RCM Overview

Presented to Acquisition and Logistics

Excellence Conference
23-24 April, 2003

By
Richard Overman
Chief RCM Engineer
Veridian
340 Corporate Way, Suite 100
Orange Park, FL 32073
(904) 264-1440
[email protected]
 Introduction to RCM

Outline
What is RCM - Definition
History of RCM
Purpose of RCM
General RCM Process
FMEA
Failure Consequences
Function Preservation Strategies
Benefits of RCM
IRCMS Demonstration
What is RCM?
 Introduction To RCM
Definition Of RCM

A process used to identify policies and strategies that must be

implemented to preserve the function of an asset in its operating

environment.
History of RCM
 Introduction To RCM
History Of RCM
 Prior to 1970s preventive maintenance programs relied on
periodic overhauls

 Believed everything exhibited a bathtub failure characteristic

Infant
Mortality
Random Wear
Failure Out

Time
 Introduction To RCM
History Of RCM

 FAA taskforce studied airline failures in 1960

 Surprising discoveries*

 “Scheduled overhaul has little effect on overall reliability of a complex

item unless the item has a dominant failure mode.”

 “There are many items for which there is no effective form of scheduled

maintenance.”

Reliability-Centered Maintenance, F. Stanley Nowlan, et. al., 1978, p5

 Introduction To RCM
History Of RCM

FAILURE CHARACTERISTICS CURVES

D
A 7%

14%

4% B E
11% 2% 89%
5%
68%

C F
 Introduction To RCM
History Of RCM - Graphic
MSG-2 MSG-3 MSG-3R2002
FAA Track 1970 1980 2002

Naval Sea Track

Mil-P-24534A
1991
Early MSG-1 VRCM
PM 1968
2001

Naval Aviation N-H RCM Mil-Hbk.- Mil-Std- NA-403

1978 266, 1981 2173, 1986 2001
Track

RCM
Applied to RCM II RCM-AMS SAE Stds.

{
commercial 1992 1993 1999
1983
Commercial Industry Track
Hybrid
RCM, 90’s
Purpose of
RCM?
 Introduction To RCM
Purpose Of RCM

 The purpose of RCM is to:

 Identify
policies that preserve the function of an asset in its
operating context . . . preserve the function not just maintain
the equipment

 RCM ensures that:

 the right maintenance is performed
 at the right time
 by the right people
 in the right way
 with the right training and tools
 Introduction To RCM
Purpose Of RCM

Considers:

scheduled maintenance

design changes

training improvements

operational changes

one-time changes

run-to-failure
 Introduction To RCM
Purpose Of RCM

 Scheduled maintenance based on failure characteristics in

operating context

 “Run-to-fail” when cost effective and no safety / environment

concerns

 Less corrective maintenance

 More proactive approach

General RCM
Process
 General RCM Process

RCM PLAN Plan that describes how the RCM

program will be developed, implemented, and sustained
throughout the equipment’s life Output : Guidance to RCM manager,
analysts, and other team members

HARDWARE BREAKDOWN End

item is broken down to the level that the analysis
will take place
Output : Individual analysis items

FMECA Analysis to determine how the analysis

item can fail, the effects of those failures, and other
failure information
Output : Information on each reasonably
likely failure mode of the analysis item
SIGNIFICANT FUNCTION
SELECTION Analysis to determine whether
the failure of a function has significant effects on
Output : Identity of functions which are
safety, operations, or economics
significant enough to warrant further
analysis
RCM TASK EVALUATION Analysis
to determine what options are available that will
deal successfully with each mode of failure
Output : PM requirements and
Identification of when action outside of
RCM is warranted
RCM TASK SELECTION Analysis to
determine which solution is the most acceptable

Output : The preventive task(s) or other

actions that deal most effectively with
the failure mode
IMPLEMENTATION Things done to
apply the output of RCM to the maintenance
program

FEEDBACK In-service and

AE data
 Obtain System Documentation
RCM PLAN Plan that describes how the RCM

SYSTEM DOCUMENTATION
program will be developed, implemented, and sustained
throughout the equipment’s life Output : Guidance to RCM manager,
analysts, and other team members

HARDWARE BREAKDOWN End

item is broken down to the level that the analysis
will take place
Output : Individual analysis items

FMECA Analysis to determine how the analysis

item can fail, the effects of those failures, and other
failure information
Output : Information on each reasonably
likely failure mode of the analysis item
SIGNIFICANT FUNCTION
SELECTION Analysis to determine whether
the failure of a function has significant effects on
Output : Identity of functions which are
safety, operations, or economics
significant enough to warrant further
analysis
RCM TASK EVALUATION Analysis
to determine what options are available that will
deal successfully with each mode of failure
Output : PM requirements and
Identification of when action outside of
RCM is warranted
RCM TASK SELECTION Analysis to
determine which solution is the most acceptable

Output : The preventive task(s) or other

actions that deal most effectively with
the failure mode
IMPLEMENTATION Things done to
apply the output of RCM to the maintenance
program

FEEDBACK In-service and

AE data

 Obtain all available system documentation

 Used to define the functional systems in the item

 Must be detailed enough to prioritize / track analyses

 Typical Documentation

 Maintenance Information Manual

 MRC Decks
 EIs/ HMRs
 NALDA/ AEMS

 Web-site

 OEM Reports
 Engineering studies and reports
 Depot documentation
 Artisan interviews
 Sailor interviews
 ENGINEERING SUBJECT MATTER EXPERTS
 Establish System Hierarchy
FUNCTIONAL HIERARCHY
RCM PLAN Plan that describes how the RCM
program will be developed, implemented, and sustained
throughout the equipment’s life Output : Guidance to RCM manager,
analysts, and other team members

HARDWARE BREAKDOWN End

item is broken down to the level that the analysis
will take place
Output : Individual analysis items

FMECA Analysis to determine how the analysis

item can fail, the effects of those failures, and other
failure information
Output : Information on each reasonably
likely failure mode of the analysis item
SIGNIFICANT FUNCTION
SELECTION Analysis to determine whether
the failure of a function has significant effects on
Output : Identity of functions which are
safety, operations, or economics
significant enough to warrant further
analysis
RCM TASK EVALUATION Analysis
to determine what options are available that will
deal successfully with each mode of failure
Output : PM requirements and
Identification of when action outside of
RCM is warranted
RCM TASK SELECTION Analysis to
determine which solution is the most acceptable

Output : The preventive task(s) or other

actions that deal most effectively with
the failure mode
IMPLEMENTATION Things done to
apply the output of RCM to the maintenance
program

FEEDBACK In-service and

AE data

 Major functional systems in item

 Based on system documentation

 General description of primary function of each system

 Functional block diagram useful but not always necessary

 Typical Hierarchy

AIRCRAFT
1

SYSTEM HYDRAULIC SYSTEM

1A SYSTEM 1B 1C

SUBSYSTEM SUBSYSTEM HYD PUMP SUBSYSTEM

1B1 1B2 ASSY 1B3 1B4

MOTOR GEAR BOX CENT PUMP HYDRAULIC PRESSURE

1B3A 1B3B 1B3C PUMP 1B3D REG 1B3E
 Prioritize Analyses
RCM PLAN Plan that describes how the RCM
program will be developed, implemented, and sustained
throughout the equipment’s life Output : Guidance to RCM manager,

SYSTEM PRIORITIES
analysts, and other team members

HARDWARE BREAKDOWN End

item is broken down to the level that the analysis
will take place
Output : Individual analysis items

FMECA Analysis to determine how the analysis

item can fail, the effects of those failures, and other
failure information
Output : Information on each reasonably
likely failure mode of the analysis item
SIGNIFICANT FUNCTION
SELECTION Analysis to determine whether
the failure of a function has significant effects on
Output : Identity of functions which are
safety, operations, or economics
significant enough to warrant further
analysis
RCM TASK EVALUATION Analysis

 Management team performs prioritization

to determine what options are available that will
deal successfully with each mode of failure
Output : PM requirements and
Identification of when action outside of
RCM is warranted
RCM TASK SELECTION Analysis to
determine which solution is the most acceptable

Output : The preventive task(s) or other

actions that deal most effectively with
the failure mode
IMPLEMENTATION Things done to
apply the output of RCM to the maintenance
program

FEEDBACK In-service and

AE data

 Senior managers have input / ownership of RCM analysis

 Management team establishes criteria

 Prioritization criteria based on:

 Potential for big improvements

 Most deleterious to the function of the plant

 Immediate safety or environmental hazard

 Typical Priorities

 System analysis priorities

 Core engine

 QECA

 Failure Mode analysis priorities

 Known safety issues.

 Items that have current MRC tasks

 Cost/Readiness Degraders identified by NALDA.

 All others
 Establish System/asset Boundaries
RCM PLAN Plan that describes how the RCM
program will be developed, implemented, and sustained
throughout the equipment’s life Output : Guidance to RCM manager,

SYSTEM/ASSET BOUNDARIES
analysts, and other team members

HARDWARE BREAKDOWN End

item is broken down to the level that the analysis
will take place
Output : Individual analysis items

FMECA Analysis to determine how the analysis

item can fail, the effects of those failures, and other
failure information
Output : Information on each reasonably
likely failure mode of the analysis item
SIGNIFICANT FUNCTION
SELECTION Analysis to determine whether
the failure of a function has significant effects on
Output : Identity of functions which are
safety, operations, or economics
significant enough to warrant further
analysis
RCM TASK EVALUATION Analysis
to determine what options are available that will
deal successfully with each mode of failure
Output : PM requirements and
Identification of when action outside of
RCM is warranted
RCM TASK SELECTION Analysis to
determine which solution is the most acceptable

Output : The preventive task(s) or other

actions that deal most effectively with
the failure mode
IMPLEMENTATION Things done to
apply the output of RCM to the maintenance
program

FEEDBACK In-service and

AE data

 Identify parts of system analyzed

 Identifies subsystems analyzed separately

 Clearly defines functional interface for analysis

 J52 Specific Boundaries

 Boundaries follow WUC breakdown unless otherwise noted

 Additional guidance:
 Fuel/lubrication components included with systems, tubing associated
with fuel and lubrication systems respectively
 Attaching hardware analyzed with system component unless hardware
has structural WUC or integral part of structural or other system
 Wiring identified as separate subsystem failure modes under wiring
subsystem except wiring internal to engine components
 Hoses and tubes analyzed under the fuel, lubrication or other systems.
Individual hoses, tubing and wiring not analyzed unless data indicates
problem areas
 Begin The Analyses
RCM PLAN Plan that describes how the RCM
program will be developed, implemented, and sustained
throughout the equipment’s life Output : Guidance to RCM manager,

RCM SYSTEM ANALYSIS

analysts, and other team members

HARDWARE BREAKDOWN End

item is broken down to the level that the analysis
will take place
Output : Individual analysis items

FMECA Analysis to determine how the analysis

item can fail, the effects of those failures, and other

{
failure information
Output : Information on each reasonably
likely failure mode of the analysis item
SIGNIFICANT FUNCTION
SELECTION Analysis to determine whether
the failure of a function has significant effects on
Output : Identity of functions which are
safety, operations, or economics
significant enough to warrant further
analysis
RCM TASK EVALUATION Analysis
to determine what options are available that will
deal successfully with each mode of failure
Output : PM requirements and
Identification of when action outside of
RCM is warranted
RCM TASK SELECTION Analysis to
determine which solution is the most acceptable

 Heart of RCM process is RCM system analysis IMPLEMENTATION Things done to

apply the output of RCM to the maintenance
program
Output : The preventive task(s) or other
actions that deal most effectively with
the failure mode

FEEDBACK In-service and

AE data

 The seven SAE questions

 What are the functions and associated desired standards of

performance of the assets in the present operation context (functions)?

 In what ways can it fail to fulfill its functions (functional failures)?

 What causes each functional failure (failure modes)?

 What happens when each failure occurs (failure effects)?

 Begin The Analyses
RCM SYSTEM ANALYSIS RCM PLAN

HARDWARE BREAKDOWN
Plan that describes how the RCM
program will be developed, implemented, and sustained
throughout the equipment’s life

item is broken down to the level that the analysis

will take place
End
Output : Guidance to RCM manager,
analysts, and other team members

Output : Individual analysis items

FMECA Analysis to determine how the analysis

item can fail, the effects of those failures, and other

{
failure information
Output : Information on each reasonably
likely failure mode of the analysis item
SIGNIFICANT FUNCTION
SELECTION Analysis to determine whether
the failure of a function has significant effects on
Output : Identity of functions which are
safety, operations, or economics
significant enough to warrant further
analysis
RCM TASK EVALUATION Analysis
to determine what options are available that will
deal successfully with each mode of failure
Output : PM requirements and
Identification of when action outside of
RCM is warranted
RCM TASK SELECTION Analysis to
determine which solution is the most acceptable

Output : The preventive task(s) or other

actions that deal most effectively with

 The seven SAE questions (cont)

the failure mode
IMPLEMENTATION Things done to
apply the output of RCM to the maintenance
program

FEEDBACK In-service and

AE data

 In what way does each functional failure matter (failure consequences)?

 What should be done to predict or prevent each failure (proactive tasks

and task intervals)?

 What should be done if a suitable proactive task cannot be found

(default actions)?
 Package Function Preservation Strategies
RCM PLAN Plan that describes how the RCM

PACKAGE ANALYSIS RESULTS

program will be developed, implemented, and sustained
throughout the equipment’s life Output : Guidance to RCM manager,
analysts, and other team members

HARDWARE BREAKDOWN End

item is broken down to the level that the analysis
will take place
Output : Individual analysis items

FMECA Analysis to determine how the analysis

item can fail, the effects of those failures, and other
failure information
Output : Information on each reasonably
likely failure mode of the analysis item
SIGNIFICANT FUNCTION
SELECTION Analysis to determine whether
the failure of a function has significant effects on
Output : Identity of functions which are
safety, operations, or economics
significant enough to warrant further
analysis
RCM TASK EVALUATION Analysis
to determine what options are available that will
deal successfully with each mode of failure

 Performed after all failure modes for the system

Output : PM requirements and
Identification of when action outside of
RCM is warranted
RCM TASK SELECTION Analysis to
determine which solution is the most acceptable

Output : The preventive task(s) or other

actions that deal most effectively with

completed
the failure mode
IMPLEMENTATION Things done to
apply the output of RCM to the maintenance
program

FEEDBACK In-service and

AE data

 Example- 3 tasks require plant shut down at intervals of 8, 9,

and 10 months
 Package so all can be performed during the same scheduled
shutdown
 Scheduled down time not necessarily at the shortest
interval
 If the 8 month task has safety or environmental consequences,
shutdown every 8 months
 If the 8 and 9 month tasks have economic or operational
consequences and the 10 month task has safety
consequences, shutdown 10 months
 If all three tasks had economic or operational consequences,
shutdown at most cost effective interval
 Typical Packaging Guidance

 Tasks packaged into existing intervals

 Create new intervals where required

 Safety or environmentally related changes made via IRAC

 Other changes packaged together and all made with one change
 Implement Improved Maintenance Program
IMPLEMENT PACKAGED RESULTS

 Tasks not implemented are of no value

 Detailed implementation plan

 Plant personnel must implement tasks

 Detailed implementation plan makes implementation easier

 System expert team develops implementation plan

 They will carry it out

 Plan will be workable, effective, and implemented

 Typical Implementation Guidance

 Changes to MRC deck via MCR and IRAC or manual change

 Changes to MIMs via MCR and manual change

 Design changes via ECP

 Supply changes via NAVICP

 Training issues worked with appropriate authority

 Other changes via appropriate NAVAIR process

 System Expert Team RCM

 Used when RCM analysis team not co-located with equipment

and System Expert Team

 Maximum input from the System Expert Team

 Minimize travel expenses

 Minimizes System Expert Team time requirements

FMEA
 FMEA Philosophy

 Function based on use not design capability

 Design capability > use to allow for degradation

 Functional failure may be actual or defined

 Failure modes- physical failure

 Failure effects- what happens when failure occurs

 At the incident

 To the system

 To the plant
 FMEA Philosophy

Design Condition Usage limit

120

100
Resistance

80
Failure

60

40

20

0
0 1 2 3 4 5 6 7 8 9 10
Time Period
 Functions

 Primary function- The purpose for which the system or asset is

acquired.
 Secondary functions- Other functions that the system or asset
may perform.
 Appearance
 Containment
 Control/ comfort
 Environmental/ economy/ efficiency
 Protective
 Transmission
 Safety/ structure/ superfluous
 J52 Specific Function Guidance

 Identifyall subsystem functions and enter in IRCMS.

 Functions developed from system descriptions in MIMs and other
appropriate documents.
 FST RCM Lead Engineer (and cognizant engineer) will approve all
functions and functional failures.
 Provide quantified performance standards whenever applicable, e.g.
“Provide 3000 psi hydraulic pressure at 8 gal/minute.”
 Function Description.
 Described function such that loss of that function has one effect whenever
possible
 If more than one effect possible, may need to separated into two or more
functions.
 Example, thermocouple send temperature signals to the temperature controller
and cockpit indicator.
 Should be separated since the effects are different

 Ensure all secondary functions are addressed

 Functional Failures

 The ways in which a function fails

 May be more than one functional failure for a function

 Can be defined as a point short of actual failure

 Failure Modes

 The physical cause of the functional failure

 All reasonably likely failure modes listed

 Types of failure modes:

 Deterioration

 Design problem

 Over stress
 J52 Specific Failure Mode Guidance

 Current PM Tasks
 HMR/EI’s that are considered “significant” will be analyzed
 Failure modes with Age Exploration Inspections will be
analyzed
 “Significant” failure modes from experience of RCM analyst or
engineer are analyzed
 Fleet maintainers and depot artisans interviews will determine
“significant” failure modes
 Top degraders are evaluated for “significant” failure modes
 3M data should be utilized to validate failure modes
 J52 Specific Failure Mode Guidance (Cont.)

 “Reasonable” Failure Modes

 Failure modes that have occurred
 Failure modes that have not yet occurred but for some reason are
expected to occur in the life of the aircraft
 Failure modes that have current PM tasks
 Avoid unrealistic failure modes.
 Combining Failure Modes - Different failure modes for a given
function can be combined to reduce repetitive analyses if the
following are the same
 Failure effects
 Detection method
 Failure consequences
 Any potential PM task must be the same, and address all combined
failure modes.
 J52 Specific Failure Mode Guidance (Cont.)

 Unspecific Failure Modes – Avoid unspecific terms such as

"inoperative", "defective", "damaged", or “failed”
 Maintenance errors and manufacturing defects should not be
described as failure modes.
 Do not identify potential failures as separate failure modes;
example, “cracked” or “broken, due to fatigue” is one failure
mode.
 Failure modes should be descriptive enough for inspections or
other preventive tasks to be developed if needed
 Document the “How” and “Why” of failure modes when
available.
 Described in sufficient detail to identify defect location on part
on a drawing in IPB or Structural Repair Manual
 Use Part numbers, stage or other specific identifying
information
 Failure Effects

 Describe what happens when a failure occurs

 Start at failure mode- Local Effect

 What happens at the component that fails

 Describe effect on system or sub-system

 The idea is to keep asking “what happens next” until the effect on the

plant is reached

 Do not describe consequences (i.e. environmental, safety,

economics)
 J52 Specific Failure Effects Guidance

 Based on complete functional failure unless a separate partial

functional failure is described in the analysis
 Three levels of effects
 Local item – generally the item that would be fixed or removed upon
failure
 Engine
 End item – aircraft
 End Effects
 Consider most severe but realistically possible effects avoid unrealistic
scenarios
 Redundancies/protective devices or fail-safe features should also be
described
 Used to determine failure consequences so accuracy is imperative
 State secondary effects or damage
 Include “Loss of Aircraft”, “Mission Abort”, or “Significant Aircraft
damage.”
 J52 Specific Failure Effects Guidance (Cont.)

MultipleEffects – Effects that differ with

circumstances such as fight regime
 Stated in memo field
 Or analyzing as separate failure modes
Uncertain Effects
 qualifiers such as “possible” or “potential” may be used
 Take care to not be overly conservative
 Effects should be reasonably likely.
Effects of hidden failures
Normally assumes a single failure has occurred
Items used only in abnormal situations, assume a
failure or series of failures has occurred to require
its use.
 Failure
Consequences
 Failure Consequences Categories – Safety

 Safety- “A failure mode or multiple failure has safety

consequences if it could injure or kill a human being.”

 Based on the concept of tolerable risk

 “Zero” is unattainable

 Degree of risk based on probability of experiencing a failure that results

in safety consequences

 Tolerable probability of experiencing a failure with safety consequences

must be determined

 Discuss how to use this concept later

Consequence categories as defined by the SAE Standard (p5)

Failure Consequences Categories – Environmental

 Environmental- “A failure mode or multiple failure has

environmental consequences if it could breach any corporate,

municipal, regional, national, or international environmental

standard or regulation which applies to the physical asset of

system under consideration.”

 It is important to be aware of which environmental standards apply to

each failure mode

Consequence categories as defined by the SAE Standard (p4)

 Failure Consequences Categories – Operational

 Operational- “A category of failure consequences that

adversely affect the operational capability of a physical asset

or system.”

 Can affect:

 Output

 Product quality

 Customer service

 Military capability

 Operating costs in addition to the cost of repair

Consequence categories as defined by the SAE Standard (p5)
 Failure Consequences Categories – Non-
Operational

 Non-Operational- “A category of failure consequences that do

not adversely affect safety, the environment, or operations, but

only require repair or replacement of any item(s) that may be

affected by the failure.”

 Consequences associated with these failures are:

 The cost of repairing the failure

 The cost of secondary damage associated with the failure

Consequence categories as defined by the SAE Standard (p5)

 Hidden Failures

 Hidden failure- “A failure mode whose effects do not become

apparent to the operating crew under normal circumstances if
the failure mode occurs on its own.”

 A function that has hidden failures is a hidden function

 Usually requires two failures

 Failure of the item (unknown)

 Another failure or abnormal event (that makes the item failure known)

 Protective functions are often hidden functions

 Could apply to defined functional failures

Consequence categories as defined by the SAE Standard (p4)
 Evident Failures

 “A failure mode whose effects become apparent to the

operating crew under normal circumstances if the failure mode

occurs on its own.”

 A function whose failure is evident is an evident function

 Users must find failure in normal “routine”

 The consequences will be realized right away

 Defined functional failures may be considered evident if effects

of complete failure is evident

Consequence categories as defined by the SAE Standard (p4)

 Failure Consequence Assessment

 Hidden Failures  Evident Failures

 Safety  Safety
 Environmental  Environmental
 Operational  Operational
 Non-Operational  Non-Operational

 Consequence assessment based on reasonably

likely worst case scenario
 Morethan one consequence is normal, most severe
consequence analyzed
 Assumes no specific scheduled task is performed
 J52 Specific Failure Consequence Guidance

 Failure Consequence Determination

 Hidden/Evident – Based on clear evidence of the functional
failure or secondary effects of the failure to the operator
 Based on failure detection method listed in the FMECA
 Operator’s normal duties
 NAVAIR Management Manual states in part: “For the air crew, these
duties do not include pre-operation, post-operation, or walk around
inspections since the inspections do not ensure operational capability of
the equipment while performing its mission.”
 In some cases pilots’ ability to detect functional failure during walk
around inspection pre-flight checks can be important to analysis
 In these cases walk around inspection can be considered normal duties
with justification in memo field.
 NATOPs Requirements. NATOPs pre-flight requirement should
be treated as “normal duties”
 Failure Consequence Flow Chart
Is the functional failure or effect of the failure mode, on its own,
evident to the operator while performing normal duties?

YES NO
Evident Hidden

Does failure mode cause function loss Does hidden failure mode in combination
or secondary damage that could have with second failure/event cause function
an adverse effect on operating safety loss or secondary damage that could have
or lead to serious environmental an adverse effect on operating safety or
violation? lead to serious environmental violation?

YES NO NO YES
Evident Evident Hidden Hidden
Safety/ Economic/ Economic/ Safety/
Environmental Operational Operational Environmental

Analyze Analyze Analyze Analyze

Options:
S, L, OC, HT, Options:
S, L, OC, HT, S, Options:
L, OC, HT, FF, S,Options:
L, OC, HT, FF,
Other No PM, No PM, Other
Action Other Other Action
Action Action

Select BEST
OPTION
 J52 Specific Failure Consequence Guidance

 Built-in-Test (BIT). May be considered evident with recurring

requirement to perform BIT
 Flight Information. Flight begins at engine start and ends with
engine shutdown.
 Safety/Non-Safety – Based on end effects. If safety impact is
possible but not certain, answer “safety”.
 Hidden failures, assume a second failure causing hidden
failure to become evident has occurred
 Secondary damage and effects such as FOD should be
considered.
 Specific safety scenarios:
 Fuel leak in interior/sealed compartment: “safety”
 Externally visible fuel leak: “safety”
 Engine flameout: “safety”
 Others?
 Function
Preservation
Strategies
 SS/L- Scheduled Service/ Lubrication

 SS/L- Scheduled Service/ Lubrication: replenishing of fluids,

grease, oil, etc. consumed by process

 Pros

 Reduces wear

 Replenishes consumables

 Based on design features

 Cons

 Consumes man-hours

 Consumes material
 SM- Scheduled Monitoring

 SM-
Scheduled Monitoring: task performed regularly to
monitor the condition of process/asset
 Pros
 Gets the most use out of assets
 The asset “tells” you when it needs repair
 Allows for multiple options
 Flexible in the amount and type of technology used
 Appropriate for all failure consequences
 Cons
 Technologies can be expensive
 Consumes man-hours
 May give less warning to plan for down-time
 J52 Specific S/L Guidance

 Give current S&L tasks cursory review for applicability and

proper interval

 Unless found deficient, current S&L tasks accepted and

documented as is

 Analyze in depth S&L tasks requiring extensive disassembly or

high economic or operational impacts

 New S&L tasks may be considered

 Lubrication required following engine wash, enter interval and

"or after engine wash" in the memo field
 SM- Scheduled Monitoring

A
WHAT CHARACTERISTIC
100 % WILL INDICATE REDUCED
FAILURE RESISTANCE?

B POTENTIAL
FAILURE
FAILURE DEFINED POTENTIAL
FAILURE CONDITION DEFINED FUNCTIONAL
RESISTANCE
FAILURE CONDITION

10 % C FUNCTIONAL
FAILURE
0%
Time
I I I
Inspection Interval
TASK INTERVAL FEASIBLE?
PF Interval
 SM- Scheduled Monitoring

 Safety/environmental Inspection interval determination

 Probability of failure must be reduced to tolerable level

ln Pact
Pact = (1 - Q ) n n=
ln (1- Q )

where: Pact = probability of actual failure

Q = probability of detecting failure during one inspection
n = number of inspections during PF interval
Inspection Interval = T/n
where: T = time from potential failure to functional failure
n = number of inspections during PF interval
 J52 Specific SM Guidance

 Use of "any" or "all” as potential failure limit will means no

evidence of the condition is allowable without corrective
action.
 Lube oil leak potential failures should use “one drop in 15
minutes” unless otherwise specified in maintenance
publications
 Realdata such as test data, operational data, or crack growth
analyses is preferred.
 Whendata is not available or inadequate, make an estimate
based on engineering/real world experience
 Effectiveexisting PM requirement can be defaulted by
calculating the number of inspections based on effectiveness
of task (method of last resort)
 SR- Scheduled Removal

 SR- Scheduled Removal: periodic removal of a component

regardless of it’s condition
 Pros

 Maintenance costs are predicable

 Down-time more easily scheduled
 Production interruptions accounted for and known
 Applicable for all failure consequences

 Cons

 Asset life “thrown away”

 “High” overhaul or replacement costs
 SR- Scheduled Removal
 Periodic removal of component regardless of condition
 Identifiable wear-out age
 Acceptable number must survive to that age
 Interval based on wear-out age

WEAR OUT
CONDITIONAL
PROBABILITY

REGION
OF FAILURE

TIME
 SR- Scheduled Removal

 Technically feasible
 Wear out age can be determined
 Empirically based
 Statistical methods
 Weibull Analysis
 Actuarial Analysis
 Overhaul or discard subsequent decision
 Safety/environmental consequences- probability of failure
reduced to a tolerable level
 Operational and non-operational consequences- interval must
be cost effective
 J52 Specific SR Guidance

 Fatigue test or component certification test results are

preferred for hard time task intervals.

 For structural components, fatigue analysis may be used with

appropriate safety factors

 Weibull analysis or other statistical methods can be used when

test data or fatigue analysis is not available or applicable

 Use manufacturer’s design life or recommended service life

 Hard time task for safety-related issue must be based on

testing or analysis
 FFT- Failure Finding Task

 FFT- Failure Finding Task: scheduled task to determine

whether a failure has occurred

 Pros

 Identifies failure before function is needed

 Ensures safety devices are operational

 Applicable for all failure consequences

 Cons

 Allows failure to occur

 Often difficult to check entire function

 FFT- Failure Finding Task

 Technically feasible

 Able to find the functional failure

 Testing indication (i.e. press to test) does not test whole circuit

 Capable of checking ALL of components in system

 Ideally conditions required to activate system simulated

 Disturbed system as little as possible

 Avoid dismantling

 If dismantled, ensure protection not needed

 Ensure task does not damage device

 OTC- One-Time Change

 OTC- One-Time Change: change in design, operation, training,

policy, or operating context

 Pros

 Fixes nagging problems

 Identifies asset weaknesses

 Enhances operations/maintenance/production

 Applicable for all failure consequences

 Cons

 Takes time to implement

 Can carry significant costs

 OTC- One-Time Change

 One- time change

 Design
 Operating policy
 Training
 Operating context
 Design changes
 Design away failure mode
 Design in consequence mitigation
 Design in ability to perform scheduled task
 Operation- change process operation or maintenance
 Policy-
change to improve safety process or mitigate
consequences
 Operating context- change in desired performance standards
 RTF- Run-to-Failure

 RTF- Run-to-Failure: operation of process or asset until it no

longer fulfills desired function in operating context

 Pros

 Get full use of asset

 Can be cost effective

 Cons

 Only applicable for operational and non-operational consequences

 Maintenance costs less predictable

 RTF- Run-to-Failure

 Operation of process or asset until it can no longer fulfill the

required function within the operating context

 Never considered when there are safety or environmental

consequences

 Based on cost analysis.

Packaging RCM
 Packaging Steps
Step 1 - Lay Out Tasks by Interval and Preliminary
Maintenance Level
Task Labor Hours vs Frequency
12

Fleet Depot
10

8
Labor Hours

0
2 19 38 46 0 7 9 7 9 2 8 3 4 2 5 2 5 4 4 3 9 0
10 10 12 16 19 21 22 24 26 29 31 33 38 40 46 47 50 55
Frequency
 Packaging Steps

Step 2 - Identify Logical Task Groupings

Task Labor Hours vs Frequency

12

Fleet Depot
10

8
Labor Hours

0
2 19 38 46 0 7 9 7 9 2 8 3 4 2 5 2 5 4 4 3 9 0
10 10 12 16 19 21 22 24 26 29 31 33 38 40 46 47 50 55
Frequency
 Packaging Steps

Step 3 - Fitting Tasks Into Existing Packages

Labor Hours at Packaged Intervals

100 2000
90 Fleet Depot 1800
80 1600
Fleet Labor Hours

Depot Labor Hours

70 1400
60 1200
50 1000
40 800
30 600
20 400
10 200
0 0

onth

onth
ur

ur

ur

ur

ur
tapult
Dai ly

ou r
r

ay

ay

ay
5 hou

7 Da

14 da

o
28 D

56 D

365 d
100 H

200 H

400 H

500 H

800 H
10 H

40 M

80 M
a
150 C

Task Interval
Benefits of RCM
 Benefits of RCM

 Increased asset availability to generate revenue

 Overall reduction in maintenance costs

 Reduced recurring failures

 Better understanding of system operation

 Improved safety and environmental protection

 Improved team work between all disciplines

 Improved morale with better operating equipment

 Benefits of RCM (cont.)

 Increased profits- revenues generation up, maintenance costs

down

 Documented asset management strategy

 Audit trail for regulatory and future use

 Improved maintenance management processes and

maintenance data recording

 Strategies to mitigate the consequences of failures

 RCM in
Acquisition
Early Decisions Affect Life Cycle Cost
100

90

80 Life-Cycle Cost Effectively

Cumulative 70 Rendered Unchangeable
Percent of For a Given Design
Life-Cycle
Cost 50

Life-Cycle Cost
Actually Expended
10

DR B C FRPDR IOC Out of

Milestones Service
System Life-Cycle
 Traditional VS IPPD Approach
High High
Number of Design Changes

Dollars
Low Low

Conceptualization Test and Sustainment

and Design Production
Traditional
IPPD
 Acquisition Model Comparisons

MS 0 MS I MS II MS III

Program Definition Engineering & Production,

O Concept
& Manufacturing Fielding/
L Exploration
Risk Reduction Development Deployment
D
(EMD) *

A B C
Concept Component System System LRIP Full Rate Production &
Advanced Integration
N Exploration
Development
Demo Deployment
Operations
Interim FRP
E Decision
Review Progress Decision & Support
Review Review
W
Concept & Tech Development System Development & Demonstration Production & Deployment
 403 Manual Guidance

Prior to Milestone A
 Identify
RCM as an integral function of Maintenance
Planning/Supportability analysis and Design Interface activities
 Establish “functional” failure modes and effects methodology
 Establish
RCM as approach for identifying strategies for preventive
maintenance development
 Identify potential technologies to improve/optimize preventive maintenance
 Identify potential analytical tools
 MakeRCM concepts integral and influential to maintenance concept
development
 Establish organizational responsibilities (Government/contractor) for RCM
 Plan for adequate resources for RCM
 UseRCM to consider effects on preventive maintenance during design
trade-off analyses
 403 Manual Guidance
Prior to Milestone B

 Perform baseline comparison study of preventive maintenance

requirements

 Accomplish a use study to identify preventive maintenance issues and

constraints

 Develop initial RCM plan that identifies

 Consider technological advances

 Incorporate lessons learned

 Agree on use of FMECA for Reliability, Maintainability, Supportability/RCM

 403 Manual Guidance

Prior to Milestone C
 Updatebaseline comparison study of preventive maintenance
requirements
 Useinitial “hardware” RCM analysis on evolving design to influence
design with respect to preventive maintenance
 Update RCM plan to be consistent with design phase
 Continue to evaluate technological advances
 Agree on approach for development and use of FMECA/Failure data
for System Safety, Reliability, Maintainability, and Supportability/RCM
 Incorporate lessons learned
 Include RCM results in maintenance plans and tech. manuals
 Identify and plan for RCM sustainment
 Establish initial age exploration program
 403 Manual Guidance

During Full Rate Production

 Update baseline comparison study

 Update FMECA/RCM

 Maintain RCM plan

 Continue to consider technological advances

 Agree on approach for development and use of failure data

 Incorporate RCM results into maintenance plan and tech pubs

 Plan resources for RCM sustainment

 Continue age exploration program

 System Development “V”

SYSTEM SRR SYSTEM LEVEL

SVR
LEVEL
DESIGN
REQUIREMENTS SRF

PDR CONFIGURATION
TRR ITEMS
ITEM LEVEL
DESIGN
REQUIREMENTS ASSEMBLIES

CDR COMPONENTS

ALL DESIGN
REQUIREMENTS
COMPLETE
 Systems Engineering Process

P
R
O System Analysis
C And Control
Requirements
E (Balance)
Analysis
S
S Requirements
Loop
I Functional Analysis/
N Allocation
P
Design
U Verification Loop
T Loop
Synthesis

PROCEESS OUTPUT