CH 4 Evaluating DecisionTrees
CH 4 Evaluating DecisionTrees
Spring 2, 2020
2
Success
$5,000
0.4
Invest
$0
0.6
Do Not Invest
$2,200
5
License
$23
Patent Awarded
(1-p) $22.9
Development Marketing
$-2 P $-2
Patent not Awarded
Stop development
$0
6
G (0.4)
1 C
0.7 S
Go
0.15 P
0 F
Don’t go
0.37
7
Strike Oil
$190,000
(0.1)
(0.9)
-$10,000
No Oil
Strike Oil
$190,000
(0.1)
EMV = $10,000
Dril
(0.9)
-$10,000
No Oil
Don’t drill
0
Drill
With Consultation $190,000
Drill
-$10,000
(0.9)
No Oil Don’t drill
0
Strike Oil
$190,000
(0.1)
Dril
EMV = $10,000
(0.9)
-$10,000
No Oil
Don’t drill
$0
Strike Oil
$190,000
(0.41)
Consult geologist Dril
EMV = $16,560 Good (0.59)
-$10,000
(0.23) No Oil
Don’t drill
$0
Strike Oil
$190,000
Dril (0.01)
Poor (0.99)
-$10,000
(0.77) No Oil
Don’t drill $0
10
A Success
Invest in $5,000
0.4
Opportunity A
A Flop
-$2,000
0.6
B Success
Invest in $1,000
0.9
Opportunity B
B Flop
$0
0.1
11
Success
$8,000
0.8
Invest High
Flop
-$2,000
0.2
Success
$5,000
0.4
Invest Low
Flop
$0
0.6
Do Not Invest
$2,200
12
Evaluating Decision Tree
Texaco-Penzoil
• 1984 Penzoil and Getty Oil agree to terms of merger
• Before deal formalized Texaco offers Getty Oil a better deal
• Getty Oil go back on on Penzoil Deal, sells to Texaco
• Penzoil sues and wins $11.1Bil
• Appeals court reduces the award to $10.3Bil
• Texaco vows to fight to the bitter end, even potentially declaring
bankruptcy
• Before Penzoil can file liens, Texaco offers $2Bil settlement
• Hugh Liedtke, President of Penzoil, is faced with a decision
• His advisers tell him $3-$5Bil is a fair settlement
13
Evaluating Decision Tree
Texaco-Penzoil – The Model
Accept $2Bil $2 Bill
Texaco Counters
$3Bil
.33
Refuse Texaco
Counteroffer 4.56
Accept
$3Bil 3
20
Texaco-Penzoil
Folding Back the Tree
Accept $2Bil 2
x P(X=x) xP(X=x)
Texaco Counters 4.56 0.83 3.78
$3Bil
5.00 0.17 0.85
.33
Refuse Texaco E[X]= 4.63
Counteroffer 4.56
21
Texaco-Penzoil
Folding Back the Tree
Accept $2Bil 2
Counteroffer
$5Bil 4.63
• Decision Path
A path starting at the left most node up to the values at the end of a branch
by selecting one alternative from a decision node and by following one
outcome from each uncertainty node. This yields one potential outcome
of a decision strategy and occurrence of random outcomes i.e. the
value of a random variable
Decision Strategies
Accept $2Bil 2
Decision Paths
Accept $2Bil 2
Optimal Strategy
Accept $2Bil 2
For each decision strategy collapse the tree into its most
basic uncertainty representation
Compare Risk Profiles (pmf) or Cumulative Risk Profiles
(CDF) for outcomes
Cumulative Risk Profiles can be used to explore
dominance in decision strategies. Dominated strategies
can be removed from consideration
28
Dominance
Assuming Max is Optimal
1 The CDF of 2 has
Strategy 1 reached 1 before the
Strategy 2 CDF of 1 leaves 0.
Then 1
deterministically
dominates 2
0
Deterministic Dominance
1 The CDF of 2 lies
entirely to the left
Strategy 1
and above the CDF of
Strategy 2
1. Then 1
stochastically
dominates 2
0 When Min is
optimal dominance
Stochastic Dominance is reversed
29
Dominance
1
Strategy 1
Strategy 2
•Note
When cumulative risk profiles cross use
EMV to solve the problem
Deterministic Dominance
Stochastic Dominance
Solution by EMV
30
Risk Profiles
Texaco-Penzoil
Strategy: Accept $2Bil
Accept $2Bil 2
1
1
0.8
0.6
0.4 0.5
0.2
0 0
0 1 2 3 4 5 6 7 8 9 10 11 0 2 4 6 8 10 12
31
Risk Profiles
Texaco-Penzoil
Strategy: Counteroffer $5Bil, If Texaco Counters Refuse
Texaco Accepts $5Bil 5
.17
Award High 10.3
.20
Counteroffer Texaco Refuses
Counteroffer Award Medium
$5Bil 5
.50 .50
Award Low 0
Texaco Counters .30
$3Bil Award High 10.3
.33 .20
Refuse Texaco
Counteroffer Award Medium 5
.50
Award Low
.30 0
5
.17
10.3
.10
Counteroffer
$5Bil 5
.25
0
.15
10.3
.066
5
.165
.099 0
10.3
.10 + .066 = .166
Counteroffer
$5Bil 5
.17 +.25 + .165 = .585
0
.15 + .099 =.249
1
1
0.8
0.6
0.4 0.5
0.2
0 0
0 1 2 3 4 5 6 7 8 9 10 11 0 2 4 6 8 10 12
34
Risk Profiles
Texaco-Penzoil
Strategy: Counteroffer $5Bil, If Texaco Counters Accept
Texaco Accepts $5Bil 5
.17
Award High 10.3
.20
Counteroffer Texaco Refuses
Counteroffer Award Medium
$5Bil 5
.50 .50
Award Low 0
Texaco Counters .30
$3Bil
.33
Accept
$3Bil 3
10.3
.10
Counteroffer
$5Bil 5
.17 + .25 = .42
3
.33
0
.15
1
1
0.8
0.6
0.4 0.5
0.2
0 0
0 1 2 3 4 5 6 7 8 9 10 11 0 2 4 6 8 10 12
37
Risk Profiles
Texaco-Penzoil
Comparison of RIsk Profiles
1.2
1 Accept $2Bil
0.8
0.6 Counter $5Bil, If Counter
0.4 Refuse
0.2
Counter $5Bil, If Counter
0
Accept
0 1 2 3 4 5 6 7 8 9 10 11
1.5
Accept $2Bil
No
1
Counter $5Bil, If Dominance
0.5 Counter Refuse
Counter $5Bil, If
0
Counter Accept
0 5 10 15
38
1.2
1 Accept $2Bil
0.8
0.6 Counter $5Bil, If Counter
0.4 Refuse
0.2
Counter $5Bil, If Counter
0
Accept
0 2 3 3 4 5 6 7 8 9 10 11
Accept $2Bil is
Comparison of Cumulative Risk Profiles deterministically
dominated
1.2
1 Accept $2Bil
0.8
Counter $5Bil, If
0.6
Counter Refuse
0.4
Counter $5Bil, If
0.2 Counter Accept
0
0.0 5.0 10.0 15.0
40
Example: Dominance
Suppose if it goes to court Leidtke must choose representation
Award High 10.5
.20
Firm 1 Award Medium 5.2
.50
Award Low 0
.30
Award High 10.3
.20
Firm 2 Award Medium 5
.50
Comparison of Cumulative Risk Profiles Award Low
.30 0
1.5
1 Firm 1
0.5 Firm 2 Firm 1 stochastically
0 dominates Firm 2
0 2 4 6 8 10 12