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A Case Against
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1. REPORT DATE
2009
4. TITLE AND SUBTITLE
00-00-2009 to 00-00-2009
5a. CONTRACT NUMBER 5b. GRANT NUMBER 5c. PROGRAM ELEMENT NUMBER
6. AUTHOR(S)
5d. PROJECT NUMBER 5e. TASK NUMBER 5f. WORK UNIT NUMBER
National Defense University,Institute for National Strategic Studies,260 Fifth Avenue SW Bg 64 Fort Lesley J. McNair,Washington,DC,20319
9. SPONSORING/MONITORING AGENCY NAME(S) AND ADDRESS(ES)
unclassified
unclassified
unclassified
Theoretical Foundations
The main theoretical underpinnings of SOD are systems theory, Soviet operational art, French postmodern philosophy, social sciences, psychology, architecture and urban planning, and, more recently, ancient Chinese military thinking. The single most important
except for some terms, any of these ideas. The leading theorist of SOD falsely reinterpreted the early Soviet writings on operational art in terms of GST. Supposedly, operational art in contrast to strategy and tactics is systemic in nature.11 This is not the case, however. In the process, Bertalanffys ideas were intentionally or accidentally distorted or misinterpreted.12 A more serious problem is that the Soviet theory of operational art as defined by SOD
Bertalanffy believed there exists a general system of laws that can be applied to any system regardless of the systems properties and the elements involved
element behind SOD is so-called general system theory (GST), first explained by the Austrian biologist Ludwig von Bertalanffy (19011972) in an article in 1945.8 His major work, General System Theory: Foundations, Development, Applications, was not published until 1968. Bertalanffy believed there exists a general system of laws that can be applied to any system regardless of the systems properties and the elements involved. These general laws are broad, diverse, and fluid. He believed the systems elements and their attributes or characteristics can only be understood as fractions of the total system. In other words, SOD proponents view a system in a holistic way.9 Bertalanffys main contribution to system theory was the theory of open systems. In his view, traditional closed systems are based on science and the second law of thermodynamics. Because closed systems are in a steady state, they are not applicable to living organismshence, the need for a general system theory that can be applied to biology, information theory, cybernetics, and social sciences. At the same time, Bertalanffy recognized the difficulties of applying his theory to social science because of the complexities in the intersection between natural sciences and human social systems. His system theory was extended to history, psychiatry, psychology, sociology, education, anthropology, economics, and political science. However, GST is also controversial. Some theorists, in fact, consider it a pseudoscience.10 SOD theory is also supposedly based on the Soviet theory of operational art of the 1920s and 1930s. The apparent reason for this was to impress upon potential supporters that the new concept rests on some viable operational warfare theory. However, despite the claims of its advocates, SOD does not contain, supporters bore almost no resemblance to what the Soviet theorists actually wrote or implied in their numerous published works. The Soviets were given undeserved credit for essentially creating the modern theory of operational warfare. According to the leading SOD proponent, the development of operational art was a neoteric (or modern) field of knowledge provided by the Russian and American examples (actually, the American contribution to the development of operational theory prior to World War II was negligible). For the first time in the history of military thought, an intermediate environment for discourse, which harmoniously bridges the traditional cognitive-conceptual gap between the conventional fields of military knowledge, was discernible.13 To reiterate, the Soviet theory of operational art emerged in the 1920s and 1930s. Soviet military theorists studied the character of modern war by analyzing the experiences of World War I and the Russian Civil War. They grappled with the problem of how to restore mobility and maneuver to the relatively stagnant battlefield. However, it is a matter of historical record that they were also greatly influenced by the major theorists of the Imperial Russian Army, notably General Genrykh A. Leer (18291904) and Colonel Aleksandr A. Neznamov (18781928). Both the Soviet and the Imperial Russian theorists were also influenced by the writings of the German theorists of their era. However, the Soviets were neither groundbreaking nor unique in their approach because similar development took place elsewhere. Western theorists, for example, faced the same dilemmas as their Soviet counterparts but reached different conclusions. Like their Soviet counterparts, French, British, and U.S. theorists
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Tactical air control party Airman coordinates air cover for 10th Mountain Division Soldiers, Afghanistan
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VEGO recognized the true nature of modern operations as a series of battles, although they did not treat the operational level of war as a distinct entity. But they, like the Soviets, recognized that operational results emerged as the sum of the results of tactical combat. B.H. Liddell Hart (18951970), J.F.C. Fuller (18781966), and others developed new concepts of warfare at the operational level. The Germans also developed their so-called Blitzkrieg (or airland) concept in the early and mid-1930s, which they successfully applied at the operational level in 19391942.14 By inappropriately using terms from system theory, the leading SOD proponent argued, the Soviets observed that the dialectical nature of warfare defines the need for a practice of command that perpetuates a learning cycle of model framing-reframing. Therefore, the need to ensure the relevance of a particular kind of warfare necessitates the expansion of the definition of warfare from a mere knowledge of forms to a form of knowledge.15 Allegedly, by establishing a systems orientation to operational art and science, the early Soviet theorists opened the path to using patterns of abstract thought to develop an understanding of rational and logical thinking within the system in being.16 For the leading SOD advocate, the Soviet theory of deep operation (glubokaya operatsiya) seems the gist of all operational art instead of an example of the operational concept for planning and execution of major offensive land operations. A false claim was made that Marshal Mikhail Tukhachevski (18931937) replaced the concept of the battle of annihilation, which dominated European military thinking, with the idea of operational shock (udar) of system disruption. Yet Soviet deep operation theory has nothing to do with system disruption or the Soviet use of that term. Moreover, in Soviet theory and practice, disruption was always a means to facilitate destruction, not substitute for it.17 The fact is that the Soviets did not use system theory terms in their numerous writings on operational art. Their approach to operational warfare was systematic, not systemic; there is a difference between the two. This approach to the study of operational art provided the Soviets the scope and limits of the operational realm and direction for research and a comprehensive methodology for achieving better understanding of preparing for and conducting war at the operational level.18 SOD theory was greatly influenced by the writings of the French postmodern philosophers, specifically Gilles Deleuze (19251995) and Felix Guattari (19301992) and, to a lesser extent, Jean-Francois Lyotard (19241998), Jean Baudrillard (19292007), and Paul Virilio (b. 1932). All these philosophers share to a greater or lesser degree a radical leftist and anti-capitalist ideology.19 Critics have pointed out that the literary style of the French postmodern philosophers is essentially a collection of scientific, pseudoscientific, and philosophical jargon. Deleuzes and Guattaris books contain a handful of intelligible sentences.20 The language is designed to be unintelligible to conceal an absence of honest thought. Baudrillards writings are full of nonsense. Numerous scientific and pseudoscientific terms were inserted into sentences that were devoid of meaning. Postmodern philosophers had a total disregard for the definitions of various terms.21
System Framing
operation Framing
establish strategic context Synthesize strategic guidance describe systemic nature of problem(s) to be solved determine strategic trends identify gaps in knowledge establish assumptions about problem identify operational problem determine initial mission statement obtain approval of problem and mission statement
System Framing
Understanding strategic logic and mission context developing systemic understanding of emerging operational environment
Cognitive transition
mission analysis
describe systemic conditions that command must realize to achieve strategic aims identify campaign objectives identify potential for campaign action
operational Frame
Campaign design
Concept design
Campaign Plan
Campaign Plan
analyze mission and develop course of action Plan operations and logistics assess plan execute plan
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reportedly, even General Halutz did not understand the new doctrine that he signed
but they were much honored. The boundary between EBAO and SOD was blurred.34 There are some contrary views in the United States to this course of events. It is claimed that in early 2006, the new IDF leadership rejected SOD in favor of EBAO and system-of-systems
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VEGO
analysis. Allegedly, all plans based on SOD were shelved and their proponents retired. This, in turn, had dire consequences for the way the Israelis then chose to frame the Hizballah problem they faced that summer.35 Yet Naveh himself stated that the core of the new doctrine for the IDF was the theory of SOD.36 During the Lebanon conflict in July 2006, the major problem the IDF had with SOD was the new terminology and methodology. It was questionable whether the majority of IDF officers could grasp a design that Naveh proclaimed was not easy to understand . . . because [it is] not intended for ordinary mortals.37 Many officers found the entire SOD concept elitist. Other officers could not understand why the old system of simple orders and terminology was replaced by one that few could understand.38 For example, new terms such as strategic directive, strategic purpose, system boundary, operational boundaries, campaign organizing theme, and rival system rationale were overused in place of traditional military terms. Units were ordered to render the enemy incoherent, make the enemy feel distress or chased down, or achieve standoff domination of the theatre. The new vocabulary was heavily drawn from French postmodern philosophy, literary theory, architecture, and psychology. Because of its cryptic character, it is hardly
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surprising that not every officer in the IDF had the time or inclination to study this philosophy.39
linear and nonlinear actions. SOD proponents mistakenly argue that such systems cannot be destroyed but must be pushed into disequilibriumthat is, into chaos and the creation of incoherence. SOD proponents claim that EBAO is a scientific concept while their concept is philosophical. However, this is only superficially true because SOD theoretical underpinnings, as shown above, are based on pseudoscientific and highly controversial ideas of French postmodern philosophers and an utterly faulty reinterpretation of the Soviet operational art. SOD advocates also argue that in EBAO the decision procedures are closed, complete, and decidable, while in SOD critical methods remain open and incomplete. Supporters of SOD also assert that EBAO is based on causation imposed on human behavior, creating false chains of cause and effect.43 Yet in contrast to EBAO enthusiasts, they acknowledge, at least in theory, that uncertainty is an attribute of complex adaptive systems, which calls for continuous reframing. 44 In contrast to EBAO, SOD proponents contend that their approach does not seek to attain perfect knowledge but emphasizes development and conceptualization of the system, which provides a sound basis for action and learning. Supposedly, SOD injects energy into a system to move it closer to the
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separating operational design from the planning process is a purely arbitrary solution and a potentially harmful one
separate but is an integral part of decisionmaking and planning. An even more serious problem is that SOD is not what traditional operational warfare theory considers an operational design; it is actually an artificial bridge between policy and strategy on the one hand and operational warfare on the other. It includes many elements normally in the domain of policy and strategy. At the same time, it includes numerous elements of the operational commanders estimate of the situation and decisionmaking. The entire focus of SOD is on campaign design, while design for major operations (which are an integral part sufficient framework in terms of the factors of space and time allowing sufficient flexibility in modifying or altering the ultimate objective of a campaign. In its essence, the desired strategic endstate is the strategic effect that the political leadership wants to see after the end of the hostilities in a given part of the theater. Because that objective cannot normally be accomplished by a single act, the entire effort must be divided into several operational or major tactical objectives; otherwise, there is a real danger of trying to do too much too quickly. The number of intermediate objectives should be neither too large nor too few,
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VEGO of operations, directions/axes, and the operational idea and operational sustainment. In operational terms, the heart of the operational design is the operational idea (scheme).50 The empirical evidence of successful application of systemic operational design outside Israel simply does not exist. In the Lebanon conflict, SOD was a major, although not the only, factor in the Israel Defense Forces distinct failure to achieve victory over a much weaker opponent. This was the reason the IDF subsequently abandoned SOD and returned to a well-proven traditional operational planning process. One has to derive
a Difference? Masters thesis, Air Force Institute of Technology, 2006, 11. 4 Jelte R. Green, Systemic Operational Design: Improving Operational Planning for the Netherlands Armed Forces (Fort Leavenworth, KS: U.S. Army Command and General Staff College, 2006), 21. 5 Joseph A. DiPasquale, Discourse in Systemic Operational Design (Fort Leavenworth, KS: U.S. Army Command and General Staff College, 2007), 4. 6 Epistemology is defined as the scientific study of knowledge, especially the construction of formal models of perception by which knowledge is obtained. See William G. Cummings, Operational Design Doctrine: Hamstrung or Footloose in the Contemporary Operating Environment (Toronto: Canadian Forces College, 2007), 77. 7 Teleology (from the Greek telos: end, purpose) is the philosophical study of design and purpose. A teleological school of thought holds that all things are designed for or directed toward a final resultthat there is an inherent purpose or final cause for all that exists. Western military thought is based on such a deterministic approach. Teleology teaches that the natural and historic processes are determined not only by causality but also by ultimate purposes. See Cummings, 76. 8 Ludwig von Bertalanffy, Zu einer allgemeinen Systemlehre, Bltter fr deutsche Philosophie, 3/4 (extract in Biologia Generalis, 19 [1949], 139164; quoted in Green, 22). 9 Shimon Naveh, In Pursuit of Military Excellence: The Evolution of Operational Theory (London: Frank Cass, 1997), 3. 10 For two critiques of general system theory, see <http://isss.org/laszlofw.htm> and <http:// outbacksoftware.com/systems/systems.html>. 11 Harold R. Winton, review of Shimon Naveh, In Pursuit of Military Excellence: The Evolution of Operational Theory, in Journal of Military History 63, no. 3 (July 1999), 759. 12 See Niklas Zetterling, A Critique of In Pursuit of Military Excellence (London: Frank Cass, 1997) by Shimon Naveh, 24, available at <www. militaryhistory.nu/critiques/PDF/naveh.pdf>. 13 Green, 21. 14 David M. Glantz, Soviet Military Operational Art: In Pursuit of Deep Battle (London: Frank Cass, 1991), 19. 15 Shimon Naveh, Operational Art and the IDF: A Critical Study of a Command Culture (Washington, DC: Center for Strategic and Budgetary Assessment, 2007), 14. 16 DiPasquale, 6. 17 Winston. 18 Glantz, 12. 19 Avi Kober, The Israel Defense Forces in the Second Lebanon War: Why the Poor Performance? Journal of Strategic Studies 31, no. 1 (February 2008), 32. 20 Eugene W. Holland, The Anti-Oedipus: Postmodernism in Theory: Or, the Post-Lacanian Historical Contextualization of Psychoanalysis, Boundary 2, 14, no. 1/2 (August 1985Winter 1986), 291. 21 Richard Dawkins, Postmodernism disrobed, Nature, July 9, 1998, 141143. 22 Green, 24. 23 Huba Wass de Czege, Renewing the Core of Operational Art: How to Design Sound Campaign Strategies, Learn Effectively and Adapt Rapidly and Appropriately, 4, available at <www. operationaldesign.net/RESTRICTED/coursebook/ ARCENT/01Event_15-19%20DEC%2008/ TAB%20I_Renewing%20the%20Core%20of%20 OperationalArt.pdf>. 24 Green, 24. 25 Ibid., 24; Wass de Czege, 4. 26 William H. Mott IV and Jae Chang Kim, The Philosophy of Chinese Military Culture: Shih vs. Li (New York: Palgrave MacMillan, 2006), 11. 27 Ibid., 1213, 3233. 28 Avi Kober, The Second Lebanon War, BeginSadat Center for Strategic Studies Perspectives No. 22, September 28, 2006, 4, available at <www.biu. ac.il/SOC/besa/perspectives22.pdf>. 29 Eyal Weizman, Walking through walls: Soldiers as architects in the Israeli-Palestinian conflict, Radical Philosophy, no. 136 (March-April 2006), 10. 30 Ibid., 10, 13. 31 Eyal Weizman, The Kokhavi Affair, available at <http://roundtable.kein.org/node/803>. 32 Kober, Israel Defense Forces, 3132. 33 Matthews, 2324, 26. 34 Ibid., 26. 35 Wass de Czege, 2. 36 Shalom Zaki, Hizbollahs Increased Strength: Risks and Opportunities for Israel, Institute for National Security Studies Insight No. 57, May 26, 2008, available at www.inss.org.il/research. php?cat=6&incat=&read=1824. 37 Yotam Feldman, Dr. Naveh, or, how I learned to stop worrying and walk through walls, available at <www.haaretz.com/hasen/ spages/917158.html>. 38 Matthews, 25. 39 Zaki, 2526. 40 Richard Swain, Design in Army Doctrine, in Naveh et al., 17. 41 Cummings, 74. 42 Swain, 16. 43 Green, 23. 44 Ketti C. Davison, Systemic Operational Design (SOD): Gaining and Maintaining the Cognitive Initiative (Fort Leavenworth, KS: U.S. Army Command and General Staff College, 2006), 46. 45 Ibid., 52. 46 Green, 2627, 40. 47 Ibid., 40. 48 Davison, 46. 49 Kober, Israel Defense Forces, 26. 50 Operational idea (operative idea) is the German term; the Soviets/Russians use idea of the operation.
empirical evidence of successful application of systemic operational design outside Israel simply does not exist
proper lessons from the Lebanon conflict instead of ignoring them. The vocabulary used by SOD advocates is essentially unintelligible. Experience shows that no doctrine can be successfully applied unless all its elements are written in clear and succinct language understandable to all. Adopting SOD will result in having two sets of termsone for SOD and another for the traditional military decisionmaking process. Such a situation will be untenable and should never be allowed. The entire decisionmaking and planning process must use the same vocabulary; otherwise, misunderstanding and confusion in both peacetime and combat will inevitably occur. JFQ
NOTES Matt M. Matthews, We Were Caught Unprepared: The 2006 Hezbollah-Israeli War, The Long War Series Occasional Paper 26 (Fort Leavenworth, KS: Combat Studies Institute, U.S. Army Combined Arms Center, 2008), 25. Part of this definition made its way into the new definition of operational art in Joint Publication 30, Joint Operations (Washington, DC: Joint Chiefs of Staff, September 17, 2006), GL24. 2 Shimon Naveh et al., Operational Design Worskhop, Center of Excellence, Booz Allen Hamilton, Washington, DC, December 2008, available at <www.operationaldesign.com/RESTRICTED/ coursebook/ARCENT/ARCENT%20coursebook. html>. 3 Patrick E. McGlade, Effects-Based Operations versus Systemic Operational Design: Is There
1
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