Deregulation and restructuring in

INDIA

SUBMITTED BY :
PARVEEN 06705
EED(MTECH)

Deregulation and restructuring in

INDIA
The success of privatization of airline and
telecommunications industries has motivated the
deregulation and restructuring of the electricity industry.
The success of UK and Norway (1990-96) has
encouraged to other countries world wide to follow the trend
of privatization
Deregulation is widely adopted to refer to the introduction of
competition

Deregulation often involves unbundling which refers to

Disaggregating an electric utility service in to its basic component
and offering each components separately for sale with separate
rates for each component .
As shown in fig. generation , transmission and distribution
could be unbundled and offered to discrete services , however
deregulation involve not only unbundling but also the separation
of ownership and
Operation .

The electricity sector in India is undergoing fundamental

transformation particularly after the enactment of Electricity
Act, 2003. The Union Parliament enacted the Electricity Act,
2003 laying down a road map for evolving a competitive
electricity supply industry in the country. Some of the
important features of the Electricity Act, 2003, as follows:

o Delicensed generation.
o Non-discriminatory open access in transmission mandated.
o Single buyer model dispensed with for the distribution utilities.
o Provision for open access in distribution is to be implemented
in phases.
o Provision for multiple distribution licensees in the same area o
supply has been incorporated.
.

o Provision for reorganization of the State

Electricity Boards, with the relaxation to
continue as SEBs during a transition period is
to be mutually decided between the Centre and
the States.

Though the Indian power sector has

achieved substantial growth during the postindependence era, the sector has been ailing from
serious functional problems during the past few
decades.
most of the State Electricity Boards (SEBs) in
India have been striving under resource crunches and
operating at huge commercial losses. Consequently,
the electricity services provided to the consumers by
these SEBs
both in terms of quality and quantityare poor.

Commencing with a installed capacity of 1300 MW during

the year of national independence in 1947, the Indian power sector
has made substantial growth over decades.
By the year 1990 the installed capacity grew to the tune of
75000 MW and the total electricity sale was about 289,440 million
units. Major portion of the transactions related to the trading of
electricity in the country, including generation, transmission and
distribution, power delivery and revenue realisation have been
carried out at State level by 19 State owned Electricity Boards
(SEBs)
In general, the technical performances of these SEBs were
not satisfactory. The T&D losses recorded during the year 1991 was
about 22.90%. Thermal power stations were operating at very low
efficiency and with average Plant Load Factor (PLF) of only 53.90%.

 In

the financial side also, the score card of

the SEBs were not impressive.
The annual commercial loss of the
SEBs during the year 199091 was about
40,210 million Indian rupees.
It was in this situation that in 1991
Government of India decided to restructure
the power sector radically through a set of
comprehensive reforms.

 The

efforts to restructure the power sector in India

formally commenced in 1991. The prime reasons
which prompted the Government to initiate such a
reform process were:

(i) the ever-widening gap between the demand

and availability of electricity,
(ii) the poor technical and financial performance of
the State Electricity Boards and
(iii) inability of the Central and State Governments
to finance and mobilise resources for generation
capacity expansion projects, making third party
investment in power sector imperative.

The initial step in this direction has been the amendment

of legislation governing the electricity sector in 1991.
This allowed private sector participation in power
generation and also permitted foreign companies to build
up power projects in India and sell the power to SEBs.

Central Electricity Regulatory Commission (CERC,

formed on 26 April 1999) as well as State Electricity
Regulatory Commissions (SERCs) subsequently set up
in 15 States are already functioning. Most of the States
have initiated reform process and some have made
substantial progress in restructuring of the power sector.

The salient features of the restructuring process of

Indian power sector can be summarized as follows:

(i)

Unbundling of vertically integrated SEBs into different

companies, segregating along their different functional
lines viz. generation, transmission and distribution.

(ii)

Allowing private investment (from both national and

foreign investors) in all spheres of electricity industry,
mainly in generation sector.

(i)

Steps to rationalize the tariff, effort to reduce the

commercial losses, promote fair competition and to
ensure transparency in all activities related to the trade
of electricity.

Private sector participation

Having seen the technical and financial
performance of the power sector in the last decade, now
the review is focused on the success of the private
sector participation, which was one of the chief aims of
restructuring.
It can be seen that there was terrible shortfall in the
capacity addition expected from private sector. Against a
target of 2810 MW in the eighth National Plan (199297)
the achievement was only 1430 MW and against a
targeted capacity addition of 17588.5 MW from private
sector in the ninth plan (19972002)
The poor financial situation of the SEBs and their
inability for ensuring payment security for the power
purchase are the main reasons for the poor participation
of private sector.

Contributions of various sectors in ownership of installed

capacity

Restructuring Choices for the

Indian Power Sector
The Indian power sector is presently going through
a process of reform and restructuring, as is the
trend in many other parts of the world.
Independent regulatory commissions are
being set up, and vertically integrated utilities are
being unbundled into corporate entities. Efforts
are also being made to facilitate competition
wherever feasible, and the choice of an
appropriate power market model assumes
significance in this context

Indian Power Sector

Power in India

Installed Capacity sector wise

(as on 31-12-2006)

Installed Capacity type wise

(as on 31-12-2006)

10 Plan Capacity Addition

th

Type

2002-03* 2003-04* 2004-05* 2005-06*

2006-07@
Commissioned

Yet to be
commission

Total

Total
(MW)

Hydro

635

2,590

1,015

1,340

1316

1958

3274

8,854

Thermal

2,223

1,362

2,934

1,588

1812

10468

12280

20387

Nuclear

50

590

540

220

760

1,400

Total

2,858

4,002

3,949

3,518

3668

12646

16314

30,641

 Indian

Power Sector Organization

The Indian power sector is organized into
five Regional Electricity Boards (REB),each
consisting of several State Electricity Boards
(SEB) as depicted in Figure 1.The Central
Electricity Authority (CEA) is responsible for
power planning at the national level. CEA
advises the Ministry of Power (MoP) on national
power policy, national power planning and
regulatory matters.

Electric Power Delivery in India

Transmission and distribution losses in India stood at about 21% in

1995-1996. This level of losses is considered to be very high, and
efforts are being made to reduce losses.
Electricity prices for households in India has been very lowin the
late 1990s as shown in Figure 2. On the other hand, electricity
prices for commercial applications are very high, and only Japan
has a higher electricity price among developing countries.
In the late 1990s, the installed power generating capacity in India
included 67,617.5 MW of thermal capacity, 22,438.5 MW of
hydropower, 2,225 MW of nuclear, 968MWof wind, and a total
capacity of 93,249 MW. However, the demand for electricity
exceeded the level of supply during the period between November
2001 and March 2002, leading to 39,187 GWh (7.5%) of energy
shortage (compared to the available generation) and 10,293 MW
(12.6%) of peak capacity shortage (compared to the available
capacity). The peak demand and energy requirements forecasted
for India are shown in Table 1.

Performance of the Power Sector in India

The power sector in India has also have problems of nonpayment by

customers at all levels, increasing fiscal losses at REBs, large-scale thefts
of power, over-staffing, under-investment in transmission and distribution,
increasing power outages due to inadequate transmission, etc.

The unsatisfactory financial health of SEBs has precluded

adequate investments for improving the utilization of existing capacities and
for establishing the additional generating capacity.
Over the years, most SEBs have become unwieldy due to the increase in
generating capacity, massive transmission and distribution network covering
nooks and corners of states, and ever-increasing consumption. It is
perceived that the management of such huge utilities involving technical,
commercial, managerial, personnel, and industrial relations is becoming
increasingly difficult.
Private power projects are deemed to be too expensive for SEBs to afford,
some SEBs have signed up on power projects that are far in excess of their
capabilities, and a small portion of proposed initiatives will be implemented
successfully.

Restructuring of the Indian Power Sector

Keeping in view the pros and cons of different restructuring processes
in various countries, it is recognized easily that India is not yet ready for
electricity restructuring. The first and major restructuring problem is
the gap between demand and generation. Thus, this study suggests
the following steps towards the restructuring of the Indian power
sector:
_ Bridge the gap between power demand and electricity generation
_ Decentralize the planning process for an easy entry of generators
_ Increase the intrastate transmission lines
_ Increase the tariffs incrementally
_ Reduce the direct government control
_ Establish an independent regulating authority
_ Unbundle SEBs as generation, transmission, and distribution entities
_ Privatize and commercialize the power entities
_ Establish a competitive power market.

 The

restructuring process as a whole is a very

complex process, and steps suggested here are
overlapping and interrelated. The first four steps
will prepare a background for restructuring,
i.e., after implementing phase
one, India will be ready for restructuring in a real
sense. Steps five to seven are part of the
second phase, and steps eight and nine
constitute the third phase.

Bridge the Gap between Demand and Generation

To bridge this gap, the following measures could be taken.
Tariff Setting. The current pricing method used by most utilities in
the Indian power sector is the traditional cost-plus method.
The cost-plus method starts with the identification of costs, which
include the fixed costs related to capacity, the variable costs related
to fuel, and other customer related costs. Then these costs are
allocated as equitably as possible among consumers through the
tariff structure.
Typically, electricity prices in India are less than the cost of
electricity production and substantially less than the cost to build
and operate a new power plant. The poor power factor leads to the
increased transmission and distribution (T&D) losses, thereby
raising the cost of power delivery.
On the consumption side, energy pricing is a very
important tool for demand side management, especially in the long
run. Incentives should be established for maintaining a high power
factor and for conservation during peak hours and seasons.

 Develop

an Integrated National Grid.

The development of a national grid will
lead to the better utilization of resources. The
five existing REBs are not fully interconnected.
The development and operation of the Indian
power sector are at present limited to the
regional level.
The development of a national grid
could avoid the generating capacity expansion
by 2,784 MW with a total cost of $4,912 million
for installation, fuel, operation, and maintenance.

 Decentralize

the Planning Process

for an Easy Entry of Generators At
present in India, it takes a long time for new
private power projects to be approved and
initiated. Previously, the independent power
project (IPP) approval was through MOU, on
behalf of the Government of India. Now as part
of the reform process, the government has also
started competitive bidding routes.
The competitive bidding process
involves the request for qualification (RFQ) and
the request for proposal (RFP) stages. The
competitive process takes much time currently
and needs to be decentralized.

Increase the Interstate and Intrastate Transmission Lines

Any reform to increase the generating capacity in India could be
futile so long as there is an insufficient transmission capacity for
transferring the added generated power to demand sites.
sufficient transmission line capacity should be made available
to avoid congestion. Thus, private investment for adding
transmission capacity should be encouraged in India.
private sector in transmission system will be conceivably
limited to the construction and the maintenance of transmission
lines under the supervision of the Power Grid Corporation of India
Limited (PGCIL) and RBIPP. Transmission charges payable to
private owners will be directly proportional to the availability of
transmission lines. Furthermore, special attention should be paid to
the northeastern region of India where large potentials for
hydropower exist for the foreseeable future.

Increase Tariffs Incrementally

At present, the household electricity price in India is
minute due to government subsidies. It is expected that
restructuring would lead to higher electricity prices. It is
critically important for the people of India to recognize
that subsidies have resulted in a substantial loss to SEBs
and to the economy as a whole, and SEBs financial
conditions should be improved by a hike in household
electricity prices.
Thus, study suggests that the government of
India should increase the electricity prices in six-month
steps (perhaps to a greater extent in urban areas and a
lesser extent in rural areas) to the level that, when
electricity markets are in operation, would lead to
comparatively lower market prices for electricity.

Reduce Direct Government Control

Current planning strategies in India are centralized
and political. The political timeframe causes a mismatch between
planning and the responsibility for its implementation, limits longterm thinking, and neglects the distribution system planning.
Most of the already implemented restructuring models around
the world limit the governments involvement in the regulation and
the co-ordination processes. Thus, the government role should be
reduced in the restructuring of the Indian power sector, and most of
the government functions like tariff setting, granting licenses, and
taking care of the interests of consumers and investors should be
delegated to independent regulators.

Establish an Independent Regulating Authority

An independent regulator is already

in place in India at the central level. There is also a need
for establishing an independent regulating authority for
the power sector at the state level.
CERC, which was established in 1998 by
the Electricity Regulation Commission Act, is charged
with the responsibility of increasing the competition and
efficiency in India. A few states like Orissa, Haryana, and
Andhra Pradesh have established SERCs already. Other
states should start the process of setting up SERCs
urgently.

Unbundle SEBs as Generation, Transmission, and Distribution

Entities
The activities of an SEB should be broken into separate
divisions.
This step is relatively easy to accomplish,
as it does not require any legislative actions or staff reallocations.
The SEBs activities can be divided into separate divisions based on
their functional roles, i.e., generation, transmission, and distribution.
It is possible to further subdivide the divisions. The generation
business can be divided based on the nature of the generating
plants, i.e., thermal, hydro, nuclear, non conventional, etc.
The divisions must operate as separate profit
centers with a full financial autonomy and functional independence.
Many states in India are in the process of unbundling; however, this
process must be implemented more unilaterally.

 Privatize

Entities

and Commercialize the Power

It is well recognized that reforms

cannot be meaningful unless the competition
and the privatization are initiated.
The central government must,
therefore, break up its generating PSUs into
smaller companies and introduce measures to
enable the competition amongst these
companies. Generation companies will be
responsible to participate in an open market for
trading power, which will be created by the
unbundling of SEBs.

Indian Private Power Player

TATA POWER in delhi

Tata Power Company Ltd signed a share purchase

agreement with the Government of Delhi, for acquisition
of a 51 per cent stake in the North North-West Delhi
Distribution Co Ltd from Delhi Power Company Ltd
With the privatisation of the three power distribution
companies of the Delhi Vidyut Board (DVB), the 51 per
cent stake in two of DVBs arms were given to BSES and
the third to Tata Power, for a total consideration of Rs
481 crore.
The company has managing control of the North NorthWest Delhi Distribution Company Ltd with effect from
July 1, 2002 and the remaining 49 per cent remains with
Delhi Power Co.

 DVB

has been split into six companies,

including the three distribution companies,
a holding company, a generation and a
transmission company.

Establish a Competitive Market

The central government has to take initiatives to set up the
wholesale power market, create an electricity pool and enforce
market-like competitive pressure.
The power markets operating in different parts of the world include:
monopoly model, single buyer model, bilateral contract, poolco
model, and hybrid model.
In a single buyer model, a single entity purchases the power from all
generators on a competitive basis. This is the simplest model, but
buyers do not have any incentive to seek out the most economical
source of supply.
The bilateral contract model allows generators to have direct
contracts with distributors and large consumers without an
intermediary. This model requires an open access to transmission
lines, which leads to a complex transmission system development,
concerns for access costs, and critical regulatory control on
transmission access.

The poolco model envisages different generators to sell power to a pool and
distributors or large consumers to buy from the pool. This model also
requires open access on transmission lines.

The hybrid model is a combination of power pool and bilateral contract

model. The choice of an appropriate market structure for India has to be
necessarily related to the present operating environment and the extent of
competition that is feasible /desirable for India.

study suggests applying the single buyer model at the state level, which
consists of one agency to buy all the necessary power. This agency will be
the upshot of the unbundling of REBs. The single buyer model will ensure
better coordination in transmission system planning and a uniform tariff
throughout the state. By applying this model, REBs will be able to either
follow contractual commitments made with various generating companies

In the future, the single buyer model can gradually evolve into a power pool
model, with a provision for a hybrid model in which bulk consumers will be
allowed to acquire power directly from generators.

Orissa
Orissa, one of the poorest states on India, began
the process of fundamental restructuring of the states
power sector in mid 1990s and became the front-runner
in India to adopt the World Bank template for reforms.
The model, known as WB-Orissa model of reform,
consisted of a three step process:
i) Un-bundling the integrated utility in three separate
sectors of generation, transmission and distribution,
ii) Privatization of generation and distribution companies
and,
iii) Establishment of independent regulatory commissions to
regulate these utilities

Step-1: Structural reform: Unbundling

The structural reform means disintegration of the vertically integrated
monopoly sector into its different functions i.e. generation, transmission and
distribution and allowing access to the transmission lines for private
generators.
Orissas vertically integrated electricity industry was
unbundled into to 2 companies with separate financial structure:
Orissa Hydro Power Corporation (OHPC)
Grid Corporation of Orissa (GRIDCO).
OHPC was the Generation Company; Orissa State
Electricity Board (OSEB) had already sold its only thermal power generation
plant to National Thermal Power Corporation (NTPC), a central power
generation utility. GRIDCO was the transmission and Distribution Company,
which had to privatize the distribution within a stipulated time frame.
Orissa adopted the single-buyer-single-seller model. In 1996,
T&D assets were transferred from OSEB to GRIDCO. GRIDCO would have
to act as a monopsony, it would buy electricity from the producers and sell
that to the distribution companies.

Problems

But it was difficult to achieve the success, as the

problems werent envisaged properly before initiating the
structural reforms. The support structure i.e. physical
transmission and distribution networks were very risky,
weak and fragmented.
The time frame set up by the bank for completing the
reform was too short. Even UK took additional 10 years
to complete its reform in addition of the 10 years of
consultation and planning. GRIDCO had a time line to
restructure and privatize its distribution companies within
next 3-4 years.
This meant that it didnt have time to expand the existing
transmission networks and upgrade distribution
networks.

Step-2: Ownership reform:

Corporatization and eventual privatization
The change in ownership from government to public
corporation and then as a private company is termed as ownership
reforms. Generation and distribution are the favourable choices for
privatization if market competition is the final goal.
Orissa became the first state that adopted ownership reform
advised by World Bank. It had ownership of 100% of transmission
and distribution systems and approx. 60% of the generation
capacity. In 1994, the state government created a new state-owned
corporation,
In 1995, OSEB incorporated all hydro stations under
Orissa Hydro Power Corporation (OHPC) and the transmission and
distribution section under Grid Corporation of Orissa (GRIDCO).

Privatization of generation and distribution was a key

component of the reform package.
The basic assumption was that privatizing distribution
was the best way to reduce the most critical problem i.e.
high line losses.
GRIDCO created separate distribution companies
Central Electricity Supply Company of Orissa
(CESCO),
Western Electricity Supply Company of Orissa
(WESCO),
Northern Electricity Supply Company of Orissa
(NESCO),
and Southern Electricity Supply Company of Orissa
(SOUTHCO).

CESCO, the most lucrative region was immediately

privatized and given to Bombay Suburban Electric
Supply (BSES).
Under the agreement, BSES would manage the utility
and improve billings and collection for a management
The contract was terminated on 30 April 1997. It was a
complete failure on the part of Orissa governments effort
towards privatization. Despite the first failure, Orissa
government put on sale its all four distribution companies
through international bidding in early 1998. Only 2
companies (BSES and Tata Electric Company, TEC)
submitted bids and BSES was awarded three companies
(NESCO, SOUTHCO, and WESCO) in April 1999. A US
multinational company, AES awarded CESCO in
September 1999. Orissa followed or rather beat the
deadline for privatization

Problems
The ownership transfer wasnt an easy job.
The fundamental idea of competition was still
missing. Very few interested parties came
forward . Transferring employees to these newly
formed corporations was another challenge.
Firstly, it was possible only through legislation
from state government, and secondly, the
experienced staff had to work under the much
younger and inexperienced manager who had
little idea of the local conditions.

Step-3: Regulatory reform:

Independent commission formation
Structural and ownership reforms are incomplete
without regulatory reforms. The regulatory reforms are required to
correct distortions that might arise in new deregulated regime. The
new unbundled structure creates more complexity in monitoring and
controlling.
The Indian Electricity Act 1948 is the basis for the
electricity industry. The Electricity Regulatory Commission Act 1998
(ERC) mandated the creation of an electricity regulatory commission
at central and state levels to bring out competition and efficiency in
the electricity industry. Orissa established Orissa Electricity
Regulatory Commission (OERC) on 1 April 1996 as required by the
Orissa Electricity Reform Act 1995.
This was the first independent electricity regulatory commission in
India,

Lessons from Orissa experience

-

Orissa was facing high T&D losses. Inefficient T&D networks were
the main reasonsfor the high line losses. Privatization of T&D
network was an option but the statewas in its nascent stage of
reforms. It had not understood the mechanism of marketsand
privatization.

Distribution circles formed were of smaller sizes and there was an

uncertainty in the financial viability of the zones. Assessing true
asset value of T&D networks before selling them to private investors
was another problem. The apprehension was real as the correct
valuation of theft of electricity wasnt recorded properly.

Tariff structure was irrational. Subsidies and cross-subsidies were

high. Revenue realization was also very weak.

Insufficient capacity obviously a roadblock to market competition.

- Political interference in decision-making process to appease vote

bank. Free electricity and lower tariff setting for farmers are two
such examples.

Conclusions
This seminar presents a detailed analysis of the
current power sector in India and lessons should be learned from
the restructuring process in other states .
The study suggests a restructuring process for the Indian power
sector in three phases.
The three phases of the suggested restructuring
process involve a nine-step action plan that serves as guidelines for
the ongoing reform process in India. The suggestions for
restructuring are summarized as follows.

_ In the first phase, the Indian government should establish an

appropriate background needed for restructuring, which involves
bridging the gap between power demand and generation,
decentralizing the planning process, increasing the number of
transmission lines, and increasing the tariffs in steps.

_ In the second phase, the direct government control

should be reduced, SEBs should be unbundled, and an
independent regulator should be established.
_ In the third phase, the privatization and
commercialization of newly formed entities should be
considered, and a free electricity market should be
established.
The suggested steps for restructuring are to be
implemented in a time-bound manner.
However, once a successful model is
implemented in a single state, the other states in India
are bound to follow suit to make the reform process a
success story.

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Thank

you