IN THE SUPERIOR COURT OF JUDICATURE

IN THE COURT OF APPEAL

ACCRA AD. 2023

CORAM:

H/L Justice Poku-Acheampong, JA (Presiding)

H/L Justice Adjei-Frimpong, J.A.

H/L Justice Dr. E. Owusu-Dapaah, J.A.

Suit No.: H1/74/2023

Date: 11th May, 2023

GCB BANK LIMITED : RESPONDENT/APPELLANT

VRS

1. JARVIS ASIEDU

2. MARIAM ABDULLAH COMPLAINANTS/RESPONDENTS

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3. ROBERT KWEINOO AMAMOO

JUDGMENT

Adjei-Frimpong,J.A:

This suit has a brief antecedent. The Respondents before us, originally complainants at

the National Labour Commission were employees of the GCB Bank Limited, the

Appellants herein. Prior to their employment with the Appellant, the Respondents had

been employees of two defunct banks under what has come to be known as the banking

crises in this country. The Appellant engaged them based upon a Purchase and

Assumption Transaction entered between it and the joint Receivers of the two banks.

Having worked with the Appellant for about two years, their employments were

terminated by the Appellants. No reasons were assigned for the termination. Each was

however paid three months’ salary in lieu of notice. Aggrieved nonetheless, the

Respondents filed a complaint against the Appellant at the National Labour

Commission (hereinafter “the Commission”). The reliefs they sought were as follows:

1. Reinstatement

2. Payment of all salaries, allowance etc. till final payment.

3. Compensation for trauma and hardship

4. Costs including legal and associated cost directive as this Commission deem appropriate.

At the Commission, an aXempt at resolving the dispute by mediation failed. The

Commission referred the maXer to voluntary arbitration with the consent of the parties

pursuant to Regulations 15 and 17 of the National Labour Commission Regulations,

2006 (L.I 1822). Upon hearing, the Sole Arbitrator Mr Paul Osei Mensah published an

award in favour of the Respondents. The award was short and unambiguous. It stated:

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 “The award.

From the analysis of the relevant facts and law as well as the Collective Agreement (1)

Each of the three Complainants should be paid three months salary for each year of

service or part thereof. (2) Each should, in addition, be paid their salaries from the

effective date of termination to 31/1/2022 when the Arbitration process began.

I am unable to ask the employer to pay them any loss of future income, because by

diligent effort, they may be able to secure alternative work within a reasonable time. Their

entitlements under this award must be paid not later than 21 days from today

14/3/2022.”

The Appellant was unhappy with the award and is before this court on appeal. He filed

the appeal on 30th March 2022. The grounds in the notice of appeal without any

addition, contrary to an indication to later file additional grounds, are as follows:

1. The award is against the weight of evidence

2. The National Labour Commission erred when it held that the termination of the

complainants/Respondents’ employment was unlawful

In the Respondents’ wriXen submission filed on 22nd November 2022, two legal points

have been raised. The first one is that the award of the voluntary arbitrator under the

law was not appealable. The second, which is contingent on the first is that granted the

award was appealable, the Appellant filed it out of time. The award was delivered on

14th March 2022 whilst the appeal was filed on 30th March. In effect, the appeal was not

filed within fourteen days as prescribed by Section 134 of the Labour Act.

We consider the two objections fundamental. Each one goes to the very root of the

appeal. In the event either or both of them succeed, the appeal fails in limine. They strike

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at the jurisdiction of this court to determine the merits of the appeal. Indeed, properly

speaking, the Respondent ought to have invoked Rule 16 of the Rules of this court (C.I

19 as amended) by filing notice of preliminary objection for the objections to be

determined without considering the appeal on merits. The essence of the Rule 16, as we

do appreciate, is to terminate an appeal which may fail on some legal or technical

grounds so as to economize judicial time.

That said however, we do not think the non-compliance with the rule defeats the

objections. Once they question the very jurisdiction of this court, we are obliged to make

a determination regardless of how and at what stage our aXention was drawn to them.

It is a deep-rooted legal principle that a challenge to jurisdiction may be raised at any

time even for the first time on appeal. ATTORNEY GENERAL VRS FAROE ATLANTIC

[2005-2006] SCGLR 27; R VRS NII ADAMA THOMPSON [2012]46 GMJ 31.

Following from the foregoing, we set down two questions for determination in the

preliminary; first, whether or not by law, the award made or published in the voluntary

arbitration of the labour dispute between the parties was appealable and second,

whether the Appellant’s appeal was filed out of time.

Learned Counsel for the Respondents refers to the relevant provisions of the Labour Act

to draw a statutory distinction between a decision made by the Labour Commission

which may be appealed against and an award published by a voluntary arbitrator

appointed by the Commission with the consent of the parties pursuant to Section 156 of

the Act which is not appealable.

Counsel contends that the process of Voluntary arbitration is governed by the

Alternative Dispute Resolution Act, 2010, Act 798 (The ADR Act). Therefore, an award

published by the voluntary arbitrator is not a decision of the Commission which may be

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appealed against. Such a voluntary award is binding on the parties and may only be set

aside in terms of the relevant provisions in Sections 52 and 58 of ADR Act.

It is further argued that aside the Labour Act not making provision for appeal in

voluntary arbitration, the parties arbitration management agreement created no right of

appeal. Consequently, the award was final and binding. KLIMATECHNIC VRS JENSEN

INTERNATIONAL [2005-2006] SCGLR 913 cited.

Counsel submits that the right of appeal against the decision of the Commission which

has been expanded and explained in the cases of JAMES DAVID BROWN VRS NLC

(2018)1 GLR 592 CROCODILE MACHETTES VRS NLC [2012]1 SCGLR 270 does not

extend to a voluntary arbitration award under the relevant provisions of the Labour Act

and the ADR Act.

The response of Learned Counsel for the Appellant in summation is that the voluntary

award was rendered under the auspices, procedures and directions of the Commission.

The award is therefore by extension a decision of the Commission hence, the appeal

against same was proper. Reference was made to the Supreme Court’s decision in the

self-same JAMES DAVID BROWN case.

Now, we note that Section 156 of the Labour Act on the subject of Appointment of

Arbitrators stipulates:

“156. Subject to the Arbitration Act, 1961 (Act 38), or any general enactment on dispute

resolution in force, the parties to an industrial dispute shall agree on the method of

appointment of arbitrators or arbitration panel and in the absence of an agreement by the

parties the Commission shall appoint an arbitrator or an arbitration panel.”

Section 157 on Voluntary Arbitration also stipulates:

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 “157(1) When mediation fails under Section 154(6) and the dispute is referred to the

Commission, the Commission shall with the consent of the parties refer the dispute to an

arbitrator or an arbitration panel appointed under Section 156.

(2) The parties to an industrial dispute shall, within three days after the appointment of

an arbitrator or an arbitration panel under Section 156, submit in writing a statement of

the issues in dispute signed by one or more of the parties or their representatives.

(3) The arbitrator shall as soon as possible appoint a time and place for the hearing and

notify the parties.

(4) If any party fails to appear before the arbitrator after the expiration of seven days after

being so notified, the arbitrator shall proceed to hear and determine the dispute.”

On the subject of Arbitration award, Section 158 states:

“158. (1) The decision of the arbitrator or a majority of the arbitrators shall constitute the

award and shall be binding on all the parties.

(2) The arbitrator shall communicate the award in writing to the parties and the

Commission within seventy-two hours after the award has been made except where the

Commission is the arbitrator.

Section 164 on Compulsory reference to arbitration provides:

“164(1) when a dispute is referred to compulsory arbitration in pursuance to Section 160

or 162, the Commission shall be the arbitrators and shall serve on the parties a notice

a. Stating what, in its opinion are the unresolved issues between the parties; and

b. Asking the parties whether they agree to those issues.

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 (2) The Commission shall, within fourteen days after service of the notice, determine the

dispute by compulsory arbitration.

(3) A compulsory arbitration shall be composed of three members of the Commission, one

member each representing Government, organized labour and employers’ organization.

(4) In a compulsory arbitration, the decision of the majority of the arbitrators shall constitute

the award and shall be binding on all the parties.”

Then on the subject of Publication of compulsory arbitration award and the effect of arbitration

awards on existing employment contracts, Section 167 provides:

“167. (1) The award of the Commission in a compulsory arbitration shall immediately on

completion be published in the Gazece by the Commission.

(2) A award published under subsection (1) shall be final and binding on the parties and

unless challenged in the Court of Appeal on questions of law within seven days after the

publication of the award.

(3) Subject to any appeal, an award arising from a voluntary or compulsory arbitration

shall prevail over any contract of employment or collective agreement in force at the time

of the award and the terms of the contract of employment or collective agreement shall be

deemed to have been modified as far as may be necessary in order to conform to the

award.”

The National Labour Commission Regulations, 2006 (L.I.1822) made pursuant to

Section 152 of the Act, captures the substance of some of the provisions of the Act

reproduced above. On Voluntary arbitration, Regulations 17, 24, and 25 capture the

provisions in Sections 157 and 158 whereas on Compulsory arbitration, Regulations 27,

28 31 and 32 capture the provisions in Sections 164 and 167 of the Act.

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We have had to set out the above statutory provisions to draw on the framework of

distinction between the two shades of arbitral proceedings that may ensue under the

law for purposes of determining for what is important to us, the legislative approach to

challenging an award made in either case. This way, the paramount issue of whether an

award in a voluntary arbitration is appealable under the law is placed in proper

perspective.

It is certain that an award by the Commission in a compulsory arbitration is appealable

under Section 167(2). The provision is repeated under Regulation 32 of L.I 1822. The

appeal is permiXed only on questions of law. No such provision is made in case of

voluntary arbitration. Neither the Act nor the Regulations has created a right of appeal

in voluntary arbitration process.

That the provision in Section 167(2) limits the right of appeal only to questions of law

accentuates the fact that a right of appeal is a statutory creation, and the enabling

statute defines the terms of the right. The principle that a right of appeal is a creature of

law is a universal one. The Learned Authors of Halsbury’s Laws of England put the

principle this way:

“A right of appeal is conferred by statute or equivalent legislative authority; it is not a

mere macer of practice or procedure and neither the superior nor the inferior court or

tribunal nor both combined can create or take away such a right.” Vol 37 4th ed.,

(Reissue), para 1501, p.485.

In ODGERS, Principles of Pleadings and Practice, (Sweet & Maxwell), 20th ed., p. 363, it

is stated:

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 “Under English law, a litigant has no inherent right to appeal against a decision of any

tribunal which has found against him; such a right must always be sought in the

provisions of some statute.”

Then also in HEALEY VRS MINISTRY OF HEALTH (1954)3 ALL ER 449 at page 453

MORRIS L.J at the opportune point espoused:

“By raising the preliminary issue the defendant invites the court to rule now that it is

not endowed with any jurisdiction to grant the relief sought. In my judgment, there is no

right of appeal to the court from the determination of the Minister. None is given by reg.

60 or in any other regulation. There can certainly be no implication of a right of appeal.

Had it been desired to provide some machinery or procedure for an appeal from the

decision of the Minister, it could have been done. Any such prescribed appeal might or

might not have been an appeal to the courts. Questions as to which methods for

determining

rights are the most desirable, raise issues of policy which are for parliament to decide, but

the courts cannot invent a right of appeal where none was given. The courts will not

usurp an appellate jurisdiction where none is created.” [Emphasis added]

Back home, the tall list of cases on the point will include FRIMPONG VRS NYARKO

((1998-99) SCGLR 734; FRIMPONG VRS POKU (1963)2 GLR 1; IN RE OKINE (1960)

GLR 84; MOORE VRS TAYEE (1933)2 WACA 43 SANDEMA-NAB VRS ASANGALISA

(1996-97) SCGLR 302 and finally, IN RE YENDI SKIN AFFAIRS; YAKUBU II VRS

ABUDULAI (1984-84)2 GLR 226 where ABBAN J.A (as he then was) at page 229, in a

short rendition noted:

“The main issue of importance is whether or not the applicant has a right of appeal to the

Supreme Court, he not having appealed against any of the findings of the of the Ollenu

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 Commicee. An appeal is a creature of statute and if the statute does not give a right of

appeal, that is the end of the macer.”

It is argued for the Respondent in this case that the award of the voluntary arbitrator

was by extension, a decision of the Commission hence the appeal could properly be

launched against it under the law. According to Counsel, the complaint had been

lodged with the Commission and the proceedings were steered at the Commission.

Again, it was the Commission’s secretary that called the parties when the award was

ready. For him, this made the award the decision of the Commission.

The statutory ramifications of the two distinct proceedings (Compulsory arbitration and

voluntary arbitration) and how in this case, the parties’ arbitral proceedings were

conducted do not lend support to such a position.

First, it would be observed that, unlike a voluntary arbitration, the Commission itself

acts as the arbitrator in a compulsory arbitration. Its panel is constituted in accordance

with Section 164(3) and Regulation 28 of L.I.1822. The parties are compelled to submit

their dispute to the Commission for resolution even if they are unwilling to do so. The

Commission must publish the award in the GazeXe and other State media and give

copies to the parties. The award in a compulsory arbitration is therefore the decision of

the commission which is reached by compulsion and devoid of element of

voluntariness.

In voluntary arbitration, the law, reading particularly the provisions in Sections 157 and

158 together, leaves the initial process of appointment of a voluntary arbitrator in the

hands of the parties. The Commission comes in to appoint an arbitrator for them where

they were unable to agree on such appointment. Even then, the Commission acts with

the consent of the parties. The arbitrator on appointment then appoints a time and place

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for the hearing and notify the parties. The arbitral process is conducted in terms of the

parties’ own agreement. The decision of the arbitrator or a majority of the arbitrators

shall constitute the award and shall be binding on all the parties.

In consonance with the above, the record before us shows that the Appellant and the

Respondent consented in writing to the appointment of the Sole arbitrator. [Pages 48-54

of Record of Appeal (ROA)]. On the appointment of the Sole arbitrator, the parties

entered into an Arbitration Management and Confidentiality Agreement. This

agreement regulated the arbitral process that resulted in the award. The agreement

which had no provision on any right of appeal covered such maXers as; Agreement to

Arbitrate; Issues for Arbitration; Arbitrators’ role, Submissions; Arbitration sidings;

Arbitration process, Confidentiality; Fees and Award. [Pages 72—74 ROA].

It must be clear from the above that the award of the voluntary arbitrator was not the

decision of the Commission. It was the product of the parties’ own agreed process. Not

only was the process undertaken in accordance with the parties’ own agreement, the

parties’ sponsored the process. It was out of their fees that the arbitrator was paid for

his services.

From our standpoint, the Commission’s role in a voluntary arbitration is that of a

facilitator and not a decision-maker. The argument therefore that the award of the

voluntary arbitrator was by extension the decision of the Commission is erroneous and

ought to be rejected. It cannot be suggested, indeed, we have not come across a case

where the Commission is in court seeking to enforce an award made by a voluntary

arbitrator as it would, for its own award in a compulsory arbitration, which to all

intents and purposes is its own decision and enforceable as such.

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The Alternative Dispute Resolution Act, 2010, (Act 798) has adequately provided for the

enforcement of and recourse to challenging a voluntary arbitral award.

Section 52 on Effect of award provides:

“52: Subject to the right of a party to set aside an award under section 58 of this Act, an

arbitration award is final and binding as between the parties or any person claiming

through or under them.”

Sections 57 on enforcement stipulates:

“57(1) An award made by an arbitrator pursuant to an arbitration agreement may, by

leave of the High Court, be enforced in the same manner as a judgment or order of the

Court to the same effect.

(2) Where leave is so given, judgment may be entered in terms of the award.

(3) Leave to enforce an award shall not be given where, or to the extent, that a person

against whom the award is sought to be enforced shows that the arbitrator lacked

substantive jurisdiction to make the award.”

Section 58 on challenge of award provides:

“58 (1) An arbitral award may subject to this Act be set aside on application by a party to

the arbitration.

(2) The application shall be made to the High Court and the award may be set aside by the

Court only where the applicant satisfies that Court that:

(a) a party to the arbitration was under some disability or incapacity;

(b) the law to the arbitration agreement is not valid;

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 (c) the applicant was not given notice of the appointment of the arbitrator or of the

proceedings or was unable to present the applicant’s case;

(d) the award deals with a dispute not within the scope of the arbitration

agreement or outside the agreement except that the Court shall not set aside any

part of the award that falls within the agreement;

(e) there has been failure to conform to the agreed procedure by the parties;

(f) the arbitrator has an interest in the subject macer of the arbitration which the

arbitrator failed to disclose.

(3) The court shall set aside an arbitral award where it finds that the subject-macer of the

dispute is incapable of being secled by arbitration or the arbitral award was induced by

fraud or corruption.

(4) An application to set aside an award may not be made after three months from the

date on which the applicant received the award unless the Court for justifiable cause

orders otherwise.

(5) On hearing the applicant, the Court may make an order as is just in the

circumstances of the case.

(6) An appeal from the Court lies to the Court of Appeal.”

The above provisions of the ADR Act present the statutory regime to regulate the

enforcement of and the recourse to challenging a voluntary arbitral award.

Significantly, a right of appeal is created under Section 58(6) to the Court of Appeal but

that is against the decision of the High Court deciding on the award. There is no right of

appeal directly against the award to the Court of Appeal. The law maker, we presume

knew the state of the law under the Labour Act at the time it legislated to regulate

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voluntary arbitration under the ADR Act. We dare not aXempt to create any such right

of appeal.

The Supreme Court of Zimbabwe in the case of ZIMBABWE EDUCATIONAL

SCIENTIFIC, SOCIAL AND CULTURAL WORKERS UNION VRS WELFARE

EDUCATIONAL INSTITUTIONS EMPLOYERS’ ASSOCIATION (Civil Appeal SC 121

of 2011)[2013] ZWSC 11 had to decide inter alia, whether there was a right of appeal in

voluntary arbitration in terms of Section 98(10) of that country’s Labour Act, Chapter

28:01. The provision, similar to Section 167(2) of our law, creates a right of appeal on

questions of law in compulsory arbitration.

The court, having examined the provisions of the country’s Labour Act vis vis its

Arbitration Act took the view that the Labour Court which is vested with appellate

jurisdiction under the law had no power to entertain an appeal or review over an award

made in a voluntary arbitration.

Malaba DCJ delivered himself thus:

“Consistent with the meaning of s 98(1)(a) of the Act, s 98(10) provides that an appeal

on a question of law shall lie to the Labour Court from any decision of an arbitrator

appointed to hear and determine a dispute referred to him or her for compulsory

arbitration. The fact that s 98(10) of the Act gives limited right to appeal on a question of

law underscores the fact that a right of appeal is a statutory creation and its ambit will

depend on the terms of the statute creating it.”

Delivering further, he stated:

“…The provisions of s 98(10) become relevant in the determination of the appeal because

in terms of the provision there is no right of appeal against a decision of an arbitrator in

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 compulsory arbitration proceedings on a question of fact. Voluntary arbitration

proceedings cannot thus be subjected to either an appeal or review under the Labour Act.

Voluntary Arbitration proceedings are governed by the Arbitration Act.”

The learned judge then cited another decision of the court thus: “In McKelvey v

Abrahams & Anor 1989 (2) ZLR 251 (SC) Gubbay CJ at 264C-D said:

“The object of arbitration, as expressed in para 13 of the Schedule to the Act, is to arrive

at an award that is final and binding on the parties. Thus, an award is not subject to

appeal. It may be set aside on any of the four grounds. First, that it does not fall under

para 13 as not being “made in terms of the submission”. Second, if the arbitrator has

misconducted the proceedings, as envisaged in s 12(2) of the Act. Third, where it has been

improperly procured (vide the same section). Fourth, where the arbitrators’ mistake is so

gross and manifest that it could not have been made without some degree of misconduct.”

For what we consider to be sound exposition of the law and given the similarity of

terms in the provisions in Section 167(2) of our law and the s 98(10) of the Act referred

to, we are persuaded to toe the line of the Zimbabwean Supreme Court. In the final

analysis, we shall hold that the award in the voluntary arbitration was not appealable.

No such right is created under the law and this court has no jurisdiction to entertain the

appeal.

In the strength of our conviction, we have applied our minds to the time-honoured

presumption in law against creating or enlarging existing jurisdiction. Rooted in

common law, the presumption in essence prohibits a court from extending its

jurisdiction in the absence of an express statutory provision to that effect. See The Law of

Interpretation in Ghana (Exposition & Critique) S.Y BIMPONG-BUTA; (Advanced Legal

Publications ALP, 1995) p.157. AZORBLIE VRS ANKRAH (1984-86)1 GLR 562;

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REPUBLIC VRS VOLTA REGIONAL HOUSE OF CHIEFS, EX PARTE ASOR II (1972)1

GLR 273.

The case of JAMES DAVID BROWN VRS NLC (supra) has been cited for our

consideration. The Appellant wants this court to hold by that decision, that the subject

award is appealable.

The JAMES DAVID BROWN case involved the Supreme Court essentially interpreting

the relevant provisions of the Labour Act to allow a person aggrieved by the

Commission’s determination of a case of Unfair termination under Section 63 to have

recourse to appeal to the Court of Appeal as in the case of Unfair Labour Practices and

Compulsory arbitration under Sections 134 and 167(2) respectively. The court’s

interpretation gave rise to its formulation as follows:

“Accordingly, based on the provisions already made by parliament that the Court of

Appeal shall determine appeals from determinations of the NLC in unfair Labour practice

macers and awards in compulsory arbitration cases, we formulate our opinion as follows:

wherever in the Labour Act, the NLC is required to make a determination and no remedy

is provided for the aggrieved party, a dissatisfied party shall be entitled to appeal within

14 days of the making or giving of the order, direction or decision to the Court of Appeal.

This is in consonance with similar provisions made by the lawmaker.”

Let it be stated without hesitation that the decision in JAMES DAVID BROWN is

incapable of advancing the Appellant’s case. Our reasons are straightforward. First, the

award in a voluntary arbitration is not a decision of or a determination by the

Commission. As demonstrated, it is an award by the parties’ own agreement which

they have consented to be final and binding. Second, a party aggrieved by such award is

not without remedy. The party has recourse to the High Court on an application

16
pursuant to Section 58 of the Alternative Dispute Resolution Act, 2010 (Act 798) to have

the award set aside on stated grounds. Thereafter, there is a further recourse to the

Court of Appeal. The JAMES DAVID BROWN case did not involve a voluntary

arbitration. Were the facts similar to those in the instant case, we are certain the

Supreme Court would have reached a different decision.

We now come to the second issue. Was the appeal filed within time assuming the award

was appealable?

By the provision in Section 134 of the Act (if the award is taken to be decision of the

Commission), the appeal was to have been filed within fourteen days of the making of

same. The award in question was made on 14th March 2022. The appeal was filed 30th

March 2022. It was therefore filed out of time.

The Appellant however has the following argument which is contained in its Counsel’s

wriXen submission to make:

“My Lords, respectfully, on the 28th of March 2022, Appellant received a call from the

Arbitrator’s secretary that the award was ready. Counsel for the Appellant immediately

went to the National Labour Commission for its copy of the Award only to see that the

Award was dated the 14th of March, 2022. Some fourteen days after the award was

purportedly delivered to the Commission by the Arbitrator. We respectfully submit that

in the peculiar circumstances of this case where there was no fixed date for the delivery of

the Award, but rather same was to be communicated to the parties. Notice should be

deemed to be given to the Appellant from the date on which the Award was received by

the Appellant which is 28th of March 2022.” REPUBLIC VRS WASSA FIASE

TRADITIONAL COUNCIL AND OTHERS, (J4/55 2014) [2015] GHASC 135 (28th

May 2015) cited.

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Observably, the maXers forming the basis of the argument are not borne by the record

before us. Apart from the fact that the award was dated 14th March, nothing else in the

above submission is verifiable from the record. There is therefore no factual basis for

this court to assess the argument.

We state with emphasis that this court determines maXers based on the record before it.

As far we are concerned, anything not contained in the record is deemed not to have

taken place. In SKYWAYS TRAVELS LTD VRS GCB (2005-2006) SCGLR 724 holding 1 of

the headnote contains the following passage:

“Though the record of proceedings must reflect what actually transpires in court, in the

absence of any cogent evidence to the contrary, all the courts (as well as the general

public) are entitled to presume that the record of proceedings, as set out in the record of

the court, is a true and accurate reflection of what transpired in the proceedings. Where a

party is of the view that such records, i.e. if the court’s version of the proceedings is

inaccurate, there are legal steps he or she may take to cause same to be rectified. Failing

that, every party is bound by every part of the record of proceedings, regardless of what

might be reflected in the party’s personal version of what transpired in court.

Consequently, since in the instant case, there is nothing on record of appeal indicating

that the Appellant ever challenged the accuracy of any part of the record of proceedings,

or otherwise sought to rectify same (or caused the same to be rectified) for any reason

whatsoever, there is no way the Supreme Court can legitimately rely on any alternative

record that seems to exist only in the Appellant’s realm of reality.” See also IDDRISU

VRS AMARTEY (2009) SCGLR 670.

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We take the position that the submission made by Counsel contains maXers that exist in

the Appellant’s realm of reality. There is absolutely no legal basis for us to consider

them on merits. The argument is therefore rejected.

In the end, we come to the conclusion that the appeal fails on both objections. The

award made in the voluntary arbitration by the arbitrator Mr. Paul Osei-Mensah was

not appealable in law. Assuming it was appealable, same was filed out of time and the

notice of appeal was incapable of invoking the jurisdiction of this court. We dismiss the

appeal in its entirety without going into the merits.

Costs of GH¢10,000.00 for the Respondents.

(SGD)

RICHARD ADJEI-FRIMPONG

(JUSTICE OF THE COURT OF APPEAL)

(SGD)

I agree, ALEX B. POKU-ACHEAMPONG

(JUSTICE OF THE COURT OF APPEAL)

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 (SGD)

I also agree, DR. ERNEST OWUSU-DAPAA

(JUSTICE OF THE COURT OF APPEAL)

COUNSEL:

1. Faisal Ziblim for the Appellant.

2. Charles Bawaduah for the Respondents.

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