CASE DIGEST
TORTS AND DAMAGES: REQUISITES OF ARTICLE 1157 OF THE CIVIL
CODE
By: Myla A. Santos (City University of Pasay School of Law)
DY TEBAN TRADING VS. CHING [543 SCRA 560]
G.R. No. 161803, February 4, 2008
Ponente: Reyes, R.T., J:
Summary: This case concerns a vehicular collision caused by a stalled prime
mover with trailer parked improperly on a national highway. The Supreme
Court reversed the Court of Appeals' decision, finding private respondents
Liberty Forest, Inc. and Cresilito Limbaga liable for damages due to Limbaga's
negligence in parking the prime mover askew on the highway without
adequate warning devices. The Court held that this negligence was the
proximate cause of the collision, triggering a series of events that led to the
damage of the petitioner's Nissan van. This ruling reinforces the importance
of adhering to traffic rules, regulations, and road safety standards,
particularly regarding the proper parking of vehicles and the use of early
warning devices, and clarifies the application of quasi-delict principles in
vehicular accident cases.
Facts:
Rogelio Ortiz was driving a Nissan van owned by Dy Teban
Trading, Inc. He was traveling along the National Highway in
Butuan City.
A prime mover with trailer, owned by Liberty Forest, Inc. was
driven by Limbaga, suffered a tire blowout the night before and
was parked askew on the highway, partially obstructing the lane.
The prime mover was not equipped with triangular, collapsible
reflectorized plates, the early warning device. As substitute,
Limbaga placed a banana trunk with leaves on the front and the
rear portion of the prime mover to warn incoming motorists. An
incoming passenger bus was approaching and to avoid hitting
the parked prime mover, it swerved into the lane of the
approaching Nissan van. Ortiz swerved to avoid the bus but
collided with the front of the parked prime mover, causing
significant damage to the van.
Petitioner Nissan van owner filed a complaint for damages
against private respondent’s prime mover owner and driver with
the RTC. The RTC held that the proximate cause of the three-way
vehicular collision was improper parking of the prime mover on
the national highway and the absence of an early warning device
on the vehicle. On appeal, the CA reversed the RTC Decision and
held that the proximate cause of the vehicular collision was the
failure of the Nissan van to give way or yield to the right of way
of the passenger bus.
Issue:
Whether or not the prime mover is liable for the damages
suffered by the Nissan van.
Ruling:
Article 2176 of the Civil Code provides that whoever by act
or omission causes damage to another, there being fault or
negligence, is obliged to pay for the damage done. Such fault or
negligence1, if there is no pre-existing contractual relation
between the parties, is called a quasi-delict. To sustain a claim
based on quasi-delict, the following requisites must concur: (a)
damage suffered by plaintiff; (b) fault or negligence of defendant;
and (c) connection of cause and effect between the fault or
negligence of defendant and the damage incurred by plaintiff.
In this case, Limbaga was negligent in parking the prime
mover on the national highway and he failed to prevent or
minimize the risk to oncoming motorists. Likewise, the skewed
parking of the prime mover was the proximate cause 2 of the
collision. The skewed parking of the prime mover posed a serious
risk to oncoming motorists. Limbaga failed to prevent or
minimize that risk. The skewed parking of the prime mover
triggered the series of events that led to the collision, particularly
the swerving of the passenger bus and the Nissan van.
1
Negligence is defined as the failure to observe for the protection of the interests
of another person that degree of care, precaution, and vigilance which the
circumstances justly demand, whereby such other person suffers injury.
2
Proximate cause is defined as that cause, which, in natural and continuous sequence, unbroken by any
efficient intervening cause, produces the injury, and without which the result would not have occurred.
comprehensively, proximate cause is that cause acting first and producing the injury, either
immediately or by setting other events in motion, all constituting a natural and continuous chain
of events, each having a close causal connection with its immediate predecessor, the final event
in the chain immediately effecting the injury as natural and probable result of the cause which
first acted, under such circumstances that the person responsible for the first event should, as an
ordinarily prudent and intelligent person, have reasonable ground to expect at the moment of his
act or default that an injury to some person might probably result therefrom.
