Work Book
Work Book
8 7 6 5 4 3 2 1 0 0 1
Units of food Units of clothing (millions) (millions) 8m 7m 6m 5m 4m 3m 2m 1m 0 0.0 2.2m 4.0m 5.0m 5.6m 6.0m 6.4m 6.7m 7.0m
(1) Price
A B C D E
20 40 60 80 100
28 15 5 1 0
16 11 9 7 6
E D C
Point Price Market demand (pence per kg) (tonnes 000s) A B C D E B A 20 40 60 80 100 700 500 350 200 100
80
60
40
20
Demand
0 100 200 300 400 500 600 700 800
100
e Supply d
Cc
80
60
40
b
a
B
A
20
Demand
0 0 100 200 300 400 500 600 700 800
Pe
D
O Qe
1
S1
P1
P2
b D2
D1
S1
P1 P2
a b
D1 D2
O Q
Price
a
P1
D
O Q1 Quantity
10
P ()
4
Demand
0 0 10 20 30 40 50
Q (000s)
30
40 Q
100
b a D
10
20
S + tax S
P1
D
O
Q1
S surplus
minimum price
Pe
D
O
Qd
Qs
Pe
Pg
D
O
Qs Qd
Slegal
Plegal
Dlegal
O Qlegal Q
TU
Packets of crisps 0 1 2 3 4 5 6 TU in utils 0 7 11 13 14 14 13
Utility (utils)
10 8 6 4 2 0 -2 0 1 2 3 4
P1
Consumption at Q1 where P1 = MU
MU = D
Q1
Consumer surplus
MU, P
P1
MU
Q1
U1
5000
10 000
15 000
Income ()
30 28 26 24 22 20 18 16 14 12 10 8 6 4 2 0 0
Pears
10
12
14
16
18
20
22
Oranges
30
A budget line
Units of good X Units of Point on good Y budget line 30 20 10 0 a b
Units of good Y
20
0 5 10 15
10
Assumptions PX = 2 PY = 1 Budget = 30
0 0 5 10 15 20
Units of good X
Units of good Y
20
10
0 0 5 10 15 20 25 30
Units of good X
30
Units of good Y
20
Assumptions
10
PX = 2 PY = 1 Budget = 30
0 0 5 10 15 20
Units of good X
Units of good Y
Budget line
O Units of good X
I1
I2
I3
I4
I5
I2
h f
I1 I2 I3 I4 I5 I6
B2 QX3 QX1
B1
Units of Good X
I1
h
B2 QX1QX3
I2
B1 Units of Good X
Supply essential story: deriving indiv. supply from cost function background, variations, etc.: 1) background to cost function: production function 2) market-power: downward-sloping demand curve faced 3) long run: - switch production method - entry, exit 4) choice production factors: isoquants, iso-cost curves
TR
TR ()
Quantity
Price ()
Pe
D O Q (millions) O Q (hundreds)
AR, MR ()
100
80
60
40
20
TFC
0 0 1 2 3 4 5 6 7 8
Marginal cost
MC
Costs ()
Output (Q)
TPP
30
20
10
0 0 1 2 3 4 5 6 7 8
02
b
01
0 8 7 6 5 4 3 2 1 0
TPP
14 12 10 8 6 4 2 0 -2 0 1 2
b c
APP d
3 4 5 6 7 8
MPP
SRAC3
Costs
5 factories
Output
LRAC Costs O
Output
Costs ()
z y x AFC
Output (Q)
45 40 35
An isoquant
a Units of K 40 20 10 6 4 Units of L 5 12 20 30 50 Point on diagram a b c d e
30 25 20 15 10 5 0 0 5 10 15 20 25
30
35
40
45
50
g
=
. h
MRS = K / L
10 8 6 4 2 0 0 2
. .
j
L = 1
. k
isoquant
4 6 8 10 12 14 16 18 20
30 25
An isocost
Assumptions PK = 20 000 W = 10 000 TC = 300 000 a b c TC = 300 000 d
0 5 10 15 20 25 30 35 40
20 15 10 5 0
35 30 25 20 15 10 5 0
TC = 500 000
TC = 400 000
TPP1
50
10
20
30
40
Price ()
Pe
D O Q (millions) O Q (hundreds)
AR, MR ()
16
12
TR ()
Quantity P = AR () (units) 1 2 3 4 5 6 7
0 1 2 3 4
TR () 8 14 18 20 20 18 14
6 7
TR
8 7 6 5 4 3 2
5
Quantity
TC
TR, TC, T ()
16 12 8 4 0 1 -4 -8
TR
c
2 3 4
d
5 6 7
Quantity
AR, MR ()
AR
0 1 -2 2 3 4 5 6 7
Quantity
-4
MR
Profit-maximising output
4 5 6 7
0 1 -4 2 3
Quantity
MR
Total profit
MC AC
AR
AC
AR MR
O
Qm
Pe
AR AC
D = AR = MR
D O Q (millions) O Qe Q (thousands)
(a) Industry
(b) Firm
Natural Monopoly
LRAC D1
Q
D2
O
Limit pricing
AC new entrant
PL
AC monopolist
A contestable monopoly
P1
a
LRAC
D = AR O
Q1
P1
D
O
200
(a) Market X
(b) Market Y
Profit-maximising cartel
Industry MC P1
Industry MR
O
Industry D AR
Q
Q1
P1
a Dmarket b
Dleader
P2
AR D market
AR D leader MR leader
O Q
P1
Q1
A decision tree
Airbus 500 se decides
te r
r ate
B1
400
Boeing decides A
50 0
40 0
se a
sea te
se at e
500
r ate se
Airbus decides
B2
400
sea
t er
in the market
Hourly wage
Wm
in the market
Dall firms
O Labour hours
Hourly wage
Wm
Slabour
Dindividual employer
O
Q1
Labour hours
Hourly wage
Wm
Dlabour
Q2
Labour hours
Hourly wage
WI
Hours
Daily income
120
60 40
B1 x I1
Wm
MCL= W
MRPL
O
Q of labour
Qe
Monopsony
MCL
(supply curve)
ACL W
MRPL
O Q of labour
W1
D
O Q1 Q of labour
Bilateral monopoly
W2
MCL
MCL = ACL
2
MRPL O
Q1 Q of labour
MCB
ACB
WB
MRPB
QB
1
Black workers
MCW
ACW
WW
MRPW
Qw
1
White workers
MC
Pe
D = MU
O
Qe
O Quantity
Q1
External benefit P
Q1 Quantity
Q2
Social optimum
(MB) MU = D
O
Q1 Quantity
S MSB (MB) MU = D
Q1 Quantity
Q2
Social optimum
P External cost
O Social optimum
Q2 Quantity
Q1
P1 P2 = MSB
= MSC
MC1
MR
O
AR = MSB Q
Perfectly competitive output
Monopoly output
Q1
Q2
100
Lorenz curve
60
40
20
20
40
60
80
100
Percentage of population
P1
D
O
Q1
P External cost
O Social optimum
Q2 Quantity
Q1
TC
TR
Q1
P1
f AC h j
P2
D
O Q1 Q2
1st Market level Competitors prices Direct cost plus variable mark-up Direct cost plus fixed mark-up Customer set Regulatory agency 257 161 131 108 33 1
% 39 25 20 17 5 2
% 21 35 18 8 8 1
3rd 78 100 88 42 47 5
% 12 15 14 6 7 1