Chapter 7: Risk, Safety and

Liability in Engineering

IENG 355
ETHICS IN ENGINEERING

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 Case (Part 1)
 Don Hayward is employed as a chemical engineer at ABC
Manufacturing. Although he does not work with hot metals himself, he
supervises workers who are exposed to hot metals eight hours a day,
five days a week.
 Don becomes concerned when several workers develop respiratory
problems and complain about "those bad smelling fumes from the hot
metals".
 When Don asks his superior, Cal Brundage, about air quality in the
workplace, the reply is that the workplace is in full compliance with
OSHA guidelines.
 However, Don also learns that OSHA guidelines do not apply to
chemicals that have not been tested. A relatively small percentage of
chemicals in the workplace have actually been tested. This is also the
case with the vast majority of chemicals workers are exposed to at
ABC.
 Should Don do anything further, or should he simply drop the matter?
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 Case (Part 2)
 Don goes to ABC's science library, talks to the reference librarian
about his concerns, and does a literature search to see if he can
find anything that might be helpful in determining why the workers
have developed respiratory problems. He finds the title of an article
that looks promising and asks the reference librarian to send for a
copy. The librarian tells Don that the formal request must have the
signed approval of Cal Brundage.
 Don fills out the request form and sends it to Cal's office for
approval. One month later the article has still not arrived. Don asks
Cal about the request. Cal replies that he doesn't recall ever seeing
it. He tells Don that it must have gotten "lost in the shuffle." Don fills
out another form and this time personally hands it to Cal. Cal says
he will send it to the reference librarian right away.
 Another month passes by and the article has not arrived. Don
mentions his frustration to the reference librarian. He replies that
he never received a request from Cal.
 What should Don do now? 3
How should engineers deal with issues of
risk and safety?

 Engineering necessarily involves risk.

 New hazards could be found in products,

processes, and chemicals that were once
thought to be safe.

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Risk
 Risk increases because engineers are
constantly involved in innovation.

 New machines are created and new

compounds synthesized always
without full knowledge of their long-
term effects on humans or the
environment.
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 In this chapter we will go over
 The codes and engineering practice regarding risk
and safety
 Difficulties in estimating risk
 Normalizing deviance
 Three approaches to acceptable risk:
 experts,
 laypersons, and
 government regulators approach to acceptable risk

 The Engineers liability for risk

 Becoming a responsible engineer regarding risk
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 The codes and engineering practice
regarding risk and safety
 All engineering codes say that: “Engineers must hold
paramount the safety, health, and welfare of the public.

NSPE:
 II1b. Engineers shall approve only those engineering
documents that are in conformity with applicable
standards. (are standards in the case applicable???)

 III2b. Engineers shall not complete, sign, or seal plans

and/or specifications that are not in conformity with
applicable engineering standards. If the client or
employer insists on such unprofessional conduct, they
shall notify the proper authorities and withdraw from
further service on the project. (Case Part 1) 7
 The codes and engineering practice
regarding risk and safety

 II1a. If engineers' judgment is overruled

under circumstances that endanger life
or property, they shall notify their
employer or client and such other
authority as may be appropriate.
(Case Part 2)

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 Difficulties Estimating Risk
Detecting Failure Modes:
A failure mode is a way in which a structure,
mechanism or process can malfunction.

 Fault-Tree Analysis: a diagram of the possible

ways in which a malfunction or accident can
occur.
 Event-Tree Analysis (similar with different approach)

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 Fault-Tree Analysis

 In a Fault-tree analysis one starts with

an undesirable event, and then reasons
backward to determine what might
have led to the event. (p149)

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 Fault-Tree Analysis used to discover
why a car wont start
Fault Tree

Car W ont Start

Battery Charge Insufficient Starting System defective Fuel System ignition system
Type title here Type title here Defective defective

1. Faulty ground corrections

2. Terminals loose or corroded
3. Batery week

1. Rust 1. lights left on motor off

2. Corrosion 2. Age
3. Dirt 3. Bad weather
4. Loose connections 4. Defective ..........
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Event Tree-Analysis

 In event-tree analysis one begins with

an initial event and reason forward to
the state of system to which the event
can lead. (p.150)

 These have limitations p.150

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 Are There Normal Accidents?

Two characteristics of high-risk

technologies that make them susceptible to
accidents:
 Tight Coupling and
 Complex Interactions of the parts of
technological systems

**These two factors make accidents likely and

difficult to predict and control 14
 Tight Coupling
 Processes are TIGHTLY COUPLED if
they are connected in such a way that
one process is known to affect another
and will usually do so within a short time.

Ex: A chemical plat is tightly coupled because the

failure in one part of the plant can quickly affect
other parts of the plant.
Ex: A university is loosely coupled, why?
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 Complex Interactions

 Processes are COMPLEXLY INTERACTIVE if

the parts of the system can interact in
unanticipated ways. Like no one expected that
when part B failed it would affect part C.

Examples of complexly interactive and tightly

coupled technical systems:
chemical plants, nuclear power plants, space
missions, nuclear weapon systems. These can
have unexpected failures, and little time to
correct the problems. (all system affected)16
 The answer is:
 It may not be possible to make a
system both loosely coupled and
noncomplex therefore accidents in
complex, tightly coupled systems are
inevitable and “Normal” (Perrow).
Students should read page 160-161(151-152): an example of an
accident in a system that was complexly interactive and tightly coupled
and that could have been prevented by good engineering.

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 Normalizing Deviance
 Engineers increase the risk to the public by
allowing increasing numbers of deviances
from proper standards of safety and
acceptable risk.
 This is called normalization of deviance.

Accepting anomalies instead of attempting to

correct a design or operating conditions that
led to the anomalies make accidents
inevitable!
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(page 162/153 example from the challenger disaster)
Risk

 Technology imposes RISK on the

public

 RISKs are often difficult to detect and

eliminate

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 Three approaches to acceptable risk

 The Experts Approach

 The Layperson’s Approach

 The Government Regulator’s Approach

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 Experts Approach to
Acceptable Risk

 Identifying risk
To assess the risk, an engineer must first identify it. To identify a risk,
an engineer fmust fits know what a risk is. Concept of risk involves the
notion of adverse effect or harm.

 Utilitarianism and acceptable risk

The risk expert’s approach to risk is usually utilitarian. Apply cost-
benefit analysis by modifying it to risk-benefit analysis because the
“cost” is measured in terms of the risk of deaths, injuries, or other
harms.

 Risk as maximizing benefit 21

 Identifying risk
 Concept of risk involves adverse effect or
harm. Harm is a limitation of a persons
freedom or well being. (physical well being,
psychological well being, economical well
being)

 Risk can be defined as: “a compound measure

of the probability and magnitude of adverse
effect” (William W. Lowrance)

 We can add : “probability of death or injury”

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 Utilitarianism and Acceptable Risk
 The experts approach to risk is usually
utilitarian. That the answer to any moral
question is to be found by determining the
course of action that maximizes well being.
 Cost/benefit technique is often called
risk/benefit analysis. Cost is measured in terms
of risk of deaths, injuries, or other harms
associated with a given course of action.
(Case Ex: Is the risk to the workers from the fumes
acceptable? ).
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 Risk as maximizing benefit
 An acceptable risk is one of where, given
the options available, the risk of harm is
at least equaled by the probability of
producing benefit.

Limitations: (that will yield the cost/benefit approach inconclusive)

 It might not be possible to anticipate all of the costs and benefits
associated with each option
 It is not always possible to translate all of the risks and benefits
into monetary terms. What is the monetary value of human life?
 The method makes no allowances for the distributions of costs
and benefits.
 The method gives no place for informed consent to the risk
imposed by technology. 24
 The Laypersons Approach to
Acceptable Risk
 Expert and Layperson
Public is sometimes mistaken in estimating the
probability of death and injury from various activities
of technology. Experts and lay person understand
risk differently.

 Informed consent and justice: lay person approach

follows more closely the ethics of respect of
persons than utilitarianism.

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 Free and informed consent and
compensation

Three necessities to give free and informed

consent to the risks imposed by technology:

 A person must not be coerced

 A person must have the relative information
 A person must be rational and competent
enough to evaluate the information.

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Lay criterion of acceptable risk:

An acceptable risk is one in which risk

is freely assumed by free and informed
consent, or properly compensated,
and which is justly distributed.

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The Government Regulator’s
Approach to Risk

 An acceptable risk is one in which

protecting the public from harm has
been weighted more heavily than
benefiting the public.

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 Three approaches to
acceptable risk
 Risk Expert: wants to balance risk and benefit in a
way that optimizes overall public well-being.

 Layperson: wants to protect himself or herself from

risk.

 The government regulator: wants as much

assurance as possible that the public is not being
exposed to unexpected harm.
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Becoming a Responsible
Engineer Regarding Risk

Includes to be aware
 that risk is often difficult to estimate

 that there are different approaches to

the determination of acceptable risk
 of the legal liabilities regarding risk.

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 (A more general) Principle of
Acceptable Risk

 People should be protected from the harmful

effects of technology, especially when the
harms are not consented to or when they are
unjustly distributed, accept that this protection
must sometimes be balanced against
(1) the need to preserve great and irreplaceable
benefits, and
(2) the limitations on our ability to obtain informed
consent.
Page 168 some issues (6) that arise in applying the principle.
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