Hoover Institution | Stanford University

HOOVER HISTORY LAB

Policy Brief

Twenty Million Lef Behind

How Nigeria’s Broken Education Policies
Threaten a Nation, a Continent, and the World

Gif Iyioku

Education is widely recognized as a cornerstone of national development, economic opportu-

nity, and political stability across Africa. Nowhere is this more urgent than in Nigeria, where more
than half the 237 million population is under the age of eighteen.1 This youthful demographic
holds immense potential to drive economic and social progress if equipped with the skills and
knowledge to thrive. Yet despite decades of policy interventions, Nigeria continues to record
the highest number of out-of-school children on the continent, with over twenty million young
people currently excluded from formal education out of the sixty-six million Nigerian children
who fall within the school-age range, ages six through ffeen.2 This is not merely a domestic
crisis. Nigeria’s education failures risk deepening poverty, fueling insecurity, and acceler-
ating migration, with far-reaching implications for regional and even global stability, world
economic growth, and international development agendas.

As of 2024, approximately seventeen million Nigerians reside abroad, forming one of the larg-
est diaspora populations globally. The primary destinations for Nigerian emigrants include
the United States, approximately 476,000; the United Kingdom, around 215,000; Italy, about
119,400; the United Arab Emirates, approximately 100,000; and Canada, around 70,000. The
majority of these emigrants are young adults, with a signifcant proportion between the ages
of twenty-fve and forty-four, refecting a trend of skilled professionals seeking better oppor-
tunities abroad.3 Indeed, Nigeria’s youth bulge could be an incomparable opportunity for the
countries undergoing precipitous population decline. And yet, the persistently limited impact
of its national education system, despite numerous reform eforts, raises a fundamental ques-
tion: What must now be done diferently to ensure that Nigeria’s education system delivers
transformative, sustainable change?

This policy brief examines the root causes of Nigeria’s enduring education crisis and outlines
practical, context-sensitive solutions for reform. It begins by tracing the historical evolution
of Nigeria’s education policy from 1960 to 2025, showing how successive reforms have
been undermined by poor planning, underfunding, and weak institutional capacity. Next,

A Hoover Institution Policy Brief

No. 2503 • July 2025

 it examines how Nigerian communities and civil society hold the education system account-
able, highlighting how parents, alumni groups, and nongovernmental organizations (NGOs)
have stepped in to fll gaps and, at times, pressure the state to act. The analysis then shifs
outward to explore two diferent streams of international comparison, ofering examples of
how strategic investment, political commitment, and system coherence can produce mea-
surable gains. The frst follows the state-led models of educational progress in Tunisia and
Seychelles. The second focuses on the role of private-sector competition, drawing lessons
from Kenya, Ghana, Uganda, and Liberia, where nonstate actors have expanded access
and introduced new models for service delivery. These case studies, taken together, reveal
the power of both state-led leadership and adaptive, market-based innovations in driving
progress.

Informed by these state-led and market-based cases, the fnal section presents policy rec-
ommendations inspired by African innovations, ofering actionable proposals for Nigeria
to combine stronger public accountability with efective engagement of nonstate actors.
These recommendations include piloting public-private partnerships, expanding vocational
and adult learning, supporting low-cost private schools, and improving regulatory oversight
and funding stability. Crucially, the brief argues that a blended approach, rooted in both
local accountability and regional best practices, presents the most viable path forward for
Nigeria’s education system.

With global stability increasingly tied to Africa’s trajectory, Nigeria’s education crisis cannot
be ignored. As the continent’s largest democracy and most populous country, Nigeria’s ability
to educate the next generation will shape migration patterns, economic development, and
security partnerships far beyond its borders. The time for isolated reform is over. Nigeria
must now embrace integrated, inclusive, and scalable strategies that prepare its youth for
the future. In doing so, Nigeria can strengthen the African foundation for global stability and
shared prosperity.

HISTORICAL EVOLUTION OF NIGERIA’S EDUCATION

POLICY (1960–2025)

Over more than six decades, Nigeria’s quest to educate its populace has been mired in a
cycle of well-intentioned policies undermined by systemic challenges. The historical record
shows a pattern of ambitious plans followed by implementation shortfalls: from Universal
Primary Education (UPE) in the 1970s to Universal Basic Education (UBE) in the 2000s, obsta-
cles including inadequate planning, funding gaps, corruption, and governance issues have
recurred, preventing these programs from reaching their full promise. Although Nigeria has
experienced periods of progress, such as the expansion of school access in the 1970s and
early 2000s, and ongoing eforts to reform the system, the fundamental issues remain unre-
solved. Policies ofen fail at the intersection of design and execution: The government sets
goals without realistic pathways, and the education bureaucracy struggles to carry out even
well-crafed plans in the face of resource and accountability constraints. As a result, the

2 GIFT IYIOKU U TWENTY MILLION LEFT BEHIND

education system, despite minor improvements, still does not meet the needs of Nigeria’s
growing population or the demands of the modern economy.

Addressing these challenges requires sustained political commitment beyond the reform
rhetoric, ensuring continuity of policies across administrations; involving stakeholders at all
levels, from teachers to state governments, in decision making; and dramatically improv-
ing funding and oversight. Encouragingly, the current policy discourse in Nigeria recognizes
these needs, with the House of Representatives, civil society organizations such as the Socio-
Economic Rights and Accountability Project (SERAP), education advocates, and international
observers calling for enforcing the right to education as enshrined in the constitution, insulat-
ing education from politicization, and cracking down on corruption in the sector.4

Learning from historical mistakes is also essential for Nigerian decision makers. By examin-
ing the patterns since 1960, one can see that piecemeal approaches will not sufce. Rather,
both comprehensive reforms that strengthen institutions and systems of accountability must
accompany any new policy initiatives. Only then can Nigeria’s educational policies translate
into tangible gains in literacy, skills, and national development, fulflling the long-deferred
promise of education for all. Understanding the context of Nigeria’s educational policies
requires a look at key historical phases and shifs.

1960s (POST-INDEPENDENCE)
Upon independence in 1960, Nigeria inherited a regional education structure from British
colonial rule. Education policy was largely region driven in the First Republic (1960–1966).
Local initiatives such as the Western Region’s (now largely comprising states in Nigeria’s
South West zone) free primary education program, launched in 1955, set early examples by
ofering tuition-free and compulsory schooling, funded largely through regional taxation. This
ambitious scheme led to signifcant increases in enrollment. However, overall access to school-
ing remained uneven across the country. The Northern Region, with fewer fnancial resources
and a diferent administrative legacy, lagged behind the south. Due to limited local experience
in educational administration, the period was marked by planning challenges that debilitated
the education system during this period.5 Early policies were modest in scope, and the need
for a national framework grew as regional disparities became apparent to the government.

1970s (OIL BOOM AND UPE)

A major federal push in education began in the early 1970s. Afer the civil war (1967–1970),
the government assumed control over most schools, which were previously run by regional
or missionary bodies, in order to centralize and standardize education.6 A landmark 1970
National Curriculum Conference set the stage for Nigeria’s frst National Policy on Education
formulated in 1977.7 In 1976, the military government launched Universal Primary Education
(UPE), an ambitious program to provide free primary schooling nationwide. UPE led to
an explosion in enrollments—for example, primary one (ages fve and six) intake in some
northern states jumped by over 400 percent in one year.8 This rapid expansion, however,
exposed serious planning and capacity gaps: The lack of trained teachers, classrooms, and

HOOVER INSTITUTION U STANFORD UNIVERSITY 3

 learning materials could not meet the demand. By the late 1970s, the UPE program struggled
under the weight of its unrealistic targets and resource shortfalls, illustrating the consequences
of inadequate preparation and data in policy design.9

1980s–1990s (ECONOMIC CRISIS AND DECLINE)

The 1981 revised National Policy on Education aimed to make education more functional and
vocational, introducing the 6-3-3-4 system—six years primary, three junior secondary, three
senior secondary, four tertiary. Nigeria in the 1980s, however, experienced an economic reces-
sion and a Structural Adjustment Program, which led to cuts in public spending on education.
Under military regimes (1983–1998), funding for education stagnated or fell in real terms.
Many reforms remained only partially implemented. The quality of education deteriorated as
facilities decayed and teachers lef for better opportunities.10 Frequent policy shifs contin-
ued, with regimes announcing new nomadic and adult education initiatives. Yet weak imple-
mentation meant limited results. The late 1990s saw Nigeria lagging behind global Education
for All (EFA) goals, with high illiteracy and millions of children out of school.

2000s (RETURN TO DEMOCRACY AND UBE)

With the return to civilian rule in 1999, the sitting president, Olusegun Obasanjo, renewed
emphasis on education reform. The Universal Basic Education (UBE) program was launched
in 1999 to provide free, compulsory nine-year basic education (primary and junior secondary)
as a follow-up to the earlier UPE.11 Backed by the UBE Act of 2004, the UBE initiative came
with high hopes and specifc targets. Unfortunately, it quickly became evident that the same
structural challenges persisted. A 2001 evaluation found signifcant inadequacy in UBE imple-
mentation, with the identical problems that handicapped UPE, including inadequate qualifed
teachers, insufcient funds, inadequate facilities, and poor motivation, reappearing.12 In efect,
Nigeria had relaunched UPE under a new name (UBE) without fully learning from past fail-
ures. Nonetheless, during the 2000s, the Nigerian government achieved marginal progress
in enrollment numbers due to UBE and increased international support, such as debt-relief
funds channeled to education. The National Policy on Education was revised in 2004 to
refect new commitments such as education for girls and the introduction of Information
and Communications Technology (ICT), but implementation remained patchy.

2010s–2020s (CONTEMPORARY CHALLENGES)

In the last decade, Nigeria’s education system has continued to grapple with long-standing
issues amid new challenges. In 2015, UNESCO noted that despite some gains, Nigeria still
had one of the world’s largest out-of-school populations, and quality remained low.13 Teacher
shortages and infrastructural decay were widespread, partly due to funding defciencies and
population growth outpacing school expansion.14 Crucially, the governance issues persisted:
Insufcient coordination between federal and state authorities ofen led to funding mismatches
and duplication of eforts.15 The mid-2010s also brought security challenges, notably the
Boko Haram insurgency in the northeast, that directly disrupted schooling; UNESCO’s Global
Education Monitoring Report estimated that insurgency in the north had displaced over
nineteen thousand teachers and further undermined educational access.16

4 GIFT IYIOKU U TWENTY MILLION LEFT BEHIND

Entering the 2020s, Nigeria has increased education spending modestly under recent admin-
istrations, but it still falls far short of international benchmarks. According to BudgIT’s 2025
Budget Analysis, the federal government allocated N = 3.66 trillion to education, representing
6.65 percent of the national budget, signaling its highest nominal allocation in history. This
fgure, however, still falls signifcantly short of the UNESCO benchmark of 15–20 percent
of national expenditure or 4–6 percent of GDP.17 Thus, while the context has evolved, with
greater global attention and new policies addressing safety of schools and technology in
education, the core problems aficting policy design and execution have remained remark-
ably consistent over time. See table 1.

Despite numerous reforms since independence, Nigeria’s education system remains deeply
constrained by governance failures, underfunding, and implementation gaps. Yet, while state-
led eforts have struggled to deliver consistent results, education has not collapsed entirely.
This resilience is, in large part, due to the ofen-overlooked role of Nigerian society itself.
Across the country, parents, alumni groups, religious leaders, and local communities have
stepped in, not only to supplement state eforts, but in many cases to sustain and supervise
the education system where the government has faltered. Understanding their contributions
reveals how nonstate actors have become indispensable coproviders and watchdogs in
basic education.

HOW DO NIGERIAN COMMUNITIES AND CIVIL SOCIETY

HOLD THE EDUCATION SYSTEM ACCOUNTABLE?

In the absence of efective state oversight, Nigerian communities and civil society organiza-
tions have developed grassroots accountability tools to monitor education delivery, expose
corruption, and pressure ofcials to act.

The NGO Connected Development (CODE) runs the “Follow the Money” (FTM) initiative,
which enables local communities to track education budgets and infrastructure projects.
= 91.6 million school project in Fune Local
In 2019, citizens in Yobe State monitored a N
Government Area, using community site visits, social media, and town halls to report delays,
leading to the project’s completion.18 Similar campaigns have succeeded in Plateau, Kaduna,
and Adamawa States.

BudgIT’s Tracka project has also empowered communities to demand school upgrades. In
Meigero in Kaduna State, Tracka revealed that a funded classroom block had not been built.
In response, the parent-teacher association (PTA) repeatedly petitioned local ofcials, leading
to construction being completed afer two years of pressure.19 These models show how citi-
zen access to budget data and advocacy platforms can bypass middlemen and directly pres-
sure the state.

When domestic mechanisms fail, some NGOs turn to litigation. In 2010, SERAP sued the
Nigerian government at the Economic Community of West African States (ECOWAS) Court
= 54.8 billion in UBE funds were mismanaged. The court ruled in favor of SERAP,
afer N

HOOVER INSTITUTION U STANFORD UNIVERSITY 5

 TABLE 1 MAJOR EDUCATIONAL REFORM POLICIES IN NIGERIA, 1960–PRESENT. THIS TABLE
PROVIDES AN OVERVIEW OF SIGNIFICANT EDUCATION REFORMS INTRODUCED IN NIGERIA
FROM 1960 TO DATE, INCLUDING THEIR LEGAL/POLICY STATUS AND THEIR INTENDED ROLES
IN BASIC, SECONDARY, AND TERTIARY EDUCATION.

Name Legal/Policy status Role Current status

First National Government planning Introduced Nigeria’s frst Historical milestone.

Development policy formal education develop- Helped launch institu-
Plan (1962–1968) ment strategy; emphasized tions and infuenced the
technical/vocational edu- 1970s UPE program.
cation and teacher training.

Free Universal Implemented (1976) Introduced by the Still in place, though

Primary Obasanjo military implementation varies
Education (UPE) government to provide by state.
free primary education
nationwide.

National Policy Implemented (frst in Provided a blueprint for Still in efect; revised
on Education 1977, revised multiple educational objectives multiple times to refect
times) and curriculum across all new goals.
levels.

Nomadic Implemented (1989) Targeted at educating Partially active, but

Education Policy nomadic and pastoral with limited reach and
communities through declining support.
mobile and fexible
schooling systems.

National Implemented (1989) Created a regulatory body Still operational; serves

Commission for colleges of education as the regulatory body for
for Colleges of to enhance tertiary teacher colleges of education.
Education Act training.

Education for All Internationally Nigeria committed to No longer actively ref-

(EFA) ratifed commitment global goals for universal erenced; absorbed into
(1990, 2000) education by 2015, afect- Sustainable Development
ing national strategies. Goal (SDG) 4 initiatives.

Universal Basic Implemented (1999) Expanded UPE to include Active and ongoing, but
Education (UBE) junior secondary educa- faces funding and infra-
tion; aimed at compulsory, structure challenges.
free, and universal educa-
tion for children aged 6–15.

Almajiri Implemented (2010) Aimed at integrating Largely dormant or

Education Western education into the poorly implemented due
Program traditional Quranic schools to structural challenges.
system in northern Nigeria.

Tertiary Statutory funding Tertiary education funding Active and well funded,
Education Trust agency (TETFund and development. though future sustain-
Fund (TETFund) Act, 2011) ability is threatened by
proposed tax reforms.

(continued)

6 GIFT IYIOKU U TWENTY MILLION LEFT BEHIND

TABLE 1 (Continued)

Name Legal/Policy status Role Current status

Safe Schools Implemented (2014) Established to protect stu- Still in place, but imple-
Initiative (SSI) dents and schools, espe- mentation limited by
cially in confict-afected insecurity and funding.
northern regions.

National Implemented (2016) A federal social invest- Active nationwide.

Home-Grown ment initiative providing The program is ongo-
School Feeding free daily meals to public ing under the Federal
Programme primary pupils (initially Ministry of Humanitarian
(NHGSFP) grades 1–3). Afairs, though it faces
budgetary and logistical
challenges as it scales.

Edo Basic Implemented (2018, A state-level reform in Edo Active and acclaimed.
Education Edo State program) State aimed at overhauling EdoBEST has signif-
Sector basic education delivery. cantly improved school-
Transformation Emphasizes teacher train- ing outcomes—over
(EdoBEST) ing, technology-enabled 16,000 teachers trained,
learning, and data-driven teacher absenteeism
school management to dropped, and student
improve teaching qual- performance in literacy/
ity and student learning numeracy climbed.
outcomes.

Nigerian Enacted (2024) Established to provide Active; has disbursed

Education Loan interest-free loans to funds to thousands of
Fund (NELFUND) students in tertiary students across various
institutions. institutions.

New Curriculum Implemented (2025) Introduced vocational Active; aims to reduce

with 15 Trades training in secondary youth unemployment,
schools to equip students though implementation
with practical skills. faces challenges such
as resource constraints.

ordering restitution for violated education rights.20 SERAP has since fled additional lawsuits,
including against governors for failing to allocate 15 percent of state budgets to education
while overspending in other areas.21

At the school level, integrity subcommittees formed by PTAs and school-based management
committees (SBMCs) now monitor textbook deliveries and school feeding procurement, report-
ing fraud to anti-corruption agencies. Some communities use mobile phones to report absen-
teeism or grant diversion, creating real-time accountability loops. These eforts informed
some of Nigeria’s transparency-related initiatives, which formally encouraged community
monitoring.

HOOVER INSTITUTION U STANFORD UNIVERSITY 7

 When monitoring and litigation are not enough, some communities bypass the state alto-
gether. In areas with chronic neglect, locals hire volunteer teachers, fund unregistered
community schools, and work with religious groups to ofer informal literacy programs.
One example is the community-built school in Rumde Baru, Adamawa State, which oper-
ated independently until it gained state attention and eventual support.

While grassroots and civil society eforts in Nigeria have proven resourceful and at times
transformative, they ofen operate in response to, or in spite of, weak state structures. Yet, in
some African contexts, the state has successfully led broad-based education reform without
requiring parallel civic intervention. To better understand what a functional, reform-oriented
state can achieve, the next section examines two African countries, Tunisia and Seychelles,
that have pursued sustained, state-led pathways to educational progress. These examples,
alongside the upcoming analysis of private-sector contributions elsewhere, allow us to
explore two key streams of reform: one driven by strong and coherent government leader-
ship, the other by adaptive, nonstate innovation. Together, they ofer comparative lessons for
how Nigeria might reimagine the role of the state while leveraging the power of civic engage-
ment and private initiative.

STATE-LED MODELS OF EDUCATIONAL PROGRESS:

TUNISIA AND SEYCHELLES AS CASE STUDIES

This section explores the educational reform experiences of Tunisia and Seychelles, two African
nations that, while difering signifcantly in population size, religious composition, and histori-
cal trajectories, exemplify state-led pathways to education success. Tunisia, a predominantly
Muslim North African country, has pursued wide-reaching reforms focused on curriculum
modernization and public investment in universal education. Seychelles, a small island state
with a largely Christian population, has achieved near-universal literacy and remarkable edu-
cational equity through consistent political will and strategic state funding.

TUNISIA
Tunisia presents a compelling case for educational reform in Africa, combining strong state
policy with consistent investment to achieve near-universal access and high literacy rates.
Since gaining independence, Tunisia has prioritized education through legislation that guar-
antees free and compulsory basic education for children aged six through sixteen.22 Modeled
afer the French system, its structure includes primary, secondary, vocational, and tertiary
education, with increasing integration of digital tools and multilingual instruction in Arabic,
French, and, increasingly, English.23

The government’s annual allocation of approximately 6.2 percent of GDP to education, one
of the highest on the continent, has underpinned sustained reforms.24 This investment has
enabled infrastructure development, modern teacher training, and widespread access to
educational technologies. Notably, 20 percent of university courses at Tunis University are
now delivered online, providing fexible learning options that support student employment

8 GIFT IYIOKU U TWENTY MILLION LEFT BEHIND

and lifelong learning.25 Gender parity is another success: Enrollment rates among boys and
girls remain nearly equal.

Despite these gains, Tunisia continues to grapple with youth unemployment, particu-
larly among university graduates. The World Bank reports an overall unemployment
rate of 15.5 percent, with rates exceeding 29 percent for graduates and over 22 percent
for women. 26 This mismatch between education and labor market needs has prompted
recent reforms targeting curriculum modernization, expanded vocational training, and
greater private-sector collaboration. A notable initiative is the €40 million agreement with the
European Investment Bank in 2023 to construct eighty sustainable primary schools, refect-
ing Tunisia’s strategic use of international partnerships.27 The country also maintains a robust
adult education system, with programs such as the National Adult Education Program reducing
intergenerational literacy disparities.28 Tunisia’s model, characterized by sustained investment,
gender equity, technological adoption, and a mix of general and vocational pathways, ofers
Nigeria important lessons on aligning education policy with workforce realities and building
resilience into public education systems.

SEYCHELLES
Seychelles, the smallest African country by population, has emerged as one of the continent’s
most efective models of inclusive and high-performing education. Through sustained politi-
cal will, constitutional guarantees, and a frm commitment to education as a public good, the
island nation has developed a system marked by universal access, gender equity, and global
competitiveness. Education in Seychelles is compulsory from ages six to sixteen and free until
age eighteen.29 The country’s education structure includes early childhood care, six years of
primary education, and fve years of secondary education, followed by pathways to vocational
training or tertiary study. Instruction begins in Creole and gradually transitions to English and
French, promoting multilingual literacy.30 Importantly, ten out of thirteen years of schooling
are compulsory, a foundation that has contributed to Seychelles’ 95 percent literacy rate and
its leading position in African education rankings.31

The government’s budgetary commitment to education has ranged between 9 percent and
19 percent of total national expenditure, with 4.7 percent of GDP consistently allocated to
the sector.32 This investment supports a strong network of professionally trained educators,
free provision of textbooks and tuition, and continuous professional development for school
leaders. Seychelles also achieved all six UNESCO Education for All goals and ranks among
the top countries globally for teaching quality and critical thinking.33 Adult education has
also been a sustained priority. The Adult Learning and Distance Education Centre, founded
in the 1980s, continues to provide skill-development programs for out-of-school youth and
adult learners, contributing to lifelong learning and workforce fexibility.34 Policy continuity
and accountability have been central to Seychelles’ success. Reforms such as the 2009–2010
Education Reform Action Plan and the subsequent Medium-Term Strategic Plan (2013–2017)
focused on governance, early childhood care, curriculum quality, and educational access.35
These frameworks ensured that the education system evolved with changing societal and
labor market demands.

HOOVER INSTITUTION U STANFORD UNIVERSITY 9

 Seychelles’ achievements refect the power of compact scale, coherent governance, and
cultural consensus around education. For Nigeria, the lesson lies not in replication but in
adaptation, especially in how sustained funding, professional teaching standards, and strong
institutional frameworks can deliver quality outcomes, even under resource constraints.

KEY COMPARATIVE INSIGHTS AND IMPLICATIONS FOR NIGERIA

Nigeria’s path to educational transformation lies in strategic adaptation: combining the fscal
discipline of Tunisia, the institutional coherence of Seychelles, and a homegrown vision that
confronts Nigeria’s demographic complexity with urgency and innovation. The educational
experiences of Tunisia and Seychelles ofer distinct yet complementary lessons for Nigeria.
While both countries difer from Nigeria in population size, religious composition, and gov-
ernance scale, they demonstrate how coherent policy, consistent investment, and targeted
reforms can signifcantly improve education systems, even within resource-constrained
environments.

A primary diference lies in scale: Nigeria’s population of over 220 million dwarfs Tunisia’s
12 million and Seychelles’ 130,000. This amplifes Nigeria’s logistical and funding challenges,
but it also highlights the need for decentralization and data-driven planning. Both Tunisia
and Seychelles have implemented clear accountability structures that allow national policies
to adapt locally, an approach Nigeria could replicate by empowering subnational education
authorities.

Investment is another key diferentiator. Tunisia and Seychelles consistently dedicate over
4.5 percent of GDP to education, compared to Nigeria’s 0.3 percent.36 This disparity has
clear consequences: overcrowded classrooms, low teacher morale, and insufcient infra-
structure in Nigeria’s public schools. Addressing this requires a renewed national commit-
ment to education as a public good, backed by stable and protected funding channels.

The role of religion in education also bears important implications. While Tunisia is predomi-
nantly Muslim and Seychelles predominantly Christian, Nigeria’s near-equal Muslim-Christian
population has ofen made education reform politically sensitive, particularly around cur-
riculum content and gender equality.37 This makes consensus building across religious
and regional divides essential to any reform efort.

Importantly, both Tunisia and Seychelles demonstrate the benefts of embedding voca-
tional training into mainstream education. Tunisia’s MANFORME (Professional Training and
Employment Upgrade Program) strategy 38 and Seychelles’ integrated TVET (Technical and
Vocational Education Training) programs prepare students not just for exams, but for employ-
ment, an area where Nigeria’s system still underdelivers. Expanding and updating vocational
education, especially for underserved youth, could help close this gap.39

Finally, both countries underscore the value of adult education in national development strat-
egies. Tunisia’s adult literacy reforms and Seychelles’ distance learning centers show how

10 GIFT IYIOKU U TWENTY MILLION LEFT BEHIND

lifelong learning policies can reduce intergenerational disadvantage. Nigeria could adopt
this approach, particularly for women and rural populations.

While Tunisia and Seychelles demonstrate the transformative potential of sustained state
leadership, they are not the only models worthy of consideration. In other African contexts,
nonstate actors, including private education providers and community-based schools, have
played signifcant roles in expanding access, improving learning outcomes, and introducing
innovations that challenge public systems to improve. The next section turns to these alterna-
tive pathways, drawing lessons from countries such as Kenya, Ghana, Uganda, and Liberia,
where public-private dynamics have created competitive pressures and scalable solutions
that may also ofer insights for Nigeria.

THE ROLE OF PRIVATE-SECTOR COMPETITION: LESSONS

FROM KENYA, GHANA, UGANDA, AND LIBERIA

Across sub-Saharan Africa, private schooling has expanded substantially in recent

decades. In 2017, researchers estimated that about 21 percent of pupils in the region
were being educated in private schools and projected that share to rise to 25 percent by
the early 2020s—a projection that has largely materialized, refecting growing demand
for education outside the public sector.40 Notably, this growth includes both elite private
institutions serving wealthier families and low-fee private schools serving low-income
communities. Governments have ofen welcomed private involvement to help meet rapidly
increasing demand for education, though regulatory responses vary. In countries such as
Kenya, Ghana, Uganda, and even Nigeria, tens of thousands of low-cost private schools have
sprung up, indicating viability at scale in delivering education outside the public system.41
Parents’ motivations for choosing private schools usually center on perceived better qual-
ity, greater accountability, or simply the availability of a school seat when public schools
are overcrowded.42 As the following cases illustrate, private education in Africa has, in
various ways, complemented state provision and sometimes pressured public schools
to improve.

KENYA: LOW-FEE PRIVATE SCHOOLS SPUR COMPETITION

Kenya ofers a prominent example where low-cost private schools introduced efective com-
petition for public schools. Afer Kenya made primary education free in 2003, public school
enrollment surged, but quality and resources were strained. In an unexpected twist, private
primary enrollment more than doubled between 2005 and 2009, from 4.4 percent to 10.5 per-
cent of total enrollment, despite the availability of “free” public schools.43 Many families,
dissatisfed with overcrowded and presumably dysfunctional public schools, turned to aford-
able private schools even in slums and rural areas. Unlike the older elite academies, these
new private schools charged very low fees and operated with modest facilities. Remarkably,
studies found that students in Kenya’s low-cost private schools consistently achieved
higher English and math scores than their public school peers, despite private schools
spending less per student. For example, one survey showed private school fourth graders

HOOVER INSTITUTION U STANFORD UNIVERSITY 11

 outperforming public school counterparts by 16 percent in English and 10 percent in math,
even though two-thirds of children in private schools paid fees below the amount of public
schools’ per-pupil spending.44

This performance gap signaled strong competitive pressure on the government system.
The success of private academies, achieved with lower-paid teachers and larger classes,
highlighted inefciencies in public education and shook public confdence in government
schools. In response, Kenyan policymakers faced mounting calls to address teacher absen-
teeism and accountability in public schools in order to stem the exodus of students to private
institutions.45 At the same time, the government moved to regulate the burgeoning private
sector, enforcing school registration and minimum standards, and occasionally even order-
ing closure of substandard private schools. The demonstration efect of the private schools’
better outcomes helped spur reforms such as renewed emphasis on learning assessments
and a competency-based curriculum in public schools indirectly infuenced by the example
set by nonstate schools.

One notable Kenyan model is Bridge International Academies, a chain of low-cost private
schools that grew to serve over ffy thousand pupils in Kenya and expanded to other coun-
tries.46 Bridge introduced highly standardized lesson scripts, teacher tablets, and a strict
accountability system. A recent study led by Nobel laureate Michael Kremer found that
Bridge’s approach produced learning gains among the largest in the international education
literature, with primary students learning in two years what others learned in three.47 These
gains—roughly 0.8 standard deviations higher test scores for Bridge pupils over two years—
demonstrate that quality education can be delivered at scale in a resource-poor setting.48
Importantly, the study suggested that public schools could replicate elements of this model,
such as scripted lesson plans and teacher monitoring, to achieve dramatic improvements. In
fact, Kenya’s experience with Bridge and similar academies has informed debates on public
sector innovation.

In sum, Kenya’s low-fee private schools introduced real competition, resulting in parents
“voting with their feet” for better quality, and forced a reckoning in the public system regard-
ing education quality. The Kenyan case shows both the potential and the challenges of har-
nessing private education: While it has expanded options and demonstrated better outcomes,
it has also raised equity concerns, as the poorest still struggle to pay even low fees, and has
required efective regulation to ensure minimum standards are met.

GHANA: COMMUNITY SCHOOLS AND PRIVATE CHAINS EXPANDING ACCESS

In Ghana, private education, much of it low-cost, has fourished alongside the public
system, contributing to both access gains and competitive pressure. Since the early 2000s,
Ghana has achieved near-universal primary enrollment, thanks not only to government action
such as the fee-abolition policies but also to community-driven growth of private schools.49
The IDP Foundation notes that the number of private basic schools grew by 46 percent
between 2010 and 2015, far outpacing the 4 percent growth in public schools during that
period. By some estimates, around 40 percent of basic education institutions in Ghana are

12 GIFT IYIOKU U TWENTY MILLION LEFT BEHIND

now private, and about 40 percent of those are low-fee schools targeting poor households.50
Even in rural villages, parents have established afordable private schools when public provision
was lacking.51

Crucially, many poor families willingly pay modest fees for these schools due to a percep-
tion of better quality and accountability. Surveys fnd that even some of the poorest parents
choose low-fee private schools because teachers are seen to be more present and atten-
tive than in nearby public schools.52 In Ghana’s low-cost private schools, teacher absentee-
ism is generally lower and local proprietors are directly accountable to fee-paying parents,
which creates pressure to maintain standards. While learning outcome data are mixed, there
is evidence that private school students ofen outperform their public school peers in core
subjects, afer adjusting for socioeconomic diferences.53 More consistently, Ghana’s private
schools operate at signifcantly lower unit cost than public schools, indicating better cost
efciency even if absolute learning diferences are debated.54 For the government, this has
underscored the possibility of achieving more with limited resources.

A prominent example from Ghana is the Omega Schools franchise. Launched in 2009, Omega
Schools pioneered a “pay-as-you-learn” model, charging a tiny daily fee, which made school-
ing afordable for families with irregular incomes.55 Omega grew to thirty-eight schools serv-
ing roughly twenty thousand students in Ghana and Liberia before being acquired by another
education network. Its model demonstrated that a chain of low-fee private schools could
be fnancially viable at scale while reaching poor communities. Omega students generally
performed at or above national averages, and the chain’s operational practices, such as cen-
tralized training and simple accountability metrics, attracted attention from policymakers.
Ghana’s government has not formally integrated private schools into public programs, but it
has acknowledged their role in absorbing demand and extending access to hard-to-reach
areas.56 Community-run private schools have in many cases flled gaps where public schools
were distant or overcrowded, thus indirectly supporting Ghana’s education targets.

The lesson from Ghana is that empowering local entrepreneurs and faith-based organiza-
tions to run schools can expand capacity rapidly. It also shows the importance of oversight:
Ghana has moved to strengthen standards—for example, requiring teacher certifcation even
in private schools, a policy that proprietors say has sometimes stifed the growth of low-cost
schools due to compliance costs.57 Going forward, Ghana’s experience suggests that public-
private collaboration, such as microfnance programs for school owners or targeted subsi-
dies, can help improve quality in private schools, ensuring that they complement rather than
undermine public education. The Ghanaian case confrms that viable private school models
can be scaled in Africa, contributing to universal education goals by working in tandem with
the state.

UGANDA: PUBLIC-PRIVATE PARTNERSHIPS FOR SECONDARY EDUCATION

Uganda provides a case where private and public sectors explicitly partnered to expand
schooling, with positive efects on competition and outcomes. Afer Uganda achieved free
universal primary education in the late 1990s, a surge of primary graduates created pressure

HOOVER INSTITUTION U STANFORD UNIVERSITY 13

 for secondary schooling. The government’s solution, launched in 2007, was a public-private
partnership (PPP) in secondary education under the Universal Secondary Education program.58
In this PPP, the state contracted low-cost private secondary schools to enroll students free
of charge, with government paying a per-student subsidy, in communities where government
schools were insufcient.59 This efectively leveraged excess capacity in private schools to
meet public demand, instead of building new state schools overnight.

The PPP has shown promising results. A randomized evaluation found that the program
signifcantly increased access to secondary education, as intended.60 Participating private
schools rapidly absorbed large numbers of students who would otherwise have lacked a
secondary place.61 Importantly, these schools had to accept the government stipend as full
payment. As a result, they competed to deliver education cost-efectively within the sub-
sidy. Student performance under the PPP improved modestly, with some evidence of better
Ordinary Level (O-level) exam results compared to non-PPP schools, although the primary
achievement was broader enrollment.62 The partnership also had equity benefts: Schools
in the PPP enrolled signifcantly more poor and rural students than the average government
school, since the program targeted underserved areas. For instance, one nonproft network
(PEAS—Promoting Equality in African Schools) used the PPP funds to keep fees near zero,
and an external evaluation found that PEAS schools admitted twice as many of the poorest
students as government schools, and three times as many as other private schools. This sug-
gests that with smart design, private operators can expand access without cherry-picking
only afuent students.

The competitive efect of Uganda’s PPP is subtle but noteworthy. By partnering with pri-
vate schools, the government introduced a form of performance-based competition: Private
schools had to meet certain standards to qualify for the program, and their existence gave fami-
lies an alternative to any nearby underperforming public school. Some local reports indicate
that government secondary schools in areas with PPP schools felt pressure to improve their
teaching to retain students, knowing that families now had other free options. Additionally, the
collaboration fostered an exchange of best practices—for example, PPP school networks ofen
shared data and training resources with the Ministry of Education.63 This knowledge transfer
has infuenced public schools. Lessons from the PPP informed Uganda’s eforts to strengthen
school inspections and data systems nationwide.

Nonetheless, the Uganda experience also highlights challenges: Ensuring adequate govern-
ment regulation and funding stability is critical. Private school partners have voiced concern
about delayed subsidy payments and uncertain policy commitments, which can deter their
investment in new schools.64 Despite these hurdles, Uganda’s PPP model is considered a
replicable success in many respects; it demonstrated that a diverse range of nonstate pro-
viders, such as religious, NGO, and for-proft schools, can be harnessed to deliver public
education at scale, improving both access and accountability. For Nigeria, where secondary
school demand soars, Uganda’s model suggests that contracting with vetted low-cost pri-
vate schools, with proper oversight, could rapidly expand opportunities while raising the bar
for quality through competition.

14 GIFT IYIOKU U TWENTY MILLION LEFT BEHIND

LIBERIA: OUTSOURCING PUBLIC SCHOOLS TO PRIVATE OPERATORS
A recent bold experiment in leveraging private management to improve public education
comes from Liberia. In 2016, the Liberian government launched Partnership Schools for
Liberia (PSL), an initiative to outsource the management of some public primary schools
to private education providers.65 The aim was to inject new accountability and methods
into failing public schools by letting proven nonstate operators run them, with public fund-
ing. In the pilot year, ninety-three public schools—over 8 percent of students nationwide—
were handed to eight operators, including international chains such as Bridge International
Academies and local NGOs.66 The results afer one year were striking: Students in the
partnership schools learned about 60 percent more in terms of reading and math progress
compared to their peers in traditional public schools.67 In other words, learning outcomes
in the outsourced schools far outpaced those in regular government schools, a fnding con-
frmed by an independent randomized evaluation.68

This improvement was accompanied by some trade-ofs. Diferent operators had varying levels
of success—for example, Bridge International Academies achieved the highest test score
gains but also incurred higher costs by hiring additional teachers and extending instruction
time.69 Some providers also implemented strict teacher-accountability measures, in cer-
tain cases replacing a portion of the teaching staf, which sparked controversy with unions.
Despite these challenges, the government deemed the pilot sufciently successful to expand
the program. By 2019, the renamed Liberia Education Advancement Program (LEAP) had
scaled up to partner with around 180 schools, and as of 2021 it had reached an estimated
115,000 students across 475 schools.70 This indicates viability at scale, as multiple private
partners managed hundreds of schools within the public system’s framework.

Liberia’s approach created a quasi-market within the public sector, wherein private opera-
tors competed to demonstrate superior performance under similar conditions and fund-
ing as government-run schools. This competitive benchmarking had an infuence on the
broader system. First, it proved that with the same students and budgets, better management
could yield signifcantly better outcomes—a powerful demonstration that has pressured the
Ministry of Education to adopt the operators’ practices of stronger teacher supervision, provi-
sion of scripted lesson guides, and regular student assessments. Second, the existence of
partnership schools gave parents and communities a basis for comparison. Surveys showed
increased parental satisfaction in PSL schools, which in turn motivated nearby public
schools to emulate certain reforms. For instance, some non-PSL school principals began
implementing extra tutoring sessions and stricter attendance monitoring afer seeing PSL
schools do so.

From a policy perspective, Liberia’s experiment ofers several lessons. It confrms that
public-private partnership can dramatically improve learning outcomes in a short time, even
in a low-income, postconfict context.71 It also reveals the importance of enabling condi-
tions: The program benefted from external donor funding and rigorous evaluation, which
provided political cover and learning for course correction. Additionally, strong government
oversight was key; contracts with clear performance targets and independent monitoring

HOOVER INSTITUTION U STANFORD UNIVERSITY 15

 kept operators accountable. However, Liberia’s experiment also shows that scaling up such
models requires careful attention to equity and sustainability. Some critics noted that cer-
tain partnership schools achieved gains partly by limiting class sizes or receiving extra aid,
which may be hard to replicate across an entire system. The Liberian government has had
to balance the desire for rapid improvement with the need to eventually integrate successful
practices system-wide. For Nigeria, Liberia’s PSL/LEAP indicates that contracting private edu-
cation experts to manage public schools on a pilot basis can yield quick wins in quality, but it
should be done with transparency, community engagement, and a plan for long-term institu-
tionalization of the gains.

KEY COMPARATIVE INSIGHTS AND IMPLICATIONS FOR NIGERIA

The experiences of Kenya, Ghana, Uganda, and Liberia show that private actors can play a
pivotal role in education reform, especially where public systems are overstretched or inef-
fective. These models are not about replacing the state but about reimagining its role as a
regulator, funder, and partner rather than a sole provider. For Nigeria, where nearly one in
fve children already attends a private school, the question is no longer whether to involve
nonstate actors, but how to do so strategically and equitably.72

One core insight is the potential of performance-based partnerships. In Liberia, the public-
private partnership model tied funding to learning outcomes and independent evaluations.
Schools that underperformed were replaced, introducing a level of accountability rarely seen
in public systems. Nigeria can adopt similar mechanisms by piloting performance contracts
with vetted school operators, particularly in underserved regions.

Another lesson is the scalability of low-fee private schools. In Kenya and Ghana, these schools
emerged organically in response to unmet demand. While quality varies, governments have
begun to support them through teacher training, microfnance, and inclusion in assessment
systems. Nigeria, rather than marginalizing this sector, should regulate and support it as a key
pillar of educational delivery, especially in urban slums and rural areas.

Third, these models highlight the need for regulatory realism. Kenya’s experience with Bridge
International Academies shows the risks of poor oversight, but also the importance of
enabling regulation. Nigeria’s current approval and monitoring frameworks are ofen too
bureaucratic or underresourced to be efective. Strengthening inspectorates and aligning
private school standards with national priorities is essential if private expansion is to be
equitable and safe.

Finally, these reforms demonstrate the importance of fexibility and experimentation. None
of the countries pursued a rigid blueprint. Instead, they started small, allowed for local adap-
tation, and adjusted based on results. Nigeria’s federal structure and diversity make it well
suited for a similar approach. States could be encouraged to pilot public-private initiatives,
faith-based school partnerships, or voucher schemes within a national framework that
guarantees equity and quality.

16 GIFT IYIOKU U TWENTY MILLION LEFT BEHIND

POLICY RECOMMENDATIONS

Ranging from state-led reform successes in Tunisia and Seychelles to adaptive private-sector
models in Uganda, Liberia, Ghana, and Kenya, the preceding case studies ofer valuable les-
sons for Nigeria’s education system. These diverse approaches demonstrate that meaning-
ful progress is possible when reforms are backed by political will, strategic investment, and
accountability mechanisms, whether driven by the state, the private sector, or both. Given
Nigeria’s size, complexity, and decentralized education structure, no single model can ofer
a perfect solution. By drawing selectively from both streams of reform, however, Nigeria
can design hybrid strategies that combine the reach and legitimacy of government with the
innovation and responsiveness of nonstate actors. The following policy recommendations
are derived from these regional insights and adapted to Nigeria’s unique institutional, social,
and demographic realities.

FOSTERING PUBLIC-PRIVATE COLLABORATION

Forging stronger public-private partnerships is the most directly replicable action. Just as
Uganda contracted private schools to expand access, Nigerian federal or state governments
could partner with established low-cost school networks to run schools or reach out-of-
school children. This could be piloted in high-need states, with clear performance targets.
Given Nigeria’s federal structure, state governments could experiment with PPP schools,
learning from Liberia’s careful evaluation approach. With Nigeria’s existing cadre of private
school providers, some homegrown, some international like Bridge, there is a foundation
to build on.

ADOPTING PROVEN PEDAGOGIES

Nigeria can integrate private-sector pedagogical innovations into public schools at scale.
The EdoBEST program has already demonstrated this by using a Bridge-style model to
improve public basic education, yielding notable gains in literacy and numeracy in a short
period.73 Other states can follow Edo State’s lead, potentially with support from private edu-
cation frms or NGOs for training and technology.

ENCOURAGING LOW-FEE PRIVATE SCHOOLS

Nigeria, especially in urban centers, already has thousands of low-cost private schools
started by entrepreneurs or faith-based groups. Rather than viewing them with suspicion,
the government can support them to improve quality. This may include ofering microcredit
or grants for infrastructure, as Ghana did via the IDP Rising Schools Program; incorporating
their untrained teachers into government teacher-training programs; or creating a quality-
rating system so that competition is based on learning outcomes, not only marketing.74
Such measures could make Nigeria’s large private sector a more efective complement that
pushes public schools to do better. Given that one in every fve of the world’s out-of-school
children is in Nigeria, uplifing this segment could substantially raise overall education
outcomes.75

HOOVER INSTITUTION U STANFORD UNIVERSITY 17

 PROVIDING TARGETED VOUCHERS OR SCHOLARSHIPS
To ensure equal access, Nigeria could pilot a voucher scheme for low-income families to
attend a school of their choice, whether public or private. This was not explicitly tried in the
African cases above, but the competitive dynamics suggest it could work: Schools would
compete for students, and public schools would have to improve or risk losing enrollment.
South Africa has an example of private academies attracting even modest-income families,
indicating that if a basic subsidy is provided, many more will have real choice.76 A Nigerian
adaptation might be a scholarship fund for marginalized children to enroll in accredited
low-fee private schools in areas where public schools are failing.

ENSURING CONTEXT-SENSITIVE IMPLEMENTATION

While these models are promising, implementing them in Nigeria requires care. The scale of
Nigeria, which is more than two hundred million people, means interventions must be large to
make a dent, and education is largely decentralized to states. Moreover, political economic
factors, such as resistance from teachers’ unions or proprietors’ associations, can pose chal-
lenges. For instance, introducing private management in public schools, as in Liberia, could
face pushback from Nigerian teachers’ unions concerned about job security. Any PPP would
need to involve stakeholders from the design stage, and perhaps start small to build evidence
and trust. Additionally, regulatory capacity in Nigeria would need bolstering to monitor any
expanded private-sector role. The Kenya and Ghana cases showed that without proper over-
sight, quality can be uneven; Nigeria thus should invest in its quality assurance agencies,
such as an inspectorate and exams council, concurrently.

INSTITUTIONALIZING LONG-TERM EDUCATION FUNDING AND PLANNING

Both Tunisia and Seychelles demonstrate the transformative potential of sustained, well-
targeted investment. Nigeria should establish multiyear education fnancing frameworks at
federal and state levels, modeled on Seychelles’ medium-term strategies, while protecting
critical programs such as UBE and TETFund from political and fscal volatility. Committing
at least 15 percent of national expenditure to education and ensuring ring-fenced funds for
teacher salaries, curriculum delivery, and school infrastructure are vital steps toward restor-
ing system stability.

CONCLUSION

If Nigeria gets education right, the gains could be transformative, both nationally and across
the continent. Raising average time of schooling by just three years could add over 1 percent
to annual GDP growth, equivalent to $4–6 billion per year in added economic output.77
Improvements in basic education could lif millions of Nigerians out of poverty, having a
dramatic impact in a country where over 60 percent of the poor are under twenty-fve.78
Secondary education expansion alone is associated with a 3–5 percent reduction in civil
confict risk.79 For the wider region, a well-educated Nigerian workforce would help posi-
tion the country as a driver of West Africa’s development goals, reduce irregular migration

18 GIFT IYIOKU U TWENTY MILLION LEFT BEHIND

pressures, and boost skilled labor contributions to global markets.80 These quantifable ben-
efts underscore why education reform must be a national priority.

Nigeria’s education crisis requires a strategic recalibration grounded in institutional disci-

pline and evidence-based practice. Decades of reform have yielded limited outcomes due
to fragmented implementation, inconsistent funding, and a failure to tailor national policies
to local needs. Drawing on lessons from across Africa, this brief recommends six practical
actions: institutionalizing long-term education funding and planning insulated from politi-
cal cycles; ensuring regionally responsive and context-sensitive implementation; providing
targeted vouchers or scholarships to expand access for the most disadvantaged; supporting
low-fee private schools to improve overall quality and capacity; adopting proven pedagogi-
cal models with investments in training and digital infrastructure; and fostering public-private
collaboration under strong regulatory oversight. By aligning political commitment with insti-
tutional coherence and operational capacity, these recommendations ofer a realistic path to
achieving long-term education reform.

NOTES
1. UNICEF reports that Nigeria, home to over two hundred million people, is the most populous country
in Africa and is projected to become the third-most populous in the world by 2050, with an estimated
population of 375 million. Nearly half of its population is under eighteen, and one in three Nigerians is an
adolescent or young adult between the ages of ten and twenty-four. UNICEF, “Country Ofce Annual
Report 2022: Nigeria,” n.d., https://www.unicef.org/media/136256/fle/Nigeria-2022-COAR.pdf.
2. Estimates based on Nigeria’s 2025 projected population of approximately 237.5 million. According to World
Bank data, 41.7 percent of the population is under age ffeen. This translates to roughly ninety-nine million
children aged zero through fourteen. Since the school-age range of six through ffeen spans approximately
ten years of that cohort, a proportional estimate yields approximately sixty-six million school-age children
(99 million × 10⁄15). Sources: World Bank Group, “Population Ages 0–14 (% of Total Population)—Nigeria,”
2024 Revision, https://data.worldbank.org/indicator/SP.POP.0014.TO.ZS?locations=NG; and Worldometer,
“Nigeria Population (Live),” accessed May 24, 2025, https://www.worldometers.info/world-population
/nigeria-population/.
3. Intelpoint, “The Population of Nigerian-Born Immigrants in the US Increases at an Average of 4.8% per
Year,” accessed May 24, 2025, https://intelpoint.co/insights/the-population-of-nigerian-born-immigrants-in
-the-us-increases-at-an-average-of-4-8-per-year/; Migration Policy Institute, “The Nigerian Diaspora in the
United States,” June 2015 revised, https://www.migrationpolicy.org/sites/default/fles/publications/RAD
-Nigeria.pdf; and Solomon Ekanem, “10 Foreign Countries with the Largest Nigerian Population,” Business
Insider Africa, August 25, 2024, https://africa.businessinsider.com/local/lifestyle/foreign-countries-with-the
-largest-nigerian-population/wkl0z2g.
4. Centre for Public Impact, “Universal Basic Education in Nigeria,” May 17, 2017, https://centreforpublic
impact.org/public-impact-fundamentals/universal-basic-education-in-nigeria/; G. Samuel, “How Corruption
Is Afecting Basic Education in Nigeria,” International Anti-Corruption Conference, December 18, 2018,
https://iaccseries.org/how-corruption-is-afecting-basic-education-in-nigeria/; and Adetokunbo Mumuni,
“Mismanaged Public Funds Recovered in Nigeria Thanks to SERAP,” United Nations Convention Against
Corruption Coalition, June 30, 2011, https://uncaccoalition.org/mismanaged-public-funds-recovered-in
-nigeria-thanks-to-serap/.
5. Oyeromi S. Olumuyiwa, Folajogun O. Akinkuowo, and T. Sola Kareem, “Educational Policy Formulation
and Analysis: Challenges and Coping Strategies,” Benin Journal of Educational Studies 23, nos. 1–2 (2014):
34–45; and Akin L. Mabogunje, A Measure of Grace: The Autobiography of Akin Mabogunje (Bookcraf,
2016), 132–35. See also S. O. Oyelaran, “The Western Region Universal Primary Education Program:
A Case Study in Planning,” West African Journal of Education 2, no. 2 (1958): 72–80.

HOOVER INSTITUTION U STANFORD UNIVERSITY 19

 6. Olumuyiwa et al., “Educational Policy Formulation.”
7. Olumuyiwa et al., “Educational Policy Formulation.”
8. Marguerite Csapo, “Universal Primary Education in Nigeria: Its Problems and Implications,” African
Studies Review 26, no. 1 (1983): 9–106 (enrollment surge in UPE).
9. Additional data from UNESCO Global Education Monitoring Report and Federal Ministry of Education
documents. Nnamdi Okoroma, “Educational Policies and Problems of Implementation in Nigeria,”
Australian Journal of Adult Learning 40, no. 2 (2006): 248–50.
10. Okoroma, “Educational Policies and Problems.”
11. Okoroma, “Educational Policies and Problems,” 251.
12. Nnamdi Okoroma, “An Evaluation Study of the 3-3 Aspect of the National Policy on Education in Port
Harcourt and Obio/Akpor Local Government Areas of Rivers State,” Journal of Technical and Science
Education 10, nos. 1 & 2 (2001): 23–35.
13. Centre for Public Impact, “Universal Basic Education in Nigeria” (UNESCO fndings on UBE).
14. Adunola Adepoju and Anne Fabiyi, “Universal Basic Education in Nigeria: Challenges and Prospects,”
Union for African Population Studies, December 2007, https://uaps2007.popconf.org/abstracts/70830.
15. Centre for Public Impact, “Universal Basic Education in Nigeria.”
16. Solomon C. Ohiri and Oscar U. Ihenacho, “Educational Evaluation in Nigeria: Relevance, Constraints
and Solutions,” IRE Journals 7, no. 5 (November 2023): 153–60.
17. Qosim Suleiman, “2024 Budget: Tinubu’s Improved Funding for Education Still Below UNESCO
Recommendation,” Premium Times, December 23, 2023. According to the 2025 Appropriation Act, the
= 2.52 trillion to education, a 133.33 percent increase from 2023’s N
federal government allotted N =1.08 trillion;
earlier estimates for 2023 and 2024 placed education’s share at approximately 7.9 percent and 8.2 percent,
respectively, but these likely refected narrower calculations and do not align with the broader methodology
used in the 2025 analysis.
18. Follow the Money (posting as followth), “#EducateFune—Tracking NGN 91,645,300 for the Construction
and Rehabilitation of School Projects in Fune LGA, Yobe State [Mega Campaign],” May 22, 2019, https://www
.followthemoneyng.org.
19. BudgIT Foundation, “Advocating for Improved Education Funding in Nigerian Communities,” video,
1:25–4:45, July 14, 2021, https://budgit.org/budgit_videos_/advocating-for-improved-education-funding-in
-nigerian-communities/.
20. Adetokunbo Mumuni, “Litigating Corruption in International Human Rights Tribunals: SERAP Before the
ECOWAS Court,” Open Society Foundations, October 2016, 6–7, https://www.justiceinitiative.org/uploads
/7e3c503b-8749-4929-b432-920a22776e1a/legal-remedies-8-mumuni-20161014.pdf.
21. David Great, “Life Pension: SERAP Sues 36 Governors ‘for Failing to Fund Education for Poor Children,’”
Socio-Economic Rights & Accountability Project, Chronicle NG, July 10, 2022, https://www.chronicle.ng
/news/life-pension-serap-sues-36-governors-for-failing-to-fund-education-for-poor-children/#google
_vignette.
22. European Training Foundation, “Key Policy Developments in Education, Training and Employment—
Tunisia 2023,” February 5, 2024, https://www.etf.europa.eu/en/document-attachments/key-policy
-developments-education-training-and-employment-tunisia-2023.
23. Silvia Marchionne, “Vocational Educational Training (VET) in Tunisia: Barriers and Challenges to Its
Internationalization and Possible Solutions to Boost Socio-Economic Development of the Country,”
Frontiers: The Interdisciplinary Journal of Study Abroad 35, no. 3 (November 15, 2023): 208–37, https://
doi.org/10.36366/frontiers.v35i3.837.
24. European Training Foundation, “Key Policy Developments.”
25. Amr Hamdy, “ICT in Education in Tunisia,” World Bank, June 2007, https://openknowledge.worldbank
.org/server/api/core/bitstreams/b1d1949d-1bba-532e-9986-668e2feaeda/content.
26. World Bank Group, “Unemployment, Total (% of Total Labor Force) (National Estimate)—Tunisia,”
accessed June 20, 2025, https://data.worldbank.org/indicator/SL.UEM.TOTL.NE.ZS?locations=TN.

20 GIFT IYIOKU U TWENTY MILLION LEFT BEHIND

27. European Investment Bank, “Tunisia: €40 Million in New Financing to Build Schools,” July 11, 2023,
https://www.eib.org/en/press/all/2023-267-tunisie-un-nouveau-fnancement-de-40-millions-d-euros-pour
-la-construction-d-ecoles.
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/literacy-and-basic-education/education-for-adults-in-tunisia/.
29. Kathleen Trayte Freeman, “Seychelles,” AACRAO Edge, accessed April 28, 2025, https://www.aacrao
.org/edge/country/seychelles; and Republic of the Seychelles Ministry of Education, “Education Sector
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/sites/default/fles/ressources/seychelles_education_sector_medium_term_strategic_plan_2013-2017.pdf.
30. Commonwealth Network, “Education in Seychelles—An Overview,” accessed June 25, 2025, https://
www.commonwealthofnations.org/cedol/africa-2/seychelles/.
31. Data Pandas, “Literacy Rate by Country,” last updated May 22, 2025, https://www.datapandas.org/ranking
/literacy-rate-by-country.
32. World Bank Group, “Government Expenditure on Education, Total (% of GDP),” accessed April 28, 2025,
https://data.worldbank.org/indicator/SE.XPD.TOTL.GD.ZS.
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News Agency, May 13, 2014, https://www.seychellesnewsagency.com/articles/473/UNESCO+Seychelles+is
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Preferred citation: Gif Iyioku, “Twenty Million Lef Behind: How Nigeria’s Broken Education Policies
Threaten a Nation, a Continent, and the World,” Hoover Institution, Hoover History Lab, July 2025.

HOOVER INSTITUTION U STANFORD UNIVERSITY 23

 ABOUT THE AUTHOR

GIFT IYIOKU
Gif Iyioku is a PhD candidate in German studies at Stanford University
with a minor in political science. Her interdisciplinary research examines
Afro-German migration and autobiographical narratives of African migrants.
She has contributed to African development policy with UNESCO-IACIU and
the Africa Progress Group. At Hoover, she researches Africa’s demography and
migration, aiming to translate academic insights into efective public policy.

The Hoover History Lab

The Hoover History Lab (HHL) uses the study of the past to analyze contemporary policy issues. HHL scholars
and students research and write about how our modern world came into being, how it works, where it might
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