Maqsood Ahmad & Ors v Majlis Agama Islam Selangor &

[2022] 4 ShLR Ors (Vazeer Alam J) 1

A Maqsood Ahmad & Ors v Majlis Agama Islam Selangor & Ors

HIGH COURT (SHAH ALAM) — APPLICATION FOR JUDICIAL

REVIEW NO 25–56–10 OF 2015
B
VAZEER ALAM J
25 OCTOBER 2021

Civil Procedure — Judicial review — Application for judicial review — High

C Court was directed by Court of Appeal to undertake factual examination of
religious status of applicants — Whether applicants were of Ahmadiyya faith by
origin or were subsequent adherents of the faith — Whether applicants were
Muslims under law — Whether applicants were within respondents jurisdiction
— Whether applicants fell within renunciation cases — Whether religious belief
D should be determined as at time of entry into country — Administration of the
Religion of Islam (State of Selangor) Enactment 2003

This was an application for judicial review against the decision of the second
respondent to issue letters of agreement and bond against each of them;
E compelling them to appear before the Syariah Court on pain of monetary
penalty for proceedings in respect of an offence under s 97(2) of the
Administration of the Religion of Islam (State of Selangor) Enactment 2003
(‘the ARIE’); instituted by the fifth respondent. On 11 April 2014, officers of
the fourth respondent, raided premises which were being privately used by the
F applicants to perform their prayers. The raiding officers were informed that all
those present at the premises were members of the Ahmadiyya Muslim Jama’at
religious group (‘the Jama’at’). Following the raid on the premises: (a) the
applicants were informed that they had not obtained written permission to use
the premises for purposes which may only be carried on, in or by a mosque,
G contrary to s 97 of the ARIE; (b) all 39 applicants, comprising 36 adult
members of the Jama’at and three of their children, who were present at the
premises, were arrested, detained and threatened with prosecution in the
Syariah Court; and (c) the applicants were then all issued with letters of
agreement and bond (‘the bond’) by the second respondent, which compelled
H them to appear before the Syariah Court on pain of monetary penalty. On
10 July 2014, the applicants filed an application for leave to commence judicial
review in respect of the issuance of the bond to each of them. On 14 August
2014, leave was granted by the High Court. On 5 February 2016, a stay of
proceedings was granted in relation to the bond till the determination of the
I judicial review. On 29 September 2017, pursuant to s 84 of the Courts of
Judicature Act 1964, the High Court stayed the applicants’ judicial review
proceedings, and stated a special case with two constitutional questions and
transmitted the same to the Federal Court for its decision. The said questions
in effect concerned the jurisdiction of the Syariah Courts in respect of ‘offences’
2 Shariah Law Reports [2022] 4 ShLR

as regards to ‘mosques or any Islamic public places of worship’, and the Syariah A
Court’s jurisdiction over members of the Jama’at. However, on 26 March 2018,
the Federal Court remitted the said constitutional reference to the High Court
without answering the questions on the basis that the High Court had
jurisdiction to hear and dispose of these constitutional issues. The learned High
Court judge considered the two constitutional questions raised and decided in B
favour of the applicants, and granted orders in terms of the prayers in the
application. The respondents appealed that decision. The Court of Appeal
allowed the appeal in part and remitted the matter to the High Court to
reconsider the status of all the applicants as Ahmadis. The High Court was
directed by the Court of Appeal to undertake a factual examination of the C
religious status of the applicants, in order to determine if they would be persons
caught by the two fatwas, namely, ‘Fatwa Tentang Ajaran Ahmadiah/Qadiani’
gazetted as Jil 51, No 20, Sel PU 15 on 24 September 1998, and ‘Pindaan Fatwa
Tentang Ajaran Ahmadiah/Qadiani’ gazetted as Jil 53, No 17, Sel PU 36 on
17 August 2000 (‘the two fatwas’). Hence, the present application was limited D
to the factual ascertainment of: (a) whether the applicants were of the
Ahmadiyya faith by origin, such as birth, or were subsequent adherents of the
faith having left mainstream Islam as practiced in Malaysia; and (b) whether
the applicants were or were not Muslims under the law, ie particularly for the
purposes of any offence under the ARIE and the Syariah Courts (Criminal E
Jurisdiction) Act 1965.

Held, allowing the judicial review application in part, with no order as to costs:
(1) Having considered the submissions and the supporting evidence in the F
voluminous affidavits, the learned judge found that the applicants could
generally be divided into two categories, namely, those who were born
Ahmadis (‘first category’), and those who later in life became Ahmadis
(‘second category’).The uncontroverted evidence showed that except for
applicants No 5, 10 and 27–36, who became members of the Ahmadiyya G
sect sometime during their lifetime (‘second category’), the rest of the
applicants were born to Ahmadi parents (‘first category’). Hence,
applicants Nos 1–4, 6–9,11–26 and 37–39, who were in the first
category had been followers of the Ahmadiyya sect since birth. Thus, they
were Ahmadis by original faith and not persons professing the religion of H
Islam. Thus, the question of them renouncing Islam did not arise. They
would, for reasons given in the earlier judgment, be beyond the reach of
the respondents’ jurisdiction (see paras 23 & 25).
(2) There was overwhelming evidence showing that applicants Nos 1–4,
6–9, 11–26 and 37–39, were part of the Ahmadiyya community in I
Malaysia. The court found that by their lifelong association with the
Ahmadiyya Muslim Jama’at, the first category applicants, had clearly
demonstrated to the satisfaction of the court that they were members of
the Ahmadiyya Jama’at and that they were Ahmadis who would be
 Maqsood Ahmad & Ors v Majlis Agama Islam Selangor &
[2022] 4 ShLR Ors (Vazeer Alam J) 3

A deemed to be persons not professing Islam by virtue of the two fatwas (see
paras 26 & 31).
(3) The second category applicants, that was applicants Nos 5, 10 and
27–36, on the other hand, were those who were not born into Ahmadi
B families, but had subsequently come to adopt the Ahmadiyya faith. The
evidence adduced showed that these second category applicants, who had
adopted the Ahmadi faith in later part of their lives, had been adherents
of the sect for a considerable period of time. Some were Malaysians, while
some were foreigners who were either legally in the country or as refugees.
C The evidence, on a balance of probabilities, established the fact that these
second category applicants were also followers of the Ahmadiyya sect.
The applicants in the second category, who were Malaysians, and who
were persons who professed the religion of Islam, and who had
subsequently embraced the Ahmadiyya teachings would definitely fall
D within the renunciation cases, ie ‘one who no longer professes the religion
of Islam’. Despite their adherence to the Ahmadiyya faith, the law
deemed such persons to be persons who profess the religion of Islam,
until and unless they obtain an order of renunciation of Islam from the
Syariah Courts. Thus, they would still come under the jurisdiction of the
E respondents until and unless they obtained on order from the Syariah
Court to the effect that they were followers of the Ahmadi sect, and/or
were persons affected by the two fatwas, and/or were no longer persons
professing the religion of Islam. Those falling within this category would
be applicants Nos 27–36 (see paras 32 & 34–35).
F (4) The court found that it did not make sense for a refugee or a foreigner
(the non-Malaysians within the second category applicants) who was on
a transient journey through the country, to first get an order from the
Syariah Court before he/she could join the local Ahmadi congregation in
their prayers and religious practices. That was just impractical. In any
G event, it was not even certain if such persons were professing the religion
of Islam, as defined in our statutes, before they embraced the teachings of
the Ahmadi sect in their country of origin or some other place beyond
our shores. As far as such persons are concerned, the learned judge was of
the view that a more reasonable legal construct would be for their
H religious belief to be determined as at the time of their entry into the
country, just as it would be for any person not professing the religion of
Islam. When they first entered into Malaysian territory, and more
specifically into Selangor, they were already persons who were not
professing the religion of Islam by virtue of the two fatwas. It did not
I matter whether such persons were Ahmadis by birth or whether they had
subsequently embraced it, they were Ahmadi by origin when they entered
the country. In the premise, there should not be any legal impediment for
such persons joining the first category Ahmadiyya community in their
religious practices, as applicants Nos 5 and 10 were doing at the time of
4 Shariah Law Reports [2022] 4 ShLR

the raid and arrest (see paras 36–38). A

(5) Having considered the evidence as a whole, the court found that
applicants Nos 1–26 and 37–39 had established their case for judicial
review. The decision and action of the respondents against applicants
Nos 1–26 and 37–39 was in excess of jurisdiction and those applicants B
were entitled to the reliefs prayed for. As for applicants Nos 27–36, they
were deemed to be persons professing the religion of Islam until and
unless they obtained an order from the Syariah Court to the contrary.
And until they did, they would be within the jurisdiction of the
respondents (see paras 39). C

[Bahasa Malaysia summary

Ini adalah permohonan semakan kehakiman terhadap keputusan responden
kedua yang mengeluarkan surat perjanjian dan bon; mendesak mereka untuk
hadir di hadapan Mahkamah Syariah atas alasan hukuman penalti bagi D
prosiding bagi kesalahan di bawah s 97(2) Enakmen Pentadbiran Agama Islam
(Negeri Selangor) 2003 (‘EPAI’); dimulakan oleh responden kelima. Pada
11 April 2014, pegawai responden keempat, menyerbu premis persendirian
pemohon-pemohon untuk menunaikan solat mereka. Pegawai serbuan
dimaklumkan bahawa semua yang hadir di premis tersebut adalah anggota E
kumpulan agama Ahmadiyya Muslim Jama’at (‘Jama’at’). Berikutan serbuan
ke atas premis tersebut: (a) pemohon telah dimaklumkan bahawa mereka tidak
mendapat kebenaran bertulis untuk menggunakan premis tersebut bagi
maksud-tujuan yang hanya boleh dijalankan, di dalam atau oleh masjid,
bertentangan dengan s 97 EPAI; (b) kesemua 39 pemohon, yang terdiri F
daripada 36 ahli dewasa Jama’at dan tiga anak mereka, yang hadir di premis
tersebut, telah ditangkap, ditahan dan diugut dengan pendakwaan di
Mahkamah Syariah; dan (c) pemohon kemudiannya telah dikeluarkan dengan
surat perjanjian dan bon (‘bon’) oleh responden kedua, yang memaksa mereka
untuk hadir di hadapan Mahkamah Syariah untuk hukuman penalti. Pada G
10 Julai 2014, pemohon memfailkan permohonan kebenaran untuk
memulakan semakan kehakiman berkenaan bon kepada setiap daripada
mereka. Pada 14 Ogos 2014, kebenaran telah diberikan oleh Mahkamah
Tinggi. Pada 5 Februari 2016, penangguhan prosiding telah diberikan
berhubung dengan bon sehingga keputusan semakan kehakiman. Pada H
29 September 2017, menurut s 84 Akta Mahkamah Kehakiman 1964,
Mahkamah Tinggi menangguhkan prosiding semakan kehakiman pemohon,
dan menyatakan kes khas untuk dua soalan perlembagaan dan memindahkan
kes tersebut ke Mahkamah Persekutuan untuk keputusan. Soalan-soalan
berkenaan adalah mengenai bidang kuasa Mahkamah Syariah berkenaan I
dengan ‘kesalahan’ berkenaan dengan ‘masjid atau mana-mana tempat ibadat
awam Islam’, dan bidang kuasa Mahkamah Syariah ke atas ahli Jama’at. Walau
bagaimanapun, pada 26 Mac 2018, Mahkamah Persekutuan telah
memerintahkan rujukan perlembagaan tersebut untuk kembali ke Mahkamah
 Maqsood Ahmad & Ors v Majlis Agama Islam Selangor &
[2022] 4 ShLR Ors (Vazeer Alam J) 5

A Tinggi tanpa menjawab soalan-soalan atas dasar bahawa Mahkamah Tinggi

mempunyai bidang kuasa untuk mendengar dan melupuskan isu-isu
perlembagaan ini. Hakim Mahkamah Tinggi menimbangkan dua soalan
perlembagaan yang dibangkitkan dan memutuskan untuk memihak kepada
pemohon-pemohon, dan memberikan perintah berdasarkan di dalam
B permohonan tersebut. Responden merayu terhadap keputusan tersebut.
Mahkamah Rayuan membenarkan rayuan tersebut secara sebahagian dan
memerintahkan perkara tersebut untuk didengar di Mahkamah Tinggi untuk
mempertimbangkan semula status semua pemohon sebagai Ahmadis.
Mahkamah Tinggi telah diarahkan oleh Mahkamah Rayuan untuk melakukan
C pemeriksaan fakta mengenai status agama pemohon, untuk menentukan sama
ada mereka boleh menjadi orang yang ditangkap oleh dua fatwa, iaitu, ‘Fatwa
Tentang Ajaran Ahmadiah/Qadiani’ yang diwartakan sebagai Jil 51, No 20, Sel
PU 15 pada 24 September 1998, dan ‘Pindaan Fatwa Tentang Ajaran
Ahmadiah/Qadiani’ yang diwartakan sebagai Jil 53, No 17, Sel PU 36 pada 17
D Ogos 2000 (‘dua fatwa tersebut’). Oleh itu, permohonan ini adalah terhad
kepada penentuan fakta berikut: (a) sama ada pemohon adalah daripada
kepercayaan Ahmadiyya menurut kelahiran, atau penganut yang telah
meninggalkan Islam arus perdana seperti yang diamalkan di Malaysia; dan
(b) sama ada pemohon-pemohon bukan orang Islam di bawah
E undang-undang, iaitu terutamanya bagi maksud apa-apa kesalahan di bawah
EPAI dan Akta Mahkamah Syariah (Bidang Kuasa Jenayah) 1965.

Diputuskan, membenarkan permohonan semakan kehakiman secara

sebahagian, dengan tanpa perintah kos:
F
(1) Setelah meneliti hujahan-hujahan dan keterangan-keterangan di dalam
afidavit-afidavit yang difailkan, hakim yang terpelajar mendapati bahawa
pemohon-pemohon dibahagikan kepada dua kategori, iaitu, mereka
yang dilahirkan sebagai Ahmadis (‘kategori pertama’), dan mereka yang
G kemudiannya menjadi Ahmadis (‘kategori kedua’). Keterangan
menunjukkan bahawa kecuali pemohon No 5, 10 dan 27–36, yang
menjadi ahli mazhab Ahmadiyya semasa hayat mereka (‘kategori kedua’),
selebihnya pemohon dilahirkan oleh ibu bapa yang menganut Ahmadi
(‘kategori pertama’). Oleh itu, pemohon No 1–4, 6–9, 11–26 dan
H 37–39, yang berada dalam kategori pertama merupakan penganut
mazhab Ahmadiyya sejak lahir. Oleh itu, mereka adalah Ahmadis asal
dan bukan orang yang menganut agama Islam. Oleh itu, persoalan
mereka meninggalkan Islam tidak timbul. Mereka adalah di luar bidang
kuasa responden (lihat perenggan 23 & 25).
I (2) Terdapat banyak keterangan yang menunjukkan bahawa pemohon
No 1–4, 6–9, 11–26 dan 37–39, adalah sebahagian daripada komuniti
Ahmadiyya di Malaysia. Mahkamah mendapati bahawa dengan anutan
mereka dengan Ahmadiyya Muslim Jama’at selama ini, pemohon
kategori pertama, telah jelas menunjukkan kepada ini bahawa mereka
6 Shariah Law Reports [2022] 4 ShLR

adalah ahli Ahmadiyya Jama’at dan bahawa mereka adalah Ahmadis yang A
dianggap sebagai orang yang tidak menganut Islam berdasarkan dua
fatwa tersebut (lihat perenggan 26 & 31).
(3) Pemohon kategori kedua, iaitu pemohon No 5, 10 dan 27–36,
sebaliknya, tidak dilahirkan dalam keluarga Ahmadi, tetapi B
kemudiannya mengamalkan kepercayaan Ahmadiyya. Keterangan
selanjutnya menunjukkan bahawa pemohon kategori kedua ini, yang
telah mengamalkan kepercayaan Ahmadi kemudiannya telah menjadi
penganut mazhab ini untuk jangka masa yang agak lama. Ada yang
merupakan rakyat Malaysia, manakala ada yang adalah warga asing yang C
sama ada secara sah di negara ini atau sebagai pelarian. Keterangan ini,
pada keseimbangan kebarangkalian, mewujudkan fakta bahawa
pemohon kategori kedua ini juga merupakan pengikut mazhab
Ahmadiyya. Pemohon dalam kategori kedua, yang merupakan rakyat
Malaysia, dan yang merupakan orang yang menganut agama Islam, dan D
yang kemudiannya memeluk ajaran Ahmadiyya termasuk dalam kes
murtad, iaitu ‘orang yang tidak lagi menganut agama Islam’. Walaupun
mereka menganut mazhab Ahmadiyya, undang-undang tersebut
menganggap sebagai orang yang menganut agama Islam, sehingga dan
melainkan mereka mendapat perintah pegeluaran dari Islam dari E
Mahkamah Syariah. Oleh itu, mereka masih berada di bawah bidang
kuasa responden sehingga dan melainkan jika mereka mendapat perintah
daripada Mahkamah Syariah sehingga mereka mendapat perintah
daripada Mahkamah Syariah bahawa mereka adalah pengikut mazhab
Ahmadi, dan/atau orang yang terjejas oleh kedua-dua fatwa tersebut, F
dan/atau bukan lagi orang yang menganut agama Islam. Mereka yang
termasuk dalam kategori ini adalah pemohon No 27–36 (lihat perenggan
32 & 34–35).
(4) Mahkamah ini mendapati bahawa tidak masuk akal bagi pelarian atau
warga asing (bukan warganegara Malaysia dalam pemohon kategori G
kedua) yang dalam perjalanan sementara melalui negara ini, untuk
terlebih dahulu mendapatkan perintah dari Mahkamah Syariah sebelum
dia dapat menganut kepercayaan Ahmad. Hal ini adalah tidak praktikal.
Dalam apa jua keadaan, tidak pasti sama ada mereka menganut agama
Islam, seperti yang ditakrifkan dalam undang-undang negara ini, H
sebelum mereka memeluk ajaran mazhab Ahmadi di negara asal mereka
atau tempat lain di luar negara ini. Hakim yang terpelajar berpendapat
bahawa untuk kepercayaan agama mereka ditentukan seperti pada masa
mereka masuk ke negara ini, sama seperti mana-mana orang yang tidak
menganut agama Islam. Apabila mereka mula-mula memasuki wilayah I
Malaysia, dan lebih khusus ke Selangor, mereka sudah menjadi orang
yang tidak menganut agama Islam berdasarkan dua fatwa tersebut. Tidak
kira sama ada orang tersebut adalah Ahmadis sejak lahir atau sama ada
mereka kemudiannya menganutnya, mereka adalah Ahmadi secara asal
 Maqsood Ahmad & Ors v Majlis Agama Islam Selangor &
[2022] 4 ShLR Ors (Vazeer Alam J) 7

A ketika mereka memasuki negara ini. Oleh itu, tiada halangan

undang-undang bagi mereka yang menyertai komuniti Ahmadiyya
kategori pertama dalam amalan agama mereka, seperti yang dilakukan
oleh pemohon No 5 dan 10 pada masa serbuan dan penangkapan (lihat
perenggan 36–38).
B
(5) Setelah meneliti keterangan secara keseluruhan, mahkamah ini
mendapati bahawa pemohon No 1–26 dan 37–39 telah Berjaya untuk
membuktikan kes mereka untuk semakan kehakiman. Keputusan dan
tindakan responden terhadap pemohon No 1–26 dan 37–39 adalah
C melebihi bidang kuasa dan pemohon-pemohon tersebut berhak
mendapat relif yang dipohon. Bagi pemohon No 27–36, mereka
dianggap sebagai orang yang menganut agama Islam sehingga dan
melainkan jika mereka memperoleh perintah dari Mahkamah Syariah.
Dan sehingga mereka memperolehinya, mereka berada di dalam bidang
D kuasa responden (lihat perenggan 39).]]

Cases referred to
Maqsood Ahmad & Ors v Ketua Pegawai Penguatkuasa Agama & Ors [2019] 9
MLJ 596; [2019] 8 CLJ 96, HC (refd)
E MN and others (Ahmadis – country conditions – risk) Pakistan CG [2012]
UKUT 00389 (IAC) (refd)
Rosliza bt Ibrahim v Kerajaan Negeri Selangor & Anor [2021] 2 MLJ 181, FC
(refd)
WA (Pakistan) v Secretary of State for the Home Department (United Nations
F
High Commissioner for Refugees intervening) [2019] EWCA Civ 302, CA
(folld)

Legislation referred to
G Administration of the Religion of Islam (State of Selangor) Enactment 2003
ss 49, 97, 97(2)
Courts of Judicature Act 1964 s 84
Enakmen Pentadbiran Hukum Syarak Selangor 1952 s 41
Federal Constitution arts 5, 8, 11, Schedule 9, List II, item 1
H Syariah Courts (Criminal Jurisdiction) Act 1965
Aston Paiva (with Michael Cheah Ern Tien) (Amerbon) for the applicant.
Hasnan bin Hamzah (with Qushwa Hasnan) (Hasnan Hamzah) for the first and
fourth respondents.
I Muhammad Haziq bin Hashim (Selangor State Legal Advisor) for the second,
third and fifth respondents.
8 Shariah Law Reports [2022] 4 ShLR

Vazeer Alam J: A

[1] This is an application for judicial review by the applicants against the
decision of the Ketua Pegawai Penguatkuasa Agama, ie the Chief Religious
Enforcement Officer of Selangor (the second respondent) to issue letters of
agreement and bond against each of them; compelling them to appear before B
the Syariah Court on pain of monetary penalty for proceedings in respect of an
offence under s 97(2) of the Administration of the Religion of Islam (State of
Selangor) Enactment 2003 (‘the ARIE’); instituted by the Ketua Pendakwa
Syarie, ie the Chief Syarie Prosecutor of Selangor (the fifth respondent).
C

[2] By way of background, the following facts are relevant. On Friday the
11 April 2014 at around 2pm, officers of the Jabatan Agama Islam Selangor
(‘JAIS’), ie the fourth respondents, raided premises at No 16-2, Dolomite Park
Avenue, Jalan Batu Caves, 68100 Selangor (‘the premises’) which was being D
privately used by the applicants to perform their prayers. The raiding officers
were informed that all those present at the premises were members of the
Ahmadiyya Muslim Jama’at religious group (translated in English as the
Ahmadiyya Muslim Community) (‘the Jama’at’).
E
[3] Following the raid on the premises:
(a) the applicants were informed that they had not obtained written
permission to use the premises for purposes which may only be carried
on, in or by a mosque, contrary to s 97 of the ARIE; F
(b) all 39 applicants, comprising 36 adult members of the Jama’at and three
of their children, who were present at the premises, were arrested,
detained and threatened with prosecution in the Syariah Court; and
(c) the applicants were then all issued with letters of agreement and bond G
(‘the bond’) by the second respondent, the Chief Religious Enforcement
Officer, which compels them to appear before the Syariah Court on pain
of monetary penalty.

[4] On 10 July 2014, the applicants filed an application for leave to H

commence judicial review in respect of issuance of the letters of agreement and
bond (‘bond’) to each of them. On 14 August 2014, leave was granted by the
High Court in Malaya at Kuala Lumpur. On 15 September 2015, the judicial
review proceedings were transferred to the High Court in Malaya at Shah
Alam. On 5 February 2016, a stay of proceedings was granted in relation to the I
bond till the determination of the judicial review.

[5] On 29 September 2017 pursuant to s 84 of the Courts of Judicature Act

1964, the High Court at Shah Alam stayed the applicants’ judicial review
 Maqsood Ahmad & Ors v Majlis Agama Islam Selangor &
[2022] 4 ShLR Ors (Vazeer Alam J) 9

A proceedings, and stated a special case with two constitutional questions and
transmitted the same to the Federal Court for its decision.

[6] These two constitutional questions were:

B 1. In light of Item 9 (read together with the sub-matter ‘mosques or any Islamic
public places of worship’ in Item 1) of the State List in the Federal Constitution and
section 2 of the Syariah Courts (Criminal Jurisdiction) Act 1965, whether the
Syariah courts in the State of Selangor do not have jurisdiction in respect of the
offence in s 97(2) of the Administration of the Religion of Islam (State of Selangor)
C Enactment 2003.
2. If the above is answered in the negative: In light of ‘Fatwa Tentang Ajaran
Ahmadiah/Qadiani’ gazetted as Jil 51, No 20, Sel PU 15 on 24 September 1998,
‘Pindaan Fatwa Tentang Ajaran Ahmadiah/Qadiani’ gazetted as Jil 53, No 17, Sel
PU 36 on 17 August 2000 and art 11 (read together with Item 1 of the State List)
D of the Federal Constitution, whether the Syariah courts in the State of Selangor do
not have jurisdiction over members of the Ahmadiyya Muslim Jama’at religious
group (translated in English as the ‘Ahmadiyya Muslim Community’) including the
Applicants.

E The said questions in effect concern the jurisdiction of the Syariah Courts in
respect of ‘offences’ as regards to ‘mosques or any Islamic public places of
worship’, and the Syariah Court’s jurisdiction over members of the Ahmadiyya
Muslim Jama’at religious group, ie the Jama’at.
F [7] However, on 26 March 2018, the Federal Court remitted the said
constitutional reference to the High Court without answering the questions on
the basis that the High Court has jurisdiction to hear and dispose-off these
constitutional issues.
G
[8] Learned counsel on both sides of the divide were of the common view
that the answers to these two constitutional questions would in effect
dispose-off this judicial review application wherein the applicants were seeking
the following substantive remedy:
H (a) Declarasi bahawa menurut seksyen 49 Enakmen Pentadbiran Agama
Islam (Negeri Selangor) 2003 dibaca dengan ‘Penetapan di bawah seksyen
41 Enakmen Pentadbiran Hukum Syarak bagi Negeri Selangor’ bertarikh
11 April 1977 [JPM (U) W.P. 0172/6/1; PN. (PU) 197] yang diwartakan
sebagai P.U. (B) 279 dan ‘Fatwa tentang ajaran Ahmadiah/Qadiani di
I bawah Enakmen Pentadbiran Perundangan Islam 1989’ bertarikh
22.6.1998[JAI. Sel 8069/2: PU. Sel. AGM/0007 Jld 2] yang diwartakan
sebagai Sel. P.U. 15 pada 24.9.1998 (Jil. 51. No. 20. Tambahan No. 6),
Responden-Responden tidak mempunyai bidangkuasa untuk menyiasat
dan/atau mendakwa Pemohon-Pemohon atau setiap satu daripada
mereka.
10 Shariah Law Reports [2022] 4 ShLR

(b) Deklarasi bahawa tindakan dan/atau keputusan Responden-Responden A

dan kakitangan-kakitangannya, pegawai-pegawainya dan/atau
agen-agennya untuk menyiasat dan/atau mencadangkan pendakwaan
dan/atau mendakwa Pemohon-Pemohon atau setiap satu daripada
mereka adalah bercanggah dengan hak-hak Pemohon-Pemohon di bawah
Fasal-Fasal 5 dan/atau 8 dan/atau 11 dan/atau Item 1, Senarai II, Jadual B
Ke-9 Perlembagaan Persekutuan dan/atau seksyen 49 Enakmen
Pentadbiran Agama Islam (Negeri Selangor) 2003.
(c) Perintah bersifat pembatalan (certiorari) keputusan
Responden-Responden dan kakitangan-kakitangannya,
pegawai-pegawainya dan/atau agen-agennya untuk menjalankan C
penyiasatan atau meneruskan penyiasatan dan/atau meneruskan
pendakwaan yang dicadangkan terhadap dan/atau mendakwa
Pemohon-Pemohon atau setiap satu daripada mereka.
(d) Perintah bersifat pembatalan (certiorari) keputusan
Responden-Responden Ke-2, Ke-3 dan Ke-4 untuk mengeluarkan ‘Surat D
Perjanjian dan Jaminan kepada Ketua Pegawai Pengkuatkuasaan Agama’
masing-masing bertarikh 11 April 2014 kepada Pemohon-Pemohon
Ke-11; 14 April 2014 kepada Pemohon-Pemohon Ke-33; 15 April 2014
kepada Pemohon-Pemohon Ke-2, 3, 4, 7, 9, 14, 19, 20, 35 dan 39;
16 April 2014 kepada Pemohon-Pemohon Ke-10, 15, 18, 21, 22, 23, 25, E
26, 27, 29, 34, 36 dan 38; dan 17 April 2014 kepada Pemohon-Pemohon
Ke-5, 6, 8, 12, 13, 16, 17, 24, 28, 30, 31, 32, dan 37.
(e) Perintah bersifat mandamus terhadap Responden-Responden untuk
melaksanakan penetapan di bawah seksyen 41 Enakmen Pentadbiran
Hukum Syarak bagi Negeri Selangor’ bertarikh 11 April 1977 [JPM (U) F
W.P. 0172/6/1; PN. (PU) 197] yang diwartakan sebagai P.U. (B) 279 dan
‘Fatwa tentang ajaran Ahmadiah/Qadiani di bawah Enakmen
Pentadbiran Perundangan Islam 1989’ bertarikh 22.6.1998 [JAI. Sel
8069/2: PU. Sel. AGM/0007 Jld 2] yang diwartakan sebagai Sel. P.U. 15
pada 24.9.1998 (Jil. 51. No. 20. Tambahan No. 6), terhadap penyiasatan
dan/atau pendakwaan atau pendakwaan yang dicadangkan ke atas kes-kes G
Pemohon-Pemohon dan selanjutnya untuk membatalkan dan/atau
mengugurkan penyiasatan dan/atau pendakwaan atau pendakwaan yang
dicadangkan tersebut.
(f) Perintah bersifat larangan (prohibition) terhadap Responden-Responden
H
Ke-2, Ke-3 dan Ke-4 dan kakitangan-kakitangannya,
pegawai-pegawainya dan/atau agen-agennya daripada menjalankan
penyiasatan atau meneruskan penyiasatan terhadap Pemohon-Pemohon
atau setiap satu daripada mereka.
(g) Secara alternative perintah bersifat larangan (prohibition) terhadap I
Responden-Responden Ke-2, Ke-3 dan Ke-4 dan
kakitangan-kakitangannya, pegawai-pegawainya dan/atau agen-agennya
daripada menjalankan penyiasatan atau meneruskan penyiasatan
dan/atau meneruskan terhadap Pemohon-Pemohon atau setiap satu
daripada mereka sekiranya Pemohon-Pemohon atau setiap satu daripada
 Maqsood Ahmad & Ors v Majlis Agama Islam Selangor &
[2022] 4 ShLR Ors (Vazeer Alam J) 11

A mereka mengemukakan bukti atau keterangan kepada

Responden-Responden Ke-2, Ke-3 dan Ke-4 bahawa mereka adalah
pengikut-pengikut ajaran Ahmadiah/Qadiani.
(h) Perintah bersifat larangan (prohibition) terhadap Responden-Responden
Ke-2, Ke-3 dan Ke-4 dan kakitangan-kakitangannya,
B pegawai-pegawainya dan/atau agen-agennya daripada mengambil
langkah-langkah untuk mendakwa dan/atau meneruskan pendakwaan
yang dicadangkan terhadap Pemohon-Pemohon atau setiap satu daripada
mereka.

C (i) Deklarasi bahawa kesemua orang (samada warganegara atau bukan

warganegara Malaysia) yang mengakui (professing)
kepercayaan-kepercayaan dan doktrin-doktrin Jemaat Ahmadiyah
Muslim atau Ahmadiyya Muslim Community adalah berhak untuk
mengakui dan mengamalkan (profess and practise) agama mereka di
negeri Selangor, dan kesemua undang-undang yang dibuat menurut
D Jadual Ke-9 Senarai II Item 1 Perlembagaan Persekutuan di negeri
Selangor tidak terpakai dan tidak mempunyai kesan ke atas orang-orang
yang seumpama.

E [9] I heard the application for judicial review and also considered the two
constitutional questions raised and decided in favour of the applicants, and
granted orders in terms of the prayers in the application. The respondents
appealed that decision.

F [10] The Court of Appeal allowed the appeal in part and remitted the matter
to the High Court for me to reconsider the status of all the applicants as
Ahmadis, and ascertain whether they were Ahmadis by original faith or
whether there are amongst them those who had renounced Islam to adopt the
Ahmadiyya faith.
G
[11] Thus, I was directed by the Court of Appeal to undertake a factual
examination of the religious status of the applicants, in order to determine if
they would be persons caught by the two fatwas, namely, ‘Fatwa Tentang
Ajaran Ahmadiah/Qadiani’ gazetted as Jil 51, No 20, Sel PU 15 on
H
24 September 1998, and ‘Pindaan Fatwa Tentang Ajaran Ahmadiah/Qadiani’
gazetted as Jil 53, No 17, Sel PU 36 on 17 August 2000 (‘the two fatwas’).

[12] In so ordering, the Court of Appeal made the following observation in

I its judgment:
[183] We have already noted that the learned judge did not undertake an evidential
analysis to determine whether the respondents or any one of them is either an Ahmadi by
original belief or an Ahmadi by reason of his or her renunciation of the religion of Islam.
Naturally, as the point was not canvassed in the court below, neither the appellants nor
12 Shariah Law Reports [2022] 4 ShLR

the respondents made any submissions as to the factual status of any of the respondents in A
the High Court.
[184] Before us, the issue was one of law, that is, whether the fact that some of the
respondents’ MyKads label them as ‘Islam’ has any legal effect on their religious
status. What is clear is that it does not but nonetheless, as the judgments by our courts
have made clear, such as that in Kamariah Ali (supra), whether the respondents or any B
one of them is actually an Ahmadi by birth or by renunciation of the Islamic faith, poses
a real issue. (Emphasis added.)

[13] The reason for that direction by the Court of Appeal is found in
C
paras 190–192 of the court’s judgment:
[190] In respect of Appeal 468, premised on prayer (g) of the respondents’
application for judicial review, the respondents’ case at it is themselves are willing to
accept that the relief may be contingent upon them adducing proof that they are
followers of the Ahmadiyya faith. Accordingly, for the reasons already indicated, we D
allow Appeal 468 in part and the order of the High Court in Appeal 468 is hereby
set aside.
[191] We accordingly remit the matter of Appeal 468 to the High Court to allow
parties to make further submissions on the evidence already on record in accordance
with prayer (g) of the respondents’ application for judicial review. For expediency, E
we hereby direct that the matter be fixed for case management at the High Court of
Shah Alam forthwith.
[192] For the avoidance of doubt, should the respondents or any of them make their
case by cogent and credible supporting evidence that they are Ahmadiyya, then the High
Court has the discretion to grant them the reliefs they seek to quash and prohibit all F
Syariah investigation and prosecution against them or further relief relevant to the
successful enforcement of that order.

[14] Now, as to the nature of prayer (g) in the applicant’s judicial review
G
application alluded to by the Court of Appeal and what it entailed, the Court
of Appeal had this to say:
[158] We also note that one of the prayers of the respondents sought in their
application for judicial review is prayer (g) which we reproduced as follows:
(g) In the alternative, an order in the nature of prohibition against the first, H
second and third appellants and their servants, officers and/or agents from
conducting investigations or continuing investigations against the respondents
or each of them if the respondents or each of them procures proof or evidence to the
first, second and fourth appellants that they are followers of the teachings of the
Ahmadiah/Qadiani. (Emphasis added.) I
[159] Premised on the above prayer, the respondents themselves had indicated their
amenability to be subjected to an investigatory process to prove that they are indeed
Ahmadiyya. Thus, in our considered view, the learned judge should have allowed an
investigation into the respondents’ religious status. With respect, in our view, the learned
 Maqsood Ahmad & Ors v Majlis Agama Islam Selangor &
[2022] 4 ShLR Ors (Vazeer Alam J) 13

A judge erred in finding the Religious Enforcement Officers had exceeded their jurisdiction
simply on the assumption that all the respondents are indeed Ahmadi without making
the distinction as to whether they are of the Ahmadiyyah faith by origin or by conversion
from Islam. (Emphasis added.)

B [15] In this regard, the Court of Appeal added:

[171] For the foregoing reasons, we are of the considered view that the burden to
establish that the respondents herein are indeed Ahmadiyya lies on them because
their faith is a fact especially within their knowledge.
C [172] We pause for a moment to note that this ‘peculiarity’, arises specifically in this
case because the Ahmadiyyah consider themselves as Muslims though the law of
Selangor says they are not. The difficulty, is that we do not know, on the facts of this case
whether the respondents are Ahmadi by original faith or whether there are among them
any one who had renounced Islam to adopt the Ahmadi faith. If say a Christian or a
D Hindu were to convert to become an Ahmadi, it would unlikely be an issue whether
he had renounced his Christian or Hindu faith before he adopted the Ahmadi faith
subsequently. This is why a factual examination of the religious status of the
respondents, which the learned judge failed to undertake, is necessary.
…
E
[178] Thus, given the systemic issues in our Federal Constitution, we think the
approach taken by the court below was, with respect, incorrect. The learned judge
presumed that the respondents in the present case are indeed, Ahmadiyya without
due regard to the averments by the relevant officer of the third appellant that the
appellants are unable to conclude that the respondents are of the Ahmadiyya
F community. Without such a factual determination, the court would be unable to
determine whether the applicant is a genuine Ahmadiyya or an apostate. This distinction
is important because the courts must rule in accordance with the law which includes the
Federal Constitution and the ARIE 2003. (Emphasis added.)

G [16] Hence, the importance of the determination as to whether the person is

professing the religion of Islam is underscored by the legal implications that
flow from that characterisation. The underlying legal rationale for that
direction by the Court of Appeal can be gleaned from the following passage in
the judgment of Badariah Sahamid JCA speaking for the court:
H
[119] Given the strict technicalities of the law on this sensitive subject, we seek to
avoid any potential doubt or confusion. At this juncture, we seek to make the
following points clear:
(i) The freedom of religion is an absolute and non-derogable right save for the
I express limitations that the Federal Constitution itself allows. This for one
is art 11(4) on the prohibition of proselytisation of any religion other than
Islam to those professing the religion of Islam and the strict restriction
being the one stipulated in art 11(5).
(ii) The freedom of religion applicable to non-Muslims does not apply with
14 Shariah Law Reports [2022] 4 ShLR

equal force to Muslims. This is because being a Muslim confers one a legal A
status and changes the entire regime of personal law applicable to them. It also
allows the State to enact offences specifically catered to Muslims under item 1
of List II of the Ninth Schedule. This is supported by the difference in
language in item 1 which is relatively more narrowly worded to include all
those ‘professing’ the religion of Islam whereas art. 11(1) uses the more B
liberal phrase ‘profess and practise’.
(iii) Therefore, the term Islam for all intents and purposes inasmuch as it is a
religious belief, is also a legal label demarcating between those who can
and cannot seek recourse in and be tried (as the case may be) before the
Syariah Courts. Section 74(2) of the ARIE 2003 and all related legislation of C
other States exist to presume that a person originally a Muslim is presumed to
be a Muslim until and unless he seeks an order of the Syariah Court stating
otherwise.
(iv) If a person is born and raised as a Muslim (whether he chooses to practise his
beliefs or not), he is in law a person ‘professing the religion of Islam’. Should he D
change his religion from Islam to Ahmadiyya, just as if he were to attempt to
renounce Islam for any other faith, he cannot do so unless by order of the
Syariah Court as prescribed by the relevant State law. Thus, any renunciation
of the Islamic faith is within the jurisdiction of the Syariah Courts.
(v) The legal label of being a Muslim also has other legal effects. For one, it E
determines whether one is constitutionally a Malay or not and a fortiori
whether such a person is entitled to the special position under art 153 of the
Federal Constitution. This point is also made in the 2000 fatwa specifically in
respect of the Ahmadiyya community.
(vi) The 1998 and 2000 fatwas essentially removed the legal status of the F
Ahmadiyya community as persons ‘professing the religion of Islam’.
Having lost that label, they cannot therefore be taken as persons or a class
of persons being subject to the exclusive jurisdiction of the Syariah Courts
prescribed in item 1, List II of the Ninth Schedule of the Federal
Constitution. G

[17] Hence, the present exercise is limited to the factual ascertainment of

whether the applicants were of the Ahmadiyya faith by origin, such as birth, or
were subsequent adherents of the faith having left mainstream Islam as
practiced in Malaysia. This court is seized with jurisdiction to determine those H
in the first category, whilst if they are adherents of the Ahmadiyya faith having
originally been persons who professed the religion of Islam as defined in the
relevant statute, then the determination of that status belongs exclusively to the
Syariah Courts. This jurisdictional dichotomy was reiterated by the Federal
Court in Rosliza bt Ibrahim v Kerajaan Negeri Selangor & Anor [2021] 2 MLJ I
181, where the court stated that there is:
… a significant distinction between ‘one who no longer professes the religion of
Islam’ and ‘one who never professes the religion of Islam’. The former refers to
renunciation cases which therefore fall within the jurisdiction of the Syariah Courts,
 Maqsood Ahmad & Ors v Majlis Agama Islam Selangor &
[2022] 4 ShLR Ors (Vazeer Alam J) 15

A whilst the latter, described as ab initio cases, fall within the jurisdiction of the Civil
Courts. The Civil Courts would have jurisdiction over the ab initio cases as the issue
is not one of faith but of one’s identity under the FC.

[18] Hence, if the applicants, or any one of them, can establish by cogent
B evidence that he or she did not profess the religion of Islam at the time of arrest,
which includes Ahmadis by virtue of the two fatwas, then the civil courts,
including this High Court, would have jurisdiction to make that
determination and declare them to be so. Such applicants would for the
purposes of the present exercise include those who were Ahmadis by birth.
C
However, if any of the applicants, were not Ahmadis by birth, and were persons
professing the religion of Islam before embracing the tenets and doctrinal
beliefs of the Ahmadiyya sect, then such persons would be deemed to no longer
profess the religion of Islam, and would come under the category of
D renunciation cases, which would be within the jurisdiction of the Syariah
Courts to make that determination.

[19] It must be noted that of the 39 applicants herein, 28 are Malaysians

(two of whom are minors), eight are Pakistani (one of whom is a minor), two
E are Indian and one Indonesian. The evidence in relation to each of the
applicant is voluminous as lengthy affidavits have been filed by them asserting
their status as members of the Ahmadiyya faith. On the other hand, the
affidavit of Nurhelmi bin Ikhsan, filed on behalf of the respondents, doubts the
Ahmadi status of the applicants. Parties submitted at length on the issue.
F
[20] Now, to determine this issue, I have taken guidance from the
pronouncement of the English Court of Appeal in WA (Pakistan) v Secretary of
State for the Home Department (United Nations High Commissioner for Refugees
intervening) [2019] EWCA Civ 302 (‘WA (Pakistan)’), that was referred to by
G
the Court of Appeal in their judgment in the instant case. The WA (Pakistan)
case referred to another case, that is, MN and others (Ahmadis – country
conditions – risk) Pakistan CG [2012] UKUT 00389 (IAC), where at headnote
5 it was stated as follows:
H In light of the above, the first question the decision-maker must ask is (1) whether
the claimant genuinely is an Ahmadi. As with all judicial fact-finding the judge will
need to reach conclusions on all the evidence as a whole giving such weight to
aspects of that evidence as appropriate in accordance with Article 4 of the
Qualification Directive. This is likely to include an enquiry whether the claimant
I was registered with an Ahmadi community in Pakistan and worshipped and
engaged there on a regular basis. Post-arrival activity will also be relevant. Evidence
likely to be relevant includes confirmation from the UK Ahmadi headquarters
regarding the activities relied on in Pakistan and confirmation from the local
community in the UK where the claimant is worshipping.
16 Shariah Law Reports [2022] 4 ShLR

[21] These English cases dealt with the determination of one’s religious faith A
for the purposes of deciding on an asylum seekers application to be allowed
into and reside in the United Kingdom. The English Court of Appeal had
enjoined the tribunal of fact to reach conclusions based on the evidence as a
whole, giving such weight to aspects of that evidence as appropriate, and in
particular taking into consideration whether the applicant was registered with B
an Ahmadi community within locality and worshipped and engaged there on
a regular basis. Confirmation of that fact from the local community where the
applicant is congregating for worship would be a relevant consideration.
C
[22] Having considered the submissions and the supporting evidence in the
voluminous affidavits, I find that the applicants can generally be divided into
two categories, namely, those who were born Ahmadis (‘First Category’), and
those who later in life became Ahmadis (‘Second Category’).
D
[23] The applicants in the Second Category in turn may be divided into
several sub-categories, namely:
(a) Malaysians;
(b) foreigners, who are legally residing in Malaysia; and E
(c) foreigners, who are refugees recognised by the UNHCR.

[24] The uncontroverted evidence shows that except for applicants Nos 5,
10 and 27–36, who became members of the Ahmadiyya sect sometime during F
their lifetime (Second Category), the rest of the applicants were born to
Ahmadi parents (First Category). Hence, applicants Nos 1–4, 6–9, 11–26 and
37–39, who are in the First Category had been followers of the Ahmadiyya sect
since birth. Thus, they are Ahmadis by original faith and not persons professing
the religion of Islam. Thus, the question of them renouncing Islam does not G
arise. They would for reasons given in my earlier judgment, be beyond the
reach of the respondents’ jurisdiction.

[25] There is overwhelming evidence showing that applicants No 1–4, 6–9,

11–26 and 37–39, are part of the Ahmadiyya community in Malaysia. I have H
delved in some detail on the historical presence of the Ahmadiyya community
in Malaysia. This is summarised in para [76] of my earlier judgment that is
reported as Maqsood Ahmad & Ors v Ketua Pegawai Penguatkuasa Agama &
Ors [2019] 9 MLJ 596; [2019] 8 CLJ 96:
I
[76] The existence of the Ahmadiyya community in Selangor, since at least from the
1950s, is a fact that was well known to the Selangor State Religious Authorities. The
Ahmadis were declared as non-Muslims after a hearing before HRH The Sultan of
Selangor in 1953. Thereafter, separate burial grounds for Ahmadis were reserved on
State land by the Selangor State Government. Then, sometime in 1963, the
 Maqsood Ahmad & Ors v Majlis Agama Islam Selangor &
[2022] 4 ShLR Ors (Vazeer Alam J) 17

A Ahmadiyya community were moved from Kampung Baru in Kuala Lumpur and
resettled in Kampung Nakhoda, Batu Caves, on several plots of land given to the
community by the Malaysian Government, by the good office of the then Prime
Minister Tunku Abdul Rahman. Thereafter, the two fatwas, namely, ‘Fatwa Tentang
Ajaran Ahmadiah/Qadiani’ gazetted as Jil 51, No 20, Sel PU 15 on 24 September
B 1998, and the ‘Pindaan Fatwa Tentang Ajaran Ahmadiah/Qadiani’ gazetted as Jil
53, No 17, Sel PU 36 on 17 August 2000 were published declaring the members of
the Jama’at as non-Muslims. The Selangor State Religious Authorities knew well of
the Jama’at’s religious activities at their base in Kampung Nakhoda and this is
evidenced by the signboards erected around the ‘Bait-us-Salam’ notifying the public
that ‘Qadiani is not Islam’ and also by the notice of prohibition issued by the MAIS
C
in 2009 to the Jama’at to cease all prayer activities on the premises. The applicants
were then forced to conduct their prayers at the rented premises. There is no
evidence of the applicants being a nuisance or being a cause of concern in respect of
public order and security. They were peacefully conducting their religious affairs.
D
[26] The government of Malaysia had recognised the Ahmadiyya Jama’at as
a distinct community and had given them land in Batu Caves for the purposes
of their religious activities. These First Category applicants regularly
worshipped together with the larger Ahmadiyya community, particularly at
E their ‘Bait-us-Salam’ base at Kampung Nakhoda, Batu Caves, where they have
been carrying out their religious practices for some years, including
congregational prayers within the compound. Jabatan Agama Islam Selangor,
the fourth respondent, knew well of the activities of the Ahmadiyya Jama’at at
‘Bait-us-Salam’, and had erected or caused to be erected by the Majlis
F Perbandaran Selayang sometime in 2005 three signboards in front and to the
side of ‘Bait-us-Salam’, identifying it as ‘Bait-us-Salam’ and a further three
signboards around Kampung Nakhoda, Batu Caves, with the words, ‘Qadiani
Bukan Agama Islam’ — a phrase meaning that the Ahmadiyya belief is not
Islam. Hence, there is express recognition by the fourth respondent of the
G existence of the members of the Ahmadiyya Jama’at in Selangor, and that the
Ahmadis practised their religious beliefs in peaceful congregation at the
‘Bait-us-Salam’. The fourth respondent clearly regarded the Ahmadis gathering
for their religious practices at the ‘Bait-us-Salam’ as persons professing the
religion of Islam.
H
[27] These applicants had congregated at ‘Bait-us-Salam’ until April 2009,
when they received a letter from Majlis Agama Islam Selangor (‘MAIS’) stating
that the applicants could not use the ‘Bait-us-Salam’ as a place of worship or to
perform any prayers therein without prior written approval from MAIS.
I
[28] Not wanting any confrontation with the authorities, the Ahmadis
stopped using the ‘Bait-us-Salam’ as a place of worship and relocated
themselves to the premises, solely for prayer and worship purposes. When the
arrest of the applicants took place it was at this premises, which the respondents
18 Shariah Law Reports [2022] 4 ShLR

knew very well was the congregational place of worship for the Ahmadiyya A
community, after having forced their relocation from Kampung Nakhoda.

[29] On Friday 11 April 2014 at around 2pm, officers of the Jabatan Agama
Islam Selangor (‘JAIS’), ie, the fourth respondent, raided the premises, which
was being privately used by the applicants to perform their congregational B
prayers. The raiding officers were informed that all those present at the
premises were members of the Ahmadiyya Muslim Jama’at religious group.
However, these protestations fell on deaf ears, and the raiding party proceeded
to arrest all the applicants who were gathered at the premises.
C

[30] Hence, not only by birth, but also by their lifelong association with the
Ahmadiyya Muslim Jama’at, the First Category applicants, namely applicants
Nos 1–4, 6–9, 11–26 and 37–39 have clearly demonstrated to the satisfaction
of this court that they are members of the Ahmadiyya Jama’at and that they are D
Ahmadis who would be deemed to be persons not professing Islam by virtue of
the two fatwas.

[31] The Second Category applicants, that is applicants Nos 5, 10 and

27–36, on the other hand, are those who were not born into Ahmadi families, E
but had subsequently come to adopt the Ahmadiyya faith. The evidence
adduced shows that these Second Category applicants, who had adopted the
Ahmadi faith in later part of their lives, had been adherents of the sect for a
considerable period of time. Some are Malaysians, while some are foreigners
who are either legally in the country or as refugees. They regularly worshipped F
together with the Ahmadi community in Malaysia, particularly at the
‘Bait-us-Salam’ base at Kampung Nakhoda, Batu Caves, where they have been
carrying out their religious practices, including prayers within the compound,
before relocating to the premises. The evidence, on a balance of probabilities,
establishes the fact these Second Category applicants are also followers of the G
Ahmadiyya sect. However, whether that by itself is sufficient to establish in law
that they are also persons affected by the two fatwas, and thus beyond the
jurisdiction of the respondents is another matter.

[32] The subject matter of the present exercise is the determination of H

whether the applicants are or are not Muslims under the law, ie particularly for
the purposes of any offence under the Administration of the Religion of Islam
(State of Selangor) Enactment 2003 (‘the ARIE’) and the Syariah Courts
(Criminal Jurisdiction) Act 1965.
I
[33] The applicants in the Second Category, who are Malaysians, and who
were persons who professed the religion of Islam, and who had subsequently
embraced the Ahmadiyya teachings will definitely fall within the renunciation
cases, ie ‘one who no longer professes the religion of Islam’. Despite their
 Maqsood Ahmad & Ors v Majlis Agama Islam Selangor &
[2022] 4 ShLR Ors (Vazeer Alam J) 19

A adherence to the Ahmadiyya faith, the law deems such persons to be persons
who profess the religion of Islam, until and unless they obtain an order of
renunciation of Islam from the Syariah Courts. This is a necessary requirement
of the law as expressed by the Federal Court in several judgments, the most
recent of which was in Rosliza’s case.
B
[34] Thus, the applicants in the Second Category who are Malaysians fall
squarely within the renunciation cases, ie ‘one who no longer professes the
religion of Islam’. They would still come within the jurisdiction of the
respondents, until and unless they obtain on order from the Syariah Court to
C
the effect that they are followers of the Ahmadi sect, and/or are persons affected
by the two fatwas, and/or are no longer persons professing the religion of Islam.
Those falling within this category would be applicants Nos 27–36.

D [35] Now whether, the non-Malaysians within the Second Category

applicants are also required to obtain such an order from the Syariah Court is
less clear. There are two such applicants, namely, applicants Nos 5 and 10.
Having given it some thought, I find that it does not make sense for a refugee
or a foreigner who is on a transient journey through the country, to first get an
E order from the Syariah Court before he/she can join the local Ahmadi
congregation in their prayers and religious practices. That’s just impractical. In
any event, it is not even certain if such persons were professing the religion of
Islam, as defined in our statutes, before they embraced the teachings of the
Ahmadi sect in their country of origin or some other place beyond our shores.
F In this regard, I had observed in my earlier judgment as follows:
Should every foreigner who professes to be an Ahmadi be also required to make an
application to the Syariah Court after he enters the country if he intends to
participate in the religious rituals and prayers of the Jama’at. Surely not. When the
religious authorities have by law excommunicated a sect from the state-recognised
G mainstream or dominant orthodox Islam, then by implication all members of that
sect would not be members of the State-sanctioned mainstream orthodox Islam, ie,
Ahlul Sunnah Wa Jamaah.

[36] As far as such persons are concerned, I am of view that a more

H reasonable legal construct would be for their religious belief to be determine as
at the time of their entry into the country, just as we would for any person not
professing the religion of Islam. Just as we do not require any non-Muslim
entering the country to get proof of their status from the Syariah Court, we
should not require a foreigner professing to be an Ahmadi to first get an order
I from the Syariah Court. When such a person upon entering the country
declares himself to be an Ahmadi, and there is evidence in support of that, he
would for all intents and purposes be Ahmadi by origin when entering the
country. Such persons would, thus, come within the ambit of the two fatwas,
and as such be regarded as persons not professing the religion of Islam when
20 Shariah Law Reports [2022] 4 ShLR

they entered the country. In the circumstance, it would be sufficient to classify A

them as members of the Ahmadi community by origin, and they would thus be
beyond the reach of the respondent’s jurisdiction.

[37] This court is seized with jurisdiction to make that determination

according to the principles enunciated in Rosliza’s case, for when they first B
entered into Malaysian territory, and more specifically into Selangor, they were
already persons who were not professing the religion of Islam by virtue of the
two fatwas. To my mind, it does not matter whether such persons were
Ahmadis by birth or whether they had subsequently embraced it, they are
C
Ahmadi by origin when they entered the country. In the premise, there should
not be any legal impediment for such persons joining the First Category
Ahmadiyya community in their religious practices, as applicants Nos 5 and 10
were doing at the time of the raid and arrest.
D
[38] Having considered the evidence as a whole, I find that applicants
Nos 1–26 and 37–39 have established their case for judicial review. The
decision and action of the respondents against applicants Nos 1–26 and 37–39
are in excess of jurisdiction and these applicants are entitled to the reliefs prayed
for. As for applicants Nos 27–36, they are deemed to be persons professing the E
religion of Islam until and unless they obtain an order from the Syariah Court
to the contrary. And until they do they would be within the jurisdiction of the
respondents.

[39] Wherefore, I make the following orders: F

(a) deklarasi bahawa menurut s 49 Enakmen Pentadbiran Agama Islam (Negeri

Selangor) 2003 dibaca dengan ‘penetapan di bawah s 41 Enakmen
Pentadbiran Hukum Syarak 1952 bagi Negeri Selangor’ bertarikh 11 April
1977 (JPM (U) WP 0172/6/1; PN (PU) 197) yang diwartakan sebagai PU G
(B) 279 dan ‘Fatwa tentang ajaran Ahmadiah/Qadiani di bawah Enakmen
Pentadbiran Perundangan Islam 1989’ bertarikh 22 June 1998 (JAI Sel
8069/2: PU Sel AGM/0007 Jld 2) yang diwartakan sebagai Sel PU 15 pada
24 September 1998 (Jil 51 No 20 Tambahan No 6), responden-responden
tidak mempunyai bidangkuasa untuk menyiasat dan/atau mendakwa H
pemohon-pemohon No 1–26 dan 37 hingga 39 atau setiap satu daripada
mereka, manakala untuk pemohon-pemohon 27 hingga 36 deklarasi ini
hanya terpakai sekiranya mereka memperolehi perintah daripada
Mahkamah Syariah bahawa mereka adalah pengikut ajaran Ahmadiah
atau termasuk dalam ‘Fatwa tentang ajaran Ahmadiah/Qadiani di bawah I
Enakmen Pentadbiran Perundangan Islam 1989’ bertarikh 22 June 1998
(JAI Sel 8069/2: PU Sel AGM/0007 Jld 2);
(b) deklarasi bahawa tindakan dan/atau keputusan responden-responden dan
kakitangan-kakitangannya, pegawai-pegawainya dan/atau agen-agennya
 Maqsood Ahmad & Ors v Majlis Agama Islam Selangor &
[2022] 4 ShLR Ors (Vazeer Alam J) 21

A untuk menyiasat dan/atau mencadangkan pendakwaan dan/atau

mendakwa pemohon-pemohon No 1–26 dan 37 hingga 39 atau setiap satu
daripada mereka adalah bercanggah dengan hak-hak pemohon-pemohon
No 1–26 dan 37 hingga 39 di bawah fasal-fasal 5 dan/atau 8 dan/atau 11
dan/atau item 1, Senarai II, Jadual Ke-9 Perlembagaan Persekutuan
B dan/atau s 49 Enakmen Pentadbiran Agama Islam (Negeri Selangor) 2003,
manakala untuk pemohon-pemohon 27–36 deklarasi ini hanya terpakai
sekiranya mereka memperolehi Perintah daripada Mahkamah Syariah
bahawa mereka adalah pengikut ajaran Ahmadiah atau termasuk dalam
‘Fatwa tentang ajaran Ahmadiah/Qadiani di bawah Enakmen Pentadbiran
C Perundangan Islam 1989’ bertarikh 22 June 1998 (JAI Sel 8069/2: PU Sel
AGM/0007 Jld 2);
(c) perintah bersifat pembatalan (certiorari) keputusan responden-responden
dan kakitangan-kakitangannya, pegawai-pegawainya dan/atau
D agen-agennya untuk menjalankan penyiasatan atau meneruskan
penyiasatan dan/atau meneruskan pendakwaan yang dicadangkan terhadap
dan/atau mendakwa pemohon-pemohon No 1–26 dan 37–39 atau setiap
satu daripada mereka;
(d) perintah bersifat pembatalan (certiorari) keputusan responden-responden
E kedua, ketiga dan keempat untuk mengeluarkan ‘Surat Perjanjian dan
Jaminan kepada Ketua Pegawai Pengkuatkuasaan Agama’ masing-masing
bertarikh 11 April 2014 kepada Pemohon-pemohon ke-11; 15 April 2014
kepada pemohon-pemohon ke-2–4, 7, 9, 14, 19–20, dan 39; 16 April 2014
kepada pemohon-pemohon ke-10, 15, 18, 21–23, 25–26, dan 38; dan
F 17 April 2014 kepada pemohon-pemohon ke-5, 6, 8, 12–13, 16–17, 24
dan 37;
(e) perintah bersifat mandamus terhadap responden-responden untuk
melaksanakan penetapan di bawah s 41 Enakmen Pentadbiran Hukum
G Syarak bagi Negeri Selangor’ bertarikh 11 April 1977 (JPM (U) WP
0172/6/1; PN (PU) 197) yang diwartakan sebagai PU (B) 279 dan ‘Fatwa
tentang ajaran Ahmadiah/Qadiani di bawah Enakmen Pentadbiran
Perundangan Islam 1989’ bertarikh 22 Jun 1998 (JAI Sel 8069/2: PU Sel
AGM/0007 Jld 2) yang diwartakan sebagai Sel PU 15 pada 24 September
H 1998 (Jil 51 No 20 Tambahan No 6), terhadap penyiasatan dan/atau
pendakwaan atau pendakwaan yang dicadangkan ke atas kes-kes
pemohon-pemohon No 1–26 dan 37–39 dan selanjutnya untuk
membatalkan dan/atau mengugurkan penyiasatan dan/atau pendakwaan
atau pendakwaan yang dicadangkan tersebut;
I (f) perintah bersifat larangan (prohibition) terhadap responden-responden
kedua, ketiga dan keempat dan kakitangan-kakitangannya,
pegawai-pegawainya dan/atau agen-agennya daripada menjalankan
penyiasatan atau meneruskan penyiasatan terhadap pemohon-pemohon
No 1–26 dan 37–39 atau setiap satu daripada mereka;
22 Shariah Law Reports [2022] 4 ShLR

(g) perintah bersifat larangan (prohibition) terhadap responden-responden A

kelima dan kakitangan-kakitangannya, pegawai-pegawainya dan/atau
agen-agennya daripada mengambil langkah-langkah untuk mendakwa
dan/atau meneruskan pendakwaan yang dicadangkan terhadap
pemohon-pemohon No 1–26 dan 37 –39 atau setiap satu daripada mereka;
and B
(h) as this is a matter of public importance, there shall be no order of costs.

Order accordingly.
C
Reported by Muhamad Azham Marwan