US Army Combined Arms Center FM 3-0, Operations

SOLDIERS AND LEADERS - OUR ASYMMETRIC ADVANTAGE

Purpose:
Provide an overview of the new FM 3-0, Operations

Agenda
• Doctrine Overview
• Why FM 3-0?
• FM 3-0 Big ideas
• Chapter overview
• Warfighting function impacts
Approved for public release
UNCLASSIFIED
As of: 18 SEP 17
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 US Army Combined Arms Center
SOLDIERS AND LEADERS - OUR ASYMMETRIC ADVANTAGE
Army Doctrine Overview
• True Hierarchy
• Easy to track needed information
• Easier to update
• Separates out fundamentals and TTP
• Accessibility

ADRP 3-28

Army Doctrine
Publications (ADP)
Fundamental principles

Army Doctrine Reference

Publications (ADRP)
Detailed information on
fundamentals
Field Field Field Field Field Field
Field Manuals (FM) Manual Manual Manual Manual Manual Manual
Tactics and Procedures

Army Techniques Techniques Techniques Techniques Techniques Techniques Techniques

Publications (ATP)
Techniques

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 US Army Combined Arms Center Nested Doctrine
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Revised Revised
Describes the Describes the
Army’s roles and fundamentals of Army
core competencies operations across the
in support of the range of military
Nation. operations.

(Inform
ADP 1)
New
Rescinded in 2011 Describes how Army
forces, as part of a joint
CSA Directed that we team, conduct large-scale
rewrite and publish a combat operations
new version based on against a peer threat. (Inform
changes in the OE. ADP/ADRP 3-0)

ADP 1 and ADP/ADRP 3-0 changed to account for new doctrine. UNCLASSIFIED 3
 US Army Combined Arms Center Doctrine versus Concepts
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Doctrine: Doctrine is validated principles, tactics, techniques, procedures, and terms and
symbols that the force can apply. The Administrative Assistant to the Secretary of the Army
authenticates doctrine. It is concerned with the art of the possible for the force that is currently
fielded, trained, and equipped or will be in the immediate, foreseeable future.

Concepts: Concepts are ideas for a significant change based on proposed new approaches to
the conduct of operations or technology. These ideas propose how the force might do
something significantly different in the future, usually 5 to 15 years hence. Ideally, concepts
start with a problem for which the current DOTMLPF solutions either do not work or prove
inadequate.

(ADP 1-01, Doctrine Primer)

FM 3-0 discusses what the Army is capable of today and for the near future.

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 US Army Combined Arms Center Changing our Culture to Prevail
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in Large-Scale Ground Combat
• U.S. Army is transitioning away from operations focused on stability/COIN.

• Peer threats (Russia, China, North Korea, Iran) are advancing in technology and capability.

• Army forces must re-learn required skills necessary to conduct large-scale ground combat.

Limited Contingency Operations Large-Scale Combat Operations

- Start at Position of Advantage - Start at Position of Disadvantage
- Methodical - Hyper Active Chaos
- Sporadic Tempo - Accelerated Tempo
- Domain Superiority - Contested All Domains
- Episodic Lethality - Exponential Lethality
- EAB Fight – Opnl/Strategic Preclusion – Isolation -- Systems Warfare -- Information Warfare -- Sanctuary - EAB Fight – Tactical/Opnl
- Restrictive Deconfliction - Permissive ROE
How do we change our culture and develop leaders
- UA at the Small Unit - UA at Echelon
to…
- Platoons at Risk -overcome 15 years of institutional memory? - BN and BDE at Risk
-see/understand/seize fleeting opportunities?
-develop the situation in contact and chaos?
-offset “one-off” dependencies and contested
domains?
XX -rapidly exploit positions of advantage?
-survive hyper-lethal engagements?
FOB
-continuously present multiple dilemmas to the
enemy?
-decide and act quickly?
-fully realize mission command at echelon?

“In today’s volatile operational environment, our Army must remain ready to answer the Nation’s call anywhere and
anytime, with little or no notice. Because of this, readiness for large-scale ground combat is our first priority.“
ADP-1 Foreword UNCLASSIFIED
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 US Army Combined Arms Center FM 3-0 Problem Set
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• All domains are contested and the joint force cannot solve tactical problems in every regional context,
particularly against peer threats.

• All battle is multi-domain battle across the range of military operations.

• Peer threats can generate formidable A2 and AD threats that exploit friendly capability gaps more lethally
than opponents in Afghanistan and Iraq.

• Large-scale ground combat operations are more likely than any time since 1991, while the Army is
optimized across the DOTMLPF for lesser operations along the continuum of conflict.

• Operational level doctrine must account for threats in a multi-polar world, but benchmarked against the
most capable.

• Adversaries threaten U.S. interests with activities short of open conflict that require operations by Army
(and Joint) forces to counter.

• Failure to consolidate gains in a timely, effective manner ceded positions of relative advantage and lost
opportunities to exploit tactical military success in the past.

No one starts a war, or rather, no one in his senses should do so, without being clear in his mind what
he intends to achieve by that war and how he intends to conduct it. - Carl von Clausewitz

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US Army Combined Arms Center FM 3-0 Big Ideas
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Focused on large-scale combat operations with current force

structure and capabilities.

Organization: operations to shape & prevent, large scale

operations to defend & attack, and consolidate gains.

Adjusts operational frame work to include the consolidation area

and multiple domain considerations (physical, temporal,
cognitive, and virtual).

Accounts for extended battlefield that includes cyberspace, EMS,

space, and the information environment across the ROMO.

Recognizes threat parity or regional superiority.

Tactics to defeat peer threats with capability advantages (IADS,

long range fires).

Focuses on exploiting positions of relative advantage.

Addresses operations by echelon: theater army, corps, division,

and brigade.

The first, the supreme, the most far-reaching act of judgement that the statesman and commander have
to make is to establish…the kind of war on which they are embarking; neither mistaking it for, nor trying
to turn it into, something that is alien to its nature. - Carl von Clausewitz
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US Army Combined Arms Center FM 3-0 Organization
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• CH 1: Overview of Army Operations

• CH2: Army Echelons, Capabilities and Training
• CH 3: Operations to Shape
• CH 4: Operations to Prevent
• CH 5: Large-Scale Combat Operations
• CH 6: Large-Scale Defensive Operations
• CH 7: Large-Scale Offensive Operations
• CH 8: Operations to Consolidate Gains
• App A: Command and Support Relationships
• App B: Risk Considerations

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 US Army Combined Arms Center CH1: Overview of Army Operations
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• The Army conducts operations as part of the joint force during unified action to fulfill a purpose unique
to the opponent, regional context, and national strategic aims. Army operations occur in four broad
categories defined by purpose: Operations to Shape, Operations to Prevent, Large-Scale Combat
Operations (Defense & Offense), and Operations to Consolidate Gains.
• The Army conducts operations to shape or prevent are successful when they defeat an adversary’s
attempt to destabilize the status quo or subvert a friendly state.
• Large-scale ground combat operations are successful when we destroy or defeat conventional means of
resistance on the battlefield in such a way that the enemy lacks the will and means to resist with
conventional forces.
• Operations to Consolidate Gains exploit tactical and operational success by destroying or defeating
enemy means for protracted resistance and denying his operational purpose. Pursuit of remaining
enemy capabilities to resist below the threshold of large-scale combat begins in the consolidation area.
Consolidation of gains is the follow through to achieve the strategic purpose of large-scale ground
combat.
• Divisions and corps are the lowest echelon that can typically orchestrate and synchronize multi-domain
capabilities during large scale combat operations.
• Adding physical, temporal, cognitive, and virtual considerations to the operational framework
emphasizes the role of echelons in the convergence of multi-domain capabilities.

War is not merely a political act, but also a political instrument, a continuation of political relations, a
carrying out of the same by other means. - Carl von Clausewitz UNCLASSIFIED
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US Army Combined Arms Center
SOLDIERS AND LEADERS - OUR ASYMMETRIC ADVANTAGE Operational Framework

The strategic Joint Security Area. The consolidation area The close area is the A deep area is the portion of the
support area A specific surface is the portion of the portion of a commander’s area of operations
describes the area area, designated by commander’s AO that commander’s area of that is not assigned to subordinate
extending from a the joint force is designated to operations assigned to units.
theater of commander to facilitate the security subordinate maneuver Interdiction best
operations to a facilitate protection and stability tasks forces. describes how
necessary for freedom Army and Joint
CONUS base or of joint bases and The zone between fires are typically
another combatant their connecting of action in the close the FLOT and the employed in the
commander’s AOR, lines of area and to support FSCL is typically the Deep Area.
that contains those communication that the continuous area over which Interdiction. An
organizations, LOCs, support joint consolidation of gains. friendly ground action to divert,
forces intend to disrupt, delay, or
and other agencies operations. The support area is the maneuver in the destroy the
required to support portion of the commander’s near future and is
forces in the field. It enemy’s military
area of operations that is also the area where surface capability
includes the air and designated to facilitate the joint AI operations before it can be
seaports supporting positioning, employment, are normally used effectively
the flow of forces executed through the against friendly
and protection of base ASOC/DASC. JP 3-03.
and sustainment sustainment assets required forces, or to
into the theater. to sustain, enable, and otherwise
achieve
control operations. objectives.

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US Army Combined Arms Center Operational Framework
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Operational Framework:

• Deep • Decisive • Main Effort

• Close • Sustaining • Supporting
• Support
• Shaping Effort
• Consolidation

Considerations:
• Physical
• Temporal Apply to each area
• Cognitive
• Virtual

Across all domains:

• Air
• Land
Joint Security • Maritime
Area • Space
• Cyberspace
Strategic
Support
Area
• Within the information
environment.

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 US Army Combined Arms Center CH 2: Army Echelons, Capabilities and
SOLDIERS AND LEADERS - OUR ASYMMETRIC ADVANTAGE Training

• The Army provides a mix of headquarters, units, and capabilities to geographic combatant
commanders (GCCs) in support of a theater campaign plan (TCP) and specific joint
operations.

• The theater army is the senior Army headquarters in an area of responsibility (AOR).

• Large-scale combat operations may require a corps headquarters to function as a

tactical land headquarters under a joint or multinational land component command.

• A division’s primary role is as a tactical headquarters commanding brigades in

decisive action.

• Theater armies, corps, and divisions may be task-organized with an assortment of

multifunctional and functional units to support their operations.

• Training is the most important thing the Army does to prepare for operations, and it is
the cornerstone of combat readiness.

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US Army Combined Arms Center CH 3: Operations to Shape
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• Operations to shape consist of various long-term military engagements, security

cooperation, and deterrence missions, tasks, and actions.

• Shaping activities ensure regions remain stable, a crisis does not occur, and
there is no need for an escalation of force.

• Shaping activities include military engagement, security cooperation, intelligence,

CWMD, humanitarian efforts, information operations, and combined training and exercises.

• Shaping activities protect and enhance national security interests, deter conflict, and set
conditions for future contingency operations.

• Theater army integrates landpower within theater engagement plans and security
cooperation activities.

• Army units at the corps and lower echelons execute shaping tasks and provide the
forces for security cooperation.

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 US Army Combined Arms Center CH 4: Operations to Prevent
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• The purpose of operations to prevent is to deter adversary actions contrary to U.S. interests.

• Operations to prevent are tailored in scope and scale to achieve a strategic or operational
level objective.

• Prevent activities include flexible deterrent options (FDOs) and flexible response options
(FROs), set the theater, tailor Army Forces, and project the force.

• Sustainment is a critical aspect of force projection; sustainment preparation of an

operational environment (OE) serves as the base for sustainment planning.

• The theater army enables the GCC to employ land forces within the AOR and into specific
operational areas.

• Corps headquarters may deploy into an operational area as a tactical headquarters with
subordinate divisions and brigades as a show of force.

• Divisions and brigades demonstrate national resolve by presenting a credible coercive force.

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US Army Combined Arms Center CH 5: Large-Scale Ground Combat
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• The Army provides the JFC operationally significant and sustained landpower.

• Army forces, as part of a joint force, must be capable of deploying and fighting to
gain access to geographic areas controlled by hostile forces.

• Large-scale combat operations introduce levels of complexity, lethality, ambiguity,

and speed to military activities not common in other operations.

• The Army supports the joint force by providing capability and capacity for the
application of land power through maneuver, fires, special operations, cyberspace
operations, EW, space operations, sustainment, and area security.

• Army forces provide the JFC the ability to capitalize on operational success by
consolidating gains.

• Commanders direct tactical enabling tasks to support the performance of all

offensive, defensive, and stability tasks.

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US Army Combined Arms Center CH 6: Large-Scale Defensive
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Operations

• The defense provides time for a commander to build combat power and establish
conditions for transition to the offense.

• Rotational and forward stationed Army forces must be able to fight outnumbered and
win.

• There are three primary defensive tasks: area defense, mobile defense, and
retrograde.

• Characteristics of the defense include disruption, flexibility, maneuver, mass and

concentration, operations in depth, preparation, and security.

• Defending corps and division commanders seek to gain the advantage in multiple
domains and the information environment when the enemy initially has the initiative.

• Corps and division orders for the defense include the minimum control measures
required to coordinate the operation.

• Corps and divisions employ security forces to protect the force from surprise, collect
information, and preserve freedom of action.

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US Army Combined Arms Center CH 7: Large-Scale Offensive
SOLDIERS AND LEADERS - OUR ASYMMETRIC ADVANTAGE
Operations
• The offense is the most direct and sure means of seizing, retaining, and exploiting the
initiative to gain physical, temporal, and cognitive advantages.

• There are four primary offensive tasks: movement to contact, attack, exploitation, and
pursuit.

• Commanders employ four defeat mechanisms—destroy, dislocate, disintegrate, and isolate.

• Characteristics of the offense include audacity, concentration, surprise, and tempo.

• The Army has six forms of maneuver: envelopment, flank attack, frontal attack, infiltration,
penetration, and turning movement.

• The offense emphasizes the requirement for a balance of high tempo and synchronization
to mitigate current capabilities gaps (fires, EW, Cyber, CBRN, mobility, sustainment)

• Corps and division subordinate units remain dispersed until immediately before
commencement of the offense.

• Army units must be able to maneuver into the close fight to enable joint capabilities.

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 US Army Combined Arms Center CH 8: Operations to Consolidate Gains
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• Operations to consolidate gains exploit tactical and operational success by destroying

or defeating enemy means for protracted resistance and denying his operational
purpose. Consolidate gains is a transition that occurs as large scale combat ends.

• Commanders employ defeat mechanisms and four stability mechanisms: compel,

control, influence, and support.

• Commanders conduct tactical tasks (such as search and attack, cordon and search, etc.)
as necessary to stabilize an area of operation.

• Divisions and corps designate a consolidation area when appropriate, generally during
offensive operations. The force assigned is additive (BCT for a DIV, DIV for a corps).

• Divisions and corps may eventually transition the bulk of combat power to consolidate
gains as large scale combat operations end and the operational focus changes.

Consolidate gains
The activities to make enduring any temporary operational success and set the conditions for a
stable environment allowing for a transition of control to legitimate authorities.
ADRP 3-0, Operations

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US Army Combined Arms Center Consolidation Area During and After
SOLDIERS AND LEADERS - OUR ASYMMETRIC ADVANTAGE Large-Scale Combat Operations

Consolidating gains during large scale combat

Consolidating gains at the culmination of large
operations
scale combat operations
Joint Phases 2 and 3
Transition to Joint Phase 4

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 US Army Combined Arms Center FM 3-0 Paths to Victory
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During operations to shape and prevent, Army forces set conditions to deny adversaries’ ability to
achieve objectives at acceptable military and political cost. They may do this through security cooperation
tasks designed to thwart short term success, such as improving the readiness and effectiveness of partner
conventional military forces. They may also do this by assisting with unconventional capabilities that enable
protracted resistance against a more powerful neighbor, which is likely to be more viable in situations where
resource constraints and geography make other options unrealistic.
 
During large-scale combat operations, enemies whose operational approach relies upon integrated fires
complexes and air defense systems requiring a level of centralized control are vulnerable to deception,
disruption, and isolation. The combination of conventional, unconventional, and joint operations that isolate
part of the system, destroy key components of it so as to enable rapid tactical maneuver at operational depth,
and exploit disruptions to the systems before they can mass effects can dislocate and ultimately collapse the
enemy's ability to employ them, creating maneuver opportunities. Establishing and retaining mobility
generates positions of relative advantage on the ground for maneuver forces to exploit.
 
Rapidly consolidating gains is a form of exploitation that transitions tactical positions of advantage into
enduring operational and strategic outcomes. Ensuring that enemies cannot transition a conventional military
defeat into a protracted conflict that negates initial friendly successes is foundational to victory. Defeating
remaining conventional forces, denying the means to conduct irregular warfare, controlling population
centers, and discrediting enemy narratives with facts on the ground ensures enduring, sustainable outcomes.
Building irreversible momentum towards the desired end state is a continuous process and should be pursued
relentlessly, without pause.

The aim of war should be the defeat of the enemy. But what constitutes defeat? The conquest of his whole territory is
not always necessary, and total occupation of his territory may not be enough. - Carl von Clausewitz

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 US Army Combined Arms Center FM 3-0 Training Considerations
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 Understanding threat purpose, capabilities, doctrine, and vulnerabilities in context

 Joint Force cannot solve all tactical problems; adapt to overcome capability gaps

 Survival in a sensor-rich environment against superior long range fires – mobility, dispersion, camouflage,
EMS signature, deception, protection

 Mission command at echelon, initiative, risk taking, bias towards action; orchestration vs. synchronization

 Operations to shape and prevent create positions of relative advantage to exploit during large scale
combat operations, which in turn create positions of advantage to exploit during operations to consolidate
gains

 Large scale combat operations = different culture: no MRX, force cap, golden hour, FOB living

 Rapid planning to exploit opportunities; enough information vs. perfect situational awareness

 Responsibility by echelon within the operational framework – authorities, capabilities, physical / cognitive /
temporal / virtual considerations
 Maneuver to operational depth to isolate, disrupt, and dislocate enemy forces
 CONUS based - fight outnumbered and win
“The history of failure in war can almost be summed up in two words: Too Late. Too late in
comprehending the deadly purpose of a potential enemy; too late in realizing the mortal danger; too
late in preparedness; too late in uniting all possible forces for resistance; too late in standing with
one’s friends.” -- Douglas MacArthur
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US Army Combined Arms Center FM 3-0 Driven Doctrine Priorities
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Mission Command
• ADP/ADRP 6-0, Mission
Command (revision)
• ADP/ADRP 5-0, The Operations
Process (revision)

Echelon Roles and Tactics

Responsibilities • ADRP 3-90, Tactics,(revision)
• FM 3-94 ,Theater Army, Corps, • ATP 3-90-x, Support and
and Division Tactical Consolidation Area Operations
Operations, (revision) (new)
• FM 3-94-1,Theater Army, • ATP 3-94-2, Deep Operations
Corps, and Division as Joint HQ (revision, or incorporate into
(new) FM 3-94)

Sustainment
• Alignment at echelon
• Large-scale combat operations focused
• Command and Support Relationships
• FM 4-95, Logistics Operations (revision)
Ongoing ADP-ADRP alignment with FM 3-0

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US Army Combined Arms Center Combined Arms Doctrine Directorate
SOLDIERS AND LEADERS - OUR ASYMMETRIC ADVANTAGE

Discussion

As of: 18 SEP 17
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US Army Combined Arms Center Mission Command Warfighting Function
SOLDIERS AND LEADERS - OUR ASYMMETRIC ADVANTAGE

• Expanded operational framework.

• Expanded cyberspace and space discussion.

• The importance of preparation and training for large-scale combat operations

across the warfighting functions.

• Planning to consolidate gains/acknowledgement of additional forces (U.S. or

others).

• Understanding positions of relative advantage and multi-domain considerations.

• Understanding the OE in terms of multiple domains.

• Virtual, physical, cognitive and temporal aspects of the OE.

• Addition of the support area command post.

• Orchestration versus synchronization.

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 US Army Combined Arms Center Changes: Corps and Division
SOLDIERS AND LEADERS - OUR ASYMMETRIC ADVANTAGE

• FM 3-0 discusses corps and divisions as tactical formations employing capabilities, not
simply headquarters.

• Designating a consolidation area requires additional combat power (brigade for a division,
division for a corps)

• Division and corps assign offensive, defensive, and stability tasks to the unit given a
consolidation area as its AO.

• Sustainment command and support relationships. Sustainment brigade may be OPCON

to division. Expeditionary sustainment command may be OPCON to the Corps.

• Requirement for an additional command post (support area command post) to assist
corps and division commanders with operations in the support and consolidation areas.

• Recognizes DIVARTY and the roles and responsibilities of the FFAHQ at corps and
division.

• Adds the requirement for corps to control airspace.

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US Army Combined Arms Center Intelligence Warfighting Function
SOLDIERS AND LEADERS - OUR ASYMMETRIC ADVANTAGE

• Threat discussion focuses on a peer threat:

• Information warfare
• Preclusion
• Isolation
• Sanctuary
• Systems warfare

• Integration of the intelligence enterprise through the theater.

• Adequate vs. perfect intelligence.

• Fighting for information; developing a situation through action.

• Military Intelligence Brigade-Theater roles.

• Importance of cyberspace and space capabilities.

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US Army Combined Arms Center Movement and Maneuver Warfighting
SOLDIERS AND LEADERS - OUR ASYMMETRIC ADVANTAGE Function

• Expanded operational framework considerations.

• Fighting division and corps as formations.

• Full discussion of tactics at echelon and how they work together.

• Operations in the deep area.

• No deep or consolidation area BCT and below.

• Brigades and lower generally focused on one component of decisive action.

• Establishing consolidation area requires additional combat power.

• Movement of large formations.

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US Army Combined Arms Center Fires Warfighting Function
SOLDIERS AND LEADERS - OUR ASYMMETRIC ADVANTAGE

• DIVARTY roles and responsibility.

• Field Force Artillery Headquarters (FFAHQ) roles and responsibility.

• Importance of mass, accuracy, and responsiveness, as well as precision.

• Recognizes capability and capacity gaps.

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US Army Combined Arms Center Protection Warfighting Function
SOLDIERS AND LEADERS - OUR ASYMMETRIC ADVANTAGE

• Consolidation area addresses significant threats to the support area.

• Recognizes forces are continuously in contact and under observation.

• Emphasis on CP survivability.

• Emphasis on mobility.

• Recognizes CBRN threat.

• Importance of SHORAD roles and responsibilities.

• Cyberspace defense.

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US Army Combined Arms Center Sustainment Warfighting Function
SOLDIERS AND LEADERS - OUR ASYMMETRIC ADVANTAGE

• Emphasis on lethality and volume of casualties.

• Command and support relationships for logistics units.

• Significant implications for sustaining movement and maneuver over distance.

• Importance of sustainment planning.

• Importance of setting the theater.

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US Army Combined Arms Center Change 1, ADP/ADRP 3-0
SOLDIERS AND LEADERS - OUR ASYMMETRIC ADVANTAGE

Change 1, ADP/ADRP 3-0 Alignment with FM 3-0

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US Army Combined Arms Center ADRP 3-0 / FM 3-0 Alignment
SOLDIERS AND LEADERS - OUR ASYMMETRIC ADVANTAGE

Chapter 1:
Added Peer Threat discussion from FM 3-0.
Added Readiness Through Training discussion from FM 3-0.
Refined definitions and added examples of the defeat mechanisms for the reader.

Chapter 2:
Added Multi-Domain Language from FM 3-0.
Added Army Design Methodology Graphic from FM 3-0.
 
Chapter 3:
Updated the refined definitions for Unified Land Operations, Consolidate Gains, and Consolidation Area from
FM 3-0.
Added FM 3-0 discussion on Simultaneity.
Replaced the “Combining Tasks of Decisive Action across Joint Phases” diagram with updated version from
FM 3-0.
Added the FM 3-0 discussion on seize, retain and exploit the initiative in multi-domains.
Mentioned Consolidate Gains as an Army Strategic Role.
 

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 US Army Combined Arms Center ADRP 3-0 / FM 3-0 Alignment
SOLDIERS AND LEADERS - OUR ASYMMETRIC ADVANTAGE

Chapter 4:
Added Consolidation Area Framework discussion from FM 3-0.
Added Contiguous and Non-Contiguous graphics that show battlefield framework from FM 3-0.
Added Position of Relative Advantage language from FM 3-0.
Added the FM 3-0 discussion on decisive, shaping, and sustaining operations in multi-domains.
Added FM 3-0 planning considerations for Deep Area.
Added FM 3-0 language on Consolidate Gains Forces are Additive.
 
Chapter 5:
Replaced Synchronize Information-Related Capabilities with Conduct Information Operations.
Replaced Conduct CA Operations with Conduct CMO.
Referenced ATP 6-05 for more information on Conventional and Special Operations Force Interoperability,
Integration and Inter dependence. 

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US Army Combined Arms Center Current MTT Dates
SOLDIERS AND LEADERS - OUR ASYMMETRIC ADVANTAGE

• DLRO: 20SEP17
• CALL: 26SEP17
• IL ARNG: 19-21 OCT; Decatur, IL
• 1st ID: 20FEB18 (T)
• DDE: TBD
• MCCoE: TBD
• MCTP: TBD

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 US Army Combined Arms Center FY 18 Umbrella Week
SOLDIERS AND LEADERS - OUR ASYMMETRIC ADVANTAGE

Umbrella Week Early FY 18 schedule

• Ft Campbell KY: 1 BCT/101 Sustainment BDE; 27NOV-01DEC 2017
• FT Carson CO: 3rd ABCT, 4th ID; 4-8 DEC 17/ 8-11 JAN 18
• FT Drum NY: 10th MTN; 19-23 FEB 18
• FT Hood TX: III Corps; 26-29 MAR 18

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US Army Combined Arms Center
SOLDIERS AND LEADERS - OUR ASYMMETRIC ADVANTAGE Operational Framework
Unified Land Operations (ULO)

Consolidation Deep Area

Strategic Joint Security Area
Support Area Area
Support Close Area
(Inter-theater) (Intra-theater) Area Maneuver Fires

FSCL
FLOT
Space, Cyberspace, Information

The strategic Joint Security Area. The consolidation area The close area is the A deep area is the portion of the
support area A specific surface is the portion of the portion of a commander’s area of operations
describes the area area, designated by commander’s AO that commander’s area of that is not assigned to subordinate
extending from a the joint force is designated to operations assigned to units.
theater of commander to facilitate the security subordinate maneuver Interdiction best
operations to a facilitate protection and stability tasks forces. describes how
necessary for freedom Army and Joint
CONUS base or of joint bases and The zone between fires are typically
another combatant their connecting of action in the close the FLOT and the employed in the
commander’s AOR, lines of area and to support FSCL is typically the Deep Area.
that contains those communication that the continuous area over which Interdiction: An
organizations, LOCs, support joint consolidation of gains. friendly ground action to divert,
forces intend to disrupt, delay, or
and other agencies operations. The support area is the maneuver in the destroy the
required to support portion of the commander’s near future and is
forces in the field. It enemy’s military
area of operations that is also the area where surface capability
includes the air and designated to facilitate the joint AI operations before it can be
seaports supporting positioning, employment, are normally used effectively
the flow of forces executed through the against friendly
and protection of base ASOC/DASC. JP 3-03
and sustainment sustainment assets required forces, or to
into the theater. to sustain, enable, and otherwise
achieve
control operations. objectives.

UNCLASSIFIED 43 43
US Army Combined Arms Center Operational Framework
SOLDIERS AND LEADERS - OUR ASYMMETRIC ADVANTAGE

Operational Framework:
• Deep
• Close
• Support
• Consolidation

Operational Framework Considerations:

• Temporal
• Physical
• Cognitive
• Virtual

Across all domains:

• Air
• Land
• Maritime
• Space
• Cyberspace
Contiguous corps area

UNCLASSIFIED
44
US Army Combined Arms Center CH 2, Army Echelons, Capabilities
SOLDIERS AND LEADERS - OUR ASYMMETRIC ADVANTAGE
and Training
• Army provides a mix of headquarters, units, and capabilities to geographic combatant
commanders (GCCs) in support of a theater campaign plan (TCP) and specific joint
operations.

UNCLASSIFIED
45