AGENDA: "Discussing the use of Private Military and Security

Companies (PMSCs) and their role in Modern Conflict, with special

emphasis on the Russia-Ukraine Conflict"

Questions to be answered through this Background Guide:

- What are the historical precedents for the use of PMSCs in armed
conflicts, and how has their role evolved in recent decades?
- How does international law, including the Montreux Document and
International Humanitarian Law (IHL), regulate the activities of
PMSCs?
- How does the presence of PMSCs alter the dynamics of warfare in
terms of tactics, logistics, and military outcomes in the
Russia-Ukraine conflict (first a general overview of how it impacts
warfare in general, then specifically the Russia-Ukraine conflict)
- How does the involvement of PMSCs impact the overall strategy of
conflict? For example, does it increase plausible deniability for certain
operations or actions?
- What are the known human rights violations and abuses linked to
PMSCs in conflict, and how are these being addressed by the
international community?
- Why is it hard to hold PMSCs accountable for their human rights
violations?
- What specific roles have PMSCs played in the Russia-Ukraine conflict
since its outbreak in 2014, and how have these roles changed since the
2022 escalation?
- Are there particular companies or groups associated with either
Russia or Ukraine, and how do they contribute to the military
objectives of the parties involved?
- What is the extent of Russia’s use of groups like the Wagner Group
(often considered a PMSC) in Ukraine, and what is the relationship
between these forces and the Russian government?
- In what ways might the role of PMSCs in the Russia-Ukraine conflict
inform the future of privatized warfare in global conflicts?

INDEX:
 1. Letter From the EB
2. DISEC as a Committee
3. Expectations from the Delegates in the Committee
4. Brief on Private Military and Security Companies (PMSCs)
5. Noteworthy PMSCs
6. Involvement of PMSCs in conflicts and their plausible deniability
7. Human rights violations and abuses linked to PMSCs
8. Lack Of Accountability for PMSCs
9. The Montreux Document
10. Pre-war History on the Russia-Ukraine Conflict
11. The War In 2022
12. Changing Climate of Warfare Since PMSCs
13. Suggested Discussion Statements
14. Bibliography

1) Letter From The EB :

[Date]

Dear Delegates,

We are thrilled to welcome you to the Disarmament and International Security Committee
(DISEC) at SOMUN 2024. As members of the Executive Board, we would like to take this
opportunity to congratulate you on your selection and provide you with some key insights as we
embark on what promises to be an engaging and transformative experience.

DISEC has long been one of the most critical committees in the United Nations, tasked with
addressing some of the most pressing issues related to global peace, disarmament, and
security. From nuclear disarmament to the proliferation of conventional weapons,
counter-terrorism efforts, and the growing threats in cyberspace, the discussions you will
engage in have far-reaching implications for the global order.

Your role as a delegate is crucial. You will be called upon to analyze, negotiate, and develop
practical solutions to these complex global challenges. We urge you to take this responsibility
seriously, and we have no doubt that your unique perspectives and insights will contribute
greatly to the discussions.

Here are a few key reminders as we prepare for the upcoming sessions:

1. Preparation is Key: We encourage you to thoroughly research your assigned country’s

position on the topics at hand, and to familiarize yourself with the rules of procedure. A
 strong understanding of both the issues and diplomatic protocol will be essential to your
success in this committee.
2. Diplomacy and Collaboration: DISEC requires not only a firm stance on critical issues
but also a collaborative spirit. You will be working closely with delegates from around the
world, each bringing their own priorities and perspectives. We urge you to engage in
open dialogue, practice active listening, and build alliances that will help foster
resolutions that are inclusive, feasible, and impactful.
3. Effective Communication: Your ability to clearly and persuasively communicate your
country’s position will be crucial. Whether through speeches, negotiations, or drafting
resolutions, we encourage you to be articulate, respectful, and solution-oriented in all
your contributions.
4. Innovation and Leadership: In today’s rapidly evolving global landscape, the
challenges of disarmament and security are ever-changing. We urge you to think outside
the box, propose creative solutions, and take the lead in shaping the discourse around
these issues.

As your Executive Board, we are here to guide and support you throughout the conference. We
are committed to ensuring that every delegate has the opportunity to participate actively,
develop key skills, and make meaningful contributions. Should you have any questions or
concerns, please do not hesitate to reach out to us at any time.

Once again, we congratulate you on your selection and look forward to witnessing the lively
debates, negotiations, and solutions that will emerge from DISEC. Together, we can contribute
to a safer, more secure world.

Best regards,

Sreesai K. Juttiga
Chairperson, Disarmament and International Security Committee
SOMUN 2024

Aum Darshan Koticha

Vice-Chair, Disarmament and International Security Committee
SOMUN 2024

2) DISEC as a Committee:
The Disarmament and International Security Committee (DISEC) is the
First Committee of the United Nations General Assembly. The committee
concerns itself with questions of international importance regarding the
 security and demilitarization throughout all countries and regions, along
with ensuring that citizens across the globe remain protected.

3) Expectations From the Delegates in the Committee:

1. Thorough Research and Knowledge:

● Country’s Policy: Delegates should have a deep understanding of their assigned

country’s stance on the agenda topics (e.g., arms control, disarmament treaties, conflict
resolution).
● Global Perspective: Knowledge of the current international scenario, and the positions
of other countries.
● Historical Context: Be familiar with past resolutions, important UN actions, and ongoing
global security issues.

2. Diplomacy and Negotiation:

● Effective Communication: Delegates are expected to communicate their country's

views effectively and persuasively during speeches and in informal negotiations
(lobbying).
● Building Alliances: Collaborating with other delegates to form blocs and negotiate
resolutions is a key expectation. Forming coalitions of countries with similar interests is
crucial for passing resolutions.
● Compromise and Cooperation: Finding common ground, especially in complex
security issues, requires compromise while safeguarding national interests.

3. Drafting Resolutions:

● Resolution Writing: Delegates should actively participate in drafting, merging, and

editing working papers that outline potential solutions to the topics being discussed.
● Content and Structure: The resolutions should be well-structured, with clear clauses
that address the disarmament or security issue at hand, offering actionable solutions.
● Creativity and Feasibility: The solutions proposed should be innovative yet practical,
reflecting realistic diplomatic outcomes.

4. Adherence to MUN Procedures:

● Rules of Procedure: Delegates must follow formal MUN rules, including raising
motions, points of order, and adhering to speaking times.
● Formal Speech: During moderated caucuses and general debate, delegates are
expected to speak formally, referring to themselves as "the delegate of [country name]"
and addressing the Chair and other delegates with respect.
5. Proactiveness in Debate:

● Engagement: Delegates are expected to actively participate in the discussions and

debates, not just in formal speeches but also in lobbying and negotiations.
● Responsiveness: Responding to other countries’ concerns and adjusting strategies
during the course of debate is important.

6. Problem-Solving Mindset:

● Strategic Thinking: The DISEC committee addresses pressing global security issues.
Delegates should think critically and strategically about how their country can contribute
to peace and security.
● Long-Term Solutions: Proposals should focus not only on immediate actions but also
on long-term sustainable solutions for global security.

7. Representation of National Interest:

● National Priorities: Throughout the committee sessions, the delegate must remain true
to their country’s interests and not personal opinions, even if it means opposing a
popular resolution.

4) Brief on Private Military and Security Companies (PMSCs)

Private military and security companies (PMSC), are independent corporations

that offer military services to national governments, international organizations,
and substate actors.PMSCs specialize in providing combat and protection forces.
Their work ranges from running small-scale training missions to providing
combat units composed of up to several hundred highly trained soldiers
equipped with powerful weapons platforms, including tanks and attack
helicopters.

Private Security as a whole holds deep historical roots, with its evolution through
the years revolutionizing its impact in armed conflict. The concept of
mercenaries in military campaigns dates back to ancient times, famously the
Carthiginians used Greek and African mercenaries, among others, notably in the
Punic Wars. The British had employed Hessian mercenaries (Germany) during
the American Revolutionary War (1775-1783), however defeated by George
Washington and the American revolutionaries at ‘The Battle of Trenton’. There
are indications pointing towards mercenaries influencing proxy wars during the
Cold War period.
The introduction of corporate PMSCs in the 1990s, offered military services to
governments, multinational corporations, and NGOs. Post-Cold War, with the
reduction of military budgets and spending, PMSCs took upon the demand to fill
these gaps. The use of PMSCs and their role in conflicts around the world
diversified as time went on, but not without bringing about questioning of their
legal and ethical validity in accordance with International Humanitarian Law
(IHL).

5)Noteworthy PMSCs:

1) Erinys

A British private military contractor that is famed for protecting oil assets in
the Middle East and Africa. The group was contracted by the US State
Department to secure key oil pipelines across 282 locations in Iraq with its
manpower of 16,000 personnel. Erinys also maintains a presence in Congo to
protect its iron ore mines, and oil and gas projects.

2) Olive Group

Founded in 2001, the company has been protecting oil facilities in Iraq from
attackers since 2003. The Olive Group recruits its staff from the UK’s Special Air
Service team for higher salaries.

3) Academi (formerly Blackwater)

Academi is one of the largest military contractors in the world. Founded by Erik
Prince in 1996 as Blackwater, the company was renamed as Academi in 2011, before
it merged with Triple Canopy to form Constellis Holdings in 2014. The private
military contractor had an active involvement in America’s wars in Afghanistan and
Iraq. During its peak, the force had its own fleet of armored vehicles and military
aircraft, and even recently in 2017, Erik Prince offered assistance to the Afghan Air
Force to boost their aerial capabilities. The offer, however, was declined by Kabul.

4) PMC Wagner

Russia’s PMC Wagner is the second largest private military contractor in the world,
with a manpower of over 50,000 personnel that are actively engaged in conflicts in
Mali, Libya, Sudan, Syria, and Ukraine. The group is believed to be backed by the
Russian government, but operates independently from the conventional military
forces. Ties between the Kremlin and Wagner received a dent in 2023 after Wagner
chief Yevgeny Prigozhin staged a rebellion against Putin’s regime.

5) G4S

British private security company, G4S, is one of the largest employers in the world,
with around 620,000 personnel. While the majority of the group’s operations are
centered around securing airports, prisons, and banks, its operatives also play an
active role in some of the most volatile crisis zones in the world. G4S is present in 125
countries of the world, including in the war-hit regions of Africa and Latin America.
The company acquired ArmorGroup in 2008, whose 9,000 guards provided security
to a third of all non-military convoys in Iraq. In 2015, G4S was awarded a £100m
contract to secure a gas plant in Iraq and provide security to British diplomats in
Afghanistan.
6) Use Of PMSCs in conflicts and their plausible deniability:

Private Military and Security Companies (PMSCs) have gained more prominence,
especially in global affairs, by carrying out both combatant and non-combatants
operations such as states’ logistics and support supply lines, base building &
gathering intelligence and other security provisions.

The changing character of warfare and the inclusion of private forces into the
battlefield have changed the dynamics of conflict that is shifting from high intensity
warfare to low intensity warfare. PMSCs have the potential to become integral part of
privatized conflicts (as shown in figure 4), thereby, states’ demand for PMSCs has
been augmenting gradually. For instance, developed states go for PMSCs for
‘plausible deniability’ on one hand, and to ‘reduce their defense budget’ on the other
hand. At the same time, states also facilitate the training of PMSCs and strengthens
their military capability.8 Few examples are:

• The Wagner group, who was hired to assist the breakaway Russian region in
Eastern Ukraine.

• Wagner group in Syria to fight for Assad.

• Private military contractors who fought Boko Haram in Nigeria.

• The US Blackwater/Xe/Academi in Iraq and Afghanistan to train Afghan soldiers.

• Executive Outcomes in Angola.

• Sandline International in Sierra Leone to train soldiers and conduct military

operations.
Unlike the developed states, failed or underdeveloped states need PMSCs to survive,
reinstate their sovereignty, and stop prevailing internal conflicts or threats posed by
warlords and rebels against the state. Besides states, NGOs, international
institutions like the UN employ PMSCs for humanitarian assistance during conflicts.

7) Human rights violations and abuses linked to PMSCs:

(The Working Group is a task force created by the UN)Through its visits, the
Working Group observed that mercenaries, private military and security
companies, and foreign fighters can significantly destabilize a country by violent
means. This can render a State helpless and ineffective, particularly if the violent
conflict is prolonged. This severely affects local populations and hinders them
from effectively building a peaceful, developed and democratic society. Moreover,
the Working Group has documented human rights violations instigated by
mercenaries, private military and security companies, and foreign fighters,
including summary executions, enforced disappearances and abductions,
arbitrary detention, sexual and gender-based violence, and slavery, to name a
few.

Mercenarism and mercenary-related activities further undermine Target 16.2. to

end abuse, exploitation, trafficking and all forms of violence against and torture
of children. The Working Group found that children were commonly the victims
of human rights violations in situations where mercenaries, private military and
security companies, and foreign fighters operated, particularly in conflict zones.
The human rights violations committed against children included abductions,
torture, detention, sexual slavery and forcible recruitment as child soldiers. Our
most recent report to the Human Rights Council on a related topic emphasizes
the importance of rehabilitation and reintegration responses to this
phenomenon, as well as addressing root causes.

8) Lack Of Accountability for PMSCs:

Challenges in governance pose major obstacles in ensuring human rights

accountability for private military companies (PMSCs). These issues arise from
the transnational nature of PMSC operations and the complex interactions
between international and domestic regulatory systems. State jurisdiction
generally limits state courts, while restrictions on the extraterritorial application
of domestic law narrow the scope for civil actions . Protection agreements can
protect PMSCs from local litigation, and international tribunals like the ICC have
little jurisdiction over companies.Conflicting legal issues create uncertainty
when multiple legal provisions may apply, and private arbitration cases can lead
to disputes in federal court. The ambiguous legal status of some PMC employees
further complicates matters.

All of these factors combine to create a responsibility gap, as host states may not
be jurisdictional, while resident states have extraterritorial barriers suggested
solutions create a clear international legal framework, increase international
cooperation, expand international court orders to include corporate liability,
strengthen domestic corporate law accountability, legal mutual aid agreements
Reform exists and yet the necessary political will and international consensus
are needed to implement comprehensive solutions. Removing these
jurisdictional barriers is essential to ensure proper accountability for human
rights in the private armed forces.
9) The Montreux Document:
The Montreux Document is a collection of international legal obligations
respecting human rights law, in particular ‘international humanitarian law’ (IHL)
that states are advised to follow, when PMSCs are present or involved in armed
conflict. It was developed in 2008 by Switzerland and the International
Committee of the Red Cross (ICRC). The document is not legally binding, its main
purpose is to provide recommendations on how PMSCs should be regulated. The
document is essentially a layout of the effective regulation of PMSCs.
It accentuates the responsibilities of three types of states:
1. Contracting states (countries that hire PMSCs)
2. Territorial states (countries on whose territory PMSCs operate)
3. Home states (countries in which PMSCs are headquartered or based)
The Montreux Document is supported by 59 countries, and 3 International
Organisations (EU, NATO, OSCE):
International Humanitarian Law, the law of armed conflict, applies to all parties
of a conflict, therefore including PMSCs and their involvement in conflict. IHL
helps categorize PMSC employees to one of two statuses: ‘Combatants’ or
‘Civilians’, holding differing obligations and protections accordingly. PMSCs are
also subject to international human rights law in general.

The International Code of Conduct for Private Security Providers (ICoC),

established in 2010, is a voluntary set of standards with the goal of enhancing
international law compliance within PMSCs. The ICoC is overseen by the
International Code of Conduct Association (ICoCA).

States have also incorporated their own national legislation so as to regulate

PMSCs, which often draw from principles from the Montreux Document and the
ICoC. For example, the United States of America has the Military Extraterritorial
Jurisdiction Act, allowing them to prosecute certain individuals for felonies
committed outside the country, and employees of PMSCs do come under this Act
under certain circumstances.

10) Pre-war History on the Russia-Ukraine Conflict:

The history of the Russia-Ukraine conflict, particularly leading up to the war that
escalated in 2022, is complex and rooted in historical, political, and cultural
factors. Below is a brief overview of the pre-war history:

The 2014 Euromaidan protests:

In November 2013, the Ukrainian Government of pro-Russian President Viktor
Yanukovych decided not to sign a planned Association Agreement with the
European Union and demonstrations ensued in the capital Kyiv. These
‘Euromaidan’ demonstrations turned violent in early 2014 and, in February that
year, some European foreign ministers mediated a compromise, involving a unity
government and early elections. After the collapse of a power-sharing agreement
on 22 February 2014, President Yanukovych disappeared from Ukraine and a new
government was installed by the Ukrainian parliament.

Russia’s annexation of Crimea, 2014 :

Toward the end of February 2014, unidentified military figures, later confirmed to
be Russian personnel, surrounded the airports in Crimea, a majority Russian
peninsula in Ukraine. The Crimean autonomous assembly was then seized by
pro-Russian forces. In March 2014 the assembly issued a declaration of
independence and a subsequent referendum on union with Russia was held.
According to Russian election officials, 95.5% of voters supported union with
Russia. The results of that referendum are not internationally recognised. Since
then, Russia has maintained its control over Crimea and supported pro Russian
separatist forces who also took control of parts of the Donetsk and Luhansk
regions of eastern Ukraine (the Donbas) in 2014. Fighting between
Russian-supported separatists and Ukrainian government forces has continued
in the Donbas despite the negotiation of the Minsk Agreements in 2014/2015
which called for a ceasefire, the withdrawal of all foreign armed groups and
constitutional reform recognising the special status of Donetsk and Luhansk

11) The War In 2022 :

The Russia-Ukraine War in 2022 was the culmination of a series of historical

tensions and geopolitical events. The roots of the conflict trace back to Ukraine's
1991 independence from the Soviet Union, which Russia has historically
struggled to accept fully, especially regarding Ukraine's Western alignment and
aspirations for NATO membership.In the lead-up to the 2022 invasion, Russia
amassed a large military presence along Ukraine's borders, citing security
concerns over NATO's expansion and Ukraine's potential membership. Russia
demanded security guarantees, including a halt to NATO's eastward expansion,
which were rejected by the West.
The immediate trigger for the 2022 invasion was Russia's recognition of the
self-proclaimed republics of Donetsk and Luhansk in eastern Ukraine, followed
by the deployment of Russian troops under the guise of peacekeeping. On
February 24, 2022, Russia launched a full-scale invasion, leading to widespread
international condemnation and severe economic sanctions against Russia. The
war has resulted in significant casualties and displacement, marking one of the
most severe conflicts in Europe since World War II.

Wagner Group’s Involvement:

The history of the Wagner Group dates back to the Donbas war in 2014–5, when
several independent combat groups were formed from loose mercenary units,
each of strengths up to that of a light infantry company. It is not exactly known
how they were created. They were generally supervised by the secret services,
and the Russian army provided them with its training centers and weapons.
These units were used primarily as sabotage and reconnaissance groups, but
they did not play a major role in this phase of the aggression in the Donbas. One
group commanded by a former Spetsnaz officer, Dmitry Utkin, who used the
call-sign Wagner, distinguished itself among the other units.Because Wagner has
spent most of its existence in a gray area of plausible deniability, its origins and
organizational structure are, by design, murky. The most credible account of the
group’s creation involves Dmitry Utkin, a former GRU and Spetsnaz officer, and a
short-lived mercenary company called the Slavonic Corps. The Slavonic Corps
was formed in 2013 to provide support for the regime of Bashar al-Assad during
the Syrian Civil War, but the unit was routed in its first engagement, a clash with
fighters from the Islamic State (ISIL) outside Homs in October 2013. In early 2014
Utkin became associated with a GRU-backed mercenary company that drew at
least part of its membership from the Slavonic Corps, and its
name—Wagner—was reportedly derived from Utkin’s former radio call
sign.Wagner’s first known operations took place during the Russian proxy war in
Ukraine’s Donbas region in 2014.
12) Changing Climate of Warfare Since PMSCs:

State-backed PMSCs can be used to conduct illegal combat operations against

neutral forces in conflict zones to further the national agenda while allowing
deniability from the sponsoring state. This is a gray area that can be exploited as
Russia has done with the Wagner Group in Syria and Ukraine.

In the current climate of low-intensity conflicts, counterinsurgencies and gray

zone warfare, PMSCs will increasingly be used to conduct kinetic actions to solve
internal conflicts or extend the reach of a government which cannot overtly order
uniformed soldiers into an area.

The privatization of conflict erodes a country’s sole ownership of the legitimate

use of force as per the Westphalian order. This incentivises countries providing
their own PMSCs to foreign countries where projects need security, thus
influencing their presence and diplomatic power while reducing the host
nations’, as they are seen as not being able to provide sufficient security to
international projects and personnel.

Including PMSCs in training scenarios will increase the complexity of the training
and bring it in line with future battle spaces where the ADF may provide
peacekeeping operations.

Suggested Discussion Topics :

1) What is terrorism ?
 2) What can be considered PMSCs and if they are a negative or positive influence ?
3) To what extent are states responsible for the actions of PMSCs operating within their
jurisdiction or on their behalf in conflict zones?
4) Should PMSCs be held to the same ethical standards as military personnel?
5) What are the emerging trends in the use of PMSCs?
6) What mechanisms are currently in place for oversight, and how effective are they?

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