Security Basics

Prof Mark Baker

ACET, University of Reading

Tel: +44 118 378 8615
E-mail: [email protected]
Web: http://acet.rdg.ac.uk/~mab

9 March, 2006 [email protected]

 Basic Security - Outline
• Concerns.
• Objectives.
• Basic Definitions
• Security Components:
– Symmetric/asymmetric systems,
– Public Key Encryption.
• Public Key Infrastructure:
– Certificates,
– Signatures.
• Summary.

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 Security Concerns
• Unauthorized access to resources.
• Masquerade as authorized user or end system.
• E-mail forgery.
• Malicious attacks.
• Monitoring and capture of network traffic.
• Exploitation of software bugs.

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 Contributing Factors
• Increased Internet use:
– Home broadband,
– Greater coverage (wired and wireless):
– More ubiquitous on-line use:
• Education,
• Business,
• Games,
• Shopping…
• Lack of awareness of threats and risks.
• Wide-open network policies.
• Unencrypted network traffic.
• Complexity of security measurements and administration.
• Software bugs.
• Availability of cracking tools .

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 The Actors

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 Attack Sophistication vs. Intruder Technical Knowledge
Malicious Code
Morphing
Intruder Knowledge “Stealth”/Advanced
High Scanning Techniques
BOTS
Denial of Service
Zombies
Network Management Diagnostics Distributed Attack Tools
Web Attacks
Sweepers
Automated Probes/Scans
Back Doors GUI
Packet Spoofing
Disabling Audits
Sniffers
Hijacking Sessions Intruders
Exploiting Known Vulnerabilities
Password Cracking
Self-Replicating Code
Password Guessing
Low Attack Sophistication
1980 1985 1990 1995 2000 2005 2010

Sources: Carnegie Mellon University, 2002 and Idaho National Laboratory, 2005

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 Basic Security Terms
• Classic security concerns deal more with data:
– Confidentiality – data only available to those authorised,
– Availability – you can get it when you want it,
– Integrity – data has not been changed.
• Additional concerns deal more with people and transactions:
– Trust – who you are and what you are authorized to do,
– Non-repudiation – you can’t deny doing something you did,
– Auditability – I can check what you did to the data,
– Reliability – the system does what I want, when I want it to,
– Privacy – within certain limits no one should know who I am or what I
do.

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 Basic Security Objectives
• Confidentiality: prevent/detect/deter improper
disclosure of information.
• Integrity: prevent/detect/deter improper modification
of information.
• Availability: prevent/detect/deter improper denial of
access to services.

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 Security Terms
Authentication:
• The process by which a person or other entity proves that it is
who (or what) it says it is.
• Want to authenticate the person or entity that you are dealing
before transferring something valuable, such as information or
money, to or from, it.
• Authentication is achieved by presenting some unique
identifying entity to the endpoint that is undertaking the
process:
– An example of this process is the way you authenticate yourself with an
ATM: here you insert your bank card (something you have) and enter
your personal identification number (PIN, something you know).

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 Identification
• Being able to identify yourself to a computer is
absolutely essential:
– ATM, e-banking,
– Access to e-mail, computer accounts,
– Access to personal information (e.g., staff or student
portal).
Non-computer identification
• Bank teller knows you by sight (good).
• Bank teller checks your picture against a photo ID (dodgy).
• Bank back office compares cheque signature to one on record
(dodgy).
• All examples of biometric identification.

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 Computer Identification
• How we identify a human to a computer?
– Username/Passwords (common),
– Token, e.g. ATM card,
– Cryptographic protocols,
– Combinations, e.g. token and password,
– Biometrics, e.g. face recognition, finger prints, and
retina/iris scans.

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 Passwords
• Most common identification technique:
– Variants: such as “PIN” (number), memorable date,
mothers maiden name.
• Problem: we are not well-suited to remembering
passwords:
– Especially rarely used ones,
– We can also confuse passwords used in similar contexts.

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 Vulnerabilities
• Users reveal passwords to outsiders.
• Users reuse passwords.
• Users choose “easy to guess” passwords.
• Password observed on entry.
• Password obtained from system files.
Biometric identification
• Passwords are pretty useless at identifying people.
• Can we identify them by their properties?
– Face, handwriting, retina, DNA, voice, signature, fingerprint…
• “How humans identify other humans”.

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 Other issues
• Cost:
– Voice recognition is cheap,
– Eye (iris) scanning is expensive.
• User comfort:
– Face recognition is nice (look into camera),
– DNA matching is not (blood/skin sample).
• Theoretical accuracy:
– Iris is unique (determined while an embryo),
– DNA is shared by identical twins,
– Voice can be imitated.
• Excluded population:
– Voice does not work on mute people,
– Fingerprints do not work on amputees,
– DNA works on everyone!
• Variability:
– Dirty fingers, or sick (cold) for voice.

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 Security Terms
Authorisation:
• Is the act of providing the rights to perform some action:
– Typically based on based on what are known as Access Control Lists
(ACLs), which for some set of resources, a list of user names and their
rights are provided.
• For example, the mere possession of a security badge does not
grant you the right to enter a restricted area, such as the
administration room:
– An examples could be a guest list for an event or a door lock that reads
your badge.

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 Setting Up Access Rights
• Classify users into groups:
– Patients, doctors, chemist, lab, NHS admin, …
• Classify resources into groups:
– Prescriptions, blood test results, diagnoses, patient contact details, …
• Classify access rights:
– Read, write, delete, modify, append, …
– Domain specific: number AIDS cases per region.

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 Access Control Lists (ACL)
• Specify the access permissions of each group for each resource
(or resource type):
– (doctors, blood-test.db) – read access.
– (lab, blood-test.db) - read, write access.
• Program-specific permissions:
– Allows application-specific restrictions:
• (NHS, blood-test.db, SPSS) – AIDS/region

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 Security Terms
Trust:
• Trust is the “assured reliance on the character, ability, strength,
or truth of someone or something”.
• A distributed environment requires explicit statements of trust,
such as:
– “who is trusted to do what”,
– Also obligations of all the parties involved in the trust relationship.
• Trust percolates through almost every stage of today’s security
infrastructure and can be seen as a key issue with the world of
information assurance.

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 Security Terms
Integrity:
• This is the assurance that the data has not changed since it was
written:
– e.g., prevent a potential intruder-in-the-middle from changing
messages.
• Data integrity can be checked using:
– A check-sum, which is a simple error-detection scheme where each
transmitted message is accompanied by a numerical value based on the
number of set bits in the message:
• Checked by the receiving station - if different the receiver can assume that
the message has been garbled.
– Hash functions, any one-way function that reduces variable sized data
to a fixed length “hash code”:
• If the hashes of two documents differ, then the documents differ.

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 Security Terms
Confidentiality:
• This is the act of ensuring no one but authorised parties (who
know some secret) can understand the data.
• There are two mechanisms used to ensure data confidentiality,
the more common encryption, and steganography:
– With encryption an algorithm or function (encrypt) that transforms
plain text to cypher text where the meaning is hidden, but which can be
restored to the original plain text by another algorithm (decrypt).
– Steganography, on the other hand is where a message is hidden in
another message or image:
• It is used when it is necessary to conceal the fact that a secret message is
being transmitted.

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 Security Components
Encryption and Decryption:
– Encryption is the conversion of data into a form, called a ciphertext,
which cannot be easily understood by unauthorised entities.
– Decryption is the process of converting encrypted data back into its
original form, so it can be understood.
• Most security technologies rely, to some degree, on encryption
of text or data:
– For example, encryption is used in the creation of certificates and
digital signatures, for the secure storage of secrets or transport of
information.
• Encryption can be anything from a simple process of
substituting one character for another, in which case the key is
the substitution rule, to some complex mathematical algorithm.

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 Security Components
Encryption and Decryption:
• We assume that the more difficult it is to decrypt the
ciphertext, the better.
• Trade-off - if the algorithm is too complex and it takes too long
to use, or requires keys that are too large to store easily, it
becomes impractical to use:
– Need a balance between the strength of the encryption; that is, how
difficult it is for someone to discover the algorithm and the key, and
ease of use.
• There are two main types of encryption in use for computer
security, referred to as symmetric and asymmetric key
encryption.

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 Symmetric Key
• Symmetric key cryptography, also called private or secret key
cryptography, is the classic cryptographic use of keys:
– Here the same key is used to encrypt and decrypt the data.

Plaintext Plaintext

Encrypt with Decrypt with

secret key secret key

Internet
Ciphertext

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 Symmetric Key
• Key management is an issue.
• Each pair of communicating entities needs a shared key:
– For an n-party system, there are n(n-1)/2 distinct keys in the system and
each party needs to maintain n-1 distinct keys.
• How to reduce the number of shared keys in the system:
– Centralised key management:
• Session keys.
– Public keys.
K1 K4
K2 K3
K5
K6
K8
K7
K9

K10

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 Asymmetric Keys
• In asymmetric key cryptography, different keys are used for
encrypting and decrypting a message.
• In that case, one key can be made public while the other is kept
private.
• There are advantages to this public-key–private-key
arrangement, often referred to as public key cryptography:
– The necessity of distributing secret keys to large numbers of users is
eliminated,
– The algorithm can be used for authentication as well as for creating
cipertext.

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 Public Key Encryption
• Jill has two keys: public and private:
• Jill publishes her public key:
• Such that the key is publicly known!
• Jill keeps her private key secret.
• Other people use Jill’s public key to encrypt messages for Jill.
• Jill uses her private key to decrypt messages.
• Only Jill can decrypt since only she has the private key.

Public key

Message Encrypt rfwekfs

Private key

Message Decrypt rfwekfs

• Security: To compute the private key from the public key is assumed
difficult.
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 Secure Message Exchange Using Asymmetric Keys

Send Jill's
Public public Key
Key

Jill Mark

Private
Key

Decrypt with
Use Jill's private key Jill's public Key
to encrypt

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 Public key vs. Symmetric key

Symmetric key Public key

Two parties MUST trust each Two parties DO NOT need to trust each
other other

Typically both share Two separate keys: a public and a

same key private key

Typically faster x100! Typically slower

Examples: Examples:
DES, IDEA, RC5, AES, … RSA, ElGamal Encryption, ECC…

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 Public Key Infrastructure
• Many applications need key distribution.
• Anyone can derive keys, so there is a need to have a
mechanism to assure that keys belong to entities they claim to
come from.
• In PKI a Certification Authority (CA) validates keys.
• Distribution in PKI is done via a hierarchy of CAs.
• A CA:
– Checks real-world credentials,
– Gets key from user in person,
– Signs Certificate (“cert”) validating key.
• Then a certificate is attached to assure an end point that an
entity is who it claims to be:
– If the end point trusts the CA, then it will trust that entity and who it
claim to be.

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 Certification Authority
• CAs issue digital certificates after verifying that a
public key belongs to a certain owner:
– Driving licenses, identification cards and fingerprints are
examples of documentation required.
• Some examples of CAs are:

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 The e-Science CA

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 Public Key Certificate
• A public key certificate is a file that contains a public key,
together with identity information, such as a person's name, all
of which is signed by a certification authority (CA):
– Similar in concept to a passport signed by the national government.
• The CA is a guarantor who verifies that the public key belongs
to the named entity.
• Certificates are required for the large-scale use of public-key
cryptography, since anybody can create a public-private key
pair:
– So in principle, if the originator is sending private information
encrypted with the recipient’s public key, a malicious user can fool the
originator into using their public key, and so get access to the
information, since it knows its corresponding private key.

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 Public Key Certificate
• But if the originator only trusts public keys that have been
signed ("certified") by an authority, then this type of attack can
be prevented.
• In large-scale deployments one user may not be familiar with
another’s certificate authority (perhaps they each have a
different company CA), so a certificate may also include a
CA's public key signed by a higher level CA, which is more
widely recognised.
• This process can lead to a hierarchy of certificates, and
complex graphs representing trust relations.

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 E-Science Certificate

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 E-Science Certificate

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Digital Certificate – Info.

Version

Serial number

Certificate issuer

Certificate holder

Validity period (note that the certificate is not valid before or after this period),

Attributes, known as certificate extensions that contain additional information such as

allowable uses for this certificate,

Digital signature from the certification authority to ensure that the certificate has not
been altered and to indicate the identity of the issuer,

Public key of the owner of the certificate,

Message digest algorithm used to create the signature.

Table 1: The Contents of Digital Certificate

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 E-Science Certificate

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 The Role of the Certification Authority

Signed Document Decrypt

Sender Message

Sender Public
Key

CA Public Key Recipient

CA

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 Digital Signatures
• Integrity is guaranteed in public-key systems by using
digital signatures:
– This is a method of authenticating digital information, in
the same manner that an individual would sign a paper
document to authenticate it.
• A digital signature is itself a sequence of bits
conforming to one of a number of standards.
• Most digital signatures rely on public key
cryptography to work.

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 Digital Signatures
• Often, a cryptographically strong hash function is
applied to the message.
– A hash function is an algorithm which creates a digital
representation in the form of a "hash value" of a standard
length, which is typically much smaller than the message
but nevertheless unique to it.
• The resulting message digest is encrypted instead of
the entire message:
– This makes the signature significantly shorter than the
message and saves considerable time since hashing is
generally much faster, byte for byte, than public-key
encryption.

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 Basic Features of a Digital Signature
• Private key: sender uses the private key to sign the
document.
• Public key: recipient uses the public key to
authenticate the document.
• Message hash algorithm: perform a mathematical
calculation on the document and generate a hash value
unique to the message.
• Encryption algorithm: accept the private key and a
hash value to generate a digital signature or accept a
public key and a digital signature to generate a hash
value.

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 How does Digital Signature Work?

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 Digital signatures
Private key

Message Sign rfwekfs

(fixed-length signature)

Public key Message

Valid/Invalid Verify rfwekfs

• Only the signer (who has a private key) can generate a valid
signature.
• Everyone (since the corresponding public key is published) can
verify if a signature with respect to a message is valid.

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 Adding A Digital Signature

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 A Digital Signed Email

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 Security – Summary
• Security Concerns:
– Confidentiality – data only available to those authorised,
– Availability – you can get it when you want it,
– Integrity – data has not been changed.
– Trust – who you are and what you are authorized to do,
– Non-repudiation – you can’t deny doing something you did,
– Auditability – I can check what you did to the data,
– Reliability – the system does what I want, when I want it to,
• Public Key Infrastructure:
– Secret key,
– Public key,
– Certificates,
– Digital Signatures.

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 Questions?

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