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Presidential Elections
PRESIDENTIAL ELECTIONS
Strategies and Structures of
American Politics
THIRTEENTH EDITION

Nelson W. Polsby
Aaron Wildavsky
Steven E. Schier
David A. Hopkins

ROWMAN & LIT TLEFIELD PUBLISHERS, INC.

Lanham • Boulder • New York • Toronto • Plymouth, UK
Published by Rowman & Littlefield Publishers, Inc.
A wholly owned subsidiary of The Rowman & Littlefield Publishing Group, Inc.
4501 Forbes Boulevard, Suite 200, Lanham, Maryland 20706
http://www.rowmanlittlefield.com

Estover Road, Plymouth PL6 7PY, United Kingdom

Copyright © 2012 by The Polsby Family Trust, Steven E. Schier, David A. Hopkins

All rights reserved. No part of this book may be reproduced in any form or by any electronic or
mechanical means, including information storage and retrieval systems, without written permission
from the publisher, except by a reviewer who may quote passages in a review.

British Library Cataloguing in Publication Information Available

Library of Congress Cataloging-in-Publication Data

Presidential elections : strategies and structures of American politics / Nelson W. Polsby . . .
[et al.]. — 13th ed.
p cm.
Includes bibliographical references and index.
ISBN 978-0-7425-6422-0 (cloth : alk. paper) — ISBN 978-0-7425-6423-7 (pbk. : alk. paper) —
ISBN 978-1-4422-1225-1 (electronic)
1. Presidents—United States—Election. I. Polsby, Nelson W.
JK528.P63 2012
324.973—dc22 2011004623

` ™ The paper used in this publication meets the minimum requirements of American National
Standard for Information Sciences—Permanence of Paper for Printed Library Materials, ANSI/
NISO Z39.48-1992.

Printed in the United States of America

 From Nelson W. Polsby and Aaron Wildavsky:
To our grandchildren: Benjamin Polsby Stern, Eva Miriam Wildavsky, Aaron Alexander
Wildavsky, Edward Polsby Stern, Saul Abraham Wildavsky

From Steven E. Schier:

To my family, Mary, Anna, and Teresa Schier

From David A. Hopkins:

To my family and friends
Contents

List of Figure, Tables, and Boxes xi

Preface xiii

Part I
THE STRATEGIC ENVIRONMENT 1
1 VOTERS 3
Why People Don’t Vote 3
Why People Do Vote: A Theory of Social Connectedness 8
Party Identification as Social Identity 10
Parties as Aggregates of Loyal Voters 11
Ideologies, Candidates, and Issues in the Minds of Voters 15
Changes in Party Identification: Social Habit versus
Contemporary Evaluation 18
A Central Strategic Problem: The Attentiveness of Voters 22

2 GROUPS 25
The Presidential Vote as an Aggregation of Interest Groups 25
Variations among Interest Groups 33
“Special” Interests and Public Interest Groups 37
Political Parties as Organizations 42
Third Parties 47

3 RULES AND RESOURCES 51

Rules: The Electoral College 51
Thinking about Resources 52

vii
 viii | C O N T E N TS

Resources: Money 53
The Beverly Hills Primary 53
Campaign Money in the Prenomination Period 59
Raising and Spending Money in the General Election 61
Does Money Buy Elections? 64
Campaign Finance Reform 70
Resources: Control over Information 73
Newspapers 74
Television 79
The Internet and Other New Media 82
Incumbency as a Resource: The Presidency 85
Incumbency as a Liability: The Vice Presidency 88
The Balance of Resources 92

Part II
SEQUENCES 93
4 THE NOMINATION PROCESS 95
Before the Primaries 97
Iowa and New Hampshire: The First Hurdles 100
1972 101
1976 102
1980 103
1984 104
1988 104
1992 105
1996 106
2000 107
2004 108
2008 109
What Do These Historical Vignettes Teach? 111
State Primaries 112
State Caucuses 124
Superdelegates 126
The National Party Conventions 128
Candidate Organizations at the Conventions 130
Party Delegates at the Conventions 131
 C O N T E N TS | ix

The Convention as Advertising 135

The Vice Presidential Nominee 138
The Future of National Conventions 143

5 THE CAMPAIGN 147

The Well-Traveled Candidates 148
Persuading Voters 152
Economic Issues 153
Foreign Issues 155
Social Issues 156
Presentation of Self 158
Negative Campaigning 162
Getting Good Press 164
Campaign Professionals 167
Policy Advisers 171
Polling 173
Focus Groups 178
Television Advertising 180
New Media 182
Televised Debates 184
Getting Out the Vote 190
Campaign Blunders 192
Forecasting the Outcome 197
Counting the Vote 203

Part III
ISSUES 209
6 APPRAISALS 211
The Political Theory of Policy Government 214
Reform by Means of Participatory Democracy 219
Some Specific Reforms 223
The Nomination Process 224
The Decline of the National Convention 228
The Electoral College 231
Party Platforms and Party Differences 238
 x| C O N TE N TS

7 AMERICAN PARTIES AND DEMOCRACY 241

Elections and Public Policy 242
Parties of Advocacy versus Parties of Intermediation 247

APPENDIXES 253
A Vote by Groups in Presidential Elections, 1952–2008 255
B Voter Turnout in Presidential Elections, by Population
Characteristics, 1968–2008 263
C Selections from the Democratic and Republican Party
Platforms, 2008 275
Notes 281
Index 329
Figure, Tables, and Boxes

Figure
1.1 The effect of income growth on incumbent party success, 1932–2008 18

Tables
1.1 Voter turnout in selected world democracies 4
1.2 Turnout of eligible voting-age population in presidential and
midterm elections, 1952–2010 5
1.3 Turnout in states with same-day voter registration, 2008 8
1.4 Presidential election results, 1928–2008 10
1.5 Party identification by social group, 2008 12
1.6 Party identification, 1952–2008 21
2.1 Republicans win by doing well with large groups 26
2.2 The Democratic party base: smaller, loyal groups 27
2.3 The parties as coalitions of social groups, 1952–2008 28
2.4 Vote for Democratic presidential candidate by age group, 1968–2008 31
2.5 The gender gap: Votes in presidential elections by sex, 1960–2008 36
2.6 The rise of political action committees (PACs), 1974–2008 39
2.7 The growth of presidential primaries, 1960–2008 43
2.8 The rise of national party fund-raising, 1983–2008 44
3.1 Federal campaign spending, 1972–2008 54
3.2 Federal campaign spending adjusted for inflation, 1972–2008 71

xi
 xii | F I G U R E , TA B L E S , A N D B OX E S

4.1 Early money in the 2008 election 99

4.2 The front-loading of the presidential primary calendar, 1992–2008 114
4.3 Income of delegates and party voters in 2008 132
4.4 Selected delegate surveys, 1944–2008 133
4.5 Democratic delegates to the left of rank-and-file party members
and public, 2008 134
4.6 Republican delegates to the right of rank-and-file party members
and public, 2008 135
4.7 Number of presidential ballots in national party conventions,
1928–2008 144
5.1 Which party is better for prosperity? 154
5.2 Democrats versus Republicans on foreign policy 157
6.1 Reform commissions of the Democratic Party, 1969–2012 212
6.2 Outcomes under the unit rule and three alternatives,
selected elections, 1960–2008 236

Boxes

1.1 In the arena: 2008 Obama and McCain voters speak on issues,
ideology, and candidates 19
2.1 In the arena: 2008 group endorsements for Obama and McCain 38
3.1 In the arena: Internet money and message in the 2008 campaign
and beyond 55
3.2 In the arena: Newspaper endorsements in 2008 78
5.1 In the arena: Which 2008 campaign ads were effective? 183
5.2 In the arena: Campaign professionals on the 2008 general
election campaign 185
 A TO U R O F NAT I V E PE O P L E S A N D NAT I V E LA N D S | xiii

Preface

N ELSON W. POLSBY and Aaron Wildavsky first met as graduate students

at Yale University in the mid-1950s and soon became close friends as well as
professional collaborators. As Polsby later remembered, they hatched the idea
for this book during a long conversation over the Thanksgiving holiday in 1960, a few
weeks after John F. Kennedy’s narrow election to the presidency. Presidential Elections
first appeared in 1964, and revised editions have proceeded at regular four-year inter-
vals ever since, reflecting the continuing evolution of American electoral politics while
educating generation after generation of readers.
Wildavsky died on September 4, 1993, and Polsby passed away on February 6, 2007.
We hope their vitality, imagination, wit, and commitment to fair and accurate political
science are still as visible to readers of these pages as they are to us as we prepare this
new edition, even as the march of events and the progress of scholarship in the years
since they first wrote this book have continued to unearth many additional matters
deserving significant consideration. Though the 2008 election produced more than
the usual number of new issues, questions, and milestones, we believe that the basic
theoretical foundation established in the first edition of Presidential Elections and built
upon in subsequent volumes remains as sound as ever. Put simply, the pages that fol-
low argue that the institutional rules of the presidential nomination and election pro-
cesses, in combination with the behavior of the mass electorate, structure the strategic
choices faced by politicians in powerful and foreseeable ways. We can make sense of
the decisions made by differently situated political actors—incumbents, challengers,
Democrats, Republicans, consultants, party officials, activists, delegates, journalists, and
voters—by understanding the ways in which their world is organized by incentives,
regulations, events, resources, customs, and opportunities.
This new thirteenth edition of Presidential Elections is the result of collaboration
between Steven E. Schier and David A. Hopkins. Dave, one of Polsby’s last graduate
students in the Department of Political Science at the University of California, Berke-
ley, also assisted in the creation of the two previous editions. We sought to maintain
the quality and originality of earlier versions of this book while updating the text to
reflect the contemporary political environment. The theoretical perspectives of Polsby
and Wildavsky, developed especially in the volume’s final two chapters, remain of cen-
tral importance to the study of presidential elections despite the ongoing changes in
xiii
 xiv | P R E FAC E

campaign strategies, technologies, and procedures accounted for in this newly revised
edition.
It is a great honor for us to continue the publication of Presidential Elections, allow-
ing future students of American politics to benefit from the insights of its two founding
authors. We are especially indebted to Linda O. Polsby and Mary Wildavsky, and to Lisa,
Emily, and Dan Polsby, for their faith in our ability to take up the mantle. Thanks also
to Niels Aaboe at Rowman & Littlefield for his initiative, support, and enthusiasm for
producing a thirteenth edition. We express our gratitude to Jonathan Bernstein for his
invaluable contributions to previous editions.
We benefited greatly from the assistance of James Kerson and Yael Levin, and from
much constructive kibitzing by the colleagues and students who have sustained our
morale every day at Carleton College; the University of California, Berkeley; and Bos-
ton College. Special thanks to the graduate students, staff, and librarians at Berkeley’s
Institute of Governmental Studies for their unwavering assistance and encouragement.

Steven E. Schier
Northfield, Minnesota
David A. Hopkins
Chestnut Hill, Massachusetts
 PART I
The Strategic
Environment

T HE STRATEGIES of all the participants in presidential elections are to

a certain extent constrained, and to a certain extent driven, by the ways in
which actors are situated with respect to conditions that are for them given
and hard to manipulate. Here are some examples: the rules governing how votes are
counted, the sequence in which primary elections occur, the accepted practices of
campaign journalism, whether candidates are incumbents or challengers, and the
habits of voters. All these conditions need to be taken into account by participants
and need to be understood by observers.
 CHAPTER 1

Voters

M ORE THAN 130 MILLION Americans voted in the 2008 presidential

election. Millions more who were old enough to vote—nearly 100 million
in 2008—did not. Parties and candidates depend on their supporters to
turn out on Election Day. And so it is important for them to know why some people
show up at the polls and others do not. In two respects, Americans are different from
citizens of other democratic nations. A smaller proportion of Americans will usually
vote in any given election than the citizens of most other democracies, but Ameri-
cans collectively vote much more often, and on more matters, than anyone else.1 Vot-
ing behavior is one of the most carefully studied political activities. Who votes? Who
doesn’t vote? Who votes for which candidate and why? Each of these questions is the
subject of extensive study.

Why People Don’t Vote

A lot of elections—not just presidential contests but also congressional, state, and local
elections—take place in the United States. Americans are noted for their lukewarm
levels of participation as compared with voters in most world democracies, especially
those of Western Europe. Table 1.1 compares the voting turnout rate of Americans in
the most recent election for president—when participation is highest—to the most
recent turnout figures in the national elections of other democratic countries. Why
don’t Americans vote more, or at least more like Europeans? In some respects, to be
sure, the elections being compared are not exactly the same. Parliamentary elections in
many places—for example, the United Kingdom—require voters to do only one thing:
place a single X on a ballot to fill an office more or less like that of a U.S. representative
in Congress. Who ends up running the government in these countries depends on how
many parliamentarians of each political party are elected (from over 600 constituencies
in the UK), and so most voters cast party-line votes and do not much care about the
identity of individuals on the ballot.2 Ballots in U.S. presidential elections are longer
and more complex: they require voting for president and vice president, members of
the House of Representatives, senators (two-thirds of the time), various state and local
offices, ballot propositions, and so on. American ballots therefore demand quite a lot

3
 4| CHAPTER 1

TABLE 1.1. Voter turnout in selected world democracies

Turnout of voting Compulsory Eligible required

Country age population voting to register

Belgium 86.0 Yes Automatic

Iceland 84.7 No NA
Denmark 83.2 No Automatic
Australia 82.7 Yes Automatic
Sweden 80.6 No Automatic
Greece 79.6 No Automatic
Italy 79.1 No Automatic
New Zealand 77.8 No Yes
Finland 77.6 No Automatic
Netherlands 77.5 No Automatic
Spain 77.2 No Automatic
France 76.8 No No
Norway 76.5 No Automatic
Germany 72.0 No Automatic
Israel 71.2 No Automatic
Portugal 69.2 No NA
Ireland 68.9 No Automatic
Japan 66.6 No Automatic
United Kingdom 58.3 No Automatic
United States 56.9 No Yes
Canada 53.6 No Yes
Switzerland 39.8 No Automatic
Source: International data from International Institute for Democracy and Electoral Assistance, “Voter
Turnout,” last updated May 18, 2009, http://www.idea.int/vt. U.S. data from Michael P. McDonald,
“2008 General Election Turnout Rates,” last updated October 6, 2010, http://elections.gmu.edu
/Turnout_2008G.html.
Note: The percentage listed for each country is the proportion of the voting-age population casting
ballots in the most recent national election as of 2009.

of knowledge from voters. In general, Americans do not invest their time and energy in
becoming knowledgeable about all the choices they are required to make.3
But American voters do turn out for presidential elections more conscientiously
than for midterm congressional elections, so the complexity of presidential elections is
clearly not a deterrent to voting (see table 1.2). To the contrary, the added publicity of a
presidential campaign obviously helps turnout, as do the greater sums of money spent
by candidates and the increased level of campaign activity in presidential elections by
political activists and interest groups.4
An often-heard explanation of low turnout in the United States (low by the stan-
dards of other Western democracies) is that Americans are unusually disaffected from
politics and that abstention from voting is their method of showing their disapproval
of, or alienation from, the political system. Scholars have been deeply interested in the
subject of political alienation, but they have shown that this explanation of low turnout
is improbable or at best incomplete.
 VOT E R S | 5

TABLE 1.2. Turnout of eligible voting-age population in presidential and midterm

elections, 1952–2010
Year Presidential elections Year Midterm elections

1952 62.3 1954 43.5

1956 60.2 1958 45.0
1960 63.8 1962 47.7
1964 62.8 1966 48.7
1968 62.5 1970 47.3
1972 56.2 1974 39.1
1976 54.8 1978 39.0
1980 54.2 1982 42.1
1984 55.2 1986 38.1
1988 52.8 1990 38.4
1992 58.1 1994 41.1
1996 51.7 1998 38.1
2000 54.2 2002 39.5
2004 60.1 2006 40.3
2008 61.6 2010 40.9
Source: Harold W. Stanley and Richard G. Niemi, Vital Statistics on American Politics, 2009–2010
(Washington, DC: CQ Press, 2010), 4–5; Michael P. McDonald, “2010 General Election Turnout
Rates,” last updated January 28, 2011, http://elections.gmu.edu/Turnout_2010G.html.

There are several elements to their demonstration. First, scholars note that the
constellation of sentiments associated with alienation—disaffection, loss of trust in
government, and so on—are more prevalent, on the whole, in many countries where
turnout is relatively high. Americans do not express especially negative feelings toward
government. On more measures than not, Americans actually report more positive
attitudes about government than citizens of other democratic nations.5 Americans also
rank comparatively high in other forms of political participation: expressing interest in
politics, discussing politics with others, trying to persuade others during elections, and
working for candidates or parties of their choice.6 Within the United States, people who
don’t like or don’t trust government vote about as frequently as people who do.7
A better explanation for what really distinguishes Americans from their more par-
ticipatory counterparts elsewhere is the existence of stringent voter registration require-
ments in the United States. While most other democratic nations either consider all of
their citizens to be automatically registered to vote, requiring no special initiative on
the part of the prospective voter, or combine voter registration with enrollment for
universal government benefits such as health insurance or pension programs, every
American state except North Dakota requires citizens to apply to their city, town, or
county government specifically in order to participate in elections, including presiden-
tial elections. In most states, registration must be completed at least thirty days before
the election, when political interest among the public has yet to peak.
Moreover, American citizens must register all over again each time they change
address, even when they move within the same state or city. Because the United States
is an unusually mobile nation—in any given two-year period, roughly one-third of
 6| CHAPTER 1

the American public will have moved at least once—a lot of reregistering is required
in order to maintain voting rights.8 Most states also have laws permitting or requiring
regular purges of the voting rolls to remove citizens who have not voted for a certain
number of years or who are believed—sometimes incorrectly—to have moved, died,
or become ineligible to vote due to a criminal conviction; if they are indeed still among
the eligible living, these individuals must register again in order to resume electoral
participation.9 Unsurprisingly, the costs imposed by this system of voter registration
depress American participation rates relative to those in Europe. The turnout of reg-
istered voters in the United States is, in fact, comparable to that of other democratic
nations; 90 percent of registered voters participated in the 2008 presidential election.10
Voting itself takes place not on a national holiday, as in some countries, or over a
weekend, but rather on a regular weekday—for presidential elections, the first Tuesday
after the first Monday in November.11 Presidential primaries (electoral events that play
a major role in nominating presidential candidates) take place, state by state, on a series
of dates, usually but not always on Tuesday, stretching from January or February to
June of a presidential election year. These primary dates can be, and often are, changed
every four years and may or may not be combined with a state’s primary elections for
other offices. History, geography, and custom thus play a significant part in determining
contemporary patterns of turnout.
While the United States now lags behind the performance of most Western democ-
racies in overall levels of voter participation, there was once a time when between 70
and 80 percent of potential (not just registered) voters routinely participated in presi-
dential elections: the late nineteenth century, or “Gilded Age.” Partisan mobilization in
the United States reached extremely high levels during this era even though the impact
of the federal government was remote, mass communication was absent, and electronic
voting equipment was unheard of. In the election of 1876, for example, 82 percent
of the eligible electorate (which at the time consisted of only men) turned out in the
nation as a whole. Soon thereafter, however, nearly every state introduced strict reg-
istration requirements, cloaked in rhetoric about reducing fraud and corruption but
aimed at keeping down the vote of “undesirable elements” (code words for immigrants
and blacks). As Stanley Kelley and his collaborators observed, turnout

may have declined . . . not because of changes in the interest of voters in elections,
but because of changes in the interest demanded of them. . . . [Not only are] elec-
torates . . . much more the product of political forces than many have appreciated.
But also, . . . to a considerable extent, they can be political artifacts. Within limits,
they can be constructed to a size and composition deemed desirable by those in
power.12

Until relatively recently, the ease of voter registration in a particular jurisdiction

could be manipulated by local political figures in an attempt to give an advantage to
their electoral supporters.13 The most extreme examples of this practice were the mea-
sures taken in the South in the late 1800s by white segregationists to prevent black
participation, including poll taxes and literacy requirements, which were outlawed
by the Twenty-fourth Amendment to the Constitution in 1964 and the Voting Rights
Act of 1965. But even after the civil rights era, state laws varied considerably on such
details as the length of residence required before one could legally vote, and registration
 VOT E R S | 7

might well require a trip to the county courthouse several months before the election.
In a nation noted for the geographic mobility of its population, a majority of states
required, as recently as 1972, a residence of at least one year within the state, three
months within the county, and thirty days within the precinct in order to vote in any
election, including for president. That year, the Supreme Court ruled that thirty days
was an ample period of time for the state of Tennessee to register its voters and declared
its existing six-month state residency requirement an unconstitutional denial of equal
protection. In two subsequent per curiam decisions, the court held that an extension
to fifty days was permissible under certain conditions, but that this time period repre-
sented the absolute limit.14
Declining national turnout rates from the 1960s to the 1990s prompted a series
of public initiatives intended to reduce the burdens of registration and participation
on prospective voters. In 1993, Congress enacted the National Voter Registration Act,
commonly known as the “motor voter” law. This legislation required voter registra-
tion forms to be available at the Department of Motor Vehicles and other government
offices in every state, allowed registration by mail-in forms, and compelled states to
allow citizens to register up to thirty days before an election. The “motor voter” law was
widely expected to benefit Democrats, whose popular constituencies (especially low-
income citizens and ethnic minorities) tended to be underrepresented on the voting
rolls; in fact, Republican president George H. W. Bush had vetoed an earlier version of
the legislation in 1992. In practice, however, though the law appeared to have a minor
positive impact on turnout rates, it produced no significant effect on the partisan affili-
ation of the American electorate.15
Several states took additional measures to encourage voter turnout. Minnesota,
Wisconsin, and a few other states introduced same-day voter registration, under which
an unregistered citizen may go to a polling place on Election Day, register to vote, and
immediately cast a ballot. The turnout rate in these states is noticeably higher (see table
1.3).16 Other states loosened eligibility requirements for absentee ballots, which were
once reserved for those unable to vote in person due to travel or illness. For example,
California now allows any voter to register as a “permanent absentee” and receive a
ballot automatically by mail before each election; 42 percent of the state’s vote in 2008
was cast by absentee ballot.17 Oregon has dispensed with the traditional polling place
altogether, conducting its elections entirely by mail. And a number of states, including
Arizona, Colorado, Georgia, Nevada, North Carolina, Tennessee, and Texas, offer early
voting, allowing voters to cast ballots in person at designated places in the weeks before
Election Day.
These reforms may have helped to produce a rebound in the national turnout rate
after the election of 1996, when it reached a modern nadir of slightly over 50 percent
of the eligible adult population (see table 1.2), although a series of closely fought elec-
tions and renewed voter mobilization efforts by political parties and interest groups
have also likely contributed to the recent rise in mass participation. In any case, voters
clearly welcome the opportunity to escape the hassles and long lines of Election Day
polling places in states where alternative voting procedures are available. An estimated
40 million citizens, or about 30 percent of the national electorate, cast their ballots
via absentee or early voting in 2008 (as compared to only 7 percent in 1992); in ten
states, more than half of all votes were cast in advance of the nominal date of the elec-
tion.18 Candidates and campaigns must compete in an electoral world in which voting
 8| CHAPTER 1

TABLE 1.3. Turnout in states with same-day voter registration, 2008

Turnout of eligible voting-age population

Minnesota 77.7 %
Wisconsin 72.1
New Hampshire 71.1
Maine 70.9
Connecticut 67.4
North Carolina 66.1
Wyoming 64.5
North Dakota 64.3
Idaho 63.7
United States total 61.6
Source: Michael P. McDonald, “2008 General Election Turnout Rates,” last updated October 6, 2010,
http://elections.gmu.edu/Turnout_2008G.html.
Note: North Dakota does not require voter registration.

increasingly occurs in stages over a period of several weeks rather than on a single day
nationwide.
Still, many potential voters are kept out of the electorate. Noncitizens are not
allowed to vote, whether legal or illegal aliens. Most states strip convicted felons of their
voting rights while incarcerated or on parole; in eight states, this disenfranchisement
may stand for life even if the sentence is completed.19 These groups are not insignificant
in size. Michael P. McDonald has estimated the number of ineligible voting-age resi-
dents as roughly 20 million people as of 2008, or nearly one-tenth of the adult popula-
tion of the United States.20
There is no convincing evidence that the basic human nature of Americans differs
from that of citizens of other democratic lands. But the United States has organized
itself differently—state by state rather than as a unitary nation—to do political busi-
ness. The right to vote is administered in a more decentralized fashion than in most
democracies, and its exercise requires more initiative on the part of the prospective
voter (in the form of registration before the election at each new residential address).
That seems better than any other explanation to account for much of the difference in
turnout between American presidential elections and parliamentary elections in other
comparable nations.

Why People Do Vote:

A Theory of Social Connectedness
These findings still leave open why the millions of Americans who vote in presidential
elections bother to do so. This question is a matter of some interest to candidates and
their advisers. Even though in recent years some congressional elections have turned on
a handful of votes, and the outcome of the 2000 presidential election was determined
by a disputed 537-vote margin in the state of Florida, it cannot possibly be the case
that millions of voters have convinced themselves to turn out in presidential elections
because each of them believes that he or she will likely cast the deciding vote. Oddly
 VOT E R S | 9

enough, the more votes being aggregated in an election and the more voters expected
at the polls, the larger is the proportion of those eligible who actually show up, so
that presidential elections regularly inspire higher turnout than midterm elections for
Congress. But as the psychologist Paul Meehl once noted, the probability of casting the
decisive vote in a national election is smaller than the likelihood of being killed in an
accident en route to the polling place.21
Why people vote is, after years of investigation, still a bit of a mystery. Scholars
studying human motivation have argued that voting must in some way or other make
people feel good (or better, at least, than if they did not vote), perhaps because they see
the act of voting as a civic duty or as an opportunity for personal political expression.
Some political scientists argue that voters conclude that the benefits of turning out—
which may be psychological rather than instrumental—exceed the costs.22 We believe
that the act of voting is on the whole probably not rationally calculated in this fashion
but is instead a more or less standing decision or habit that citizens fall into as they
adopt other forms of public participation in the course of becoming integrated into the
ordinary social life of their communities.23
Essentially, voting seems to make sense mostly as an act of social participation or
civic involvement. There are by now a great many studies of voting and nonvoting,
and in general voters are people connected in various ways to the larger society or to
their local community, and nonvoters are not. Thus, people who are settled in one
place vote more than people who move around. Married adults vote more frequently
than the unmarried. People who belong to civic organizations or interest groups vote
more than nonjoiners. Citizens who follow current events and have strong opinions on
policy matters vote more than the politically indifferent. Voting participation generally
increases with age until late in life when social participation of all sorts drops away—
frequently as the result of declining health or the loss of a spouse. The young, many
of whom are unsettled and unmarried, vote much less than their elders, but as they
settle down, they begin to vote. The better educated vote more than the less educated.
And people who identify with one or another political party vote more than those who
claim no party affiliation or loyalty.24
Residence, family ties, education, civic participation in general, and party identi-
fication all create ties to the larger world, and these ties evidently create social habits
that include turning out to vote. Families of government workers—a special sort of
interest group—also participate at extremely high levels.25 Perhaps these voters are vot-
ing because they perceive a monetary incentive to do so. Typically, however, their votes
have little or no direct impact on their salaries. But they may feel keenly the centrality
of civic involvement in their lives.
If voting were in general a rationally calculated activity, we conjecture that large
numbers of the most well-educated and sophisticated citizens would become free-rid-
ing nonvoters, since showing up at the polls or filling out an absentee ballot is hardly
worth the effort given the next-to-zero probability that any single vote will decide the
outcome of an election. Yet, it is precisely those citizens best equipped to see the logic
of the free ride—the well educated—who vote the most conscientiously.
This reasoning also gives a basis for the view that political life is significantly orga-
nized according to the social identities of voters. Foremost among the group affiliations
that matter are the political parties, organizations that specialize in political activity.
Two such organizations, the Democratic Party and the Republican Party, more or less
 10 | CHAPTER 1

TABLE 1.4. Presidential election results, 1928–2008

Elect. Pop. vote Elect. Pop. vote

Year Winning candidate votes % Losing candidate votes %

1928 Herbert Hoover (R) 444 58.2 Al Smith (D) 87 40.8

1932 Franklin D. Roosevelt (D) 472 57.4 Herbert Hoover (R)* 59 39.6
1936 Franklin D. Roosevelt (D)* 523 60.8 Alf Landon (R) 8 36.5
1940 Franklin D. Roosevelt (D)* 449 54.7 Wendell Willkie (R) 82 44.8
1944 Franklin D. Roosevelt (D)* 432 53.4 Thomas E. Dewey (R) 99 45.9
1948 Harry Truman (D)* 303 49.5 Thomas E. Dewey (R) 189 45.1
1952 Dwight D. Eisenhower (R) 442 54.9 Adlai Stevenson (D) 89 44.4
1956 Dwight D. Eisenhower (R)* 457 57.4 Adlai Stevenson (D) 73 42.0
1960 John F. Kennedy (D) 303 49.7 Richard Nixon (R) 219 49.5
1964 Lyndon Johnson (D)* 486 61.1 Barry Goldwater (R) 52 38.5
1968 Richard Nixon (R) 301 43.4 Hubert Humphrey (D) 191 42.7
1972 Richard Nixon (R)* 520 60.7 George McGovern (D) 17 37.5
1976 Jimmy Carter (D) 297 50.1 Gerald Ford (R)* 240 48.0
1980 Ronald Reagan (R) 489 50.7 Jimmy Carter (D)* 49 41.0
1984 Ronald Reagan (R)* 525 58.8 Walter Mondale (D) 13 40.6
1988 George H. W. Bush (R) 426 53.4 Michael Dukakis (D) 111 45.6
1992 Bill Clinton (D) 370 43.0 George H. W. Bush (R)* 168 37.4
1996 Bill Clinton (D)* 379 49.2 Bob Dole (R) 159 40.7
2000 George W. Bush (R) 271 47.9 Al Gore (D) 266 48.4
2004 George W. Bush (R)* 286 50.7 John Kerry (D) 251 48.3
2008 Barack Obama (D) 365 52.9 John McCain (R) 173 45.6
Note: Asterisk denotes incumbent.

monopolize the loyalties of American voters. Either the Democratic or the Republican
nominee has won every presidential election since 1852, and only twice during this
time (1860 and 1912) has the candidate of the other party not finished second in both
the popular vote and the electoral college. Over the long term, the two major parties are
evenly matched. In the 21 presidential elections since 1928, the Democrats have won 11
times and the Republicans 10 (see table 1.4).

Party Identification as Social Identity

Most Americans vote according to their habitual party affiliation.26 In other words,
because they consider themselves Democrats or Republicans, many people will have
made up their minds how to vote in an election before the candidates are even chosen.27
These party identifiers are likely to be more interested and active in politics and have
more political knowledge than people who call themselves political “independents.”28
Party regulars rarely change their minds. They tend to listen mostly to their own side
of political arguments and to agree with the policies espoused by their party. They even
go so far as to ignore information that they perceive to be unfavorable to the party of
their choice.29
Thus, party identification is important in giving a structure to voters’ pictures of
reality and in helping them choose their preferred presidential candidate. But where do
 VOT E R S | 11

people get their party affiliations? There seems to be no simple answer. Every individual
is born into a social context and consequently inherits a social identity that may contain
a political component. People are Democrats or Republicans, in part, because their
parents and the other people with whom they interact are Democrats or Republicans.30
Most individuals come into close contact predominantly with members of only one
party.31 And just as people tend to share social characteristics with their friends and
families, such as income and educational level, ethnic identification, religious affilia-
tion, and area of residence, they also tend to share party loyalties with them.32
Of course, we all know of instances where this is not so, where people do not share
some of these status-giving characteristics with their parents and at least some of their
friends. In these circumstances, we would expect political differences to turn up when
there are other kinds of differences. But by and large, voters retain the party loyalties of
the primary groups—people they interact with directly—of which they are a part.

Parties as Aggregates of Loyal Voters

As a result of this tendency, each of the major political parties maintains a reservoir
of voting strength among the public that it can count on from election to election
(see table 1.5). Since the 1850s, when the Republican Party was organized, Republi-
cans have traditionally done well in the small towns and rural areas of the Northeast,
Midwest, and interior West. Over the last fifty years, the GOP has also found increasing
electoral success in the South. Republican candidates draw their support from people
who are more prosperous than Democratic supporters, occupy managerial or profes-
sional positions or run small businesses, and are predominantly Protestant (evangelical
Protestants in particular tend to be strong Republican supporters). Democratic candi-
dates traditionally draw substantial numbers of votes from large urban areas outside
the South—metropolitan Boston, New York, Philadelphia, Chicago, Los Angeles, and
so on. Wage earners, union members, Catholics, African Americans and Latinos, and
many of the descendants of the great waves of immigrants entering this country in the
latter half of the nineteenth century—Jews, Irish, and Poles—all contribute dispropor-
tionately to the Democratic vote.33
But why did these particular social groups come to have these particular loyalties?
We must turn to history to find answers to this question. Enough is known about a few
groups to make it possible to speculate about what kinds of historical events tend to
align groups with a political party.
Here are a few examples. From the end of Reconstruction in 1877 until the rise of
the civil rights movement nearly a century later, the historically “Solid South” perennially
supported Democratic candidates for president as an expression of lingering sectional
bitterness at the outcome of the Civil War and at northern Republicans’ postwar rule
over the former Confederate states. Yet, closer inspection reveals substantial geographic
variation in these sentiments. In much of the Old South—largely rural territory—there
were two kinds of farms: plantations on the flat land, which grew cash crops, used
slaves, and, in general, prospered before the Civil War; and subsistence farms in the
uplands, which had few or no slaves and, in general, were run by poorer white people
who had little stake in the Confederacy and mostly opposed secession. The prevalent
pro-Union sympathy in the mountain South translated after the war into substantial
support for Republican presidential candidates in western Virginia and North Carolina,
 12 | CHAPTER 1

TABLE 1.5. Party identification by social group, 2008

Democrat Independent Republican

Nationwide 33% 39% 27%

Men 28 44 28
Women 38 35 27
18–34 years 31 49 20
35–44 years 30 40 30
45–54 years 34 35 31
55–64 years 37 36 26
65 years and older 36 29 35
White 28 41 32
Black 71 26 3
Hispanic/Latino 42 38 19
No college education 36 42 23
Some college 29 45 26
College graduate 30 32 38
Postgraduate degree 38 30 31
Income under $20,000 36 42 22
Income $20,000–$39,999 35 41 24
Income $40,000–$59,999 33 41 26
Income $60,000–$89,000 29 31 40
Income $90,000 and over 15 31 54
Northeast 39 41 20
Midwest 44 36 20
South 29 39 32
West 31 40 29
Source: All adult respondents, American National Election Studies, “National Election Study,” 2008
dataset, http://www.electionstudies.org.
Note: Party “leaners” are treated as independents.

eastern Tennessee and Kentucky, and southeastern West Virginia, in sharp contrast to
the strong Democratic loyalties of the plantation territory. This pattern persisted well
into the twentieth century, even after the Civil War and Reconstruction had faded from
living memory.34 From the 1950s and 1960s forward, the political division between the
upland and lowland South finally began to diminish as conservative southern whites
from the plantation belt who were previously staunch Democrats started to support
Republican candidates at increasing rates, a trend that accelerated after the civil rights
movement and the mobilization of socially conservative evangelical Protestants into the
Republican Party beginning in the 1970s.35
The voting habits of African American citizens, when and where they have his-
torically been permitted to vote, have also been shaped by several large events. The
Civil War freed them from slavery and prompted the vast majority to become Repub-
licans, the party of Abraham Lincoln and Ulysses S. Grant. But the southern reaction
to Reconstruction disenfranchised them once again, because most blacks at the time
lived in the rural South well within the reach of Jim Crow laws that prevented them
from voting.36 The growth of American industry brought many African Americans
 VOT E R S | 13

north in the first half of the twentieth century, taking them away from the most severe
legal impediments to political participation but not always lifting their burden of eco-
nomic destitution or racial discrimination.37 The effects of the Great Depression of the
1930s on African American voters in the North unmoored them from their traditional
Republican loyalties and brought them into Democrat Franklin D. Roosevelt’s New
Deal coalition; northern blacks have remained overwhelmingly Democratic ever since.38
In the South, especially after the Voting Rights Act of 1965 was enacted by bipartisan
congressional majorities during the Democratic presidency of Lyndon Johnson, newly
enfranchised African Americans also voted Democratic. As these voters have observed
Democratic politicians (in increasing numbers themselves black) espousing causes in
which they believe, they have maintained their high levels of support.39
If the historical events of the Civil War in the 1860s and the Great Depression of
the 1930s shaped the political heritage of some people, for others the critical forces
seem less dramatic and more diffuse. It is possible to see why the poor become Demo-
crats, for the Democratic Party since the 1930s has been in favor of social welfare
programs, but why do the rich lean toward the Republicans? Undoubtedly, in part,
rich voters have reacted negatively to the redistributive aspirations of some New Deal
initiatives and the inclination of Democratic presidents to expand the role of govern-
ment in the national economy. But they have also been attracted to the Republican
Party by its long-standing record—dating back to the nineteenth century—in favor of
measures benefiting business interests.40 Recent Republican presidents and congres-
sional leaders have upheld the party’s traditional advocacy of policies that dispropor-
tionately appeal to affluent voters, such as income tax cuts for high earners, reduction
or repeal of the federal estate tax, and the relaxation of government regulations of
private corporations.
Sometimes party affiliation coincides with ethnic identification because of the
political and social circumstances surrounding the entry of ethnic groups into the
country. A dramatic example is the rapid influx since the 1960s of Cuban refugees from
the communist regime of Fidel Castro—many of them well-to-do and solidly middle
class or above—into southern Florida. For these Cuban émigrés and their families,
opposition to communism is extremely salient, and most favor the Republican Party. By
contrast, the descendants of the Cuban cigar makers who settled many decades ago in
the Tampa area, on Florida’s west coast, vote more according to their pocketbooks and
their union loyalties and are predominantly Democratic.41 The vast majority of Hispan-
ics/Latinos in the southwestern states of California, Arizona, and Texas are of Mexican
descent, while Puerto Ricans are more numerous in New York, New Jersey, and the rest
of the northeastern United States. Members of both of these nationalities have long
voted overwhelmingly for Democrats, who are the traditional party of immigrants and
lower-income voters. Republican leaders, mindful that Hispanic or Latino voters com-
prise a growing share of the American electorate, have increasingly attempted to court
this voting bloc in recent years, achieving some limited success during the presidency
of George W. Bush; however, these efforts are made more difficult by the Republican
Party’s traditional advocacy of restrictions on immigration.42
In the decades following the Civil War, politics in most major northern cities was
dominated by the Republican Party and by “Yankees” (Protestants of British ancestry)
of substance and high status. During this time, thousands of Irish people—many of
them fleeing the potato famine of the mid-nineteenth century and rule in Ireland by
 14 | CHAPTER 1

the English and Scots-Irish cousins of Yankee Americans—streamed into Boston, New
York, and other large population centers in the eastern United States. The Democratic
Party welcomed them; the Republicans did not. In due course, the Democratic percent-
age of the two-party vote began to increase, and Irish politicians, who uniquely among
newer immigrants already knew the English language, took over the Democratic Party
nearly everywhere they settled.43 In the Midwest, events such as American involvement
in two world wars against Germany under Democratic auspices in many cases shaped
the political preferences of Americans of German descent toward the more isolationist
Republicans.44 These are a few examples of the ways in which group membership and
historical circumstances have given voters special ties with particular parties.
Party identification may also be shaped by the identity of the politicians in power
when citizens come of political age. The generation of Americans who reached adult-
hood during the 1930s, for example, became socialized into national politics during the
administration of a popular Democratic president, Franklin D. Roosevelt. As a result,
most of these voters became Democrats themselves; even sixty years later, the now-
elderly “New Deal generation” was still more likely to support the Democratic Party
than voters who first became involved in politics during the 1950s, when Republican
Dwight D. Eisenhower was president. Similarly, voters who entered the electorate dur-
ing Ronald Reagan’s presidency in the 1980s remain, even today, significantly more
Republican than their slightly younger counterparts who reached adulthood in the
1990s during the Democratic administration of Bill Clinton.45 In the 2008 election, 45
percent of voters under the age of thirty identified as Democrats, compared to just 26
percent who considered themselves Republicans.46 This wide Democratic advantage
among the youngest generation of voters was due in part to the personal popularity of
presidential candidate Barack Obama among this age cohort. If these voters continue
to view Obama positively over the course of his presidency, their initial preference for
the Democratic Party may, for many, solidify into lifelong identification.
Once voters form psychological ties to a political party, a great deal follows. Merely
to list the functions that party identification performs for voters—reducing their costs
of acquiring political information, telling them what side they are on, organizing their
political knowledge by ordering their preferences, and letting them know what is of
prime importance—is to suggest the profound significance of parties for voting behav-
ior. Politics is complex; there are many possible issues, relevant political personalities,
and decisions to be made on Election Day. Voters who follow their party identification
can simplify their choices and reduce to manageable proportions the time and effort
they spend on public affairs simply by voting for their party’s candidate. Voters with
strong party identifications need not puzzle over each and every issue. Instead, they
can listen to the pronouncements of their party leaders, who inform them which issues
are important, what information is most relevant to those issues, and what positions
they ought to take. Of course, citizens with greater interest in public affairs may inves-
tigate matters for themselves. Even so, their party identification provides them with
important guidance in learning about the issues that interest them as well as the many
matters on which they cannot possibly be well informed. All of us, including full-time
participants in politics such as the president and other leading politicians, must find
ways to cut our information costs on some issues.47 For most of the millions who vote,
identification with one of the two major political parties performs that indispensable
function most of the time.
 VOT E R S | 15

Ideologies, Candidates, and Issues

in the Minds of Voters
Another method of reducing the costs of information may be for voters to have or
acquire a more or less comprehensive set of internally consistent beliefs, sometimes
known as an ideology. How do ideologies structure political beliefs? Voters or party
activists may be conscious of having an ideology and thus adopt views consistent with
their position; they can use ideological labels as a shortcut in making decisions, or
at least they can think of one issue as related to another. There is some evidence that
only small numbers of voters are fully consistent in their ideological thinking; a larger
minority makes use of various forms of group references when expressing preferences
for a particular candidate, and a still larger group makes use of ideological labels.48
Labels such as left and right and liberal and conservative, while commonly used in
political discourse, sometimes work and sometimes do not in structuring attitudes.
If we talk about social welfare or economically redistributive issues, these labels serve
reasonably well in sorting people out: left for, right against. But some issues are harder
to fathom. What would be the “conservative” position on abortion, for example, when
conservative libertarians are pro-choice and other conservatives pro-life?49
Specific candidates with special attractiveness or unattractiveness may under cer-
tain circumstances sway voters to desert their habitual party in a presidential vote.
The landslide victories of Dwight D. Eisenhower in 1952 and 1956 are examples of
this appeal. Though a Republican, Eisenhower enjoyed remarkable popularity among
Democrats, who perceived him less as a partisan figure than as a national military hero
of the recently concluded World War II (1941–1945). It is not surprising, then, that
Eisenhower’s personal following did not greatly aid Republican candidates for other
offices who ran with him, or the Republican Party itself once he no longer headed the
ticket. The unpopular candidacy of George McGovern in 1972 had the opposite effect;
it prompted many Democrats to desert their party’s nominee in favor of Republican
opponent Richard Nixon.50
Scholars have pointed out that in recent presidential elections even successful can-
didates carry a burden of negative evaluations. This negativity may be a consequence of
the role of primary elections in the modern nomination process—a strenuous gauntlet
in which prospective candidates of the same party must run against one another in
different states for many weeks during the early months of a presidential election year.
These elections produce a lot of bad-mouthing. As a result, the eventual nominees usu-
ally have no significant “coattails” in the general election helping candidates of their
party for other offices farther down on the ballot. High negative ratings for all surviving
candidates also mean that they will be unable to lure voters for positive reasons away
from the expression of their habitual party loyalties in the general election. But nega-
tive ratings may push voters to desert their party because they have heard so much bad
publicity.51
Particular issues have much the same occasional effect as candidates on voters’
loyalties.52 This is true because for an issue to change a voter’s habitual party prefer-
ence, it has to reach a high degree of salience for the voter. Voters must know about the
issue, they must care about it at least a little, and they must be able to distinguish the
positions of the parties and their candidates on the issue. Data from public opinion
polls tell us that most people are not well informed about the details of issues most of
 16 | CHAPTER 1

the time.53 All but major public issues are thus eliminated for most people as important
in influencing their vote. And even these major issues may enter the consciousness of
most people in only the most rudimentary way.
Once voters have some grasp of the content of a public policy and learn to prefer
one outcome to another, they must also find a public leader to espouse their point of
view. Discerning differences on policy issues between parties is not always easy. Party
statements on policy may be vague because leaders have not decided what to do. Lead-
ers may deliberately obfuscate an issue for fear of alienating interested publics. They
may try to hold divergent factions in their parties together by glossing over disagree-
ments on many specific issues. Even when real party differences on policy exist, many
voters may not be aware of them. The subject may be highly technical, or the time
required to master the subject may be more than most people are willing to spend. By
the time we get down to those who know and care about and can discriminate between
party positions on issues, we usually have a small proportion of the electorate. The
proportion of politically sophisticated voters appears to be no larger than 30 percent.54
What can we say about these people? Their most obvious characteristic is interest in
and concern about issues and party positions. These are precisely the same people who
are most likely to be strong party identifiers. Party loyalty thus works against the possibil-
ity that voters will shift allegiance just because of a disagreement on one or two issues.55
Voters who pay only a moderate amount of attention to politics are most likely to be
affected by new information on issues. This is because the most attentive are generally
committed to a party and that party’s position, whereas the least attentive are unavailable
to persuasion: since they don’t take in political information, they cannot be influenced by
it. This leaves the middle group as most open to persuasion. Not being intensely partisan,
they are not previously committed, but they learn enough so that it is possible for them
to be swayed by new information about issues and by campaigns.56 The number of issue-
oriented “independents”—voters who care about public issues but have no consistent
party preference—is very small. Knowledgeable citizens are more likely to have strong
opinions about politics and therefore almost always consider themselves either Demo-
crats or Republicans. Most people who call themselves independents actually lean toward
one or another of the two major parties.57 So purely issue-oriented voters are not numer-
ous and may be distributed on both sides of major policy questions in such a way that
gains and losses balance out and the total number of votes gained or lost by the impact
of any specific issue is minute. This is even true of such issues as the Vietnam War, which
from 1968 to 1972 was of tremendous salience to many Americans.58
Even these changes may not amount to much if other issues are also highly salient
to voters and work the other way. For if voters were willing to change their votes on one
particular issue, why should they not switch their support back because of another? There
are usually many issues in a campaign; only if all or most of the issues pointed voters in
the same direction would they be likely to switch their votes. What is the likelihood that
candidates will arrange their policies along a broad ideological front, forcing large num-
bers of weak party identifiers or “independent” voters from or into the fold? It is low but
not nonexistent. In 1964, the Republicans, led by extreme conservative Barry Goldwater,
did so. And in 1972, the Democratic candidate, George McGovern, “was perceived as so
far left on the issues that his Republican opponent, Richard Nixon, was generally closer to
the electorate’s average issue position on 11 out of 14 separate issues.”59 Supporters of the
Goldwater and McGovern campaigns argued that enthusiasm for their candidates’ more
 VOT E R S | 17

ideologically extreme positions would inspire a massive increase in turnout among disaf-
fected citizens who previously declined to participate in politics (a claim known as the
“hidden vote” theory). Instead, Goldwater and McGovern merely alienated large numbers
of Americans who already vote regularly, including many members of their own party,
resulting in landslide victories for the opposition.
Issues that arouse deep feelings can alter longer-term voting patterns, but this usu-
ally occurs when one party gets very far out of step with the preferences of voters. In
the 1930s and 1940s, this happened to the Republicans on the issue of social welfare
programs.60 When voters perceive a vast chasm separating them from one of the candi-
dates, as they did with Goldwater and again with McGovern, the importance of issues
relative to party is bound to grow. In short, when voters disagree with a candidate on
key issues and know that they disagree, they are likely to vote against him or her. Can-
didates and their campaigns therefore work hard to inform voters about potentially
unpopular positions taken by their opponents. This strategy leads to a lot of negative
campaigning, much of which works uphill against party habits and the disinclination
of voters to pay much attention to the content of campaigns.
When voters wish to reject the current presidential administration, yet they are
not sure that the other party’s policies are better, they may nevertheless decide to
take a chance on the challenging candidate. Stung by “stagflation,” a politically deadly
combination of high inflation and high unemployment, and dismayed over what
they perceived to be President Jimmy Carter’s lack of leadership, voters in 1980 chose
Republican nominee Ronald Reagan despite uneasiness about Reagan’s conservative
issue positions. They may have thought that, under then current conditions of uncer-
tainty about the economy, a new administration would do better. When unemployment
rose in 1981 and 1982, President Reagan’s popularity dropped, and Republican congres-
sional candidates suffered. Economic recovery brought Reagan renewed support and
a resounding victory in 1984. Figure 1.1 shows how closely the vote for the president’s
party tracks the performance of the economy.61
News of an economic turnaround came too late to save George H. W. Bush in 1992.
He lost his bid for reelection despite his tremendous popularity two years earlier at the
time of the Desert Storm operation (January 1991) when he orchestrated the defense
of Kuwait against Iraqi aggression. By the fall of 1992, however, Americans were more
concerned with the state of the national economy than with the nation’s military suc-
cesses. Bush fell victim to negative retrospective evaluations of his performance on
domestic matters and to popular feelings that he demonstrated insufficient concern
about an economic recession occurring on his watch, receiving only 38 percent of the
vote in a three-way race.62
George W. Bush’s unpopular economic stewardship in 2008 created serious politi-
cal problems for his fellow Republican, John McCain, who was running to succeed
him as president. An unprecedented financial crisis, threatening the survival of sev-
eral prominent private investment banks and insurance companies, erupted just weeks
before the November election in the midst of an existing recession. This development
made the management of the national economy the dominant issue of the fall cam-
paign. McCain’s career-long focus on national security concerns did not position him
well to address this matter, allowing his Democratic opponent Barack Obama to charge
that McCain would simply continue Bush’s policies if elected. Obama’s solid victory,
by a popular margin of 53 percent to 46 percent, reflected voters’ historical tendency to
 18 | CHAPTER 1

FIGURE 1.1. The effect of income growth on incumbent party success, 1932–2008

Source: Economic data from Bureau of Economic Analysis, “National Economic Accounts,” last
updated October 29, 2009, http://www.bea.gov/national/nipaweb/SelectTable.asp.

hold the incumbent party responsible for poor economic conditions. Even so, Repub-
lican voters remained loyal to their party, casting 90 percent of their votes for McCain.
So, while candidates matter sometimes, and issues matter sometimes, and both
are capable of affecting who wins, for most voters party matters almost all the time.
Activating party loyalties is the most important electoral strategy at the disposal of
candidates.

Changes in Party Identification: Social Habit

versus Contemporary Evaluation
Thus far, we have considered factors that cause voters to deviate in voting from their
underlying party allegiance. Under what conditions do they actually change their party
identification?
The prevailing model of party identification holds that it is a strong social habit. It
begins early in life, is remarkably stable, resists short-run political forces, and changes only
through reaction to long-lasting and powerful political events, such as the Great Depres-
sion of the 1930s. This view was authoritatively propounded in 1960 by the authors of
The American Voter. At its core is the idea that party identification constitutes a strong
emotional bond and is therefore “firm but not immovable.”63 This leaves at least a little
 VOT E R S | 19

BOX 1.1. In the arena: 2008 Obama and McCain

voters speak on issues, ideology, and candidates
Issues
“Obama Pledges to withdraw most U.S. troops from Iraq within 16 months, by the
end of next year. Dammit, I want our people home; let other countries figure
themselves out—we shouldn’t be babysitting them.”
“To help the middle class, Barack Hussein Obama has promised to drastically increase
the taxes on the wealthy and big corporations. This is scam to make the American
People think that the middle class will be better off. Well, don’t be fooled! The
reality is when big companies pay more taxes, they cut costs, they cut jobs, and
they cut salaries.”

Ideology
“If you believe in the rule of law, the U.S. Constitution, freedom, self-reliance, and
personal responsibility, then you should vote McCain/Palin. Obama . . . believes
the government is entitled to more of the fruits of your labor, and he believes
you can’t and shouldn’t be able to take care of your life and properly set your
priorities.”
“Obama’s plan for health care and taxes are what the middle class need right now. If
I ever make $250,000 a year, I will be more than happy to help those behind me
who are also struggling to get to that point! Time to trickle down and stop the up
trickle that has been going on waaaay too long.”

Candidates
“It will take an intelligent leader to fix this mess. Bush is not a bright man; McCain is
not much brighter. Obama is smart. VERY smart. Obama graduated Magna Cum
Laude from Harvard Law School. He graduated at the top of the top law school
in the country. Doesn’t that tell you something?”
“Barack Hussein Obama applied for the Presidency. The way we look at job appli-
cants, he would have never made it as far as the interview. His process would have
stopped at the resume review stage. I do not care how smart any one person is;
nothing can take the place of real experience. Experience comes with doing the
job under pressure, stress and knowing if you make the ‘wrong’ decision [it] will
impact thousands of lives.”

Source: Posted comments to the question: “I’m an undecided voter. Should I vote for Obama or
McCain? Convince me!” Squidoo, “Who Should Be President of the United States? Convince
me!” accessed February 22, 2011, http://www.squidoo.com/convince-me.
 20 | CHAPTER 1

room for candidate and issue-related changes and for a more active evaluative role on the
part of voters. One classic study shows that those who change party from one election to
the next are generally sympathetic to some key policies of their new party. “Standpatters,”
in contrast, tend to agree with major policies of their existing party.64
It is often difficult to determine whether citizens choose a party in accordance
with their preexisting political beliefs or instead adopt a party’s positions after affiliat-
ing with it for other reasons, such as ethnic, religious, or class identity or affinity for a
particular political leader. Almost certainly, both processes are having an impact on the
electorate. One synthesis that combines long-term habit with more contemporaneous
evaluations concludes that “there is substantial continuity in partisanship from one
point in time to the next” and that party identification “can be interpreted as the indi-
vidual’s accumulated evaluation of the parties.”65
In addition to extremely rare tidal waves that change the party preferences of large
groups of voters, there are also more common squalls that affect the life experiences
of smaller numbers of individuals and from time to time lead a relatively few voters
to alter their party identifications. Since these eddies in the larger flow of events lack
a common origin, they usually cancel one another out in their net effects. Thus, the
big picture of relatively stable aggregate partisanship in the overall electorate can be
reconciled with a more complicated picture of occasional individual change.66 Both
the thinking and feeling individuals who change parties once in a while and the large
masses of people who are caught up in infrequent movements away from or toward
certain parties are galvanized by their reactions to shared experiences.67 Thus, people
whose partisanship was not firmly fixed early in life, perhaps because politics was sel-
dom discussed in the home, may develop party identifications in their twenties or thir-
ties. They adjust their party loyalties to their policy preferences or to the views of the
groups with which they associate. But they do not make these adjustments often. As
Charles Franklin tells us, “Citizens remain open to change throughout life, though as
experience with the parties accumulates, it is accorded greater weight.”68
Is party identification a durable standing decision to vote a certain way, as the
authors of The American Voter put it, or, as Morris Fiorina argues, a “running tally of
retrospective evaluations of party promises and performance” subject to significant
change based on unfolding political events?69 Scholars find that citizen assessment of
party performance on major dimensions of public policy—war and peace, employ-
ment, inflation, race relations, and so forth—do matter. 70 Nevertheless, most changes
of party identification involve switching in and out of the independent category rather
than between the parties.71 This seemed to happen in 2008, as Republican identifiers
decreased as the number of independents grew. Donald Kinder sums up:

So party identification is not immovable; it is influenced by the performance of

government, by policy disagreements, and by the emergence of new candidates.
The loyalty citizens feel for party is at least partially a function of what govern-
ments and parties do, and what they fail to do. . . . I do not mean to press this too
hard, however. Although party identification does respond to political events, it
does so sluggishly. It is one thing for Republicans to feel less enthusiastic toward
their party after a period of sustained national difficulty presided over by a Repub-
lican administration; it is quite another to embrace the opposition. The latter sel-
dom happens.72
 VOT E R S | 21

Has there been an overall decline in party identification in the United States? From
1952 to 1964, the level of party identification among voters remained stable. From
1964 onward, many more Americans identified themselves as independents. Indeed,
as of 1974, self-styled independents outnumbered Republicans five to three and came
near to the number of Democrats. By the late 1990s, more Americans classified them-
selves as independents than identified with each of the two major parties. In 2008, a
declining number of Republicans still resulted in equal proportions of Democrats and
independents in a survey by the Pew Research Center for the People and the Press.73
These trends have prompted some observers to claim that parties do not affect the
behavior of voters nearly as much as they once did.74 However, more than two-thirds of
nominal independents admit that they “lean” toward either the Democratic or Repub-
lican Party.75 These partisan independents are far more knowledgeable and participate
much more actively in politics than “pure,” nonleaning independents; they also show
a far greater tendency to vote, and they nearly always vote for the party toward which
they lean. In short, independents who lean toward a party behave almost the same as
partisans and not at all like truly independent voters. By separating party identification
into seven categories rather than three, table 1.6 shows that the number of pure inde-
pendents is closer to 10 percent than to the 35 percent often cited.76
People are a lot more stable in their party identifications than in the policy prefer-
ences that are sometimes held to underlie party allegiances.77 But lifelong identification
with a party does not ensure that a voter will always support that party’s nominees
for public office; in the past, there have often been significant defections of partisan
identifiers to the other party’s candidate in presidential elections. From 1952 to 1968,
Democrats defected, on average, about twice as often as Republicans (19 percent to 10
percent). After 1972, Republican defection rates stayed about the same, but Democratic
defections increased, averaging 25 percent from 1976 to 1988. Even Jimmy Carter’s
successful candidacy in 1976 received just 77 percent of the Democratic vote, while 90
percent of the smaller but more loyal Republican electorate backed its party’s candidate,
Gerald Ford.78
Recent elections have been different. After losing about a quarter of Democratic
voters in 1992 to Republican George H. W. Bush and independent candidate Ross Perot,
Bill Clinton received 85 percent of the Democratic vote in 1996. For the first time in

TABLE 1.6. Party identification, 1952–2008 (in percentages)

Democrats Republicans
Pure
Year Strong Weak Independent Independent Independent Weak Strong

1952 22 25 10 6 7 14 14
1962 23 23 7 8 6 16 12
1972 15 26 11 13 10 13 10
1982 20 24 11 11 8 14 10
1992 18 18 14 12 12 14 11
2002 16 17 15 8 13 16 14
2008 19 15 17 11 11 13 13
Source: Harold W. Stanley and Richard G. Niemi, Vital Statistics on American Politics, 2009–2010
(Washington, DC: CQ Press, 2010), 105, based on data from the National Election Studies.
 22 | CHAPTER 1

many years, Republicans were slightly less loyal than Democrats, with defections total-
ing 27 percent in 1992 and 20 percent in 1996. Both major candidates received over-
whelming support from their parties’ identifiers in the closely fought 2000, 2004, and
2008 elections, reflecting the highly polarized nature of contemporary electoral poli-
tics. In 2000, 91 percent of Republicans voted for George W. Bush, while 86 percent of
Democrats backed Al Gore. Four years later, Bush received 93 percent of the Republican
vote, while 89 percent of Democrats supported their party’s nominee, John Kerry—the
highest combined level of party loyalty in the American electorate since the advent of
modern survey research over fifty years ago.79 This result was virtually replicated in
2008, when Obama gained the support of 89 percent of Democrats and McCain won
90 percent of self-identified Republicans.80
As these results suggest, party as an orientation point is still very important. Most
people, especially most voters (since those without any party preference are much less
likely to vote), identify with or lean toward one party or the other. There are always
defections, however, and the parties cannot automatically count on all their identifiers
to give them unqualified support in every election. Party identification does not trans-
late automatically into party-line voting. Voters may tend to be loyal, but they can also
be driven away.

A Central Strategic Problem:

The Attentiveness of Voters
A remarkably consistent picture emerges from the study of American voters over the
past several decades:

1. Most voters (about 70 percent, or more than 90 percent if independent “leaners”

are included) have a party allegiance, which determines their vote most of the time. The
strategic implication for presidential candidates is that there is such a thing as a party
base. Major-party candidates must mobilize this base so the party faithful turn out, and
they must strive to minimize defections; the overwhelming evidence is that efforts in
this direction will be rewarded.
2. In any election, the number of voters making a judgment to desert their custom-
ary party of preference will ordinarily be small. If there is a tide of such evaluations in
a single direction, this can be decisive for the outcome. Mostly, these tides are expressed
as decisions to move from partisan loyalty to weaker loyalty, from weak loyalty to neu-
trality, or to a weakened resolution to vote at all.
3. Most citizens do not pay much attention to politics or keep well informed about
the substantive details of current events. The world inhabited by politicians, a world
full of public policy and of contention over complex issues, is only dimly perceived by
ordinary voters. A strategic implication is that politicians must expend resources and
work very hard to give meaning to the choices that voters ordinarily make according
to party habit. For a candidate to become visible as an individual to voters is a difficult
task. Much of the activity during an election campaign is understandable in the light
of the fact that voters are not attentive to the specifics of public affairs, ideologically
consistent in their views, or spontaneously eager to change their habitual orientations
to politics. Politicians must therefore strive to capture their attention.
 VOT E R S | 23

4. Voters participate in politics mostly in accordance with their social loyalties and
involvements. They retain and sometimes exercise their capacity to make contemporary
judgments on issues. Either way, their behavior is importantly influenced by the ways
in which they are organized into social groups, especially political parties.

In the heat of a fall presidential campaign, voters are not always coolly rational in
their choices. That makes presidential candidates and parties all the more eager to find
a way to reach and influence them. “Persuadable” voters, those not anchored by ideol-
ogy or party identification and less attentive to politics, become a central campaign
focus. Larry M. Bartels notes that

recent studies offer abundant evidence that election outcomes can be powerfully
affected by factors unrelated to the competence and convictions of the candidates.
But if voters are so whimsical, choose the candidate with the most competent-
looking face or most recent television ad, how do they manage to sound so sen-
sible? Most people seem able to provide cogent-sounding reasons for voting the
way they do. However, careful observation suggests that these “reasons” often are
merely rationalizations from readily available campaign rhetoric to justify prefer-
ences formed on other grounds.81

Discovering the true reasons why citizens vote the way they do—retrospective
performance, issue positions, perceptions of candidates, and party identification—
and attempting to influence these decisions is the central objective of presidential
campaigns.
 CHAPTER 2

Groups

The Presidential Vote as an

Aggregation of Interest Groups

I N EACH ELECTION, members of the various social groups that make up

the American voting population turn out to vote, dividing their loyalties in vary-
ing ways between the major parties. Turnout varies enormously among differ-
ent groups in the population, rising with income, occupational status, education, and
age. Since Republicans are disproportionately located in the high-turnout groups and
Democrats in the low, this tends to give Republicans electoral advantages that in some
measure, varying from election to election, counteract the overall preponderance of
Democrats in the total adult population.
The two major parties are somewhat differently constituted as voting blocs of
interest groups. Democrats appeal especially to identifiable segments of society—nota-
bly, disadvantaged minorities—that have specific programmatic interests. That is the
Democratic base, and Democrats win presidential elections by activating these inter-
est groups and persuading them to turn out. This is not always easy, since among the
groups that characteristically turn out at lower rates—recent immigrants, the young,
the poor, the less educated, and the less socially integrated—many tend to favor the
Democratic Party when they do vote.
Republicans win presidential elections by doing slightly better than Democrats and
better than usual for Republicans among the big battalions: aggregates of voters not
necessarily organized as self-conscious groups, such as white voters (74 percent of the
electorate in 2008), voters in their middle years or older, those with at least some college
education, and Protestants. In years when Republicans do slightly less well among these
very large segments of the population, Democrats win (see table 2.1).
Democrats maintain a strong electoral base among groups that for one reason or
another have historically felt disadvantaged in American society: black voters, union
members, religious minorities, and gay voters. Even in years when Democrats lose the
presidency, they tend to do well with these groups (see table 2.2). Note, for example, the
strong Democratic vote of blacks and union members even in 1984, when Republican

25
Exploring the Variety of Random
Documents with Different Content
 5.4 The Fundamental Theorem of Calculus 281 Proof of
Theorem 4 We prove the Fundamental Theorem, Part 1, by applying
the definition of the derivative directly to the function F(x), when x
and x + h are in (a, D). This means writing out the difference
quotient F(x + h) — F(x) an (a and showing that its limit as A — 0 is
the number f(x) for each x in (a, b). Doing so, we find F(x + h) —
F(x) m Pea m 1 xth x = im | f f(t) dt — f FO ar! x+h = lim h , f(@
dt. Table 5.6, Rule 5 According to the Mean Value Theorem for
Definite Integrals, the value before taking the limit in the last
expression is one of the values taken on by f in the interval between
x and x + h. That is, for some number c in this interval, 1 xth J! f()
dt = f(c). (4) As h — 0, x + h approaches x, forcing c to approach x
also (because c is trapped between x and x + h). Since f is
continuous at x, f(c) approaches f(x): lim f(c) = fœ). (5) In
conclusion, we have x+h F'Q)- limr f(t) dt li Eq. (4 lim f(c) q. (4)
f(x). Eq. (5) If x = a or b, then the limit of Equation (3) is
interpreted as a one-sided limit with h —> 0* or h —> 0,
respectively. Then Theorem 1 in Section 3.2 shows that F is
continuous over [a, b]. This concludes the proof. a Fundamental
Theorem, Part 2 (The Evaluation Theorem) We now come to the
second part of the Fundamental Theorem of Calculus. This part
describes how to evaluate definite integrals without having to
calculate limits of Riemann sums. Instead we find and evaluate an
antiderivative at the upper and lower limits of integration. THEOREM
4 (Continued)—The Fundamental Theorem of Calculus, Part 2 If f is
continuous over |a, b] and F is any antiderivative of f on |a, b], then
b J f(x) dx = F(b) — F(a). Proof Part 1 of the Fundamental Theorem
tells us that an antiderivative of f exists, namely G(x) = J f@ dt.
Thus, if F is any antiderivative of f, then F(x) = G(x) + C for some
constant C for a < x < b (by Corollary 2 of the Mean Value Theorem
for Derivatives, Section 4.2).
 282 Chapter 5: Integrals Since both F and G are continuous
on [a, b], we see that F(x) = G(x) + C also holds when x = a and x
= b by taking one-sided limits (as x — a* and x — b7). Evaluating
F(b) — F(a), we have F(b) — F(a) = [G(b) + C] — [G@ + C] G(b) —
G(a) b a - J fO dt — / f(t) dt E a = J f(t) dt — 0 i = J f(t) dt. = The
Evaluation Theorem is important because it says that to calculate the
definite integral of f over an interval [ a, b] we need do only two
things: 1. Find an antiderivative F of f, and 2. Calculate the number
F(b) — F(a), which is equal to f. i f@) dx. This process is much
easier than using a Riemann sum computation. The power of the
theorem follows from the realization that the definite integral, which
is defined by a complicated process involving all of the values of the
function f over [ a, b], can be found by knowing the values of any
antiderivative F at only the two endpoints a and b. The usual
notation for the difference F(b) — F(a) is b b o | or LJ ; depending
on whether F has one or more terms. EXAMPLE 3 We calculate
several definite integrals using the Evaluation Theorem, rather than
by taking limits of Riemann sums. 7T T (a) | cos x dx = sin 1 < sinx
= cosx 0 0 2 sina — sn0=0-0=0 0 0 " (b) / sec x tan x dx — secx gy
SOX = sec x tan x —m/A —m/A = sec 0 se ( z)-: v2 bam 4 o -4l [ay
+ 1 [8 +1] - [5] ^ 4 g Exercise 72 offers another proof of the
Evaluation Theorem, bringing together the ideas of Riemann sums,
the Mean Value Theorem, and the definition of the definite integral.
 5.4 The Fundamental Theorem of Calculus 283 The Integral
of a Rate We can interpret Part 2 of the Fundamental Theorem in
another way. If F is any antiderivative of f, then F' — f. The equation
in the theorem can then be rewritten as b J F'(x) dx = F(b) — F(a).
Now F'(x) represents the rate of change of the function F(x) with
respect to x, so the last equation asserts that the integral of F’ is just
the net change in F as x changes from a to b. Formally, we have the
following result. THEOREM 5—The Net Change Theorem The net
change in a differentiable function F(x) over an interval a = x = b is
the integral of its rate of change: b F(b) — F(a) — J F' (x) dx. (6)
EXAMPLE 4 Here are several interpretations of the Net Change
Theorem. (a) If c(x) is the cost of producing x units of a certain
commodity, then c'(x) is the marginal cost (Section 3.4). From
Theorem 5, J dded, which is the cost of increasing production from
x, units to x, units. (b) If an object with position function s(t) moves
along a coordinate line, its velocity is v(t) = s'(f). Theorem 5 says
that n dt = s(t5) — s(t), so the integral of velocity is the
displacement over the time interval t, = t = 4. On the other hand,
the integral of the speed |v(?)| is the total distance traveled over the
time interval. This is consistent with our discussion in Section 5.1. E]
If we rearrange Equation (6) as b F(b) = F(a) + | F' (x) dx, a we see
that the Net Change Theorem also says that the final value of a
function F(x) over an interval [a, b] equals its initial value F(a) plus
its net change over the interval. So if v(t) represents the velocity
function of an object moving along a coordinate line, this means that
the object’s final position s(t) over a time interval t, € t = f; is its
initial position s(t,) plus its net change in position along the line (see
Example 4b). EXAMPLE 5 Consider again our analysis of a heavy
rock blown straight up from the ground by a dynamite blast
(Example 3, Section 5.1). The velocity of the rock at any time t
during its motion was given as v(t) = 160 — 321 ft/sec. (a) Find the
displacement of the rock during the time period 0 = f = 8. (b) Find
the total distance traveled during this time period.
 284 Chapter 5: Integrals FIGURE 5.20 These graphs
enclose the same amount of area with the x-axis, but the definite
integrals of the two functions over [ -2, 2] differ in sign (Example 6).
Solution (a) From Example 4b, the displacement is the integral 8 8 J
«7 f oe 321) dt = [160r — 162] 0 0 — (160)(8) — (16)(64) — 256.
This means that the height of the rock is 256 ft above the ground 8
sec after the explosion, which agrees with our conclusion in Example
3, Section 5.1. (b) As we noted in Table 5.3, the velocity function
v(f) is positive over the time interval [0, 5] and negative over the
interval [ 5, 8]. Therefore, from Example 4b, the total distance
traveled is the integral 8 3 8 J vote - f vola f |v(?)| dt 0 0 5 5 8 = J
(160 — 327) dt — L (160 — 321) dt 0 5 = [160r — 162]; — [160r —
1677] = [(160)(5) — (16)(25)] — [(160)(8) — (16)(64) — ((160)(5)
— (16)(25))] = 400 — (-144) = 544. Again, this calculation agrees
with our conclusion in Example 3, Section 5.1. That is, the total
distance of 544 ft traveled by the rock during the time period 0 = ft
= 8 is (i) the maximum height of 400 ft it reached over the time
interval [0,5] plus (ii) the additional distance of 144 ft the rock fell
over the time interval [ 5, 8 ]. El The Relationship Between
Integration and Differentiation The conclusions of the Fundamental
Theorem tell us several things. Equation (2) can be rewritten as df
"— 2: | fO dt = fx), which says that if you first integrate the function
f and then differentiate the result, you get the function f back again.
Likewise, replacing b by x and x by t in Equation (6) gives | F'(t) dt
= F(x) — F(a), so that if you first differentiate the function F and
then integrate the result, you get the function F back (adjusted by
an integration constant). In a sense, the processes of integration
and differentiation are “inverses” of each other. The Fundamental
Theorem also says that every continuous function f has an
antiderivative F. It shows the importance of finding antiderivatives in
order to evaluate definite integrals easily. Furthermore, it says that
the differential equation dy/dx — f(x) has a solution (namely, any of
the functions y — F(x) * C) for every continuous function f. Total
Area Area is always a nonnegative quantity. The Riemann sum
contains terms such as f(c,) Ax; that give the area of a rectangle
when f(c,) is positive. When f(c;) is negative, then the product f(c,)
Ax, is the negative of the rectangle's area. When we add up such
terms for a negative function, we get the negative of the area
between the curve and the x-axis. If we then take the absolute
value, we obtain the correct positive area. EXAMPLE 6 Figure 5.20
shows the graph of f(x) = x? — 4 and its mirror image g(x) = 4 —
x? reflected across the x-axis. For each function, compute
 FIGURE 5.21 The total area between y — sin x and the x-
axis for 0 = x = 2r is the sum of the absolute values of two integrals
(Example 7). 5.4 The Fundamental Theorem of Calculus 285 (a) the
definite integral over the interval [ —2, 2], and (b) the area between
the graph and the x-axis over [—2, 2]. Solution 2 R 2 X^ 8 8 32 (a)
[io dx E «p G s) ( 3 + s) cix and 3 x3)? 32 n dx — E 3 ie 3 (b) In
both cases, the area between the curve and the x-axis over [ —2, 2]
is 32/3 square units. Although the definite integral of f(x) is
negative, the area 1s still positive. | To compute the area of the
region bounded by the graph of a function y = f(x) and the x-axis
when the function takes on both positive and negative values, we
must be careful to break up the interval [ a, b | into subintervals on
which the function doesn't change sign. Otherwise we might get
cancelation between positive and negative signed areas, leading to
an incorrect total. The correct total area is obtained by adding the
absolute value of the definite integral over each subinterval where
f(x) does not change sign. The term "area" will be taken to mean
this total area. EXAMPLE 7 Figure 5.21 shows the graph of the
function f(x) = sin x between x = 0 and x = 277. Compute (a) the
definite integral of f(x) over [ 0, 27 ]. (b) the area between the
graph of f(x) and the x-axis over [ 0, 27 ]. Solution (a) The definite
integral for f(x) = sin x is given by Qa Qa / sinxdx = —cosx| -—-—
[cos27 — cos0] 2 -[1— 1] =0. 0 0 The definite integral is zero
because the portions of the graph above and below the x-axis make
canceling contributions. (b) The area between the graph of f(x) and
the x-axis over [0,277] is calculated by breaking up the domain of
sin x into two pieces: the interval [ 0, 7 ] over which it is
nonnegative and the interval [ 7, 27 ] over which it is nonpositive. f
sin x dr = =cos «| = —[|cos m — cos0] 2—[-1— 1] 22 0 0 27 2r /
sinx dr = =cos «| = -| cos 2r — cos m] = -[1- CD] = 2 The second
integral gives a negative value. The area between the graph and the
axis is obtained by adding the absolute values, Area = |2| + |-2| =
4. B Summary: To find the area between the graph of y = f(x) and
the x-axis over the interval [ a, b |: 1. Subdivide [ a, b] at the zeros
of f. 2. Integrate f over each subinterval. 3. Add the absolute values
of the integrals.
 286 Chapter 5: Integrals EXAMPLE 8 Find the area of the
region between the x-axis and the graph of FIGURE 5.22 The region
between the curve y — x? (Example 8). Exercises 54 Evaluating
Integrals — x? — 2x and the x-axis f(x) = 2 — x? kars: Solution First
find the zeros of f. Since fœ = 2 x? — 2x = x(x? — x — 2) = x(x +
Dx — 2), the zeros are x = 0, —1, and 2 (Figure 5.22). The zeros
subdivide [—1, 2 ] into two subintervals: [—1, 0], on which f = 0,
and [0,2], on which f = 0. We integrate f over each subinterval and
add the absolute values of the calculated integrals. 0 4 3 0 3 2. x x 2
1 1 5 fo x 2x) dx E 3 J 0 HE 1 12 2 4 3 2 3 2. x x 2| _ 8 _ 8 fe x 2x)
dx E 3 d E 3 a| 0 3 The total enclosed area is obtained by adding the
absolute values of the calculated integrals. Evaluate the integrals in
Exercises 1-28. 2 1. f x(x — 3) dx 0 2 3. J E dx a (x + 3)4 4 3 23 f
(2: 3r 1 / (x + vx) dx 0 tn Di 7/3 2 sec? x dx / 3m /A4 11. f csc 6 cot
0 dO 1 + cos 2t 2 dt 13. tan?x dx 15. 17. -1 i. f (r + 1) dr 1 sin 2x dx
1 2: J (x? — 2x 3) dx =i 1 4. J x? dx =1 3 6. J (x3 — 2x + 3) dx -2
32 8. f x65 dx 1 10. f (1 + cos x) dx 0 T/3 ? 12. J 4 SU du 0 cos?u
7/3 14. J sin? t dt —m/3 7/6 16. i) (sec x + tanx)? dx 0 —m/4 18. J
(4 sec?t + z) dt —7/3 t V3 20. J (t + D(P + 4) dt -V3 5 8 37 Total
enclosed area — 12 + : =D E 1 1 ew. . 2 a. f (£- 4) au n. yay v2\2 u
-3 y V2 2 813 4 1)(2 — 32/3 23. I gea. 24. f i A ieu 1 s 1 ai To. 2x
T/3 25. f Sm dx 26. f (cos x + sec x)? dx 2sin x m/2 0 4 71 27. |x|
dx 28. | z (cos x + |cos x|) dx -4 o? In Exercises 29—32, guess an
antiderivative for the integrand function. Validate your guess by
differentiation and then evaluate the given definite integral. (Hint:
Keep in mind the Chain Rule in guessing an antiderivative. You will
learn how to find such antiderivatives in the next section.) vs m 29. f
x cos x? dx 30. sin Vx 0 1 Vx dx 5 ds 1/3 31. f = 32. f sin? x cos x dx
2 VI+ 0 Derivatives of Integrals Find the derivatives in Exercises 33-
38. a. by evaluating the integral and differentiating the result. b. by
differentiating the integral directly.
 Vx sin x 33. a cos t dt 34. a 30° dt dx " dx i e tan d d 2 35.
diJ, Vu du 36. a sec’ y dy a Vi 37.4 | raa TE / (« + 2) dx dx 0 dt 1 x
Find dy/dx in Exercises 39-46. » y= | victa a. y= f fa, x>0 0 1 0 e
41. y= i sin (1?) dt 42. y= xf sin (£) dt 2 Vx X " x " 43. y= 3 dt 5 dt
40-4 48-4 x 3 44. y= (f (P + 1) ar) 0 sin x dise f _ a 0 v1-f28 0 dt
46. y — f tanx 1 + p Area In Exercises 47—50, find the total area
between the region and the x-axis. 47.y—-—-x)-2x -32xz2 48. y =
3x7 — 3, -2zxx2 49. y -:09—30 + 2x, OS x=2 50. y=x'3—x, -lSx<8
Find the areas of the shaded regions in Exercises 51-54. 51. ><
y=1+cosx 52. y= sinx 5.4 The Fundamental Theorem of Calculus
287 53. 7 54. y y = sec 0 tan 0 T >0 d 4 y = sec“ t AIA y=1-?" >t T
—V/2b 4 Initial Value Problems Each of the following functions solves
one of the initial value problems in Exercises 55-58. Which function
solves which problem? Give brief reasons for your answers. x x ayn f
1a-3 b. y= | sare a 1 0 Xx *4 «vo f sectd +4 a y= f fas =l T ss, 2 =
1 =-3 56. y'= -1)=4 RTP yGr) .y = secx, y(-1)57. y, = secx, y(0) = 4
58. y = 2 x1) = —3 Express the solutions of the initial value
problems in Exercises 59 and 60 in terms of integrals. 59 A C. 2)=3 -
g Sees y2) = dy = 2 = — 60. 7. 1+x, y(D 2 Theory and Examples
61. Archimedes’ area formula for parabolic arches Archimedes (287-
212 B.c.) inventor, military engineer, physicist, and the greatest
mathematician of classical times in the Western world, discovered
that the area under a parabolic arch is two-thirds the base times the
height. Sketch the parabolic arch y = h — (4h/b?)x?, —b/2 = x =
b/2, assuming that h and b are positive. Then use calculus to find
the area of the region enclosed between the arch and the x-axis. 62.
Show that if k is a positive constant, then the area between the x-
axis and one arch of the curve y = sin kx is 2/k. 63. Cost from
marginal cost The marginal cost of printing a poster when x posters
have been printed is gi. 1 dx 2vx dollars. Find c(100) — c(1), the
cost of printing posters 2-100. 64. Revenue from marginal revenue
Suppose that a company's marginal revenue from the manufacture
and sale of eggbeaters is dr _ 2 Tieri, where r is measured in
thousands of dollars and x in thousands of units. How much money
should the company expect from a production run of x = 3 thousand
eggbeaters? To find out, integrate the marginal revenue from x = 0
to x = 3.
 288 Chapter 5: Integrals 65. The temperature TF) of a
room at time t minutes is given by T—85—3V25—t for 0t 25. a. Find
the room's temperature when t = 0, f = 16, and t = 25. b. Find the
room's average temperature for 0 = t = 25. 66. The height H (ft) of
a palm tree after growing for t years is given by H=Vt+1+5 for 01-8.
a. Find the tree's height when t = 0,7 = 4, and t = 8. b. Find the
tree's average height for 0 = f = 8. 67. Suppose that I5 f(t) dt = x?
— 2x + 1. Find f(x). 68. Find f(4) if [} f(r) dt = x cos mx. 69. Find
the linearization of x+1 9 fay =2- f 14 14 70. Find the linearization
of atx = l. 2 g(x) = 3 «f sec (t — 1) dt 1 atx — —l. 71. Suppose that
f has a positive derivative for all values of x and that f(1) = 0. Which
of the following statements must be true of the function go) = 1
quan 0 Give reasons for your answers. a. g is a differentiable
function of x. b. g is a continuous function of x. c. The graph of g
has a horizontal tangent at x = 1. d. g has a local maximum at x =
1. e. g has a local minimum at x = 1. f. The graph of g has an
inflection point at x — 1. g. The graph of dg /dx crosses the x-axis at
x = 1. 72. Another proof of the Evaluation Theorem a. Let a = xo <
xi < xc: < x, = b be any partition of [ a, b], and let F be any
antiderivative of f. Show that n F(b) — F(a) = > [F(x) — FG]. i-l b.
Apply the Mean Value Theorem to each term to show that F(x) —
FG) = f(c¢)(; — x;4) for some c; in the interval (x-1 xj). Then show
that F(b) — F(a) is a Riemann sum for f on [a,b]. €. From part (b)
and the definition of the definite integral, show that b F(b) — F(a) —
f f(x) dx. 73. Suppose that f is the differentiable function shown in
the accompanying graph and that the position at time f (sec) of a
particle moving along a coordinate axis is eme 0 meters. Use the
graph to answer the following questions. Give reasons for your
answers. a. What is the particle's velocity at time t = 5? b. Is the
acceleration of the particle at time tf = 5 positive, or negative? c.
What is the particle's position at time t = 3? d. At what time during
the first 9 sec does s have its largest value? e. Approximately when
is the acceleration zero? f. When is the particle moving toward the
origin? Away from the origin? g. On which side of the origin does the
particle lie at time t = 9? 74. The marginal cost of manufacturing x
units of an electronic device is 0.00132 — 0.5x + 115. If 600 units
are produced, what is the production cost per unit? COMPUTER
EXPLORATIONS In Exercises 75-78, let F(x) = J. y f(t) dt for the
specified function f and interval [a, b]. Use a CAS to perform the
following steps and answer the questions posed. a. Plot the
functions f and F together over [a, b]. b. Solve the equation F'(x) =
0. What can you see to be true about the graphs of f and F at points
where F'(x) — 0? Is your observation borne out by Part 1 of the
Fundamental Theorem coupled with information provided by the first
derivative? Explain your answer. €. Over what intervals
(approximately) is the function F increasing and decreasing? What is
true about f over those intervals? d. Calculate the derivative f' and
plot it together with F. What can you see to be true about the graph
of F at points where f'(x) = 0? Is your observation borne out by Part
1 of the Fundamental Theorem? Explain your answer. 75. f(x) = x —
4? + 3x, [0,4] 76. f(x) = 2x^ — 17x? + 46x? — 43x + 12, [o2 77.
f(x) = sin2x cos 3, [0, 27] 78. f(x) = xcos mx, [0,27]
 In Exercises 79-82, let F(x) = J. Ai f(t) dt for the specified
a, u, and f. Usea CAS to perform the following steps and answer the
questions posed. a. Find the domain of F. b. Calculate F'(x) and
determine its zeros. For what points in its domain is F increasing?
Decreasing? c. Calculate F"(x) and determine its zero. Identify the
local extrema and the points of inflection of F. d. Using the
information from parts (a)-(c), draw a rough handsketch of y — F(x)
over its domain. Then graph F(x) on your CAS to support your
sketch. 5.5 Indefinite Integrals and the Substitution Method 289 7..4
—- 1, uà) 2 xà, fQ)-2 VI- x 80. a=0, ux) =x, fw = V1- x 8l. a=0,
ux=1—x, fd) =x - 2x- 3 82. a=0, ux) =1- x2, fix) =x - 2x -3 In
Exercises 83 and 84, assume that f is continuous and u(x) is
twicedifferentiable. u(x) 83. Calculate dx f(t) dt and check your
answer using a CAS. a u(x) 84. Calculate p f(t) dt and check your
answer using a CAS. x a 5.5 Indefinite Integrals and the Substitution
Method The Fundamental Theorem of Calculus says that a definite
integral of a continuous function can be computed directly if we can
find an antiderivative of the function. In Section 4.8 we defined the
indefinite integral of the function f with respect to x as the set of all
antiderivatives of f, symbolized by f f(x) dx. Since any two
antiderivatives of f differ by a constant, the indefinite integral /
notation means that for any antiderivative F of f, fiw dx = F(x) + C,
where C is any arbitrary constant. The connection between
antiderivatives and the definite integral stated in the Fundamental
Theorem now explains this notation: I fŒ) dx = Fb) — Fla) = [FŒ +
c]? -| / fede When finding the indefinite integral of a function f,
remember that it always includes an arbitrary constant C. We must
distinguish carefully between definite and indefinite integrals. A
definite integral de f(x) dx is a number. An indefinite integral f f(x)
dx is a function plus an arbitrary constant C. So far, we have only
been able to find antiderivatives of functions that are clearly
recognizable as derivatives. In this section we begin to develop more
general techniques for finding antiderivatives of functions we can’t
easily recognize as a derivative. Substitution: Running the Chain
Rule Backwards If u is a differentiable function of x and n is any
number different from — 1, the Chain Rule tells us that d utl csi du
dx\n+ 1 us From another point of view, this same equation says that
1/*!/(n + 1) is one of the antiderivatives of the function u"(du/dx).
Therefore, „du u ul Ježa Z5 c (1)
 290 Chapter 5: Integrals The integral in Equation (1) is
equal to the simpler integral un^! n = + u” du ntl C, which suggests
that the simpler expression du can be substituted for (du/dx) dx
when computing an integral. Leibniz, one of the founders of
calculus, had the insight that indeed this substitution could be done,
leading to the substitution method for computing integrals. As with
differentials, when computing integrals we have EXAMPLE 1 Find the
integral J (x? + Bx + 1) dx. Solution We set u = x? + x. Then du —
M d = (332 + 1) dx, so that by substitution we have n + xp (3x? +
l)dx = fe du Let u = xX? + x, du = (3x? + 1) dx. uÊ = 6 +C
Integrate with respect to u. (x? + x = E +C Substitute x? + x for u. [
| EXAMPLE 2 Find J V2x + 1 dx. Solution The integral does not fit
the formula fe du, with u = 2x + 1 and n = 1/2, because du = = dx
= 2 dx dx is not precisely dx. The constant factor 2 is missing from
the integral. However, we can introduce this factor after the integral
sign if we compensate for it by a factor of 1/2 in front of the integral
sign. So we write [ eie sif vn u du — 1 [ao 75 u'* du Let u = 2x + 1,
du = 2 dx. 1 uf? = 2 3/2 C Integrate with respect to u. my | 3/2 , =
3 (2x + 1)" +C Substitute 2x + 1 for u. gl The substitutions in
Examples 1 and 2 are instances of the following general rule.
 5.5 Indefinite Integrals and the Substitution Method 291
THEOREM 6—The Substitution Rule If u = g(x) is a differentiable
function whose range is an interval J, and f is continuous on /, then
J f(gG))g'Q) dx = J fu) du. Proof By the Chain Rule, F(g(x)) is an
antiderivative of f(g(x)) * g'(x) whenever F is an antiderivative of f: L
FeO) = F'(A g'(x) Chain Rule = fg E. F=f If we make the substitution
u = g(x), then J fgG))g' Q9 dx = J A Fega) ax = F(g(x) + C Theorem
8 in Chapter 4 = F(u) + C u = g(x) = [rw du Theorem 8 in Chapter
4 = n F'-f L| The use of the variable u in the Substitution Rule is
traditional (sometimes it is referred to as u-substitution), but any
letter can be used, such as v, t, 0 and so forth. The rule provides a
method for evaluating an integral of the form f f(e(x))g' (x) dx given
that the conditions of Theorem 6 are satisfied. The primary
challenge is deciding what expression involving x you want to
substitute for in the integrand. Our examples to follow give helpful
ideas. The Substitution Method to evaluate f f(e(x))g' (x) dx 1.
Substitute u = g(x) and du = (du/dx) dx = g'(x) dx to obtain f f(u)
du. 2. Integrate with respect to u. 3. Replace u by g(x). EXAMPLE 3
Find f sees + 0D:54dx Solution We substitute u = 5x + 1 and du = 5
dx. Then, n *tdy:5dx-— ] 9» Let u = 5x + 1, du = 5 dx. — d 2 =
tanu + C — tanu = sec?u du tan (5x + 1) + C. Substitute 5x + 1 for
u. E
 292 Chapter 5: Integrals ISTORICAL BIOGRAPHY EL
George David Birkhoff (1884-1944) EXAMPLE 4 Find f cos (70 + 3)
dð. Solution We let u = 70 + 3 so that du = 7 d0. The constant
factor 7 is missing from the d0 term in the integral. We can
compensate for it by multiplying and dividing by 7, using the same
procedure as in Example 2. Then, [os (70 + 3) d0 = a cos (70 +
3):7 d0 Place factor 1/7 in front of integral. = 5 f cos udu Let u = 70
+ 3, du = 7 dé. dl. = 7 sin u TOC Integrate. = 7 sin (70 t 3) * C.
Substitute 70 + 3 for u. There is another approach to this problem.
With u = 70 + 3 and du = 7 d0 as before, we solve for d0 to obtain
d0 = (1/7) du. Then the integral becomes Jos (70 + 3) d0 = fos u*
du Let u = 70 + 3, du = 7 d6, and d0 = (1/7) du. EDU mE sinu + C
Integrate. = 7 sin (70 + 3) + C. Substitute 70 + 3 for u. We can
verify this solution by differentiating and checking that we obtain the
original function cos (70 + 3). Ei EXAMPLE 5 Sometimes we observe
that a power of x appears in the integrand that is one less than the
power of x appearing in the argument of a function we want to
integrate. This observation immediately suggests we try a
substitution for the higher power of x. This situation occurs in the
following integration. [5 dx — J cos X? * x? dx Letu = x du = 3x*dx,
- ET B vos 3 s (1/3) du = x? dx. ad = 5 f cosu au 1 ss = 3 sinu + C
Integrate with respect to u. — l 3 3 m sin x" + C Replace u by x°. iB
It may happen that an extra factor of x appears in the integrand
when we try a substitution u = g(x). In that case, it may be possible
to solve the equation u = g(x) for x in terms of u. Replacing the
extra factor of x with that expression may then allow for an integral
we can evaluate. Here's an example of this situation.
 5.5 Indefinite Integrals and the Substitution Method 293
EXAMPLE 6 Evaluate I xV2x + 1 dx. Solution Our previous
integration in Example 2 suggests the substitution u = 2x + 1 with
du = 2 dx. Then, V2x + 1 dx = 5 Vu du. However, in this case the
integrand contains an extra factor of x multiplying the term V2x + 1.
To adjust for this, we solve the substitution equation u = 2x + 1 to
obtain x = (u — 1)/2, and find that xV2x + Idx = bu — D- Vu du.
The integration now becomes fva + 1dx= if — DVudu = ifo — Du?
du Substitute. = ij (w — ul?) du Multiply terms. = 1 (2,30 = ten) +C
Integrate. = 5 + 1p? — tox TO» +C. Replace u by 2x + 1. MI
EXAMPLE 7 Sometimes we can use trigonometric identities to
transform integrals we do not know how to evaluate into ones we
can evaluate using the Substitution Rule. (a) nz dx — Jm — ~ A dk
dii a D BERE — B _1 rus (1 — cos 2x) dx 1 ] sin 2x x sin2x "Pow ux
iN" wd (b) n dx = J us ~ 2x x = 2 + snes +C cos? x = UR. E) a =
(c) J (1 — 2 sin? x)sin 2x dx = I (cos? x — sin? x)sin 2x dx = Joos
2x sin 2x dx Cos 2x = cos? x — sin? x SEL u = 4x, du = 4 dx = —
cos 4x + C. Bi
 294 Chapter 5: Integrals Exercises Evaluating Indefinite
Integrals Evaluate the indefinite integrals in Exercises 1-16 by using
the given substitutions to reduce the integrals to standard form. 1.
[2o «a. u=2x+4 Trying Different Substitutions The success of the
substitution method depends on finding a substitution that changes
an integral we cannot evaluate directly into one that we can. Finding
the right substitution gets easier with practice and experience. If the
first substitution fails, try another substitution, possibly coupled with
other algebraic or trigonometric simplifications to the integrand.
Several of these more complicated substitutions are studied in
Chapter 8. 2z dz EXAMPLE 8 Evaluate | ————. 43/72 gF] Solution
We can use the substitution method of integration as an exploratory
tool: Substitute for the most troublesome part of the integrand and
see how things work out. For the integral here, we might try u = z?
+ 1 or we might even press our luck and take u to be the entire
cube root. Here is what happens in each case, and both
substitutions are successful. Method 1: Substitute u = z? + 1. 2zdz _
du Letu = 2+ 1, W2 +] "LE du = 2z dz. = pew du In the form fu du
=~ +C Integrate. = TG +15 +C Replace u by z? + 1. Method 2:
Substitute u = Wz? + 1 instead. 2zdz _ | Bu du Letu = V2 + 1, xz
+1 u P= 2 + 1,3 du = 22dz. =3:5 +C Integrate. E ae + IEC Replace
u by (z? + 1)!5. H 2. [ricas u= 7x — 1 3. pow + 5)4dx, u=x +5
 4. "m ps u-x*--41 - 2)(3x2 + 4x)¢ dx, u = 3x? + 4x FE 15
m dx, u=1+ Vx de e Mem, Uo = J A D 9, I sec 2t tan 2t dt, u = 2t
(uod t 10. f cos ) sin 5 df, u-i cos 5 9r? dr 11. usl- r Vi- Pr 12. n +
4y? + 10? + 2y)dy, u= yf + 4y +1 13. J sie —pDdx u =x -— 1 1 1 1
J 5) dx, u-—-x 15. Joe 20 cot 20 d0 14. A a. Using u — cot 20 b.
Using u — csc 20 16. J = V5x + 8 a. Using u = 5x + 8 b. Using u =
V5x + 8 Evaluate the integrals in Exercises 17—50. 1 17. [ V3=2sas
18. J s V5s + 4 19. J 0N/1 — 6? do 20. J 3y V7 — 3y? dy 1 21. |
—— — dx 22. | Vsinx cos? x dx / Vx(1 + Vx) / 23. fse (3x + 2) dx
24. n sec? x dx ia e 7X cec? * 25. n 3 COS 3 dx 26. nz 7 Sec 5d* 27
a( 2 Ya 28 (7-2) a . 18 i 10 29. nz sin (xY? + 1) dx V-T v= T 30. f 2
Jes( 2 IL in Qt + 1 z z 41. J sin ( ) P 3. {2 ztan d cos? (2t F 1) V sec
Z I sin 3x dx, u = 3x 8. xsin (2x?) dx, u = 2x? 5.5 Indefinite
Integrals and the Substitution Method 295 33. n (+- ja 34. fizo (Vi
+3) dt bo d d cos V/8 35. la sin — cos —dé 36. d e? 0 0 Ve sin? V8
37. X d 38. J tli 1+x x ] 1 1 [2-1 39. I2 2 = y dx 40. 13 E dx 3 4 41.
J i 42. I | — dx x x=] 43. Jo — 1)! dx 44. Ez — x dx 45. / (x-F IY =
xp dx 46. J (x + 5)x — 5)! dx 47. E + 1ldx 48. ES + ldx x x 49. — d
50. | — — — d iz — 4p jos -p7 If you do not know what substitution
to make, try reducing the integral step by step, using a trial
substitution to simplify the integral a bit and then another to simplify
it some more. You will see what we mean if you try the sequences of
substitutions in Exercises 51 and 52. 2 2 51. ps X Sec" X Jy (2 +
tan? x? a. u = tan x, followed by v = iP, then by w = 2 + v b. u =
tan?x, followed by v = 2 + u C. u = 2 + tan?x 52. n + sin?(x — 1)
sin (x — 1) cos (x — 1) dx a. u = x — 1, followed by v = sin u, then
by w = 1 + v? b. u = sin (x — 1), followed by v = 1 + ie C u = 1 +
sin?(x — 1) Evaluate the integrals in Exercises 53 and 54. Qr —
1)cos V32r — 1? + 6 53. dr V3(2r —1» + 6 54. sin sin V0 dà V8 cos?
VO Initial Value Problems Solve the initial value problems in
Exercises 55—60. 55. e - 12t (377 — 1, s(1 = 3 dy 3 i — = ie /3 =
56. E 4x (x + 8) ^, y(0)-0 ds _...5 KS (0) = 57. um 8 sin ( + z), s(0)
=8
 296 Chapter 5: Integrals dr NE; = 61. The velocity of a
particle moving back and forth on a line is 58. do 3cos 4-8 > r0) = y
v = ds/dt = 6 sin 2t m/sec for all t. If s = 0 when t = 0, find the
value of s when t = 7/2 sec. 2 59. as = —4 sin (z a z), s'(0) = 100,
s(0) =0 62. The acceleration of a particle moving back and forth on
a line is dt a = d’s/dt? = s? cos mt m/sec” for all t. If s = 0 and v=
ay 8 m/sec when t = 0, find s when t = 1 sec. 60. au 4 sec? 2x tan
2x, y'(0 —4, y(0 —-1 x D; 6 Definite Integral Substitutions and the
Area Between Curves There are two methods for evaluating a
definite integral by substitution. One method is to find an
antiderivative using substitution and then to evaluate the definite
integral by applying the Evaluation Theorem. The other method
extends the process of substitution directly to definite integrals by
changing the limits of integration. We apply the new formula
introduced here to the problem of computing the area between two
curves. The Substitution Formula The following formula shows how
the limits of integration change when the variable of integration is
changed by substitution. THEOREM 7—Substitution in Definite
Integrals If g' is continuous on the interval [ a, b] and f is continuous
on the range of g(x) = u, then b g(b) J Fe) * g'G) dx = Di fu) du. a
gi (a) Proof Let F denote any antiderivative of f. Then, d x=b qx F
(800 = F'(g(x))g' (x) b J f(gG)) * g(x) dx = Fig) | 5 = fgg x) x=a =
F(g(b)) — F(g(a)) u=g(b) = Foo | u=g(a) da Fund; tal undamenta i
a fu) du. Theorem, Part 2 ga To use the formula, make the same u-
substitution u = g(x) and du = g'(x) dx you would use to evaluate
the corresponding indefinite integral. Then integrate the transformed
integral with respect to u from the value g(a) (the value of u at x =
a) to the value g(b) (the value of u at x = b). 1 EXAMPLE 1 Evaluate
J 3x?N x? + 1 dx. 2j
 5.6 Definite Integral Substitutions and the Area Between
Curves 297 Solution We have two choices. Method 1: Transform the
integral and evaluate the transformed integral with the transformed
limits given in Theorem 7. Letu = x? + 1, du = 3x? dx. 1 J 3x2 V/ x3
+ ldx When x lu ( p FJ 0. =f Whenx-lu-(154122. 2 I d Evaluate the
new definite integral. = [28 08/2] = Aa] = 43 Method 2: Transform
the integral as an indefinite integral, integrate, change back to x,
and use the original x-limits. ES + ldx= ] «^ Let w= x^ 1,du = 3x?
dx. 2 = 3 w2 + C Integrate with respect to u. = Zo + 19/7 +C
Replace u by x? + 1. 1 1 2 Use the integral just found, with 2A a3 =
vd 3/2 [» x + ldx = 3 +1) l limits of integration for x. = ZKO + De-
C1 + p] = [ 23/2 032] -$[2v2] s 8H WI Which method is better—
evaluating the transformed definite integral with transformed limits
using Theorem 7, or transforming the integral, integrating, and
transforming back to use the original limits of integration? In
Example 1, the first method seems easier, but that is not always the
case. Generally, it is best to know both methods and to use
whichever one seems better at the time. EXAMPLE 2 We use the
method of transforming the limits of integration. 1/2 0 Let u = cot 6,
du = —csc? 0 d0, (a) J cot 0 csc? 0 dð = f us (—du) —du = csc? 0
d. m/A 1 When 0 = c /4,u = cot(T/4) = 1. When 0 = 7/2,u =
cot(7/2) = 0. Nl
 298 Chapter 5: Integrals >x >X (b) FIGURE 5.23 (a) For f
an even function, the integral from —a to a is twice the integral from
0 to a. (b) For f an odd function, the integral from —a to a equals 0.
m /A mÍ/A , (b) / tan x dx — I aa dx =r /4 =r /4 : Zero width
interval Definite Integrals of Symmetric Functions V2/2 Let u = cos
x, du = —sin x dx. u When x = —7/4, u = V2/2. When x = 1/4, u =
V2/2. The Substitution Formula in Theorem 7 simplifies the
calculation of definite integrals of even and odd functions (Section
1.1) over a symmetric interval [—a, a] (Figure 5.23). (a) If f is even,
then THEOREM 8 Let f be continuous on the symmetric interval | —
a, a]. J fœ) dx = Ji f(x) dx. —a 0 (b) If f is odd, then f f(x)dx = 0.
Proof of Part (a) a 0 a i f@dx = J fo) dx + J f(x) dx —a —a 0 -| feas.
fat 0 0 -f fcocáo + f rods 0 0 ] rom f 16 0 0 f ioa f foa 0 0 Ji fœ) dx 0
Additivity Rule for Definite Integrals Order of Integration Rule Let u
= —x, du = —dx. When x = 0, u = 0. When x = —a,u = a. f is even,
so fcu) = f(u). The proof of part (b) is entirely similar and you are
asked to give it in Exercise 114. a The assertions of Theorem 8
remain true when f is an integrable function (rather than having the
stronger property of being continuous). 2 EXAMPLE 3 Evaluate | (x^
— 4x? + 6) dx. 2
 >< Upper curve y —fQ) >x Lower curve y = g(x) FIGURE
5.24 The region between the curves y = f(x) and y = g(x) and the
lines x = a and x = b. y ^ y-fe) FIGURE 5.25 We approximate the
region with rectangles perpendicular to the x-axis. y ^ (ces f(CK)) T
KK) — alex) i sp (p (ep) FIGURE 5.26 The area AA, of the kth
rectangle is the product of its height, f(cqd — g(c,), and its width,
Ax. 5.6 Definite Integral Substitutions and the Area Between Curves
299 Solution Since f(x) = xt — 4x? + 6 satisfies f(—x) = f(x), it is
even on the symmetric interval | —2, 2], so 2 2 J geine af G^ — 4x?
6)dx -2 0 5 2 = 2E — T + er) 5 3 E -32322 _ 232 = 2(3 2 + 12) 15"
L| Areas Between Curves Suppose we want to find the area of a
region that is bounded above by the curve y — f(x), below by the
curve y = g(x), and on the left and right by the lines x = a and x = b
(Figure 5.24). The region might accidentally have a shape whose
area we could find with geometry, but if f and g are arbitrary
continuous functions, we usually have to find the area with an
integral. To see what the integral should be, we first approximate
the region with n vertical rectangles based on a partition P =
{x9,x,,...,%,} of [a,b] (Figure 5.25). The area of the Ath rectangle
(Figure 5.26) is AA, = height X width = [f(c) — elch] Ax. We then
approximate the area of the region by adding the areas of the n
rectangles: A > AA, = ps [fc = gc) | AX. Riemann sum k=1 1 k= As
||P|| — 0, the sums on the right approach the limit f [ f(x) — g(x) ]
dx because f and g are continuous. We take the area of the region
to be the value of this integral. That is, n b S [Fle — c0] Ax, = J [
f(x) — 269 ] dx. k=1 A= lim P90 DEFINITION If f and g are
continuous with f(x) = g(x) throughout [a,b], then the area of the
region between the curves y = f(x) and y = g(x) from a to b is the
integral of (f — g) from a to b: b a= [ tfe) - soda When applying this
definition it is helpful to graph the curves. The graph reveals which
curve is the upper curve f and which is the lower curve g. It also
helps you find the limits of integration if they are not given. You may
need to find where the curves intersect to determine the limits of
integration, and this may involve solving the equation f(x) = g(x) for
values of x. Then you can integrate the function f — g for the area
between the intersections. EXAMPLE 4 Find the area of the region
enclosed by the parabola y = 2 — x? and the line y = —x.
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