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Discovering Diverse Content Through
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 Objec. Why may not things be now going on in other worlds,
and continue always to go on in this world, in the same mixed
and disordered state as at present?
Ans. We are not proving that God’s moral government is
perfect, or the truth of religion, but only seeing what
there is in the course of nature, to confirm it,
supposing it to be known. Were there nothing to judge
by, but the present distribution of pleasure and pain,
we should have no ground to conclude that hereafter
we should be rewarded or punished exactly according
to our deserts. But even then there would be no
indication that vice is better than virtue. Still the
preceding observations confirm the doctrine of future
retribution; for,
1.) They show that the Author of nature is not
indifferent to virtue and vice.
2.) That future distributive justice would differ not
in kind, but in degree only, from God’s present
government. It would be the effect, towards
which we see the tendency.
3.) That higher rewards and punishments may be
hereafter.
4.) That we should expect it to be so; because the
tendencies of vice and virtue are immutable,
while the hinderances are only artificial.

SUMMARY.

[This enumerates the steps of the argument, in the foregoing

chapter, in as condensed a form as possible.]

CHAPTER IV.
OF A STATE OF PROBATION.
 The doctrine of probation comprehends several particulars. But
the most common notion is that our future interests are depending;
and depending on ourselves. And that we have opportunities for
both good and bad conduct, and temptations to each.
This is not exactly the same as our being under moral
government; for it implies allurement to evil, and difficulties in being
good.
Hence needs to be considered by itself.
Doctrine. The natural government of God, in this world, puts us on trial
as to the things of this world; and so implies, what religion teaches,
that his moral government puts us on trial as to a future world.

I. So far as we are tempted to do what will damage

our future temporal interests, so far we are under
probation as to those interests.

1. The annexing of pleasures and pains to actions, as good or

bad, and enabling us to foresee their effect, implies that our
interests, in part at least, depend on ourselves.
2. We often blame ourselves and others for evils, as resulting
from misconduct.
3. It is very certain that we often miss possible good, and incur
evils, not for want of knowing better, but through our fault.
4. Every one speaks of the hazards of young persons, from
other causes than ignorance.

II. These natural or temporal trials are analogous to

our moral and religious trial.

1. In both cases, what constitutes the trial, is either in our

circumstances or in our nature.
 1.) Some would do right but for violent or extraordinary
temptations.
2.) Others will seek evil, and go out of their way after
wicked indulgence, when there are no external
temptations.
3.) But even those who err through temptation, must
have that within which makes them susceptible of
temptation.
4.) So that we are in a like state of probation with respect
to both present and future interests.
2. If we proceed to observe how mankind behave in both
capacities, we see the same analogy.
1.) Some scarcely look beyond the present gratification.
2.) Some are driven by their passions against their better
judgment and feeble resolutions.
3.) Some shamelessly go on in open vice.
4.) Some persist in wrong-doing, even under strong
apprehensions of future misery.
3. The analogy is no less plain in regard to the influence of
others upon us.
1.) Bad example.
2.) Wrong education.
3.) Corruptions of religion.
4.) General prevalence of mistakes as to true happiness.
4. In both cases negligence and folly bring difficulty as well as
vice.

III. The disadvantages we labor under from our fallen

and disordered state, are the same, in relation to
 both earthly and future interests.

This disadvantage affords no ground of complaint; for,

1. We may manage to pass our days in comfort and peace.

2. And so may we obtain the security and comfort of religion.
3. We might as well complain that we are not a higher order of
beings.

REMARKS.

1. It is thus proved that the state of trial, which religion says we

are in, is credible; for it exactly corresponds to what we see.
1.) If from birth till death we were in a constant security
of enjoyment, without care or correctness, it would be
a presumption against religion.
2.) It might, if we had no experience, be urged that an
infinitely good Being would not expose us to the
hazard of misery. This is indeed a difficulty, and must
remain so; but still the course of nature is as it is.
3.) The miseries which we bring on ourselves are no
more unavoidable than our deportment.
2. It has been proved that we are in danger of miscarrying as to
our interests, both present and future.
3. The sum of the whole is, that as we do not have present
enjoyments and honors forced upon us, in spite of
misconduct, so this may be the case, as to that chief and final
good which religion proposes.

CHAPTER V.
PROBATION INTENDED FOR MORAL DISCIPLINE AND IMPROVEMENT.
 Why we should be placed in the condition spoken of in the last
chapter, is a question which cannot be answered. It may be that we
could not understand, if told. And if we could, it might injure us to
know, just now. It certainly is consistent with God’s righteous
government.
Religion tells us that we are so placed in order to become qualified
for a better state.
This, though a very partial answer to the inquiry why we are so
placed, answers an infinitely more important question,—viz.: What is
our business here?

I. We are placed in this state of trial, for our

improvement in virtue, as the requisite
qualification for future security and happiness.

1. Every creature is designed for a particular way of life.

1.) Happiness depends on the congruity between a
creature’s nature and its circumstances.
2.) Man’s character might be so changed as to make him
incapable of happiness on earth.
3.) Or he might be placed, without changing his nature,
in a world where he must be wretched, for want of the
proper objects to answer to his desires.
4.) So that without determining what is the future
condition of good men, we know there must be
necessary qualifications to make us capable of enjoying
it.
2. Human beings are so constituted as to become fit for new
and different conditions.
1.) We not only acquire ideas, but store them up.
2.) We can become more expert in any kind of action.
3.) And can make settled alterations in our tempers.
4.) We can form habits—both bodily and mental.
As these operate in producing radical changes in human
character, we will look for a moment at the process.
—Neither perceptions, nor knowledge, are habits;
though necessary to forming them.
—There are habits of perception, however, and
habits of action: the former are passive, the
latter active.
—Habits of body are produced by external acts,
and habits of mind by the exertion of principles;
i.e. carrying them out.
—Resolutions to do well are acts, and may help
towards forming good habits. But mere
theorizing, and forming pictures in the mind, not
only do not help, but may harden the mind to a
contrary course.
—Passive impressions, by repetition grow weaker.
Thus familiarity with danger lessens fear.
—Hence active habits may be formed and
strengthened, by acting according to certain
motives or excitements, which grow less
sensibly felt and less and less felt, as the habit
strengthens.
· Thus the sight of distress excites the
passive emotion of pity, and the active
principle of benevolence. But inquiring
out cases of distress in order to relieve
them, causes diminished sensitiveness at
the sight of misery, and stronger
benevolence and aptitude in relieving it.
 · So admonition, experience, and example,
if acted upon, produce good; if not,
harden.
5.) The formation of a habit may be imperceptible and
even inexplicable, but the thing itself is matter of
certain experience.
6.) A habit once formed, the action becomes easy and
often pleasurable: opposite inclinations grow weaker:
difficulties less: and occasions more frequent.
7.) Thus, a new character, in several respects, is formed.
3. We should not have these capacities for improvement and for
the reconstruction of character, if it were not necessary.
1.) They are necessary, even as to this life.
—We are not qualified, at first, for mature life:
understanding and strength come gradually.
—If we had them in full, at birth, we should at first
be distracted and bewildered, and our faculties
would be of no use previous to experience.
Ignorant of any employment, we could not
provide for ourselves.
—So that man is an unformed, unfinished
creature, even as to this world, till he acquire
knowledge, experience, and habits.
2.) Provision is made for our acquiring, in youth, the
requisite qualities for manhood.
—Children learn, from their very birth,
· The nature and use of objects.
· The subordinations of domestic life.
· The rules of life.
 —Some of this learning is acquired so insensibly,
as to seem like instinct, but some requires great
care and labor, and the doing of things we are
averse to.
—According as we act during this formative
period, is our character formed; and our
capacity for various stations in society
determined.
—Early opportunities lost, cannot be recovered.
3.) Our state of discipline throughout this life, for another,
is exactly of the same kind: and comprehended under
one general law.
—If we could not see how the present discipline
fitted us for a higher life, it would be no
objection.
· We do not know how food, sleep, &c.
enlarges the child’s body; nor would we
expect such a result, prior to experience.
· Nor do children understand the need of
exercise, temperance, restraint, &c.
—We thus see a general analogy of Providence
indicating that the present life is preparatory.
4. If virtue is a necessary qualification for future happiness,
then we see our need of the moral culture of our present
state.
1.) Analogy indicates that our future state will be social.
—Nature furnishes no shadow of
unreasonableness in the Scripture doctrine that
this future community will be under the more
immediate government of God.
 —Nor the least proof that its members will not
require the exercise of veracity, justice, &c.
towards each other; and that character which
results from the practice of such virtues.
—Certainly the universe is under moral
government; and a virtuous character must, in
some way, be a condition of happiness in that
state.
2.) We are deficient, and in danger of deviating from
what is right.
—We have desires for outward objects.
—The times, degrees, &c. of gratifying these
desires, are, of right, subject to the control of
the moral principle.
—But that principle neither excites them, nor
prevents their being excited.
—They may exist, when they cannot be lawfully
gratified, or gratified at all.
—When the desire exists, and the gratification is
unlawful, we are tempted.
3.) The only security is the principle within.
—The strengthening of this lessens the danger.
—It may be strengthened, by discipline and
exercise.
· Noting examples.
· Attending to the right, and not to
preference.
· Considering our true interests.
—When improved, it becomes, in proportion to its
strength, our security from the dangers of
 natural propensions.
—Virtue, become habitual by discipline, is
improved virtue; and improved virtue must
produce increased happiness, if the government
of the world is moral.
4.) Even creatures made upright may fall.
—The fall of an upright being, is not accounted for
by the nature of liberty; for that would only be
saying that an event happened because it might
happen.
—But from the very nature of propensions.
—A finitely perfect being would have propensions
corresponding to its surroundings; its
understanding; and its moral sense; and all
these in due proportions.
—Such a being would have propensions, though
the object might not be present, or the
indulgence might be contrary to its moral sense;
and this would have some tendency, however
small, to induce gratification.
—The tendency would be increased by the
frequency of occasions; and yet more by the
least indulgence, even in thought; till, under
peculiar conjunctures, it would become effect.
—The first transgression might so utterly disorder
the constitution, and change the proportions of
forces, as to lead to a repetition of irregularities;
and hence to the construction of bad habits, and
a depraved character.
5.) On the contrary, a finitely perfect being may attain
higher virtue, and more security, by obeying the moral
principle.
 —For the danger would lessen, by the increased
submissiveness of propensions.
—The moral principle would gain force by exercise.
6.) Thus vice is not only criminal, but degrading; and
virtue is not only right, but improving.
—The degree of improvement may be such that
the danger of sinning may be almost infinitely
lessened.
—Yet the security may always be the habits
formed in a state of discipline; making such a
state altogether fit and necessary.
7.) This course of reasoning is vastly stronger when
applied to fallen and corrupt creatures.
—The upright need improvement; the fallen must
be renewed.
—Discipline is expedient for the one; necessary for
the other; and of a severer sort.

II. The present world is peculiarly fit for such discipline

as we need.

1. Surrounding evils tend to produce moderation, practical

knowledge, &c. very different from a mere speculative
knowledge of our liability to vice and misery.
2. Our experience in this world, with right views and practice,
may leave eternal impressions for good.
3. Every act of self-government in the exercise of virtue, must,
from the very make of our nature, form habits of virtue, and a
more intense virtuous principle.
4. Resolute and persevering resistance to particular and violent
temptations, is a continued act of virtue, and that in a higher
 degree than if the seduction were transient and weak.
5. Self-denial is not essential to virtue, but is almost essential to
discipline and improvement.
1.) Because actions materially virtuous, which have no
difficulty, but agree with our inclinations, may be done
merely from inclination, and so not be really virtuous.
2.) But when they are done in face of danger and
difficulty, virtuousness is increased, and confirmed into
a habit.
Objec. 1. As our intellectual or physical powers may be
overtasked, so may our moral.
Ans. This may be so in exceptional cases, but it does not
confute the argument. In general, it holds good. All
that is intended to be proved is, that this world is
intended to be a state of improvement, and is fitted for
it.
1.) Some sciences which of themselves are highly
improving, require a trying measure of
attention, which some will not submit to.
2.) It is admitted that this world disciplines many
to vice: but this viciousness of many is the very
thing which makes the world a virtuous
discipline to good men. The whole end in
placing mankind as they are we know not; but
these things are evident—the virtues of some
are exercised:—and so exercised as to be
improved: and improved beyond what they
would be in a perfectly virtuous community.
3.) That all, or even the generality, do not
improve, is no proof that their improvement was
not intended. Of seeds and animals not one in a
million comes to perfection; yet such as do,
 evidently answer an end for which they were
designed. The appearance of waste in regard to
seeds, &c. is just as unaccountable, as the ruin
of moral agents.
Objec. 2. Rectitude arising from hope and fear, is only the
discipline of self-love.
Ans. Obedience is obedience, though prompted by hope
or fear: and a course of such obedience, forms a habit
of it: and distinct habits of various virtues, by
repressing inclination whenever justice, veracity, &c.
require.
Beside, veracity, justice, regard to God’s authority, and
self-interest, are coincident; and each, separately, a
just principle. To begin a good life from either of
them, and persist, produces that very character
which corresponds to our relations to God, and
secures happiness.
Objec. 3. The virtues requisite for a state of afflictions, and
produced by it, are not wanted to qualify us for a state of
happiness.
Ans. Such is not the verdict of experience. Passive
submission is essential to right character. Prosperity
itself begets extravagant desires; and imagination may
produce as much discontent as actual condition.
Hence, though we may not need patience in heaven,
we shall need that temper which is formed by
patience.
Self-love would always coincide with God’s commands,
when our interest was rightly understood; but it is
liable to error. Therefore, habits of resignation are
necessary, for all creatures; and the proper discipline
for resignation is affliction.
 Objec. 4. The trouble and danger of such discipline, might have
been avoided by making us at once, what we are intended to
become.
Ans. What we are to be, is the effect of what we are to
do. God’s natural government is arranged not to save
us from trouble or danger, but to enable and incline us
to go through them. It is as natural for us to seek
means to obtain things, as it is to seek the things; and
in worldly things we are left to our choice, whether to
improve our powers and so better our condition, or to
neglect improvement and so go without the advantage.
Analogy, therefore, makes the same arrangement
credible, as to a future state.

III. This state of discipline may be necessary for the

display of character.

1. Not to the all-knowing Being, but to his creation, or part of it,

and in many ways which we know not.
2. It may be a means in disposing of men according to
character.
3. And of showing creation that they are so disposed of.
4. Such display of character certainly contributes, largely, to the
general course of things considered in this chapter.

CHAPTER VI.
OF NECESSITY AS INFLUENCING CONDUCT.

Fatalists have no right to object to Christianity, for they of course

hold the doctrine to be compatible with what they see in nature.
The question is, whether it be not equally compatible with what
Christianity teaches.
 To argue on the supposition of so great an absurdity as necessity,
is puzzling; and the obscurity and puzzle of the argument must
therefore be excused.

I. Necessity does not destroy the proof of an intelligent

Author and Governor of the world.

1. It does not exclude design and deliberation.

1.) This is matter of actual experience and consciousness.
—Necessity does not account for the existence of
any thing, but is only a circumstance relating to
its origin. Instance the case of a house: the
fatalist admits that it had a builder, and the only
question would be, was he obliged to build it as
he did?
2.) It is the same as to the construction of the world. To
say it exists by necessity must mean it had a maker,
who acted by necessity: for necessity is only an
abstract notion, and can do nothing.
3.) We say God exists by necessity, because we intuitively
discern that there must be an infinite Being, prior to all
causes; but we cannot say that every thing so exists.
The fact that many changes in nature are produced by
man’s contrivance is a proof of this.
4.) Thus though the fatalist does not choose to mean by
necessity an agent acting necessarily, he is obliged to
mean this.
5.) And it also follows that a thing’s being done by
necessity does not exclude design.
2. It does not exclude a belief that we are in a state of religion.
1.) Suppose a fatalist to educate a child on his own
principles,—viz.: that he cannot do otherwise than he
 does; and is not subject to praise or blame.
(It might be asked, would he, if possessed of common
sense, so educate his child?)
—The child would be delighted with his freedom;
but would soon prove a pest, and go to
destruction.
—He would meet with checks and rebuffs, which
would teach him that he was accountable.
—He would, in the end, be convinced either that
his doctrine was wrong, or that he had reasoned
inconclusively upon it, and misapplied it.
2.) To apply fatalism to practice, in any other way, would
be found equally fallacious: e.g. that he need not take
care of his life.
3.) No such absurdity follows the doctrine of freedom.
—Reasoning on this ground is justified by all
experience.
—The constitution of things is as if we were free.
4.) If the doctrine of necessity be true, and yet, when we
apply it to life, always misleads us; how, then, can we
be sure it would not mislead us with respect to future
interests?
5.) It follows that if there are proofs of religion on the
supposition of freedom, they are just as conclusive on
the supposition of necessity.
3. It does not refute the notion that God has a will and a
character.
1.) It does not hinder us from having a will and a
character; from being cruel, or benevolent, or just, &c.
 2.) If necessity be plead as the excuse for crime, it
equally excuses the punishment of crime; for if it
destroys the sin of the one, it destroys the sin of the
other.
3.) The very assumption of injustice in punishing crime,
shows that we cannot rid ourselves of the notion of
justice and injustice.
Objec. If necessity be reconcilable with the character of God, as
portrayed in Christianity, does it not destroy the proof that he
has that character; and so destroy the proofs of religion?
Ans. No. Happiness and misery are not our fate, but the
results of our conduct. God’s government is that of a
father and a magistrate; and his natural rule of
government must be veracity and justice. We shall
proceed to show that,

II. Necessity does not destroy the proofs of religion.

1. It is a plain fact that God rewards and punishes.

1.) He has given us a moral faculty, by which we discern
between actions, and approve or disapprove, &c.
2.) This implies a rule, a peculiar kind of rule; i.e. one
from which we cannot depart without being self-
condemned.
3.) The dictates of our moral faculty are God’s laws, with
sanctions. It not only raises a sense of duty, but a
sense of security in obeying, and danger in disobeying;
and this is an explicit sanction.
4.) God’s government must conform to the nature he has
given us; and we must infer that in the upshot
happiness will follow virtue, and misery vice.
 5.) Hence religious worship is a duty, if only as a means
of keeping up the sense of this government.
6.) No objection from necessity can lie against this course
of proof.
—The conclusion is wholly and directly from facts;
not from what might appear to us to be fit, but
from what his actions tell us he wills.
2. Natural religion has external evidence which necessity, if true,
does not affect.
1.) Suppose a person convinced of the truths of natural
religion, but ignorant of history, and of the present
state of mankind, he would inquire:
—How this religion came?
—How far the belief of it extended?
—If he found that some one had totally
propounded it, as a deduction of reason, then,
though its evidences from reason would not be
impaired, its history would furnish no further
proof.
2.) But such an one would find, on the contrary,
—That essentially it had been professed in all
countries.
—And can be traced up through all ages.
—And was not reasoned out, but revealed.
3.) These things are of great weight.
—Showing natural religion to be conformed to the
common sense of mankind.
—And either that it was revealed, or forces itself
upon the mind.
 —The rude state of the early ages leads to the
belief of its being revealed, and such is the
opinion of the learned.
3. Early pretences to revelation indicate some original real one
from which they were copied.
—The history of revelation is as old as history itself.
—Such a fact is a proof of religion, against which there is
no presumption.
—And indicates a revelation prior to the examination of
the book said to contain it; and independent of all
considerations of its being corrupted, or darkened by
fables.
4. It is thus apparent that the external evidence of religion is
considerable; and is not affected by the doctrine of necessity.

REMARKS.

1. The danger of taking custom, &c. for our moral rule.

1.) We are all liable to prejudice.
2.) Reason may be impaired, perverted, or disregarded.
3.) The matter in hand is of infinite moment.
2. The foregoing observations amount to practical proof.
Objec. Probabilities which cannot be confuted, may be
overbalanced by greater probabilities: much more by
demonstration. Now, as the doctrine of necessity must be
true, it cannot be that God governs us as if we were free
when he knows we are not.
Ans. This brings the matter to a point, and the answer is
not to be evaded,—viz.: that the whole constitution
and course of things shows this reasoning to be false,
be the fallacy where it may.
 The doctrine of freedom shows where,—viz.: in
supposing ourselves necessary agents when in fact
we are free.
Admitting the doctrine of necessity, the fallacy
evidently lies in denying that necessary agents are
accountable; for that they are rewarded and
punished is undeniable.

Conclusion.—It follows that necessity, if true, neither proves that

God will not make his creatures happy or miserable according to
their conduct, nor destroys the proofs that he will do so. That is,
necessity, practically, is false.

CHAPTER VII.
DIVINE GOVERNMENT A SCHEME IMPERFECTLY COMPREHENDED.

Moral government, as a fact, has now been considered; it remains

for us to remove objections against its wisdom and goodness. A
thing being true does not prove it to be good.
In arguing as to its truth, analogy could only show it to be
credible. But, if a moral government be admitted as a fact, analogy
makes it credible that it is a scheme or system, and that man’s
comprehension of it is necessarily so limited, as to be inadequate to
determine its injustice.
This we shall find to be the case.
Doctrine. On the supposition that God exercises moral government, the
analogy of nature teaches that it must be a scheme, and one quite
beyond our comprehension.

I. The ordering of nature is a scheme; and makes it

credible by analogy, that moral government is a
scheme.
1. The parts curiously correspond to each other; individuals to
individuals, species to species, events to events; and all these
both immediate and remote.
2. This correspondence embraces all the past, and all the
future; including all creatures, actions, and events.
1.) There is no event, which does not depend for its
occurrence on some further thing, unknown to us; we
cannot give the whole account of any one thing.
2.) Things apparently the most insignificant, seem to be
necessary to others, of the greatest importance.
3. If such is God’s natural government, it is credible that such is
his moral government.
1.) In fact they are so blended as to make one scheme.
—One is subservient to the other, just as the
vegetable kingdom subserves the animal, and
our animal organization subserves our mental.
—Every act of God seems to look beyond the
occasion, and to have reference to a general
plan.
—There is evidently a previous adjustment.
· The periods, &c. for trying men.
· The instruments of justice.
· The kinds of retribution.
2.) The whole comprises a system, a very small part of
which is known to us: therefore no objections against
any part can be insisted on.
3.) This ignorance is universally acknowledged, except in
arguing against religion. That it ought to be a valid
answer to objections against religion, we proceed to
show.
 —Suppose it to be asserted that all evils might
have been prevented by repeated interpositions;
or that more good might have been so
produced; which would be the utmost that could
be said: still,
—Our ignorance would vindicate religion from any
objections arising from apparent disorders in the
world.
—The government of the world might be good,
even on those suppositions; for at most they
could but suggest that it might be better.
—At any rate, they are mere assertions.
—Instances may be alleged, in things much less
out of reach, of suppositions palpably
impossible, which all do not see to be so: nor
any, at first sight.
4.) It follows that our ignorance is a satisfactory answer
to all objections against the divine government.
—An objection against an act of Providence, no
way connected with any other thing, as being
unjust, could not be answered by our ignorance.
—But when the objection is made against an act
related to other and unknown acts, then our
ignorance is a full answer.
—Some unknown relation, or unknown
impossibility, may render the act not only good,
but good in the highest degree.

II. Consider some particular things, in the natural

government of God, the like of which we may
infer, by analogy, to be contained in his moral
government.
1. No ends are accomplished without means.
1.) Often, means very disagreeable bring the most
desirable results.
2.) How means produce ends, is not learned by reason,
but experience.
3.) In many cases, before experience, we should have
expected contrary results.
4.) Hence we may infer that those things which are
objected against God’s moral government, produce
good.
5.) It is evident that our not seeing how the means work
good, or their seeming to have an opposite effect,
offers no presumption against their fitness to work
good.
6.) They may not only be fit, but the only means of
ultimate good.
Objec. Though our capacity of vice and misery may
promote virtue, and our suffering for sin be better than
if we were restrained by force, yet it would have been
better if evil had not entered the world.
Ans. It is granted that though sinful acts may
produce benefits, to refrain from them would
produce more. We have curative pains, yet pain
is not better than health.
2. Natural government is carried on by general laws.
1.) Nature shows that this is best: all the good we enjoy
is because there are general laws. They enable us to
forecast for the procurement of good.
2.) It may not be possible, by general laws, to prevent all
irregularities, or remedy them.
 3.) Direct interpositions might perhaps remedy many
disorders arising under them, but this would have bad
effects.
—Encouraging improvidence.
—Leaving us no rule of life.
—Every interposition would have distant effects:
so that we could not guess what would be the
whole result.
· If it be replied that those distant effects
might also be corrected by direct
interpositions—this is only talking at
random.
Objec. If we are so ignorant as this whole argument supposes,
we are too ignorant to understand the proofs of religion.
Ans. 1. Total ignorance of a subject precludes argument,
but partial ignorance does not. We may, in various
degrees, know a man’s character, and the way he is
likely to pursue certain ends; and yet not know how he
ought to act to gain those ends. In this case objections
to his mode of pursuing ends may be answered by our
ignorance, though that he does act in a certain manner
is capable of proof. So we may have evidence of God’s
character and aims, and yet not be competent judges
as to his measures. Our ignorance is a good answer to
the difficulties of religion, but no objection to religion
itself.
Ans. 2. If our ignorance did invalidate the proofs of
religion, as well as the objections, yet is it undeniable
that moral obligations remain unaffected by our
ignorance of the consequences of obedience or
violation. The consequences of vice and virtue may not
be fully known, yet it is credible that they may be such
 as religion declares: and this credibility is an obligation,
in point of prudence, to abstain from sin.
Ans. 3. Our answers to the objections against religion,
are not equally valid against the proofs of it.
[Answers rehearsed.]
Ans. 4. Our answers, though they may be said to be
based on our ignorance, are really not so, but on what
analogy teaches concerning our ignorance,—viz.: that
it renders us incompetent judges. They are based on
experience, and what we do know; so that to credit
religion is to trust to experience, and to disregard it is
the contrary.

CONCLUSION.

1. The reasoning of the last chapter leads us to regard this life

as part of a larger plan of things.
1.) Whether we are connected with the distant parts of
the universe, is uncertain; but it is very clear we are
connected, more or less, with present, past, and
future.
2.) We are evidently in the midst of a scheme, not fixed
but progressive; and one equally incomprehensible,
whether we regard the present, past, or future.
2. This scheme contains as much that is wonderful as religion
does: for it certainly would be as wonderful that all nature
came into existence without a Creator, as that there should be
a Creator: and as wonderful that the Creator should act
without any rule or scheme, as that he should act with one;
or that he should act by a bad rule, rather than a righteous
one.
 3. Our very nature compels us to believe that the will and
character of the Author of nature, is just and good.
4. Whatever be his character, he formed the world as it is, and
controls it as he does, and has assigned us our part and lot.
5. Irrational creatures act their part, and receive their lot,
without reflection, but creatures endued with reason, can
hardly avoid reflecting whither we go, and what is the
scheme, in the midst of which we find ourselves.

[Here follows a recapitulation of the book.]

PART II.
CHAPTER I.
IMPORTANCE OF CHRISTIANITY.

Every one must admit that we need a revelation. Few, if any, could
reason out a system, even of natural religion. If they could, there is
no probability that they would. Such as might, would still feel the
want of revelation. To say that Christianity is superfluous, is as wild
as to say all are happy.
No exactness in attending to natural religion can make Christianity
of small importance.
If Christianity be from God, we must obey, unless we know all his
reasons for giving it: and also that those reasons no longer exist; at
least in our case. This we cannot know.
The importance of Christianity appears if we regard it

I. As a republication of natural religion.

1. It gives the moral system of the universe.

1.) Free from corruptions; teaching that
 —Jehovah created all things.
—” governs all things.
—Virtue is his law.
—Mankind will be judged according to character.
2.) It publishes its facts authoritatively.
3.) With vastly more clearness; e.g. the doctrines of a
future state: danger of sin: efficacy of repentance.
4.) With the advantage of a visible church, distinguished
from the world by peculiar institutions.
Objec. The perversions of Christianity, and the
little good it has done.
Ans. 1. Natural religion is no less perverted,
and has done less good.
2. The benefits of Christianity are not small.
3. The evils ascribed to it, are not its
effects. Things are to be judged by their
genuine tendencies.
4. The light of reason, no more than
revelation forces acquiescence.
5.) With the additional advantage that every Christian, is
bound to instruct and persuade others.

II. As containing truths not discoverable by natural

reason.

1. A mode of salvation for the ruined.

2. Duties unknown before.
3. Our relations to the Son and Holy Ghost.
1.) Hence the form of baptism.
 2.) Pious regards to Christ, and the Holy Ghost, based on
our relations to them.
4. The manner of external worship.

III. The fearful hazard of neglecting Christianity.

1. Those who think natural religion sufficient, must admit that

Christianity is highly important.
2. Our relations to Christ being made known, our religious
regard to him is an evident obligation.
3. These relations being real, there is no reason to think that
our neglect of behaving suitably to them, will not be attended
with the same kind of consequences as follow the neglect of
duties made known by reason.
4. If we are corrupt and depraved, and so unfit for heaven, and
if we need God’s Holy Spirit to renew our nature, how can it
be a slight thing whether we make use of the means for
obtaining such assistance?
5. Thus, if Christianity be either true, or merely credible, it is
most rash and presumptuous to treat it lightly.

REMARKS.

1. The distinction between positive and moral obligations.

1.) For moral precepts we can see the reason: for
positive we cannot.
2.) Moral duties are such prior to command; positive
duties are such because commanded.
3.) The manner in which a duty is made known, does not
make it moral or positive.
2. The ground of regarding moral duties as superior to positive.
 1.) Both have the nature of moral commands.
2.) If the two conflict, we must obey the moral.
—Positive institutions are means to moral ends.
—Ends are more excellent than means.
—Obedience to positive institutions, has no value
but as proceeding from moral principle.
3.) Both moral and positive duties are revealed, and so
are on a level; but the moral law is also interwoven
with our very nature, and so its precepts must prevail
when the two interfere.
3. There is less necessity for determining their relative authority,
than some suppose.
1.) Though man is disposed to outward and ritual
religion, nothing can give us acceptance with God,
without moral virtue.
2.) Scripture always lays stress on moral duties.
3.) It is a great weakness, though very common, to make
light of positive institutions, because less important
than moral.
—We are bound to obey all God’s commands.
—A precept, merely positive, admitted to be from
God, creates moral obligation, in the strictest
sense.

CONCLUSION.

This account of Christianity shows our great obligation to study

the Scriptures.

CHAPTER II.
PRESUMPTIONS AGAINST A REVELATION, CONSIDERED AS
 MIRACULOUS.

Having shown the need of revelation, we now examine the

presumptions against it.
The analogy of nature is generally supposed to afford
presumptions against miracles.
They are deemed to require stronger evidence than other events.

I. Analogy furnishes no presumptions against the

general scheme of Christianity.

1. It is no presumption against Christianity, that it is not the

discovery of reason, or of experience.
2. Nor is it a presumption against Christianity, that it contains
things unlike the apparent course of nature.
1.) We cannot suppose every thing, in the vast universe,
to be just like what is the course of nature in this little
world.
2.) Even within the present compass of our knowledge,
we see many things greatly unlike.
3. If we choose to call what is unlike our known course of
things, miraculous, still that does not make it improbable.

II. There is no presumption against such a revelation,

as we should now call miraculous, being made, at
the beginning of the world.

1. There was then no course of nature, as to this world.

2. Whether man then received a revelation involves a question
not of miracles, but of fact.