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A Survey On Privacy Protection in Blockchain System

This document discusses privacy protection in blockchain systems. It begins by outlining the structure of blockchains and privacy requirements, including keeping transaction links undiscoverable and content private. It then discusses privacy threats like de-anonymization and transaction pattern exposure. Specific techniques for protecting privacy are mixing services, ring structures, and homomorphic cryptography. The document concludes by mentioning future directions like scalability, stronger privacy, compatibility and legal traceability.

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Hafiz Muhammad Azeem Sarwar
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78 views

A Survey On Privacy Protection in Blockchain System

This document discusses privacy protection in blockchain systems. It begins by outlining the structure of blockchains and privacy requirements, including keeping transaction links undiscoverable and content private. It then discusses privacy threats like de-anonymization and transaction pattern exposure. Specific techniques for protecting privacy are mixing services, ring structures, and homomorphic cryptography. The document concludes by mentioning future directions like scalability, stronger privacy, compatibility and legal traceability.

Uploaded by

Hafiz Muhammad Azeem Sarwar
Copyright
© © All Rights Reserved
Available Formats
Download as PPTX, PDF, TXT or read online on Scribd
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A Survey on Privacy

Protection in Blockchain
System
Structure of Blockchain

 P2P network
 Global Ledger
 Applications
Privacy Requirements for Blockchains

 To protect privacy, the blockchain needs to satisfy the following


requirements:
(1) the links between transactions should not be visible or discoverable
(2) the content of transactions is only known to their partakers.

 The privacy requirements should be considered on the following two


factors:
 Identity Privacy
 Transaction Privacy
Privacy Threats for Blockchain

 De-anonymization
 Transaction Pattern Exposure
De annonymization

 Due to the public and openness of blockchain, it is possible to perform a


static analysis of the blockchain or actively listening for network
information to unmask users
 Network Analysis
 Address Clustering
 Transaction Fingerprinting
 DOS Attacks
 Sybil Attacks
Transaction Pattern Exposure

 Except for some personally identifiable information, other transaction


information flows to the public network can be used to extract statistical
distributions, which may reveal some new regulation within the
applications of blockchain.

 Transaction Graph Analysis


 AS-Level Deployment Analysis
Methodology For Privacy Protection

 Mixing Services
 Ring Structure
 Homomorphic Cryptography
Mixing
Services
Mixing Services

 Centralized Mixing
There are multiple mixing websites available .All of them offer the functionality to
mix transactions anonymously at the cost of some service fees. These websites act
as online mixers and swap the transactions among different users in order to hide
the relationship between their incoming and outgoing transactions
 De-centralized Mixing
To mitigate the DOS threat caused by the centralized services, a decentralized
mixing pattern is proposed to enable a set of mutually untrusted peers to publish
their messages simultaneously and anonymously without the need of a third-party
anonymity proxy
Examples are Conjoin and Multi Party Communication (MPC)
De-Centralized Mixing
Ring Structure

 A digital signature that could be used to produce a valid but anonymous


signature from a group of possible signers without telling which member
actually produced the signature
Homomorphic Cryptography

 A homomorphic cryptosystem (HC) supports a cryptographic


methodology that satisfies homomorphism so as to preserve arithmetic
operations carried out on ciphertexts
 Consider the following scenario, A has secret values {x1, x2, · · · , xn} and B
has a function f(·). A and B wants to calculate f(x1, ..., xn) together without
leaking secret values or algorithm details. We define E(·)/D(·) to be a set of
the homomorphic encryption system. Then A can send encrypted inputs
{E(x1), ..., E(xn)} to B who later performs the normal computations on the
ciphertexts, randomizes and outputs the result to A. After decryption, A will
learn f(x1, · · · , xn) securely
Future Directions

 Scalable and economy


 Stronger privacy under weaker assumptions
 Compatibility
 Legal traceability and accountability

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