This document discusses several key aspects involved in interpreting discourse, including:
1) Computing the communicative function by recognizing social rules and intended meanings rather than just linguistic connections.
2) Using general socio-cultural knowledge and facts about the world to determine inferences and interpretations.
3) Applying top-down and bottom-up processing, where top-down uses context and prior sentences to predict meanings while bottom-up builds from word and sentence meanings.
Download as PPTX, PDF, TXT or read online on Scribd
100%(1)100% found this document useful (1 vote)
398 views
Coherence in The Interpretation of Discourse
This document discusses several key aspects involved in interpreting discourse, including:
1) Computing the communicative function by recognizing social rules and intended meanings rather than just linguistic connections.
2) Using general socio-cultural knowledge and facts about the world to determine inferences and interpretations.
3) Applying top-down and bottom-up processing, where top-down uses context and prior sentences to predict meanings while bottom-up builds from word and sentence meanings.
Download as PPTX, PDF, TXT or read online on Scribd
You are on page 1/ 33
Coherence in the
interpretation of discourse Coherence in discourse Coherence in discourse
The assumption of coherence will only
produce one particular interpretation in which the elements of the message are seen to be connected, with or without overt linguistic connections between those elements. Coherence in discourse
The extract could be interpreted as an
advertisement by someone looking for an upholsterer. (a cover for a chair)
Self Employed Upholsterer
Free estimates. 332 5862 Coherence in discourse • There are several things in the reader, however, which lead him to avoid this interpretation. The most important of these is the reader’s (or hearer’s) effort to arrive at the writer’s (or speaker’s) intended meaning in producing a linguistic message. The reader has also more knowledge than knowledge of discourse. Coherence in discourse
Epistemics Seminar: Thursday 3d June,
2.00 p.m. Steve Harlow (department of Linguistics, University of York). “Welsh and Generalized Phrase Structure Grammar” Coherence in discourse
The reader of the message knows
• the purpose of the linguistic message • its function in communicative terms • that it is an announcement and not a warning partly because of its form, location and partly because of the socio-cultural knowledge Aspects of interpreting a speaker’s / writer’s intended meaning in producing discourse involve
• computing the communicative function
(how to take the message) • using general socio-cultural knowledge (facts about the world) • determining the inferences to be made Computing communicative function There are ‘rules of interpretation which relate what is said to what is done’ and it is on the basis of such social but not linguistic rules that we interpret some conversational sequences as coherent and others as non-coherent. Labov (1970) Computing communicative function Example of a non-coherent conversational sequence: a doctor talking to a schizophrenic patient
A: What’s your name?
B: Well, let’s say you might have thought you had something from before, but you haven’t got it any more. A: I’m going to call you Dean. Laffal (1965, 85) Computing communicative function
The recognition of coherence or
incoherence in conversational sequences is not based on a relationship between utterances but ‘between the actions performed with those utterances’. Labov Computing communicative function
The example of a coherent piece of
conversational discourse:
A: Can you go to Edinburgh tomorrow?
B: B.E.A. pilots are on strike. Widdowson (1979, 96) Computing communicative function Widdowson claims that B’s reply is to be taken as a negative answer to the question. This is one interpretation of the speaker’s intended meaning, but we could suggest the others.
Whatever the intended meaning , B’s
utterance counts as a response. Computing communicative function
Only by recognizing the action performed
by each of the utterances within the conventional sequences (the following example) we can accept this sequence as coherent discourse. /Widdowson/ Computing communicative function A: That’s the telephone. B: I’m in the bath. A: Ok.
A requests B to perform action.
B states reason why he cannot perform it. A undertakes to perform action. Conversation analysis Turn-taking identifies the regularities of conversational structure by describing the ways in which participants take turns at speaking.
There are easily identifiable regularities in the
ordering of those two-turn units described as adjacency pairs.
Greeting –Greeting Question –Answer
A: Hello. A: How are you? B: Hi. B: Fine. Conversation analysis Adjacency pair structure can be disrupted by an ‘insertion sequence’ which delays the answer-part to one question-part of a pair until another answer to a different question has been provided. Speech acts ‘Words' (short utterances) do things; they are in themselves social acts. In fact they are the only ways in which certain social acts can be done’. /Austin/ • I name this baby Eric. or • I promise I'll bring the book back tomorrow. or • I bet it'll rain this afternoon. Speech acts These are respectively the very act of naming, promising and betting, with consequential effects for everyone involved (as Levinson puts it, after you've made an utterance like this, "the world has changed in substantial ways" ) (p 228). Speech acts The utterance of some sentences, must, in specified circumstances, be treated as the performance of an act:
I bet you sixpence it will rain tomorrow.
I name this ship the Queen Elizabeth.
Austin (1962) Speech acts Austin described such utterances as ‘performatives’ and the specified circumstances for their success - as a set of ‘felicity conditions’. In uttering any sentence a speaker could perform • some act or, an illocutionary act
• an perlocutionary act - effect the illocutionary
act has on the hearer. Speech acts Searle (1975) also introduces a distinction between direct and indirect speech acts which depends on a recognition of the intended perlocutionary effect of an utterance on a particular occasion. Indirect speech acts are ‘cases in which one perlocutionary act is performed indirectly by performing another’. Can you speak a little louder? (a question about a hearer’s ability at one level and a request for action, at another level) Using knowledge of the world
“The question of how people know what is
going on in a text is a special case of the question of how people know what is going on in the world at all’.
De Beaugrande (1980, 30)
Top-down and bottom-up processing
2 activities of discourse processing
bottom-up Top – down
Top-down and bottom-up processing Bottom-up processing works out the meanings of the words and structure of a sentence and builds up a composite meaning for the sentence Top-down processing is predicting, on the basis of the context plus the composite meaning of the sentences already processed, what is the next sentence likely to mean. Knowledge of the world
The representations of ‘knowledge of
the world’ are mainly used for the type of predictable information a writer / speaker can assume his hearer / listener has available whenever a situation is described. Knowledge of the world Given one particular situation, such a restaurant scene, the speaker / writer should not have to inform his reader / hearer that there are tables and chairs in the restaurant, or that one orders and pays for the food consumed. Knowledge of this sort about restaurants is generally assumed. Knowledge of the world
‘Comprehension is a memory process’
Riesbeck (1975) Understanding discourse is essentially a process of retrieving stored information from memory and relating it to the encountered discourse. Knowledge of the world
When we read a story involving a visit to
the dentist, we use our knowledge of dentist-visiting, but not our knowledge of typing a letter or going to a birthday party. Knowledge of the world Organisation of knowledge in memory is related to the terms such as frames, scripts, scenarios, schemata and mental models. Minsky’s frame-theory says that knowledge is stored in our memory in the form of data structures, which he calls ‘frames’ and which represent stereotyped situations. Knowledge of the world Example: A postcard telling you where you should go to register your vote in a local government election, your understanding of this information can be described in terms of a ‘voting-frame’. You do not have to be informed that there is such a thing as a polling station and that a clerk will be there. Knowledge of the world
Schemata can be seen as the organized
background knowledge which leads us to expect or predict aspects in our interpretation of discourse. Knowledge of the world In fact, Tannen (1979, 138) uses the description ‘structures of expectation’ to characterize the influence of schemata on our thinking. Such expectations influence what type of discourse we produce. Different cultural backgrounds can result in different schemata for description of witnessed events. Knowledge of the world After watching a film (with no dialogue), a group of American subjects described in great detail the actual events of the film and what filming techniques had been employed. In contrast, a group of Greek subjects produced elaborate (give more details and new information) stories with additional events and detailed accounts of the motives and feelings of the characters in the film.