Safe Cable Technology

J E Robinson

Association of European Producers of Flame Retardant Olefinic Cable Compounds

Summary

The manufacture of zero halogen cable products is either carried out by cable
companies themselves or alternatively a number of relatively small independent
companies specialising in compound manufacture. The dispersed nature of this
group makes effective promotion of these materials difficult and as a result the
need for a trade association was highlighted. The result is the Association of
European Producers of Flame Retardant Olefinic Cable Compounds (FROCC)
which was formed in summer 2001.

Over the past 3 years it has been claimed in numerous publications (1, 2, 3)
originating from the USA (or from work carried out within Europe but
sponsored by companies of US parentage) that "Zero Halogen" cables exhibit
excessive flame spread, self reignite, cause explosions and generate combustion
fumes with significant toxicity. The purpose of this paper is to place on record a
response to the alleged deficiencies of zero halogen cable technology and to
confirm our belief in the continuing viability of these products.

Introduction.

Different perceptions of fire hazard exist within the USA and Europe. In the USA it has
been noted that fire fatalities are due to carbon monoxide (CO) poisoning and that under
flashover conditions CO is directly linked to heat release(4). Therefore if the heat release
is controlled by whatever means the fatalities will correspondingly be reduced. In Europe
the model is different. Fire fatalities are believed due to people failing to escape from the
fire hazard. Smoke, irritancy and toxicity are factors inhibiting escape and it is to these
factors that the greatest attention is given(5). The exclusion of halogenated materials is a
strategy to improve escape potential as the combustion fumes arising from halogenated
materials are known to cause significant smoke, irritancy and toxicity.

Considerable debate has been stimulated by the use of "prescriptive" description such as
"zero halogen" in cable regulations. The combustion chemistry for halogenated products
is extremely complex and published results indicate approximately twice the number of
identifiable combustion fume components compared with the number arising from the
combustion of zero halogen cable products. In addition many of these halogenated
components have significant toxicity and/or irritancy. In comparison the principal toxic
or irritant products arising from the combustion of zero halogen products are CO and the
aromatic hydrocarbons (Formaldehyde and Acrolein). Thus by excluding halogens (a
relatively straightforward test) and controlling CO, Formaldehyde and Acrolein the
design engineer can go a long way towards risk reduction(6). Attempts to define better
approaches using fire safety engineering have foundered due to the opposition of the very
people who oppose prescriptive testing. The ISO standard 13571 is now at its 14th draft
and has been watered down to a Draft Technical Standard. Our position is that until
industry is able to accept adequate replacements (such as ISO 13571) the current acid gas
and corrosivity regulations must remain in place.

Flamespread

There are two scenarios by which cables may become involved in fire situations. The first
is due to propagation following an ignition due to an electrical deficiency. Typically this
might involve a smouldering type ignition followed by combustion property controlled
propagation. The second is the external fire where in effect the cables are simply
providing fuel for an established fire. A good example of the second type is the plenum
chamber work carried out in the UK where the cables were exposed to an established
1MW secondary fire(1).

Test
Supply sample
voltag e (5 cm in sulation)

Large section
flexible cabl e
(55 mm2)

Fig 1. Circuit diagram for fire initiation test rig

Recent studies have attempted to define the factors which cause cable initiated fires to
propagate. The results compared single 1.5 mm2 insulated conductors. As a first step the
current overload situation was explored. The test circuit involved one loop of cable
passing through a HV transformer (Fig 1). It was calculated that the maximum available
current in the loop would be 900 A at 10 Volts. Two cables were tested:
Zero halogen (hydrate filled)
Plasticised PVC
The results are shown Table 1. Under the conditions of test, neither cable ignited.
Smouldering decomposition did occur with significant smoke release from the PVC
cable.
Table 1. Propagation of electrically initiated fire
Current Time [s] Hydrate filled PVC
[Amp]
20 Not tested No effect
50 30 No effect Smoke
60 – 180 Maximum smoke
420 Signs of plastic deformation. No cracks. Stops smoking, insulation brittle and
Good physical properties after test. cracked
70 30 Slight smoke, insulation discolours Heavy smoke, insulation falling away
from conductor
45 Wire red hot Bare wire
60 Smoke
90 Insulation still intact Wire melts
120 Insulation turns white
420 Stable white char

Additional work explored the propagation of fire along a ladder comprising vertical and
horizontal elements within a 3m3 test cell (Fig 2). The test was carried out with the door
to the cell open which allowed some ventilation. Some results for data cable are being
published (MIT Sept 2001). However the total programme involved many cable types
and as a general conclusion it can be stated that horizontal propagation was difficult to
provoke.

Fig 2. Flashover test cell

Given a different experimental set-up with sufficient source energy plus the correct
(magnitude and direction) ventilation, the complete propagation along a horizontally
installed cable is clearly possible. Tests using low fire performance cables have been
carried out at BRE (7). The fire source was a 1MW gas crib which burned for 30 minutes.
The test samples were German building cables NYM (PVC) and NHMH (Zero halogen).
The cables were totally consumed during the test. Comparative Heat Release data is
shown (Table 2). Concern is generally expressed for the delicate computer equipment
being exposed to such conditions although it is a debatable point if the equipment would
behave differently due to NYM or NHMH heat exposure.
Table 2. Heat release during large scale plenum fire tests
Cable NYM NHMH
Burner - HRR(average) MW 1.00 1.00
Cable - HRR(average) MW 0.22 0.38
Total HRR(average) MW 1.22 1.38
Burner - HRR(peak) MW 1.00 1.00
Cable - HRR(peak) MW 0.96 1.59
Total HRR(peak) MW 1.96 2.59

Explosive flamespread – “Flashover”

The definition of flashover is given in a British Standard (8) as: “a sudden transition to a
state of total surface involvement in a fire of combustible materials within a
compartment”. The international Standard Organisation (9) gives a similar wording: “The
rapid transition to a state of total surface involvement in a fire of combustible materials
within an enclosure”.

These definitions might be considered abstract. The following description, coming from
the Home Office Fire Research and Development Group, provides further clarification
(10). “In a compartment fire there can come a stage where the total thermal radiation
from the fire plume, hot gases and hot compartment boundaries cause the radiative
ignition of all exposed combustible surfaces within the compartment. This sudden and
sustained transition of a growing fire to a developed fire is flashover”. From experimental
data, Thomas (11) has derived an expression for the minimum rate of energy release
required for flashover. His expression assumes a sudden temperature change of 600 °C.

In parallel with the thermal process, there are also chemical processes. These chemical
processes in the hot gas layer are often the reason for the sudden and dramatic increase in
radiation to the fuel, resulting in flashover. These processes have not been greatly
investigated. Measurement of certain parameters like mass loss rate, O2 , CO and C O2
concentration makes it possible to determine the equivalence ratio, which is the ratio
between fuel and air, normalised to the stochiometric fuel air ratio. This can also be used
to identify flashover.

A principal objective of the 3m3 work programme described above (Fig 2) was an attempt
to provoke a flashover fire propagation in a cable installation. Previous work had shown
that fire propagation is very dependent on cable installation. It was hoped that by
combining all the most adverse factors, the fire growth would become so rapid that
flashover would be provoked. From previous studies, the worst case scenario was found
to be a single layer of cable in a tray installation. The addition of a cover to the vertical
part of the installation provokes a chimney effect and extremely rapid vertical
propagation. Different cables have been used for this work but in only one out of 40 tests
did propagation occur along the full length of the horizontal ladder. This was despite
significant fires approaching 400kw being provoked in the vertical part of the test
assembly.
 500 60

PVC36x-400mm tray+lid
NHMH36x-400mmTray+lid
FIGRA 50
400
PVC36x-400mm tray+lid

NHMH36x-400mmTray+lid 40

300

30

200

20

100
10

0 0
00:00 07:12 14:24 21:36 28:48 36:00 00:00 07:12 14:24 21:36 28:48 36:00 43:12

Time [s]
Time [s]

Fig 3. Flashover study – Heat release data + Vitiation

The gradient of the growth of heat release is defined as fire growth rate (FIGRA) and is
seen to be +/-800 W/s. This is a value typically associated with a flashover fire. However
only the NYM cable propagated along its full length. The CO2/CO ratio of below 10
indicates severe vitiation. Due to the heavy smoke it was impossible to observe the fire
development and so we remain uncertain if flashover occurred. Horizontal fire
propagation for the NHMH cable was < 2000 mm and so in this case flashover had
certainly not occurred.

It should be emphasised that these of installations were designed to provoke severe fire
growth and should never be encountered in practice. It may be concluded that correctly
installed cables are by themselves unlikely to cause flashover.

Re-ignition

The reported re-ignition experiment (2) was carried out as part of the PIT funded research
using the BRE plenum rig. The test was carried out using zero halogen cable. There was
no ventilation. During the period where the burner was alight limited flame propagation
was observed which ceased a short time into the test. However the cable assembly and
plenum space clearly became very hot. After the fire was extinguished air entered the
plenum and the fire reignited and propagated until all the air was consumed when it self
extinguished again. This cycle was slowly repeated until the total cable length had been
consumed.

Our view is that this experiment says more about post fire management than cable
technology. The risk of re-ignition following a fire is well established and is not
particular to zero halogen cables.

Toxicity Studies.
It is always possible to find a particular combustion process which gives a particular
combustion chemistry with particular combustion fume composition. Literature surveys
for general combustion fume toxicity reveal a consistent picture - PE less toxic than PVC
which is less toxic than FEP, Fig 4.
Fig.4 Concentration time response plot for classifying the potency of combustion products by plastics.
(after A.H. Landrock,”Handbook of Plastics Flammability and combustion Toxicology”)

The results of the cable toxicity tests such as IMO MSc. 41 or NES 713 do not always
correspond with these findings. Identification of specific products requires the definition
of decomposition reactions which must then be proven by practical experiments.
Potential combustion reactions for PE, PVC and FEP are shown in figures 5, 6 and 7. It
is clear from the reaction schemes presented that some of the most toxic substances such
as benzene, carbonyl fluoride, octa fluoro isobutylene etc. are not taken into account in
these methods. It comes as no surprise that a non-hydro carbon polymer like FEP gives
totally different decomposition products than a hydrocarbon one and it is clear that this
fact has not been taking into account in the referred methods.

− [CH 2
− CH 2
]n −
2
O
al

N2
Ide

Reality
O2 + H 2O
CO2 + H2O Aliphatics +
CO2 + CO + H 2O + aromatics
aliphatics + aromatics +
Oxygenated aliphatics
Fig.5. Possible combustion reactions for polyethylene.
 − [CF 2 − CF 2 − CF ]n −
CF

2
3

O
dry

N2
al
Ide
Reality
O O 2 + H2O
||
F −C − F + CO2 +CF4 Per fluoro aliphatics
HF + CO2 + CO +
Per fluoro aliphatics +
Fluoro oxygenated compounds
Fig. 6. Possible combustion reactions for Fluorinated Ethylene Propylene.

− [CH 2 − CH ]n −
Cl
2
O

N2
al
Ide

Reality
O 2 + H 2O
CO2 + H2O+ HCl HCl + aromatics +
CO2 + CO + HCl + H 2 O Chlorinated aromatics
Aromatic & aliphatic Hydrocarbons +aliphatics+chlorinated
Chlorinated aromatics & aliphatics Aliphatics + soot
Oxygenated aromatics & aliphatics
Cloro-oxygenated aromatics & aliphatics + soot
Fig.7. Possible combustion reactions for PVC

Extensive work comparing the toxicity of fumes arising from the combustion of chalk
filled polyolefins, chalk filled polyolefins, PVC and FEP and cables produced from these
materials has been previously published (12, 13). The key point is that the combustion of
zero halogen products is largely a function of fire temperature plus the available oxygen.
During the initial stages when oxygen is plentiful the combustion is clean with little
smoke and very low toxicity. As the fire progresses the oxygen depletes, combustion
slows and temperature decreases with resulting increases in smoke and toxic gases such
as Acrolein and Formaldehyde. The combustion of halogenated materials is different.
Smoke and gas analysis are largely independent of the available oxygen and the fire
behaves as if vitiated, irrespective of the actual fire conditions. The result is a very rapid
increase in both smoke and irritancy/toxicity during the early stages of the fire.
Euroclassification

At the time of preparation of this paper the debate regarding the Euroclassification of
cables is by no means closed. (CONSTRUCT 00/430 Rev 2).

Table 3. EC proposal for the classification of cables

Class Test Classification Additional

A Not applicable

B Bunch vertical Flame spread Dynamic Smoke

FIGRA or peak RHR
Single vertical Flamespread Dripping
Fumes Acidity
C Bunch vertical Flame spread Dynamic Smoke
FIGRA or peak RHR
Single vertical Flamespread Dripping
Fumes Acidity

D Bunch vertical Flame spread Dynamic Smoke

FIGRA or peak RHR
Single vertical Flamespread Dripping
Fumes Acidity

E Single Vertical Flamespread Dripping

Fumes Acidity
F No performance

The current document clearly separates the application of Zero Halogen products from
PVC (Table 3). Without going into details of the limits proposed, the overall approach
seems correct and will allow Zero Halogen products to compete in all classes. Where
smoke and corrosivity are less important PVC will dominate – thus maintaining the status
quo. Product selection will correctly be a matter of debate between the building designer
and the National Fire Regulators.

Probably the most important outcome of the Euroclassification debate is the introduction
of a time element to the definition of fire performance with FIGRA (Peak Heat
Release/Time) and SMOGRA (Peak Smoke/time) defined as a key safety parameters.
Comparative cone data is shown for Zero Halogen and a PVC products Fig 8.
 Heat rel eas e rate (kW/m2)
1500
LDPE F IGRA g ra dien t Cone Ca lo rimeter
Compar is o n o f co mb ustion beh avior
1250
Prod uc t D es cripti on
L DPE L ow density po lyethyl ene
1000 PP/Cha lk C ha lk filled, polyp ropylene
EVA/AL (O H ) Alu miniu m Trihyd ra te fille d, E VA
3
PVC G e neral jacke ting compoun d
750 b uilding w ire
PP/Chalk
500
EVA/Al(OH)3
250
PVC
0
0 120 240 360 480
Ti me (s)

m2/s
180
SMOGRA gradient Cone Calorimeter
160 PVC Comparison of combustion behavi or
140 P roduct Description
LDPE Low Densit y Polyethylene
120 PP/Chalk P P/Chalk Chalk filled, Polypropylene
E VA/Al(OH)3 Aluminium Trihydrate f illed, E VA
100 P VC General jacket ing compound
LDPE building wire
80
EVA/Al(OH) 3
60
40
20
0

0 120 240 360 480

Time (s)

Fig 8. Typical FIGRA and SMOGRA data

The fire performance of these products has been explored by means of large-scale tests
using the BRE plenum rig (7). Results correlate perfectly with the cone data with the
PVC cable exhibiting rapid growth of both flamespread and smoke whereas the fire
growth for the zero halogen cable was much slower. In the latter stages of the fire the
zero halogen cable burned more strongly whereas the PVC cable was more subdued.

Discussion

In the introduction we described the basic fire safety philosophy in the USA of being
totally concerned with Heat Release on the basis that after flashover the quantity of CO
produced is directly related to the heat release. This approach gives problems. It is
claimed that life is not tenable in the proximity of a flashover fire. The problem therefore
is for the building occupants to effect an escape before flashover. This is recognised in
Euroclassification legislation where FIGRA (Heat Release/Time) is defined as the key
safety parameter.

The limited work reported on fire growth following cable electrical breakdown indicates
that this mechanism is an unlikely source of a fire. This conclusion is supported by
statistical data on fires. The research in this area is ongoing and it is hoped will form part
of a European Community sponsored project on Life Cycle – Risk Analysis. However on
the basis of the available evidence it may be assumed that the principal cable contribution
is to provide fuel to a secondary fire source.

In any risk analysis consideration must be given to the size and nature of the fire source.
If the fire is large adding zero halogen fuel will simply increase the fire load. There will
be little change in smoke or toxicity/irritancy. Adding halogen containing fuel to an
established fire is far more complex. There is a strong possibility of an immediate
increase in smoke. Toxicity/irritancy will certainly increase and under certain
circumstances it is reported that there is a possibility of the formation of extremely
hazardous super toxic materials.

The ISO 13571 approach is to consider hazard in terms of Fractional Effective

Concentration (FEC) which correlates with irritancy and Fractional Effective Dose (FED)
correlating with toxicity. Currently FED and FEC values are established based on rather
few of the possible combustion products. Recent work has shown that approximately 1/3
of the combustion products require GCMS procedures for their identification and are
ignored using current protocols. The key here is the use of a mass balance in order to
identify the scale of any problem.

The description “zero halogen cable compound” covers a range of products and
technologies from simple mineral filled products to sophisticated intumescent systems.
These products, especially those based on Hydrate technology, have an excellent record
of safe use in building applications. We recognise that requirements change but believe
strongly that the future lies in fire safety engineering as a means to design cost effective
cable installations within the built environment. To that end FROCC supports:
1) Euroclassification (although with the proviso that the protracted gestation may
render the result obsolete at birth!)
2) The application of FSE for building design
3) Improved toxicity assessment methods
4) Definition of strategies for Life Cycle Analysis/Risk Assessment

FROCC intends to participate fully in the ongoing debate on safe cable technology. The
organisation is new and it is hoped will develop quickly. Our progress can be monitored
on our web-site (www.frocc.org) which also contains full contact details.

References

1. Chapin T.J. Tan T.C., Willis A., Pye K., Hoover J.R., Caudill L.M., "Full-scale UK
fire tests of LAN Data Communication cables in concealed-space applications."
Seminar, Loss Prevention Council, Borehamwood, UK, Feb 98.
2. Tan TC & Chapin JT, “Cable Fire Hazard: Results of full-scale fire tests of
communications cables used in concealed space applications”, EUROCABLE ‘98,
Manchester May, 1998.
3. Leung L & Kasprzak D, “Determination of Acrolein, Formaldehyde and other
volatile components from combustion of conductor wires from polyolefin coated
communication cables”, Interflam ’99, Edinburgh
4. Hirschler M, “Fire hazard and smoke toxicity: Post-flashover fire issues or
incapacitation via irritancy”, Flame Retardants 2000, London
5. Building Design Directive, BSI, DD240, Part 1 , 1997.
6. Knutson L, DERA, UK. Discussions October, 2000
7. Fagrell O & Robinson JE, “Low cost building wire in a large scale fire”, Plastics in
Telecommunication VIII, London, Sept 1998.
8. BS 4422 British Standard Glossary of Terms Associated with Fire. Part 1. General
terms and phenomena of fire. British Standards Institution 1987.
9. ISO/IEC Guide 52, Glossary of Fire Terms and Definitions. International Standards
Organisation 1990.
10. Chitty, R., A survey of backdraft, Fire Research and Development Group, Home
Office, 1994.
11. Thomas P.H., Bullen M.L., Quintiere J.G., McCaffrey B.J., “Flashover and
Instabilities in Fire Behaviour”, Combustion and Flame 38: p159-171, 1980.
12. Robinson, J. E., Samson, F., and Sultan, B-Å., “Cable Fire Smoke and Toxicity”,
Eurocable 2000, Stuttgart, Germany, 2000
13. Sultan B-A, Samson F & Robinson JE, “Combustion atmosphere toxicity of
polymeric materials intended for internal cables”, IWCS, Philadelphia, Nov, 2000