CIS3360: Security in Computing

Chapter 5 : Network Security I

Cliff Zou
Spring 2012
 Network Monitoring Tool:
Wireshark
• Wireshark is a packet sniffer and protocol analyzer
• Captures and analyzes frames
• Supports plugins
• Usually required to run with administrator privileges
• Setting the network interface in promiscuous mode
captures traffic across the entire LAN segment and not
just frames addressed to the machine
• Freely available on www.wireshark.org
 menu
 main toolbar
 filter toolbar

 packet list pane

 packet details
pane

 packet bytes pane

 status bar 3
 MAC Addresses and ARP
 32-bit IP address:
 network-layer address
 used to get datagram to destination IP subnet
 MAC (or LAN or physical or Ethernet)
address:
 Data link layer address
 used to get datagram from one interface to another physically-
connected interface (same network)
 48 bit MAC address (for most LANs)
burned in the adapter ROM
 Some Network interface cards (NICs) can change their MAC

5-4
 ARP: Address Resolution Protocol

Question: how to determine  Each IP node (Host,

MAC address of host B when Router) on LAN has ARP
knowing B’s IP address? table
 ARP Table: IP/MAC
237.196.7.78 address mappings for
1A-2F-BB-76-09-AD some LAN nodes
237.196.7.23 < IP address; MAC address; TTL>
237.196.7.14

TTL (Time To Live): time
after which address
LAN
71-65-F7-2B-08-53
mapping will be forgotten
58-23-D7-FA-20-B0
(typically 20 min)

0C-C4-11-6F-E3-98
237.196.7.88

5-5
 ARP
 ARP works by broadcasting requests and caching responses for future
use
 The protocol begins with a computer broadcasting a message of the
form
who has <IP address1> tell <IP address2>
 When the machine with <IP address1> or an ARP server receives
this message, its broadcasts the response
<IP address1> is <MAC address>
 The requestor’s IP address <IP address2> is contained in the link
header
 The Linux and Windows command arp - a displays the ARP table
Internet Address Physical Address Type
128.148.31.1 00-00-0c-07-ac-00 dynamic
128.148.31.15 00-0c-76-b2-d7-1d dynamic
128.148.31.71 00-0c-76-b2-d0-d2 dynamic
128.148.31.75 00-0c-76-b2-d7-1d dynamic
128.148.31.102 00-22-0c-a3-e4-00 dynamic
128.148.31.137 00-1d-92-b6-f1-a9 dynamic
 ARP Spoofing
 The ARP table is updated whenever an ARP response is
received
 Requests are not tracked
 ARP announcements are not authenticated
 Machines trust each other
 A rogue machine can spoof other machines
 ARP Poisoning (ARP Spoofing)
 According to the standard, almost all ARP
implementations are stateless
 An arp cache updates every time that it receives
an arp reply… even if it did not send any arp
request!
 It is possible to “poison” an arp cache by
sending gratuitous arp replies
 ARP Caches

IP: 192.168.1.1 IP: 192.168.1.105

MAC: 00:11:22:33:44:01 Data MAC: 00:11:22:33:44:02

192.168.1.1 is at
00:11:22:33:44:01
192.168.1.105 is at
00:11:22:33:44:02
ARP Cache ARP Cache
192.168.1.105 00:11:22:33:44:02 192.168.1.1 00:11:22:33:44:01
 Poisoned ARP Caches
(man-in-the-middle attack)
192.168.1.106
00:11:22:33:44:03

Data Data

192.168.1.105 is at 192.168.1.1 is at
00:11:22:33:44:03 00:11:22:33:44:03
192.168.1.1 192.168.1.105
00:11:22:33:44:01 00:11:22:33:44:02

Poisoned ARP Cache Poisoned ARP Cache

192.168.1.105 00:11:22:33:44:03 192.168.1.1 00:11:22:33:44:03
 ARP Spoofing
 Using static entries solves the problem but it is almost
impossible to manage!

 Check multiple occurrence of the same MAC

 i.e., One MAC mapping to multiple IP addresses (see previous
slide’s example)

 Software detection solutions

 Anti-arpspoof, Xarp, Arpwatch
 TCP Session Hijacking
 TCP connection has both client server
sequence number and
acknowledge number in each SY
seq=c N,
packet. lient_
seq
 The two ends negotiate what ,
N/ACK eq,
seq. and ack. Numbers to be SY
s e r
s
ver_ q+1
seq= lient_se
used in TCP set up stage. ack=
c

 seq and ack number size: 232 A

seq=c CK,
li
 Makes seq/ack guessing very hard ack=s ent_seq+1
erver_
seq+1
to achieve
 Very hard to hijack an already
setup TCP connection!

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 TCP Session Hijacking
 Possible when an attacker is on the same network
segment as the target machine.
 Attacker can sniff all back/forth tcp packets and know the
seq/ack numbers.
 Attacker can inject a packet with the correct seq/ack numbers
with the spoofed IP address.
 IP spoofing needs low-level packet programming, OS-based socket
programming cannot be used!

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 TCP Session Hijacking

Due to
ARP spoofing

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 TCP Session Hijacking
 Another way is “coordinated IP spoofing” by using two
computers, such as the “Thin pipe / Thick pipe method”
introduced in spam lecture:
 High Speed Broadband connection (HSB)
 Controls a Low Speed Zombie (LSZ)

 Assumes no egress filtering at HSB’s ISP

 Hides IP address of HSB. LSZ is blacklisted.
TCP handshake
LSZ
Target
TCP Seq #s SMTP
Server
HSB SMTP bulk mail
(Source IP = LSZ)
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Denial-of-Service (DoS) Attack
 An attempt to make a computer or network resource
unavailable to its intended users
 DoS to the network bandwidth of targeted server
 DoS to the computing resource of targeted server
 Memory, CPU
 DoS to the vulnerability in targeted server
 Causing server OS crash (buffer overflow bug, logic bug, etc)
 Causing server program crash (e.g., Apache, Sendmail, SQL)

 Distributed Denial-of-Service (DDoS) attack

 Sending attack packets from multiple computers
 Botnet is the root cause for DDoS attacks

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Denial-of-Service (DoS) Attack
 Format:
 Real IP-based attack using botnets
 Attacker does not worry about exposing bots’ IP addresses.
 TCP flooding, UDP flooding, icmp flooding

 Spoofed IP-based attack

 SYN flooding with spoofed IPs.

 Source address hiding attack

 Smurf attack

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 Smurf Attack
 Some contents from this link:
 www.pentics.net/denial-of-service/.../msppt/19971027_smurf.ppt

 Uses ICMP echo/reply packets with broadcast networks to

multiply traffic
 Requires the ability to send spoofed packets

 Abuses “bounce-sites” to attack victims

 Traffic multiplied by a factor of 50 to 200

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Description of Smurfing Attack
ICMP echo (spoofed source address of victim)
Sent to IP broadcast address
ICMP echo reply

Internet

Perpetrator
Victim

Router broadcasts to
all LAN’s computers
How to prevent being a “bounce site”
 Turn off directed broadcasts to subnets with 5 hosts or
more
 Cisco router: Interface command “no ip directed-broadcast”
 Use access control lists (if necessary) to prevent ICMP
echo requests from entering your network
 Probably not an elegant solution; makes troubleshooting difficult
 But many networks are doing this now
 Encourage vendors to turn off replies for ICMP echos to
broadcast addresses
 Host Requirements RFC-1122 Section 3.2.2.6 states “An ICMP
Echo Request destined to an IP broadcast or IP multicast address
MAY be silently discarded.”
 Patches are available for free UNIX-ish operating systems.

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 SYN Flooding Attack
 An attacker sends a large number of SYN
requests to a target's system
 Target uses too much memory and CPU resources to
process these fake connection requests
 Target’s bandwidth is overwhelmed
 Usually SYN flood packets use spoofed source
IPs
 No TCP connection is set up (not like the TCP
hijacking!)
 Hide attacking source
 Make the target very hard to decide which TCP SYN
is attack and which TCP SYN is from legitimate Image from wikipedia
users!

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 SYN Flood Defense: SYN Cookie
 Some contents from:
 http://www.cc.gatech.edu/classes/AY2007/cs7260_spring/lectures/L18.ppt
 General idea
 Client sends SYN to server (client_seq number only)

 Server responds to Client with SYN-ACK cookie

 Server_sqn = f(src addr, src port, dest addr, dest port, rand)
 Ack number is normal value: client_seq +1
 Server does not save state
 Honest client responds with ACK(client_ack = server_sqn+1)
 Server checks response
 If matches SYN-ACK, establishes connection

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 TCP SYN cookie
 TCP SYN/ACK server_seq encodes a cookie
 32-bit sequence number
 time mod 32: counter to ensure sequence numbers
increase every 64 seconds
 MSS: encoding of server MSS (can only have 8 settings)
 Cookie: easy to create and validate, hard to forge
 Includes timestamp, nonce, 4-tuple
32 0

t mod 32 MSS Cookie=HMAC(t, Ns, SIP, SPort, DIP, DPort)

5 bits 3 bits

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 SYN Cookies
 client
 sends SYN packet and ACK number to server
SYN
 waits for SYN-ACK from server w/ matching
ACK number ack-number
 server
 responds w/ SYN-ACK packet w/ initial SYN- SYN-ACK
cookie sequence number
seq-number as SYN-cookie,
 Sequence number is cryptographically ack-number
generated value based on client address,
NO BUFFER ALLOCATED
port, and time.
 client ACK
 sends ACK to server w/ matching sequence
seq_number
number
ack-number+data
 server
 If ACK is to an unopened socket, server
SYN-ACK
validates returned sequence number as SYN-
cookie seq-number, ack-number
 If value is reasonable, a buffer is allocated TCP BUFFER ALLOCATED
and socket is opened

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 SYN Cookies Limitation
 Windows has not adopted SYN cookies
 Some Linux distributions have used it

 Maximum segment size can only be 8 possible values

 Do not allow the use of TCP option field
 Many TCP option fields have been used by many programs

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 IP Traceback
R R A R

R R R7 R

R4 R5 R6

R R3

R1 R2

V
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 Logging Challenges
 Attack path reconstruction is difficult
 Packet may be transformed as it moves through the network

 Full packet storage is problematic

 Memory requirements are prohibitive at high line speeds (OC-
192 is ~10Mpkt/sec)

 Extensive packet logs are a privacy risk

 Traffic repositories may aid eavesdroppers

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