Explosion of Fixed Roof Atmospheric Storage Tanks, Part 1: Background and Review of Case Histories

Jerome Taveau1 Institut de Radioprotection et de Surete Nucleaire, IRSN/DSU/SERIC/BEXI, 31 avenue de la Division Leclerc, 92 260 Fontenay aux Roses Cedex, France; [email protected] (for correspondence)
Published online 26 August 2011 in Wiley Online Library (wileyonlinelibrary.com). DOI 10.1002/prs.10459
Many ammable products are stored in large tanks at atmospheric pressure. Ignition of a hydrocarbonair mixture in such tanks can lead to an explosion and cause lethal casualties or damage the surrounding facilities and buildings. To apprehend this, safety distances for humans, structures and equipments need to be dened. Several simple methodologies have been set up to estimate safety distances in case of an atmospheric storage tank explosion. This rst article gives an overview of accident frequencies of atmospheric storage tanks and past accidents described in the open literature, to show the possible accidental sequences, underline the most frequent causes involved in explosions of atmospheric storage tank, and highlight the potential consequences of such accidents. 2011 American Institute of Chemical Engineers Process Saf Prog 30: 381392, 2011 Keywords: atmospheric storage tanks; xed roof; explosion; accidents; frequencies
INTRODUCTION

xed roof tanks or accidentally for oating roof tanks). When a sufcient amount of energy is supplied to the mixture, it may ignite and lead to either or both an explosion and a re. When a tank explosion occurs, overpressure waves and ejected fragments that are generated might cause devastating effects (see Some Examples of Storage Tank Explosions section). This rst article gives an overview of past accidents to show the possible causes and consequences of atmospheric storage tank explosions.
TYPES OF ATMOSPHERIC STORAGE TANKS

Atmospheric storage tanks are generally selected according to the ash point of the stored liquid. The two main types of atmospheric storage tanks are xed roof storage tanks and oating roof storage tanks:

Many ammable products, for example, liquid hydrocarbons at normal temperatures and pressures such as gasoline, naphtha, heavy oil, kerosene, and diesel oil are usually stored in large tanks at atmospheric pressure or under a low pressure of 0.5 barg [13]. In these tanks, a more or less important amount of ammable gaseous hydrocarbonair mixture may be present above the liquid phase (continuously for
2011 American Institute of Chemical Engineers

Fixed roof tanks are used to store low volatility products with high ash points, such as fuel oil and bitumen. The lower part of the tank contains the stored liquid, whereas the upper part comprises the vapor space (concentration depending on the vapor pressure of the product). Floating roof tanks are divided into external and internal oating roof tanks types. They are used to store large quantities of high volatility products, such as crude oil or gasoline. The roof oats on the surface of the stored liquid and hence can rise or descend, depending on the liquid level in the tank. This type of tank eliminates breathing losses and greatly reduces the evaporative loss of the
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stored liquid. For low liquid levels, the roof eventually lands on deck legs, and a vapor space can form between the liquid surface and the roof. Table 1 summarizes the advantages and disadvantages of xed and oating roof tanks.
ACCIDENT FREQUENCIES OF ATMOSPHERIC STORAGE TANKS

According to Kletz [5], atmospheric storage tank accidents represent a signicant fraction of the accidents in the process industries: No item of equipment is involved in more accidents than storage tanks, probably because they are fragile and easily damaged by slight overpressure or vacuum. Fortunately, the majority of accidents involving tanks do not cause injury, but they do cause damage, loss of material, and interruption of production. [5]

Chang and Lin [6] have listed 242 accidents during the last 40 years involving atmospheric and pressurized storage tanks of any type containing petroleum or chemicals. 60% are res and 25% are explosions (Table 2). Explosions comprise unconned vapor cloud explosions, pressurized vessel burst, and tank explosions. According to Figure 1, the three major causes of accidents are lightning (32%), maintenance operations (13%), and operational errors (12%). Other causes are equipment failure (8%), sabotage (8%), crack and rupture (7%), leak and line rupture (6%), static electricity (5%), open ames (4%), nature disaster (3%), and runaway reaction (2%). Table3 lists the types of tanks and contents involved in reviewed accidents. Floating roof and xed roof tanks (to a lesser extent), which are extensively used for the storage of crude oil, gasoline, and

Table 1. Advantages and disadvantages of xed and oating roof tanks [4]

Fixed roof tank

Advantages Simple design and requires limited maintenance (no moving parts) Reduction of evaporative loss of liquid and limitation of VOC emission.* Limited vapor space and so small risk of internal explosion.

Floating roof tank

Disadvantages Evaporative loss of liquid Large vapor space and hence high risk of internal explosion if ammable vapor is ignited. Possible accumulation of rain water and snow on the roof leading to roof sinking.

*Volatile organic compounds.

Table 2. Number of res and explosions [6]

Years Number of res Number of explosions 1960s 8 8 1970s 26 5 1980s 31 16 1990s 59 22 20002003 21 10 Total 145 61

Figure 1. Causes of tank accidents [6]. [Color gure can be viewed in the online issue, which is available at

wileyonlinelibrary.com.]

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Table 3. Type of tanks and contents involved in accidents [6]

Type of Tank Content Crude oil Oil products Gasoline LPG Propane Hydrochloric acid Methyl cyanate Subtotal Floating Roof 23 3 20 0 0 0 0 46 Fixed Roof 5 10 3 0 0 0 0 18 Sphere 0 0 0 11 0 0 0 11 Fixed Roof with Internal Roof 2 1 3 0 0 0 0 6 Fiber Glass 0 0 0 0 1 2 0 3 Wooden Roof 2 0 0 0 0 0 0 2 Refrigerated Tank 0 0 0 0 1 0 1 2 Total 32 14 26 11 2 2 1 88

Table 4. Number of res involving hydrocarbon storage tanks [7]

Number of res

1950s 13

1960s 28

1970s 80

Years 1980s 135

1990s 161

20002003 62

Total 479

diesel oil, are the most frequent type of tanks involved in accidents. Persson and Lonnermark [7] have also made a survey concerning storage tanks accidents. They have listed 479 res involving hydrocarbon storage tanks between 1951 and 2003 (Table 4). 31% of these accidents were caused by lightning, which is in good agreement with statistics from Chang and Lin. On the basis of the work of Persson and Lonnermark, Hailwood et al. [8] identied 21 tank explosions followed by a re. Based on a review of over 500 xed roof hydrocarbon tanks over a 20-year period, Kletz and [9] estimated that the frequency of a re or an explosion in a xed roof hydrocarbon storage tank is about 1.2 3 1023/(year tank). A report from the International Association of Oil and Gas Producers (OGP) [10] gives more recent data coming from several sources. According to this report:

followed by res (20%). No detail is given about the type of tank (xed or oating roof tanks). On this basis, the OGP report suggests:

a frequency of 9 3 1025/(year tank) for internal explosions and full surface res and a frequency of 2.5 3 1025/(year tank) for internal explosions without res.

The review of different databases and reports available in the open literature indicates that atmospheric storage tank explosions occur regularly and, hence, need to be correctly taken into account in a risk assessment. The next section focuses on some particular well documented past accidents to show the possible accident sequences and highlight the potential consequences of atmospheric storage tank explosions.
SOME EXAMPLES OF STORAGE TANK EXPLOSIONS

Large atmospheric storage tank res (LASTFIRE) project [11] quantied the occurrence of tank re scenarios but gave no cases of explosions in 33,906 tank years for oating roof tanks; so assuming one case of explosion in 33,906 tank years by default, the frequency of an explosion is assumed to be 2 3 10-5/(year tank). Major hazard incident data service (MHIDAS) database was both analyzed by Technica in 1990 and Det Norske Veritas in 1997 for a different period of time. Technica found that 2% of the 122 tank res considered were initiated by explosions, whereas a total of about 22% of these incidents were recorded as involving explosions. Det Norske Veritas reported a much bigger proportion of accidents initiated by explosions for crude oil tanks, as 19 out of 92 accidents were reported as explosions

The present section focuses on some particular well documented past accidents to show the possible accident sequences and highlight the potential consequences of atmospheric storage tank explosions that occured both in France and in the rest of the world. Romeoville, USA (1977) On September 24, 1977, lightning struck a 58 m (diameter) by 16 m (high) xed roof tank that was almost fully lled with gasoil. The tank exploded, and the projected fragments spread the re to another tank (Figure 2). Overpressure was felt as far as 16 km away [12,13]. Herne, Germany (1984) Lightning provoked the bursting of a 10,000 m3 isopropyl alcohol tank at the Herne chemical site in
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Figure 2. Tank 413 re, Romeoville, USA (1977) [13]. [Color gure can be viewed in the online issue, which is available at wileyonlinelibrary.com.]

Figure 4. Overview of the explosion area, Rouseville, USA (1995) [16]. [Color gure can be viewed in the online issue, which is available at wileyonlinelibrary. com.]

Figure 3. Tank re, Herne, Germany (1984) [14].

[Color gure can be viewed in the online issue, which is available at wileyonlinelibrary.com.]

Germany (Figure 3). The roof was ejected and the overpressure broke windows of the surrounding houses up to 1 km from the centre of the explosion [14]. Channelview, USA (1990) Seventeen workers were killed on July 5, 1990, at the ARCO Chemical Company site in Texas after a 4,000 m3 tank storing wastewater and hydrocarbons exploded [15]. Two cooling towers, a cogeneration facility, a main pipe rack, and two large tanks were heavily damaged. The explosion was felt as far as 13 km away. Rouseville, USA (1995) An explosion occurred at the Pennzoil Products Company renery in Rouseville, PA, at about 10:15 a.m. on October 16, 1995, during a welding operation conducted near the wastewater tank 488 containing a layer of ammable liquid. Sparks ignited ammable vapors at openings in the tank. The deagration caused the tank to fail at the bottom seam and shoot into the air (Figures 47). Five workers were killed. The tank did not have a frangible roof or other emergency venting. The resulting re ignited several other
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Figure 5. Area of the explosion, Rouseville, USA

(1995) [16].

tanks, causing several loud explosions as compressed gas cylinders and other sealed containers exploded [16]. Ashdod, Israel (1997) On November 2, 1997, the explosion of a 15,000 m3 xed roof gasoil tank located in the tank farm of
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Figure 6. Original site of Tank 488 (tank 487 in back-

ground), Rouseville, USA (1995) [16]. [Color gure can be viewed in the online issue, which is available at wileyonlinelibrary.com.]

Figure 9. Tank 411 re (2), Ashdod, Israel (1997) [18]. [Color gure can be viewed in the online issue, which is available at wileyonlinelibrary.com.]

Figure 7. Tank 488 after the explosion, Rouseville,

USA (1995) [16]. [Color gure can be viewed in the online issue, which is available at wileyonlinelibrary. com.]
Figure 10. Roof of tank 411 in the dike, Ashdod, Israel (1997) [18]. [Color gure can be viewed in the online issue, which is available at wileyonlinelibrary.com.]

Ashdod Oil Renery caused loss of life of one worker (Figures 810). The investigation concluded that a noncomplete gasoil stripping with hydrogen at the exit of gasoil hydrotreating unit caused penetration of hydrogen inside the tank. The source of ignition was most likely electrostatic spark initiated by synthetic rope (instead of cotton one) used to get samples out of the tank [17,18].

Figure 8. Tank 411 re (1), Ashdod, Israel (1997) [18]. [Color gure can be viewed in the online issue, which is available at wileyonlinelibrary.com.]

Delaware, USA (2001) On July 17, 2001, an explosion occurred at the Motiva Enterprises LLC in Delaware City, killing one worker and injuring eight others. The pressure wave was sufcient to separate the tanks base-to-shell joint (Figures 11 and 12). The explosion was most likely initiated by a spark from the maintenance work [15].
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Figure 11. Tank 393 (shell on the left and base on the right), Delaware, USA (2001) [15]. [Color gure can be viewed in the online issue, which is available at wileyonlinelibrary.com.]

Figure 13. View of the toluene diisocyanate facility after the explosion, Mestre, Italy (2002) [19]. [Color gure can be viewed in the online issue, which is available at wileyonlinelibrary.com.]

Figure 14. Tank D 528/2 (rst explosion), Mestre, Italy

(2002) [19]. [Color gure can be viewed in the online issue, which is available at wileyonlinelibrary.com.]
Figure 12. View of surrounding tanks, Delaware, USA

(2001) [15]. [Color gure can be viewed in the online issue, which is available at wileyonlinelibrary.com.]

Mestre, Italy (2002) An explosion occured at about 7:40 a.m. on November 28, 2002, in a chemical facility after a runaway reaction in a tank containing bitumen and toluene diisocyanate, caused by a stirrer shutdown (Figures 1315). There were no casualties in the accident, but high damage and a high concern of the population because of the dispersion of toxic fumes [19]. Glenpool, USA (2003) At about 8:55 p.m., on April 7, 2003, an 80,000barrel storage tank exploded at the ConocoPhillips Companys Glenpool South tank farm in Glenpool, Oklahoma, while being lled with diesel (Figures 16 and 17). There were no injuries or fatalities. Nearby
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Figure 15. Tank D 528/1 (second explosion), Mestre,

Italy (2002) [19]. [Color gure can be viewed in the online issue, which is available at wileyonlinelibrary.com.]

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Figure 16. Tank 11 in background, Glenpool, USA

Figure 19. View of tanks and debris from the explo-

(2003) [20]. [Color gure can be viewed in the online issue, which is available at wileyonlinelibrary.com.]

sion, Partridge-Raleigh, USA (2006) [21]. [Color gure can be viewed in the online issue, which is available at wileyonlinelibrary.com.]

Figure 17. Wreckage of tank 11, Glenpool, USA (2003)

[20]. [Color gure can be viewed in the online issue, which is available at wileyonlinelibrary.com.]

Figure 20. Fire-ghting operations, Partridge-Raleigh, USA (2006) [21]. [Color gure can be viewed in the online issue, which is available at wileyonlinelibrary. com.]

residents were evacuated, and schools were closed for 2 days [20]. Partridge-Raleigh, USA (2006) Three contractors died and one contractor suffered from serious injuries after an explosion at the Partridge-Raleigh Oileld (Figures 1820) on June 5, 2006, as they were standing on top of a series of four oil production tanks, preparing to weld piping to the tanks [21]. Spoleto, Italy (2006) On November 25, 2006, an explosion occurred at Umbria Olii plant near Spoleto, Italy, when ve workers were welding a structure on the roofs of several tanks. Firstly, one tank containing raw pomace oil exploded, rising up of about 10 m. This rst explosion led to a pool re that spread in the tanks park. One hour later, two other tanks explode, with
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Figure 18. Overview of tanks 1, 2 and 3 after the explosion, Partridge-Raleigh, USA (2006) [21]. [Color gure can be viewed in the online issue, which is available at wileyonlinelibrary.com.]

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g, Norway Figure 24. Tank T3 after the re, Slva (2007) [23]. [Color gure can be viewed in the online issue, which is available at wileyonlinelibrary.com.]

Figure 21. Frames taken by a CCTV during the explo-

sion, Spoleto, Italy (2006) [22].

Figure 25. Storage tank after the explosion (1), Toma-

hawk, USA (2008) [24]. [Color gure can be viewed in the online issue, which is available at wileyonlinelibrary.com.]
Figure 22. Tank projected by the explosion, Spoleto, Italy (2006) [22]. [Color gure can be viewed in the online issue, which is available at wileyonlinelibrary.com.

rupture of the bottom welding, ejecting missiles of 10 tons 80 m away near warehouses storing by-products and packaging materials. Four workers lost their life in this accident [22] (Figures 21 and 22). g, Slva Norway (2007) On May 24, 2007, an explosion occurred in a storg age tank of the company Vest Tank AS, on the Slva industrial area. The rst explosion took place in tank T3 at around 10 a.m. (Figures 23 and 24): the base shell weld ruptured and the upper part of the tank was launched up in the air and landed in the northeastern corner of Tank Farm II. Subsequent explosions and res destroyed Tank Farm II. There were no casualties in the accident. This accident occurred during purication of coker gasoline (reduction of the content of mercaptans). The investigation found that addition of hydrochloric acid during the process reduced the solubility of mercaptans in the solution, leading to the build-up of a ammable mixture. Air lter with activated carbon placed on the roof absorbed mercaptans, leading to a self-ignition and the explosion [23]. Tomahawk, USA (2008) On July 29, 2008, three workers died and one worker was injured after the explosion of a 24-m-tall
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Figure 23. Tank T3 few minutes after the explosion, g, Slva Norway (2007) [23]. [Color gure can be viewed in the online issue, which is available at wileyonlinelibrary.com.]

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Figure 26. Storage tank after the explosion (2), Toma-

hawk, USA (2008) [24]. [Color gure can be viewed in the online issue, which is available at wileyonlinelibrary.com.]

storage tank at the Packaging Corporation of America (PCA) in Tomahawk, Wisconsin (Figures 25 and 26). The workers were on the tank (containing a mixture of recycled paper pulp and water) performing welding at the time of the explosion. The causes of this accident remain unknown for the moment [24]. Several tank explosions also occurred in France during the last two decades:

1992, Verdun: On March 10, two tanks containing fuel oil exploded due to an excessive heating [25]. 1994, Portet-sur-Garonne: An explosion occurred on May 3, during hot work near the vent of a tank containing bitumen (Figures 27a and 27b). The tank was thrown 20 m away, and two workers were killed. This rst explosion caused a re and the explosion of another tank [26]. 2000, Villette-sur-Aube: On July 24, lightning struck the roof of a 5,000 m3 storage tank containing 1,000 m3 of ethanol (Figure 28). Roof lifted off and fell down on the tank [27]. 2001, Lespinasse: During a cleaning operation on February 20, two workers entering a 5,090 m3 petroleum tank caused an internal explosion [28] (Figure 29). 2001, Lillers: An empty 1,500 m3 ethanol tank exploded during a cleaning operation on September 3. Several tank explosions followed (Figure 30). Workers used potassium permanganate, causing a runaway reaction in the presence of ethanol residues [29]. 2002, Dunkerque: On May 18, a 185-m3 tank containing additives for bitumen exploded. The tank lifted off and fell down several meters away (Figure 31). This explosion was due to thermal decomposition of polymers into organic peroxides, which have then self-ignited [30]. 2010, Burosse-Mendousse: On May 5, 3:45 p.m., in an oil depot, an explosion occurred during the start-up of a 1,400 m3 atmospheric storage tank containing crude oil. The tank was equipped with

Figure 27. (a and b) Location of tanks after the explosion, Portet-sur-Garonne, France (1994) [26]. [Color gure can be viewed in the online issue, which is available at wileyonlinelibrary.com.]

Figure 28. View of the tank after the explosion and

the subsequent re, Villette-sur-Aube, France (2000) [27]. [Color gure can be viewed in the online issue, which is available at wileyonlinelibrary.com.]

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Figure 32. Roof of the tank after the explosion, Bur-

osse-Mendousse, France (2010) [31]. [Color gure can be viewed in the online issue, which is available at wileyonlinelibrary.com.]
Figure 29. View of the tank after the explosion, Lespinasse, France (2001) [28]. [Color gure can be viewed in the online issue, which is available at wileyonlinelibrary.com.]

Figure 33. View of the tank after the explosion, Bur-

Figure 30. Tank F10 (roof on the left and shell on the

osse-Mendousse, France (2010) [32]. [Color gure can be viewed in the online issue, which is available at wileyonlinelibrary.com.] a frangible roof. The roof was ejected several meters away and the tanks base slightly lifted up. Investigation concluded that the most probable ignition source is an electrostatic discharge (Figures 32 and 33) [31,32]. 2011, Nogent-sur-Seine: On January 18, a 1,000 m3 tank lled with paper pulp exploded at around 8:40 am whereas two workers were performing hot work on the roof. One operator died. Causes remain unknown (presence of hydrogen?). An estimate of damage caused by the accident amounted to 2 million dollars (Figure 34) [33].

right) and damaged tanks in the background (left), Lillers, France (2001) [29]. [Color gure can be viewed in the online issue, which is available at wileyonlinelibrary.com.]

CONCLUSIONS

Figure 31. Roof of the tank after the explosion, Dunkerque, France (2002) [30]. [Color gure can be viewed in the online issue, which is available at wileyonlinelibrary.com.]

Numerous atmospheric storage tank explosions with spectacular consequences occured during the last decades, involving different products (gasoil, diesel, bitumen, alcohols, waste) and ignition sources (lightning, hot work, sparks, chemical reaction, excessive heating). According to data and examples reviewed in this article, most frequent causes are lightning and human errors, which represent more than 60% of the total causes.
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5. 6. 7.

8.

9.

Figure 34. Roof of the tank after the explosion,

10. 11. 12. 13.

Nogent-sur-Seine, France (2011) [33]. [Color gure can be viewed in the online issue, which is available at wileyonlinelibrary.com.]

Several cases led to extensive damage to surrounding facilities and dwellings, either caused by the resulting overpressure, particularly Romeoville (overpressure felt 16 km away) and Herne (broken windows 1 km away) accidents, which involved tanks full of liquid and stricken by lightning, or caused by ejected fragments when tanks do not have frangible roofs (Rouseville), causing tanks shooting into the air. It seems that lightning provokes the most devastating accidents: in their article, Chang and Lin [6] indicated that among the 80 lightning accidents, a dozen tanks were hit directly, resulting in roof blowing off and massive destruction. Also, many accidents caused domino effects in the surrounding units (Channelview, Rouseville, Mestre, Portet-sur-Garonne, Lillers). Since atmospheric storage tank explosions occur regularly and often lead to extensive damage, the process safety community must understand these hazards, and further be able to make appropriate predictions such that if a storage tank explodes, the consequences to life and property are reduced as low as reasonably practicable.
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