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 sanctions, but these have done little to
Preserving Primacy deter Putin.
TOMORROW’S MILITARY

Nor has the administration’s “pivot”

to Asia, now five years on, been matched
A Defense Strategy for the by effective action. China continues to
New Administration ramp up its military spending, investing
heavily in weapons systems designed to
Mac Thornberry and Andrew F. threaten U.S. forces in the western Pacific.
As a result, it is proving increas­ingly
Krepinevich, Jr. willing and able to advance its expansive
territorial claims in the East China and
South China Seas. Not content to resolve

T
he next U.S. president will its disputes through diplomacy, Beijing
inherit a security environment has militarized them, building bases on
in which the United States con­ natural and artificially created islands.
fronts mounting threats with increasingly The United States has failed to respond
constrained resources, diminished stature, vigorously to these provocations, causing
and growing uncertainty both at home allies to question its willingness to meet
and abroad over its willingness to protect its long-standing security commitments.
its friends and its interests. Revisionist The lack of U.S. leadership is also
powers in Europe, the western Pacific, fueling instability in the Middle East. In
and the Persian Gulf—three regions Iraq, the Obama administration forfeited
long considered by both Democratic hard-won gains by withdrawing all U.S.
and Republican administrations to be forces, creating a security vacuum that
vital to U.S. national security—are enabled the rise of both Iranian influence
seeking to overturn the rules-based and the Islamic State, or isis. Adding to
international order. In Europe, Russian its strategic missteps, the administration
President Vladimir Putin has seized fundamentally misread the character of
Crimea, waged proxy warfare in eastern the Arab Spring, failing to appreciate that
Ukraine, and threatened nato allies on the uprisings would provide opportunities
Russia’s periphery. Further demonstrating for radical Islamist elements rather than
its newfound assertiveness, Russia has lead to a new democratic order. The
dispatched forces to Syria and strength­ administration also failed to learn from the
ened its nuclear arsenal. After a failed previous administration’s experience in
attempt to “reset” relations with Moscow, Iraq when it chose to “lead from behind”
U.S. President Barack Obama has issued in Libya, intervening to over­throw
stern warnings and imposed economic Muammar al-Qaddafi, only to declare
victory and abandon the country to
MAC THORNBERRY is a Republican Con- internal disorder. It then drew a “redline”
gressman from Texas and Chair of the House over President Bashar al-Assad’s use of
Armed Services Committee.
chemical weapons in Syria but failed to
ANDREW F. KREPINEVICH, JR., is President act to enforce it. The result is growing
of Solarium and a Distinguished Senior Fellow
at the Center for Strategic and Budgetary instability in the Middle East and a
Assessments. decline in U.S. influence.

26 f o r e i g n a f fa i r s
 Preserving Primacy

The threat of Islamist terrorism has from establishing dominance over a

grown on the Obama administration’s key region—Europe, the western
watch. Al Qaeda and isis, both Sunni Pacific, or the Persian Gulf—where it
groups, have gained new footholds in could accumulate sufficient power to
Iraq, Libya, Syria, Yemen, and even West threaten core U.S. interests. Thus, in
Africa. Obama’s negotiations with Iran, the first half of the twentieth century,
the home of radical Shiite Islamism, have the United States waged war twice in
not curbed the country’s involvement Europe to defeat Germany and once
in proxy wars in Iraq, Syria, and Yemen in the Pacific to defeat Japan. During
or its support for Hezbollah in Lebanon the Cold War, it worked with allies to
and Hamas in the Palestinian territories. prevent the Soviet Union from domi-
What the talks did produce—the nuclear nating Western Europe or expanding its
deal—may slow Tehran’s march to ob­ influence into the Middle East and East
taining a nuclear weapon, but it also gives Asia. This goal remains valid today.
the regime access to tens of billions of In order to preserve access to its
dollars in formerly frozen assets. The allies and trading partners, the United
ink on the agreement was barely dry States also needs access to the global
when, in March, Tehran tested ballistic commons. For over 70 years, the U.S.
missiles capable of delivering a nuclear military has borne the responsibility
warhead, in blatant defiance of a un for guaranteeing access to the seas and
Security Council resolution. Adding to the air, not only for the United States but
all this instability, military competition for other countries, too. It has accom­
has expanded into the relatively new plished this task so well that many take
domains of outer space and cyberspace— it for granted. Yet preserving access to
and will eventually extend to undersea the global commons is neither cheap nor
economic infrastructure, as well. easy. Should the United States decline
With the current approach failing, the to play this role, there is no other like-
next president will need to formulate a minded power that could take its place.
new defense strategy. It should include These two tasks have been made all
three basic elements: a clear statement of the more challenging by the revisionist
what the United States seeks to achieve, powers’ growing “anti-access/area-denial”
an understanding of the resources (A2/AD) capabilities, such as long-range
available for those goals, and guidance precision-strike weaponry, antisatellite
as to how those resources will be used. systems, and various cyberweapons. All
The strategy laid out here, if properly are designed to attack the U.S. military’s
implemented, will allow the United States muscle (its forward air bases and aircraft
to preclude the rise of a hegemonic power carriers) and its nervous system (its sur­
along the Eurasian periphery and preserve veillance, reconnaissance, targeting, and
access to the global commons—without communications systems).
bankrupting the country in the process. What resources are available for
accomplishing these two goals? Although
ENDS AND MEANS the United States is no longer as dom­
The chief goal of U.S. foreign policy inant as it was at the end of the Cold
has long been to prevent a hostile state War, relative to the revisionist powers,

September/October 2016 27
Mac Thornberry and Andrew F. Krepinevich, Jr.

the country enjoys an enviable position. budgets—especially in comparison to

It possesses extensive natural resources, the invest­ments that the revisionist
an efficient free-enterprise system, and powers are making—puts the United
the healthiest demographic profile of States and its allies at ever-greater risk.
any major power. The United States has As former Secretary of Defense Robert
a proven ability to assimilate immigrants, Gates said in 2014, cutting U.S. defense
and its educational system, although funding “sends a signal that we are
badly in need of reform, still ranks among not interested in protecting our global
the world’s finest. Thanks to its insular interests.” But Washington needs to do
geographic position and peaceful neigh­ more than simply spend more money on
bors, it can mount a defense of the home­ defense. It needs a strategy that allocates
land far from its shores. Its long list these dollars more efficiently and in ways
of allies includes most of the world’s that create a more effective military.
biggest economies. And it boasts the
world’s best military, in terms of quality CHARTING A COURSE
of people and equipment, as well as in Resources are always limited, so strategy
terms of experience conducting a wide is about making choices. In doing so,
range of operations. policymakers must consider not only the
Yet even as the challenges to U.S. immediacy of a threat but also its scale,
security grow, Washington continues to form, and trajectory. Radical Islamism
cut its military spending. Between 2010 represents the most immediate threat
and 2016, the U.S. defense budget fell the United States faces, but China and
by over 14 percent in real terms, and by Russia have far greater potential to
roughly 30 percent as a percentage of threaten U.S. security. China, a rapidly
gdp, and it will likely fall further over rising power, has built the most capable
the next decade, as interest payments conventional forces besides those of
on U.S. government debt rise. The the United States, and Russia, although
United States’ most capable allies are showing clear signs of decline, still main­
contributing even less. Of the richest tains the world’s largest nuclear arsenal.
powers within nato, only the United The threat from Iran, meanwhile, mainly
Kingdom budgets more than the alli­ entails the risk that its progress toward
ance’s minimum target of two percent achieving a nuclear capability will trigger
of gdp. In Asia, Japan remains con­ a cascade of proliferation in the Middle
strained by its self-imposed ceiling of East. Since the aim should be to minimize
one percent. the overall risk to its security over time,
This is not to say that the United the United States should focus principally
States should simply peg its defense on preparing for the threats from China
spending to a particular percentage of and Russia and secondarily on checking
gdp. The level should depend on many Iranian expansionism and supporting
factors, including the types of threats like-minded partners in suppressing
faced, the amount of risk the American radical Islamist groups.
people are willing to accept, the con­ To meet these challenges, given that
tributions made by allies, and more. resources are limited, the U.S. military
Never­theless, the decline in military will have to adopt a “one-and-a-half-

28 f o r e i g n a f fa i r s
 Preserving Primacy

Access denied: during a Chinese naval exercise, April 2009

war posture”—giving it the ability to and perhaps Vietnam, the door is in­
at once deter or wage a major war with creas­ingly open to greater U.S. military
China and send expeditionary forces to pre­sence and assistance, but it will not
either Europe or the Middle East. In remain open indefinitely. Nor will the
the western Pacific, this means pursuing United States be able to establish a
a strategy of “forward defense” of the forward defense posture quickly. So the
first island chain, which runs from Japan next administration should begin the
through Taiwan and along the Philippines, process without delay.
three countries with which the United The immediate problem posed by
States has firm security commitments. Russia is its use of proxy forces beyond
What it should not do is pursue a strategy its borders. Given the character of
centered on a distant blockade of China this threat, Washington should deploy
or one that relies on mobilization to retake more ground and air forces to front­
lost territory, as the United States did line coun­tries in eastern Europe. Their
in World War II. This would be tanta­ mission would be to help those states
mount to exposing allies and partners deter and, if need be, suppress the
to aggression or coercion and would be Kremlin’s attempts to employ local
seen as such. Instead, by positioning Russian nationals as proxies. The United
GUA N G N I U / R E U T E R S

sufficient forces forward, including ground States should encourage its major nato
forces in Japan and the Philippines, the allies to make similar contributions.
United States could, along with its allies, And to further deter Russian adven­
offset China’s military buildup and pre­ turism, it should preposition weapons,
serve the peace. In Japan, the Philippines, munitions, and supplies in the region

September/October 2016 29
Mac Thornberry and Andrew F. Krepinevich, Jr.

to facilitate the rapid reinforcement of government. It should tighten the

allied forces. sanctions and remove them only after
In the Middle East, the United States Pyongyang takes verifiable and irre­
has oscillated from too much involve­ versible actions to reduce its nuclear
ment to too little, while announcing capability as part of a plan to eliminate
unrealistic objectives, such as destroy­ the arsenal entirely.
ing isis and defeating Iranian proxies.
Washington cannot expunge these GAINING THE UPPER HAND
corrupt forms of Islam; only the local A core element of any defense strategy
populations can do that. It can and involves gaining military advantages in
should, however, support those states certain areas to offset losses in other
and groups that seek to do so, and with areas. For example, the near monopoly
far more vigor than it has to date. Given that the United States has enjoyed in
the greater challenges posed by China precision warfare is coming to an end as
and Russia, the emphasis should be on its rivals acquire new A2/AD capabilities.
quality over quantity. This means relying For over 70 years, the U.S. approach to
more on Special Forces and military projecting power has centered on build­
advisers to assist local governments ing up ground and air forces at forward
and groups, supported by airpower and bases and positioning its fleet close to
cyber-operations. As in eastern Europe, the enemy’s shores. But with ever-greater
it also means adopting an expeditionary numbers of missiles and aircraft armed
military posture that emphasizes the with precision-guided munitions, China
ability to send in reinforcements rapidly and other rivals are increasingly able to
in the event of overt aggression, in this target U.S. forces at greater distances.
case by Iran. The United States is also losing its
North Korea, with its radical regime, edge in a number of key military tech­
weakening economy, and growing nuclear nologies. Artificial intelligence, big data,
arsenal, poses a unique challenge. For directed energy, genetic engineering,
years, the United States agreed to give and robotics all have military applica­
economic aid to the country to prevent tions, yet their development is being
it from becoming a nuclear power. After driven primarily by the commercial
Pyongyang crossed that threshold in sector. So they are available to anyone
2006, Washington pursued still more with the means to obtain them, includ­
agreements in a vain effort to limit the ing U.S. rivals.
regime’s nuclear arsenal, which continues To sustain its advantage in key areas of
to expand. Fortunately, there are indi­ competition, the U.S. military will have
cations that the Obama administration to develop new operational concepts—
is beginning to supplant this failed the methods by which it organizes, equips,
strategy with one emphasizing tougher and employs forces for deterring an
economic sanctions, and both Japan and enemy or prevailing against one should
South Korea are improving their missile deterrence fail. Above all, this means
defenses. The next administration should ensuring that the military is focused on
not abandon these efforts in exchange the right set of challenges, such as the
for promises from the North Korean A2/AD threats in those regions where

30 f o r e i g n a f fa i r s
 Preserving Primacy

the United States has vital interests. The to get new equipment from the drawing
effort should entail experimenting with board into the hands of its men and
different types of forces and equipment, women in uniform—more than a decade,
since history shows that experimentation in many cases. In large part, that’s because
lies at the heart of every great military the Pentagon often seeks to push new
innovation. In the period between the systems’ performance characteristics to
world wars, for example, the German an extreme. Projects incur cost overruns
army experimented with exploiting rapid when their overseers attempt to incor­
advances in commercial technologies— porate new technologies before they are
mechanization, aviation, and radio—thus mature, wasting both time and money
laying the foundation for the blitzkrieg while troops make do with old equipment.
form of warfare; the U.S. Navy exper­ Compounding the problem, Uncle Sam
imented with similar technologies to too often spends, relatively speaking,
make the leap from a fleet centered on thousands of dollars ensuring that it
battleships to one organized around the doesn’t get cheated out of nickels and
aircraft carrier. In addition to encouraging dimes. It’s past time to reform that system
innovative thinking, experimentation by setting more realistic requirements and
helps ensure that new weapons systems speeding new equipment into the field.
are sufficiently mature before large-scale Preserving access to the global
production begins, reducing the odds commons remains among the United
that a program will have to be canceled. States’ most important goals. Its military
History also shows that a military strategy must take this into account. A
will have to accept regular failures in little more than a century ago, “the global
order to make major breakthroughs. If commons” generally referred to the
every experiment is a success, then no high seas. Over the ensuing decades,
one is learning much. The German army technological advances expanded the
suffered many failures along its path to definition to include the air and space
the blitzkrieg, as did the U.S. Navy as it and, eventually, cyberspace and undersea
created the aircraft carrier force. Above energy and telecommunications infra­
all, past experience shows that because structure. Once the Cold War ended,
preparing for new problems frequently the United States’ access to the commons
requires making major changes, there was taken as a given. The U.S. military
is often firm resistance to such efforts. controlled the seas and the air, and it
Strong civilian and military leadership viewed the other, more novel domains
is needed to overcome it. as benign.
Not only must the U.S. military This is no longer the case. Revisionist
identify the right operational concepts states are increasingly challenging U.S.
to exploit emerging technologies; it access to the commons. Both China
must also field the forces needed to and Russia are perfecting antisatellite
execute them more quickly than rivals. weapons. As lasers grow more powerful,
The faster it generates new capabilities, more states will be able to blind or even
the less it needs to spend on standing destroy satellites. Cyberspace has emerged
forces. Currently, however, the United as a place for economic warfare, espionage,
States takes far longer than its adversaries crime, and terrorism. It is only a matter

September/October 2016 31
Mac Thornberry and Andrew F. Krepinevich, Jr.

of time before undersea infrastructure Chinese have opposed similar plans in

becomes a target. States and nonstate South Korea designed to guard against
actors can obtain unmanned underwater a North Korean attack. Concerns that
vehicles that can reach the seabed. As is cyberweapons could be used to disable
the case with cyberattacks, it may prove early warning and command-and-control
difficult to identify the source of attacks systems complicate matters even further.
on the United States’ assets in space or on Despite these profound changes, the
the seabed, which means that a strategy Obama administration has remained
based on deterrence is unlikely to work. firmly rooted in the Cold War paradigm
Instead, the U.S. military will have to of arms control, focusing on U.S. and
shift to a strategy based on defending Russian nuclear arsenals while envision-
its assets, limiting damage to them, and ing a world without nuclear weapons.
repairing or regenerating them rapidly. The United States’ principal rivals, by
contrast, are already operating in the new
A NEW NUCLEAR AGE nuclear age. The Russians have adopted
The United States’ nuclear forces remain an “escalate to de-escalate” doctrine,
the foundation on which its security rests. which calls for the use of nuclear weapons
But the context in which these forces to offset Russia’s inferiority in conven­
function has changed dramatically. The tional forces, and have tested weapons
world has entered a second nuclear age, that likely violate the 1987 Intermediate-
having shifted from a bipolar U.S.-Soviet Range Nuclear Forces Treaty. China
competition to increasingly multipolar shares Russia’s concerns about the United
regional and global competitions. These States’ precision-strike capabilities and
competitions are also becoming multi­ missile defenses and has refused to
dimensional. Although nuclear weapons provide anything but the most modest
retain pride of place, other capabilities— details about its own nuclear capabilities
such as precision-guided munitions and and intentions, even as it modernizes its
cyberweapons, as well as advanced air nuclear forces and expands its arsenal
and missile defenses—have entered the of precision-guided munitions and
discussion of strategic warfare. What cyberweapons.
used to be called “the nuclear balance” It is time to move beyond Cold
might now more accurately be described War–era thinking and assess the compe-
as “the strategic balance.” tition not by merely counting weapons
China and Russia, for example, have but by looking at it through the lens of
expressed concerns about the United the second nuclear age. A key initial
States’ nascent “prompt global strike” step toward adapting the U.S. nuclear
capability, which would allow the U.S. arsenal involves developing detailed
military to hit a target anywhere in the plans to address various plausible crisis
world within one hour. They have also scenarios—ones involving the United
complained about U.S. air and missile States, China, and Russia; the possible
defenses: the Russians have protested use of nuclear weapons by minor powers
U.S. plans to place missile defenses in such as North Korea; or a conflict between
eastern Europe to deal with attacks two nuclear-armed states, such as India
launched from the Middle East, and the and Pakistan. In the meantime, the

32 f o r e i g n a f fa i r s
United States must maintain a robust
nuclear posture—the ultimate guarantor
of its security. U.S. warheads, delivery
methods, and command-and-control
systems have been neglected to the point
where they will soon become obsolete all
at once. The United States can afford to
modernize its nuclear deterrent, which
would cost only around five percent of
the total defense budget. But it needs
to begin this effort now to ensure that it
has a nuclear deterrent that can address
future challenges—not one designed for
a bygone age.

MIND THE GAP

Even the best strategy will fail if it is
not properly resourced, and the strategy
outlined here requires significantly
greater resources than what the Pentagon
is currently projecting will be made
available. Fortunately, there is bipartisan
support for restoring funding for defense
to levels called for by the budget Gates
proposed as secretary of defense for fiscal
year 2012. Doing so would go a long
way toward closing the gap between
the United States’ security needs and
its ability to meet them at a reasonable
level of risk.
Yet the rapid growth in entitlements
and projected increases in federal deficits
will likely impose political constraints
on defense spending. The Obama admin­
istration’s policies have produced an
anemic economic recovery while burden­
ing future generations with ever-greater
debt, thus accelerating the erosion of the
United States’ position. The next pres­
ident must make restoring the country’s
economic foundation a priority. The
long-term solution lies in stimulating
economic growth, making tough choices
on entitlements, and revising the outdated

33

Mac Thornberry and Andrew F. Krepinevich, Jr.

tax code. Success on this front is far from much of the uncertainty that plagues
assured, and even if progress is made, it defense planning. For too long, U.S.
will not reverse the country’s economic military planners have lacked explicit
fortunes overnight. directions, resulting in the poor allo­
There are other ways to reduce the cation of resources. As the saying goes,
gap between ends and means, but they “If you don’t know where you’re going,
will take foresight and political courage. any road will take you there.”
One approach involves relying more A clear strategy can realign forces in
on the United States’ economic power. ways that not only conserve resources
Sanctions exerted substantial pressure but also reduce the overall risk to security.
on Iran and North Korea, yet the last For example, South Korea has twice the
three administrations abandoned them population of the North and over ten
in exchange for promises that proved times its gdp. Over time, it should be
illusory. The United States’ economic possible for Seoul to assume a greater
might is a poorly developed source of share of the U.S.–South Korean alliance’s
power that, properly employed, can ground force requirements, freeing up
impose substantial costs on rivals, even some U.S. ground forces for other
to the point of compelling them to divert pri­ority missions. Similarly, developing
resources from their military efforts. new operational concepts—for example,
Washington should also draw more one that enables an effective forward
on U.S. allies’ military potential. Too defense of the first island chain—would
often, the Obama administration has further refine the military’s under­
treated allies as impediments to its efforts standing of which forces and capabilities
to accommodate U.S. adversaries, despite would be most useful and which could
the lack of evidence that they will some­ be cut at little risk. The result would
how abandon their hostile aims. Working be the more efficient use of resources
with like-minded governments to craft and a more effective military.
well-designed regional strategies would The ability to field new capabilities
help restore allies’ confidence in the quickly should also cut costs for the
United States as a capable and reliable United States, in part by reducing the
partner. Better relationships would prove practice of relying on immature tech-
especially valuable in the western Pacific, nologies, which leads to cost overruns
where prospective partners must decide and production delays. If policymakers
whether to accommodate themselves set realistic requirements during the
to an increasingly demanding China or acquisition process, the military could
work with the United States. field equipment more rapidly and
Just as important, Washington needs effi­ciently. What’s more, such a move
to clearly articulate its strategy, so that would impose costs on rivals, since the
allies know which military capabilities uncertainty created by a fast timeline
will be contributing to common objec- would force them to prepare for a wider
tives. A clear strategy should also help range of possible U.S. military capabili-
reduce the gap between ends and means ties: they would need to either spread
by giving the military precise instructions their resources more thinly, reducing
about national priorities, removing the threat they posed, or increase their

34 f o r e i g n a f fa i r s
 Preserving Primacy

spending to counter capabilities that debt at an unprecedented rate. To be

Washington may never end up acquiring. sure, there is room for greater efficiency
The Pentagon is enjoying some modest in how the U.S. government allocates
success in this area in the form of the air its defense dollars, but its financial woes
force’s Rapid Capabilities Office, which have little to do with military expend­i­
allows the air force to bypass the dysfunc­ tures; the main culprits are the govern­
tional acquisition system in order to ment’s rapidly increasing debt and the
procure new equipment and upgrade old expanding costs of entitlement programs.
equipment more quickly. The navy has Simply put, the United States is fast
followed suit, creating the Maritime approaching the time when its debt can no
Accelerated Capabilities Office this year. longer be deferred to future generations.
The long-term solution, however, is to Thus, it is on the domestic front
fundamentally reform the system itself. where the tough choices will have to
be made in order to defend the nation’s
TOUGH CHOICES security and economic well-being. As
During the last eight years, as a result President Dwight Eisenhower once
of the Obama administration’s ineffec- warned, “Our system must remain
tive strategy, the United States has seen solvent, as we attempt a solution of
its influence decline and the threats to this great problem of security. Else we
its interests grow. As Henry Kissinger have lost the battle from within that we
observed last year, “The United States are trying to win from without.”∂
has not faced a more diverse and complex
array of crises since the end of the Second
World War.”
Given that the current challenges
are both greater in scale than and dif­
ferent in form from those the United
States encountered only a short time
ago, increasing the resources devoted
to national security is necessary but not
sufficient. More of the same will not
do. The United States must develop
new military advantages, and do so
faster than its rivals.
None of this will be easy. During the
Cold War, the United States allocated
an average of over six percent of gdp
to defense in order to create the shield
behind which its prosperity grew to
unprecedented heights. Yet despite sizable
cuts in military spending, the country’s
financial standing has eroded substan­
tially since the Great Recession, with
the federal government accumulating

September/October 2016 35