Chapter Three
Chapter Three
LANGUAGE
Varieties of Meaning
Ordinary language serves various functions in our day-to-day lives . For our purpose, two linguistic
functions are particularly important: (1) to convey information and (2) to express or evoke feelings.
# Consider, for example, the following statements:
The death penalty, which is legal in thirty-six states, has been carried out most often
in Georgia; however, since 1977 Texas holds the record for the greatest number of
executions.
# The death penalty is a cruel and inhuman form of punishment in which hapless prisoners
are dragged from their cells and summarily slaughtered only to satiate the bloodlust of
a vengeful public .
Terminology that conveys information is said to have cognitive meaning, and terminology that
expresses or evokes feelings is said to have emotive meaning.
The emotively charged statement about the death penalty illustrates two important
points. The first is that statements of this sort usually have both cognitive meaning and
emotive meaning.
Varieties of Meaning
The second point is that part of the cognitive meaning of such statements is a value claim. A
value claim is a claim that something is good, bad, right, wrong, or better, worse, more
important or less important than some other thing .
For the purposes of logic, it is important that we be able to disengage the value claims of
emotively charged statements from the emotive meaning and treat these claims as separate
statements.
Value claims as such normally require evidence to support them. For example, the claim that
the death penalty is immoral cannot simply stand by itself. It cries out for reasons to support it.
But when value claims are couched in emotive terminology, the emotive “clothing” tends to
obscure the fact that a value claim is being made, and it simultaneously gives psychological
momentum to that claim.
As a result, readers and listeners are inclined to swallow the value claim whole without any
evidence. Furthermore, the intellectual laziness of many speakers and writers, combined
with their inability to supply supporting reasons for their value claims, reinforces the
desirability of couching such claims in emotive terminology .
Varieties of Meaning
Now that we have distinguished emotive meaning from cognitive meaning, let us
explore some of the ways that cognitive meanings can be defective. Two of them are
vagueness and ambiguity.
A linguistic expression is said to be vague if there are borderline cases in which it is
impossible to tell if the expression applies or does not apply. Vague expressions often
allow for a continuous range of interpretations. The meaning is hazy, obscure, and
imprecise.
For example, words such as “love,” “happiness,” “peace,” “excessive,” “fresh,” “rich,”
“poor,” “normal,” “conservative,” and “polluted” are vague. We can rarely tell with any
precision whether they apply to a given situation or not .
Vagueness and Ambiguity
The other way in which cognitive meanings can be defective is ambiguity. An expression
is said to be ambiguous when it can be interpreted as having more than one clearly
distinct meaning in a given context.
For example, words such as “light,”“proper,” “critical,” “stress,” “mad,” “inflate,” “chest,”
“bank,” “sound,” and “race” can be used ambiguously.
The difference between ambiguity and vagueness is that vague terminology allows for
a relatively continuous range of interpretations, whereas ambiguous terminology allows
for multiple discrete interpretations. In a vague expression there is a blur of meaning,
whereas in an ambiguous expression there is a mix-up of otherwise clear meanings.
Ambiguity and vagueness are important in logic because there are countless occasions
in which the evaluation of an argument leads to the observation, “Well, that depends on
what you mean by . . .” Certain phraseology in the argument is vague or ambiguous, and
its meaning must be clarified before any evaluation can proceed .
The role of vagueness and ambiguity in arguments may be conveniently explored in
the context of conflicting arguments between individuals. Such conflicts are called
disputes:
≠ CLAUDIA: Mrs.Wilson abuses her children. And how do I know that? I saw her spank one
of her kids the other day after the kid misbehaved.
JANE: Don’t be silly. Kids need discipline, and by disciplining her children, Mrs.Wilson is
showing that she loves them.
≠ BRENDA: I’m afraid that Smiley is guilty of arson. Last night he confided to me that he
was the one who set fire to the old schoolhouse.
WARREN: No, you couldn’t be more mistaken. In this country no one is guilty until proven
so in a court of law, and Smiley has not yet even been accused of anything
Disputes that arise over the meaning of language are called verbal disputes. But not
all disputes are of this sort. Some disputes arise over a disagreement about facts, and
these are called factual disputes. Example:
≠ KEITH: I know that Freddie stole a computer from the old schoolhouse. Barbara told me
that she saw Freddie do it.
PHYLLIS: That’s ridiculous! Freddie has never stolen anything in his life. Barbara hates
Freddie, and she is trying to pin the theft on him only to shield her criminal boyfriend
The Intention and Extension of terms
The main task of logic is the evaluation of arguments. However, as we saw in the previous section,
there are countless arguments in which this task leads to the observation, “Well, that depends on
what you mean by . . .” Such an observation usually indicates that the meaning of certain words in
the argument is vague or ambiguous.
Clearing up the problem often involves supplying a definition. Thus, the study of
meaning and definition is closely related to the main task of logic. In this section we
continue our inquiry into aspects of linguistic meaning, and the results of this inquiry
provide the basis for the theory of definition in the next section.
The basic units of any ordinary language are words. Our main concern in this chapter, however, is
not with words in general but with terms. A term is any word or
arrangement of words that may serve as the subject of a statement .
The previous section of this chapter explored the cognitive meaning of language in
general. The cognitive meaning of terms comprises two kinds: intensional and extensional. The
intensional meaning consists of the qualities or attributes that the term
connotes, and the extensional meaning consists of the members of the class that the
term denotes
The Intention and Extension of terms
Exactly how a term connotes a set of attributes allows for at least two different
interpretations. Some philosophers take an objective approach and hold that a term
connotes whatever attributes something must have in order to be denoted by the term.
Others take what might be called a subjective approach and hold that a term connotes
the attributes that occur in the minds of the people who use that term.
The denotation of a term also typically remains the same from person to person,
but it may change with the passage of time. The denotation of “currently living cat,”
for example, is constantly fluctuating as some cats die and others are born. The denotation
of the term “cat,” on the other hand, is presumably constant because it denotes
all cats, past, present, and future
Sometimes the denotation of a term can change radically with the passage of time.
The terms “currently living dodo bird” and “current king of France,” for example, at
one time denoted actually existing entities, but today all such entities have perished.
Accordingly, these terms now have what is called empty extension. They are said to
denote the empty (or “null”) class, the class that has no members.
The fact that some terms have empty extension leads us to an important connection
between extension and intension—namely, that intension determines extension.
The intensional meaning of a term serves as the criterion for deciding what the extension
consists of. the intension of the word “cat” serves as the criterion for determining what
is and what is not a member of the class of cats
The Intention and Extension of terms
The distinction between intension and extension may be further illustrated by comparing
the way in which these concepts can be used to give order to random sequences
of terms .
A series of terms is in the order of in creasing intension when each term in the series
(except the first) connotes more attributes than the one preceding it. In other words, each
term in the series (except the first) is more specific than the one preceding it. (A term is
specific to the degree that it connotes more attributes.) The order of decreasing intension
is the reverse of that of increasing intension.
A series of terms is in the order of increasing extension when each term in the series
(except the first) denotes a class having more members than the class denoted by
the term preceding it. In other words, the class size gets larger with each successive
term. Decreasing extension is, of course, the reverse of this order.
The need for a stipulative definition is often occasioned by some new phenomenon
or development. For example, a few years ago the attempt was made at a certain zoo to
crossbreed tigers and lions. Because of the genetic similarity of the two species, the attempt succeeded . The names “tigon” and
“liger” were selected.
“Tigon” was taken to mean the offspring of a male tiger and a female lion, and “liger” the offspring of a male lion and a female tiger.
Another use for stipulative definitions is to set up secret codes.
Because people are continually coming up with new creations, whether it be food concoctions, inventions, modes of behavior, or
kinds of apparel, stipulative definitions are continually being introduced to name them.
Because a stipulative definition is a completely arbitrary assignment of a meaning
to a word for the first time, there can be no such thing as a “true” or “false” stipulative definition . Furthermore, for the same reason, a
stipulative definition cannot provide
any new information about the subject matter of the definiendum.
Lexical Definitions
A lexical definition is used to report the meaning that a word already has in a
language. Dictionary definitions are all instances of lexical definitions .
lexical definitions have the further purpose of eliminating the ambiguity that
would otherwise arise if one of these meanings were to be confused with another .
an expression is ambiguous when it can be interpreted as having two or more clearly
distinct meanings in a given context.
Because a lexical definition lists the various meanings that a word can have, a person
who consults such a definition is better prepared to avoid ambiguous constructions of
his or her own and to detect those of others .
Precising Definitions
In this section we will investigate some of the techniques used to produce these definitions. These
techniques may be classified in terms of the two kinds of meaning, intensional and extensional.
An extensional definition is one that assigns a meaning to a term by indicating the
members of the class that the definiendum denotes. There are at least three ways of indicating the
members of a class: pointing to them, naming them individually, and naming them in groups : The three
kinds of definitions that result are called, respectively, demonstrative or ostensive definitions,
enumerative definitions, and definitions by subclass.
Demonstrative (ostensive) definitions are probably the most primitive form of
definition. All one need know to understand such a definition is the meaning of pointing. As the
following examples illustrate, such definitions may be either partial or complete, depending on whether
all or only some of the members of the class denoted by the definiendum are pointed to:
“Chair” means this and this and this—as you point to a number of chairs, one after the
other.
Definitional Techniques
If you were attempting to teach a foreigner your own native language, and neither of
you understood a word of each other’s language, demonstrative definition would almost certainly be one of
the methods you would use.
Because demonstrative definitions are the most primitive, they are also the most limited.
In addition to the limitations affecting all extensional definitions (which will
be discussed shortly), there is the obvious limitation that the required objects be available for being pointed at
For example, the English word “license” is derived from the Latin verb
licere, which means to be permitted, and the English word “captain” derives from the
Latin noun caput, which means head
Etymological definitions have special importance for at least two reasons. The first is
that the etymological definition of a word often conveys the word’s root meaning or
seminal meaning from which all other associated meanings are derived.
Unless one is familiar with this root meaning, one often fails to place other meanings in their
proper light or to grasp the meaning of the word when it is used in its most proper sense.
For example, the word “principle” derives from the Latin word principium, which means
beginning or source.
Accordingly, the “principles of physics” are those fundamental laws that provide the
“source” of the science of physics .
Intensional (Connotative) Definitions
The second reason for the importance of etymological definitions is that if one is familiar with the etymology of
one English word, one often has access to the meaning of
an entire constellation of related words.
For example, the word “orthodox” derives from the two Greek words ortho, meaning right or straight, and doxa,
meaning belief or opinion. From this, one might grasp that “orthopedic” has to do with straight bones (originally
in children—pais in Greek means child), and that “orthodontic” has to do with straight teeth (odon in Greek
means tooth) .
Similarly, if one is familiar with the etymological definition of “polygon” (from the Greek words poly, meaning
many, and ganos meaning angle), one might grasp the meanings of “polygamy” (from gamos, meaning marriage)
and “polygraph” (from graphein, meaning to write .
Democracy means
Bureaucracy
meritocracy
An operational definition assigns a meaning to a word by specifying certain experimental procedures that
determine whether or not the word applies to a certain thing.
Intensional (Connotative) Definitions
One substance is “harder than” another if and only if one scratches the other when the
two are rubbed together.
A subject has “brain activity” if and only if an electroencephalograph shows oscillations
when attached to the subject’s head.
A “potential difference” exists between two conductors if and only if a voltmeter shows a
reading when connected to the two conductors.
A solution is an “acid” if and only if litmus paper turns red when dipped into it .
A definition by genus and difference assigns a meaning to a term by identifying a
genus term and one or more difference words that, when combined, convey the meaning of
the term being defined.
In logic, “genus” and “species” have a somewhat different meaning than they have
in biology. In logic, “genus” simply means a relatively larger class, and “species” means
a relatively smaller subclass of the genus.
The “specific difference,” or “difference,” is the attribute or attributes that distinguish the
various species within a genus.
“Daughter” means female offspring
“Ice” means frozen water