THE NAMIBIAN CONSTITUTION

CHAPTER 11 - Principles of State Policy

Article 100 Sovereign Ownership of Natural Resources

Land, water and natural resource below and above the surface of the land and in the continental shelf and within the territorial waters and the exclusive economic zone of Namibia shall belong to the State if they are not otherwise lawfully owned.

FAO Fisheries Technical Paper 404/1 Use of Property Rights in Fisheries Management
D. SYMES FAO DOC. WEBSITE-Technical Papers This paper seeks to address some of these questions from a European perspective. it begins by briefly summarising the advantages and disadvantages of rights-based management, more generally, from a social science viewpoint. the focus then switches to the particular circumstances of Europes fisheries, suggesting that the unique conditions affecting both the fisheries and their governance are perhaps less conducive to universal and unalloyed adoption of rights-based management, but also indicating ways in which the three principal objectives of fisheries management - resource sustainability, economic efficiency and social equity - might be pursued through a system of differential management combining elements of both rights-based and community approaches.

SOUTH AFRICA-FAO TECHNICAL PAPERS

This tension is linked directly to difficulties in first formulating and second effectively implementing the new marine fisheries policy of South Africa. For instance, the former distribution of rights of access gave the upper hand in fisheries to relatively few organizations, almost all of which were dominated by the formerly advantaged sector of the population. Tensions were created by the need to create (demographic) equity in distribution while still allowing for some of the industrial stability that had allowed markets to be developed so effectively over the years. The process of formulating a new marine fisheries policy was initiated by the Minister of Environmental Affairs and Tourism in October 1994 (Cochrane and Payne 1998). The immediate background was unrest over prevailing policy, which was widely considered to be insensitive to the requirements of South Africans previously marginalized by the policy of apartheid. In December 1994 the idea of establishing a Fisheries Policy Development Committee (FPDC) to develop a Green Paper for the fisheries was mooted. On 4 June 1996 the FPDC presented the Green Paper to the Minister. The White Paper (Anon 1997), and the Marine Living Resources Act (Anon 1998) which became operational from 1 September 1998, were developed from that same Green Paper.

During the policy-development process three issues were not contested. They were sustainability of utilization of marine resources, the need to maintain stability in the industry, and the need to broaden access to include previously excluded population groups (equity). On the other hand there were some issues on which consensus was difficult. These included: i. the nature of access rights, where the key issue is the balance between the rights of the individual rights-holder and those of the State and ii. the position of the user-group versus the State where the issue is the balance between user-group interest and Ministerial discretion 2. THE NATURE AND ALLOCATION OF ACCESS RIGHTS, AND STAKEHOLDER INFLUENCE IN FISHERIES MANAGEMENT Until 1994 (in reality, until the new Act was promulgated in September 1998), access to resources was granted by the State in the form of annual quotas. During the FPDC process, the dominant concept was that of a long-term property right. The recommendation handed to the Minister by the FPDC was essentially for an ITQ system with relatively modest scope for government intervention (FPDC 1996). The rationale behind this recommendation was that long-term rights should be granted because they would result in an increase in the stability of the labour force and in economic efficiency, while encouraging investment and sustainable resource utilization. The Ministry in its White Paper on Marine Fisheries (Anon 1997) also supported the ITQ concept, but with rights to be sold for a maximum period of 50 years, during which period they would revert to the State. The same document recommended that the transfer of rights would be regulated by the State to prevent concentration of rights in the hands of the economically powerful. This regulation was considered necessary to achieve the broadening of the participation ideal. The legislature finally reduced the maximum period of holding rights to 15 years, and the principle of State ownership of the resources was underlined by a decision that rights would only be leased to participants, rather than actually sold From this brief analysis, it is clear that there was divergence in thought between stakeholders, the executive and the legislature. The stake-holders sought regulation in the marketplace, so diminishing the role of the executive. The executive, on the other hand, attempted to introduce a market-regulated system that allowed for intervention. The legislature finally settled for a system in which the market would play a minimal role in the distribution of access rights. The reluctance to leave matters with markets both on the part of the executive and the legislature was clearly related to their consideration of the level of inequality in the fishing industry. However, it did broaden the definition of stability beyond the concept of industrial stability mentioned earlier as a cornerstone of the new policy. It also moved stability into the sphere of politics while retaining some level of industrial stability. 3. HISTORICAL DEVELOPMENTS REGARDING ACCESS RIGHTS IN THE SOUTH AFRICAN FISHERIES SECTOR - THE HAKE TRAWL FISHERY

South Africa has a coastline of some 3000km, extending from the border of Namibia in the west to Ponta do Ouro in the east, adjacent to Mocambique. The western coastal shelf is highly productive, in common with other upwelling ecosystems around the world, while the east coast is considerably less productive but has a high species diversity including both endemic and Indo-Pacific species. The living marine resources of South Africa have been exploited for many centuries. Industrial fisheries, however, started just after the turn of the 20th century with the commencement of the hake trawl fishery. The hake trawl fishery is the mainstay of South Africas fishing industry. The two hake species are harvested, primarily off the western Agulhas Bank and the annual total allowable catch (TAC) for the two species combined is currently just over 155 000t. A conservative management strategy has been adopted for the stocks, in a highly successful endeavour to rebuild the resource after a period of severe over-fishing by distant-water fleets during the 1960s and 1970s. The hake fishery is dominated by two large companies and as a result there are high expectations for transformation within this sector. The hake fishery underwent unprecedented growth during the early 1960s when foreign fleets discovered the rich grounds of the south-eastern Atlantic. Catches were uncontrolled and escalated rapidly, peaking at over one million tonnes per annum. The hake stocks were decimated within 15 years and by 1977 the fleet was landing primarily juvenile fish. Due to the open-access nature of the fishery and the absence of any form of access-rights, catches in several South African fisheries started to exceed sustainable yields by the 1960 and this over-exploitation led to sharp declines in some important stocks. Concerns over the sustainability of the open-access fisheries led the authorities to impose regulations such as total allowable catches (TACs), limited seasons and area restrictions. These regulations only partially succeeded in controlling over-fishing. At this time, a clause in the draft Convention on the Law of the Sea indicated that if host nations did not have the vessel capacity to harvest their stocks at MSY, foreign vessels could not be excluded. The South African government saw this as an opportunity to encourage large-scale new entrants into the fishing industry in an attempt to expand local fishing capacity. However, due to the parlous state of the resource, potential investors were hesitant and it was left to the existing participants to invest further in order to acquire the necessary capacity. Once this had been achieved, the authorities promulgated an Exclusive Fishing Zone out to 200nm in November 1977 and the fishery was effectively South Africanised once more. . The South African common law had also never recognised that the sea or its resources could be the subject of ownership. The Commission did, however, accept the first argument and recommended that tenure should be for a long term. In the White Paper the Government indicated that it was of the opinion that some of the evidence over-emphasized the need for greater security and stability and pointed out that, in practice, quotas or fishing rights were perpetuated provided the holder complied with prescribed requirements. It accepted the Commissions recommendations in this regard, but pointed out that the quantum of the quota would vary each year according to fluctuations in the TAC.

The Legislator eventually introduced a system whereby an independent statutory body, the Quota Board, granted exploitation rights for a specific period to stake-holders, as well as annual quotas (it also recommended that the specific period differ for the different sectors of the industry). In practice, exploitation rights were awarded to all existing stake-holders for a period of 10 years and for five years to new entrants. This system meant that stake-holders had more security than before, but were still not guaranteed that their quotas would be renewed from year to year. In anticipation of a stock recovery, the Government decreed that 20% of all TAC increases were to be reserved for distribution to new entrants. These measures resulted in the erosion of founding company quota holdings by 28% over the 20-year period following quota introduction. The Government therefore used the quota-management system as a tool to manipulate market share. The guidelines of the Quota Board provided that the quotas could be reduced or withdrawn in certain specified situations. Examples of such instances were: i. a reduction in the TAC. ii. the Board being of the opinion that a redistribution of quotas was desirable. iii. the quota-holder gave preference to employment of foreigners. iv. non-compliance with statutory, regulatory or other requirements stipulated by the Board or Department. This system did not prove to be popular and especially the Quota Board was widely criticized. Although the Board made its allocations according to a set of criteria, the quotas were generally perceived to have been allocated arbitrarily and often unfairly. Consequently, the industry became steeped in uncertainty and insecurity prevailed amongst most of the stake-holders. A paradox was that although the new Sea Fishery Act (1988) endorsed the conditional marketability of quotas, it failed to allow for divisibility of rights. This meant that while small companies could be bought up, the larger companies were not able to downsize and diversify (Bross 1999).. 4. WHY THE PRE-DEMOCRACY MANAGEMENT REGIME WAS SUCCESSFUL Quotas in the hake fishery were introduced at a time when stocks were in need of rebuilding. The small number of role-players meant that agreement between Government and industry was easily reached and management action could be implemented quickly. Individual relationships between personnel within the fisheries management authority and those of the fishing companies were comfortable in the sense that in most instances, a common culture was shared (educational background, language, value systems, etc.). This homogeneity meant that a spirit of co-operation was easily engendered between the two groups, enabling a high degree of comanagement with respect to stock assessment and management procedures adopted and at the level of the Sea Fisheries Advisory Committee (the advisory body to the Minister). GOVERNMENT FISHERIES POLICY INITIATIVES

As stated earlier the Marine Fisheries Policy White Paper (May 1997), proposed that rights should be allocated for a period not exceeding 50 years, and should revert back to the State during the course of that period. The rights were to be defined as a proportion of the TAC, were to be divisible, inheritable and transferable, with the consent of the Minister. In the Bill (May 1998) and later the Marine Living Resources Act 1998, the right was redefined as a portion of the TAC, with the intent that quantities of fish made available by increases in the TAC would be available for allocation to new entrants, echoing the policy of the previous Government. Similarly, the maximum duration of a right was reduced to 15 years. It is clear that the ANC Government, like the Nationalist Government before it, has shied away from a market-driven industry-structure based on the sale of rights in perpetuity. In both instances, the Governments of the day have been intent on broadening access to the hake fishery and on divesting control from the two largest companies. In 1999, these two companies still hold 64% of the hake TAC, while the five largest companies hold a total of 71%. A system whereby rights are allocated for a shorter period is more flexible and allows Government more opportunities for social engineering. This must be seen against the background of inequity that prevailed for so long in South Africa and the fact that both Governments were aware that restructuring of the Industry had to take place over a number of years. Both Governments were also aware that under a system of freely transferable long-term rights, the rights may revert back to the economically powerful. Although this domination is likely to lead to greater economic efficiency, the general feeling of both Governments has been that it might also have a negative impact on the restructuring process. As far as the sustainability of the major resources in the South African fisheries are concerned, it can be argued that even in the absence of long-term access or property rights, the management of the various resources has been reasonably successful. 6. CURRENT CHALLENGES TO TRANSFORMATION 6.1 Need for common purpose The relationships and co-operation that existed between the fishery management authority and stake-holders under the old regime will be much more difficult to emulate during the post-transformation era due to the diversity of cultural backgrounds now involved. Differences will have to be overcome and a sense of common purpose will once again need to be established. In particular, it is essential that the Minister, members of the Consultative Advisory Forum and decision-makers within the government agency (Marine & Coastal Management) should share this sense of common purpose 6.2 Economic versus socio-economic considerations There is a divergence in the expectations of the established industry and the aspirant new entrants. The established industry feel that they should be permitted to continue as before because they have taken steps to transform their companies and were highly efficient operators earning valuable foreign currency and offering stable employment to a large workforce. The aspirant new entrants expect the Government to reallocate a significant portion of the TAC to them. Neither expectation can be met in its entirety. While there were some small allocations to new entrants under the old legislation, the

new Marine Living Resources Act 1998, which is envisaged to bring about transformation, still has to be implemented. Employment stability will be a major consideration in the re-allocation process. 6.3 Black empowerment - financial and capacity problems The Governments policy to empower black people economically has resulted in a number of schemes being initiated in the general economy. Some of these schemes are faltering as a result of debt burdens and the sluggish growth in the economy over the last few years. Experience has shown that transformation will be a more gradual and multi-faceted process involving not only new entrants but also investments by black entrepreneurs in existing companies. However, lessons from the fishing (and other) industries have taught that markets, when left to themselves, tend to reinforce the existing distribution of income and assets rather than promoting diversification. In any event, this type of approach to Black Economic Empowerment is unlikely to prove rapid enough to satisfy the enormous expectations of the electorate. The Government is therefore under enormous pressure to facilitate rapid transformation through heavy-handed intervention (Gqubule 1999). The Government is intent upon transforming the industry so that ownership more fairly reflects the demography of the country. However, the stranglehold by the established companies on marketing and distributional networks, domination of infrastructure and berthing facilities and lack of access to capital, are still a reality. The highlyindustrialised nature of, for instance, the hake fishery means that in addition to viable rights, new entrants will need enormous financial backing. The problem is that the black population of South Africa has only recently been given the opportunity of entering the mainstream economy and has yet to develop the financial muscle or collateral required for this type of investment. 6.4 Legal challenges There have been legal challenges against the Minister from existing rights-holders whose rights have been reduced or taken away. As any redistribution of rights will be at the expense of current rights-holders we expect more legal challenges in future 6.5 Compliance In the transformation process, the Government has committed itself to the allocation of rights to small and medium-size enterprises (SMMEs). While there are currently some SMMES that share in the TAC, the number of these companies will have to be increased. The newly established hake longline fishery has also enabled the Government to bring new entrants into the industry as the threshold for entry into this fishery is relatively low. This broadening of participation will place an additional strain on the enforcement of regulations in the fishery as there are going to be many more rights-holders than before. The broadening of participation idea has created a lot of uncertainty among the existing rights-holders as the extent of adjustments have not finally been set. There is a danger that such uncertainty might lead to overcatching by those under threat.

7. CONCLUSION As far as the sustainability of the major resources in the South African fisheries are concerned, it can be argued that even in the absence of long-term access or property rights, the management of the various resources has been reasonably successful. Success in implementing the new policy will likely depend upon the success with which the three cornerstones (sustainability, stability and equity) are married in the global interests of the country. A marriage of two entities is, as we know, fraught with some difficulty. How then will we fare in addressing all three in an optimal manner? The key to this lies in a balancing-act based on the rational utilization of the resources, something based in turn on a knowledge of the resources. Future generations of South Africans will tell us how successful we have been in our balancing-act. In essence, and for a multiplicity of reasons, we dare not fail. Regarding the rights-regime, we believe we are on the right track and are positive that the current system whereby the state has scope for intervention is the only way in which to ensure that a redistribution, leading to equity, will take place. Once this has occured, a more classical ITQ system might be introduced

MOVING THROUGH THE NARROWS: FROM OPEN ACCESS TO ITQS AND SELF-GOVERNMENT - A. SCOTT
4.1 Limited licensing as a right of entry As with other topics in this review, I have been unable to find a good chronology of the introduction of limited licensing. In Canada it was being phased in under new legislation in the 1960s and maybe other jurisdictions had started earlier.(Wilen 1989 p. 250) Today limited licensing is widespread, especially, I believe, where fishstocks are migratory or straddle jurisdictional boundaries. It was perceived that gear limitations and closures were inadequate to deal with the problems mentioned. Therefore there was a search for a system that would reduce the amount of effort (rather than limit its form and timing). The answer seemed to be to reduce the number of vessels, and this was done by focussing on the licence. Previously the licence in itself had played no part in regulation, as a drivers licence is not important for dealing with traffic congestion. The innovation was to re-interpret the licence as a kind of ticket of entry. Every vessel had to have one. 4.2 Transition by grandfathering Seen in retrospect, a limited-licensing regime was not very different from what had preceded it. But the transition caused a great deal of upset, so different did it seem from free and open access. It was introduced when there was already over-fishing. To be sold politically as a system that would benefit already hard-pressed fishermen, the new scheme had to be based on the existing fleet and their crews. It was infeasible to start all over again, perhaps allocating a limited number of licences by a lottery, by tendering bids, or by an open auction sale. True, there was sometimes a reservation of a number of licences to be held for particular classes: foreigners, or aborigines, or owners of particular kinds of vessel or gear, and so on. Apart from these reservations, the new

licenses were simply handed out to those who claimed to have recently been fishing. This was the now-familiar grandfathering approach. 4.3 Getting to the right number of licences Limited licensing puts no limit on a vessels catch (apart from that already imposed by existing gear and closure regulations). So, by itself, it could not bring the fleets catch down to the TAC. So the governments had to think of supplements to limit licensing. They came up with quite a variety. One was to do nothing, allowing fisherman retirement or death to gradually reduce the number of licences. A second was to make the licences transferable, allow a market to develop, and buy some back at the market, or at a fair price. A third way was to buy back some vessels, with the licences attached. 4.4 Success? Limited licensing has not been a great success. For one thing, fleet sizes were rarely reduced to the right level. When these schemes were still being discussed, fishermen made sure they would be eligible, so that in the transition period the number of active vessels actually increased. In the early months of buy-back schemes, the prices of the remaining licences increased. Naturally, the remaining fishermen began to speculate on how high the increases would go. As a result most vessel owners held on, refusing to sell at the fair offer prices. The schemes did not reinforce the regulations in place for other reasons. Fish stocks were subject to increasing fishing effort exerted by a slowly-decreasing number of vessels. The catches increasingly consisted of young fish. Neither total catch nor catchper-unit-effort increased significantly. Third, the cost of fishing continued to increase. The remaining vessels had still to compete with each other for the catch. The open periods continued to shorten and the gear regulations continued to increase the time and equipment needed to fill up a vessel. To these private costs must be added the increasing public costs of enforcing the TAC. 4.5 Significance In spite of this near-failure to accomplish what was hoped for it, limited licensing had very significant features, some accidental and some by design, that prepared the regulators and the fishermen for what was to come next. It created a sort of marriage between the fleet and the stock. In large and offshore fisheries, a group of vessels and their owners were directly associated with a single species, or stock, or fishing ground. Those who wanted to lower costs and improve efficiency had to think about the specific fish stock being exploited; while those concerned about a fishstock had to consider the distinct part of the industry that was harvesting it. It created an incentive for the fishermen to assist the administrators in enforcing the regulations, for there was no doubt about who was hurt when the regulations were flouted.

It also created an incentive for the fishermen to develop a helpful relationship between themselves and the regulators. It became obvious there were insiders who held licences, and outsiders who could now be ignored. The insiders had in common an interest in conserving and improving the stock. The previous fierce, perpetual, wrangling, in which the regulators were regarded as stupid policemen to be defied and evaded could now be seen in need of replacement by joint consultation and collection of information. Indeed these opportunities and incentives were evident, but they were eclipsed by rivalrous, competitive, fishing behaviour. It was clear to many fishermen that they could individually do better by getting a larger part of the TAC for their own class, port or group of vessels than by helping to increase the stock to be fished for by everyone. This involved devoting ones time to fighting the system rather than using it. The incentives to work together created by limited licensing were overwhelmed by incentives to conceal, evade, discourage and free-ride separately. Hostility, distrust and obstruction were words used to describe the atmosphere in some important fisheries into which a system of limited licensing had been introduced. 4.6 Focus on the licence Finally, by being limited, fishing licences became important in themselves. They had come into existence as convenient cogs in a registration and administration system, having what outsiders may call bureaucratic functions. Until the 1960s it would have been possible to abolish ocean fishing licences, and vessel licences, and many other kinds of paperwork, without plunging the regulatory system into complete chaos. To my mind, the forward-looking importance of limited licensing lies in the word licensing. The license had became a permit, a certificate, that showed one had had a right to fish in a specified place and time. Those who had no licence had no such right, and if they did fish they were in a fundamental sense committing trespass. It was no longer just for the convenience of the administrator but was a control against other fishermen. Further, the group of licence holders was seen by certain courts to have rights, not only to hold a public right to fish, but of something like ownership: in early cases of oil pollution, and in the 1960s, the local licence holders did, as a group, win damages or settlements against leaking tankers that had damaged their fishery. One can see that the licence now gave its holders rights with new attributes: i. Quality of title and security. Licences were no longer free, a casual privilege to be handed out and withdrawn at the whim of the state. Many fishermen had to argue or pay for them. Having forced the fishermen to take the licence seriously, the state had now to do the same. It had to resist the temptation to cancel them, take them back or reduce their content, but rather to honour them. And, it had to protect the holder against those who claimed they had a better right to a holders licence than the holder himself in order to protect the quality of title. ii. Exclusivity. There was no longer open access. As I said, some people might fish but others might not. As the latter were now excluded, the rights of those who might fish were far from being perfectly exclusive, but they were more exclusive.

iii. Transferability. Some of the early systems had licences that were not transferable. Those who had them could use them till they died, but they then reverted to the state. Whatever their initial feelings, this non-transferability became unpopular with the fishermen. Their licence had some value, but they could not cash in on it or pass it to their heirs, or use it as security for a loan. They agitated to have licences made transferable, and found ways to evade the prohibition. Soon, nearly every type of limited licence had become transferable, or marketable. These three attributes, or characteristics, partial as they were, complemented each other. For example, transferability was more valuable if the licences were more secure, and also if they had a longer duration (yet another characteristic.) A good title and security were worthwhile obtaining if the right had some exclusivity. And so on. Those who acted politically to get more of one attribute in their local limited-licence scheme found themselves promoting the inclusion of all three. 5. PROPERTY 5.1 Characteristics of property rights This account now jumps from this history of regulation to a short survey of what property is. In doing so the issues that have to do with personal property, with movable assets are disregarded and focus on real property in soil, minerals, water and other natural resources. We start with a piece of land. The person with ownership rights over it has powers to use and cultivate the land; to sell or rent it to others and to receive and keep its rent or yield. What is it that gives the rights holder these powers? It is the collection of characteristics of the particular property right he owns. Its a mistake to think that one either has a property right or has not. Most systems of law make provision for a variety of rights. All standard or well-known property rights have some of each of the six important characteristics, but in different amounts. If the right has too little of the relevant characteristics, it is still a property right but it does not enable the holder to fully exercise certain powers - some, but not all. Before turning to rights over a fishery, consider a simple example. To serve those attending a fair or festival in the country a farmers field has been turned into a parking lot. When a driver enters the lot he receives a ticket. The driver owns the ticket and whatever it entitles him to. The ticket represents a feeble kind of property right usually known as a licence. A licence can be issued by a private property owner like a farmer, or by the government in the form of a variety of licences and permits to do things that would otherwise be trespasses or illegal. The parking licence gives our driver very few powers: he cannot transfer it to someone else, nor change or manage his part of the parking lot, nor get income from it. He cannot do these things because, although his licence has some of all the essential characteristics, it has not enough. This is as true of a fishing licence as it is of a ticket in a parking lot. Consider the following six characteristics: i. The first is exclusivity, the right to use and manage a resource without interference. The more sources of potential interference, the less the exclusivity. Every kind of

property right has some exclusivity, and the fee-simple ownership held by some farmers comes close to putting the owners on isolated desert islands, nearly 100 percent exclusive. Now consider a right to use a fishery. To what extent can the right-holder exclude others from the powers of ownership (to use and manage the fishery, to sell the fishery, and to take income from it)? If the right is over an isolated fish-pond in the country, the right is nearly 100 percent exclusive. But if is merely an entitlement to fish for a pelagic species in the high seas, it has close to zero percent exclusivity. ii. The second characteristic is duration. This is the period the holder is entitled to exercise the powers of ownership. Property rights range from a term of a few hours to a number of years. Some kinds of right that are short of exclusivity can nevertheless have a long duration. The ordinary fishing right has a duration of one year, renewable. If it is expected to be automatically renewed, then its effective duration is much longer. iii. Security, or quality of title, is the third characteristic. If an outsider can successfully eject a possessor because his title is difficult to prove or wrongly based, the right is not secure. If the original owner can, at will, take back possession from a person to whom he granted a lease, the lease is not secure. If the government can interfere with the fisherman without notice and reduce his powers or the size of the estate, the fishermans right is insecure. iv. The fourth characteristic is transferability. In the countryside, farm land has long been bought, sold and bequeathed. In fisheries waters, however, the licence was at first not transferable. Why should it be? Anyone who wanted a licence could get it free from the government. But when fishing rights began to acquire more of the exclusivity characteristic, there emerged a demand for the right to be transferable. There are two other property-rights characteristics, divisibility and flexibility; they are sometimes treated as a subset of the characteristic of transferability. i. The fifth characteristic is divisibility. When a fishing right is divisible its holder has powers to change the scale of his/her enterprise. The ownership can be made joint or single. The size or quantify of the thing owned, such as hours of fishing, a territory or a quota, can be split. If the holders right is also transferable, the holder can assemble parts of rights to match the scale of the resource or the fishing vessel. Divisibility is increased by adding to the permissible number of joint owners, or the number of units into which the thing owned, may be split. ii. A right can gain flexibility in many ways. Typically Rights have conditions or stipulations. The more easily these can be relaxed in special circumstances, such as an unexpected change in fish migration or population, or in the seasonality of the market, the more flexible the Right is. Payments obligations can also be made more flexible, e.g. when holders may pay for the right by a royalty instead of by a set rental (when the royalty is based on net revenue instead of on weight of catch). Typically, flexibility transfers risk of unexpected events from the user/holder of the right to the leassor. These characteristics are not abstract. One can think of ways of measuring each of them. In addition to their conceptual measurability, they are valuable. The more of a characteristic a Right has over a piece of land or water, the more valuable it is to its owner. This is because having more of these characteristics enables the holder to catch fish at lower costs, to improve the size or the quality of the catch and the stock, to sell

his catch at the best going prices, to reduce his transactions costs with other fishers, and to reduce the risk of being ejected or dispossessed of some of the powers that traditionally go with ownership of a natural resource. Security and duration, if they increase together, justify the holder in looking ahead, to husband the stock by adjusting present catches with respect to total amount, age, gender, size and season, to buy durable vessels and equipment, to eject trespassers, and improve, or protect, habitat. In such ways, having more of the characteristics in ones ownership rights not only allows one to do more things, but it creates incentives to do them. The incentives are current and expected future income, and, if there is transferability, a higher payment to be received when the holder retires or dies. If rights are widely transferable, then an exchange or market in them will develop. If so, those who can find better things to do with their time and capital can leave, and those better suited or having more time, a closer location, a better vessel, more risk-taking propensity, etc. can buy in. Their trades may be permanent, or for a few days or months. 5.2 The standard property rights Of course, if one wants to hold rights over a particular piece of land, or a fishery, one cannot just acquire it with whatever blend of the six characteristics one wants. Usually one must accept one of a few standard interests or tenures: allodial title (or variants with names like freehold, fee simple, free and common socage, or patent); leasehold (with a variety of characteristics added or taken away with conditions or covenants written in the bargaining); easements; profits; and some special ones with names like mining claim; appropriative water right; tree-cutting licence; pollution right; and so on. At the end of the scale there are standard rights having very little exclusivity. Under the common law there are: individual licences; co-ownerships (including joint ownership and ownership in common;) and free-and-open-access (in Roman law called res nullius) of which most fisheries may be examples, especially a fishery on the high seas. There are really not many of these standard blends or categories. Very rarely, the legislature or the courts re-defines one of them, in effect changing its mix of characteristics. 5.3 Who holds the right? 5.3.1 Which government may grant a fishery property right? One of the unsettled questions about fishery-rights systems is whether the government is prepared to admit that the right that it distributes qualifies as a standard property right under the local law of property. Here are two reasons, good and bad, why it may not. i. A legalistic/constitutional reason is that, in some states the fisheries are under government control, but the government has never acquired a property-like interest over them. There is a legal maxim to the effect that a person/government cannot grant to another what it does not hold itself. This may also happen in a federal country. It may also happen because a fishery is outside national waters. If so a government may have sovereign rights as against another, but cannot, according to the maxim above, grant property rights in fisheries to individuals.

ii. A bureaucratic reason is that fishery administrative agencies, accustomed to making and enforcing regulations, are unwilling to share their powers with property owners. 5.3.2 Who may hold a right? To whom may the government grant an individual fishing right? In the old days, in an open-access fishery on the high seas with large vessels, the licence to fish was usually, I believe, issued to the vessel - the vessel had a licence attached. However, as fishery regulation has moved in the direction of a system of individual rights, there is a tendency to vest the right in a person. Doing so still leaves a choice. Should the person be the vessel owner - possibly a business corporation? Should it be a group of such individuals, a sort of co-ownership? Or should it be all the owners of all the vessels, in effect creating a co-operative or communal proprietorship or leasehold or licence over all the fishery? Some experts raise objections to making the vessel owner or owners the units of fishery right-holder. They suggest that this system tends to unfairly exclude the hired captain and the crew. In many fisheries - but by no means all - the crews are paid in the form of percentage shares of the receipts from sale of the catch. These experts suggest that the individual property rights in the fishery should be further divided according to the crewshares on each vessel. Sometimes this idea seems rather visionary and theoretical, but it has been a political issue in Iceland. 5.3.3 A property right over what? In all situations where there are private property rights over natural resources, there is some uncertainty under the local system of law about the subject of the right. Exactly what is it that the right-holder owns? Take the owner of an exclusive mining right. From what may he exclude other miners? All the land, rock and minerals below the surface? All the minerals, or just those that are valuable? When half the minerals have been removed, does the holder of the right still own the rockwall and roof making up the chamber around them? May he exclude a neighbour who wants to use the chamber as a tunnel or a drainage pipe? These varieties of exclusivity have been worked over in local courts, and all are possible, in special circumstances. There is a similar range of possible subjects of water rights on a river. If a farmer has an exclusive right to divert water to his land, does the exclusivity apply to the water itself, or just to the right to divert it? Does the exclusivity prevent a farmer upstream from diverting the flow? Does he own the flow he might divert but does not? Similar questions to these are found in fisheries. Usually in older systems of law swimming fish cannot be anyones property. Only when they have been caught and reduced to possession by being brought on deck, say, does anyone own them. But there are exceptions. The old laws do also allow swimming fish that are in a lake or a private pond to be privately owned, even though they have not been caught. Sometimes the owner of inland fishing rights can rent his rights by the hour, another type of ownership. And, under the old customary laws of whaling, certain whales that a vessel had failed to capture, but had escaped, could still belong to that vessel even though it was later caught and brought alongside by another vessel.

What will be the usual subject for modern fisheries rights is not yet clear. Take the variety of inshore property rights. The owner of rights over an inshore fishery could hold exclusive rights to set up fixed gear - as in Japan. Or, as in other countries, the holder could own a right to use any gear or even, own the fish that have not yet been caught in a bay, fjord or lagoon. As for offshore fisheries within the EEZ, it is too early to say over what thing the right holder is going to have exclusive rights. The economic and legal decisions are still being made. Francis Christy will be talking about the advantages and difficulties of exclusive territorial or area rights. To many it seems reasonable that, even on the high seas, one holder should have a monopoly of an area that is delimited on a map. South Africa has used this approach. Economists have long discussed setting up a private sole ownership of a particular stock of a particular species in a particular location, but there are no real-world examples, onshore or offshore water. What did emerge, in the 1960s and 1970s, and what I will be talking about, is the modern development of the limited-licensing fisheries regime: the exclusive individual property right to land a certain number of fish, in a certain location, of a certain species, during a certain period. This is the individual or vessel quota, to which I now turn. 6. INDIVIDUAL TRANSFERABLE QUOTAS - ITQs 6.1 The innovation: the quota as a development of existing licensing schemes The ITQ, as it emerged in Iceland and New Zealand in the 1960s and 1970s was the latest development of the fishing nation progression from open access to regulated fishery to limited licensing. The administrators who introduced it were trying to improve the existing managerial regime. They looked for a scheme with greater enforceability, more revenue for government and a smaller need for a costly government presence. Its introduction was perhaps made easier because in both countries the fishermen were in the process of expanding into the widened territorial sea. Probably in neither country did the official innovators think in terms of the creation of property rights. That is also true of fisheries elsewhere that have more recently come under individual quota management systems. Indeed, many governments have discouraged their fisheries agencies from using the word property. 6.2 Characteristics of ITQs In nearly all cases, ITQs were introduced to replace an earlier exclusive system such as limited licences. There were exceptions, such as that for the northern tuna in Australia and some offshore stocks in New Zealand neither of which had yet been under any kind of exclusive regulation. The holder acquired a numerical quota, denominated in pieces or by weight. These schemes distinguished between two types of quota. One was the absolute amount that a vessel might take from the TAC in a season; the other was the ongoing percentage share of the TAC to which the quota holder was entitled every season. The initial distribution might be in terms of absolute quotas, but was implicitly in terms of a percentage share. In most quota fisheries the ongoing share percentage was based on the holders share on the catch in previous years under licensing. In some new fisheries - without a history - the holders were given, or were sold, equal shares.

In most places a politically-motivated attempt was made to steer the quotas to individuals. In the case of Canadas Enterprise Allocation Scheme, the quotas were distributed, from the beginning, to a few large companies. There are probably other exceptions to the individual orientation. In most schemes, except those in New Zealand, there was no intention of charging an initial price, rental, royalty or tax. The administrators started off many schemes nervously, giving the quota rights or licences a limited duration. However, this feature has usually been relaxed, perhaps by making renewal more-or-less automatic. Likewise, administrators initially refused to make most schemes transferable or marketable, or achieved the same effect by limiting the amount of quota that any holder could sell, or acquire. Fishermen soon expressed a demand for transferability, and/or evaded the limitations. Most laws were changed, and the IQ or IVQ became an ITQ. 6.3 Not a new kind of title to resources The quantitative feature of the quota licence was a novelty in ocean fisheries, but the general idea had long been familiar to participants in other natural-resource sectors. Government disposes of the resources from public land in quantitative terms, and old and new holders of the resources trade all or parts of the amounts they have acquired. For example, in agriculture, farmers buy and sell livestock by the head or the pound, not attached to or confused with the land on which the stock is located. Farmers also acquire, rent and sell water for irrigation. In the power production industry it is not unusual for the trade to be in terms of cubic feet of river flow, or even in terms of horsepower. In the petroleum and natural gas industries, ownership is in volume terms, and firms trade underground units with each other. In the lumber industry on private lands, milling firms acquire rights from landlords to cut certain lengths or volumes of timber. In all these cases, the deed may specify the place where the resource is located, but those who are trading are less interested in the location than in the amount of ore, lumber, oil, trees, water, etc. to be removed. This was also the ITQ approach to naturalresource trade: the individual does not acquire a right to a minutely-defined area, but to a minutely-defined amount within a general neighbourhood. 7. THE PROPERTY RIGHT CHARACTERISTICS OF ITQs 7.1 Listing the characteristics Governments protest that according to their intentions, an ITQ is not a piece of property. Nevertheless, at this stage the evidence is that the fishery quota, or quotalicence, is a form of standard individual property right, with its own blend of characteristics (Scott 1989 pp. 11-38; Devlin and Grafton 1998 pp. 68-100). It is descended from the historic ocean freedom to fish, a liberty or licence that had almost none of the characteristics of property. It has emerged from reforms to the limited licence, a simple licence with added exclusivity and transferability. It has features strikingly like those of quantitative water rights, oil rights and other real interests in land, long known to the common law, all having well-established property-

like features. What is more, it has more than trivial amounts of the essential characteristics of a property right, e.g.: i. Duration: All quota shares have a life of more than one season. Some seem to be permanent. All can be renewed. ii. Exclusivity: A quota licence is much more exclusive than what went before it which is a great change. But the holders right is merely in co-ownership with other holders; and is merely a right over the catch and not over the stock. Neither the swimming fish, nor fish yet to be born, nor the fish habitat have been exclusively assigned to any individual or collectivity. However, in most instances, an individuals right to a share of the catch is equivalent to a right to a share of the stock. That is, to have a 1% share in a TAC is implicitly to have a 1% share in the fishstock from which it is caught. Every other possible shareholder is accounted for by the initial distribution of the quotas and subsequent transfers. Further, because of the long duration of quota rights, to have a 1% share in the catch implies having a 1% share in future catches, and this, given stock dynamics, is equivalent to having a 1% share in the fishstock. This is an important result: because the quota allots a share in the collective right to catch fish, it must implicitly allot the same share of the of ownership right over the stock. But a percentage share of the stock is not exclusive ownership. The person going fishing with an ITQ has impressively more exclusivity than his ancestors with their inherited open access to the fishery. But his share gives him little or no power over the management of what he owns. Managerial powers are diffused and dissipated among the fishermen and the administrators. iii. Transferability (and divisibility): Like limited licences, quotas have become marketable. Private brokers, groups of fishermen and governments have established exchanges on which they can be traded. They acquire present values, related to the share of the net present value of the catch in future years. These present values are affected by speculation and hedging which can add to, or reduce, the fluctuations, uncertainty and risk in their values. In these respects their transferability is like that of certain well-established types of property value in land or natural resources. Further, in, perhaps most, ITQ systems, the quotas are highly transferable in the very short run rights to catch and land fish can be rented by the trip, by the week and by the season. iv. Security and quality of title: There is nothing in the ITQ rules that makes the quota right more secure than the older licences that went before it. There can still be disputes about who owns a quota, and there can still be inconstant governments that unexpectedly revise the system, depriving the holders of some of their quota. Nevertheless, the marketability and bankability of quotas, similar to that of other kinds of real property, seems to have heightened the reluctance of administrators or politicians to reduce the value of the system by casual changes in the law that govern the powers of a quota-holder. To summarise, in the introduction of the ITQ, especially in offshore fisheries, the fishermen were transported from holding the individual powers inherent in an ordinary transferable license, with a little inherent exclusivity, to holding a property right with enforceable characteristics, in positive amounts, of long duration, transferability, exclusivity and security.

7.2 Fishermen acting like a property owner Proprietary behaviour by fishermen was a major step with widespread effects. For example, take husbandry. The fishermens sometimes shrill, negative, obstruction of policies about the amount, and especially the distribution, of the catch has given way to paying serious attention to the biologists proposals for increases or decreases in the stock. Where once the individuals right to fish was a thing to be battled for; their collectively-owned stock had become a natural asset to be enhanced. Or, take enforcement. ITQs did not cure some fishermens incurable addiction to getting around the rules, to catching and landing more than their entitlement, and to free-riding on the efforts of others. Indeed, preventing their cheating has now become more complicated and costly. On the other hand, once the group of fishermen saw themselves as the owners of valuable rights to the fishstock, they began to disapprove of cheating. They no longer indulgently ignored or covered up the infractions of others, for they now saw the others as thieves. It became worthwhile to obey the rules oneself, if doing so discouraged cheating by others. This has led to a new helpful attitude, born of ownership, that has prevented sky-rocketing official enforcement costs. Finally, take competitive behaviour and uniform behaviour. Fishermen whose rights had been grandfathered in from older forms of fishing licences still tended to act as though they were in a contest. Who could find the fish first? Who could get the largest load on their vessels? Whose vessels had the greatest speed, capacity and versatility? Under ITQs however each soon learnt that the other vessels were not his antagonists. As long as each respected their quota limits, there was a greatly-reduced need to behave uniformly and rivalrously. Like a property-owning farmer, each could bring in his harvest without worrying about whether his neighbour had forestalled him. Some could perhaps stretch their fishing to a year-round activity while others could make the opposite decision: taking their share of the harvest when it suited them, fitting in the harvest of one species in one season with that of other species in other seasons. Some could fish slowly, with modest vessels, others could speed on super-vessels with larger crews and versatile gear.

MET
Geographic Location

The Republic of Namibia is a vast, sparsely populated country situated along the south Atlantic coast of Africa between 17 and 29 degrees south of the Equator. With its surface area of 824 268 square kilometres, Namibia is the 31 st largest country in the world. It stretches for about 1 300 km from south to north and varies from 480 to 930 km in width from west to east. Namibia, previously known as South West Africa, is bordered by South Africa in the south, Angola and Zambia in the north and Botswana and Zimbabwe in the east. The oldest desert in the world, the Namib Desert stretches along the whole west coast of the country, while the Kalahari Desert runs along its southeastern border with Botswana. The country is demarcated into 13 regions, namely the Caprivi, Kavango, Kunene, Omusati, Ohangwena, Oshana and Oshikoto regions in the north, the Omaheke. Otjozondjupa, Erongo and Khomas Regions in the central areas and the Hardap and Karas regions in the south.

Namibia's Climate: MET The Namibian climate varies from arid and semi-arid to subtropical with the generally temperate desert coast offering sometimes fog-ridden days with temperatures between 5 C and 20C. The central, southern and coastal areas constitute some of the most arid landscapes south of the Sahara. The hottest months are January and February, with average day temperatures varying between 9C to 30C. During the winter months that stretch from May to September minimum temperatures can fluctuate between 6C and 10C at night to recover to 20C after 11:00 in the day. Frost occurs over large areas of the country during winter, but in general winter days are clear, cloudless and sunny. Overall Namibia is a summer rainfall area, with limited showers occurring from October and building up to peak in January and February.

SECOND NATIONAL DEVELOPMENT PLAN (NDP2) 2001/2002 - 2005/2006

The national development strategy for Namibia consists of a long and medium term development perspectives. The Second National Development Plan (NDP2) was prepared soon after completing the execution of NDP1, whose five-year implementation ended during the financial year 1999/2000. The launching of NDP2, during 2001/2002 fiscal year, has provided the much needed continuity and consistence in the application of the countrys development strategy. The Second National Development Plan was prepared through wider participation of stakeholders during the various stages of its preparation. Early in the planning process, consultative meetings and workshops, at both national and line ministries, were held to discuss the issues and threats to sustainable development in Namibia, and on which basis a vision for NDP2 was developed and undertaken to guide the drafting of chapters. As soon as the draft chapters became available, participatory mechanisms were set up for the screening and reviewing of, and consolidation of the comments and suggestions made into the draft chapters. Participants were drawn from the government and non-government sectors, such as Trade Unions, NGOs, Civil Society, Donors, Governors and their officials, parastatals, private sector representatives. Cabinet Ministers participated actively both during the workshops and during the drafting of sector and cross-sectoral chapters. Representatives from the University of Namibia participated in the planning process through sectoral planning committees which were set up for the purpose by line ministries. We have therefore, succeeded in making the NDP2 planning process more consultative than was the case in the past. Growing more conscious of the fact that Namibias continued economic growth depends very much on its rich natural resources and unique arid environment, we have in NDP2, initiated the difficult, but necessary process of taking into account environmental and sustainability aspects in sectoral, cross-sectoral and regional development planning. Harmonization of the draft chapters and the establishment of the plans internal consistency was carried out by the National Planning Commission in consultation and collaboration with line ministries and regional authorities. The Second National Development Plan, is made up of three volumes as follows: Volume One Macroeconomic, Sectoral and Cross-Sectoral Policies; Volume Two Regional Development Perspectives; and Volume Three - Public Sector Investment Programme Volume One is divided into four parts: Part One: Overall Review of the Economy; Part Two: National Development Objectives and Strategies; Part Three: Sectoral Development; and Part Four: Cross-Sectoral Policies. Volume Two on the other hand consists of an introduction which is a general chapter discussing general regional issues common to all regions and thirteen chapters representing individual regional development programmes. Volume Three is made up of all the programmes and projects presented in respective chapters of NDP2. It includes those projects categorised as To be

BRIEF ON AQUACULTURE FOR THE FISHERIES INDUSTRY BOOK. (HAMUKUAYA, 2002)

Aquaculture commenced in the late 1800s with introduction of carp, bass and tilapia to state-owned dams. There was negligible production up to the mid80s, then private sector interest increased. Namibias fledgling aquaculture sector has great development potential for: Mariculture (at Oranjemund, Luderitz, Walvis Bay, Swakopmund and Henties Bay) Inland fresh water species along the southern and northern rivers of Namibia and existing dams

The Ministry has established a new Directorate of Aquaculture. This will oversee implementation of the new Aquaculture legislation, administration and planning for the aquaculture sector. The Directorate aims to create an enabling environment for aquaculture development in Namibia. Crucial to the successful development of aquaculture in any country is to first set in place a proper policy and legislative framework. Namibias aquaculture policy is laid out in the policy paper: Towards the Responsible Development of Aquaculture (2001). The main policy objective is the responsible and sustainable development of aquaculture to achieve socio-economic benefits for all Namibians and to secure environmental sustainability. Other legislative documents in place are the Aquaculture Act No. 18 of December 2002 and the Regulations on Licensing of 3rd December 2003. Regulations concerning import and export control are at an advanced stage. The Government foresees the role of aquaculture to enhance food security, reduce poverty, generate employment, improve rural livelihoods and increase investment. Namibias productive advantages for aquaculture development can be summarized as follows: Policy and legal framework already in place for the development of a responsible aquaculture sector. 1,500 km largely uninhabited coastline. Excellent security along long stretches of coast. High primary productivity of marine waters. Very low aerial and water pollution levels. Perennial rivers, lakes and dams currently not utilised for aquaculture. Availability of inexpensive fish by-products from established fish processing sector for inclusion in wet aqua-feeds. Already well-established processing, packaging and marketing systems.

Commercial marine aquaculture is currently dominated by oyster production in Walvis Bay, Swakopmund and Lderitz. Seaweed (Gracilaria verricosa) is grown by one company in the Luderitz lagoon while another farm also at Luderitz has started Abalone (Haliotis midae) culture production.

Although culture of freshwater fish is in its infancy, excellent freshwater culture development potential exists along rivers such as the Okavango, Kunene, Chobe, Orange and Zambezi, as well as lakes such as Oponono, Engombe and Tamanzi, as well as the Olushandja - Etaka reservoir. The Ministry is currently involved in developing pilot-based intensive freshwater aquaculture in the Omusati, Caprivi and Kavango Regions. The long-term strategy of this activity is to apply the lessons learned to other regions. Local species already adapted to culture requirements shall be the first priority (e.g. catfish and tilapia). Tilapia (Oreochromis andersonii) and catfish (Clarias gariepinus) are currently produced commercially, for example at Hardap. STASTISTICS (MFMR Website) Employment Fishing Rights Licenses Revenue TAC's Landings Value of Landings Employment The fishing industry is a source of considerable employment in Namibia. Currently, the Ministrys estimates of the industrys workforce suggest that total employment is in the range of 14,500 to 15,000 people. Table 10 shows the employment on fishing vessels by fishing method. It also gives the proportion of Namibians employed in fishing crews. That proportion has been steadily increasing from 47% in 1996 to 66% in 1998. Onshore workers are predominately Namibian; of the current 8,000 to 8,500 workers, at least 95% are Namibian. Table 1: Employment on fishing vessels and proportion of Namibians, 1995-1998 1994 1996 1997 1998 Total Namibian Total Namibian Total Namibian Total Namibian 445 94% 476 95% 427 97% 562 96% 2,001 426 2,409 342 147 674 1356 7,800 72% 2,514 71% 502 1% 2,141 95% 294 46% 118 99% 541 33% 940 47% 7,526 72% 2,263 75% 386 5% 2,100 99% 277 53% 73 99% 525 261 65% 957 57% 7,269 79% 92% 8% 100% 64% 100% 70% 63% 60% 2,036 176 1,606 316 101 429 139 1218 6,583 83% 91% 6% 100% 65% 100% 78% 76% 66%

Pelagic Demersal Trawlers Longliners Midwater trawl Linefish Crab Rock Lobster Deep water Tuna Total crew

Number and duration of Fishing rights The total number of existing rights in 2003 was 159. Table 2 shows the number and duration of existing harvesting rights for each species. In 1n 2002, 4 out of 17 mullets right holders expired. Table 2: Number and duration of existing harvesting rights as at December 2003 Duration of Rights Four-year Seven-year Ten-year fifteen-year Twenty-year Total Hake 0 10 6 22 0 38 Monk 0 2 2 5 0 9 horse Mackerel 0 0 11 1 0 12 Large Pelagic 3 1 3 12 0 19 Red Crab 0 1 2 0 0 3 Rock Lobster 0 0 1 20 0 21 Line Fish 1 1 2 8 0 12 Orange Roughy 0 0 5 0 0 5 Pilchard 0 7 5 10 0 22 Mullets 0 0 0 13 0 13 Seals 0 2 1 1 0 4 Guano 0 1 0 0 0 1 Total 4 25 38 92 0 159 Fishery

Vessel Licenses The number of licensed vessels operating in Namibian waters from 1999 to 2003 is indicated below. A total of 279 vessels were licensed for commercial fishing in 2003 Table 3: The number of licensed vessels by fishery, 1996-1998

Fishery Small Pelagic Demersal Trawlers Longliners Midwater Deepwater Tuna Linefish Crab Rock lobster Monk Total

1999 33 97 20 26 6 54 25 3 27 0 293

2000 30 111 24 26 5 56 26 2 29 0 309

2001 26 128 38 24 3 68 22 2 29 0 340

2002 25 114 10 20 6 71 26 2 38 23 335

2003 20 100 8 26 5 49 19 3 42 21 279

Revenue Generated The Fisheries sector plays a key role in generating revenue for the State. Revenues are generated through various fees and levies. Table 4 shows revenue from various fees and levies collected from 1999 to 2003. During 2003, N$ 100 227.000 was collected from the fishing industry.

Table 4: State Revenue from the fishing industry, 1999 2003 ( N$ thousands, current value). 1999 2000 2001 2002 2003 Quota fees 91 100 76 125 69 900 100 011 74 437 Marine Resources Fund levy 13 229 11 027 9 211 15 794 12 042 By-catch fees 9,001 10 300 12 800 15 788 13 561 License fees 172 185 172 286 187 Total revenue 113 502 97 637 82 083 131 879 100 227* * Note: Figures for 2003 are provisional. Arrangements are in place to collect outstanding quota fees during 2004 Fees

TAC's and Landings The setting of Total Allowable Catches is one of the main management measures to prevent overexploitation of Namibian fish stocks. TACs are set for most commercial species in Namibia. Table 12 shows the TACs set by fishery during 1999- 2003 Table 5: Total allowable catches 1999-2003 (metric tonnes) 1 9 9 9 Pilchard 45,000 20,000 Hake 275,00 180,000 Horse mackerel 375,000 Crab 2 000 Rock lobster 350 Orange roughy 6 000 Alfonsino n/a Monk n/a 2003

During 1999 to 2003 period the average yield from all 350,000 marine fisheries amounted to 2 000 595,150 tonnes. Adverse 400 environmental conditions experienced prior to 2002 2 650 resulted in below-average n/a yield during the 1999 2001 12 500 period, but catches rose steadily thereafter. A moratorium for pilchard was declared in 2002. However, anchovy and horse mackerel allocations to the pilchard fishery operators as relief helped offset the impact of a zero TAC for pilchard. This stock conservation measure has paid off, as the volume of

pilchard landings recorded in 2003 is twice the amount realised in 2001. Landings from other major fisheries also recorded a moderate increase in 2003, except for the monk, crab and rock lobster fisheries. Table 6 gives the total volume of marine fish production during the 1999 2003 period Table 6: Harvest of the main commercial species 1999 -2003 (metric tonnes except seals) 1 2 9 0 9 0 9 0 1 2 P 4 2 1 i 4 5 0 l 1 c 6 3 7 h 5 8 6 0 a 3 8 r d H 1 a 6 7 5 k 4 1 3 e 2 3 5 5 9 7 8 0 7 8 H 3 o 2 4 1 5 r 0 4 5 9 s e 3 2 1 9 1 4 8 m 4 5 3 a c k e r e l M 1 o 4 2 5 n k 8 3 1 0 5 9 7 2 8 0 4 2003

22 255

189 305

360 447

13 135

K 3 6 7 i n 7 9 6 2 g 0 2 1 k 6 2 7 0 l i p T 1 2 3 u n 1 4 8 a 5 0 9 3 5 1 8 7 R 3 o 0 6 c 4 5 1 k l o b s t e r C 2 r a 0 7 3 4 b 7 0 4 4 0 3 1

6 603

3 371

269

2 092

O 2 3 7 t 6 2 0 7 h e 5 9 8 4 r 0 8 1 0 7 f i s h s p e c i e s T 5 6 o 7 8 5 2 t 7 8 4 3 a l 8 4 9 3 3 0 9 f 8 4 1 i s h h a r v e s t

33 644

631 119

In addition to fish, seals and seaweed are also harvested in Namibia. The harvest of seals and seaweed is given in Table 7 Table 7: Seal and seaweed harvest, 1999-2003

2 0 0 0 1 2 3 S 2 4 e 5 1 4 0 a l 1 7 2 0 s 6 5 2 0 1 3 0 ( n u m b e r s )

2003

34 000

S 6 8 5 e 2 0 a 9 0 w 6 e 0 e 0 d ( g r a c i l a r i a c o l l e c t i o n )

288

Fisheries Economic and Production Indicator The final value, i.e. the value of fish in its final form valued at export prices, of Namibia fish production has increased from N$2,5 billion in 2000 t0 N$3.3 billion in 2002 mainly due to value additional by onshore fish processing. In 2003, the final value of production indicates a 7% increase compare to 16% in 2002. this relative small increase in mainly the result of the adverse effects of the strengthening of the Namibian Dollar against the US Dollar, which impacted in a decline in prices. The value of exports closely follow the final value of production as can be see from the table 8 below since an estimate 97% of Namibian fish production is exported. Table 8: Fisheries Economic and Production Indicators, 1999 -2003

1 2 9 0 9 0 9 0 1 2 Value of Production (N$ in million) L 1 2 a n 7 0 3 6 d 6 2 3 0 e 6 9 5 8 d . 7 0 v 3 a l u e F 2 3 i . n 3 6 9 a 4 3 9 l 7 3 2 4 . V 1 8 0 9 a l u e Value of Exports (N$ in million) F 2 3 i s 1 2 7 h 0 9 1 2 6 5 8 9 P % 2 r 2 1 o o . d f 1 2 8 3 u % c T t o s t a l E x p o r t

2003

2 637.7

3.668.0

3 506

27.6%

Contribution to GDP

The contribution of the fishing industry to gross domestic product (GDP) measures the value added to Namibia from fish production. It is essentially the gross income earned, that is, wages and salaries, gross profits, and indirect taxes. It is much less than the value of production. GDP looks only at production by resident producers and thus excludes foreign vessels that operate in Namibia on temporary basis. In 2002 the sector contributed N$2 311million (7.3%) of the GDP, compared to N$ 1 939 million (7.0%0 to GDP in 2001, making it the second largest contributor to GDP. Adverse environment conditions and prolonged winter conditions also affected the processing sector in 2001 and it resulted in a reduced contribution of the processing sector to fisheries contribution to GDP. However, despite the decline in the processing sector, total fisheries contribution to GDP increased in 2001 to 7.0% and continue to increase in 2002 to 7.3% mainly due to improvements in the hake, pilchard and midwater trawl industries. In 2003, the contribution of the fisheries sector to GDP has shown an increase in both the fishing and processing onboard and processing onshore sector to 7.8%, due to continued improvements in the landings of the demersal and midwater sector. Table 9: Contribution of the fishing industry to GDP (current values in $ millions) 1 2 9 0 9 0 9 0 1 2 F 9 1 i 7 s 1 0 4 6 h 4 0 i 4 5 8 n g F 4 5 7 i 5 4 9 0 s 1 8 4 3 h p r o c e s s i n g 2003

1 627

899

T 1 2 o t 4 5 9 3 a 2 9 3 1 l 2 9 1 c o n t r i b u t i o n P 6 7 e . r 9 7 0 c % e n t a g e o f G D P

2 526

7.0%

Namibia Fishing Industry

REFERENCES Marine Resources Act (Act No. 27 of 2000), Ministry of Fisheries and Marine Resource of the Republic of Namibia.

Namibias Marine Resources Policy (2004). Towards Responsible Development and Management of the Marine Resources Sector. Ministry of Fisheries and Marine Resource of the Republic of Namibia. FAO (2004) Information on Namibias Fisheries Management System for the FAO Digital Atlas, Rome FAO (2004) Fisheries Country Profile, Rome

Greenpeace International, (1993). It cant go on Forever, The Global Overfishing. www.archive.greenpeace.org/oceans/globaloverfishing. 01/03/06 The Environmental Consequences and Economic Costs of Depleting the Worlds Oceans, January 2003 Wiium, V (1999). The Vision. Ministry of Fisheries and Marine Resources of Namibia (MFMR) Namibia Namibias Marine Resources Policy (2004), MFMR, Namibia Iyambo, A. (1998). Managing Fisheries with Rights in Namibia: A Ministers Perspective. www.fao.org//docrep/01/03/2006 FAO (2003). The Optimal Harvesting of living Marine Resources, Rome Marine and Coastal Management (MCM/2005). Policy for the Allocation and Management of Commercial Fishing Rights in the Hake Deep Sea Trawl Fishery of South Africa www.environment.gov.za/31/03/2006 FAO, (2000/6) Species Fact Sheet www.fao.org/figis/servlet/ Nichols, P (2003). A Developing Country Puts a Hold to Foreign Overfishing. A Global Challenge-Economic Perspective: An Electronic Journal of the US Department of State Vol. 8. No 1. Copes. P. (1981) Rational Resource Management and Institutional Constraints: The Case of the Fishery. Editor Butlin, Economics and Resources Policy, London Longman Hardin, G., (1968). The Tragedy of the Commons, Vol. 162. Reprinted as Chapter 4, A Markandya and J Richardson, Earthscan Reader in Environmental Economics, London, Earthscan, 1992. Anderson, L., (1977). The Economics of Fisheries Management. John Hopkins University Press Cunningham, S., et al (1985). Fisheries Economics: An Introduction. Mansell Publishing Bell, F. W., (1978). Food from the Sea: The Economics and Politics of Ocean Fisheries. Westview Press Inc. Fridjof Nansen Institute, (1992). Annual Yearbook of International Cooperation on Environment and Development, London, Oxford.

Hartwick, J. and Olewiler, N. D., (1998). The Economics of Natural Resource Use. 2nd Ed. Addison Wesley Educational Publishers Holden, M (1994). The Common Fisheries Policy. Blackwell Science Publications, Oxford