2025 INSC 834

REPORTABLE

IN THE SUPREME COURT OF INDIA

CIVIL APPELLATE JURISDICTION

CIVIL APPEAL NO(S)._______________ OF 2025

[@ SPECIAL LEAVE PETITION (CIVIL) NO(S). 23141 OF 2024]

MANDEEP SINGH & ORS. …APPELLANTS

Versus
STATE OF PUNJAB AND ORS. …RESPONDENTS

WITH

CIVIL APPEAL NO(S)._______________ OF 2025

[@ SPECIAL LEAVE PETITION (CIVIL) NO(S). 23324 OF 2024]

AND
CIVIL APPEAL NO(S)._______________ OF 2025
[@ SPECIAL LEAVE PETITION (CIVIL) NO(S). 907 OF 2025]

JUDGMENT

SUDHANSHU DHULIA, J.

1. Leave granted.

2. The appellants before this Court have challenged the judgment

Signature Not Verified

Digitally signed by
dated 23.09.2024, of the Division Bench of Punjab and
Nirmala Negi
Date: 2025.07.15
15:52:29 IST

Haryana High Court which has reversed the findings of the

Reason:

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 learned Single Judge and has thereby upheld the selections

made by the State of Punjab for the posts of Assistant

Professors and Librarians in Government Degree colleges of

Punjab.

3. The brief facts of the case are as follows:

a. In January 2021, the State of Punjab had sent separate

requisitions to the Punjab Public Service Commission

(hereinafter referred to as ‘Commission’), for recruitment

of 931 Assistant Professors (dated 15.01.2021) and 50

Librarians (dated 29.01.2021), in Government Degree

Colleges in the State. Consequent to this and based on

correspondences exchanged, the Commission engaged 24

subject experts to prepare the syllabus for the competitive

examinations and honorarium was paid to them.

b. Later, an additional 160 posts of Assistant Professors and

17 posts for Librarians were created and sanctioned for

newly established colleges, and on 15.09.2021, the State’s

Department of Higher Education (hereinafter referred to

as ‘the Department’) sought Commission’s consent to fill

these posts through the Departmental Selection

Committee rather than the Commission.

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c. The Commission replied by letter dated 16.09.2021,

expressing their inability to respond on the ground of the

Chairman having retired and the new appointment having

not taken place. The Government then by a memorandum

dated 17.09.2021 approved the recruitment of 160 and 17

posts of Assistant Professors and Librarians respectively,

through Departmental Selection Committees which

though had to follow the University Grants Commission

(hereinafter ‘UGC’) guidelines or regulations.

d. A change in Government happened on 20.09.2021 after

which on 09.10.2021, the selection process was reviewed

in a meeting chaired by the Secretary, Department of

Higher Education. In this meeting, the entire process of

recruitment was changed and it was decided that selection

would now be made only on the basis of a Written Test,

which will be conducted by two separate selection

committees of two State Universities: (a) Punjab

University, Patiala, and (b) the Guru Nanak Dev

University, Amritsar. Further, it was decided that all the

1091 posts (931 plus 160 posts) of Assistant Professors

and 67 posts (50 plus 17 posts) of Librarians; and not just

3
 the posts recently created, are to be filled through these

departmental selection committees. This decision was

placed for approval before the Chief Minister on

12.10.2021, with the observation that it shall

subsequently be placed for approval before the Council of

Ministers; latter approval was never obtained.

e. On 18.10.2021, Government issued a memorandum

conveying to Director Public Instructions (Colleges)

(hereinafter ‘DPI’) the decision for recruitment of 1091

Assistant Professors and 67 Librarians on the basis of two

departmental selection committees of two State

Universities. On 19.10.2021, advertisements for the above

posts were issued.

f. In a little over a month, the exam was conducted and the

result was announced on 28.11.2021. Meanwhile, in the

first week of November, Writ Petitions were filed before the

High Court, challenging the memorandum dated

18.10.2021 and advertisements dated 19.10.2021. On

26.11.2021 in CWP No. 22446 of 2021, before the results

were published, while issuing notice, it was clarified that

4
 the selection shall be subject to the result of the writ

petition.

g. Vide order dated 08.08.2022, the learned Single Judge

allowed the Writ Petitions and quashed the entire

recruitment process for being in violation of law inasmuch

as the Commission not having been excluded as per

procedure prescribed and State having not followed the

UGC guidelines and adopting an arbitrary process for the

recruitment.

h. Against the order of the learned Single Judge, the State of

Punjab as well as the candidates who were

selected/appointed filed intra-court appeals. Vide the

impugned order dated 23.09.2024, the Division Bench of

the High Court allowed these intra-court appeals and

upheld the recruitment by quashing the order passed by

the learned Single Judge. Assailing the same, appellants

are before us.

4. Before the learned Single Judge, the Division Bench as well as

before this Court, the appellants’ have been consistent in their

submission that the recruitment process was vitiated on more

than one count. Most importantly the recruitment was made

5
 in violation of UGC Regulations of 2010 (hereinafter ‘2010

UGC Regulations’) which were adopted by the State of Punjab

on 30.07.2013, and which mandated an entirely different

criterion and procedure for recruitment. Further the selection

to these posts ought to have been made through the

Commission, as admittedly these were the posts within the

purview of Commission [under Article 320 of the Constitution

of India read with Punjab Public Service Commission

(Limitation of Functions) Regulations, 1955 (hereinafter ‘the

1955 Regulations’)]. In any case, the entire process is

arbitrary and was followed not in the interest of the State or

for the cause of higher education but for narrow political gains.

5. The State and the private respondents would though argue

that Article 320(3) is directory and not mandatory in nature.

They would submit that the State government is empowered

to decide its own method and procedure of recruitment for the

posts of Assistant Professors and Librarians in Degree colleges

under the State government; and it is not bound to make these

selections through the Commission.

6. We have heard Senior Advocates Mr. Raju Ramchandran, Mr.

Nidhesh Gupta, Mr. Preetesh Kapur and Mrs. Rekha Palli

6
 appearing for the appellants, and Senior Advocates Mr. Kapil

Sibal, Mr. Rakesh Dwivedi and Mr. P.S. Patwalia for the private

respondents. We have also heard Mr. Shadan Farasat,

Additional Advocate-General appearing on behalf of the State

of Punjab.

7. It is first necessary to narrate the sequence of events and their

context as this would give us a better perspective. A large

number of posts of Assistant Professor and Librarians in

Degree Colleges remained unfilled for the last 20 years or so

in Punjab. The last selection to these posts was only made in

the year 2002, and this too got into trouble due to allegations

of corruption which led to a protracted litigation. Later,

another recruitment was attempted in the year 2008 for 265

posts which was again stuck in litigation for many years. The

issue of large unfilled vacancies in Punjab had come earlier

before this Court by the guest/part-time faculties where a

Three-Judge Bench of this Court vide its order dated

02.12.2014 had directed the Commission to fill the sanctioned

vacant posts as soon as possible. The relevant portion of that

order reads as under:

7
 “4. We do not intend to keep these Special
Leave Petitions on board. Accordingly, we
dispose of the Special Leave Petitions with an
observation that the Punjab Public Service
Commission, Patiala will take all effective
steps to fill up all the sanctioned posts of the
lecturers in the State of Punjab as
expeditiously as possible, at any rate, within
12 months’ time from today.”

The argument of the State is that the main reason for these

vacancies remaining unfilled for all these years was that these

posts were within the purview of the Commission which had

failed to fill these posts and hence the decision taken by the

State to remove these posts from the purview of the

Commission and to expedite the process of selection was in

public interest.

8. The Commission has a duty to make selections for different

services in response to the requisition of the State government.

In the present case, in January 2021, the State government

had sent two requisitions for the recruitment of 931 Assistant

Professors and 50 Librarians respectively, yet no decision had

been taken by the Commission.

9. Article 320(3) of the Constitution provides that the

Commission shall be consulted in the recruitment of different

8
services. The relevant portion of Article 320 of the Constitution

reads as follows:

“Article 320: Functions of Public Service

Commissions-
(1)...
(2)...
(3) The Union Public Service Commission or the
State Public Service Commission, as the case
may be, shall be consulted—
(a) on all matters relating to methods of
recruitment to civil services and for civil
posts;
(b) on the principles to be followed in
making appointments to civil services
and posts and in making promotions and
transfers from one service to another and
on the suitability of candidates for such
appointments, promotions or transfers;
(c) on all disciplinary matters affecting a
person serving under the Government of
India or the Government of a State in a
civil capacity, including memorials or
petitions relating to such matters;
(d) on any claim by or in respect of a
person who is serving or has served
under the Government of India or the
Government of a State or under the
Crown in India or under the Government
of an Indian State, in a civil capacity, that
any costs incurred by him in defending
legal proceedings instituted against him
in respect of acts done or purporting to be
done in the execution of his duty should
be paid out of the Consolidated Fund of

9
 India, or, as the case may be, out of the
Consolidated Fund of the State;
(e) on any claim for the award of a
pension in respect of injuries sustained
by a person while serving under the
Government of India or the Government of
a State or under the Crown in India or
under the Government of an Indian State,
in a civil capacity, and any question as to
the amount of any such award, and it
shall be the duty of a Public Service
Commission to advise on any matter so
referred to them and on any other matter
which the President, or, as the case may
be, the Governor of the State, may refer to
them:

Provided that the President as respects the all-

India services and also as respects other
services and posts in connection with the
affairs of the Union, and the Governor, as
respects other services and posts in connection
with the affairs of a State, may make
regulations specifying the matters in which
either generally, or in any particular class of
case or in any particular circumstances, it shall
not be necessary for a Public Service
Commission to be consulted.”

Public Service Commission at the Union and at the State levels

are constitutional bodies. There is a purpose for which these

institutions have been created, which we shall discuss in a

while. All the same, it is not necessary that all posts in the

10
 States or Union must be filled through Commission. It is not

mandatory. But there is a method prescribed under the law

to take out these posts from the purview of the Commission.

This has been violated in the present case; is the argument.

But first, for the role of the Commission.

10. Impartiality, fairness and recognition of merit while selecting

Public Servants are absolutely necessary in modern

democracies. The basic purpose of a Union Public Service

Commission or State Public Service Commission(s) for that

matter, is to remove impartiality and political influence while

making selection on Public Posts. It is necessary to have an

impartial Public Service Commission in a Democracy, or

everything will be reduced to a mere scramble for jobs1. The

concept is not new. It goes back to the Government of India

Act, 1919, and even earlier to the pre 1857 era. The East India

Company, which had under its administration a vast area, felt

the need to replace the system based on recommendations and

nominations to a merit-based system, which was also the

recommendation of the Macaulay Committee Report2. A Civil

1 Dr. Naresh Chandra Roy, The Working of the Public Service Commission in Bengal, Indian
Political Science Conference, Third Session, Mysore, Dec 1940, p.192.
2 See Macaulay Report on the Indian Civil Service 1854.

11
 Service Commission was then established in 1854 to conduct

competitive examinations which were held for the first time in

the year 1855.

11. It was the Government of India Act, 1919 that formally

introduced the concept of Public Service Commissions in

India. Section 96C3 provided for the establishment of a Central

Public Service Commission in India. But the Public Service

Commission was not set up immediately till its need was

emphasized by the Lee Commission in its report of 1924:

“Wherever democratic institutions exist,

experience has shown that to secure an
efficient Civil Service it is essential to protect it
so far as possible from political or personal
influences and to give it that position of
stability and security which is vital to its
successful working as the impartial and
efficient instrument by which Governments, of
whatever political complexion, may give effect
to their policies. In countries where this
principle has been neglected, and where the
“spoils system” has taken place, an inefficient
and disorganized Civil Service has been the

3 Section 96C: Public Service Commission- (1) There shall be established in India a public
service commission, consisting of not more than five members, of whom one shall be
chairman, appointed by the Secretary of State in Council. Each member shall be removed
before the expiry of his term of office, except by order of the Secretary of State in Council. The
qualifications for the appointment, and the pay and pension (if any) attaching to the office of
chairman and member, shall be prescribed by rules made by the Secretary of State in Council.
(2) The public service commission shall discharge, in regard to recruitment and control of
the public services in India, such functions as may be assigned thereto by rules made by the
Secretary of State in Council

12
 inevitable result and corruption has been
rampant. In America a Civil Service
Commission has been constituted to control
recruitment of the Services, but, for the
purposes of India it is from the Dominions of
the British Empire that more relevant and
useful lessons can perhaps be drawn. Canada,
Australia and South Africa now possess Public
or Civil Services Acts regulating the position
and control of the Public Services, and a
common feature of them all is the constitution
of a Public Service Commission, to which the
duty of administering the Acts is entrusted. It
was this need which framers of the
Government of India Act had in mind when
they made provision in Section 96C for the
establishment of a Public Service Commission
to discharge “in regard to recruitment and
control of the Public Services in India such
functions as may be assigned thereto by rules
made by the Secretary of State in Council”.
Since the passing of the Act, a prolonged
correspondence, extending over nearly four
years, has been passed between the Secretary
of State, the Government of India, and Local
Governments, regarding the function and
machinery of the body to be set up. No
decisions have, however, been arrived at, and
the subject has been referred to this
Commission for consideration”4

12. It was based on the recommendation of the Lee Commission

that the Commission was formed as contemplated under the

4Report of the Royal Commission on Superior Civil Services in India, dated 27th March,
1924 at pp.13-14 and 16.

13
 Government of India Act, 1919. The Central Public Service

Commission was thus established in the year 1926, and its

functions were governed by the Public Service Commission

(Function) Rules, 1926. Till this stage, the role of a similar

Commission at Provincial level was not much in discussions.

13. It was only with the Simon Commission Report that we have

an official recommendation for the first time for the setting up

of Provincial Public Service Commissions. It is well-known

that the formation of the Simon Commission was resented by

the leaders of the Indian freedom struggle, primarily because

it had no Indian representative, and because senior officials of

the British Raj had questioned the very ability of Indians to

draft a Constitution. In response, an all-party committee

under the chairmanship of Congress stalwart Motilal Nehru

was formed, which was tasked with drafting a Constitution for

India. The report submitted by this committee (which came to

be known as the Nehru Report) also favoured the creation of a

Permanent Public Service Commission to deal with issues

such as the recruitment, appointment, emoluments etc. of civil

servants in India.

14
14. Finally, a Federal Public Service Commission and Public

Service Commissions for Provinces were established under

Section 2645 of the Government of India Act, 1935 and their

functions were given in Section 266, which was pari materia to

Article 320 of the Constitution.

15. While the Constituent Assembly was busy in drafting the

Constitution for free India, the Public Service Commission at

the Centre and in some of the States were already functioning.

16. During discussion on Public Service Commissions in the

Constituent Assembly Debates, Dr. P.S Deshmukh highlighted

the purpose and importance of the Public Service

Commissions in these words:

“...these Commissions are said to be a

necessity of a modern State. These
Commissions are primarily meant to keep
appointments away from day to day politics,
party preferences and influences and the

5 264.Public Service Commission: (1) Subject to the provisions of this Section, there shall
be a Public Service Commission for the Federation and a Public Service Commission for
each Province.
(2) Two or more Provinces may agree-
(a) that there shall be one Public Service Commission for that group of Provinces; or
(b) that the Public Service Commission for one of the Provinces shall serve the needs
of all the Provinces,
and any such agreement may contain such incidental and consequential provisions as may
appear necessary or desirable for giving effect to the purposes of the agreement and shall,
in the case of an agreement that there shall be one Commission for a group of Provinces,
specify by what Governor or Governors the functions which are under this Part of this Act
to be discharged by the Governor of a Province are to be discharged.
(3) The Public Service Commission for the Federation, if requested so to do by the Governor
of a Province, may, with the approval of the Governor-General, agree to serve all or any of
the needs of the Province…

15
 attempt is made, by having recourse to these
Commissions, that the appointments shall be
as far as possible on merit and there shall be
no interference in their choice or in their
selection from day to day by the executive
authorities of the State.”

17. Our entire purpose here of giving this background to the

formation of Public Service Commission in India both at the

Union as well as State level, was to emphasize the purpose for

its establishment, which was to have an impartial and

autonomous body which should select the best possible

persons for Government posts, and to have fairness and

transparency in the procedure. The present dispute which is

before this Court reflects this concern.

18. Article 320(3)(a) of the Constitution, inter alia, states that the

State Public Service Commission “shall be consulted on all

matters relating to methods of recruitment to civil services and

for civil posts”. The provision appears to be mandatory as the

words “shall be consulted” suggest. All the same, the learned

counsel for the respondents would rely on a 1957 Constitution

Bench decision of this Court in State of U.P v. Manbodhan

Lal Srivastava 1957 SCC OnLine SC 4 which had laid down

that the provision is not mandatory but merely directory.

16
19. The above decision is binding on us. Yet, we must examine the

context in which the above judgment was rendered. The

context is important. Although the findings in the judgment

are generally worded, this Court in Manbodhan Lal

Srivastava was not dealing with Article 320(3)(a), as is the

case before us, but was concerned with Article 320(3)(c) i.e. a

disciplinary matter in an individual case. In Manbodhan Lal

Srivastava, a government servant who was posted as an

officer-on-special-duty in the Education Department from

1948 to 1951 was accused of giving favours to his friends and

relatives, while working in a Book Selection Committee, as he

had approved books written by his 14 year old nephew and

other publishers from whom he had taken certain money on

interest. In August 1952, he was suspended from service and

a departmental enquiry was conducted against him. On the

recommendations of the departmental enquiry report, the

Government issued a show cause notice under Article 311(2)

of the Constitution and finally, after hearing the concerned

employee, the Government issued a notification reducing his

rank and compulsorily retiring him. These were the facts of the

case before this Court.

17
20. Article 320(3) speaks of a variety of matters where the

Commission is to be consulted- (a) Recruitment in Service and

(c) disciplinary matters, being two such instances. Whereas

Article 320(3)(c) is generally concerned with individual matters

relating to disciplinary proceedings, Article 320(3)(a) deals

with policy issues where an entire recruitment process is at

stake. Manbodhan Lal Srivastava, was a case dealing with

Article 320(3)(c), and not with Article 320(3)(a), which is before

us.

21. Another question in Manbodhan Lal Srivastava, was

whether Article 311 of the Constitution of India is subject to

Article 320(3)(c). Para 4 of the Judgment reads like this:

“Hence, the main question in controversy in

Appeal No. 27 of 1955, is whether the High
Court was right in taking the view that Article
311 was subject to the provisions of Article
320(3)(c) of the Constitution, which were
mandatory, and as such, non-compliance with
those provisions in the instant case, was fatal
to the proceedings ending with the order
passed by the Government on September 12,
1953.”

22. The judgment also restricts itself to the facts relating to Article

320(3)(c). This is how it concludes :

18
 “13. In view of these considerations, it must be
held that the provisions of Article 320(3)(c) are
not mandatory and that non-compliance with
those provisions, does not afford a cause of
action to the respondent in a court of law. It is
not for this Court further to consider what other
remedy, if any, the respondent has. Appeal No.
27 is, therefore, allowed and Appeal No. 28
dismissed. In view of the fact that the appellant
did not strictly comply with the terms of Article
320(3)(c) of the Constitution, we direct that
each party bear its own costs throughout.”

23. Thus, it was in the background of the above facts that it was

held by this Court that consultation with the Commission to

be directory and not mandatory. Manbodhan Lal Srivastava

also emphasized the purpose of the proviso to Article 320(3) of

the Constitution which states that the Governor of a State is

empowered to make regulations specifying the matters in

which it is not necessary for the State to consult the Public

Service Commission. This is what was said by this Court:

“7…Perhaps, because of the use of the word

“shall” in several parts of Article 320, the High
Court was led to assume that the provisions of
Article 320(3)(c) were mandatory, but in our
opinion, there are several cogent reasons for
holding to the contrary. In the first place, the
proviso to Article 320, itself, contemplates that
the President or the Governor, as the case may
be, “may make regulations specifying the

19
matters in which either generally, or in any
particular class of case or in particular
circumstances, it shall not be necessary for a
Public Service Commission to be consulted”. The
words quoted above give a clear indication of
the intention of the Constitution makers that
they did envisage certain cases or classes of
cases in which the Commission need not be
consulted. If the provisions of Article 320 were
of a mandatory character, the Constitution
would not have left it to the discretion of the
Head of the Executive Government to undo those
provisions by making regulations to the
contrary. If it had been intended by the makers
of the Constitution that consultation with the
Commission should be mandatory, the proviso
would not have been there, or, at any rate, in
the terms in which it stands. That does not
amount to saying that it is open to the Executive
Government, completely to ignore the existence
of the Commission or to pick and choose cases
in which it may or may not be consulted. Once,
relevant regulations have been made, they are
meant to be followed in letter and in spirit and
it goes without saying that consultation with the
Commission on all disciplinary matters affecting
a public servant has been specifically provided
for, in order, first, to give an assurance to the
Services that a wholly independent body not
directly concerned with the making of orders
adversely affecting public servants, has
considered the action proposed to be taken
against a particular public servant, with an
open mind; and secondly, to afford the
Government unbiased advice and opinion on
matters vitally affecting the morale of public
services. It is, therefore, incumbent upon the
20
 Executive Government, when it proposes to take
any disciplinary action against a public servant,
to consult the Commission as to whether the
action proposed to be taken was justified and
was not in excess of the requirements of the
situation.”
(Emphasis Provided)
Thus, even if, for arguments sake, consultation with

Commission is held to be directory then also there is no doubt

that once Regulations are framed these are to be followed, “in

letter and spirit”.

24. In other words, this Court in Manbodhan Lal Srivastava,

had recognised the importance of Regulations framed under

the proviso to Article 320(3) of the Constitution and had

cautioned against the casual bypassing of the Regulations. In

the case at hand, Regulations as contemplated under the

Proviso were already in existence in Punjab known as Punjab

Public Service Commission (Limitation of Functions)

Regulations, 1955. For our purposes, it is relevant to note that

with these Regulations the State had taken out certain posts

outside the purview of the Commission. Admittedly, the posts

of Assistant Professors and Librarians in Degree Colleges were

not amongst them. In other words, these posts were within

the purview of the Commission. Thus, selection of these posts

21
 was within the purview of the State Commission, and it was

mandatory that it ought to be consulted.

25. The respondents have tried to meet this deficiency by stating

that the State had amended the 1955 Regulations in March

2022 (by retrospective effect), by mentioning these posts in the

1955 Regulations and these posts were then taken out from

the purview of Commission. All the same, we are unable to

accept this argument inasmuch as the amendment was made

after concluding the entire recruitment process and giving

appointment letters to the selected candidates. It was hence a

post facto exercise. The Government had already made its

selections on the posts which could only have been done by

the Commission under Article 320 of the Constitution of India.

26. This apart, the 1955 Regulations prescribed a procedure

under which posts within the purview of the Commission

could be withdrawn. Part III-B and Part III-C of the

‘Regulations and Instructions Governing the Work of the Punjab

Public Service Commission’ provide a procedure for the

exclusion of posts/services from the purview of the

Commission. Regulation 20 reads as under:

22
“20. For exclusion of posts/services and other
matters from the purview of the Punjab Public
Service Commission, the following procedure is
to be followed:
(i) Individual proposals for taking out posts
from the purview of the Commission would be
processed by the Administrative Departments
concerned. After the Department had taken a
tentative decision to take out certain posts from
the purview of the Commission, the
Department would obtain the views/comments
of the Public Service Commission by making a
self-contained reference to the Commission.
(ii) On receipt of the comments/views of the
Commission, the matter would further be
examined by the Department concerned
keeping in view the comments/views so
received and the advice of the Department of
Personnel and Administrative Reforms. If the
Department comes to a definite conclusion that
the posts in question must be taken out of the
purview of the Commission, the Department
would take the matter to the Council of
Ministers incorporating the advice of the
Department of Personnel and Administrative
Reforms in the Memorandum to be placed
before the Council of Ministers.
(iii) After the proposal of the Administrative
Department is approved by the Council of
Ministers, necessary action to amend the
Punjab Public Service Commission (Limitation
of Functions) Regulations, 1955 would be
taken by the Department of Personnel and
Administrative Reforms.”

23
27. Further, Part III-C of the Regulations provides that in cases

where a difference of opinion between a Department of

Government and Public Service Commission arises then what

is to be done. Regulation 21 reads as under:

“21. In order to secure uniformity of practice in

cases of difference of opinion between a
Department of Government and the
Commission and to ensure that the
Commission is duly consulted in all cases in
which such consultation is necessary, all
cases, in which there is difference of opinion
between a Department and the Commission,
should be referred to the Chief Minister.
22. The procedure for submitting cases to the
Chief Minister should be that whenever as
department finds itself unable to arrive at an
agreement with the Commission, the cases
should be sent over to the Chief Secretary on
an early stage, if possible before any decisive
action is taken…”

28. It is admitted that in the present case the required procedure

was not followed. In relation to 160 posts of Assistant

Professor and 17 posts of Librarians, the Department had

sent a reference to take the posts out of the purview of the

Commission, but the Commission could not take any

decision, in the absence of its Chairperson; a post which

24
 remained unfilled for long years. Meanwhile the concerned

department proceeded without the views of the Commission.

931 posts of Assistant Professors and 50 posts of Librarians;

admittedly with the Commission, pending recruitment as

requisitioned by the State itself, and not taken out of the

purview of the Commission, were also added and the

advertisement inviting applications for the posts was issued

on 19.10.2021. On the same day, the Department wrote to

Commission to return its requisition sent to Commission for

these posts. The Commission, however, on 16.11.2021 wrote

to the Department disagreeing with the idea of taking the

posts out of the purview of the Commission since the action

as required at the end of the Government was not followed.

Without any further action, the examinations were

conducted between 20th to 22nd November, 2022.

29. It was after the selection and appointments were made that

retrospectively on 26.03.2022 an amendment was made

taking out these posts out of the purview of the Commission.

The learned Single Judge has rightly observed that the

retrospective amendment to the 1955 Regulations, which

was made much after the conclusion of the recruitment

25
 process, was nothing but a response to the Writ Petitions

which had been filed by this time by the appellants. The

learned Single Judge also notes that in the last 30 years, five

advertisements had been issued for filling of posts of

Assistant Professors/Lecturers6 and these selections were to

be conducted by the Commission. The State never took the

recruitment for these posts in its hands.

30. What was the need to bypass the Commission in the present

case? The learned counsel who appear for the appellants

would argue that a new Government was formed in Punjab in

September, 2021 which had to face elections in February,

2022 and the burning hurry to make selections and

appointments to more than 1000 such posts, on the eve of

State elections was an act of political pragmatism, and nothing

more.

31. In case the State government was dissatisfied with the manner

in which the Commission was conducting the recruitment (an

argument which appears to have found favour with the

Division Bench), then it ought to have followed the due

procedure and withdrawn the posts from the purview of the

6 Now the posts of Lecturers have been re-designated as Assistant Professors.

26
 Commission in accordance with the 1955 Regulations. The

case at hand is a prime example where Commission’s role was

totally eliminated in the recruitment and well considered

selection parameters, prescribed by an expert body, like UGC,

were replaced with a simple Multiple-Choice Question type

test, which is unheard of where appointments for the posts of

Assistant Professor in degree colleges are concerned.

32. Let us for the moment keep aside the ground of political

expediency and look at what transpired leading to the volte

face insofar as the selection entrusted to the Commission as

early as in January 2021. At the risk of repetition, the decision

of the Council of Ministers on 17.09.2021, as approved by the

Chief Minister was to take out 160 posts of Assistant

Proffesors and 17 posts of Librarians from the purview of the

Commission, which were the freshly created posts in the newly

established Colleges. The selection committee proposed for the

said exercise was also to be Chaired by a Former Chairman of

the UGC. On 20.09.2021, a new Government took over and on

09.10.2021, a committee headed by the Secretary,

Department of Higher Education reviewed the earlier decisions

and constituted two separate Committees, each headed by the

27
 Vice-Chancellors of the two Universities and the selection

criteria was confined to a written test. The proposal was put

up before the Chief Minister, with the observation that it shall

subsequently be placed before the Council of Ministers.

Though the Chief Minister accepted the proposal on

13.10.2021, it was never placed before the Council of Ministers

and a Memo was issued on 18.10.2021 including the entire

posts of Assistant Professors and Librarians available, to be

filled up. As noticed above the decision to remove the said

posts from the purview of the Commission was taken much

later, after the selection process stood completed.

33. Let us also understand the scheme of UGC Regulations. Entry

66 of List I of Schedule VII of the Constitution empowers Union

to make laws relating to “Co-ordination and determination of

standards in institutions for higher education or research and

scientific and technical institutions”. Under this entry, the

Parliament had enacted the UGC Act, 1956 setting up an

expert body named UGC for the purposes of the Act, which is

clear from the Preamble of the UGC Act which reads as follows:

“An Act to make provision for the co-ordination

and determination of standards in Universities

28
 and for that purpose, to establish a University
Grants Commission.”

34. Under provisions of the UGC Act, UGC frames Regulations

from time to time setting qualifications and other standards

for teaching and non-teaching staff. Under Section 26(1)(e) and

(g)7, the UGC (Minimum Qualifications for Appointment of

Teachers and Other Academic Staff in Universities and

Colleges and Measures for the Maintenance of Standards in

Higher Education) Regulations, 2010 were framed. These

Regulations set the minimum eligibility criterion for the

appointment to various posts including Assistant Professors

and Librarians. A method of selection to these posts is also

provided in the 2010 UGC Regulations which has not been

followed in the present case. To this, the private respondents

as well as the State have taken the stand that these

Regulations are directory in nature and non-compliance of

these Regulations would not vitiate the recruitment.

7 The Commission may, by notification in Official Gazette, make regulations consistent with
this Act and the rules made thereunder-
(a) …
(b) …
…
(e) defining the qualifications that should ordinarily be required of any person to be
appointed to the teaching staff of the University, having regard to the branch of education
in which he is expected to give instruction.
(f) …
(g) regulating the maintenance of standards and the co-ordination of work or facilities
in Universities.

29
35. The respondents would place reliance upon Kalyani

Mathivanan v. KV Jeyaraj & Ors. (2015) 6 SCC 363 to

contend that UGC Regulations are not binding on the State if

the State has not adopted the UGC Regulations 2018 which

were in force at the relevant time, as was the case here. What

were adopted by the State in the present case were the 2010

UGC Regulations, which stood superseded by this time by the

subsequent Regulations of 2018 of UGC which were not

adopted by the State till the completion of recruitment process.

36. All the same, the adoption of 2010 UGC Regulations by the

State vide order dated 30.07.2013 was an adoption by

incorporation and not an adoption by mere reference. This

means that the 2010 UGC Regulations were in force in the

State of Punjab despite its repeal by the 2018 Regulations by

the UGC. This is clear from the intention and purpose of the

order dated 30.07.2013 where it was stated in no uncertain

terms that the 2010 Regulations are being adopted with a view

to raise the standard of Higher Education in the State, with a

specific mention of adoption of API Scores. Now API as we

know means Academic Performance Indicator which is a

method used in Higher Education to assess the quality and

30
 merit of teachers in Higher Education which would include

teaching experience and research and academic contribution,

which are extremely relevant factors to judge the merit of a

teacher in Higher Education. The relevant part of the order

dated 30.07.2013 reads as follows:

“With a view to raise the standard of Higher

Education in the State of Punjab, the
Notification issued by the U.G.C dated
30.06.2010 and 14.06.2013 pertaining to
governing the appointment and promotion of
Principals/Professors/Associate
Professors/Asst. Professors, the relevant API
scores with modifications mentioned below are
ordered to be applied in the Universities, Govt,
aided and private colleges : -
1. The term/tenure of the Principal of a private
college is raised from 5 to 10 years.
2. D.P.T. Punjab or his representatives will be
associated with the selection committee
constituted for the appointment of
Principals/Asst. Professors (covered under
Grant-in-aid posts) in private colleges.”

37. The distinction between adoption by incorporation as opposed

to reference has been explained by Bhagwati, J., speaking for

a three-judge Bench of this Court in Mahindra & Mahindra

Ltd. v. Union of India, (1979) 2 SCC 529, in the following

terms:

31
“…It ignores the distinction between a mere
reference to or citation of one statute in another
and an incorporation which in effect means
bodily lifting a provision of one enactment and
making it a part of another. Where there is
mere reference to or citation of one enactment
in another without incorporation. Section 8(1)
applies and the repeal and re-enactment of the
provision referred to or cited has the effect set
out in that section and the reference to the
provision repealed is required to be construed
as reference to the provision as re-enacted.
Such was the case in Collector of Customs v.
Nathella Sampathu Chetty [AIR 1962 SC 316 :
(1962) 3 SCR 786] and New Central Jute Mills
Co. Ltd. v. Assistant Collector of Central Excise
[(1970) 2 SCC 820 : AIR 1971 SC 454 : (1971)
2 SCR 92] . But where a provision of one statute
is incorporated in another, the repeal or
amendment of the former does not affect the
latter. The effect of incorporation is as if the
provision incorporated were written out in the
incorporating statute and were a part of it.
Legislation by incorporation is a common
legislative device employed by the legislature,
where the legislature for convenience of
drafting incorporates provisions from an
existing statute by reference to that statute
instead of setting out for itself at length the
provisions which it desires to adopt. Once the
incorporation is made, the provision
incorporated becomes an integral part of the
statute in which it is transposed and thereafter
there is no need to refer to the statute from
which the incorporation is made and any
subsequent amendment made in it has no
effect on the incorporation statute…”
32
38. The distinction here is that in case of adoption by

incorporation, the subsequent amendment or repeal of the

incorporated statute will be of no consequences on the

incorporation. The adoption then becomes frozen at the point

in time when the incorporation was made. But the question

whether a provision of law is adopted by reference or

incorporation also depends upon the language of the

order/statute in which such provision is being adopted. It may

also depend upon the conduct of the State and how it has been

recognised and accepted in that State. 2018 UGC Regulations

may have repealed the 2010 UGC Regulations but still they

were being considered and recognised in the State of Punjab

for all purposes, even after its repeal. We have already referred

above the order dated 30.07.2013 whereby the State

Government had adopted 2010 Regulations and the reasons

assigned by the State Government in doing so which was to

uplift the standard of higher education.

39. Further the memorandum passed by Council of Ministers on

17.09.2021 makes it clear that the State of Punjab was still

referring to the 2010 UGC Regulations irrespective of the fact

33
that 2010 UGC Regulations had been repealed in 2018. In this

memorandum, the Council of Ministers has explicitly

mentioned the 2010 UGC Regulations and also admitted that

the 2010 UGC Regulations have to be followed strictly since

they were adopted by the State of Punjab. The relevant portion

of the said memo reads as under:

1.4 The UGC has already notified rules and

regulations for recruitment of Assistant
Professors and Librarians in its notification
“UGC Regulation on Minimum Qualifications
for Appointment of Teachers and Other
Academic Staff in Universities and Colleges
and Measures for the Maintenance of
Standards in Higher Education” of 2010,
which has been adopted by the Government of
Punjab along with the subsequent
amendments.

The Departmental Selection Committee will

strictly follow the guidelines as per above UGC
notification for recruitment of 160 Assistant
Professors and 17 Librarians. The relevant
portion of the notification for short
listing”/appointment of candidates to the post
of Assistant Professor and Librarians under
the University System (in University and
colleges) in Appendix III Table II-C is
reproduced as under:

34
 Selection a) Academic Record and
Committe Research Performance
e Criteria (50%)
/ b) Assessment of Domain
Weightag Knowledge and Teaching
e (Total Skills (30%)
Weightag c) Interview
e=100) Performance (20%)

40. Thus, officially the 2010 UGC Regulations were in force in the

State of Punjab as these were adopted by way of incorporation

and not by reference. The repeal of 2010 Regulations by the

UGC Regulations of 2018 had no impact insofar as

applicability of 2010 Regulations in the State of Punjab was

concerned. Also, it is on record that after the impugned order

of the Division Bench, the State adopted the 2018 UGC

Regulations. This shows that the State recognises the

importance of the UGC Regulations. The chief intention of the

G.O. dated 30.07.2013 is that while making selection to the

posts of Assistant Professors API Scores are to be seen. This

was the purpose; which negates a simple objective type test.

41. Doing away with the 2010 Regulations was also a last minute

decision. In January 2021 requisition for recruitment of 931

Assistant Professors and 50 Librarians was sent by the State

35
government to the Commission. Then, a meeting of the Council

of Ministers was held on 17.09.2021 in relation to the

recruitment of additional 160 posts of Assistant Professors

and 17 posts of Librarians which had come up in 16 new

Government Colleges where a decision was taken to remove

these posts from the purview of the Public Service Commission

so that recruitment can be made through a Departmental

Selection Committee, which we have already mentioned

above, but what is significant here is that till this time the

Government had all the intentions of following the 2010

Regulations as the memorandum dated 17.09.2021 inter-alia

states :-

1.4 The UGC has already notified rules and

regulations for recruitment of Assistant
Professors and Librarians in its notification
“UGC Regulation on Minimum Qualifications
for Appointment of Teachers and Other
Academic Staff in Universities and Colleges
and Measures for the Maintenance of
Standards in Higher Education” of 2010,
which has been adopted by the Government of
Punjab along with the subsequent
amendments.
The Departmental Selection Committee will
strictly follow the guidelines as per above UGC
notification for recruitment of 160 Assistant
Professors and 17 Librarians. The relevant

36
 portion of the notification for short
listing”/appointment of candidates to the post
of Assistant Professor and Librarians under
the University System (in University and
colleges) in Appendix III Table II-C is
reproduced as under:

Selection Academic Record

Committee Criteria and Research
/ Weightage (Total Performance (50%)
Weightage=100) Assessment of
Domain Knowledge
and Teaching Skills
(30%)
Interview
Performance (20%)

(Emphasis provided)

Till 17.09.2021, therefore, the Government had full intentions

of following the 2010 Regulations. The decision earlier was

only to remove the posts out of the purview of Commission.

42. In a more recent judgment of a Division Bench of this Court in

Gambhirdan K. Gadhvi v. State of Gujarat (2022) 5 SCC

179, it is held that UGC Regulations have a mandatory

character and are binding on all universities, State or Central,

that have opted to receive the financial assistance of the UGC

under its Scheme dated 31.12.2008 (which later came to be

37
incorporated as Appendix I of the 2010 UGC Regulations). In

that case, what weighed in the mind of the Division Bench of

this Court was the fact that the concerned University had

availed of the above-mentioned UGC Scheme, and as part of

the same, it had agreed to adhere to UGC regulations (2010

and 2018 regulations, in that case). As a result, the University

was bound to follow the UGC Regulations for the purposes of

appointment of Vice-Chancellors, and it had to amend the

relevant rules/statutes to bring them in line with the UGC

Regulations. This is what was said:

“29. It is not in dispute that the SP University

is receiving Central financial assistance under
the Scheme and it is included in the State
Universities receiving Central financial
assistance as per Section 12(b) of the UGC Act,
1956. Therefore, having adopted the UGC
Scheme and implemented the same and getting
Central financial assistance to the extent of
80% of the maintenance expenditure, the State
Government and the SP University are bound
by the UGC Regulations, 2010. The UGC
Regulations, 2010 are superseded by the UGC
Regulations, 2018. However, the eligibility
criteria for the post of Vice-Chancellor and the
constitution of the Search Committee for
appointment of a Vice-Chancellor remains the
same. Therefore, the State of Gujarat and the
universities thereunder including the SP
University are bound to follow UGC
38
 Regulations, 2010 and UGC Regulations,
2018.”

43. It was held that UGC Regulations became a part of the parent

Act i.e. the UGC Act, being a piece of subordinate legislation

that is laid before both Houses of Parliament. As a result, these

would prevail in case there is any inconsistency between State

legislation and UGC regulations, by application of the doctrine

of repugnancy:

“50. It cannot be disputed that the UGC

Regulations are enacted by the UGC in exercise
of powers under Sections 26(1)(e) and 26(1)(g)
of the UGC Act, 1956. Even as per the UGC Act
every rule and regulation made under the said
Act, shall be laid before each House of
Parliament. Therefore, being a subordinate
legislation, UGC Regulations becomes part of
the Act. In case of any conflict between the
State legislation and the Central legislation,
Central legislation shall prevail by applying the
rule/principle of repugnancy as enunciated in
Article 254 of the Constitution as the subject
“education” is in the Concurrent List (List III) of
the Seventh Schedule to the Constitution.
Therefore, any appointment as a Vice-
Chancellor contrary to the provisions of the
UGC Regulations can be said to be in violation
of the statutory provisions, warranting a writ
of quo warranto.”

(Emphasis provided)

39
44. UGC Regulations are made under UGC Act which was enacted

by Parliament under Entry 66 of List I of the Schedule VII,

whereas State Governments exercise powers under Entry 25

of the List III of the Schedule VII to make laws relating to

“education”. Further, it is to be noted that Entry 25 of the List

III is subject to Entry 66 of List I. Hence, laws, including the

subordinate legislations as in the present case, made under

Entry 66 of the Union List would prevail over any law made

under Entry 25 of the Concurrent List.

45. This Court in State of T.N. v. Adhiyaman Educational &

Research Institute, (1995) 4 SCC 104 while dealing with

Entry 66 and Entry 25 of the Union List and Concurrent List,

respectively, observed thus:

“41. What emerges from the above discussion

is as follows:
(i) The expression ‘coordination’ used in Entry
66 of the Union List of the Seventh Schedule to
the Constitution does not merely mean
evaluation. It means harmonisation with a
view to forge a uniform pattern for a concerted
action according to a certain design, scheme or
plan of development. It, therefore, includes
action not only for removal of disparities in
standards but also for preventing the
occurrence of such disparities. It would,
therefore, also include power to do all things

40
 which are necessary to prevent what would
make ‘coordination’ either impossible or
difficult. This power is absolute and
unconditional and in the absence of any valid
compelling reasons, it must be given its full
effect according to its plain and express
intention.
(ii) To the extent that the State legislation is in
conflict with the Central legislation though the
former is purported to have been made under
Entry 25 of the Concurrent List but in effect
encroaches upon legislation including
subordinate legislation made by the Centre
under Entry 25 of the Concurrent List or to give
effect to Entry 66 of the Union List, it would be
void and inoperative.
(iii) If there is a conflict between the two
legislations, unless the State legislation is
saved by the provisions of the main part of
clause (2) of Article 254, the State legislation
being repugnant to the Central legislation, the
same would be inoperative.
(iv) Whether the State law encroaches upon
Entry 66 of the Union List or is repugnant to the
law made by the Centre under Entry 25 of the
Concurrent List, will have to be determined by
the examination of the two laws and will
depend upon the facts of each case…”

(Emphasis provided)

46. In short, in the present case the UGC Regulations would be

binding particularly when the State of Punjab vide its order

dated 30.07.2013 had adopted 2010 UGC Regulations.

41
47. We may add here that what also weighed with the Division

Bench of the High Court was the fact that it was the Punjab

Educational Service (College Cadre) (Class II) Rules, 1976

(hereinafter ‘1976 Rules’) which were applicable, and not the

UGC Regulations. While it is true that the 1976 Rules were

applicable to the recruitment but a perusal of the same shows

that these only mandate that the recruitment to posts of

Assistant Professors and Librarians should be through direct

recruitment. It does not prescribe any mode or method of

recruitment. This aspect was rightly noticed by the learned

Single Judge. As discussed in detail above, the State of Punjab

itself adopted the standards and process laid down by the

UGC. Therefore, it was bound to follow these Regulations,

notwithstanding the 1976 Rules.

48. In short, we find that there is a total arbitrariness in the

present selection. The memo of Council of Ministers dated

17.09.2021 shows that State wanted to recruit only on 160

posts of Assistant Professors and on 17 posts of Librarians

through departmental selection committee on an urgent basis

as these were for the newly opened colleges. As we have

already stated, even in those cases, the recruitment was to be

42
 made by following the UGC Regulations. Next, the 931 and 50

posts of Assistant Professors and Librarians, which were lying

vacant and in regard to which requisition had already been

sent to Commission, were added and it was decided that the

sole basis of the selection would be a single exam. Moreover, a

mere 45-day deadline was set for the commencement and

conclusion of the whole recruitment process and ultimately

within a span of two months, not only was the recruitment

process concluded, but even appointment letters were issued.

One cannot fail to notice the burning haste with which this

entire exercise was undertaken by the powers that be. It has

thus been repeatedly pressed by the appellants that all this

was motivated by political exigency in the form of the

impending Assembly elections in the State of Punjab.

49. An attempt was made by the State and the private respondents

to argue that the selection process which was ultimately

adopted was in any case better than the one prescribed by the

UGC. The logic given is that a written test would be impartial

and will be same to all, whereas there are always chances of

abuse, favouritism, nepotism, even corruption in a test based

on API. Written test is also less time consuming it was argued.

43
 However, we are not at all convinced with this argument. The

recruitment for teaching posts in higher education on the

basis of scores in an objective type written test, on grounds

that such a test is non arbitrary whereas viva voce and

appreciation of other aspects such as academic work could be

abused and could be unfairly applied, is an argument which

is puerile to say the least. Abandoning a time tested and

uniformly followed method of selecting Assistant Professors in

higher education with Multiple-Choice Questions based

written examination is unacceptable; especially when the

State itself has adopted the selection process laid down by the

expert body which is also the apex statutory body, the UGC

constituted under Entry 66 in the Union List of the Seventh

Schedule of the Constitution.

50. The State cannot defend such an arbitrary practice in the garb

of a policy decision. We have to keep in mind that these were

the posts of Assistant Professors for which a specialized body

like UGC has prescribed a process for the selections, which

includes appreciation of academic work of a candidate,

his/her performance in viva-voce, amongst others. Just a

simple Multiple-Choice Question based written exam cannot

44
 be sufficient to check the suitability of such candidates. Even

if it is, then also, in the present case, the sudden replacement

of a time tested recruitment process with a new process, was

not only arbitrary but was done without following the due

procedure, which vitiates the entire process. Even if we ignore

the argument of political expediency, we cannot but notice the

executive hegemony in reversing a decision of the Council of

Ministers, without reference to the said body. It also

undermines the quality of selection, since there was no

comprehensive exercise to examine the merit of a candidate.

The written test did not challenge the innovative faculty of a

candidate. One was not required to give an elaborate answer

to a question as is done in a subjective type of test. Instead, it

was an objective type of test in which the correct answer was

to be given from multiple-choice of answers. The elimination

of the viva-voce, which is such a vital component in the overall

appreciation of merit of a candidate, who has to teach in a

higher education institute, was another grave error.

51. All this goes on to show that the intention of the authorities

was to conclude the exercise as quickly as possible; which

though sought to be justified on grounds of expediency in

45
 filling up the posts, undermines the selection by reason of no

qualitative assessment of the candidates carried out. The

learned Single Judge rightly observed that this approach casts

serious doubts on the fairness of the process and the

impartiality of the selectors, who were likely to be under

pressure to complete the exercise within the timeline,

regardless of the quality of the selections. The selection

process is further impaired by the inclusion of posts already

requisitioned to the Commission, which as per the Regulations

were required to be filled up by the Commission and the

apparent deviation from the UGC Guidelines which were

adopted by the State and required to be followed, in this very

selection, by the Council of Ministers.

52. The State and its instrumentalities have a duty and

responsibility to act fairly and reasonably in terms of the

mandate of Article 14 of the Constitution. Any decision taken

by the State must be reasoned, and not arbitrary. This Court

has consistently held that when a thing is done in a post-haste

manner, mala fides would be presumed, and further that

anything done in undue haste can also be termed as arbitrary

46
 and cannot be condoned in law. We may refer here to a few

judgments of this Court which lay down this proposition.

53. In Fuljit Kaur v. State of Punjab (2010) 11 SCC 455, this

Court held that any State action undertaken in a hasty

manner could be arbitrary State action cannot be condoned in

law. This is what was said by this Court:

“25. Before parting with the case, it may be

pertinent to mention here that the allotment
had been made to the appellant within 48
hours of submission of her application though
in ordinary cases, it takes about a year. The
appellant had further been favoured to pay the
aforesaid provisional price of Rs. 93,000 in four
instalments in two years, as is evident from the
letter dated 8-4-1987. Making the allotment in
such a hasty manner itself is arbitrary and
unreasonable and is hit by Article 14 of the
Constitution. This Court has consistently held
that “when a thing is done in a post-haste
manner, mala fides would be presumed”.
Anything done in undue haste can also be
termed as “arbitrary and cannot be condoned
in law”. [Vide S.P. Kapoor (Dr.) v. State of H.P.
[(1981) 4 SCC 716 : 1982 SCC (L&S) 14 : AIR
1981 SC 2181] , M.P. Hasta Shilpa Vikas
Nigam Ltd. v. Devendra Kumar Jain [(1995) 1
SCC 638 : 1995 SCC (L&S) 364 : (1995) 29 ATC
159] , Bahadursinh Lakhubhai Gohil v.
Jagdishbhai M. Kamalia [(2004) 2 SCC 65 : AIR
2004 SC 1159] and ZenitMataplast (P) Ltd. v.
State of Maharashtra [(2009) 10 SCC 388] .]

47
 Thus, such an allotment in favour of the
appellant is liable to be declared to have been
made in arbitrary and unreasonable manner.
However, we are not inclined to take such
drastic steps as the appellant has developed
the land subsequent to allotment.”

(Emphasis provided)

54. In Bahadursinh Lakhubhai Gohil v. Jagdishbhai M.

Kamalia (2004) 2 SCC 65, this Court reiterated the above

principle while dealing with a case where the change in the

office-bearer had resulted in a hasty and arbitrary change in

the policy, which is also the case here. The relevant

observations in the said judgment are as follows:

“24. The impugned order was preceded by a

direction of the Home Minister on 7-9-1996. A
change in the opinion came into being only
upon change in the holder of the office and that
too within a few days. Not only had the matter
not been admittedly placed on the agenda of
the meeting dated 25-7-1997, the same was
considered showing undue haste.
25. In S.P. Kapoor (Dr) v. State of H.P. [(1981) 4
SCC 716 : 1982 SCC (L&S) 14 : AIR 1981 SC
2181] this Court held that when a thing is done
in a post-haste manner, mala fide would be
presumed, stating: (SCC p. 739, para 33)
“33. … The post-haste manner in which these
things have been done on 3-11-1979 suggests
that some higher-up was interested in pushing

48
 through the matter hastily when the Regular
Secretary, Health and Family Welfare was on
leave.”

(Emphasis provided)

55. In Zenit Mataplast (P) Ltd. v. State of Maharashtra (2009)

10 SCC 388, this Court laid down the general principle that

State action should be grounded in sound principles and

should not be unpredictable or without basis. This Court

noted as follows:

“27. Every action of the State or its

instrumentalities should not only be fair,
legitimate and above-board but should be
without any affection or aversion. It should
neither be suggestive of discrimination nor
even apparently give an impression of bias,
favouritism and nepotism. The decision should
be made by the application of known principles
and rules and in general such decision should
be predictable and the citizen should know
where he is, but if a decision is taken without
any principle or without any rule, it is
unpredictable and such a decision is antithesis
to the decision taken in accordance with the
rule of law (vide S.G. Jaisinghani v. Union of
India [AIR 1967 SC 1427] , AIR p. 1434, para
14 and Haji T.M. Hassan Rawther v. Kerala
Financial Corpn. [(1988) 1 SCC 166 : AIR 1988
SC 157] ).”

(Emphasis provided)

49
56. In the present case there are multiple deficiencies, as stated

above. The giving away of a rigorous criteria laid down in the

UGC regulations with a single, multiple-choice question based

written test, and the complete elimination of the viva-voce, all

establish the arbitrary nature of the exercise which cannot

pass the test of reasonableness laid down under Article 14 of

the Constitution. Hence, the learned Single Judge had rightly

struck down the entire selection process, and the Division

Bench of the High Court erred in interfering with that

conclusion.

57. Lastly we need to state that it is a settled principle that when

the law prescribes a thing to be done in a particular manner,

then it should be done in that manner alone. [See: Cherukuri

Mani v. Chief Secretary, Govt of Andhra Pradesh & Ors.

(2015) 13 SCC 722, Dharmin Bai Kashyap v. Babli Sahu

(2023) 10 SCC 461, Nazir Ahmed v. King-Emperor (LR 63

IA 372), Babu Verghese & Ors. v. Bar Council of India &

Ors. (1999) 3 SCC 422]

58. True, the State is entitled to change its policy, yet a sudden

change without valid reasons will always be seen with

suspicion. Even in cases where there is no statutory

50
prescription of any particular way of doing a thing, the

executive must observe the long-standing practice, and a

deviation from such a practice would require passing the

muster of reasonableness, which is a facet of Article 14 of the

Constitution. In this regard, this Court in Bannari Amman

Sugars Ltd. v. CTO (2005) 1 SCC 625 observed that:

“9. While the discretion to change the policy in

exercise of the executive power, when not
trammelled by any statute or rule is wide
enough, what is imperative and implicit in
terms of Article 14 is that a change in policy
must be made fairly and should not give the
impression that it was so done arbitrarily or by
any ulterior criteria. The wide sweep of Article
14 and the requirement of every State action
qualifying for its validity on this touchstone
irrespective of the field of activity of the State is
an accepted tenet. The basic requirement of
Article 14 is fairness in action by the State, and
non-arbitrariness in essence and substance is
the heartbeat of fair play. Actions are
amenable, in the panorama of judicial review
only to the extent that the State must act
validly for discernible reasons, not whimsically
for any ulterior purpose…”

In the case at hand, the State did not adhere to UGC

Regulations and took the posts out of the purview of the

Commission without following the procedure prescribed

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 under the law. And this was done suddenly without any valid

reason and thus, it would amount to arbitrariness and

cannot be sustained in the eyes of law. In Sivanandan C.T.

v. High Court of Kerala (2024) 3 SCC 799, the Constitution

Bench of this Court observed that:

“45. The underlying basis for the application of

the doctrine of legitimate expectation has
expanded and evolved to include the principles
of good administration. Since citizens repose
their trust in the State, the actions and policies
of the State give rise to legitimate expectations
that the State will adhere to its assurance or
past practice by acting in a consistent,
transparent, and predictable manner. The
principles of good administration require that
the decisions of public authorities must
withstand the test of consistency,
transparency, and predictability to avoid being
regarded as arbitrary and therefore violative of
Article 14.”

59. As far back as in the year 1979, this Court in Ramana

Dayaram Shetty v. International Airport Authority of

India, (1979) 3 SCC 489, speaking through Justice PN

Bhagwati, had said that government jobs are also a kind of

wealth and the State cannot distribute or withhold such

52
wealth on the basis of arbitrary principles. The relevant

portion from the said case law is as follows:

“11. Today the Government in a welfare State,

is the regulator and dispenser of special
services and provider of a large number of
benefits, including jobs, contracts, licences,
quotas, mineral rights, etc. The Government
pours forth wealth, money, benefits, services,
contracts, quotas and licences. The valuables
dispensed by Government take many forms,
but they all share one characteristic. They are
steadily taking the place of traditional forms of
wealth…..The discretion of the Government
has been held to be not unlimited in that the
Government cannot give or withhold largesse
in its arbitrary discretion or at its sweet will. It
is insisted, as pointed out by Prof. Reich in an
especially stimulating article on “The New
Property” in 73 Yale Law Journal 733, “that
Government action be based on standards that
are not arbitrary or unauthorised”. The
Government cannot be permitted to say that it
will give jobs or enter into contracts or issue
quotas or licences only in favour of those
having grey hair or belonging to a particular
political party or professing a particular
religious faith…

12…It must, therefore, be taken to be the law

that where the Government is dealing with the
public, whether by way of giving jobs or
entering into contracts or issuing quotas or
licences or granting other forms of largesse, the
Government cannot act arbitrarily at its sweet

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 will and, like a private individual, deal with
any person it pleases, but its action must be in
conformity with standard or norms which is not
arbitrary, irrational or irrelevant. The power or
discretion of the Government in the matter of
grant of largesse including award of jobs,
contracts, quotas, licences, etc. must be
confined and structured by rational, relevant
and non-discriminatory standard or norm and
if the Government departs from such standard
or norm in any particular case or cases, the
action of the Government would be liable to be
struck down, unless it can be shown by the
Government that the departure was not
arbitrary, but was based on some valid
principle which in itself was not irrational,
unreasonable or discriminatory.”

In the present case, the State has miserably failed to

justify the departure from the standard norms of the

recruitment process. It has failed to give any valid reason for

not adopting the UGC Regulations and avoiding the Public

Service Commission in the recruitment in question.

Moreover, as discussed earlier, the reason for this departure

were narrow political and clearly arbitrary.

60. Before parting, we would like to observe that we are aware of

the fact that quashing of the entire recruitment process may

cause hardships for the selected candidates, but at the same

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 time, there is no equity in the favour of selected candidates as

challenge to the recruitment was made during the pendency of

the process and appointments were subject to the Court

orders. A gross illegality like the present recruitment cannot

be ignored.

61. Thus, considering the entire facts of the case, we allow these

appeals and set aside the order dated 23.09.2024 passed by

the Division Bench of the Punjab and Haryana High Court and

quash the entire recruitment and direct the State to initiate

the recruitment process as per the 2018 UGC Regulations

which are now in force in the State of Punjab.

62. Pending application(s), if any, stand(s) disposed of.

………………………………J.
[SUDHANSHU DHULIA]

………………………………J.
[K. VINOD CHANDRAN]

NEW DELHI;
JULY 14, 2025.

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