an organization’s resilience, managers must be able to

detect changes in the environment, deal with uncertainty and complex-
ity, critically refect on existing practices, think in alternative futures, and
foster collective problem solving.
(p. 462)

This chapter therefore uses the theoretical construct of “scenario praxis” (Ison,
Grant, and Bawden, 2014). It refers to a theory-informed practice of “scenari-
oing” or the scenario planning process. To fesh out this construct this chapter
will discuss two situations which FIA may fnd itself in where the degree of
organizational resilience can be crucial to the result. Whereas not everything
can be planned for, the aim of this chapter is nevertheless to provide input to the
FIA on how to reduce maladaptive responses to governance challenges related to
geopolitical shifts and politically sensitive situations, such as war.

Theoretical Framework
The concept of organizational resilience, defned in the introduction, is relevant
in scenarioing the FIA’s geopolitical role for three reasons. The frst reason is the
FIA’s complex network of stakeholders. As the FIA has been evolving in terms of
members, mandate, and responsibilities since the end of World War II, it is the
level of stakeholder complexity that defnes the FIA’s response to issues related to
them. The second reason is that organizations must innovate structurally to keep
up with changing circumstances and internal desires for change. For SGBs like
the FIA, this regards decision-making procedures at the General Assembly to
the role of independent units like the Grand Prix Drivers Association (GPDA) or
partnerships with the United Nations (UN). The third reason is unexpected situ-
ations afecting the FIA’s role in geopolitical strides. Although the focus recently
has been on the Formula 1 Grand Prix in Saudi Arabia and the Russian invasion
of Ukraine, FIA has been involved in at least one geopolitical storm each decade
since the FIA’s restart as an organization in 1945 (Næss, 2020).
Being prepared for these situations, instead of treating them on a case-by-case
basis, has the beneft of keeping the organizational momentum at times when
the conditions normally force it to slow down. To address these issues before
they become real, it is relevant to explore the notion of “scenario praxis”, which
is “regarded as a way of not trying to get the future right but avoiding getting it
wrong” (Ison, Grant, and Bawden, 2014, p. 627). Scenarioing is basically a man-
agement exercise in how to frame a situation as “framing failure is a precursor
 The Case of FIA 229

to maladaptive responses because ‘frames’ are used by humans to negotiate the

complexity of the world by determining what requires attention and what can
be ignored” (Ison, Grant, and Bawden, 2014, p. 624). Consequently, the process
of engaging in scenarioing is thus subject to “a complex set of framing condi-
tions, and more-or-less conducive institutional settings may exist” (Ison, Grant,
and Bawden, 2014, p. 629). Scenarioing therefore needs to be coupled with
organizational characteristic and institutional context. As a non-governmental,
member-based, non-proft organization, the FIA cannot draw upon the logic of
a corporation or a humanitarian organization to face new geopolitical episodes.
Scenarioing within the FIA must consider its own position in the institutional
landscape.
Whereas I will return to two diferent scenarios below, there are in the litera-
ture on organizational resilience many bids on how to prepare for environmental
jolts to the organization in general. One example is the conceptual integrative
model of organizational resilience by Hillmann and Guenther (2021), which
can be used as a point of departure for assessing the level and quality of organi-
zational resilience in various felds. Their model refers to certain situations that
jolt organizations, to which an interpretation of it is set in motion, resources are
used, and capabilities assessed, before a response is implemented. Learning out-
comes from this process are then used to improve the organization (Hillmann
and Guenther, 2021, p. 32). In line with scenario thinking, and the literature
on organizational resilience and crisis management, this process is possible to
envision before it happens and then “test” various organizational setups to assess
the most likely option to avoid getting it wrong. In what follows, this will be
operationalized in by two brief scenarios constituting diferent kinds of potential
“jolts” to the FIA.

Scenario 1: Internal Entrepreneurship

Many organizations change from within, and for sport it is notable that athlete
activism has been on the rise since the early 2010s (Magrath, 2022), not just in
terms of individual engagement, but also in the form of increasing collectiviza-
tion and mobilization of athletes in “unions”. Within the FIA this engagement
has so far been mild-mannered and compliant with the mother ship. The excep-
tion is the work of seven-time world F1 champion (Sir) Lewis Hamilton, who
has actively addressed the social responsibilities of motorsport (The Hamilton
Commission, 2021). There is a likely chance that Hamilton expands his engage-
ment against racial discrimination, leading to a demand for radical changes to the
FIA’s current structure and practice on diversity and inclusion issues as a whole.
In this scenario the frst question for the FIA, thinking along the lines of the
model above, is: how should they respond?
For the sake of simplicity, we can imagine that FIA leaders would meet
Hamilton’s requests a) with a grand cheer, b) try to solve it diplomatically (by a
sit-down with the President), c) leave it to the General Assembly, or d) simply
230 Hans Erik Næss

turn it down. The second aspect, thus, following Hillmann and Guenther (2021),
would be what type of resources do they have, or want to use, for the chosen
response. By keeping everything as is the FIA must adapt to the situation with
the structural means at hand. Currently, there are few structural options within
the FIA that Hamilton could exploit to rally his wish to make motorsport a more
diverse community. There is no commission or procedure designed to cater to
this kind of initiative within the FIA.
By having in place an apparatus to facilitate “institutional entrepreneurship”,
on the other hand, the FIA would cater to those who want to create a bet-
ter ft between the organization’s commitments and its institutional design and
still “own” the process. According to Battilana, Leca, and Boxebaum (2009, p.
68), there are two relational conditions that must be in place for institutional
entrepreneurs to arise: feld characteristics and actors’ social position. The former
infuence what is possible and the latter how it can be done. An actor who knows
the inner workings of the FIA and understands the ramifcations of social change
upon the organization is well suited to become an institutional entrepreneur –
but only if the FIA allows her to be one. To do so, the FIA could consider the
fndings from Spedale and Watson’s (2014) study of an individual entrepreneur
where the interaction between individual, society, and organization is key to
understanding where emergence is possible:

Institutional logics and individual actors’ tensions constitute recurring

interruptions in the stream of ongoing action that is society at large and,
at an intermediate level, the business feld (i.e. the distinctive feld of deal-
making with resource-dependent constituencies).
(p. 771)

The alternative to integrating possibilities for institutional entrepreneurship is

to see Hamilton’s campaign as a bump in the road for a car that is too low rather
than developing a robust chassis, to speak in motorsport metaphors. Existing
research on organizational response to social and political issues (Greening and
Gray, 1994) however points to some paradoxical explanations of why organiza-
tions choose this path, where more resources are allocated to management but
without structural change that potentially would reduce the need for resource
transfer in the frst place. The FIA hence need to consider that some managers
also have an inadequate understanding of the causes of the situation or what it
takes to innovate or prefer impression management techniques to communicate
that change is not necessary.

Scenario 2: External Demands

In organizational research it is said that “the less vulnerable an organization think
it is, the fewer crises it prepares for; as a result, the more vulnerable it becomes”
(Mitrof et al., 1987, p. 285; cited in Greening and Gray, 1994, p. 489). This is
 The Case of FIA 231

crucial to acknowledge for SGBs. Due to cases of corruption and malpractice,

the formerly unanimous support for the autonomy of SGBs is characterized by
a drift towards a need for them to earn it more explicitly (Næss, 2020). For
the FIA, which in contrast to most other global SGBs located in France, not
Switzerland, the political and legal aspects of this claim can be exemplifed in
several ways. External factors which may afect FIA’s vulnerability as an autono-
mous organization include the Duty of Vigilance Law from 2017 which marks
the convergence between compliance and respect for human rights. Currently
the law only regards organizations with more than 5000 employees, but it can
also afect partners of smaller organizations (see Lavite, 2020). Consistent with
scenario thinking, one can therefore address the contemporary role of the FIA in
geopolitical strife by imagining the following situation: The French law on the
contract of association of 1 July 1901, which governs French sport clubs, federa-
tions, and their decentralized bodies, is merged with the Duty of Vigilance Law.
According to the law, FIA can be held responsible if “inappropriate or maintain-
ing excessive risk created by the organization” occurs.
Combined with the increasing pressure by the actors mentioned above, auton-
omy and legitimacy as sport governing body may require the FIA to not only
take on more responsibilities far beyond the racetrack but also redress its organi-
zational capacity to do so. For example, the European Commission’s Expert
Group on sporting events underlined in 2016 that:

it has to be recognised that the autonomy of sports bodies is only justi-

fed as long as it is combined with taking due responsibilities especially in
relation with good governance and in particular democracy, human rights
and labour law in their interaction with the public domain (such as most
bidding entities).
(Expert Group on Good Governance, 2016, p. 4)

So far, the FIA’s response to this has been to include stakeholders on macro, meso,
and local levels while addressing four pillars in its commitment to the future:
Health and Safety; Environment; Diversity and Inclusion; and Community
Development. Launched as the “Purpose Driven” campaign (FIA, 2021, https://
purposedriven.fa.com/), stakeholder deliberation and activities include the UN,
International Federation of Red Cross and Red Crescent Societies (IFRC),
and the use of motorsport events to ease political tension. One example is the
European Rally Championship Cyprus Rally in 2017. It was promoted by the
FIA as an event bringing communities together through sport, as it crossed a
UN-controlled bufer zone and afterwards hailed by the UN as “the most suc-
cessful measure in the building of trust between the communities [of Nicosia]
since 1974” (FIA, 2017).
On the one hand, FIA’s engagement is laudable. The confict between
Turkish-occupied Northern Cyprus and the Greek Cypriots in the south, fol-
lowing the Turkish invasion in 1974, has become so vehement that the European
232 Hans Erik Næss

Union’s strategy for peace talks has been dubbed “state avoidance” due to its fear
of provoking each side (Kyris, 2020). Yet, the perils of engaging in issues like
Northern Cyprus–Turkey confict and promoting values that by no standard are
universal – such as democracy, gender equality, and sustainable development
goals – is that it ties the FIA to the mast. Similar to debates in humanitarian
organizations on neutrality and complicity (see Næss, 2022), the FIA may face a
situation where external demands for engagement in return for legitimacy can
outstrip its own assessment of what they are willing to do because it has engaged
in certain political issues. Said diferently: if FIA engages in the Cyprus confict,
why not elsewhere? With increasing political tension related to events in terms
of sport-washing, soft power strategies by authoritarian regimes, and the global
media attention that comes with a Formula 1 Grand Prix, it is not utopian to
foresee a stronger incentive by the French government on the FIA’s geopolitical
role. In fact, as French law “recognizes the promotion and development of sports
as being in the public interest, the State and its bodies naturally play a major role
in the organization of sports in France” (Verheyden, 2010, p. 25). If the Macron
government reinforces a view on sport as a “total social fact” (Fait social total)
(Pigeassou, 1997), where social justice in principle would overrule any economic
incentive of hosting a Grand Prix in a wealthy state with appalling human rights
records, the FIA might be left with much greater responsibilities than they origi-
nally aimed for.

Conclusion
To meet both scenarios discussed above resiliently requires structural and cultural
changes within the FIA organization. The reason is that environmental “jolts”
come in forms where it is not the jolts individually that are the challenge, but
the organization’s lack of basic adaptivity measures. For example, the FIA could
consider a scenario where it defnes its political engagement diferently than on
the basis of past neutrality principles. It is obviously possible to remain neutral
but, as evidenced by another study (Næss, 2022), SGBs’ existing neutrality stance
is rather underdeveloped. This is particularly valid for the FIA’s engagement in
social issues which afect the geopolitical dynamic where motorsport events,
projects, and collaborations are part of the picture – like with Russia, Cyprus,
or Saudi Arabia.
As the question “resilience to what?” is central to the literature, it is moreover
crucial to identify potential threats connected to the organization’s own actions in
order to develop resilient structures and procedures for coping with social issues.
Rather than relying on campaigns alone, this scenario would include an organi-
zational redesign which could be inspired by FIFA’s way of carving out specifc
human rights principles. Its Human Rights Advisory Council, established in
2017, is an independent unit with a clear mandate and has since inception deliv-
ered fve reports on how FIFA can integrate human rights responsibilities with
its sporting and business activities. This Council moreover used a FIFA report by
 The Case of FIA 233

John G. Ruggie (2020), the lead author of the United Nations Guiding Principles
on Business and Human Rights (UNGPs), as a map to orient FIFA’s new role in
the geopolitical debate where human rights took central stage.
As the FIA operates by a diferent business model than FIFA and furthermore
is unable to adopt the UNGPs “as is” due to FIA’s status as a non-governmental
and non-proft organization, it could use the lessons from these trends in human
rights discourse and the geopolitics of sport to apply the following scenario: to
establish on its own an independent body advising the General Assembly on
FIA-related matters. This body would serve a particular function. Plans, strate-
gies, and campaigns to improve the environment, reduce gender inequality and
racial discrimination, and contribute to peace are in this context not merely add-
ons to the FIA – they are, if organizationally embedded, the FIA’s evidence of to
what degree rhetoric and practice go hand in hand in terms of earning a legiti-
mate “right to rule” on global motorsport and generating trust and accountabil-
ity as a geopolitical actor.

References
Battilana, J., Leca, B., and Boxenbaum, E. (2009) ‘How actors change institutions:
Towards a theory of institutional entrepreneurship’, The Academy of Management
Annals, 3(1), pp. 65–107. https://doi.org/10.1080/19416520903053598
Denyer, D. (2017) Organizational resilience: A summary of academic evidence, business insights
and new thinking. BSI and Cranfeld School of Management. Available at https://www
.cranfeld.ac.uk/som/case-studies/organizational-resilience-a-summary-of-academic
-evidence-business-insights-and-new-thinking (accessed: 7 September 2022).
Expert Group on Good Governance (2016) Guiding principles relating to democracy, human
rights and labour rights, in particular in the context of the awarding procedure of major sport
events. European Commission. Available at: https://s3-eu-west-1.amazonaws.com/fs
.siteor.com/msport/fles/DWM%20fles/Grupy%20eksperckie/4__XG_GG_expert
-group-major-sport-events_en.pdf ?1480411153 (accessed: 7 September 2022).
FIA (2017) ‘FIA ERC reaches mid-season at Cyprus Rally’, fa.com, 12 June. Available
at: https://www.fa.com/news/fa-erc-reaches-mid-season-cyprus-rally (accessed:
7 September 2022).
FIA (2021) Committed to a better future. Available at: https://www.fa.com/fle/158426/
download (accessed: 7 September 2022).
Greening, D.W., and Gray, B. (1994) ‘Testing a model of organizational response to social
and political issues’, Academy of Management Journal, 37(3), pp. 467–498. https://doi.org
/10.2307/256697
Hillmann, J., Duchek, S., Meyr, J., and Guenther, E. (2018) ‘Educating future managers
for developing resilient organizations: The role of scenario planning’, Journal of
Management Education, 42(4), pp. 461–495. https://doi.org/10.1177/1052562918766350
Hillmann, J., and Guenther, E. (2021) ‘Organizational resilience: A valuable construct
for management research?’ International Journal of Management Reviews, 23(1), pp. 7–44.
https://doi.org/10.1111/ijmr.12239
Ison, R., Grant, A., and Bawden, R. (2014) ‘Scenario praxis for systemic governance:
A critical framework’, Environment and Planning C: Government and Policy, 32(4), pp.
623–640. https://doi.org/10.1068/c11327
234 Hans Erik Næss

Kyris, G. (2020) ‘The European Union in Northern Cyprus: Conceptualising the

avoidance of contested states’, Geopolitics, 25(2), pp. 346–361, https://doi.org/10.1080
/14650045.2018.1552945
Lavite, C. (2020) ‘The French Loi de Vigilance: Prospects and limitations of a pioneer
mandatory corporate due diligence’, Verfassungsblog: On Matters Constitutional, 16 June.
Available at https://verfassungsblog.de/the-french-loi-de-vigilance-prospects-and
-limitations-of-a-pioneer-mandatory-corporate-due-diligence/ (accessed:
7 September 2022).
Lindholm, J. (2022) ‘How Russia’s invasion of Ukraine shook sports’ foundation’,
International Sports Law Journal. https://doi.org/10.1007/s40318-022-00211-8
Linnenluecke, M.K. (2017) ‘Resilience in business and management research: A review
of infuential publications and a research agenda’, International Journal of Management
Reviews, 19(1), pp. 4–30. https://doi.org/10.1111/ijmr.12076
Magrath, R. (Ed.) (2022) Athlete activism. Contemporary perspectives. London: Routledge.
Maguire, J.A. (2011) ‘Power and global sport: Zones of prestige, emulation and
resistance’, Sport in Society, 14(7–8), pp. 1010–1026. https://doi.org/10.1080/17430437
.2011.603555
Meyer, A.D. (1982) ‘Adapting to environmental jolts’, Administrative Science Quarterly,
27(4), pp. 515–537. https://doi.org/10.2307/2392528
Næss, H.E. (2020) A history of organizational change. The case of Fédération Internationale de
l'Automobile, 1946–2020. Cham: Palgrave.
Næss, H.E. (2022) The neutrality paradox in sport. Governance, politics and human rights after
Ukraine. Cham: Palgrave Pivot.
Pigeassou, C. (1997) ‘Les éthiques dans le sport: voyage au cœur de l'altérité’, Corps et
culture, 2. https://doi.org/10.4000/corpsetculture.316
Ruggie, J.G. (2020) ‘The social construction of the UN guiding principles on business
and human rights’, in Deva, S. and Birchall, D. (eds.), Research handbook on human rights
and business. Cheltenham: Edward Elgar, pp. 63–86.
Spedale, S., and Watson, T.J. (2014) ‘The emergence of entrepreneurial action: At the
crossroads between institutional logics and individual life-orientation’, International
Small Business Journal, 32(7), pp. 759–776. https://doi.org/10.1177/0266242613480376
The Hamilton Commission (2021) Accelerating change. Improving representation of Black people
in UK motorsport. Available at: https://static1.squarespace.com/static/5f29736c898
2c82f61df 71e0/t/60edd33a6f118478735acbbc/1626198854176/THC+-+Accelerating
+Change+-+July+2021.pdf (accessed: 7 September 2022).
Verheyden, D. (2010) ‘The organization of sports in France’, The International Sports Law
Journal, 3–4, pp. 25–32. https://www.asser.nl/media/2069/islj_2010-1-2.pdf
28
THE GEOPOLITICS OF MONEY
VERSUS MORALS
Location, Location, Location of the
Formula 1 Race Calendar

Tim Dewhirst

Formula 1 auto-racing began in 1950, and initially it was principally a European

series. Among seven races held during its inaugural season, six were situated in
Europe, with the exception being one race at the famed Indianapolis speedway
in the USA. Formula 1 has evolved, however, to ofer broader reach relative
to other motor-racing sports properties and thereby appeals to a comparatively
international audience. In due course, races would be held in a broader range
of countries, including a marked expansion of the racing calendar to four Gulf
states as well as Asia. As discussed in this chapter, the evolving – and perpetually
expanding – race locations of the Formula 1 calendar are apparently driven by a
variety of factors, including the sports property’s principal sponsors or partners,
and new Formula 1 ownership (Liberty Media assumed a controlling interest
in Formula 1 during 2017). Formula 1 was once largely European in scope but
now represents a global entity. Today’s sponsors and partners of Formula 1, con-
sequently, tend to be notable multinational corporate brands, which are predict-
ably global in ambition and those looking to expand internationally into new and
emerging markets. Moreover, some key existing sponsorship partners of Formula
1, such as Aramco and Emirates, are state-owned, which is suggestive of “soft
power” eforts to build political and marketable infuence (Chadwick, Widdop,
and Burton, 2022).
Early sponsorship, when the races were principally held in Europe, was largely
from automobile manufacturers and related sectors such as engine, fuel, and tyre
suppliers. Additional funding was provided by afuent individuals, such as Rob
Walker, whose amassed wealth refected the sales of Johnny Walker whisky
( Jenkins, Pasternak, and West, 2016). At the turn of the century, Formula 1’s
reallocation of race locations was driven in part by establishing sites where acti-
vations could persist from tobacco sponsors. By 2000, tobacco companies collec-
tively spent roughly $250 million each year towards Formula 1 teams (Grange,

DOI: 10.4324/9781003348238-34
236 Tim Dewhirst

2001), and accounted for more than 70% of sponsorship earnings among race
team budgets (Brown and Williamson, 1999). With tobacco companies contrib-
uting most of the sponsorship revenue among racing team budgets – yet tobacco
sponsorship becoming no longer allowable for several races held in Europe –
Formula 1 sought to appease their key sponsors. Accordingly, new races were
established in Bahrain, China, and Turkey, where regulations were less stringent
regarding the promotion of tobacco products (Simpson, 2004).
Unsurprisingly, oil companies, functioning as fuel and lubricant suppliers, are
also visible and prominent Formula 1 partners. Aramco – a Saudi Arabia-based
(and state-owned) energy and chemicals company – serves as a notable example.
The company proclaims to produce one in eight barrels of the global oil supply.
The Formula 1 season calendar increasingly includes races in regions known for
oil production. Saudi Arabia, for example, began hosting a Formula 1 race dur-
ing the 2021 season, which generated heightened scrutiny (Richards, 2021a).
Jamal Khashoggi – the Washington Post journalist – was murdered by agents with
an apparent connection to Saudi Arabia’s Crown Prince Mohammed bin Salman
(Rachini, 2021). Canadian musician Justin Bieber performed during the inau-
gural Saudi Arabian Grand Prix despite advance pleas to reconsider and cancel
(Associated Press, 2021; Friend, 2021). Saudi Arabia is the host for the second
race of the 2022 and 2023 Formula 1 seasons.
Acknowledged as “sport washing”, countries with documented human rights
abuses commonly host or support high-profle sports properties to improve
their image and reputation. Normally, participants of these sports properties are
unlikely to bite the hand that feeds them, as observed with the newly minted LIV
Golf, whose principal sponsor is the Public Investment Fund of Saudi Arabia.
Nevertheless, the seven-time champion Lewis Hamilton has been outspoken
about human rights issues where Formula 1 races are held. He wore a rainbow-
adorned helmet for races in Qatar and Saudi Arabia to show support for the
LGBTQ+ community while also directing attention to the repressive laws in
these countries that make same-sex relations illegal (Richards, 2021b).
Formula 1 is staged as opulent and glamorous – and linked with elitism and
excess in some circles (Nichols and Savage, 2017) – so upscale and high-status
brands are drawn to strategically building associations with the sports property.
Like Aramco, Emirates is identifed among Formula 1’s global (sponsorship)
partners. Emirates, which exemplifes another state-owned company, is head-
quartered in the United Arab Emirates and positioned as the preferred airline for
Formula 1 participants as well as for passengers seeking to attend races as a part of
destination travel. Emirates, as an airline global partner, speaks to the shifting
sites and regions where Formula 1 races are held. Meanwhile, the race car and
uniform of the seven-time Formula 1 world champion Lewis Hamilton includes
branding from The Ritz-Carlton. Marketing communication for the exclusive
and high-status hotel brand highlights locations in Azerbaijan, Bahrain, Qatar,
Saudi Arabia, and the United Arab Emirates, where Formula 1 races are held
(e.g., the Doha hotel in Qatar is described as set on a private island, fashioning
 The Geopolitics of Money Versus Morals 237

a rich resort experience, and defning elegance). According to marketing docu-

mentation from the tobacco industry, made public from litigation, “Formula
One is perceived as very glamorous and very exclusive” (Cleverly, 2001, p.
325003468). Formula 1 is seen as indicative of a “jet-setting lifestyle”, wherein
a wealthy person travels around the world frequently – from one glamorous and
exotic place to another – and engages in activities that are inaccessible to ordi-
nary people (Sturm, 2014).
China made its Formula 1 debut when Shanghai hosted a race in 2004. The
Chinese Grand Prix was removed from the Formula 1 race calendar for the 2020,
2021, and 2022 seasons, however, due to the pandemic and China’s stringent
zero-COVID approach. Still, the Chinese Grand Prix’s continuation is antici-
pated as Formula 1 has extended the contract for the race until 2025 (F1, 2021).
Once the race does resume, expect reawakened discourse about geopolitical ten-
sions pertaining to China. When China hosted the 2022 Winter Olympics in
Beijing, several nation-states – including the USA, Britain, Canada, Australia,
India, and Belgium – exercised a diplomatic boycott (Mather, 2022). While ath-
letes from the respective countries participated, government ofcials or repre-
sentatives did not attend. The diplomatic boycott was in response to China’s
human rights abuses and refected that China has become increasingly isolated
on the world stage. The country’s actions towards its Uyghur minority are under
scrutiny. Additionally, China’s enforcement of national security law in Hong
Kong violates a previous agreement with Britain. China has been engaged in
a tense border dispute with India in the Himalayas. And China is in a territo-
rial dispute concerning the South China Sea – an important shipping passage
– with Australia, among other countries. Moreover, China and Canada had a
particularly strained relationship once Huawei executive Meng Wanzhou was
arrested in Canada at the request of the USA. Soon thereafter, China detained
two Canadians, Michael Kovrig and Michael Spavor, for nearly three years in
what was widely considered “hostage diplomacy”. Tensions are also apparent
regarding Taiwan and consideration of its independence versus a “One China”
policy. The U.S. President Joe Biden has indicated that U.S. forces would defend
Taiwan if invaded by China (Ni, 2022).
The Russian Grand Prix was added to the Formula 1 calendar in 2014, with
the race being held in Sochi, which was the site of the 2014 Winter Olympics.
The race was last held in 2021, as the 2022 race was cancelled in response to
Russia’s invasion of Ukraine. Formula 1’s press release stated,

Formula 1, the FIA [Fédération Internationale de l’Automobile, Formula

1’s governing body], and the teams discussed the position of our sport, and
the conclusion is, including the view of all relevant stakeholders, that it is
impossible to hold the Russian Grand Prix in the current circumstances.

The same publicity statement also indicated, “The FIA Formula 1 World
Championship visits countries all over the world with a positive vision to unite
238 Tim Dewhirst

people, bringing nations together”. While the Russian Grand Prix was expected
to relocate to St. Petersburg beginning in 2023, Formula 1 has terminated its
contract with the race’s promoter, thus Russia will not be hosting races in the
foreseeable future (Edmondson, 2022).
Formula 1’s position is largely consistent with sanctions announced in the
general sports realm in the wake of Russia’s invasion of Ukraine. Several nota-
ble Russian partnerships have been terminated. Most Russian sports teams can
no longer compete internationally, evident by the country’s suspension from
qualifying matches for FIFA’s 2022 World Cup in Qatar. Russian tennis players
– including Daniil Medvedev and Andrey Rublev – were banned from compet-
ing at Wimbledon in 2022. Beyond cancellation of the Russian Grand Prix,
the FIA also announced that Russian fags and the national anthem are banned
from Formula 1. The implications of this position were quickly observable. A
principal sponsor of the Haas race team was Uralkali, which is a Russian ferti-
lizer company; despite the Haas race team being based in the USA, their race
cars were to be adorned in the colours of the Russian fag. For the 2022 season,
however, the Haas racing team was prompted to terminate its sponsorship with
Uralkali – rebrand – and replace their Russian driver Nikita Mazepin, whose
father owns Uralkali and is considered to have close ties with Vladimir Putin
(Associated Press, 2022a).
As aforementioned, seven races were held during the inaugural season of
Formula 1, yet the 2022 calendar initially featured an all-time high of 23 races
(22 races after the cancellation of the Russian Grand Prix). The Miami Grand
Prix debuted during the 2022 season, and the 2023 calendar now includes
an additional race in Las Vegas; thus, there will be three races situated in the
USA. Netfix has apparently played an important role in Formula 1’s growing
appeal among a U.S. fan base (Noble, 2021; Schoenfeld, 2022). ESPN’s Formula
1 ratings have escalated since Formula 1: Drive to Survive debuted on Netfix
in 2019. The documentary series produced by Netfix and Formula 1 ofers a
behind-the-scenes look at the races and drivers each season (Abbruzzese, 2021).
Oracle and Red Bull, which struck a one-year sponsorship deal with Walmart in
early 2021, exemplify recent Formula 1 partnerships primarily targeted towards
the U.S. market (Baldwin, 2021; Yeomans, 2021).
Commercial agreements among the racing teams stipulated that the
2023 season would be capped at 24 races. Announcements about new race
sites such as Las Vegas prompted speculation that one of the more established
and existing sites might be dropped from the schedule. Markedly, the legend-
ary Monaco and Belgium races entered discussion for discontinuation due to
commercial reasons (Associated Press, 2022b; Cooper, 2022). These sites are
not ofering money that measures up to hosting races elsewhere, such as those
recently added to the schedule from the Middle East region. Saudi Arabia, for
example, pays $60 million per year as a hosting fee for its race. While the Monaco
race has been on the schedule since Formula 1’s inception in 1950 – and repre-
sents one of the sports property’s more storied and glamorous races (Sturm, 2017)
 The Geopolitics of Money Versus Morals 239

– its hosting fee is minimal (purportedly about $15 million) compared to those
races newly added (Smith, 2022). Ultimately, the Monaco and Belgium races
still appear on the 2023 schedule, but the French Grand Prix has been dropped.
Speculation remains, however, about the Belgium Grand Prix beyond 2023 and
whether the race might be placed on a rotation schedule and held every other
year (Associated Press, 2022c). Liberty Media purportedly seeks to eventually
add a race in Africa too. The 24 races scheduled for the 2023 season represent a
record number (Richards, 2022), with the opening race in Bahrain, three races
situated in the USA (Austin, Las Vegas, and Miami), and the fnal race hosted by
the United Arab Emirates (Abu Dhabi).
Progressively, race sites have moved from city streets to dedicated racing facil-
ities. With escalating costs to host races, state governments have gradually taken
the place of private investors as common promoters of Formula 1 races (Codling,
2017). In an era of mounting authoritarianism globally, Formula 1’s expan-
sion into new territories is prompting scrutiny. Moreover, some of Formula 1’s
recently adopted – yet prominent – sponsorship partners are state-owned and
collect sizeable state subsidies. For state-owned companies, sometimes their
aims can be largely non-commercial; in instances where said companies pay
rights acquisitions that are considered above-market rates, questions will emerge
about the intended purposes of sponsoring a sports property (Chadwick, 2022;
Chadwick, Widdop, and Burton, 2022). A surge of popularity and interest in
Formula 1 has been apparent recently, and an expanding race calendar – with
races in added locations – is indicative of organizing bodies being responsive to
increasing demand and further growing the sports property. Still, Liberty Media
and Formula 1 face a dilemma regarding whether their values are being compro-
mised in pursuit of fnancial interests. Evidently, determination of the Formula
1 race calendar is highly illustrative of the interplay between geography, politics,
and economics.

References
Abbruzzese, J. (2021) Drive to thrive: Netfix’s docuseries a boost for Formula 1. NBC
( June 22). Available at: https://www.nbcnews.com/tech/tech-news/netfix-f1-espn
-boost-tv-ratings-espn-rcna1237.
Associated Press (2021) Justin Bieber performs in Saudi Arabia despite calls for boycott
over human rights. CBC News (December 6). Available at: https://www.cbc.ca/news
/entertainment/justin-bieber-saudi-arabia-1.6275983.
Associated Press (2022a) Haas to run rebranded F1 cars and Fittipaldi at Bahrain test.
Sportsnet (March 6). Available at: https://www.sportsnet.ca/auto-racing/article/haas
-to-run-rebranded-f1-cars-and-fttipaldi-at-bahrain-test/.
Associated Press (2022b) Monaco’s F1 future under scrutiny, drivers want it to stay.
Sportsnet (May 28). Available at: https://www.sportsnet.ca/auto-racing/article/
monacos-f1-future-under-scrutiny-drivers-want-it-to-stay/.
Associated Press (2022c) Belgian Grand Prix keeps its place on Formula 1’s calendar for
2023. The Globe and Mail (August 28).
240 Tim Dewhirst

Baldwin, A. (2021) Motor racing-Oracle cloud partnership puts the wind in Red Bull’s
sails. Reuters (March 25). Available at: https://www.reuters.com/article/motor-f1
-redbull-oracle-idUSL4N2LM46N.
Brown & Williamson (1999) Formula One sponsorship proposal. Note to the Chief
Executive’s Committee. Bates no. 323011267-323011282.
Chadwick, S. (2022) From utilitarianism and neoclassical sport management to a new
geopolitical economy of sport. European Sport Management Quarterly, 22 (5), 685–704.
Chadwick, S., Widdop, P., and Burton, N. (2022) Soft power sports sponsorship – A
social network analysis of a new sponsorship form. Journal of Political Marketing, 21 (2),
196–217.
Cleverly, S. (2001) 2001 Formula One program: Lucky Strike BAR Honda launch.
British American Tobacco documentation. Bates no. 325003466–325003489.
Codling, S. (2017) Speed read F1: The technology, rules, history and concepts key to the sport.
Beverly, MA: Motorbooks.
Cooper, A. (2022) Leclerc: “F1 without Monaco for me is not F1”. Autosport (May 26).
Available at: https://www.autosport.com/f1/news/leclerc-f1-without-monaco-for
-me-is-not-f1/10311040/.
Edmondson, L. (2022) Formula One terminates Russian Grand Prix contract. ESPN
(March 3). Available at: https://www.espn.com/f1/story/_/id/33411099/formula-one
-terminates-russian-grand-prix-contract.
F1 (2021) F1 extends Chinese Grand Prix contract to 2025 [Formula 1 press release]
(November 6). Available at: https://www.formula1.com/en/latest/article.f1-extends
-chinese-grand-prix-contract-to-2025.3EWPSR02zKJ4ItdLHQtk8u.html.
Friend, D. (2021) Human rights group asks Justin Bieber to cancel Saudi Arabia concert.
CBC News (November 10). Available at: https://www.cbc.ca/news/entertainment/
justin-bieber-saudi-arabia-human-rights-foundation-1.6244845.
Grange, M. (2001) Win on Sunday . . .sell on Monday. R.O.B. Magazine (August), pp.
36–40.
Jenkins, M., Pasternak, K., and West, R. (2016) Performance at the limit: Business lessons
from Formula 1 motor racing. 3rd edn. Cambridge: Cambridge University Press.
Mather, V. (2022) The diplomatic boycott of the Beijing Winter Olympics, explained.
The New York Times (February 6).
Ni, V. (2022) Joe Biden again says US forces would defend Taiwan from Chinese attack.
The Guardian (September 19).
Nichols, G., and Savage, M. (2017) A social analysis of an elite constellation: The case of
Formula 1. Theory, Culture & Society, 34 (5–6), 201–225.
Noble, J. (2021) Why ‘fghter jet’ F1 is winning a new wave of sponsors. Autosport (April
8, 2021). Available at: https://www.motorsport.com/f1/news/fght-jet-new-wave
-sponsors/6129935/.
Rachini, M. (2021) Saudi Arabia is using Justin Bieber, F1 event to ‘whitewash’ its human
rights record: Human Rights Watch. CBC Radio (December 1).
Richards, G. (2021a) F1 under pressure to speak out against Saudi human right abuses.
The Guardian (December 1).
Richards, G. (2021b) Lewis Hamilton condemns ‘terrifying’ LGBTQ+ laws before Saudi
Arabian GP. The Guardian (December 2).
Richards, G. (2022) F1 hits the limit with record 24-race calendar unveiled for
2023 season. The Guardian (September 20).
Schoenfeld, B. (2022) ‘Drive to survive’ made Americans fall in love with Formula 1. The
New York Times ( July 14).
Simpson, D. (2004) Turkey: F1 keeps on coming. Tobacco Control, 13, 217–218.
 The Geopolitics of Money Versus Morals 241

Smith, L. (2022) The future of a storied race. The New York Times (May 27).
Sturm, D. (2014) A glamorous and high-tech global spectacle of speed: Formula One
motor racing as mediated, global and corporate spectacle. In Dashper, K., Fletcher,
T., and McCullough, N. (eds.) Sports events, society and culture. London: Routledge,
pp. 68–82.
Sturm, D. (2017) The Monaco Grand Prix and Indianapolis 500: Projecting European
glamour and global Americana. In Wenner, L.A., and Billings, A.C. (eds.) Sport, media
and mega-events. New York: Routledge, pp. 170–184.
Yeomans, G. (2021) Red Bull F1 eyes US market with Walmart deal. SportsPro (March
15). Available at: https://www.sportspromedia.com/news/red-bull-f1-walmart
-america-2021-formula-one/.
29
THE END OF OIL?
Formula One’s Changing Face

Josh Rayman

“I smell burning – is it my car?” Max Verstappen (crash.net, 2022), during free

practice for the 2022 Saudi Arabian Grand Prix on 25th March. Thick black
smoke was visible from the missile strike at an Aramco oil depot nine miles from
the Jeddah Corniche racing circuit with Yemen’s Houthi rebels claiming respon-
sibility, and the teams and drivers were uncertain about the safety of continuing
the event (bbc.co.uk, 2022).
This controversy came at the end of a fve-race sequence across the 2021/2022
seasons in the Middle East, visiting Qatar, Saudi Arabia, the UAE, Bahrain, and
a second visit to Saudi Arabia. The Saudi race, new for 2021, had already drawn
accusations of sportswashing (amnesty.org.uk, 2022). This was the longest series
of geographically clustered races outside of Europe in the history of the Formula
One calendar.
Facing calls to adapt to the changing world around it, how did the sport arrive
at a point where its dependence on oil seems so entrenched?
Whilst motorsport was primarily associated with the tobacco industry, a rela-
tionship which stretches back to 1968 when Gold Leaf sponsored the Lotus F1
team, driver retainers were originally paid by oil companies (Grant-Brabham,
2008).
In 1967, Esso left, and the motorsport organizing body lifted restrictions on
commercial sponsorship (Collings, 2001) which allowed more expansive uses
of the cars as advertising billboards. At frst this wasn’t fully liberalized – the
BBC insisted on sponsor stickers under 55 square inches, ensuring their cameras
did not pick up the logos and broadcast product branding (Grant-Brabham &
Britton, 2011).
Throughout the 1980s and 1990s, cigarette sponsorship was not uniform, and
host countries worked to diferent rules – meaning F1 cars changed branding
race-to-race.

DOI: 10.4324/9781003348238-35
 The End of Oil? 243

Additionally, drivers were sponsored separately from teams. This could be a

cost-efective investment, Alain Prost being paid just $75,000 by Marlboro for
personal sponsorship in 1984 (Hamilton, 2015). Sponsored drivers carried prom-
inent branding on their helmets and race suits, meaning that the cigarette logos
were ubiquitous in the series, appearing on drivers rather than teams, where the
team did not receive sponsorship from a tobacco company.
The peak of the visual presence of tobacco brands was in the mid-1990s, with
over 80% of the feld carrying primary or secondary sponsorship from a tobacco
company in 1996.
In the late 1990s the EU banned cigarette advertising, which was an issue for
the sport as 30% of the track advertising and the teams’ sponsorship income in
1997 was from a small cohort of tobacco companies (Bower, 2011).
There were carve-outs for Formula One, which persisted until the last major
brand ceased visible marketing on the car – Marlboro/Philip Morris with Ferrari
in 2007, carrying the Marlboro name only in Bahrain and China (grandprix.co
m, 2007).
In 2006, Bernie Ecclestone claimed the calendar shift was to appeal to mar-
kets that still allowed tobacco advertising:

There’s been this big push to keep races in which we can run with tobacco
branding. According to the law in Italy, for example, we can run branded
there – so it means that we keep two races. Same in Germany. So we’ve got
races that maybe we wouldn’t have had otherwise.
(Roebuck, 2015)

This does not seem to square up with the fnancial reality on the ground,
seen by the exodus of cigarette money before this, in accordance with the
“International Tobacco Products Marketing Standards” agreement made in
2001 (grandprix.com, 2007). Rothmans left in 1999, following a merger with
British American Tobacco; SEITA in 2000, leaving with Prost F1; BAT in
2005, after the sale of BAR to Honda; West and Benson & Hedges in 2005;
Japan Tobacco in 2006 – leaving only Philip Morris by 2007 (Grant-Brabham,
2008).
Potentially, an explanation for the changing calendar can be found in the
sport chasing hosting fees from far-fung locations. In the late 1990s, the hold-
ing company operating the commercial rights of Formula One passed through a
series of owners. It started with Morgan Grenfell Private Equity in 1999 (atlasf1
.com, 1999). MGPE would also invest in the Arrows F1 team, holding a stake in
the team through to its liquidation in 2002 (Allsop, 2002).
By 2004, a group of banks inherited the shares from an insolvent owner. They
sued for greater control over the sport and then sold the interest to CVC (Sylt,
2015). This period coincided with a calendar expansion and escalating hosting
fees – with deals being announced for races in UAE, India, Singapore, Korea,
and Valencia in the 12 months after the CVC deal was fnalized.
244 Josh Rayman

This period was delivering a return at the potential cost of the long-term sta-
bility of the sport, “taking jam today, over the sport’s future” (Richards, 2018), and
CVC extracted the greatest return out of any owner of the F1 commercial rights
– estimated to be more than Bernie Ecclestone (Sylt, 2015).
This had consequences for the established calendar, with historic circuits
considered the backbone of the series struggling with the cost. Silverstone was
regularly considered at risk (Benson, 2003), despite hosting nearly continuously
since 1950 and the fact that a majority of the competing teams were based close
to the circuit.
Formula One has principally been a Europe-centric sport, with between one-
third (2013) and two-thirds of the calendar (most of the 1990s) held within the
continent. This unsurprisingly aligns with the teams, who are mostly based in
the United Kingdom. With the exceptions of Alfa Romeo (Switzerland) and
Ferrari and Alpha Tauri (Italy), modern Formula One is operated primarily from
the English midlands, despite branding (Alpine) and ownership (Mercedes, Red
Bull, Haas) from overseas (Asher, 2022).
However, with cigarette sponsorship bans in the European Union, and later
the CVC acquisition, Formula One scrambled for money, expanding its calendar
eastwards with a slew of additions – Malaysia (1999), Bahrain and China (2004),
Turkey (2005), Singapore (De Cotta, 2007) and Valencia (2008), Korea (2010),
and India (2011) pushing the Europe percentage from 68% to just 36% in 2013.
It spurred expensive state-backed projects that did not last long on the inter-
national stage. Turkey frst exited the calendar in 2011 after six years. It returned,
briefy, in the pandemic-afected seasons of 2020/2021 as a late-drafted replace-
ment. Although it harboured hopes for a longer-term contract, it had fallen into
disuse during the hiatus and was at one point leased to a car rental company for
storage (pitpass.com, 2015).
India and Korea would exit the calendar quicker, only a couple of years after
the inauguration – purpose-built new venues promising regeneration to their
respective regions.
Indian interest emerged in 2004, and after discussions fell through in other
regions, the Buddh International Circuit was announced in 2007. Built for the
2010 season (Spurgeon, 2012) and estimated to cost $400 million, the race was
halted by a tax dispute only three years later (Kannan, 2013). The country did not
hold another major international motorsport event for ten years, with Formula
E scheduled to return in 2023, on a street circuit in Hyderabad (Sharma, 2022).
The Korea Auto Valley Operation signed in 2006 a four-year contract for a
circuit based near Mokpo which was completed in 2009. It cost $264 million,
was subsidized by public money, and was located on the remote southwestern
coast. After Formula One left, the circuit was relegated to hosting mostly local
and amateur racing, and no international series has visited since 2013 (Sang-
Hun, 2015).
Valencia did not complete its frst contract of seven years and paid around
€300 million (including €100 million in circuit construction costs) for the fve
 The End of Oil? 245

races between 2008 and 2012 (sports.in.msn.com, 2012) that were held at the
“street” circuit. The site is tied up in legal battles and now houses a shanty town
(Bono, 2021), having been abandoned for nearly a decade (Leslie, 2013).
The Malaysian Grand Prix was sponsored by the oil company Petronas, which
had had an interest in Formula One stretching back to 1995 when it backed the
Sauber F1 team (sauber-group.com, 2019), and continuing after the race with a
visible investment in the dominant Mercedes F1 team, their cars carrying the oil
brand during its title run from 2014 to 2021.
The Malaysian tourism board sponsored the Stewart F1 team between 1997
and 1999, in the run-up to its frst race at the end of 1999. The circuit was a
major infrastructure project under Mahathir Mohamad’s government. It lasted
longer than other races added in this period, exiting the calendar in 2017 (rac-
ingnews365.com, 2022), and continues to hold MotoGP races.
From 2009 onwards, a series of Organization of the Petroleum Exporting
Countries (OPEC and OPEC+) countries were added to the calendar joining
earlier entrant Bahrain – with UAE (2009), Russia (2014), Azerbaijan (2017), and
Qatar and Saudi Arabia (2021).
Bahrain started construction in Sakhir in 2002, backed by the crown prince,
costing $150 million to build (Wilkins, 2004). It competed with the UAE,
Egypt, and Lebanon to host the race and has hosted every season since 2004,
except in 2011 due to political unrest (Spurgeon, 2011).
Bahrain held a veto over further Middle East races having committed to the
series early on (Baldwin, 2014), but this appears to have been lost or relinquished
by the late 2010s with the addition of Qatar.
Abu Dhabi announced its Formula One race at a festival held in 2007, with
its frst race in 2009 ( Joseph, 2007). In 2021, it signed a ten-year extension, with
Etihad Airways as the principal sponsor. The circuit is state-owned and con-
struction began in 2007 as part of a plan to turn Yas Island into a multi-purpose
entertainment destination (news24.com, 2007).
The Russian Grand Prix was scheduled to move on from the Sochi circuit
in 2023, built in the Winter Olympic Park; however, the ongoing confict in
Ukraine caused Formula One to terminate the contract (Benson, 2022).
In Baku, Formula One arrived in 2016 when the city hosted the European
Grand Prix. It was renamed the Azerbaijan Grand Prix in 2017 and is scheduled
to continue until at least 2024 on a street circuit that was announced in 2014
(formula1.com, 2014). The costs cited for this circuit ($7.9 million) are much
lower than those for other street circuits, and the organizers claim the race is run
for under $150 million (Alibayli, 2016).
Qatar, with an existing circuit in Losail built in 2004 for MotoGP had been
vying for a race for many years. In 2021, it was added to the COVID-altered
lineup, and it returns in 2023 with a ten-year contract. The circuit was built for
$58 million and opened in 2004, with GP2 Asia in 2009 being the highest-level
car race hosted until the 2021 Grand Prix (Tobin, 2021).
246 Josh Rayman

Saudi Arabia also joined the circus in 2021, hosting the race at a temporary
street circuit whilst construction of a larger facility takes place, scheduled for
2025 (motorsportweek.com, 2022). The Saudi family’s involvement in Formula
One stretches back to the 1970s, with a race explored in 1975 (Bower, 2011) and
its sponsorship of the Williams team between 1978 and 1984.
The Formula One race was announced in 2019, alongside hosting a round
of Formula E in Riyadh and taking over the start of the Dakar Rally. In a
brandstorming strategy that tracks its expansion in other sports in recent years,
alongside the race, Saudi Aramco also took up a signifcant investment as a prin-
cipal sponsor of the series, something that can deliver outsized returns in terms
of sponsor perception (Grant-Brabham, 2008), at a cost of $450 million over
10 years (Harris, 2020). Additionally, it sponsors the Aston Martin Cognizant
team (Mitchell, 2022) and holds an option to acquire a stake in the team in the
future.
In 2016, Liberty Media bought a controlling interest in the Formula One
Group. Its approach has been to expand the profle of street circuits in the sport
– adding street races in Miami, Las Vegas, and Saudi Arabia; expanding online,
esports, and social media presence; the Netfix Drive to Survive docuseries (tifosy
.com, 2021).
During the pandemic, with Formula One gaining greater prominence due to
the Netfix docuseries, Aramco accelerated quickly to a broad presence in the F1
paddock, taking up title sponsorship of three races and having trackside hoard-
ings at most events (Harris, 2020), combined with the Aston Martin sponsorship
and race in Jeddah.
As the sporting landscape evolves, starting to embrace electric and lower
carbon approaches to moving sporting infrastructure from country to country,
Formula One retains its 22-race calendar containing multiple long-haul trips.
Changing this is something that is beginning to take traction inside F1 manage-
ment, which has set itself a 2030 carbon-neutral commitment (Benson, 2019).
Compared to Extreme E, an international racing series which leaves six-week
breaks between rounds to accommodate a ship moving the crews and equip-
ment around, Formula One’s hectic schedule is much more energy intensive.
In the 2022 calendar, there is a single race trip to the USA for Miami (between
the Australian and Spanish GPs) and back-to-back weekend racing in Baku and
Montreal (5,500 miles apart) (formula1.com, 2022).
Several countries have contracts up for renewal in the next few years – France,
Belgium, and Mexico in 2022; Japan, Austria, and the UK in 2024; China,
Australia, Italy, the Netherlands, and Brazil in 2025 (Rencken & Janse, 2022) –
and Liberty has added a third USA race in Las Vegas for 2023 with a three-year
contract. This crowding of the schedule has prompted the idea of grouping races
by regions and running diferent groups year to year, as several European races
are geographically clustered together (Mitchell, 2022b).
Formula One expanded big in a period of economic instability. It lost the
historically reliable source of income in tobacco advertising during unstable
 The End of Oil? 247

economic cycles. It found itself with the twin challenges of replacing that income,
whilst striving to remain relevant in a world starting to reckon with the climate
crisis.
Relying on state-backed races, an expensive and resource-intensive sport
managed to bridge itself from its previous fnancial model of customer-facing
advertising, using free-to-air television coverage to maximize exposure. The
durability of this approach may have its limitations, demonstrated by the quick
churn of events in the early 2010s. Escalating costs borne by the promoters and
state backers has a fnite timeline if the revenue promised does not follow.
Although the deck may have been stacked against promoters who were
required to bear large costs without necessarily being able to achieve proportion-
ate returns, it may also be that the economic model simply didn’t allow promot-
ers the time to build a receptive audience. This is refected in a comment from
Dr Walter Kaftz, former CEO of the Nurburgring circuit, who says “racing
in countries without a motorsport tradition isn’t sustainable” (Grant-Brabham,
2008).

References
Alibayli, V. (2016) Baku’s Formula One Race: Image Over Cost. Available at: https://
eurasianet.org/bakus-formula-one-race-image-over-cost (Accessed: 2022/9/28)
Allsop, D. (2002) Debts push arrows to the edge. Available at: https://www.independent
.co.uk/sport/motor-racing/debts-push-arrows-to-the-edge-182943.html (Accessed:
2022/6/30).
amnesty.org.uk (2022) Saudi Arabia: F1 Grand Prix must not be allowed to cover up
kingdom’s brutal human rights abuses. Available at: https://www.amnesty.org.uk/
press-releases/saudi-arabia-f1-grand-prix-must-not-be-allowed-cover-kingdoms
-brutal-human-rights (Accessed: 2022/6/30).
Asher, R. (2022) Where are Formula 1 teams based? Mercedes, Ferrari, Red Bull and
more. Available at: https://www.autosport.com/f1/news/where-are-f1-teams-based
/10348715/ (Accessed: 2023/1/22)
atlasf1.com (1999) New era of arrows ownership. Available at: http://www.atlasf1.com/
news/1999/1053.htm (Accessed: 2022/6/30).
Baldwin, A. (2014) Bahrain can veto Qatar F1 race, says Ecclestone. Available at: https://
www.reuters.com/article/uk-motor-racing-ecclestone-bahrain-qatar-idUKKBN
0JP2EE20141211 (Accessed: 2022/6/30).
bbc.co.uk (2022) Saudi Arabian Grand Prix will go ahead after missile attack. Available
at: https://www.bbc.co.uk/sport/formula1/60880598 (Accessed: 2022/6/30).
Benson, A. (2003) Silverstone row made simple. Available at: http://news.bbc.co.uk/
sport1/hi/motorsport/formula_one/3083233.stm (Accessed: 2022/6/30).
Benson, A. (2019) Formula 1 launches a plan to become carbon neutral by 2030. Available
at: https://www.bbc.co.uk/sport/formula1/50382898 (Accessed: 2022/6/30).
Benson, A. (2022) Formula 1 terminates contract with Russian Grand Prix. Available at:
https://www.bbc.co.uk/sport/formula1/60601632 (Accessed: 2022/6/30).
Bono, F. (2021) The shanty town on Valencia’s abandoned Formula 1 circuit. Available
at: https://english.elpais.com/society/2021-08-09/the-shanty-town-on-valencias
-abandoned-formula-1-circuit.html (Accessed: 2022/6/30).
248 Josh Rayman

Bower, T. (2011) No angel: The secret life of Bernie Ecclestone. London: Faber and Faber.
Collings, T. (2001) The Piranha Club: Power and infuence in Formula One. London: Virgin
Books.
crash.net (2022) F1 Saudi Arabian GP: Huge fre breaks out in Jeddah ahead of race.
Available at: https://www.crash.net/f1/news/999369/1/i-smell-burning-huge-fre
-near-f1-saudi-arabia (Accessed: 2022/6/30).
De Cotta, I. (2007) F1 boss to discuss Singapore Grand Prix with Minister of State.
Available at: https://archive.ph/20120729053543/http://www.channelnewsasia.com
/stories/singaporelocalnews/view/263852/1/.html (Accessed: 2022/6/30).
formula1.com (2014) Azerbaijan layout unveiled for Baku European Grand Prix in 2016.
Available at: https://www.formula1.com/en/latest/headlines/2014/10/Azerbaijan
-layout-unveiled-for-Baku-European-Grand-Prix-in-2016.html (Accessed:
2022/9/28)
formula1.com (2022) F1 schedule 2022. Available at: https://www.formula1.com/en/
racing/2022.html (Accessed: 2022/6/30).
grandprix.com (2007) Marlboro explains tobacco liveries. Available at: https://www
.grandprix.com/ns/ns19038.html (Accessed: 2022/6/30).
Grant-Brabham, B. (2008) An investigation into motorsport sponsorship: A comparative analysis
of two and four wheeled sponsorship. Bournemouth: University of Bournemouth.
Grant-Brabham, B. and Britton, J. (2011) Motor racing, tobacco company sponsorship,
barcodes and alibi marketing. Available at: https://tobaccocontrol.bmj.com/content
/21/6/529 (Accessed: 2022/6/30).
Hamilton, M. (2015) Alain Prost. London: Blink.
Harris, G. (2020) Aramco deal worth more than $450m to Formula 1. Available at:
https://www.motorsportweek.com/2020/04/03/aramco-deal-worth-more-than
-450m-to-formula-1/ (Accessed: 2022/6/30).
Joseph, N. (2007) Abu Dhabi event draws big crowd – Bernie wants more. Available at:
https://www.autoblog.com/2007/02/06/abu-dhabi-event-draws-big-crowd-bernie
-wants-more (Accessed: 2022/6/30).
Kannan, S. (2013) Why India’s Formula 1 Grand Prix is under threat. Available at:
https://www.bbc.co.uk/news/business-24659690 (Accessed: 2022/6/30).
Leslie, J. (2013) Meet the abandoned F1 track that was once an epic street circuit.
Available at: https://www.carthrottle.com/post/meet-the-abandoned-f1-track-that
-was-once-an-epic-street-circuit/ (Accessed: 2022/6/30).
Mitchell, S. (2022a) Aramco has option to own part of Aston Martin F1 team. Available
at: https://the-race.com/formula-1/aramco-has-option-to-own-part-of-aston
-martin-f1-team/ (Accessed: 2022/6/30).
Mitchell, S. (2022b) Which GPs are at risk as Vegas forces F1 calendar rotation? Available
at: https://the-race.com/formula-1/which-gps-are-at-risk-as-vegas-forces-f1
-calendar-rotation/ (Accessed: 2022/6/30).
motorsportweek.com (2022) Saudi says Qiddiya will have ‘no restrictions’ on ideas.
Available at: https://www.motorsportweek.com/2022/03/22/saudi-says-qiddiya
-will-have-no-restrictions-on-ideas/ (Accessed: 2022/6/30).
News24.com (2007) Abu Dhabi circuit under construction. Available at: https://www
.news24.com/wheels/abu-dhabi-circuit-under-construction-20070718
pitpass.com (2015) Istanbul circuit to be “used car lot”. Available at: https://www.pitpass
.com/54537/Istanbul-circuit-to-be-used-car-lot (Accessed: 2022/6/30).
racingnews365.com (2022) Why the Malaysian Grand Prix isn’t likely to return. Available
at: https://racingnews365.com/sepang-ceo-cool-on-malaysian-gp-return (Accessed:
2022/6/30).
 The End of Oil? 249

Rencken, D. and Janse, J. (2022) How much each circuit on the calendar pays F1.
Available at: https://racingnews365.com/how-much-each-circuit-on-the-calendar
-pays-to-formula-1 (Accessed: 2022/6/30).
Richards, G. (2018) CVC ownership of F1 should serve as a warning to Premiership
Rugby. Available at: https://www.theguardian.com/sport/blog/2018/sep/10/cvc
-ownership-f1-warning-premiership-rugby-union (Accessed: 2022/6/30).
Roebuck, N. (2015) Refections with Nigel Roebuck. Available at: https://www
.motorsportmagazine.com /archive/article/october -2015/17/ref lections -nigel
-roebuck-6 (Accessed: 2022/9/28)
Sang-Hun, C. (2015) A Korean auto-racing debacle, but hope around the bend. Available
at: https://www.nytimes.com/2015/02/16/world/asia/a-korean-auto-racing-debacle
-but-hope-around-the-bend.html (Accessed: 2022/6/30).
sauber-group.com (2019) History & heritage – Sauber Group. Available at: https://www
.sauber-group.com/corporate/history/ (Accessed: 2022/6/30).
Sharma, Y. (2022) International motorsport makes its return to India as Formula E
confrm Hyderabad as race venue. Available at: https://www.fnancialexpress.com
/auto/electric-vehicles/international-motorsport-makes-its-return-to-india-as
-formula-e-confrm-hyderabad-as-race-venue/2578358/ (Accessed: 2022/6/30).
sports.in.msn.com (2012) Valencia pays 2012 fee, Spain to alternate from 2013. Available
at: https://web.archive.org/web/20140225181958/http://sports.in.msn.com/
formulaone/article.aspx?cp-documentid=5913688 (Accessed: 2022/6/30).
Spurgeon, B. (2011) Bahrain Cancels Grand Prix Amid Political Unrest. Available at:
https://www.nytimes.com/2011/02/22/sports/autoracing/22iht-PRIX22.html
(Accessed 2022/9/28)
Spurgeon, B. (2012) How India made its Grand Prix dream come true. Available at:
https://www.nytimes.com/2012/10/27/sports/autoracing/27iht-srf1prix27.html
(Accessed: 2022/6/30).
Sylt, C., Morson, L. and Reid, C. (2015) Meet the biggest winner in the history of
Formula One: CVC Capital Partners. Available at: https://www.theguardian.com
/business/2015/jul/25/cvc-capital-partners-biggest-winner-history-formula-one
(Accessed: 2022/6/30).
tifosy.com (2021) Formula 1: Liberated by liberty? Available at: https://www.tifosy.com/
insights/formula-1-liberated-by-liberty-3476 (Accessed: 2022/6/30).
Tobin, D. (2021) F1 to hold frst Qatar Grand Prix at Losail this November. Available
at: https://www.motorsportmagazine.com/articles/single-seaters/f1/f1-to-hold-frst
-qatar-grand-prix-at-losail-this-november (Accessed: 2022/6/30).
Wilkins, R. (2004) Bahrain wins race against time. Available at: https://www.crash.net/
f1/news/48157/1/bahrain-wins-race-against-time (Accessed 2022/6/30).
PART VII

Peace, Diplomacy, and

Society
30
SPORT, GEO-POLITICS, AND
THE PEACE PROCESS
Grant Jarvie

Sport has an opportunity to advance its case as an infuencer of geo-politics and

an enabler of peace processes. The scale, reach, and popularity of sport make it a
useful contemporary tool in enabling human rights and advancing the common
good. In a tense world there is a need for politically smarter ways of deepen-
ing commitments to peace processes and more efective cultural relations. This
proposition builds upon suggestions made by Bell (2017), Pospisil (2016), and the
British Academy (2017) that spaces are desperately needed to open the possibility
of dialogue involving the interests of more than one group or one state or one
community. In other words, actors are usually at the heart of national, interna-
tional, and sub-national geo-politics. Such additional spaces could be provided
through sport. If one accepts the observation that the international peacekeeping
community is at a critical moment and that geo-politics cases are invariably com-
plex and often require long-term approaches, then any resources and tools that
can help to forge mutuality and trust should be considered as at least optional if
not mandatory. Sport, it is argued here, is one such resource and tool.
In presenting such an argument, this chapter on sport, geo-politics, and the
peace process is constructed around the following sub-themes: (i) sport, peace,
and fragile contexts; (ii) sport, geo-politics, and fragile states; (iii) sport and
human rights; (iv) sport, cultural relations, and peace; (v) sport and the common
good before fnishing with a set of concluding remarks.

Geo-Politics, Peace, and Fragile Contexts

At the time of writing the contemporary global picture remains a messy one.
The international community is tense as a new state of geo-politics and fra-
gility threatens stability, shifting world orders, and peacebuilding (Economy,
2022; Cooley and Nexon, 2022; Marc and Jones, 2021). During the Cold War,

DOI: 10.4324/9781003348238-37
254 Grant Jarvie

superpower competition turned civil wars into proxy wars. The post-Cold War
era saw major investments in security, development, and political strategies to
end civil wars and foster a relatively stable development – with mixed results,
until the reversals of the Arab Spring. As fragility spread across the Middle East,
that dynamic has brought in more infuential, more capable regional actors such
as Turkey, Saudi Arabia, Iran, and the United Arab Emirates. Russia and China
have increased their engagement both at the global policy level and in specifc
fragile states. These countries, and the West, have all adopted diferent strategies
and approaches based on their capabilities and strategic economic and security
interests – often, in deep contradiction with one another. In the Indo-Pacifc,
Japan, Australia, and increasingly India are also playing an active role in fragile
states, in part, to try to fence of China’s ambitions (Economy, 2022; Marc and
Jones, 2021). It would be a tragedy if the system for peacebuilding and the eforts
to address the root causes of fragility between and within communities gave
ground to a return to a full-throated proxy war (Marc and Jones, 2021).
With each challenge there is often a temptation to simplify matters, fnd a
quick solution, and identify, often wrongly, aggressors, transgressors, and/or vic-
tims. But humanity, like power politics, is not that simple. Three recent UN
reviews of the contemporary global peace-making architecture have described
the current situation as being fractured (UN, 2015a, 2015b; United Nations
General Assembly, 2015) and call for greater inclusiveness in the forging of social
justice and peace. The issues to be confronted may be imposing in their scale,
but they need to be faced with fortitude and with cooperative and collaborative
spirit. They also need to acknowledge the full range of tools that peacekeepers
and others have at their disposal.

Sport, Geo-Politics, and Fragile States

The real politic of sport in the third decade of the 21st century is that it is
an invaluable tool for countries to deliver both sporting and non-sporting out-
comes. Rather than complaining about the role of politics in sport, the difer-
ent worlds of sport must live and work with the opportunities it opens up. The
modern sports administrator, CEO, or chair of a governing body need to operate
in the world of sport and in the world of geo-politics. The modern diplomat or
foreign ambassador needs to fully grasp the capability of sport to deliver not just
foreign policy but better cultural relations. Sport delivers on these fronts but
rarely gets the credit and funding for doing so. So, this is not a question of keep-
ing politics out of sport, you can’t stop the politicization of sport, and why would
you want to? What it is is a question of recognizing that the sports tool, the sports
administrator, the coach, the sport for development ofcer need to be equipped
to work within and with fragile states and communities to work with diferent
stakeholders in the process of peacebuilding through sport.
Sport has always been political, and in being so, it has done many good things
and some not-so-good things. The sports tool has helped to shed a light on many
 Sport, Geo-Politics, and the Peace Process 255

aspects of geo-political tension both between and within communities includ-

ing, for example, the whereabouts of the Chinese tennis player Peng Shuai and
the use of the athlete Catherine Freeman as a symbol of reconciliation between
aboriginal and white Australia and a country which had much to forgive. In
2024 it will be 100 years since the Chinese-born Scottish athlete Eric Liddell
won Olympic gold at the 1924 Paris Olympics. Another opportunity exists for
sport to deliver a message and play its part in helping to forge a common good
for a better world. When visiting Scotland in 2017 the then-Chinese Ambassador
talked of the spirit and humanity of Eric Liddell, who interned in a concentra-
tion camp in Weifang in the 1940s where he continued to support children. The
athlete’s name and story have lived on, providing a bridge for potential cultural
relations building, a sustainable space for countries to talk to one another. As the
Ambassador observed, “We are living in a time of mutual learning for common
progress”. Modern sports leaders need to work with the geo-political spaces just
as politicians and diplomats need to respect and recognize what sport does on and
of-feld. Darnell (2022) argued that what is required is organizations, policies,
and leaders within sport to support, advocate for, and directly engage with the
political struggle for peace and transitional justice. Sport as an enabler for peace
should not transcend or sidestep geo-politics but rather engages fully.
It is not as if the role of sport in the peacekeeping process has not previously
been commented upon (Armstrong, 2002; Cardenas, 2013, 2016, 2018; Clarke,
Jones and Smith, 2021; Darnell, 2022; Gasser and Levinsen, 2004; Giullanotti,
2011; Laureus, 2021; Serena, 2009; Ubaidulloev, 2018; Woodhouse, 2010).
Clarke, Smith, and Jones (2021) review of studies building peace through sport
concluded that there is scope for more targeted studies to clarify specifc demo-
graphics of involvement or an optimal timeframe for involvement. Many of the
studies reference the importance of being part of broader initiatives, but the best
context in which to utilize sport and how much of an impact is being made on
the wider communities has yet to be conclusively determined. Cardenas (2016)
drawing upon Galtung’s (1996) classical three r’s of peacebuilding (reconstruc-
tion, reconciliation, and rehabilitation) talks of (i) sports-based interventions
supporting rehabilitation and healing through psychosocial support and treat-
ment; (ii) sports interventions facilitating reconstruction and the building of
relationships and strengthening inter- and intra-community ties as well as sports
programmes aiding the process of reculturation through the establishment of
sports tournaments and leagues based on accepted cultural regulations; and (iii)
sports have been involved in the process of reconciliation at national, commu-
nity, and individual levels.
Cardenas (2016) calls for a more inclusive defnition of cultural expression,
one that remains open to sport. Something that is crucial if cultural relations
building through sport is going to be grasped as an intervention that both moves
the discussion and practice of sport and peacebuilding beyond discussion of
soft power, or sport for development or sports diplomacy or supporting fragile
states. While the European National Institutes of Culture, including the British
256 Grant Jarvie

Council (EUNIC, 2021), have recently examined the link between culture and
peacebuilding within and between fragile countries and regions they have failed
to fully grasp let alone acknowledge the role of sport in enabling the fve dimen-
sions of state and inter-state fragility, identifed by the OECD (2021), namely
economic, environmental, political, security, and societal fragility.

Sport and Human Rights

A recent comprehensive systematic examination of political settlements and
peacebuilding processes concluded that the human rights space is important. One
that is key to the forging of long-term stability (https://peacerep.org/). The local
context in which human rights are negotiated during confict or peace-making is
a vital space. A central problem with the orthodox construction of human rights
is that visions of the state during periods of transition were often seen to serve
the interests of only one group. The value of an alternative approach that allows
for negotiated human rights and a negotiated common good is that it ofers the
possibility of a much more shared concept of the state and/or community; one
that can serve a broader set of interests operating beyond that of the individual
and a single-interest group. Long-term approaches to social change are necessary
rather than short-term fxes. Post–peace agreement landscapes need to involve
sustained movement away from confict, and the implementation of human
rights commitments in peace agreements is critical to holding open political
space through which confict resolution can continue to be negotiated between
as wide a range of stakeholders as possible (British Academy, 2017, p. 58).
The value of recognizing an approach to human rights through sport is that
it brings together such an approach together with a tool (sport) that has scale,
connectivity, reach, fexibility, and resources. Marchesseault’s (2016) analysis of
the place of the bicycle and the cyclist in post-confict Rwanda provides but one
example of a study that evidences both the role of the cyclist as an active agent and
form of agency in the construction of and transition to a more peaceful Rwanda.
Thorpe’s (2018) call for sporting creativity and support for youth agency in sites
of war, confict, and disaster applies not just to local contexts but multi-national
or community contexts. More importantly international peace negotiators might
listen to Thorpe’s (2021) key message that viewing children and youth as victims
tends to overlook unique forms of youth agency, resilience, and resourcefulness.
The relatively newly formed Centre for Sport and Human Rights (https://www
.sporthumanrights.org/) is supporting international organizations such as the
IOC and multi-lateral organizations such as the Commonwealth Secretariat and
the International Labour Organization to advance human rights in and through
sport. It has an opportunity to support those working with geo-politics and the
peace process.
International peace negotiators or interveners need to be prepared to take on a
level risk and try new things and should be supported to do so. Should we not use
any means at our disposal to strive to make the world a less tense, more just, and
 Sport, Geo-Politics, and the Peace Process 257

peaceful place? Should we not argue that an opportunity exists to enable sport to
be part of the essential geo-political toolbox for anyone involved in social justice,
peace-making, forging efective cultural relations, and/or building capability?
Should peacebuilding and development actors, foreign diplomats, ambassadors,
civil servants, cultural agencies, NGOs, international aid agencies, and academ-
ics not recognize fully the full range of social and political tools at their disposal
when navigating the peacebuilding process, fghting for social justice, upholding
human rights, and creating infuence within and through sport? Thus, the value
of using feld activities such as sport to support human rights in the forging of any
peace process requires that sport, including the right to sport, like human rights
is seen as a set of commitments and should be understood as but one mechanism
that holds open a space through which social and political construction and tran-
sition can be enabled.

Sport, Cultural Relations, and Peace

How then can sport and cultural relations enhance peace and stability? If soft power is
the pursuit of infuence through attraction, cultural relations are the creation of
the conditions for sustainable collaboration between like-minded countries for
mutual beneft (British Council, 2020). Both are essential, but they are diferent.
They require diferent strategies, arrangements, and skill sets. The term cultural
relations can generally be taken to mean reciprocal, non-coercive transnational
interactions between two or more cultures, encompassing a range of activities
that are conducted by both state and non-state actors within the space of culture
and civil society ( Jarvie, 2021; Rivera, 2015). The overall outcomes of cultural
relations are greater connectivity, better mutual understanding, more and deeper
relationships, mutually benefcial transactions, and enhanced sustainable dia-
logue between states, peoples, non-state actors, and cultures. They are a tangible
component of geo-politics and the peace process in the sense that they encom-
pass the space in which a wide range of non-state actors engage in the fostering
of intercultural dialogue. This is a dialogue that can work for or against states,
but the greater the number of stakeholders that are involved in the dialogue the
greater the potential of fragile peace agreements being successful and sustainable.
Sport is not just a commodity but can be an immensely powerful vector of
change, value, principle, solidarity, a symbol, means, and arena through which a
plurality of views can be listened to. The challenge is a tough one for it requires
cultural gatekeepers to be less aloof about what is seen as culture, diplomats to
be less aloof about the contribution sport can make, and countries, communities,
and individuals to work across contexts to seek mutuality and forge and extend
the common good.
Seen in this way, that is to say sport as a resource and an enabler of cultural
relations and the peace process, culture can enhance peace and stability in several
ways.
The following observations might be considered.
258 Grant Jarvie

● Economic fragility: Sport in cultural relations building can contribute to

addressing economic fragility by fostering entrepreneurship in sport areas,
which in turn enhances employability and can foster the emergence of
micro- and small-sized enterprises.
● Environmental fragility: Sport in cultural relations building can contribute to
enabling environmental fragility by supporting the inclusion of sport actors
and resources in the face of natural disasters and climate change, through
funding, technical assistance, and environmental preservation activities; by
making cultural (inclusive of sport) organizations and venues more environ-
mentally sustainable and responsible towards the climate emergency; and by
supporting creative forms of environmental awareness raising through sport.
● Political fragility: Sport in cultural relations building can contribute to address-
ing political fragility by supporting civil society organizations that are com-
mitted to fostering democracy and human rights, recognizing the role of sport
in the promotion and defence of human rights and the exploration of political
issues, providing “safe spaces” for the discussion of controversial topics and
the exercise of freedom of expression, protecting cultural (inclusive of sport)
agents at risk, and supporting institution-building in the cultural feld (e.g.,
public bodies and strategies concerned with sport as culture generally, as well
as their intersections with other areas of peace, stability, and development).
● Security fragility: Sport in cultural relations building can contribute to address-
ing security fragility by facilitating an interpretation of the cultural dimen-
sions of conficts, responding to the impact of conficts on sporting heritage
(e.g., through restoration, mapping, management, capacity-building), and
strengthening prevention and restitution measures towards the illicit traf-
fcking of sport goods and people. This remains a complex area.
● Societal fragility: Sport in cultural relations building can contribute to
addressing societal fragility by investing in sporting heritage, provision, and
practice as a community-building vector, fostering capacity-building that
enhances participation in society, enabling the emergence of alternative nar-
ratives about society, communities, and individuals and promoting collabo-
ration and networking between sport actors and with broader civil society.

Thus, sport thought of in this way can contribute to cultural engagement and
relations building, inclusive of development, enabling of social cohesion, voice,
and agency. In this respect, sport can be seen as a good entry point in contem-
porary notions of “peace”, which are increasingly connected to development and
social justice, and which go beyond a simple binary opposition of confict and
peace, aggressors and victims, the ruling party, and opposition forces.

Sport and the Common Good

Sport is often seen as a cost-efective social tool and resource through which
conversations can take place and capabilities can be built. In this way sport can
 Sport, Geo-Politics, and the Peace Process 259

position itself in spaces where transitional justice is being forged (Duthie, 2017).
Successful peace negotiations, confict resolution, calls for social justice, and
efective cultural relations all involve compromise and seldom evoke a pre-com-
mitment to the common good. They require the common good to be constructed
in an ongoing way and spaces where this can happen. Thus, sport enabling the
common good is best understood as a project of ongoing political construction,
rather than a pre-commitment to any new political order or utopian ideal.
It responds to contemporary calls for sport to serve humanity (Hain and
Oddendaal, 2020). There needs to be a better balance between sport as an agent
of social good and the privatized pursuit of extreme proft working for the few.
Making sports policy, sports investment, sports aid, sports research, sports advo-
cacy, commitment, and sport and civil society work for more people, places, and
communities more often. The value of such an approach is that it allows for a
negotiated common good, the possibility of a much more shared concept of the
state and/or community. One that can serve a broader set of interests operating
beyond that of the individual, community, single-interest group, or country. In
this way sport can be seen as a valuable enabler in the world of geo-politics. Sport
can be a space that enables the construction of a common good while fractured
national and international communities and societies move through phases of
transitional justice. To talk of sport and the common good in this sense means
that sport is part of a set of commitments and practices aimed at using public
power to deliver public goods to people, regardless of their personal identity,
political afliation, and/or geographic location.

Concluding Remarks
If we are to reach common ground about ways of doing things diferently, then
there is a need for refexive responses to challenges to expertise. There is a need
for a better dialogue between practitioners, including peacekeepers, and academ-
ics about the challenges of new world contexts. There is also a need for those
working with geo-politics and the peace process to fully recognize the range of
tools at their disposal and use them to help deliver better outcomes.
Firstly, academics working with sport need to continue to be nuanced about
what works where, when, and under what circumstances. They also need to be
more nuanced about the growing challenges to expertise, the difculties of criti-
cal friendship, and the unpredictability of states, territories, and/or communities
undergoing fast-paced multiple political transitions because of any number of
fragile contexts and geo-political tensions and alliances.
Secondly, sport like the struggle for human rights commitments should be
understood as but one resource that helps to hold open a space through which
social and political construction and transition can take place and as an ena-
bler of new social contracts between as wide a range of stakeholders as possible.
Something that may be invariably long-term as opposed to short-term. Short-
term fxes to geo-political problems involving elite pacts are not sustainable.
260 Grant Jarvie

Thirdly, there exists an eerie silence within United Nations peacekeeping

reports about the role of sport despite the United Nations having mandated sport
as an enabler in delivering the sustainable development goals. At the same time
British Council and EUNIC critiques of the sustainable development goals argue
that culture is a missing pillar within the United Nations sustainable develop-
ment goals. They also marginalize the role of sport as culture while championing
the role of art and music as key tools to be used in enhancing peace and stability
within fragile contexts. Both fail to capture the possibilities of sport as a popu-
lar low-entry, high-impact point in the pursuit of sustainable long-term social
change. This all must change.
Those working in and through sport are well served by the notion of sport
enabling cultural relations and human rights and forging an enlarged common
good. Sport is seen as a resource and space which can help with making the art
of the possible, possible.

References
Armstrong, G. (2002). Talking up the game: Football and the reconstruction of Liberia,
West Africa. Global Studies in Culture and Power (9): pp 471–494.
Bell, C. (2017). Peace settlements and human rights: A post-cold war cultural history.
Journal of Human Rights Practice Volume 9 (3): pp 358–378.
British Academy. (2017). Navigating inclusion in peace settlements: Human rights and the
creation of the common good. London: Author.
British Council. (2020). Cultural relations for the 21st century. London: British Council.
Cardenas, A. (2013). Peace building through sport? An introduction to sport for
development and peace. Journal of Confictology Volume 4 (1): pp 24–33.
Cardenas, A. (2016). Sport and peacebuilding in divided societies: A case study on
Colombia and Northern Ireland. Peace and Confict Studies 23 (2): article 4.
Cárdenas, A. (2018). Sport and Peacebuilding. In Maguire, J, Falcous, M and Liston, K
(Eds) The Business and Culture of Sports: Society, Politics, Economy, Environment. Chapter
25 , pp. 371–388 Macmillan: London
Clarke, F., Jones, A., and Smith, L. (2021). Building peace through sports projects: A
scoping review. Sustainability Volume 13 (2129): pp 4–15.
Cooley, A., and Nexon, D. (2022). The real crisis of global order. Foreign Afairs Volume
101 (1): pp 103–118.
Darnell, S. (2022). Sport for peace and politics. The Association of Commonwealth
Universities. https://www.acu.ac.uk/the-acu-review/sport-peace-and-politics/.
[Retrieved 10 September 2022].
Duthie, R. (2017). Justice mosaics – How context shapes transitional justice in fractured
societies. https://www.ictj.org/justice-mosaics [Retrieved 9 September 2022].
Economy, E. (2022). Xi Jinping’s new world order: Can China remake the international
system. Foreign Afairs Volume 101 (1): pp 52–67.
EUNIC. (2021). Cultural relations – Key approaches in fragile contexts: How cultural relations
can enhance peace and stability. Brussels: EUNIC Global AISBL.
Galtung, J. (1996). Peace by peaceful means: Peace and confict, development and civilization.
London: Sage.
Gasser, P., and Levinsen, A. (2004) Breaking post-war ice: Open fun football schools in
Bosnia and Herzegovina. Sport in Society Volume 7 (3): pp 457–472.
 Sport, Geo-Politics, and the Peace Process 261

Giulianotti, R. (2011). Sport, transnational peace-making, and global civil society:

Exploring the refective discourses of sport, development, and peace project ofcials.
Journal of Sport and Social Issues Volume 35 (1): pp 50–71.
Hain, P., and Odendaal, A. (2020). Pitch battles: Sport, racism and resistance. London:
Rowan & Littlefeld.
Jarvie, G. (2021). Sport, soft power and cultural relations. Journal of Global Sports
Management. 4 August https://www.tandfonline.com/doi/full/10.1080/24704067
.2021.1952093 [Retrieved 16 September 2022].
Lauren’s (2021) Laureus Sport Annula Report 2020. London: Laureus Sport Foundation.
Marc, A., and Jones, B. (2021). The new politics of fragility. Washington: Brookings.
Marchesseault, D. (2016). The everyday breakaway: Participant perspectives on everyday life
within a sport for development and peace program (PhD thesis). University of Toronto,
Toronto, Canada.
Pospisil, J. (2016). UN review process: Politics and international state and peacebuilding.
Briefng paper 9. Political settlements research programme. Edinburgh University,
Edinburgh, Scotland, UK. https://www.pure.ed.ac.uk/ws/portalfles/portal
/23783135/Briefng_Paper_9_2016_UN_Review_Processes.pdf [Retrieved
9 September 2022].
Rivera, T. (2015). Distinguishing cultural relations from cultural diplomacy: The British Council’s
relationship with her majesty’s government. Los Angeles: Figueroa Press.
Serena, O. (2009). The contribution of sport within the process of peace and reconciliation.
Unpublished paper. https://www.sportanddev.org/sites/default/fles/downloads/
dissertation_serena_borsani_february_2009.pdf [Retrieved 10 September 2022].
Thorpe, H. (2018). Look at what we can do with all the broken stuf! Youth agency and
sporting creativity in sites of war, confict and disaster. In Meredith, W., Massey,
W., Darnell, S. and Smith, B. (Eds). Sport in under-resourced, underdeveloped and confict
regions. London: Routledge: pp 146–162.
Thorpe, H. (2021). Informal sports for youth recovery: Grassroots strategies in confict
and disaster geographies. Journal of Youth Studies Volume 24 (6): pp 708–730.
Ubaidulloev, Z. (2018). Sport for peace: A new era of international cooperation and
peace through sport. Asia-Pacifc Review Volume 25 (2): pp 104–126.
United Nations. (30 June 2015a) Challenge of sustaining peace: Report of the advisory
group of experts on the review of the peacebuilding architecture, A/69/968.
https://www.securitycouncilreport.org/atf/cf/%7B65BFCF9B-6D27-4E9C-8CD3
-CF6E4FF96FF9%7D/a_72_19.pdf [Retrieved 20 May 2018].
United Nations. (2015b) Preventing confict, transforming justice, securing the peace: A
global study on the implementation of United Nations Security Council resolution
1325. https://wps.unwomen.org/pdf/en/GlobalStudy_EN_Web.pdf [Retrieved
9 September 2022].
United Nations General Assembly (UNGA). (2015). Transforming our world: The
2030 agenda for sustainable development. https://sdgs.un.org/2030agenda [Retrieved
9 September 2022].
Woodhouse, T. (2010). Peacekeeping, peace culture and confict resolution. International
Peacekeeping Volume 17 (4): pp 486–498.
31
SPORTS DIPLOMACY IN THE
PACIFIC REGION AND THE SINO-
AUSTRALIAN GREAT GAME
Stuart Murray and Tony Yang

Introduction
To understand Chinese foreign policy is to consider three leaders and three
respective dictums. After a “century of humiliation” at the hands of western
powers, Chairman Mao made a slumbering, poverty-stricken nation “stand up”
(Thompson, 2020; Shirk, 2018). Deng Xiaoping, Mao’s successor and paramount
leader from December 1978 to November 1989, made China “get rich” and
made it “glorious” to do so (Shirk, 2018; Sornoza-Parrales et al., 2018). President
since 2013, Xi Jinping’s mandate is also simple: by fostering nationalism, military
expansion, and global projects such as the Belt and Road Initiatives, Xi’s job is to
make the Middle Kingdom “strong” (Sornoza-Parrales et al., 2018; Thompson,
2020).
The trouble with China’s becoming strong, however, is that much of the
geopolitical real estate they seek is already occupied. This is particularly true in
the Pacifc region. After the Pacifc War (December 1941 to September 1945), a
collection of western liberal democracies have laid claim to the area. For decades,
the United States of America, along with Australia and New Zealand, has pro-
vided security guarantees for many of the islands, as have France and the United
Kingdom. As Chinese power and infuence continue to grow in the region, such
western primacy in the region is no longer assured.
Much of the discourse on East–West strategic competition in the Pacifc
focuses on the “New Cold War” (Zhao, 2019), geopolitics (Auslin, 2020), and
classical security matters such as the balance of power, various security dilemmas,
and economic diplomacy (Ravenhill et al., 2019). Human security analyses tend
to focus on the role that development, aid, and soft power play in achieving each
of the diferent player’s foreign policy goals (Tow, 2016). One perspective miss-
ing so far, however, is the role that sports diplomacy plays in the region.

DOI: 10.4324/9781003348238-38
 Sports Diplomacy in the Pacific Region 263

Using Australia and China’s diferent approaches to the Pacifc as case stud-
ies, this chapter argues that sports diplomacy is central to creating infuence,
generating power, and winning the battle for hearts and minds (and bodies, if
we are talking about sport). The analysis reveals that China prefers a classical
approach, employing sport as part of a broader development strategy, whereas the
Australians have adopted a more innovative strategy, encapsulated in their $52
million dollar (AUD) PacifcAus Sports programme. This chapter describes and
reviews each country’s unique approach before pondering who is winning the
Great Game and the implications of the result for the region.

Australia, Sports Diplomacy, and the Pacifc

Sport has connected Australia and Pacifc Island Nations (PINs) for decades. In
2006, for example, the Australian government implemented sport for develop-
ment programmes, such as Pacifc Sports Partnerships, the Australia Sports Outreach
Program, and Team Up, which use sport to deliver positive outcomes in gender,
disability, leadership, knowledge, and governance. While impactful at a grass-
roots, community, and local level, such programmes did not include the elites
– that is, government ofcials, professional sportspeople, and sports industry
leaders and executives. This gap led to a shift in focus – from sport for develop-
ment to sports diplomacy. In 2015, for example, Australia produced the world’s
frst esoteric sports diplomacy strategy, followed by a second in 2019 – Sports
Diplomacy 2030.
The latter is a “global strategy with a Pacifc Focus”, and “recognizes the
global reach of the sports industry and the signifcance of sport, while placing
special emphasis on the vital connection between Australian and neighbouring
Pacifc communities” (DFAT, 2019, p. 9). It seeks to build on the “common
passion for sport and strong sporting connections, including a large number of
Pacifc athletes participating in Australian sporting codes” (DFAT, 2019, p. 9). In
other words, and seen through the lens of sports diplomacy, the Australian gov-
ernment is strategically harnessing the power of sport for diplomatic outcomes
in the Pacifc. Chief among those is to create “low-cost, low-risk, and high-pro-
fle” sports diplomacy programmes that “build linkages with our neighbours”
(DFAT, 2019, p. 11; Keech & Houlihan, 1999, p. 109).
For some, however, Sports Diplomacy 2030 has its issues (Murray, 2017).
Confusion exists between sports diplomacy and sports for development pro-
grammes, outcomes, and participants. Many of the PINs also view sports diplo-
macy entreaties as little more than neo-colonial talent grabs, that is, rich foreigners
plundering local players to ply their trade in far-of leagues in Europe, Australia,
and the United States of America (Besnier, 2014). Related, an unhealthy donor-
recipient perception prevails rather than one of genuine partnerships between
Australia and PINs, which is what Sports Diplomacy 2030 is attempting to achieve.
PacifcAus Sports (PAS) – a new sports diplomacy programme launched in 2019
– was created to tackle such issues. It seeks, for example, to solve the player-drain
264 Stuart Murray and Tony Yang

problem, foster pathways for elite athletes and teams to play in each other’s coun-
tries, and “strengthen Australia’s relationships in the Pacifc through sport at
the community and diplomatic level” (PacifcAus, 2019). PAS is a new type of
sports diplomacy strategy. Of note are its ambition, size, and scale. Running
from 2019 to 2023, the Australian government has budgeted $52 million dollars
(AUD) for the programme, one of its largest “ever public diplomacy investment
in its history” (Leary, 2021). The programme had one, simple, high-level objec-
tive – to enhance Australia’s relationships, brand, and diplomacy in the Pacifc
via sport.
In terms of sport, PAS focuses on the “Big Four” Aussie sports – rugby
league, rugby union, netball, and football. It aims to create pathways for Pacifc
and Australian teams, athletes, and coaches to participate in each other’s vari-
ous Australian and international sporting competitions. In terms of rugby, for
example, four Pacifc teams (and their retinues) relocated to Australia during
the COVID pandemic to compete in elite competition: The Fijian Drua (Men’s
Rugby Union), Fijiana Drua (Women’s Rugby Union), the Papua New Guinea
Hunters (Men’s Rugby League), and Kaiviti Silktails (Women’s Rugby League).
PAS also helped Samoan, Tongan, and Fijian netballers compete in Australian
competitions and supported many individual athletes in their preparations for the
Tokyo 2022 Summer Olympic Games.
Of the pitch, each sporting exchange was accompanied by strategic com-
munications, old and new media releases, public outreach programmes, speak-
ing tours, community events, and school visits. Australian and PIN ministers,
ambassadors, diplomats, and politicians looked on from the stands, forming new
informal friendships that will, in time, lead to formal gains around the negotiat-
ing table.
Generally, PAS has been a success. On the feld, it gave PIN teams, players,
coaches, and fans what they had always wanted – their own teams playing in
Australian competition,1 a level playing feld, and a genuine chance to com-
pete. Authenticity is vital to any twenty-frst-century diplomatic message, and
PAS is certainly delivered in this respect. The story of the Fijiana Drua pro-
vides a case in point: the team capped of an unbeaten season (their frst in the
competition) by beating the New South Wales Waratahs 36-32 in a thrilling,
emotional Grand Final. The scenes at the fnal whistle were public diplomacy
“gold” – some players wept, others wore disbelieving, euphoric grins, and
all joined together in the centre of the pitch to sing the gospel song We Shall
Overcome – a perfect anthem for a team of wandering, female rugby players. As
Sarah Leary, a senior Australian diplomatic and one of the architects of PAS,
notes,

Three years on and the initiative has reached 850 Pacifc and Australian
players and ofcials, attracted crowds of over 47,000 people and funded
over 120 sports diplomacy events, training camps and matches.
(Leary, 2021, para. 3)
 Sports Diplomacy in the Pacific Region 265

The programme has one or two issues that its architects may wish to address.
While many PIN athletes, coaches, and industry executives were able to enjoy
the Pacifc-to-Australia pathway, not many Australian players, teams, and
coaches made it to the islands. This was due, however, to the COVID pan-
demic, during which most PINs closed their doors to travellers, sportspeople
included. Confusion continues to exist between sport for development and sports
diplomacy strategies, programmes, and facilitators. Further clouding the feld of
play, other Australian government departments such as the Australian Defence
Force and Australian Federal Police also run similar “sport for” programmes
in the Pacifc, often in the same countries and with little inter-governmental
cooperation. And, fnally, it could be argued that the programme is a touch
one-sided; that is, PAS was made by Australian diplomats, sports “people”, and
others. Future programmes would beneft by including PIN voices, ideas, and
people in all phases of the programme – design, implementation, measurement,
and evaluation. Good diplomacy can sometimes be quite easy – Australian diplo-
mats, coaches, players, academics, and a whole host of other Engaged Australians
working in the region would do well to “shut up and listen” to Pacifc voices,
ideas, needs, and fears (Gibert, 2022, para. 4).

China, Sports Diplomacy, and the Pacifc

When it comes to sports diplomacy and China, the frst aspect to note is stadium
diplomacy – the construction of sporting venues especially for developing coun-
tries (Murray, 2018). Over the past 40 years, China has adopted this approach
when helping the “Third World” and as a key aspect of its foreign aid and devel-
opment programmes (Dubinsky, 2021). The State Council (2011), the equivalent
Chinese version of the western government “cabinet”, notes of stadium diplo-
macy that comes with “equality, mutual beneft and no strings attached”.
Historically, most of China’s stadium construction occurred in Africa. Fifty-
eight out of eighty-four stadiums built abroad were in Africa, while eight were
constructed across the Pacifc and nine in Latin America (Menary, 2015). In terms
of the topic of this chapter, PINs have greatly benefted China’s stadium diplo-
macy. Kiribati (Betio Sports Complex), Papua New Guinea (Wewak Stadium),
and the Cook Islands (Telecom Sports Arena) are all good examples of stadiums
built on Chinese aid or fnancing. In 2003, Fiji also benefted from a package of
USD 16 million to stage the South Pacifc Games (PATARA, 2007).
More recently, China’s activities with the Solomon Islands provide a fas-
cinating case study of how its stadium diplomacy has become more strategic,
political, and robust. In 2009, and after a period of intense Chinese lobbying,
The Solomon Islands switched their diplomatic allegiance from Taiwan to the
People’s Republic of China (Shi, 2019). Since then, China and the Solomon
Islands have secured security, economic, and diplomatic agreements; however, it
is their recent sports diplomacy that is causing concern for western nations such
as Australia.
266 Stuart Murray and Tony Yang

In 2023, for example, The Solomon Islands will host the Pacifc Games 2023,
and China is lending a hand to build facilities. A total of 170 Chinese engi-
neers are involved in the construction of aquatic centre, tennis centre, commu-
nal food and beverage centre, multifunctional hall, and hockey feld (Chinese
Government, 2022). China is investing USD 70 million in the Games, an amount
facilitated by the state-owned enterprise China Civil Engineering Construction
Corporation Ltd (Courmont & Delhalle, 2022). While visiting the construc-
tion site recently, the Chinese Ambassador Li Ming proudly noted to Manasseh
Sogavare, the Solomon Island’s Prime Minister, that “China keeps the promise
to start the project on time despite the pandemic; the project commencement
marks a milestone for our relations” (MFA, 2022).
However, China’s activity in the Pacifc has worried Australia. “This is our
backyard, not China’s”, argued a columnist in The Australian newspaper (2021).
Sharma (2022) went a step further, using the Cuban Missile Crisis to metaphori-
cally describe China’s client-state autocracy around Australia’s backyard, with
the Solomon Islands being the number one proxy. Sport is but another tool
of Chinese propaganda sweeping through the region. Chinese fags, develop-
ers’ logos, and bilateral friendship signs are all visible around venues. Chinese
sports diplomacy, therefore, intentionally amplifes “national culture and values
to overseas audiences and governments” (Murray & Price, 2020, p. 9).
Besides stadiums, China employs three other sports diplomacy approaches
in the Pacifc. First, they invite sports teams to visit China. Chinese delegates
invited “football professionals from Guadalcanal to visit Guangdong” and enjoy
world-class training facilities (MFA, 2021, para. 5). Second, China sponsors
sports events in the Pacifc. Samoa enjoyed such treatment when China spon-
sored World Nines Confederation Cup 2020, an International Rugby League–
sanctioned tournament (World Nines, 2020). Third, China establishes training
academies for PINs. In 2018, for example, the China Table Tennis College
Training Centre was established in Papua New Guinea (FMPRC, 2022; ITTF
Oceania, 2022).
There are many positives to China’s Pacifc sports diplomacy. Building stadi-
ums and other sporting facilities stimulates national and regional economies and
compliments other infrastructure and development requirements. Many PINs are
in desperate need of hospitals, schools, roads, and sports infrastructure can stimu-
late related investments in health, education, and human resources (USIP, 2022).
The Solomon Islands’ project, for example, employs approximately 500 local
staf (Chinese Government, 2022). For China, its sports diplomacy creates infu-
ence that translates to gains in formal diplomacy. Benefciaries of Chinese aid do
switch sides, so to speak (Harding & Pohle-Anderson, 2022). In 2019, for exam-
ple, Kiribati followed the Solomon Islands and recognized Beijing over Taipei.
In terms of issues, western suspicion over the true intention of China’s sports
and stadium diplomacy prevails. China’s generous stadium diplomacy is often
viewed as aggressive acts that undermine the western rules-based international
order. Though Chinese Foreign Minister Wang Yi reiterated otherwise, the
 Sports Diplomacy in the Pacific Region 267

USA and its allies see any Chinese presence in the region as a threat and often
respond with military exercise between First and Second Island Chains (Beijing
Daily, 2022; Al Jazeera, 2022). Second, China’s largesse can create economic
pressure for PINs, particularly if China withdraws funding or requests repay-
ment on the loans. The West calls this practice “debt-trap diplomacy” (Hameiri,
2020). Also, “fealty is expected” in return for China’s generosity (Murray, 2018).
As with western nations and their diplomacy, nothing is ever given for free in
international relations.

Conclusion
When commentators, politicians, and others use phrases like “the New Cold
War”, “battles for hearts and minds”, and the “weaponization of sport” to
describe East–West strategic competition, they miss the bigger, twenty-frst-
century picture. Both the new theory and practice of sports diplomacy encour-
age the observer to step beyond such dated thinking. China, the USA, and their
allies are not locked in battle towards some inevitable nuclear war, where to
win would be to abuse sport in the way that, say, the East Germany (German
Democratic Republic, GDR) did in the 1980s.
Genuine, win-win games for hearts, minds, and bodies is a more suitable
dictum for sports diplomacy in the Pacifc. Such “games” should generate
win-win outcomes, for all concerned, and directly contribute to building the
“International Society of Sport” (Murray, 2018, pp. 135–137). States being states,
China, Australia, and others will inevitably compete but so long as the competi-
tion does not turn violent, this is a good outcome for the PINs. The choice is
equally good, as savvy Pacifc leaders and diplomats can play rival powers of
to exact maximum diplomatic concessions; that is, they can “do” diplomacy to
eastern and western nations instead of having it always “done” to them. Sport
ofers them the power to do so, for PINs produce some of the fnest athletes on
the planet. Ideally, as well as China and Australia “doing” sports diplomacy to
the Pacifc, it would be benefcial to research what a Fijian, Tongan, or Papua
New Guinea Sports Diplomacy strategy might look like.
When it comes to the Pacifc region, sports diplomats from both countries do
need to “shut up and listen”. The Pacifc is not a monolith. Every one of the ff-
teen countries that make up the “Pacifc Islands” has diferent cultures, histories,
philosophies, and so on. They do not speak with one voice and often disagree.
Each needs to be engaged and treated as a unique sovereign nation that forms
part of a region with limited diplomatic representation, skills, and budget. If
engaging in sports diplomacy in the region, it is also important to move beyond
“Big” popular team sports. Hard as it may be to believe, not everyone in the
Pacifc likes rugby, football, and netball. Individual sports and sportspeople
would produce similar sports diplomacy dividends. The same might be said for
Indigenous, local, or cultural Pacifc sports and tournaments that generate equal
if not more public diplomacy value.
268 Stuart Murray and Tony Yang

When it comes to the Pacifc, and seen from an ideal, sports diplomacy lens, it
is not really that important who can build better stadiums, train better coaches,
or run a better dialogue between diplomats on the sidelines. In short, and in the
tumultuous twenty-frst century, the more people playing sport and doing diplo-
macy, the less people being idle and doing war.

Note
1 It should be noted that the New Zealand Government also assists a team – the Moana
Pasifka – which, similarly, was based out of New Zealand and played in the 2021–
2022 Super Rugby Pacifc Competition.

Bibliography
Al Jazeera. (2022). US aircraft carrier Ronald Reagan arrives for South Korea drills.
Al Jazeera. https://www.aljazeera.com/news/2022/9/23/us-aircraft-carrier-ronald
-reagan-arrives-for-south-korea-drills
Auslin, M. R. (2020). Asia’s new geopolitics: Essays on reshaping the Indo-Pacifc (Vol. no.
706). Hoover Institution Press, Stanford, California.
Ministry of Foreign Afairs of the People's Republic of China. (2022). Wang Yi Attends
and Addresses the General Debate of the 77th Session of the United Nations General
Assembly.Ministry of Foreign Afairs. https://www.fmprc.gov.cn/mfa_eng/wjdt
_665385/wshd_665389/202209/t20220927_10772443.html
Bergin, A. (2021). This is our backyard, not China’s. The Australian. https://www
.theaustralian.com.au/inquirer/this-is-our-backyard-not-chinas/news-story/284
1ced94a3b08401c092a19ae02a414
Besnier, N. (2014). Pacifc Island rugby: Histories, mobilities, comparisons. Asia Pacifc
Journal of Sport and Social Science, 3(3), pp. 268–276. http://doi.org/10.1080/21640599
.2014.982894
Chinese Embassy in the Solomon Islands. (2022). Zhang Guangbao, leader of China police
liaison team to Solomon Islands interviewed by the Solomon star. http://sb.china-embassy
.gov.cn/eng/sgxw_3/202203/t20220304_10647941.htm
Chinese Government. (2022). China-aided projects help the Solomon Islands to organize the
hosting of the Pacifc Games 2023. The Central People’s Government of the People's
Republic of China. http://www.gov.cn/xinwen/2022-05/26/content_5692444
.htm
Courmont, B., & Delhalle, H. (2022). A China’s Soft Power in The Pacifc: The Example of
the Solomon Islands.
DFAT. (2019). Sports diplomacy 2030. Australian Government. https://www.dfat.gov.au/
sites/default/fles/sports-diplomacy-2030.pdf
Dubinsky, I. (2021). China’s stadium diplomacy in Africa. Journal of Global Sport
Management, pp. 1–19. https://doi.org/10.1080/24704067.2021.1885101
FMPRC. (2022). Fact sheet: Cooperation between China and Pacifc Island countries. Ministry
of Foreign Afairs, the People's Republic of China. https://www.fmprc.gov.cn/mfa
_eng/wjdt_665385/2649_665393/202205/t20220524_10691917.html
Gibert, A. (2022). Resetting Australia’s relationship with the Pacifc – Three ideas. The
Interpreter. https://www.lowyinstitute.org/the-interpreter/resetting-australia-s
-relationship-pacifc-three-ideas
 Sports Diplomacy in the Pacific Region 269

Hameiri, S. (2020). Debunking the myth of China’s “debt-trap diplomacy”. Lowy Institute.
https://www.lowyinstitute.org/the-interpreter/debunking-myth-china-s-debt-trap
-diplomacy
Harding, B., & Pohle-Anderson, C. (2022). China’s search for a permanent military presence
in the Pacifc islands: After the Solomon Islands signed a security pact with Beijing in April,
Kiribati may be considering a similar deal. The United States Institute of Peace (USIP).
https://www.usip.org/publications/2022/07/chinas-search-permanent-military
-presence-pacifc-islands
Information Ofce of the State Council. (2011). China’s foreign aid. Information Ofce of
the State Council, People’s Republic of China. http://www.unicef.org
ITTF Oceania. (2022). Papua New Guinea Opens China Table Tennis College Training Center
at Butuka Academy. ITTF Oceania. https://ittfoceania.azurewebsites.net/2022/04/14
/papua-new-guinea-opens-china-table-tennis-college-training-center-at-butuka
-academy/
Keech, M., & Houlihan, B. (1999). Sport and the end of apartheid. Round Table (London),
88(349), pp. 109–121. https://doi.org/10.1080/003585399108306
Leary, S. (2021). Stepping up sports diplomacy in the Pacifc: An Australian perspective. USC
Center on Public Diplomacy. https://uscpublicdiplomacy.org/blog/stepping-sports
-diplomacy-pacifc-australian-perspective
Menary, S. (2015). China’s programme of stadium diplomacy. ICSS Journal, 3(3), pp.
2–9.
MFA. (2021). Li Ming, the Chinese Ambassador to the Solomon Islands, attended an online
conference for the China – Solomon Islands football exchange program. https://www.mfa
.gov.cn/web/gjhdq_676201/gj_676203/yz_676205/1206_676860/1206x2_676880
/202110/t20211012_9546812.shtml
MFA. (2022a). Li Ming, the Chinese Ambassador to the Solomon Islands, published “Provocation
against China’s sovereignty and territorial integrity is doomed to fail”. https://www.fmprc
.gov.cn/gytwwtdlc/zwgzs/202208/t20220806_10736356.shtml
MFA. (2022b). Li Ming, the Chinese Ambassador to the Solomon Islands, introduced China –
Solomon Islands relations and bilateral security cooperation. https://www.mfa.gov.cn/zwbd
_673032/wjzs/202204/t20220422_10672061.shtml
MFA. (2022c). Prime Minister Manasseh Sogavare, accompanied by Chinese Ambassador Li
Ming, inspected the China-aided stadium and university dormitory. https://www.fmprc.gov
.cn/zwbd_673032/wshd_673034/202208/t20220801_10731326.shtml
Murray, S. (2017). Sports diplomacy in the Australian context: Theory into strategy.
Politics & Policy, 45(5), pp. 841–861. https://doi.org/10.1111/polp.12218
Murray, S. (2018). Sports diplomacy: Origins, theory and practice. Abingdon: Routledge.
Murray, S., & Price, G. (2020). Towards a Welsh sports diplomacy strategy. British Council
Wales. https://wales.britishcouncil.org/sites/default/fles/towards_a_welsh_sports
_diplomacy_strategy_0.pdf
PacifcAus. (2019). PacifcAus sports. https://www.pacifcaussports.gov.au
PATARA. (2007). PATARA sponsors South Pacifc Games 2003 and provides Information
& Communications Technology for a “Smart Games”. PATARA Communications &
Electronics Limited. https://web.archive.org/web/20120804044326/http://www
.patarapacifc.com/spg2003
Ravenhill, J., Aggarwal, V., Evans, P. M., & Kerr, P. (2019). Pacifc cooperation: Building
economic and security regimes in the Asia-Pacifc region. Routledge. https://doi.org/10.4324
/9780429300844
Sharma, D. (2022). Beijing-backed autocracy in our backyard with “Cuba in the Pacifc”. The
Australian. https://www.theaustralian.com.au/inquirer/beijingbacked-autocracy
270 Stuart Murray and Tony Yang

-in-our-backyard-with-cuba-in-the-pacifc/news-story/85382be1f9b1038e058c076
9e02a5230
Shi, X. (2019). The Solomon Islands cabinet held a meeting and decided to sever the diplomatic
relations with Taiwan. Central News Agency. https://www.cna.com.tw/news/frstnews
/201909165005.aspx
Shirk, S. L. (2018). The return to personalistic rule. Journal of Democracy, 29(2), pp. 22–36.
https://doi.org/10.1353/jod.2018.0022
Sornoza-Parrales, G. I., Conforme-Cedeno, G. M., Saltos-Buri, V. del R., Merchán-
Nieto, L. C., Muñíz-Jaime, L. P., & Franco-Yoza, J. A. (2018). The case of China’s
Economic Reform: The Xi Jinping Era, a comparative analysis with Mao Zedong and
Deng Xiaoping. Polo Del Conocimiento, 3(7), pp. 38–52. https://doi.org/10.23857/pc
.v3i7.528
The Embassy of the People's Republic of China in Solomon Islands. (2022). Prime Minister
Manasseh Sogavare, accompanied by Chinese Ambassador Li Ming, inspected the China-aided
stadium and university dormitory. http://sb.china-embassy.gov.cn/chn/sgxw/202206/
t20220624_10709209.htm
Thompson, D. (2020). The rise of Xi Jinping and China’s new era: Implications for the
United States and Taiwan. Issues and Studies – Institute of International Relations, 56(1),
pp. 2040004–2040025. http://doi.org/10.1142/S1013251120400044
Tow, W. T. (2016). New approaches to human security in the Asia-Pacifc: China, Japan and
Australia. Routledge.
USIP. (2022a). China’s infuence on the freely associated states of the Northern Pacifc. The
United States Institute of Peace (USIP) China-Freely Associated States Senior
Study Group. https://www.usip.org/publications/2022/09/chinas-infuence-freely
-associated-states-northern-pacifc
USIP. (2022b). China’s infuence on the freely associated states of the Northern Pacifc. The
United States Institute of Peace (USIP) Senior Study Group Report. https://www
.usip.org/sites/default/fles/2022-09/ssg-china-infuence-on-freely-associated-states
-of-northern_pacifc.pdf
Will, R. (2012). China’s stadium diplomacy. World Policy Journal, 29(2), pp. 36–43.
https://doi.org/10.1177/0740277512451487
World Nines. (2020). A new international rugby league tournament is coming (Provisional date to
be confrmed in accordance with Covid 19 developments). World Nines. https://worldnines
.com
Zhao, M. (2019). Is a new cold war inevitable? Chinese perspectives on US-China
strategic competition. The Chinese Journal of International Politics, 12(3), pp. 371–394.
https://doi.org/10.1093/cjip/poz010
32
SPORTS, RACE, AND
COSMOPOLITANISM
J.P. Singh1

In July 2021, Italy defeated England to win the European Soccer Championship.
Fans across the European Union cheered the underdogs Italy, which scored its
frst win at the European championship since 1968. While Italy’s win against
England, post-Brexit, subtly represented European Union pride, the English
team was more diverse: a photograph from the Museum of Migration showed
that only 3 of the starting 11 players did not have an immigrant parent or grand-
parent. The English team exuded enthusiasm among England’s minorities. Both
sides of the story here reveal rising beyond parochialism: minority populations in
England cheered for a sport that is often associated with England’s white work-
ing class, and continental Europeans overlooked their own national identities to
cheer for the Italian team. Nevertheless, as this chapter shows this ideal version
of sports and cosmopolitanism is problematic and untenable, especially when it
comes to questions of race and racism.
The cosmopolitanism often associated with sporting events arises out of lib-
eral thought: successive interactions lead to people getting to know each other
and overcoming their prejudices (Deutsch 2015, Norris et al. 2009). A sporting
event, easily understood among the viewers through its shared rules and under-
standings, therefore, embodies the possibilities of cosmopolitanism. The socially
integrative role of sports is often acknowledged (Alkemeyer & Bröskamp 1996),
and in the United States most star athletes are African-Americans (Anderson
1995). The celebrations around megaevents such as the Olympics or the Football
World Cup, despite displays of nationalism, can be viewed from the perspective
of cosmopolitan thought. The best person or team wins, and “sportsmanship”
entails that all players respect each other and the results.
Despite international and multicultural sports teams and events, cosmopolitan-
ism can be quite thin, and racism is quite culturally entrenched in sports. British
soccer fans are frequently racist: for example, 83 per cent of the 2500 anonymous

DOI: 10.4324/9781003348238-39
272 J.P. Singh

responses in a 2011–2012 survey noted that racism was “culturally embedded”

in British soccer and 67 per cent of the respondents had personally witnessed it
(Cleland & Cashmore 2016). Despite the professed multiculturalism of British
soccer teams, black players sufer subtle or overt discrimination through their
position assignments and are often stereotyped (Maguire 1988). The minori-
ties that cheered the English soccer team in 2021 were, therefore, more of an
exception to its fandom than the rule. Similarly, Northern Europeans cheering
on a Mediterranean country is not a regular practice. Racial divisions also work
within the same team. The Economist tweeted the following after the Euro Cup:
“The most striking aspect of Italy’s 26-man squad before it took to the pitch was
that, alone among the main contenders, it did not include a single player consid-
ered as being of colour” (The Economist 2021). The tweet was itself critiqued for
racism, with Italians pointing out that they were once treated as people of colour.
The story of race and cosmopolitanism in sports is complicated, but this chap-
ter argues that racism is especially noticeable and controversial in times of rapid
cultural change. Eighteen African-Americans players accounted for 14 of the
56 medals the United States won at the 1936 Berlin Olympics (Wang 2016).
Athlete Jesse Owens’ four gold medals are often heralded in history as the perfect
riposte to what has been called “the Nazi Olympics”. History repeated itself dur-
ing the Trump Presidency when American football players “took to the knee”
while the national anthem was played as a form of protest against discrimination
at the height of the Black Lives Matter (BLM) movement. Trump supporters
labelled the players unpatriotic and directed racist vitriol towards them.
Sports comprise a set of cultural rituals that are well understood among prac-
titioners, both fans and players, through times of stability. To understand racism
in sports, a study of the cultures of sports with a racial lens is necessary. While
sports are cultural events, they perform double duty in culture: not just as sym-
bolic representations (like art) but also being deeply embedded in ways of life.
Cultures are often understood as a repertoire of options or a toolkit (Swidler
1986, Kymlicka 1995). Sociologist Anne Swidler (1986) notes that cultures pre-
sent “diverse often conficting symbols, rituals, stories, and guides to action” that
are mobilized through times of cultural stability and change (p. 277). Simplifying
cultural ideologies that present binary or divisive choices often manifest them-
selves through instability. Rather than understand the context of the athletes
taking the knee, a simplifying ideology might suggest that they are ungrateful
and unpatriotic.
Arguably, sports may even present a case of cultural stasis rather than change,
especially in matters of race. Sports are often cast as refective of society’s underly-
ing values than changing them. Following Geertz (1973), culture is about public
meanings of values and traits that are held among groups of people. Socialization
processes embed these public meanings through everyday language (Berger &
Luckmann 1966). Further, culture is the “social unconscious” (Eagleton 2016)
that represents sedimented traditions passed on through intergenerational trans-
fer as a form of “social lineage” (Patten 2011).
 Sports, Race, and Cosmopolitanism 273

Understanding culture then means tracing the lineage and traditions depos-
ited deep within the unconscious. The public meanings of culture can reveal
deep histories and private reservations. Catalans associated Real Madrid with the
Franco regime in the past and Spanish nationalism at present. One of the most
bitter rivalries in football is, therefore, between Real Madrid and FC Barcelona,
popularly known as Barça. The most American of all sports are baseball and
American football. Those who do not follow long-standing rituals set themselves
up for scorn, even when the ritual being questioned is society’s racism.
Racism in sports can take especially virulent forms because deviations from
ascribed roles are interpreted as deviations from culture’s symbolic and everyday
life aspects. Compounding all this are two other dimensions of culture: diference
and power. Culture addresses group identities, but it is also about “othering”.
Even as African-American athletes won at the Berlin Olympics and highlighted
the racist underpinnings of Nazism, racism was rampant in the United States
society with de facto segregation and lynchings in the US South. Racist attitudes
in sports might then mean allowing for a special place for African-Americans or
other minorities in sports but otherwise assigning African-Americans an une-
qual status in society. Racist attitudes in the United States, often abetted through
media, ascribe superior athletic abilities to African-American bodies while per-
ceiving them to be intellectually inferior (Anderson 1995). In other places, such
as racist jaunts and epithets directed at non-white football players in France, their
sports ability itself may play second shrift to deep-seated racism among the fans.
Racism in sports may be widely difused in times of cultural stability.
Therefore, athletes not playing their assigned roles at any time can make fans
angry and upset through unravelling the racist codes underlying fandom. During
times of cultural instability, this can lead to boycotts and threats of violence as
was the case during the BLM protest with athletes taking the knee. For per-
spective, consider cultural representations (or symbols) where socially ascribed
roles may be questioned: theatre is one such space. Judith Butler (1990) notes
that since gender is socially constructed and performed with cues, drag queens
through their performances can unravel the meanings of what it means to be
feminine. One can then understand, even if in the most troubling of ways, how
an African-American athlete who, unlike a drag queen, has not been “author-
ized” to unravel the social meanings of race is then reviled by racist white fans.
Cultural meanings are often backed with powerful institutions. Spectacle
sports are especially important for the powerful institutions that back them:
national governments, big business, media, and star-studded personalities. The
co-editors of this volume have called this the geo-political economy of sport.
This chapter provides the racialized underpinnings of this political economy. If
racist meanings have been well-ascribed and understood within sports spaces,
then questioning them openly may not lead to empathy, understanding, or
acceptance. President Trump’s frequent lashing out at African-American athletes
who did not stand up for the national anthem is an example of the institutional
context.
274 J.P. Singh

By the same token, given that sports as spectacle draws great crowds and
attention, questioning racism at these events can also carry double value: it can
appeal to fans who are already questioning racism, or it can present an alternative
perspective to those who are not doing so – especially at a level that is hard to
ignore – from athletes that they may admire. The symbolic power of sports and
star athletes is important here, but in the opposite direction from the cultural
forces of the status quo. The suggestion here is not that athletes are perfectly
poised for questioning racism in society but that their ability to do so must also
be acknowledged. It is for this reason that the presence of 18 African-American
athletes was a powerful symbol at the 1936 Berlin Olympics. African-American
athletes who “broke the colour barrier” are remembered and admired for their
ability to do so. These include Jackie Robinson’s entry into major league baseball
in 1947 after 60 years of segregation (the frst African-Americans in major league
baseball date back to 1879). The reaction of minority fans about the immigrant
lineages of the English football team at Euro Cup 2021 must be seen in similar
ways.
Sports teams and their backers can also respond powerfully to the underly-
ing progressive trends in society. An example is the renaming of many pro-
fessional teams in the United States recently. Washington Redskins became
the Washington Football Team in 2020 after pressures from activists, and
in 2021 Cleveland Indians became the Cleveland Guardians. In 2020, the
National Basketball Association took a strong stance on racial justice without
harming its ratings. In June 2020, a Pew Research Poll showed that 67 per
cent of the Americans supported the Black Lives Matter movement. National
Football League (NFL) quarterback Colin Kaepernick, the frst athlete to take
the knee in 2016, was “fred” though technically he was told his contract
would not be renewed. He opted out of doing so and was blackballed out of
NFL. Kaepernick went on to be featured in anti-hate campaigns for Nike.
Other businesses joined similar campaigns later with minority athletes (Ivry
2020).
This chapter has emphasized the cultural importance of sports for analyzing
racism: sports are symbolic forms that speak to ways of life. Although question-
ing entrenched racist ways of life is not easy, the chapter suggests that athletes as
symbols can make a diference. Markovits and Rensmann (2010) reach a similar
conclusion about the potential of sports for globalization: they are refective of
globalization, but sports also deepen it. Millward (2011) notes that English foot-
ball fans can simultaneously exhibit “thin cosmopolitanism”, “mild xenophobia”,
and “cultural racism”. For Millward, cosmopolitanism and racism/xenophobia
are not in binary opposition to each other. Fans can, for example, accept and
promote non-British members on their teams while expressing xenophobic
views towards the country of the athletes’ origin. Despite these mixed views, the
consensus seems to be that sports literatures have often overlooked racism and
domination in sports in favour of speaking to multicultural sports teams: “such
 Sports, Race, and Cosmopolitanism 275

accounts tend to overlook the broader issues of power and domination in society,
but at a more concrete level, they tend to ignore changes that have or have not
taken place at the level of organizational control” ( Jarvie 2003, 2).
Racism and cosmopolitanism are both socially understood, and each is “per-
formed” as a ritual within groups who understand its meanings. Some of the
most powerful and inspiring stories in sports are those that have questioned both
the endurance of racism and the artifciality of cosmopolitanism.

Note
1 My thanks to the editors of this volume for helpful comments. Discussions with my
colleague Antonios Anastasopoulos also improved this chapter.

References
Alkemeyer, T. & Bröskamp, B. (1996), ‘Strangerhood and racism in sports’, Sport Science
Review 5(2), 30–52.
Anderson, P. M. (1995), ‘Racism in sports: A question of ethics’, Marq. Sports LJ 6, 357.
Berger, P. L. & Luckmann, T. (1966), The social construction of reality: A treatise in the
sociology of knowledge, Doubleday, New York, NY.
Butler, J. (1990), Gender trouble: Feminism and the subversion of identity, Routledge, London.
Cleland, J. & Cashmore, E. (2016), ‘Football fans’ views of racism in British football’,
International Review for the Sociology of Sport 51(1), 27–43.
Deutsch, K. W. (2015), Political community and the North American area, Princetorn,
Princeton University Press.
Eagleton, T. (2016), Culture, New Haven, Yale University Press.
Geertz, C. (1973), The interpretation of cultures, Basic books, New York, NY.
Ivry, B. (2020), ‘Taking a knee, once career poison, now seen as good for business’,Bloomberg
News, 2 September. Available at https://www.bloomberg.com/news/features/2020
-09-02/taking-a-knee-once- career-poison-now-seen-as-good-for-business.
Jarvie, G. (2003), Sport, racism and ethnicity, London, Routledge.
Kymlicka, W. (1995), Multicultural citizenship: A liberal theory of minority rights, Oxford
political theory, Oxford University Press, New York.
Maguire, J. A. (1988), ‘Race and position assignment in English soccer: A preliminary
analysis of ethnicity and sport in Britain’, Sociology of Sport Journal 5(3): 257–269.
Markovits, A. S. & Rensmann, L. (2010), Gaming the world: How sports are reshaping global
politics and culture, Princeton, Princeton University Press.
Millward, P. (2011), The limits to cosmopolitanism’: English football fans at Euro 2008,
in D. Burdsey, ed., Race, ethnicity and football: Persisting debates and emergent issues,
Routledge, pp. 163–174.
Norris, P., Inglehart, R., et al. (2009), Cosmopolitan communications: Cultural diversity in a
globalized world, Cambridge University Press, Cambridge.
Patten, A. (2011), ‘Rethinking culture: The social lineage account’, American Political
Science Review 105(4), 735–749.
Swidler, A. (1986), ‘Culture in action: Symbols and strategies’,American Sociological Review
51(2), 273–286.
The Economist (2021), ‘Twitter post’. 13 July. https://tinyurl.com/4ezym64d.
276 J.P. Singh

Wang, H. L. (2016), ‘Black U.S. Olympians won in Nazi Germany only to be overlooked
at home’, National Public Radio. Available at: https://www.npr.org/sections/thetorch
/2016/08/13/489773389/black-u-s-olympians-won-in-nazi-germany-only-to-be
-overlooked-at-home.
33
TRANSGENDER SPORT BANS
COME FOR ELITE SPORT
Federations’ New Attempt to
Defne Womanhood

Sydney Bauer

A revolution is coming in the current sports landscape spearheaded by the

International Swimming Federation (FINA). According to a majority of coun-
tries that make up the international federation, sport will no longer be con-
strained by the current system of classifcation of dividing sport into “male” and
“female” categories. Instead, in international FINA events the federation will
ofer an “open” category for transgender and intersex athletes that do not meet
their new, strict policy to compete in the “men’s” and “women’s” categories.
Thus, the federation has determined it is allowed to legally defne which classes
of athletes, based on the puberty that have gone through at a young age, and
those with gender-diverse identities or intersex characteristics should be aforded
their own category to preserve the fairness of competition.
What exactly is the dividing line for transgender and intersex athletes from
their cisgender counterparts? Puberty. FINA defnes specifc stages in a pre-
adolescent’s development known as the “Tanner Stages” as to when athletes’
gender is solidifed for the purpose of competition. The federation noted that
competition is diferent from the legal frameworks countries around the world
set for defning gender – likely at the behest of its human rights group that
helped draft the policy – and that given the federation’s mandate of sanctioning
international competitions, it was within its legal rights to do so. Yet, the poli-
cies for transmasculine and transfeminine athletes vary wildly. Transmasculine
athletes are allowed to compete in the “men’s” category even if they have begun
hormone replacement therapy with testosterone at any time, solely if they are
after to be granted a Therapeutic Use Exemption (TUE) for the banned sub-
stance. Should transfeminine or 46XY DSD intersex athletes want to be granted
licence to compete in the “women’s” category, they need to prove to an inde-
pendent expert that they began suppressing “male puberty” before Tanner Stage
2 – or before the age of 12 – and are able to suppress their testosterone limits to

DOI: 10.4324/9781003348238-40
278 Sydney Bauer

below 2.5 nmol/L continuously from that point. Anyone unable to satisfy these
requirements will be allowed to compete in the “open” category should they
decide not to compete in the category that matches which puberty they under-
went, according to the federation.
Details about what this new “open” category should encompass and how it
will work in international competition at FINA-sanctioned events were not
forthcoming at the time of the vote. FINA (2022) in its announcement of the
policy said that it would allow a working group six months to iron out these
details and set up the category.
However, despite the lack of framework for its new category, FINA (2022)
in the explicit policy released did ofer a robust method of enforcement for ath-
letes that seek to participate under its current “men’s” and “women’s” categories.
Transgender or intersex athletes seeking to compete in categories that match
their gender identity are required by FINA to be signed of by an independent
expert that determines if their medical history meets the requirements for FINA’s
“men’s” or “women’s” eligibility. Yet the federation says it “may monitor an
athlete’s ongoing compliance with the Eligibility Conditions by any appropriate
means”, including random testing of their testosterone levels for the purpose of
eligibility. Athletes will also be required to submit chromosomal tests to FINA
before beginning the eligibility assessment.
FINA’s gender inclusion policy is the frst by an international federation to
be released after the International Olympic Committee (IOC) (2021) changed
course on its gender inclusion framework for the frst time in two decades. As the
Olympic sports’ umbrella body has moved towards a framework that de-empha-
sizes medicalization for gender-diverse bodies, FINA has chosen a diferent tract:
a narrow defnition of an athlete’s sex that is largely immutable without strict,
robust medical intervention for those who are not cisgender. Months before
the IOC released its guideline, World Rugby (2021) had announced that it had
barred transgender women from competing in events sanctioned by the federa-
tion, citing injury risk and other factors. Transgender men are allowed to com-
pete without restriction. At the national level, federations have a bit more leeway,
with countries like the United States’ USA Rugby (2020) allowing transgen-
der women to compete in nationally sanctioned events if they comply with the
old IOC transgender inclusion framework. Other countries have similarly fol-
lowed suit like Rugby Canada (2020), although the International Rugby League,
the largest form of rugby not governed by the international federation, barred
transgender women from competing at the elite level (Reuters 2022), showing
the infuence international federations have on the sports they oversee despite
only sanctioning elite competition.
How the IOC became at odds with how international federations began to
defne the categories is at the heart of the current political tension around the
world regarding the status of rights enumerated to transgender people by national
governments. For its frst decades, the IOC resisted the call to allow women to
participate en masse at the Olympics, before a rival organization the International
 Transgender Sport Bans Come for Elite Sport 279

Women’s Sports Federation (FSFI) organized its own event in the 1920s solely
for women’s athletes (Ripa, 2020). Despite the presence of a handful of women
athletes at the 1900 Games in Paris, it would not be until the 1928 Olympics
in Amsterdam that a women’s competition in athletics was permitted to be
organized. It would take nearly 100 years until the Paris 2024 Olympics when
the Olympics would achieve gender parity according to the IOC’s (2021) own
metrics.
With the increased participation of women in elite sport and the increased
attention on the Olympic Games came the beginnings of policing who deserved
to be on the playing feld in terms of competition. From the 1930s (Heggie,
2010), until before the Sydney 2000 Olympics (Brooks, 2000), the IOC required
female athletes to submit themselves to gender verifcation tests to prove they
deserved to compete in women’s categories. At frst, like that of Sprinter Stephens
at the 1936 Olympics documented by TIME magazine, many of the charges of
athletes competing under the wrong sex were charged by the media and fellow
athletes. In this, the lines between male and female athletes were more blurred,
with coaches noting in another TIME article from the Berlin Games that it was
not uncommon for female athletes to undergo sex changes and begin living life
as men. Standardized sex testing did not become the norm in the Olympics until
the 1960s, (Heggie, 2010), as the Cold War heated up with the rise of athletes
from the USSR and the GDR.
At the 1968 Winter and Summer Olympics, the IOC began using what was
known as the Barr Body Test (Ritchie, Reynard, & Lewis, 2008), to determine
if an athlete had XX or XY chromosomes. The test searches for a body in the
cell’s nucleus found when there is an inactive X chromosome – thus theoretically
determining the presence of XX chromosomes in the body. However, such tests
easily pick up women with “complete androgen insensitivity syndrome”, mean-
ing the presence of XY chromosomes despite external sex organs of women and
determining that men with Klinefelter’s syndrome – possessing XXY chromo-
somes – can compete as women having possessed the inactive X chromosome
(Ritchie, Reynard, & Lewis, 2008). Following the outcry of Spanish sprinter
Maria Martinez-Patino, the inefective Barr Body Test was phased out by the
IOC in the 1990s for another test, “which identifes a specifc region of code
usually found on the Y chromosome and known as the ‘sex determining region
Y’” (Heggie, 2010). By 2000 this test and all sex testing had gone by the wayside
amid continual athlete outcry.
After abolishing sex testing, the IOC began broadening its inclusion by ofer-
ing a formalized pathway for transgender and gender-diverse athletes to compete
in the Olympics. In 2003 its “Stockholm Consensus” (IOC, 2004) created a
pathway for athletes who have medically undergone gender confrmation sur-
gery to compete in the Olympics. Those guidelines would be challenged on
human rights grounds by cyclist Kristen Worley from Canada (Brown, 2015),
leading to a new consensus statement in 2015 from the IOC that pushed for med-
icalizing athletes in an efort to broaden inclusion in sports. This policy would
280 Sydney Bauer

stay in force for six years, as federations began once again working to claw back
control of defning who is allowed to compete in its categories, before the advent
of the IOC’s 2021 “framework”. This new policy was designed to cede control
back to the federations but create an overarching standard taking into account
human rights concerns. Ultimately, the framework says that it was designed
to respect the current elite sport landscape that is organized into “men’s” and
“women’s” categories and is “aimed at ensuring that competition in each of these
categories is fair and safe, and that athletes are not excluded solely on the basis
of their transgender identity or sex variations”. In the nearly 20 years of hav-
ing a transgender inclusion policy, only one transgender athlete – a transgender
woman named Laurel Hubbard – has competed in the Olympic Games.
The IOC’s 2021 framework can be interpreted as both a reaction to the human
rights concerns of medicalizing athletes to force them to conform to certain ath-
letic categories and the ongoing fght the World Athletes had been fghting over
the eligibility of certain female athletes in its middle-distance events. World
Athletics has had a long history of sex testing, being the frst federation to call
for sex tests in 1950 (Dillema, 2008), and being the frst federation to ban such
testing in 1992 (Simpson, Ljungqvist, de la Chapelle, et al, 1993), seven years
before the IOC followed suit. Yet, in 2009 when an 18-year-old South African
named Caster Semenya stormed to a world championship in Berlin at the 800 m
distance, World Athletics said a gender verifcation test was necessary because she
had only begun winning races at the elite level “in the last month” according to
reports at the time (Clarey, 2009). The tests were determined to be necessary in
what was deemed an unprecedented situation, with even her fellow fnalist Elisa
Cusma of Italy telling The New York Times, “For me, she’s not a woman. She’s a
man”.
Two years later, World Athletics introduced a testosterone limit on female
athletes in certain distances, with ofcials arguing that naturally occurring high
levels of testosterone – outside of conditions such as polycystic ovary syndrome –
are the main drivers of performance in track and feld (Marchant, 2011). Instead
of using internal or external genitalia as a determining factor of who is eligible to
compete in “women’s” categories in sport, World Athletics took it a step further
to say that, in order to keep the two classifcations intact for sport, limits must
be placed on some athletes to give all others a fair shot. Even with the new rules
in place, Semenya competed in the 2012 Summer Olympics winning a silver
medal – which was upgraded to gold as the winner was found to be part of the
systemic Russian state-sponsored doping scheme. Two years later Indian runner
Dutee Chand suddenly found herself withdrawn from the 2014 Commonwealth
Games due to high natural levels of testosterone, to which she challenged World
Athletics’ rules at the Court of Arbitration for Sport (Mancur, 2014).
In 2015 CAS ruled that World Athletics had arbitrarily set its limits for natural
testosterone and had two years to show evidence for its 2011 policy (Court of
Arbitration for Sport, 2015). This interregnum meant that Semenya was cleared
to compete without restriction in the 2016 Olympics, where she won a gold
 Transgender Sport Bans Come for Elite Sport 281

medal, her second Olympic gold. The next year she went on to win another
World Championships in the 800 m in London. Eventually, the World Athletics
(2018) passed a policy requiring athletes seeking to compete in the women’s
category for middle-distance races – 400 m, 800 m, and 1500 m – must show
a natural level of testosterone below 5nmol/L continuously in order to race.
Media response focused on the policy as a reaction to Semenya’s dominance in
the 800 m, but she was far from the only athlete caught in the policy’s cross-
fre. Semenya was forced to stop running her signature race and was unable to
qualify for the Tokyo 2020 Olympics in the 200 m, but two Namibian runners
Christine Mboma and Beatrice Masilingi were barred from competing in the
women’s 400 m due to the policy. After the Games, Masilingi told Burke (2021)
the experience was “hard to understand” and described the emotional toll of
having to change her entire training routine weeks before the Olympics for a
diferent event.
Disproportionately athletes from the Global South have been afected by the
World Athletics bans according to Katrina Karkazis and Rebecca Young-Jordan,
who argue in a 2018 paper, World Athletics has recognized this and has its own
views about why this has happened.

According to Bermon, women from Africa and Asia are “arriving” at

the highest level because of unfair advantage owing to not having been
“treated.” The repetition of the word “bias” and the explicit reference to
cheating indicates that their very presence in competition is unfair.
(Karkazis and Young-Jordan, 2018)

World Athletics’ use of natural testosterone when determining eligibility is not

the only federation policy that could be said to be prioritizing body standards
of the Global North in order to defne athletes. In FINA’s transgender policy, it
specifcally cites the Tanner Scale as the method for determining when an athlete
reaches a part of male puberty that necessitates them to compete in the “open”
category or “male” category despite legally being a transgender woman. The
Tanner Scale was developed from one longitudinal study of English children
from the 1940s to 1970s and has since become the global standard for puberty
milestones. However, the study did not examine how many confounding vari-
ables such as the psychological state of children led to their development, as well
as their overall health and nutrition (Roberts, 2016). Applying such a scale to the
growth and development of gender-diverse and intersex athletes for their hypo-
thetical future athletic competition could have stark implications for athletes all
over the world.
The IOC does not have the power to compel federations to make certain
decisions under its new transgender framework; however, an Associated Press
article (2022) did note that it encouraged bodies to move away from using tes-
tosterone as a marker for athletic performance. Yet, FINA, World Athletics,
and World Rugby have forged ahead with these inclusion policies. This comes
282 Sydney Bauer

at the backdrop while countries like the United States debate whether or not
young transgender girls and boys should have access to sports teams afliated
with schools based on their gender identity or what sex a doctor assigns them
at birth (Kliegman, 2022). With no explicit guidance for federations like its
2015 consensus, each individual sport worldwide will now have to consult its
athlete and scientifc working groups to determine which political defnitions
of people will be allowed to compete in the “men’s” and “women’s” categories.
Those now with “open” categories still are yet to release their plans for how and
where these categories will be administered.
Therein lies the key to the inclusion behind these plans. Sport’s history
with policing sex has ebbed and fowed throughout the history of the Modern
Olympics. Currently, through the guise of athlete health, safety, and opportu-
nity, federations are choosing to double down on certain categories of segre-
gation, inherently protecting its preferred class of athlete. Instead of opening
pathways for all elite athletes by looking at whether its current classifcation
systems are the best way to organize itself, sport has chosen its priorities over
who gets priority and investment. Both World Athletics and World Ruby cited
injuries and damage to potential earnings from broader classes of athletes being
able to compete, protecting cisgender women athletes. Likewise for Aquatics, a
supposed advantage over cisgender women athletes is being remedied by shifting
gender-diverse athletes to a new category. Once again, elite sport continues to
defne who gets the beneft of inclusion and who gets to compete.

References
Associated Press (2022) FINA efectively bans transgender athletes from competing in women’s
swimming events Available at: https://www.usatoday.com/story/sports/olympics
/2022/06/19/f ina-adopts-new-policy-transgender-athletes-swimming -events
/7677611001/
Brooks, J. R. (2000) Gender testing at Olympics abolished at last Available at: https://
www.theglobeandmail.com/sports/gender-testing-at-olympics-abolished-at-last/
article25459571/
Brown, A. (2015) Worley’s case to proceed in Human Rights Tribunal Available at: https://
www.sportsinteg rity initiative.com/worleys-case-to-proceed-in-human-rights
-tribunal/
Burke, P. (2021) Tokyo 2020 silver medalist Mboma admits 400m Olympic ban was “a very bad
experience” Available at: https://www.insidethegames.biz/articles/1113578/mboma
-masilingi-tokyo-2020-400m-ban
Clarey, C. (2009) Gender test after a gold medal fnish Available at: https://www.nytimes
.com/2009/08/20/sports/20runner.html
Court of Arbitration for Sport (2015) Dutee Chand v. Athletics Federation of India (AF) &
The International Association of Athletics Federations (IAAF) Available at: https://web
.archive.org/web/20170704221029/http://www.tas-cas.org/fleadmin/user_upload/
award_internet.pdf (Accessed Sept. 6, 2022)
Dillema, F. (2008) Foekje Dillema Available at: https://web.archive.org/web
/20160422082250/http://www.foekjedillema.nl/ (Accessed Sept. 6, 2022)
 Transgender Sport Bans Come for Elite Sport 283

FINA (2022) FINA announces new policy on gender inclusion Available at: https://www.fna
.org/news/2649715/press-release-fna-announces-new-policy-on-gender-inclusion
FINA (2022) Gender inclusion policy Available at: https://resources.fna.org/fna/document
/2022/06/19/525de003 -51f4 -47d3 -8d5a -716dac5f 77c7/FINA-INCLUSION
-POLICY-AND-APPENDICES-FINAL-.pdf
Heggie, V. (2010) ‘Testing sex and gender in sports; reinventing, reimagining and
reconstructing histories.’ Endeavor, 34(4), pp. 157–163 Available at: https://www
.sciencedirect.com/science/article/pii/S0160932710000670
IOC (2004) IOC approves consensus with regard to athletes who have changed sex Available
at: https://olympics.com/ioc/news/ioc-approves-consensus-with-regard-to-athletes
-who-have-changed-sex#:~:text=The%20consensus%20is%20based%20on,and
%20vice%20versa)%20in%20sport.
IOC (2015) IOC consensus meeting on sex reassignment and hyperandrogenism November
2015 Available at: https://stillmed.olympic.org/Documents/Commissions_PDFfles/
Medical_commission/2015-11_ioc_consensus_meeting_on_sex_reassignment_and
_hyperandrogenism-en.pdf
IOC (2021a) Gender equality through time: At the Olympic games Available at: https://
olympics.com/ioc/gender-equality/gender-equality-through-time/at-the-olympic
-games
IOC (2021b) IOC releases framework on fairness, inclusion and non-discrimination on the basis
of gender identity and sex variations Available at: https://olympics.com/ioc/news/ioc
-releases-framework-on-fairness-inclusion-and-non-discrimination-on-the-basis-of
-gender-identity-and-sex-variations
Karkazis, K., & Jordan-Young, R. (2018). The powers of testosterone: Obscuring
race and regional bias in the regulation of women athletes. Feminist Formations
Available at: https://www.researchgate.net/publication/324756732_The_Powers
_of_Testosterone_Obscuring_Race_and_Regional_Bias_in_the_Regulation_of
_Women_Athletes?showFulltext=1&linkId=5ae097f2a6fdcc91399dbb60
Kliegman, J. (2022) Understanding the diferent rules and policies for transgender athletes
Available at: https://www.si.com/more-sports/2022/07/06/transgender-athletes
-bans-policies-ioc-ncaa
Mancur, J. (2014) Fighting for the body she was born with Available at: https://www.nytimes
.com/2014/10/07/sports/sprinter-dutee-chand-fghts-ban-over-her-testosterone
-level.html
Marchant, J. (2011) ‘Women with high male hormone levels face sport ban.’ Nature.
https://doi.org/10.1038/news.2011.237
Reuters (2022) Rugby league joins clampdown on transgender athletes in women’s sports Available
at: https://www.nbcnews.com/nbc-out/out-news/rugby-league-joins-clampdown
-transgender-athletes-womens-sport-rcna34734
Ripa, Y. (2020). Women and the Olympic games Available at: https://ehne.fr/en/encyclopedia
/themes/gender-and-europe/gendered-body/women-and-olympic-games
Ritchie, R., Reynard, J., & Lewis, T. (2008). ‘Intersex and the Olympic games.’ Journal
of the Royal Society of Medicine, 101(8), 395–399. https://doi.org/10.1258/jrsm.2008
.080086
Roberts, C. (2016) ‘Tanner’s puberty scale: Exploring the historical entanglements of
children, scientifc photography and sex.’ Sexualities, 19(3), pp. 328–346. https://doi
.org/10.1177/1363460715593477.
Rugby Canada (2020) Rugby Canada provides update on feedback posed transgender rules
Available a: https://rugby.ca/en/news/2020/09/rugby-canada-provides-update-on
-feedback-to-proposed-transgender-guidelines
284 Sydney Bauer

Simpson, J. L., Ljungqvist, A., de la Chapelle, A., et al. (1993) ‘Gender verifcation in
competitive sports.’ Sports Medicine, 16, 305–315. https://doi.org/10.2165/00007256
-199316050-00002
TIME (1936a) Olympic games Available at: https://content.time.com/time/subscriber/
article/0,33009,756486-4,00.html
TIME (1936b) Olympic games Available at: https://content.time.com/time/subscriber/
article/0,33009,756542-3,00.html
USA Rugby (2020) Transgender athletes & participants Available at: https://www.usa.rugby
/transgender-policy/
World Athletics (2018) IAAF introduces new eligibility regulations for female classifcation
Available at: https://worldathletics.org/news/press-release/eligibility-regulations-for
-female-classifca
World Rugby (2021) Transgender guidelines Available at: https://www.world.rugby/the
-game/player-welfare/guidelines/transgender
PART VIII

Implications
34
WHAT THE CASES OF GAZPROM,
THE NBA, AND QATAR MEAN FOR
SPORT INDUSTRY DECISION-MAKERS
Simon Chadwick and Paul Widdop

Introduction
Sport at the end of the frst quarter of the twenty-frst century is markedly dif-
ferent to what preceded it, which is posing new and distinctive challenges for
decision-makers in the sector. This chapter highlights some of the key issues
facing them, using a series of case studies to enable this. To begin with, the
chapter profles three ages of contemporary sport, as this helps explain the nature
of the sport industry today. This provides the basis for establishing the impor-
tance of geopolitical economy for sport, of which an overview is provided here.
Thereafter, the chapter uses three case studies to illustrate the relevance of geo-
political economy but also to highlight some of the key issues being posed for
decision-makers in sport.

Three Ages of Contemporary Sport

In the late nineteenth and early twentieth centuries, the development and gov-
ernance of sports were driven by European utilitarian principles (Lanfranchi
and Roach, 2017; Vamplew, 2017). This dictated that sport should provide the
greatest good for the greatest number because it is a public good. Such principles
led to the creation of structures, systems, and organizations that underpinned
a European sporting hegemony, features of which still endure. For instance,
Switzerland remains an important global sports governance hub. By the mid-
twentieth century, the United States had attained prominence in sport that for
the remainder of the century and into the frst decade of the twenty-frst cen-
tury would dominate. US sport is essentially based upon neoclassical economic
principles, which stress the signifcance of money, markets, and individual gain
– sport in these terms is a private good (Bowles, 1991; Henry, 2012). Hence,

DOI: 10.4324/9781003348238-42
288 Simon Chadwick and Paul Widdop

the growth of sponsorship and naming rights, a focus on market expansion and
overseas growth, and the proliferation of broadcasting and media rights are all
synonymous with the neoclassical economic paradigm. Even today, US engage-
ment with and infuence on sport remains strong, evidence of which can be
found in the growing number of the country’s private equity investors acquiring
stakes in European football clubs. Over the last three decades, however, there
have been a series of giga-changes – specifcally globalization (Schulenkorf and
Frawley, 2016), digitalization (Rindfeisch, 2019), and issues of energy and the
environment (McCullough et al., 2020) – that have resulted in changes to and
challenges for both utilitarian and neoclassical notions of sport.
This has necessitated that a new conception of sport is required, which forms
the basis for this book – the geopolitical economy of sport. To begin with, this
chapter revisits some of its salient features, which more importantly set the con-
text for understanding what the geopolitical economy of sport means for indus-
try decision-makers. To assist in this process, three cases are used: UEFA and
Gazprom, the NBA and China, and Qatar and the FIFA World Cup.

Geopolitical Economy of Sport

The geopolitical economy of sport is defned as being the way in which nations,
states, and other entities engage in, with, or through sport for geographic and
politico-economic reasons in order to build and exert power and secure strategic
advantages through the control of resources within and via networks of which
sport is a constituent part (Chadwick, 2022a). This signifes sport as being a geo-
political good, rather than being a public or a private one.
A key feature of geopolitical economy is a role that nations and states intersect
with and utilize (Chadwick and Widdop, 2021). In the case of Gazprom, this is
the Russian government via its ownership of a gas corporation. In engagements
with the NBA, the Chinese government has always played a key role in moderat-
ing and controlling the basketball organization’s commercial activities (Huang,
2013). With Qatar, the way in which the state has engaged in nation-building
through sport diferentiates this country from others elsewhere in the world
(Chadwick, 2022b). However, it is important to note that sport as geopolitical
economy is not solely the preserve of emerging nations, Asian countries, or, as
some often claim, despotic regimes. For instance, the British government rou-
tinely deploys sports as part of its trade missions, as a driver of economic activ-
ity, as a channel through which to project soft power, and for the purposes of
enhancing international relationships (Chadwick, 2016).
Engagement with sport is partly driven by geographic factors, both physical
and human. In the case of Gulf nations, their investments in sport are partly
driven by the need to diversify their economies in order to reduce a dependence
on oil and gas revenues. As part of the same strategy, sport for the likes of Saudi
Arabia and Abu Dhabi contributes to achieving political ends. This includes pro-
motion of nation brands and the cultivation of diplomatic relationships through
 Gazprom, NBA, and Qatar – The Implications 289

sport (Rofe, 2016; Koch, 2018). There are also economic dimensions to such
countries’ approach to policy and strategy, for example by building a national
competitive advantage (Porter, 2011). For Saudi Arabia, this has meant bidding
for and hosting sport events, as the country seeks to become an important Afro-
Eurasian sports hub (Sports Pro, 2021). By contrast, by engaging stadium diplo-
macy in Africa, China has sought to sustain its economic performance by gifting
venues to countries in return for securing access to valuable natural resources
(Will, 2012).
In delivering sport as a good for the greatest number of people enforces
upon decision-makers the need to account for a distinctive set of criteria, for
instance reconciling the sometimes highly disparate needs of stakeholders.
Similarly, the neoclassical focus on markets, proft, and private delivery of sport
necessitate a diferent approach to decision-making. How to meet the spe-
cifc demands of individual consumers whilst delivering a commercial return
is signifcantly removed from the challenges posed by utilitarianism. Framing
sport as geopolitical economy in turn suggests other, diferent challenges fac-
ing decision-makers in sport, which the following three case analyses serve to
highlight.

Gazprom and UEFA1

Russia is one of the world’s largest producers of natural gas, a signifcant pro-
portion of which is extracted, distributed, and sold by state-owned corporation
Gazprom. This feature of Russia’s physical geography has enabled the country
to generate huge revenues, which had helped fund its political and economic
activities. It has helped the country lavishly host events such as the 2014 Winter
Olympic Games and the 2018 FIFA World Cup, both of which served a soft
power purpose for the government in Moscow. At the same time, gas has helped
fuel the rise of an oligarch class as well as the Russian middle class in general.
Indeed, Gazprom was formed following the acquisition of Sibneft from Roman
Abramovich, who had bought the company during the 1990s era of privatiza-
tion. Yet the Russian government has also strategically deployed Gazprom to
foster a dependence upon the country’s gas across several European countries,
perhaps most notably Germany. With such dependence has come control hence
the positive bilateral relationships that several European countries have had with
Russia. Against this backdrop, UEFA signed a number of lucrative sponsorships
with Gazprom, most notably for the right to associate with the men’s Champions
League. Most such deals normally involve business-to-consumer sponsorships,
whereas in Gazprom’s case, it seemed the corporation was a government-to-
government sponsorship. Irrespective of whether Gazprom actually sold extra
gas as the result of its UEFA deals, some have labelled these sponsorships as being
soft power instruments, sportswashing, and even propaganda. Some credence
was given to these views when Russia invaded Ukraine, only months before the
UEFA Champions League fnal was scheduled to take place.
290 Simon Chadwick and Paul Widdop

Such is the scale and nature of the issues addressed by this and the two other
cases presented here that commentary can only be indicative rather than exhaus-
tive. Nevertheless, it is anticipated that there will still be some salient lessons for
all decision-makers in sport. When UEFA frst signed its deal with Gazprom
in 2012, Russia and its president, Vladimir Putin, had not provoked intense
scrutiny by global. However, within two years, the annexation of Crimea and
downing of a passenger jet in eastern Ukraine had caused many to question the
country and its motives. This implies that strategic foresight needs to play a more
prominent role in sport, especially when signifcant fnancial decisions are being
made. In the same vein, when taking sponsorship decisions like those UEFA
made, extending pre-contract due diligence to account for geopolitical factors
would appear to be of increasing importance. Gazprom appears to have utilized
its UEFA sponsorships as a channel through which to build power and infuence
from inside the governing body of European football. Indeed, the corporation’s
chairman was able to secure a position on UEFA’s executive committee via his
presidency of the Russian football club Zenit Saint Petersburg (which is owned
by Gazprom). The ftness-for-purpose of the existing governance arrangements
therefore needs stress testing when it is clear that, for example, sponsorships are
being deployed for geopolitical purposes.

China and the National Basketball Association2

Basketball is a very popular sport in China, which is partially a result of more
than two decades working in collaboration with the United States’ NBA. This
collaboration has seen the NBA creating basketball facilities across the world’s
most populous nation, whilst engaging and training youngsters to play the sport.
Arguably the most potent symbol of the relationship is Yao Ming, who played
for both Shanghai Sharks and Houston Rockets. The standard of Chinese pro-
fessional basketball has been greatly enhanced, whilst commercially the NBA
has generated hundreds of millions of dollars from its Chinese operations and
the United States itself has garnered soft power returns from the NBA’s promi-
nence in China. Yet despite the apparent symbiosis, in late 2019 a tweet by Daryl
Morey, then general manager at the Houston Rockets, caused a major furore.
During the preceding months, there had been widespread democracy protests in
Hong Kong. These were the result of changes within the territory introduced
by China following its handover from Great Britain in 1997. Morey took to
Twitter to express his support for the protestors, something which the Chinese
government objected to. In spite of attempts by NBA commissioner Adam Silver
to defuse the situation, ofcials in Beijing decided to remove the broadcast-
ing of NBA games from Chinese television. This lasted for more than a year
and coincided with the global pandemic, which meant that after two decades
of operating in China, the NBA’s local activities were signifcantly curtailed.
Notwithstanding the territorial and political dimensions of this matter as they
pertain to Hong Kong, the Morey episode almost embodied a growing power
 Gazprom, NBA, and Qatar – The Implications 291

struggle between China and the United States, manifest in geographic, political,
and economic terms. At the same time, it juxtaposed a country in which the state
is omnipotent with one where individual liberty pervades. All of this was set
against the backdrop of globalization and digitalization, not least Morey’s tweet.
The NBA is not alone in having sought entry and penetration into the
Chinese marketplace over the last two decades. A small number of sport organi-
zations have successfully achieved this, engaged local consumers, and navigated
through a complex market. However, many haven’t; China is a large, hugely
diverse country, making it difcult to make decisions and create strategy.
Furthermore, the political system and social conventions can sometimes render
the market impenetrable, which many sport organizations appear not to be aware
of. Undertaking rigorous market research and analysis is therefore hugely impor-
tant, as is building a network of partners who intimately understand the prac-
ticalities of operating in what is often a very complex environment. One Daryl
Morey tweet is evidence of this; what might constitute freedom of speech in the
West may be perceived as a threat to political stability and social order elsewhere.
Understanding what is permissible and acceptable is important, though some
would question why a US citizen could be cancelled for expressing his political
opinions. At one level, this exposes some important communications of man-
agement issues, though it also shows how important an understanding of social
media environments is. At another level, what the Morey episode raised is the
imperative for sport decision-makers to reconcile the sometimes highly disparate
demands of multiple stakeholders.

Qatar and the FIFA World Cup3

Qatar is a small peninsula with only one land border which links it to Saudi
Arabia, one of the Gulf region’s political and economic powerhouses. Just to the
east is Iran, another large and powerful country, whilst to the north is Turkey.
Countries such as Yemen, Syria, and Afghanistan are close by; hence, this small
nation of three million people is strategically vulnerable. Addressing this chal-
lenge is an ongoing strategic priority for the country. At the same time, on a per
capita income basis, Qatar is one of the richest countries in the world, due to its
vast reserves of liquifed natural gas. The human geography of Qatar is distinctive,
with only ten percent of its population being Qatari nationals (the remainder being
immigrants). Establishing a coherent national identity has therefore been a chal-
lenge; equally, building the nation and establishing its brand globally have been
a focus for the country’s government over the last 50 years – Qatar was a British
protectorate until 1971. Since then, a state-led programme of reform has sought
to modernize and build the country by diversifying its economy, strengthening its
industrial foundations, and promoting enterprise. Sport has been a means through
which Qatar has been able to address these multiple challenges, which the staging
of 2022’s FIFA World Cup has been a foundation of. The country’s tournament
hosting has helped to embed it within the wider international community, driven
292 Simon Chadwick and Paul Widdop

the construction of civic infrastructure, enabled the projection of soft power, and
provided a focal point for building social cohesion within the country. The pro-
gramme has not been without criticism or problem: Qatar has been embroiled in
a FIFA corruption scandal; some commentators have condemned the country as
being contrived, inauthentic, undeserving hosts; and there has been condemnation
of its treatment of migrant construction workers, women, and minority groups.
As sport continues to globalize, the need to understand diverse territories
grows – as it impacts upon the success of entry to new markets and upon the
relationships an organization has with fans, other consumers, commercial part-
ners, and governments. Whether one works for a team, governing body, or
consultancy, it is also important to note that in countries like Qatar decisions
are primarily driven by political factors. Hence, understanding motive, policy,
strategy, implementation, and evaluation at the state level must inevitably play a
key role in decision-making. Big state orientation in countries like Qatar means
that decision-making processes can often be bureaucratic and therefore often
slow. Furthermore, the culture of doing business in such territories is often based
upon personal political relationships, as well as an understanding of local socio-
political conventions. It is worth remembering as well that decision-making in
rentier states such as Qatar is also driven by a need to diversify economic and
industrial activity, often through investment in overseas assets. Otherwise, as
frequent analyses and criticism of Qatar illustrate, sport’s geopolitical economy
has thrust all manner of issues – from the treatment of migrant workers to the
environmental status of events – into the spotlight. Sport can no longer operate
solely on the basis of staging competitive contests.

Conclusions
Following 150 years of contemporary sport during which European utilitarian
then later US neoclassical notions of sport have been hegemonic, sport in the
twenty-frst century is now more appropriately and, indeed, more accurately
portrayed as a geopolitical economy. This means that sport exists and functions
within an environment within which geography, politics, and economics dictate
and are shaping decisions being made. In consequence, the growing infuence of
state actors, the strengthening of conficting ideological positions, and the rise
particularly of nations in Asia are creating a new set of parameters within which
those working in sport must make decisions. By employing three case studies, this
chapter has highlighted some of the challenges this poses for sport decision-mak-
ers. However, this is only an overview and demands further thought and associ-
ated analyses. It is nevertheless hoped that the chapter helps prompt such work.

Notes
1 Readers may want to read the following as a background to this short case: Gazprom
and its sponsorship of football. From sex without a condom to major strategic threat
 Gazprom, NBA, and Qatar – The Implications 293

https://www.iris-france.org/154279-gazprom-and-its-sponsorship-of-football-from
-sex-without-a-condom-to-major-strategic-threat/
2 Readers may want to read the following as a background to this short case: The NBA
in China: Who calls the shots? https://www.policyforum.net/the-nba-in-china-who
-calls-the-shots/
3 Readers may want to read the following as a background to this short case: Small
Nation, Big Games – Qatar Gets Ready for 2022 https://www.iris-france.org/160117
-small-nation-big-games-qatar-gets-ready-for-2022/

References
Bowles, S. (1991). What markets can—And cannot—Do. Challenge, 34(4), 11–16.
Chadwick, S. (2016). How football is becoming a major player for British soft power.
Newsweek, 12th February, accessed via https://www.newsweek.com/football-uk
-brexit-soft-power-arsenal-premiere-league-527228
Chadwick, S. (2022a). From utilitarianism and neoclassical sport management to a new
geopolitical economy of sport. European Sport Management Quarterly, 1–20.
Chadwick, S. (2022b). Football, feuding and games in the Gulf. Insights, 21st June,
accessed via https://mei.nus.edu.sg/wp-content/uploads/2022/06/Insights-279
-Simon-Chadwick.pdf
Chadwick, S., & Widdop, P. (2021). The geopolitical economy of sport: A new era at play.
Asia and the Pacifc Policy Forum, 13th January, accessed via https://www.policyforum
.net/the-geopolitical-economy-of-sport/
Henry, J. F. (2012). The making of neoclassical economics. London: Routledge.
Huang, F. (2013). Glocalisation of sport: The NBA’s difusion in China. The International
Journal of the History of Sport, 30(3), 267–284.
Koch, N. (2018). The geopolitics of sport beyond soft power: Event ethnography and
the 2016 cycling world championships in Qatar. Sport in Society, 21(12), 2010–2031.
Lanfranchi, P., & Roach, J. (2017). Exporting football: Notes on the development of
football in Europe. In Game without frontiers (pp. 22–45). London: Routledge.
McCullough, B. P., Orr, M., & Kellison, T. (2020). Sport ecology: Conceptualizing an
emerging subdiscipline within sport management. Journal of Sport Management, 34(6),
509–520.
Porter, M. E. (2011). Competitive advantage of nations: Creating and sustaining superior
performance. New York: Simon and Schuster.
Rindfeisch, A. (2019). The second digital revolution. Marketing Letters, 31(1), 1–5.
Rofe, J. S. (2016). Sport and diplomacy: A global diplomacy framework. Diplomacy &
Statecraft, 27(2), 212–230.
Schulenkorf, N., & Frawley, S. (Eds.). (2016). Critical issues in global sport management.
London: Taylor & Francis.
Sports Pro (2021). Newcastle United and Saudi Arabia: Understanding a seismic
Premier League takeover. Sport Pro Podcast, 14th October, accessed via https://www
.sportspromedia.com/insights/podcasts/sportspro-podcasts/newcastle-united-saudi
-arabia-pif-takeover-premier-league-podcast/
Vamplew, W. (2017). Industrialization and sport. In The Oxford handbook of sports history.
Oxford: Oxford University Press.
Will, R. (2012). China’s stadium diplomacy. World Policy Journal, 29(2), 36–44.
INDEX

Page numbers in bold denote tables, those in italic denote fgures.

acquisitions 94, 113, 239; cross-border 96; 88, 90; deprivation of self-identity 39;
football 104 dissenting 13; efect of sports sanctions
activism 129; athletes’ 11, 77, 81, 229; 24; elite 9–12, 14, 70, 85, 90, 264,
human rights 119; social 119 282; equal rights 39; exclusion of 280;
Africa Cup of Nations (AFCON) 101, 170 female 87–88, 137, 279–280; foreign-
aid agencies 257 raised 86; freedom of expression
AK Party 204–207 10; gender 277; gender-diverse 279,
Al Jazeera 128–129 281–282; Global 11; improving
Alegi, P. 165–168 cognitive skills 80; individuals 37,
AlKhalifa, H. 139 264; initiatives 11; intersex 277–278,
alternative football 185–189 281; isolation from global sports
Amazon Prime 217 community 39; Israeli 75, 77, 79, 80;
ambassadors 129, 257, 264; brand 88 Jewish 77–78; minority 274; murder
Amnesty International 145–146, 150, 173 of Israel 75; naturalized 78, 86; neutral
annexation of Crimea 13, 20, 34, 44, 12, 21, 23; Olympic 75, 86; Pacifc 263;
50, 290 paralympic 69–70; patriotic 87; public
anti-gay legislature 45 stance against the war 14; Russian 1,
Anzhi 49, 51, 55, 57 11–14, 21–24, 29–31, 35–37, 39, 43,
Apartheid 32, 81; anti- 166; South 70, 73, 227; silent boycotts 77; slave
African 71 37; socially conscious 118; status of 30;
Arab Spring 128–129, 254 training abroad 81; transfeminine 277;
Arnold R 44 transgender 277–280; transmasculine
artistic gymnastics 37; World Cup 9 277; Ukrainian 12, 21; US 10, 38,
Asian Games 101, 105, 130–131 271; Western 12–14; withdrawing 75;
Associated Press 281 women 120, 136, 279, 282; young 85;
Association of Summer Olympic see also activisim
International Federations (ASOIF) 23, Athletes’ Commission 10; Rule
218; Assembly of 38, 40 50 Guidelines 10
athletes: African 137, 273–274; agency 9, Australia Sports Outreach Program 263
13–14; Belarusian 11–13, 21, 30, 36, authoritarianism 175; domestic 14;
39, 70, 73; borderless 90; Chinese 86, mounting 239; supportive of 118
296 Index

Bach, T. 1, 12, 21–24, 36, 38–39, 70 Chinese Super League (CSL) 104, 108,
Bale, J. 89 110–113
Barr Body Test 279 Chtcherbakova, A. 32
Basic Universal Principles for the Good cisgender 277–278, 282
Governance of the Olympic and Sports Clarke, F. 255
Movement (PGG) 40 climate: crisis 247; emergency 258
Basketball Africa League (BAL) 173–174, Cold War 34, 38, 71, 253–254, 279; New
176–178 262, 267
Battilana, J. 230 colonial: anti- 166; dominance 166;
Bell, C. 253 era 136, 153, 166; history 135, 139;
Belt and Road Initiatives (BRI) 96, initiation 165; institutions 166; legacy
108–109, 262 165; neo- 263; orientalist 136; rule 149;
best-practice information 131 times 156
Bezos, J. 151 commercial: activity 193, 288;
black glove salute 10 agreements 238; aspects 160; brands
Black Lives Matter (BLM) 272, 274 211; competition 170; connection 157,
blanket ban on Russian and Belarusian 198; growth 199; implications 155;
athletes 11, 13 infuence 50; interests 156; non- 239;
Blatter, S. 50, 58, 186 objectives 160; opportunities 192,
Bloomberg 96 196–197, 199–200; partners 198–199,
Board of Control for Cricket in India 292; perspective 159; potential 49, 57;
(BCCI) 156–159 reasons 238; relations 177, 193, 195;
branding 51, 81, 127, 129–130, 236, return 289; revenues 53, 199; rights
242–244; attempts 80, 129; cultural 221, 243–244; shirt sponsor 130;
75, 78; export 75, 80; investment in sponsorship 242; sport spectacle 192;
130; nation 44, 75, 78, 80–82, 142; stakeholders 142; success 58, 89, 195;
national 96; place 75, 80–81, 210; tie-ups 116; weight 157
political 75, 77; potential tool of 129; commercialization 49, 155–156, 213, 219;
product 242; re- 51, 150, 194; state of football 168–169, 197
127, 129–130; strategy 109; team 157; commodifcation 136, 169
tobacco 243 Commonwealth Games Federation 71
Brannagan, P. M. 145–146 Commonwealth of Independent States
Brinch, J. 185 (CIS) 34, 49, 58
British Academy 253 Communist Party 94, 110
British Council 260 complete androgen insensitivity
British Paralympic Association 70 syndrome 279
Burke, P. 281 Conféderation Africaine de Football
Bush, G. 151 (CAF) 166, 170
Butler, J. 273 Confederation of Independent Football
Associations (CONIFA) 186–189
Cardenas, A. 255 confict 12, 29, 41, 58, 75, 85, 94, 189,
Carlos, J. 10 256; armed 14; binary opposition of
case studies: China and the National 258; bloody 60; cultural dimensions
Basketball Association 290; Gazprom of 258; Cyprus –Turkey 231–232;
and UEFA 289; Qatar and the FIFA direct 120; of form and content 40;
World Cup 291 impact of 258; international 45; Israeli–
Catalan Agency of Tourism 211 Palestinian 81; martial 20; military 50;
Chadwick, S. 4, 93–94, 96, 142 paramilitary 36; political 43, 94; post-
Champions Trophy 156 189, 256; resolution 256, 259; Ukraine
Chernyshenko, D. 22, 31 245; Yemeni 145; zones 128–129
Chinese dream 87 corruption 39, 45, 146, 176, 193, 231;
Chinese Football Association (CFA) allegations of 128–129; high-profle
109, 113 194; scandals 2, 194, 292
Chinese Government 72 cosmopolitanism 271–272, 274–275
Chinese Stadium Diplomacy 111 Council of Europe (COE) 187
 Index 297

Court of Arbitration for Sport 22, 37, 280 stadium 95, 101, 103, 105–106, 109,
COVID-19 pandemic 68, 81, 105, 121, 111, 265–266, 289; wolf warrior 121;
159, 176, 210, 212, 237, 245, 264–265 see also debt
cricket 149, 155–157; boards 157–159; discrimination 13, 272; anti- 10–11;
commercialized 156; ecosystem 158; ideologically driven 22; overt 272;
global revenues 156; infuential board prohibition of 33; racial 229, 233
156; international 156; lack of appeal disempowerment 43–44, 146; soft 42–43,
117; obsession 156; origins 156; ploy 46–47, 141, 144–146
to achieve political gains 158; spirit of Donbas 45, 50, 60, 189
159; sponsorship 158; viewership 156; doping scandal 21, 44–46, 70
world 155 Dorries, N. 70
criticism 78, 87, 89, 103–104, 106, dual: citizenship 85; identity 85–86, 88;
145–146, 158, 292; legitimate 177; nationality 136
ongoing 77; prospect of 23; public 197, Dubinsky, Y. 80
200; rejection of 145; right-wing 88; Duty of Vigilance Law (2017) 231
vehement 151 dysfunction 38; management 36
cultural: agencies 257–258; background
136; branding 75, 78; capital 151; economic: acquisition 113; activity
changes 232, 272; cities 211; conditions 102, 197, 288–289, 292; agreements
200; conjecture 192; diferences 194; 265; assets 144; beneft 105; boycott
dimensions 258; diplomacy 81; driver 129; certainty 192, 195–197, 200;
146; ecology 90; engagement 258; competition 94, 171; conditions 102,
events 272; expression 255; feld 258; 200; development 51, 90, 108, 175;
forces 274; gatekeepers 257; heritage dimension 3, 103, 289; diversifcation
81; identities 88; ideologies 272; 146; driver 146, 214; environment 171;
imperialism 149, 153; importance 274; formations 192, 199; fragility 256, 258;
infuence 141, 146; instability 273; inter- gap 168, 171; geography 169; infuences
89, 257; lives 102; meanings 273; multi- 95, 141; instability 246; interests 93,
88, 271–272, 274; organizations 258; 200, 254; level 60, 211; might 93, 97;
politico- 151; power 109, 118; racism opportunity 198; partnerships 142,
274; regulations 255; relations 253–255, 191; performance 40, 289; politico-
257–260; representations 189, 273; – 29, 31, 50, 288; potential 105, 116;
ritual 37, 272; socio- 146, 194; space 60; power 95, 109, 200; sanctions 20, 24,
sports 267; stability 272–273; stasis 272 29; socio- 150, 211; terms 212, 291;
transformation 2, 165, 170
Dakar Youth Olympics (2026) 103 The Economist 85, 272
Darby, P. 166, 168–169 Education Above All 128
Darnell, S. 255 EFI Database 110
debt 113; accumulation of 113; dependent eligibility 21, 23, 278, 280–281
on 110; relationships 109; -trap elite 95, 137, 151, 263; African-schooled
diplomacy 267 166; athletes 9–12, 14, 70, 85, 90, 264,
Democratic Left Party (DSP) 203 282; businessmen 138; championships
demography 134, 136 219; clubs 221; competition 264, 278;
Desrosiers, M-E. 175 disability sport 67, 69, 72; divisions 221;
digitalization 200, 288, 291 European football teams 138; level 77,
diplomacy 4, 67, 98, 103, 111–112, 129, 278, 280; pacts 259; politicians 120;
141, 173–175, 178, 194, 264–265, 267; ruling 139; secular 203; selection 87;
basketball 178; corporate 210; cultural sport 134, 136–137, 279–280, 282;
81; debt-trap 267; economic 262; sport development 139; sporting power
fnancial 96–97; foreign 121; formal 88–89; sportspeople 11; tournament 217
266; global 194; hostage 237; political endorsement 87, 214; brands 87
legacy of 195; public 75, 77, 81–82, English Premier League 53, 148, 150, 157,
105, 194, 213, 264, 267; sports 44, 170, 175, 217, 219
72, 86, 96, 103, 131, 174–175, 255, environmental: awareness 258; fragility
262–265, 267–268; sport-tech 80–81; 256, 258; jolts 228–229, 232;
298 Index

preservation activities 258; protest 205; limited return 171; losses 198; model
sensitive perspective 211; status 292; 247; muscle 157, 159; problems 56, 59,
sustainability 258 110, 112–113; prospects 218; reality
Equality, Liberty, Fraternity Trophy 187 243; regulators 96; resources 95,
EUNIC 260 137, 169; rewards 145; situation 109;
European Club Association (ECA) windfall 59
220–221 Five-Year Plans 108–109
European National Institutes of Floyd, G. 3, 10
Culture 255 foreign: diplomats 257; investments
European Rally Championship 231 138, 220
European Super League 217, 221 Formula 1 2, 29, 138, 142–143, 148, 151,
European Table Tennis Union 217, 223, 227–228, 232, 235–239
(ETTU) 37 Formula E 244, 246
European Union 20, 222, 243–244, 271; Freedom House 175
Third Energy Package 55
exclusion 12, 14, 20, 30–31, 37, 75, 77 Geertz, C. 272
experience packages 116 gender 263, 273; -based violence 174; cis-
Extreme E 246 277–278, 282; confrmation surgery
279; defning 277; -diverse 277–279,
Fan, Y. 78 281–282; empowerment 175; equality
FC Barcelona 130, 169, 210–212, 10, 150, 174, 232; identity 278, 282;
214–215, 273 inclusion 278; inequality 233; parity
Fédération Internationale de Football 279; question 136; solidifed 277; trans-
Association (FIFA): bans 11, 29, 35, 277–282; verifcation 279–280
222; capital accumulation 199; Club geopolitical: actor 233; advantages 94;
World Cup (2021) 97–186; commercial competitors 94; conjuncture 192, 199;
opportunities 197; -compatible contentions 94; crisis 29, 72; debate 70,
stadiums 195; confederations 185; 136, 233; divides 194; dynamic 232;
Congress 128; corruption and collusion economy of sport 3–4, 42–44, 47, 50,
within 145, 193; corruption scandal 93–94, 98, 101, 103, 155, 160, 192,
292; delegation 196; evaluation 196; 199–200, 287–289, 292; environment
Fan Fests 193; formation of 185; full 85; episodes 229; era 141; evolution
tax exemptions 193; Global Transfer 144; factors 290; fallout 70; frmament
Report 169; ofcial languages 36; 186; friction 159–160; gain 142;
ofcial partners 130; post-scandal 195; goals 104; good 288; incident 69, 72;
principles 58; public image of 197; infuences 95, 144, 200; interests 200;
rebranding 194; revenue generation issues 71; logic of balance of power 29;
199; scandals within 2; sponsors 104; maelstrom 86; motives 142; objective
suspension by 189; U-20 World Cup 35, 127, 145, 157; order 194; pinch
(1995) 130; visa-free travel for ofcials points 94; players 12; poly 155; position
193; wealth extraction 199; World Cup 35, 72, 94; power 97; purposes 290;
(1934) 135; World Cup (2010) 168; real estate 262; reality 35, 47; results
World Cup (2014) 142, 198; World Cup 93; role 228, 232; settings 70; shifts
(2018) 44, 50, 95, 97, 289; World Cup 228; skirmishes 160; solutions 35;
(2022) 101, 127, 128, 135, 138, 142, strategies 144; strides 228; strife 231;
145, 148, 238, 291; World Cup (2026) tensions 10–11, 85, 89, 96, 155, 237;
191; Youth World Championships 167 tightrope 178; tool 113, 145
Fédération Internationale de l’Automobile Ginesta, X. 215
(FIA) 117, 227–233, 237–238 global: Athlete 11; consciousness 129;
fnancial: assets 96; -backing 96; clout diplomacy 194; economic crisis (2008)
160; decisions 290; difculties 113; 53; football business complex 165,
diplomacy 96–97; ends 109; Fair Play 170–171; media attention 9, 232; North
56, 57, 220; fair play mechanisms 150–151, 153, 171, 281; South 137,
49; independence 38; injections 220; 151, 281; sport governance 67; sporting
institutions 102, 198; interests 239; power elite 88–89; unity 194
 Index 299

globalization 89, 116, 135, 200, 211, 274, imperialism 57; cultural 149, 153
288; of sports 41 Indian Premier League (IPL) 143,
Gold, J.R. 68 155–159
golf 22, 143, 145, 148, 151, 236 Industrial Revolution 213
Golubchikov, O. 51 industry of relationships 177
governance 41, 67–69, 204–206, 263; Intelligym 80
arrangements 290; bilateral 204–205, internal entrepreneurship 229
207; bodies 96, 98; challenges 228; International Aquatic Federation (FINA)
decision 204; formal 73; formalized 22, 36, 277–278, 281–282
73; global 9, 14; good 40, 175, 231; International Basketball Federation
market-based 204–207; organizations (FIBA) 173
96–97; over politics 173, 175, 177–178; International Contact Group 128
processes 69; spatial 51; sport 3, 23, 67, International Convention on the
71–72, 95, 98, 287; stature 71; strong Elimination of All Forms of Racial
176; structures 40, 194; system 71; Discrimination (1965) 39
technical 175; top-down 70; vertical International Cricket Council (ICC) 117,
integration 206; World Sports 37 156–158
Grand Prix Drivers Association International Federation of Red Cross and
(GPDA) 228 Red Crescent Societies (IFRC) 231
Gu Ailing 1, 85–90 International Gymnastics Federation 23
Guha, R. 156 International Handball Federation 136
Gulf Cooperation Council (GCC) 134, International Judo Federation (IJF) 36
137–139 International Labour Organization 256
Gulf Region 134, 143, 146, 148, 291 International Luge Federation (FIL) 37
International Olympic Committee (IOC)
Hamilton, L. 118, 229–230, 236 1, 10, 12, 20–24, 29, 33–34, 36–40,
Heraskevych, V. 9, 11 45–46, 67–71, 73, 77–78, 97–98, 103,
Hillmann, J. 228–230 120, 135–136, 192, 218, 227, 256,
Hinks, P. 176 278–281
Hitler, A. 149 International Paralympic Committee
Horne, J. 192 (IPC) 12, 22, 67–73
hosting rights 105–106, 128, 131, 141, International Rugby League 266, 278
191, 193 international sports bodies 29–30, 32
Houston Rockets 118, 177, 290 International Sports Federation (ISF) 12,
human rights 106, 118, 145, 178, 231, 233, 32–33, 36–41, 69, 71, 219
253, 256–258, 260, 277, 279–280; abuses International Women’s Sports Federation
86, 145, 148, 150, 236–237; activism (FSFI) 278–279
119; Advisory Council 232; attention to International YMCA Training School 174
14; commitments 259; considerations 9; internationalization 113, 135
controversies surrounding 96; defence invasion of Ukraine 11, 12, 20–21,
of 258; discourse 233; Foundation 173; 29–30, 43, 45–46, 67, 69, 71, 227–228,
fundamental 30; groups 128; initiatives 237–238
10; issues 102, 104, 236; mission 10; Iraqi invasion 138
policy 227; practices 105; principles Islamist Welfare Party (RP) 203
232; record 13, 43, 145–146, 149, 232; Israeli–Arab dispute 75, 77, 80–81
respect for 231; responsibilities 232; Israeli ice Skating Federation 77
situation 105; Universal Declaration of
30; violations 14, 77, 173 James, G. 214
humanitarian; considerations 9; Jewish Diaspora 78
instruments of power 128; organization Joseph, N. 128
229, 232; values 38 Judaism 78, 80
hydrocarbon-based economies 138
Kaepernic, C. 3, 10, 274
identity diaspora 90 Kagame, P. 175–178
impact of war on sport 1 Karkazis, K. 281
300 Index

Kashmir Premier League (KPL) 157, 159 National Olympic Committee of

Key Governance Principles and Key Israel 77
Indicators (KGP) 40 National Olympic Committees 10,
Keys, B. 72 21, 218
Koch, N. 138 National Paralympic Committee 67–71
Kon’kov, A. 59 nationalism 89, 93, 105, 207, 262, 271
Kontinental Hockey League (KHL) 35, NATO 20, 22, 119, 128
50–51, 52, 57 Navratilova, M. 13
Kostyuk. M. 13 Netfix 217, 238, 246
Krasner, S.D. 39 neutrality 11–12, 14, 29, 72, 227, 232
Kuliak, I. 9, 13–14, 23 New Federation Board 185, 187
Kuwaiti Olympic Committee 137 new world order of sport 33–35
New York Times 193, 280
Leary, S. 264 NF Board 185–187
Le Guellec, G. 34 non-governmental organizations (NGOs)
Lenin, V. 34, 222 192, 257
Levitin, I. 32–33 North American Free Trade Agreement
LGBTQ+ community 146, 236 (NAFTA) 195
Nye, J. 128, 141
Maccabiah Games 81
Major League Soccer (MLS) 52, 219 Obama, B. 174
Markovits, A. S. 274 Olympic: Charter 10, 22, 33, 36, 68;
Marshall, T. 215 Truce 11–12, 14, 21, 36, 71, 78
Matytsin, O. 31 online shopping 116
medal: ceremonies 9; rankings 93 Organization of the Petroleum Exporting
media coverage 70, 129–130, 145 Countries (OPEC) 245
mega-events 42, 44, 46, 50, 94, 96, 138, organizational resilience 227–229
153, 192, 194 Ovechkin, A. 13, 23
migrant workers: conditions 128; death 2; overseas direct investment (ODI) 96,
exploitation 2; treatment of 146, 292 108–111, 113
Miller, A. 56, 58
Millward, P. 274 Pacifc Games 265–266
mimetic isomorphism 141, 144 Pacifc Sports Partnerships 263
Morey, D. 118–119, 177, 290–291 PacifcAus Sports (PAS) 263
Morris, D. 37 pandemic: control 96–97; depression 97
Motherland Party (ANAP) 203 Pavlyuchenkova, A. 12–13
Munich Air Disaster (1958) 214 peace 4, 9, 21, 233, 253, 255, 257–258,
Munich Massacre 75, 77 260; agreements 256–257; -building
Murray, A. 13 175, 253–257; -keeping 253–255,
mutually: benefcial transactions 257; 259–260; -making 254, 256–257;
constitutive relationship 200 negotiators 256, 259; political
struggle for 255; post- 256; pro-
Nadal, R. 13 11–12; processes 253, 256–257, 259;
Næss H. E. 23 promoting 38–39; sport as an enabler
Nandy, A. 156 for 255; talks 232
nation building 2, 105, 127, 130, 166, 288 People’s Republic Party (CHP) 204
National Basketball Association (NBA) personal relationships 174, 177–178
3, 50, 52, 53, 117, 118–120, 153, 157, Pervy Kanal Figure Skating Cup 31
173–178, 274, 288, 290–291 Poli, R. 169
National Football Federations 217 Polish Football Association 11
National Football League (NFL) 10, 157, political: activity 37; branding 75,
218, 274 77; conficts 43; consequences 2;
National Hockey League (NHL) 23, constituents 4; deveopment 51; fragility
50, 53 258; ideology 148–149; independence
national identity 75, 78, 89, 291 38; infuence 39, 50; interests 23, 200;
 Index 301

issues 10, 14, 43, 71, 89, 227, 230, 40; implementation of 39; imposition
232, 258; messages 9, 119; motives of 41; informal 118; justifcation 21;
12; narratives 47, 151; nature 59, 72; sport 20, 23–24; trade 96
principle 59; project 60; propaganda Saudi Arabian Public Investment Fund
10; purposes 2, 9, 50, 153; reality 2, 151
30; relations 50, 72, 94, 109, 292; Schweizer, D. 96
segregation 39; signifcance 3, 44, security 175, 254; agreements 265;
137; spheres 45; status 30; tool 23; analyses 262; dilemmas 262; fragility
transformation 2; turbulence 43; visuals 256, 258; guarantees 262; interests 254;
43; weapon 29–30 matters 262; national 237
politicization 14, 22–23, 36, 254 segregation 274, 282; de facto 273; ethnic
politico-economic 29, 50, 288 39; racial 32
politics 2–3, 13–14, 23, 68, 89, 93–94, 96, semantic ambiguity 37
173, 176, 185–187, 192, 200, 203–204, Shanghai Cooperation Organization
227, 239, 254, 292; American 38; (SCO) 31, 34
conjunctural 192, 199; external 192; Sharma, D. 266
governance over 175, 177–178; internal Smith, T. 9–10
192; international 11, 14, 73, 77; power socialL identity 78; justice 173, 176, 232,
254; reputational 141; symbolic 193 254, 257–259; justice initiatives 10, 174
Pospisil, J. 253 societal: change 146; fragility 256, 258;
press freedom 96 issues 174; make-up 134; values 139
privatization 217–218, 223, 289 society 4, 60, 89, 96, 116, 118, 137, 156,
professionalization 109, 112, 135 230, 258, 273–275; civil 40–41, 158,
property ownership 142 257–259; global 211; globalized 89;
Public Investment Fund 2, 148, modern 60; racism 273–274; rural 175;
151–152, 236 underlying values 272
public memory 45, 47 soft disempowerment 42–43, 46–47, 141,
Putin, V 13, 20–24, 29–31, 33–35, 69, 144–146
188–189, 238, 290 soft power 2, 4, 42–47, 50–51, 55, 60,
86, 96–97, 102–106, 109, 112–113,
Qatar: Foundation 129–131; National 116, 119, 127–129, 134, 139, 141–142,
Tourism Council (QNTC) 212; Sports 144–146, 151, 153, 173–175, 178, 232,
Investment (QSI) 130, 212 235, 255, 257, 262, 288–290, 292
Solidarity Games 22
racism 271–275; anti- 10 South African Apartheid 71
racist 271; anti- 11; attitudes 273; codes Spedale, S. 230
273; jaunts 273; meanings 273; sponsorship 87, 94–96, 108, 113, 116,
underpinnings 273; vitriol 272; ways of 142–144, 153, 156, 158–159, 169–170,
life 274; white fans 273 197–198, 206, 235, 238, 242–244,
Reach Out to Asia 128 246, 288–290; agreement 143, 212;
real estate sector 109–113 commercial 242; consumer 289;
Red Sports International (IRS) 34 contract 212, 218; deals 119, 148, 159,
Reuters 70 238; decisions 290; earnings 236;
Rogof, K. S. 110 global 170, 211, 236; government-to-
Rublev, A. 12–13, 238 government 289; income 243; money
Rugby Canada 278 158; partners 235, 239; personal 243;
Ruggie, J.G. 233 portfolio 2, 142–143, 170; programme
Russian Artistic Gymnastics 38; properties 2; revenues 170, 236;
Federation 37 rights 158; secondary 243; soft power
Russian attack against Kyiv 9 142; state-funded 141; state-owned 142;
Russian Federation 21, 31–32, 51 subsidized 170; title 246; tobacco 236
Russian Football Union 2, 37, 56, 58 sport cities 138
Sport Mega-events (SMEs) 42–47, 138, 192
sanctions 20–22, 29, 33, 36, 41, 43, 220, sport washing 43, 104, 106, 130, 143, 145–
238; economic 20, 24; governmental 146, 148–153, 175, 232, 236, 242, 289
302 Index

sporting international non-governmental United as One 191–195, 199

organizations (SINGOs) 192 United Nations (UN) 30, 70, 188, 211,
sports: betting 116; Diplomacy 2030 263; 228, 231, 254, 260; -controlled bufer
industry 109, 121, 160, 263; investors zone 231; General Assembly (UNGA)
95; labour migration 86, 89; Stadium 39, 178; Guiding Principles on Business
Diplomacy 95 and Human rights (UNGPs) 233;
stakeholders 2, 34, 38, 57, 81, 96, 142, peacekeeping reports 260; resolution
159, 165, 174, 227–228, 231, 237, 254, 21, 38; Security Council 38; sustainable
256–257, 259, 289, 291 development goals 260
state branding 127, 129–130 Universal Declaration of Human
Stockholm Consensus (2003) 279 Rights 30
Stoke Mandeville 68 universalism 11
streaming 81, 116, 117, 119, 156, 218, 222 urbanization 138
Sugden, J. P. 165 USA Rugby 278
Summer Olympics 40, 67, 70, 131, 142, USIP 266
198, 218, 264, 279–280 USOC 38
suppression of minority groups 148
sustainability 109, 112–113, 195 violations 33, 77, 173
sustainable: development goals (SDGs) Vision 2030 130–131
232, 260; dialogue 257 Vondracek, H. 111
Swidler, A. 272 VTB United League 50–51, 52, 57, 59

taking the knee 2, 272–273 Warsaw Pact 35

Team USA Council on Racial and Social Waugh, S. 155
Justice 10 Wimbledon 13–14, 23, 238
terrorism 75, 81, 138, 203 Winter Olympics 1, 9, 21, 43, 50, 75,
Therapeutic Use Exemption (TUE) 277 78, 79, 80–82, 88, 97, 105–106, 120,
Three Axe Strokes 93–95, 98 158, 237
TIME 279 Winter Paralympics 1, 11, 67–68, 69, 72,
Tolstoy, L.N. 39 75, 76, 79, 80, 82
Tolstykh, N. 58 Women’s Tennis Association 2
tourism 75, 80–81, 131, 138, 153, 195, World Anti-Doping Agency 70, 98
211–213, 245 World Athletics 280–282; bans 281;
transfer system 113 Championships 130; rules 280
transgender: athletes 277–280, 282; World Nines 266
framework 281; girls and boys 282; World Olympians Association
identity 280; inclusion framework 278; (WOA) 36
inclusion policy 280; men 278; people World Rugby 278, 281
278; policy 281; sport ; women 278, World Tourism Organisation
280–281 (UNWTO) 212
True Path Party (DYP) 203 World War I 20
Trump, D. 96, 151, 191, 193–194, 272 World War II 20, 68, 72, 228
trust 177, 231, 233, 253 World Weightlifting 130
Twenty20 World Cup 156 World Wrestling Entertainment 143
Worldwide Olympic Partner Intel 80
Union of European Football Associations
(UEFA) 2, 24, 29, 43, 50, 53, 54, xenophobia 274
55–56, 57, 61, 142, 165, 188, 204, Xue, H. 109
217–223, 288–290
United 2026 191, 193–197; bid book 193, Yanukovic, V. 60
195, 198–199; bid organizers 193; bid
partnership 192 Zorya Luhansk 61