A Guide To Reading, Interpreting and Applying Statutes: Rules of Statutory Interpretation
A Guide To Reading, Interpreting and Applying Statutes: Rules of Statutory Interpretation
READING,
INTERPRETING AND
APPLYING STATUTES
RULES OF STATUTORY
INTERPRETATION
“the essence of law lies in the spirit, not
its letter, for the letter is significant only as
being the external manifestation of the
intention that underlies it”
By Salmond
BACKGROUND*
A statute is a will of legislature conveyed in the form of text
Interpretation is the method by which the true sense or the
meaning of the word is understood.
The meaning of an ordinary word of the English language is
not a question of law.
The proper construction of a statute is a question of law.
The purpose of the interpretation of the statute is to unlock
the locks put by the legislature. For such unlocking, keys are
to be found out.
These keys may be termed as aids for interpretation and
principles of interpretation.
MEANING & BACKGROUND*
SALMOND – “interpretation or construction is meant, the
process by which the courts seek to ascertain the meaning of
the legislature through the medium of authoritative forms in
which it is expressed.”
The importance of avoiding literal interpretation was also
stressed in various ancient text books –
“Merely following the texts of the law, decisions are not to
be rendered, for, if such decisions are wanting in equity, a
gross failure of Dharma is caused.”
NEED FOR STATUTORY
INTERPRETATION*
Broad terms
Bad drafting
Complexity of statutes in regards to the nature of the
subject,
numerous draftsmen
the blend of legal and technical language
Unforeseeable developments
Changes in the use of language (use of the word
‘reasonable’)
BEFORE WE BEGIN…
Felix Frankfurter,
Some Reflections on the Reading of Statutes,
47 Colum. L. Rev. 527 (1947).
TOOLS TO DETERMINE THE
MEANING
I. PLAIN MEANING RULE
words of a statute mean what an “ordinary” or
“reasonable” person would understand them to
mean.
3. Every word and clause must be given effect 3. UNLESS inadvertently inserted into the statute or if repugnant to
the rest of the statute, certain words may be rejected as
“surplussage”
4. Words are to be interpreted according to the proper 4. UNLESS strict adherent to the rules of grammar would defeat the
grammatical effect of their arrangement within the purpose of the statute
statute
5. A statute cannot go beyond its text 5. To effect the purpose of the statute, the statute may be
implemented beyond its text
Term Function
• Unless • These terms usually signify an exception to the
• Except statute
•
•
COMMONLY USED WORDS
Subject to…
Within the meaning of
• These terms may limit the scope of the statute, or
may indicate that a certain part of the statute is
• For the purposes of controlled or limited by anther section or statute
4. Purposive approach
1. LITERAL
INTERPRETATION*
Giving words their plain, ordinary, dictionary
meaning
Concentrates on what the Parliament has said
Role of the judge is to apply law – not to make it
Use of external and internal aids to interpretation
INTERNAL – present within the Statute (statement of
reason, title, explanation)
EXTERNAL – not expressly a part of the Statute
(legislative history, legal dictionaries)
R v Harris (1836) 7 C & P 446*
The defendant bit off his victim's nose.
The statute made it an offence 'to stab, cut or wound' the
court held that under the literal rule the act of biting did
not come within the meaning of stab cut or wound as
these words implied an instrument had to be used.
Therefore the defendant's conviction was quashed.
Whitely v Chappel (1868) LR 4 QB 147*
A statute made it an offence 'to impersonate any person
entitled to vote.'
The defendant used the vote of a dead man.
The statute relating to voting rights required a person to
be living in order to be entitled to vote.
Held: The literal rule was applied and the defendant was
thus acquitted since a dead person is not (in the literal
meaning) not “entitled to vote”
London and North Eastern Railway v
Berriman [1946] AC 278*
A railway worker was killed whilst oiling the track.
No look out man had been provided.
A statute provided compensation payable on death for those
'relaying or repairing' the track.
Under the literal rule oiling did not come into either of these
categories.
This result although very harsh could not to be said to be
absurd so the golden rule was not applied.
There was no ambiguity in the words therefore the mischief
rule was not applied.
Unfortunately the widow was entitled to nothing.
Fisher v Bell [1961] 1 QB 394
The defendant had a flick knife displayed in his
shop window with a price tag on it.
Statute made it a criminal offence to 'offer' such
flick knives for sale.
His conviction was quashed as goods on display in
shops are not 'offers' in the technical sense but an
invitation to treat.
The court applied the literal rule of statutory
interpretation.
P.V. NARSIMHA RAO V. STATE AIR 1998 SC 2120*
Congress party secured the majority in 1991 elections and formed a government under
Narsimha Rao.
Subsequently a no-confidence motion was brought against the said government in Lok
Sabha.
It was short of 14 votes to qualify the No-Confidence motion by simple majority, which
was overcome later.
It was later disclosed that the members of Jharkhand MuktiMorcha were bribed into
voting in favor of the Congress government in the Parliament.
SC - . Immunity given under Article 105(2) squarely covered the facts in question.
Accordingly, bribe-takers who had voted against the no-confidence motion were immune
from prosecution but the bribe-givers had no such immunity. The reasoning was that an
MP who takes bribes and votes in pursuance of the bribe “in respect" of his vote in
Parliament cannot be prosecuted.
This interpretation led to an absurd conclusion that where a Member voted in pursuant to
a bribe taken by him, he couldn’t be prosecuted in a court of law but where he had taken
a bribe to vote in a particular manner, but did not cast the vote, he could be prosecuted as
no nexus between the vote and the bribe taken by him could be established.
Advantages of Literal Rule*
Recognises Parliament as the supreme law maker and
prevents unelected judges making law
It also encourages precision in drafting and ensures that
anyone who can read English can determine the law, which
promotes certainty and reduces litigation.
people know where they stand because the words remain
unchanged.
Lead to quick decisions because the answer can be found by
referring the bare law.
Restricts the role of the judge and provides no scope for
judges to use their own opinions or prejudices
Upholds the separation of powers.
Disadvantages of Literal rule*
Can lead to unfair / unjust decisions like London and North Eastern
Railway v Berriman.
Can lead to contradictory interpretation with respect to Statute
Creates awkward precedents which require Parliamentary time to
correct
Fails to recognise the complexities and limitations of English language
; same word having differing meanings across different laws.
Undermines public confidence in the law
Not possible to word an Act so as to cover every situation thus creating
loopholes.
Little discretion to the judges to adapt the law to changing times
There can be disagreement as to what amounts to the ordinary or
natural meaning.
2.GOLDEN RULE*
The term "golden rule" seems to have originated in an 1854 court
ruling, and implies a degree of enthusiasm for this particular rule of
construction over alternative rules that has not been shared by all
subsequent judges.
The golden rule is that the words of a statute must prima facie be
given their ordinary meaning.
Modification of literal rule
The golden rule allows a judge to depart from a word's normal
meaning in order to avoid an absurd result.
NARROW – if a word is ambiguous the judge may choose between
possible meanings of the word in order to avoid an absurd outcome.
WIDER – where there is only one meaning, but would lead to an
absurd / repugnant situation, which is obnoxious to principles of
public policy.
Lord Simon of Glaisdale in Stock v. Frank Jones
(Tipton) Ltd. [1978] 1 W.L.R. 231, at p. 235 added
a new caveat –
“Nowadays we should add to 'natural and ordinary
meaning' the words 'in their context and according
to the appropriate linguistic register.”
The Supreme Court held that the expression “landless person” used in
section 14 of U.P. Bhoodan Yagna Act, 1953 which made provision for
grant of land to landless persons, was limited to “landless laborers”.
A landless labourer is he who is engaged in agriculture but having no
agricultural land.
The Court further said that “any landless person” did not include a
landless businessman residing in a city.
The object of the Act was to implement the Bhoodan movement, which
aimed at distribution of land to landless labourers who were verged in
agriculture.
A businessman, though landless cannot claim the benefit of the Act.
Advantages of golden Rule*
Courts can alter the wording and make sense of
absurd / repugnant wording
Incorporates changes in law / technology
Errors in drafting can be corrected immediately
eg: R v Allen (1872)
Decisions are generally more in line with
Parliament's intention
Closes loopholes
Often gives a more just result
Brings common sense to the law
Disadvantages of Golden Rule*
No guidelines hence can be arbitrary
Applicable in very limited circumstances
Judges have no power to intervene for pure injustice where
there is no absurdity
The golden rule provides no clear means to test the existence
or extent of an absurdity. It seems to depend on the result of
each individual case. Whilst the golden rule has the
advantage of avoiding absurdities, It is limited in scope and
there is no definition or test / measurement for an absurdity.
Judges are able to add or change the meaning of statutes and
thereby become law makers infringing the separation of
powers.eg. - London and North Eastern Railway v Berriman
3. MISCHIEF RULE*
Heydon’s case (1584)
Ottery, a religious college, gave a tenancy in a manor also called “Ottery” to a man
(named in the case report simply as "Ware") and his son.
The tenancy was established by copyhold, an ancient device for giving a parcel of a
manor to a tenant, usually in return for agricultural services, which was something like a
long-running lease with special privileges for each party.
Ware and his son held their copyhold to have for their lives, subject to the will of the lord
and the custom particular to that manor.
The Wares’ copyhold was in a parcel also occupied by some tenants at will. Later, the
college then leased the same parcel to another man, named Heydon, for a period of eighty
years in return for rents equal to the traditional rent for the components of the parcel.
Less than a year after the parcel had been leased to Heydon, Parliament enacted the Act of
Dissolution, that dissolved many religious colleges, including Ottery College, which lost
its lands and rents to Henry VIII.
However, a provision the Act kept in force, for a term of life, any grants made more than a
year prior to the enactment of the statute.
The Court of Exchequer found that the grant to the Wares was protected by the relevant
provision of the Act of Dissolution, but that the lease to Heydon was void.
Significance of Heydon’s case
The ruling was based on an important discussion of the
relationship of a statute to the pre-existing common law.
The court concluded that the purpose of the statute was
to cure a mischief resulting from a defect in the
common law.
Therefore, the court concluded, the remedy of the
statute was limited to curing that defect.
Judges are supposed to construe statutes by seeking the
true intent of the makers of the Act, which is presumed
to be pro bono publico, or intent for the public good.
The court in Heydon’s held that –
“For the sure and true interpretation of all statutes in
general (be they penal or beneficial, restrictive or
enlarging of the common law), four things are to be
discerned and considered:
i. What was the common law before the making of the
Act?
ii. What was the mischief and defect for which the
common law did not provide?
iii. What remedy the Parliament hath resolved and
appointed to cure the disease of the commonwealth?
iv. The true reason of the remedy; & The core principle
of the last of is.
Corkery v Carpenter (1951)
At about 2.45 p.m. on 18 January 1950, the defendant was drunk and
was pushing his pedal bicycle along Broad Street in Ilfracombe.
He was subsequently charged under section 12 of the Licensing Act
1872 with being drunk in charge of a carriage.
The 1872 Act made no actual reference to bicycles. The court elected to
use the mischief rule to decide the matter.
The purpose of the Act was to prevent people from using any form of
transport on a public highway whilst in a state of intoxication.
Shane Corkery was sentenced to one month's imprisonment for being
drunk in charge of a bicycle in public.
The bicycle was clearly a form of transport and therefore the user was
correctly charged.
Smith v. Hughes (1960)*
Street offences Act, 1959 (section 1(1)) –
“it shall be an offence for a common prostitute to loiter or solicit in a street or public place for the
purpose of prostitution”
The issue came up about the women on private balconies and behind private windows touting for
business?
The defendants were calling to men in the street from balconies and tapping on windows. They claimed
they were not guilty as they were not in the "street."
The judge applied the mischief rule to come to the conclusion that they were guilty as the intention of
the Act was to cover the mischief of harassment from prostitutes.
House of Lords – the mischief to be cleared by the Act was to clean up the streets, to enable people to
walk along the streets without being molested or solicited by common prostitutes.
Viewed in that way, it can matter little whether the prostitute is soliciting while in the street or is
standing in a doorway or on a balcony, or at a window, or whether the window is shut or open or half
open; in each case her solicitation is projected to and addressed to somebody walking in the street.
Viewed in this way, it mattered little if the prostitute was soliciting while in the street or standing in a
doorway / balcony / window.
DPP v Bull [1995] QB 88*
A man was charged with an offence under s.1(1) of the Street Offences
Act 1959 which makes it an offence for a 'common prostitute to loiter or
solicit in a public street or public place for the purposes of prostitution'.
The magistrates found him not guilty on the grounds that 'common
prostitute' only related to females and not males. The prosecution
appealed by way of case stated.
The court held that the Act did only apply to females. The word
prostitute was ambiguous and they applied the mischief rule.
The Street Offences Act was introduced as a result of the work of the
Wolfenden Report into homosexuality and prostitution.
The Report only referred to female prostitution and did not mention male
prostitutes.
The QBD therefore held the mischief the Act was aimed at was
controlling the behaviour of only female prostitutes.
Ohison v. Hylton[1975]
A carpenter was on his way home from work. He boarded a train which was crowded. Another
passenger objected and subsequently both finished up on the platform.
The defendant, the carpenter, took one of his tools of his trade, a hammer, from his briefcase and
struck the other man with it.
He was charged under the Prevention of Crime Act 1953. Lord Widgery, CJ, said, inter alia: “This
is a case in which the mischief at which the statute is aimed appears to me to be very clear.
Immediately prior to the passing of the 1953 Act the criminal law was adequate to deal with the
actual use of weapons in the course of a criminal assault.
Where it was lacking, however, was that the mere carrying of offensive weapons was not an
offence. The long title of the Act reads as follows:
‘An Act to prohibit the carrying of offensive weapons in public places without lawful authority or
reasonable excuse’.
Parliament is there recognizing the need for preventive justice where, by preventing the carriage of
offensive weapons in a public place, it reduced the opportunity for the use of such weapons.
If, however, the prosecutor is right, the scope goes far beyond the mischief aimed at, and in every
case where an assault is committed with a weapon and in a public place an offence under the 1953
Act can be charged in addition to the charge of assault.
Bengal immunity co. v State of Bihar
AIR 1955 SC 661
The appellant company was an incorporated company carrying on the business of
manufacturing and selling various sera, vaccines, biological products and medicines. Its
registered head office was at Calcutta and its laboratory and factory were in West Bengal.
It was registered as a dealer under the Bengal Finance (Sales Tax) Act.
Its products had extensive sales throughout the Union of India and abroad. The goods are
dispatched from Calcutta by rail, steamer or air against orders accepted by the appellant
company in Calcutta.
Issue was whether the tax threatened to be levied on the sales made by the appellant
company and implemented by delivery in the circumstances and manner mentioned in its
petition was leviable by the State of Bihar; even though it was expressly barred under art.
286.
This was even though the appellant company neither had any agent or manager in Bihar
nor any office, godown or laboratory in Bihar.
SC - State of Bihar was ordered to abstain from imposing sales tax on out-of-State
dealers in respect of sales or purchases that have taken place in the course of inter-State
trade or commerce even though the goods have been delivered as a direct result of such
sales or purchases for consumption in Bihar.
Advantages of Mischief Rule*
The application of this rule gives the judge more discretion than the literal and
the golden rule as it allows him to effectively decide on Parliament's intent.
In a common law jurisdiction, the existence of precedent and the knock-on
effects of construing a statute prevent misuse of the rule;
The Law Commission sees it as a far more satisfactory way of interpreting acts
as opposed to the Golden or Literal rules;
It usually avoids unjust or absurd results in sentencing;
It is consistent with parliament sovereignty.
This rule gives the court justification for going behind the actual wording of the
statute in order to consider the problem that the particular statute was aimed at
remedying.
At one level it is clearly the most flexible rule of interpretation, but it is limited
to using previous common law to determine what mischief the Act in question
was designed to remedy.
Closes loopholes.
allows the law to develop and adapt to changing needs
Disadvantages of Mischief rule*
It can be argued that this undermines Parliament's supremacy and is
undemocratic as it takes law-making decisions away from the legislature. It is
seen to be out of date as it has been in use since the 16th century, when
common law was the primary source of law and parliamentary supremacy was
not established;
It gives too much power to the unelected judiciary which is argued to be
undemocratic;
In the 16th century, the judiciary would often draft acts on behalf of the king
and were therefore well qualified in what mischief the act was meant to
remedy. This is not often the case in modern legal systems;
The rule can make the law uncertain.
Judges can bring their own views, sense of morality and prejudices to a case
eg Smith v Hughes.
Creates a crime after the event.
4. PURPOSIVE RULE*
Ascertain the purpose of the Act
Purposive interpretation was introduced as a form of
replacement for the mischief rule, the plain meaning
rule and the golden rule to determine cases.
The purposive approach is an approach
to statutory and constitutional inter-pretation under which
common law courts interpret an enactment (that is, a
statute, a part of a statute, or a clause of a constitution) in
light of the purpose for which it was enacted.
What was the Parliament hoping to achieve?
Purposive interpretation is exercised when the courts utilize
extraneous materials from the pre-enactment phase of legislation,
including early drafts, committee reports, etc. The purposive
interpretation involves a rejection of the exclusionary rule.
It involves looking for the intention of Parliament and allows for
judicial law making.
Here the court is not just looking to see what the gap was in the
old law, it is making a decision as to what they felt Parliament
meant to achieve.
Lord Denning in the Court of Appeal stated in Magor and St.
Mellons Rural District Council v Newport Corporation (1950),
‘we sit here to find out the intention of Parliament and of
ministers and carry it out, and we do this better by filling in the
gaps and making sense of the enactment by opening it up to
destructive analysis’.
Maneka Gandhi v. Union of India (AIR
1978 SC 597)*
Petitioner was asked to surrender her passport under section 10(3)(c ) of the Act in public
interest, within 7 days from the date of receipt of the letter.
Issue was whether right to go abroad is a part of right to personal liberty under Article 21.
The Supreme Court widened the protection of life and liberty contemplated by Article 21 of
the Constitution by applying purposive interpretation.
The expression “personal liberty” in Article 21 was interpreted broadly to engulf a variety of
rights within itself. The court further observed that the fundamental rights should be
interpreted in such a manner so as to expand its reach and ambit rather than to concentrate its
meaning and content by judicial construction.
Article 21 provides that no person shall be deprived of his life or personal liberty except in
accordance with procedure established by law but that does not mean that a mere semblance
of procedure provided by law will satisfy the Article , the procedure should be just , fair and
reasonable.
Court also observed that law which prescribes a procedure for depriving a person of
“personal liberty” has to fulfill the requirements of Article 14 and 19 .
Alembic Chemical Works vs. Workmen AIR
1961*
An industrial tribunal awarded more number of
paid leaves to the workers than what Section 79(1)
of Factories Act recommended.
This was challenged by the appellant.
The Supreme Court held that the purpose of the
enactment being the welfare of the workers, it had
to be beneficially constructed in the favour of
worker and thus, if the words are capable of two
meanings, the one that gives benefit to the workers
must be used.
U.Unichoyi vs. State of Kerala, 1963*
the question was whether setting of a minimum wage
through Minimum Wages Act, 1948 is violative of
Article 19(1)(g) of the Constitution because the Act did
not define what is minimum wage and did not take into
account the capacity of the employer to pay.
It was held that the Act is a beneficial legislation and it
must be construed in favour of the worker. In an under
developed country where unemployment is rampant, it
is possible that workers may become ready to work for
extremely low wages, which is discouraged under the
law.
R vs. Bentham (2003)
D robbed A, whom he believed owed him money. A was still
in bed. The defendant pointed his finger, covered by his jacket
at A and demanded “every penny in the house”. A believed his
fingers were a gun.
Held: A purposive approach had to be adopted. Section 17 of
the Firearms Act 1968 was clearly designed to protect the
victim confronted with what he thought was a firearm. It did
not matter whether it was a plastic gun or a biro or simply
anorak material stiffened by a figure.
If it had the appearance of a firearm the jury were entitled to
find the offence made out.
Mendoza v. Ghaidan (2004)*
Gay partners living together