Preserving Primacy A Defence Strategy
Preserving Primacy A Defence Strategy
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sanctions, but these have done little to
Preserving Primacy deter Putin.
TOMORROW’S MILITARY
T
he next U.S. president will its disputes through diplomacy, Beijing
inherit a security environment has militarized them, building bases on
in which the United States con natural and artificially created islands.
fronts mounting threats with increasingly The United States has failed to respond
constrained resources, diminished stature, vigorously to these provocations, causing
and growing uncertainty both at home allies to question its willingness to meet
and abroad over its willingness to protect its long-standing security commitments.
its friends and its interests. Revisionist The lack of U.S. leadership is also
powers in Europe, the western Pacific, fueling instability in the Middle East. In
and the Persian Gulf—three regions Iraq, the Obama administration forfeited
long considered by both Democratic hard-won gains by withdrawing all U.S.
and Republican administrations to be forces, creating a security vacuum that
vital to U.S. national security—are enabled the rise of both Iranian influence
seeking to overturn the rules-based and the Islamic State, or isis. Adding to
international order. In Europe, Russian its strategic missteps, the administration
President Vladimir Putin has seized fundamentally misread the character of
Crimea, waged proxy warfare in eastern the Arab Spring, failing to appreciate that
Ukraine, and threatened nato allies on the uprisings would provide opportunities
Russia’s periphery. Further demonstrating for radical Islamist elements rather than
its newfound assertiveness, Russia has lead to a new democratic order. The
dispatched forces to Syria and strength administration also failed to learn from the
ened its nuclear arsenal. After a failed previous administration’s experience in
attempt to “reset” relations with Moscow, Iraq when it chose to “lead from behind”
U.S. President Barack Obama has issued in Libya, intervening to overthrow
stern warnings and imposed economic Muammar al-Qaddafi, only to declare
victory and abandon the country to
MAC THORNBERRY is a Republican Con- internal disorder. It then drew a “redline”
gressman from Texas and Chair of the House over President Bashar al-Assad’s use of
Armed Services Committee.
chemical weapons in Syria but failed to
ANDREW F. KREPINEVICH, JR., is President act to enforce it. The result is growing
of Solarium and a Distinguished Senior Fellow
at the Center for Strategic and Budgetary instability in the Middle East and a
Assessments. decline in U.S. influence.
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Preserving Primacy
September/October 2016 27
Mac Thornberry and Andrew F. Krepinevich, Jr.
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Preserving Primacy
sufficient forces forward, including ground States should encourage its major nato
forces in Japan and the Philippines, the allies to make similar contributions.
United States could, along with its allies, And to further deter Russian adven
offset China’s military buildup and pre turism, it should preposition weapons,
serve the peace. In Japan, the Philippines, munitions, and supplies in the region
September/October 2016 29
Mac Thornberry and Andrew F. Krepinevich, Jr.
30 f o r e i g n a f fa i r s
Preserving Primacy
the United States has vital interests. The to get new equipment from the drawing
effort should entail experimenting with board into the hands of its men and
different types of forces and equipment, women in uniform—more than a decade,
since history shows that experimentation in many cases. In large part, that’s because
lies at the heart of every great military the Pentagon often seeks to push new
innovation. In the period between the systems’ performance characteristics to
world wars, for example, the German an extreme. Projects incur cost overruns
army experimented with exploiting rapid when their overseers attempt to incor
advances in commercial technologies— porate new technologies before they are
mechanization, aviation, and radio—thus mature, wasting both time and money
laying the foundation for the blitzkrieg while troops make do with old equipment.
form of warfare; the U.S. Navy exper Compounding the problem, Uncle Sam
imented with similar technologies to too often spends, relatively speaking,
make the leap from a fleet centered on thousands of dollars ensuring that it
battleships to one organized around the doesn’t get cheated out of nickels and
aircraft carrier. In addition to encouraging dimes. It’s past time to reform that system
innovative thinking, experimentation by setting more realistic requirements and
helps ensure that new weapons systems speeding new equipment into the field.
are sufficiently mature before large-scale Preserving access to the global
production begins, reducing the odds commons remains among the United
that a program will have to be canceled. States’ most important goals. Its military
History also shows that a military strategy must take this into account. A
will have to accept regular failures in little more than a century ago, “the global
order to make major breakthroughs. If commons” generally referred to the
every experiment is a success, then no high seas. Over the ensuing decades,
one is learning much. The German army technological advances expanded the
suffered many failures along its path to definition to include the air and space
the blitzkrieg, as did the U.S. Navy as it and, eventually, cyberspace and undersea
created the aircraft carrier force. Above energy and telecommunications infra
all, past experience shows that because structure. Once the Cold War ended,
preparing for new problems frequently the United States’ access to the commons
requires making major changes, there was taken as a given. The U.S. military
is often firm resistance to such efforts. controlled the seas and the air, and it
Strong civilian and military leadership viewed the other, more novel domains
is needed to overcome it. as benign.
Not only must the U.S. military This is no longer the case. Revisionist
identify the right operational concepts states are increasingly challenging U.S.
to exploit emerging technologies; it access to the commons. Both China
must also field the forces needed to and Russia are perfecting antisatellite
execute them more quickly than rivals. weapons. As lasers grow more powerful,
The faster it generates new capabilities, more states will be able to blind or even
the less it needs to spend on standing destroy satellites. Cyberspace has emerged
forces. Currently, however, the United as a place for economic warfare, espionage,
States takes far longer than its adversaries crime, and terrorism. It is only a matter
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Mac Thornberry and Andrew F. Krepinevich, Jr.
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United States must maintain a robust
nuclear posture—the ultimate guarantor
of its security. U.S. warheads, delivery
methods, and command-and-control
systems have been neglected to the point
where they will soon become obsolete all
at once. The United States can afford to
modernize its nuclear deterrent, which
would cost only around five percent of
the total defense budget. But it needs
to begin this effort now to ensure that it
has a nuclear deterrent that can address
future challenges—not one designed for
a bygone age.
33
Mac Thornberry and Andrew F. Krepinevich, Jr.
tax code. Success on this front is far from much of the uncertainty that plagues
assured, and even if progress is made, it defense planning. For too long, U.S.
will not reverse the country’s economic military planners have lacked explicit
fortunes overnight. directions, resulting in the poor allo
There are other ways to reduce the cation of resources. As the saying goes,
gap between ends and means, but they “If you don’t know where you’re going,
will take foresight and political courage. any road will take you there.”
One approach involves relying more A clear strategy can realign forces in
on the United States’ economic power. ways that not only conserve resources
Sanctions exerted substantial pressure but also reduce the overall risk to security.
on Iran and North Korea, yet the last For example, South Korea has twice the
three administrations abandoned them population of the North and over ten
in exchange for promises that proved times its gdp. Over time, it should be
illusory. The United States’ economic possible for Seoul to assume a greater
might is a poorly developed source of share of the U.S.–South Korean alliance’s
power that, properly employed, can ground force requirements, freeing up
impose substantial costs on rivals, even some U.S. ground forces for other
to the point of compelling them to divert priority missions. Similarly, developing
resources from their military efforts. new operational concepts—for example,
Washington should also draw more one that enables an effective forward
on U.S. allies’ military potential. Too defense of the first island chain—would
often, the Obama administration has further refine the military’s under
treated allies as impediments to its efforts standing of which forces and capabilities
to accommodate U.S. adversaries, despite would be most useful and which could
the lack of evidence that they will some be cut at little risk. The result would
how abandon their hostile aims. Working be the more efficient use of resources
with like-minded governments to craft and a more effective military.
well-designed regional strategies would The ability to field new capabilities
help restore allies’ confidence in the quickly should also cut costs for the
United States as a capable and reliable United States, in part by reducing the
partner. Better relationships would prove practice of relying on immature tech-
especially valuable in the western Pacific, nologies, which leads to cost overruns
where prospective partners must decide and production delays. If policymakers
whether to accommodate themselves set realistic requirements during the
to an increasingly demanding China or acquisition process, the military could
work with the United States. field equipment more rapidly and
Just as important, Washington needs efficiently. What’s more, such a move
to clearly articulate its strategy, so that would impose costs on rivals, since the
allies know which military capabilities uncertainty created by a fast timeline
will be contributing to common objec- would force them to prepare for a wider
tives. A clear strategy should also help range of possible U.S. military capabili-
reduce the gap between ends and means ties: they would need to either spread
by giving the military precise instructions their resources more thinly, reducing
about national priorities, removing the threat they posed, or increase their
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