Chapter 8

Security
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Computer Networking: A
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Top-Down Approach
Thanks and enjoy! JFK/KWR 8th edition
Jim Kurose, Keith Ross
All material copyright 1996-2023
J.F Kurose and K.W. Ross, All Rights Reserved Pearson, 2020
Security: overview
Chapter goals:
 understand principles of network security:
• cryptography and its many uses beyond “confidentiality”
• authentication
• message integrity
 security in practice:
• firewalls and intrusion detection systems
• security in application, transport, network, link layers

Security: 8- 2
Chapter 8 outline
What is network security?
 Principles of cryptography
 Message integrity, authentication
 Securing e-mail
 Securing TCP connections: TLS
 Network layer security: IPsec
 Security in wireless and mobile networks
 Operational security: firewalls and IDS

Security: 8- 3
What is network security?
confidentiality: only sender, intended receiver should “understand”
message contents
• sender encrypts message
• receiver decrypts message
authentication: sender, receiver want to confirm identity of each
other
message integrity: sender, receiver want to ensure message not
altered (in transit, or afterwards) without detection
access and availability: services must be accessible and available to
users

Security: 8- 4
Friends and enemies: Alice, Bob, Trudy
 well-known in network security world
 Bob, Alice (lovers!) want to communicate “securely”
 Trudy (intruder) may intercept, delete, add messages

Alice channel data, control Bob

messages

secure secure
data data
sender receiver

Trudy
Security: 8- 5
Friends and enemies: Alice, Bob, Trudy
Who might Bob and Alice be?
 … well, real-life Bobs and Alices!
 Web browser/server for electronic transactions (e.g., on-line purchases)
 on-line banking client/server
 DNS servers
 BGP routers exchanging routing table updates
 other examples?
There are bad guys (and girls) out there!
Q: What can a “bad guy” do?
A: A lot! (recall section 1.6)
• eavesdrop: intercept messages
• actively insert messages into connection
• impersonation: can fake (spoof) source address in packet (or any
field in packet)
• hijacking: “take over” ongoing connection by removing sender or
receiver, inserting himself in place
• denial of service: prevent service from being used by others (e.g.,
by overloading resources)
Chapter 8 outline
 What is network security?
 Principles of cryptography
 Message integrity, authentication
 Securing e-mail
 Securing TCP connections: TLS
 Network layer security: IPsec
 Security in wireless and mobile networks
 Operational security: firewalls and IDS

Security: 8- 8
The language of cryptography
Alice’s Bob’s
KA encryption KB decryption
key key
plaintext encryption ciphertext decryption plaintext
algorithm algorithm

m: plaintext message
KA(m): ciphertext, encrypted with key KA
m = KB(KA(m))
Security: 8- 9
Breaking an encryption scheme
 cipher-text only attack:  known-plaintext attack:
Trudy has ciphertext she Trudy has plaintext
can analyze corresponding to ciphertext
 two approaches: • e.g., in monoalphabetic
cipher, Trudy determines
• brute force: search pairings for a,l,i,c,e,b,o,
through all keys
• statistical analysis
 chosen-plaintext attack:
Trudy can get ciphertext for
chosen plaintext

Security: 8- 10
Symmetric key cryptography
KS KS

plaintext encryption ciphertext decryption plaintext

algorithm K S(m) algorithm

symmetric key crypto: Bob and Alice share same (symmetric)

key: K
 e.g., key is knowing substitution pattern in mono alphabetic
substitution cipher
Q: how do Bob and Alice agree on key value?
Security: 8- 11
Simple encryption scheme
substitution cipher: substituting one thing for another
 monoalphabetic cipher: substitute one letter for another

plaintext: abcdefghijklmnopqrstuvwxyz

ciphertext: mnbvcxzasdfghjklpoiuytrewq

e.g.: Plaintext: bob. i love you. alice

ciphertext: nkn. s gktc wky. mgsbc

Encryption key: mapping from set of 26 letters

to set of 26 letters
Security: 8- 12
A more sophisticated encryption approach
 n substitution ciphers, M1,M2,…,Mn
 cycling pattern:
• e.g., n=4: M1,M3,M4,M3,M2; M1,M3,M4,M3,M2; ..
 for each new plaintext symbol, use subsequent substitution
pattern in cyclic pattern
• dog: d from M1, o from M3, g from M4

Encryption key: n substitution ciphers, and cyclic pattern

• key need not be just n-bit pattern

Security: 8- 13
Symmetric key crypto: DES
DES: Data Encryption Standard
 US encryption standard [NIST 1993]
 56-bit symmetric key, 64-bit plaintext input
 block cipher with cipher block chaining
 how secure is DES?
• DES Challenge: 56-bit-key-encrypted phrase decrypted (brute force) in
less than a day
• no known good analytic attack
 making DES more secure:
• 3DES: encrypt 3 times with 3 different keys

Security: 8- 14
AES: Advanced Encryption Standard
 symmetric-key NIST standard, replaced DES (Nov 2001)
 processes data in 128 bit blocks
 128, 192, or 256 bit keys
 brute force decryption (try each key) taking 1 sec on DES,
takes 149 trillion years for AES

Security: 8- 15
Public Key Cryptography
symmetric key crypto: public key crypto
 requires sender, receiver  radically different approach
know shared secret key [Diffie-Hellman76, RSA78]
 Q: how to agree on key in  sender, receiver do not
first place (particularly if share secret key
never “met”)?  public encryption key
known to all
 private decryption key
known only to receiver

Security: 8- 16
Public Key Cryptography
+
KB Bob’s public key

-
K Bob’s private key
B

plaintext encryption ciphertext decryption plaintext

message, m algorithm +
K (m) algorithm - +
B m = KB (K (m))
B

Wow - public key cryptography revolutionized 2000-year-old (previously only

symmetric key) cryptography!
• similar ideas emerged at roughly same time, independently in US and UK (classified)
Security: 8- 17
Public key encryption algorithms
requirements:
1 .
need KB ( ) and K (.) such that
+
B
-
- +
K (K (m)) = m
B B
+
2 given public key KB ,
it should be impossible to
-
compute private key K B

RSA: Rivest, Shamir, Adelson algorithm

Security: 8- 18
Prerequisite: modular arithmetic
 x mod n = remainder of x when divide by n
 facts:
[(a mod n) + (b mod n)] mod n = (a+b) mod n
[(a mod n) - (b mod n)] mod n = (a-b) mod n
[(a mod n) * (b mod n)] mod n = (a*b) mod n
 thus
(a mod n)d mod n = ad mod n
 example: x=14, n=10, d=2:
(x mod n)d mod n = 42 mod 10 = 6
xd = 142 = 196 xd mod 10 = 6
Security: 8- 19
RSA: getting ready
 message: just a bit pattern
 bit pattern can be uniquely represented by an integer number
 thus, encrypting a message is equivalent to encrypting a
number
example:
 m= 10010001. This message is uniquely represented by the decimal
number 145.
 to encrypt m, we encrypt the corresponding number, which gives a
new number (the ciphertext).

Security: 8- 20
RSA: Creating public/private key pair
1. choose two large prime numbers p, q. (e.g., 1024 bits each)

2. compute n = pq, z = (p-1)(q-1)

3. choose e (with e<n) that has no common factors with z (e, z are
“relatively prime”).
4. choose d such that ed-1 is exactly divisible by z. (in other words: ed
mod z = 1 ).
5. public key is (n,e). private key is (n,d).
K B+ K B-
Security: 8- 21
RSA: encryption, decryption
0. given (n,e) and (n,d) as computed above
1. to encrypt message m (<n), compute
c = m e mod n
2. to decrypt received bit pattern, c, compute
m = c d mod n

magic happens! m = (m e mod n)d mod n

c
Security: 8- 22
RSA example:
Bob chooses p=5, q=7. Then n=35, z=24.
e=5 (so e, z relatively prime).
d=29 (so ed-1 exactly divisible by z).
encrypting 8-bit messages.

bit pattern m me c = memod n

encrypt:
0000l000 12 24832 17

decrypt:
c cd m = cdmod n
17 481968572106750915091411825223071697 12

Security: 8- 23
Why does RSA work?
 must show that cd mod n = m, where c = me mod n
 fact: for any x and y: xy mod n = x(y mod z) mod n
• where n= pq and z = (p-1)(q-1)
 thus,
cd mod n = (me mod n)d mod n
= med mod n
= m(ed mod z) mod n
= m1 mod n
=m
Security: 8- 24
RSA: another important property
The following property will be very useful later:
- + + -
KB(K (m)) = m = K (K (m))
B B B

use public key use private key

first, followed first, followed
by private key by public key

result is the same!

Security: 8- 25
 - + + -
Why KB(K (m)) = m = K (K (m)) ?
B B B

follows directly from modular arithmetic:

(me mod n)d mod n = med mod n

= mde mod n
= (md mod n)e mod n

Security: 8- 26
Why is RSA secure?
 suppose you know Bob’s public key (n,e). How hard is it to
determine d?
 essentially need to find factors of n without knowing the two
factors p and q
• fact: factoring a big number is hard

Security: 8- 27
RSA in practice: session keys
 exponentiation in RSA is computationally intensive
 DES is at least 100 times faster than RSA
 use public key crypto to establish secure connection, then
establish second key – symmetric session key – for
encrypting data
session key, KS
 Bob and Alice use RSA to exchange a symmetric session key KS
 once both have KS, they use symmetric key cryptography

Security: 8- 28
Chapter 8 outline
 What is network security?
 Principles of cryptography
 Authentication, message integrity
 Securing e-mail
 Securing TCP connections: TLS
 Network layer security: IPsec
 Security in wireless and mobile networks
 Operational security: firewalls and IDS

Security: 8- 29
Authentication
Goal: Bob wants Alice to “prove” her identity to him
Protocol ap1.0: Alice says “I am Alice”

“I am Alice” failure scenario??

Security: 8- 30
Authentication
Goal: Bob wants Alice to “prove” her identity to him
Protocol ap1.0: Alice says “I am Alice”

in a network, Bob
can not “see”
Alice, so Trudy
simply declares
“I am Alice” herself to be Alice

Security: 8- 31
Authentication: another try
Goal: Bob wants Alice to “prove” her identity to him
Protocol ap2.0: Alice says “I am Alice” in an IP packet containing
her source IP address

Alice’s
IP address “I am Alice”
failure scenario??

Security: 8- 32
Authentication: another try
Goal: Bob wants Alice to “prove” her identity to him
Protocol ap2.0: Alice says “I am Alice” in an IP packet containing
her source IP address

Trudy can create

a packet “spoofing”
Alice’s
Alice’s address
IP address “I am Alice”

Security: 8- 33
Authentication: a third try
Goal: Bob wants Alice to “prove” her identity to him
Protocol ap3.0: Alice says “I am Alice” and sends her secret
password to “prove” it.

Alice’s Alice’s
IP addr password “I am Alice” failure scenario??
Alice’s OK
IP addr

Security: 8- 34
Authentication: a third try
Goal: Bob wants Alice to “prove” her identity to him
Protocol ap3.0: Alice says “I am Alice” and sends her secret
password to “prove” it.
playback attack:
Alice’s Alice’s
IP addr password “I am Alice” Trudy records
Alice’s packet
c e” and later
A li
’s “ I am plays it back to Bob
Aliceword OK
e ’s a ss l ic e’s
Alic ddr p A ddr
P a IPa
I

Security: 8- 35
Authentication: a modified third try
Goal: Bob wants Alice to “prove” her identity to him
Protocol ap3.0: Alice says “I am Alice” and sends her encrypted
secret password to “prove” it.

Alice’s encrypted
IP addr password “I am Alice” failure scenario??
Alice’s OK
IP addr

Security: 8- 36
Authentication: a modified third try
Goal: Bob wants Alice to “prove” her identity to him
Protocol ap3.0: Alice says “I am Alice” and sends her encrypted
secret password to “prove” it.

Alice’s encrypted
IP addr password “I am Alice” playback attack still
works: Trudy records
lic e” Alice’s packet
m A
pte d “ I a and later plays it
e ncry word e’s
OK
e ’s
Alic ddr p
a ss l
A ddric back to Bob
P a IPa
I

Security: 8- 37
Authentication: a fourth try
Goal: avoid playback attack
nonce: number (R) used only once-in-a-lifetime
protocol ap4.0: to prove Alice “live”, Bob sends Alice nonce, R
 Alice must return R, encrypted with shared secret key
“I am Alice”

R
KA-B(R) Bob know Alice is live, and
only Alice knows key to
encrypt nonce, so it must
Failures, drawbacks? be Alice!
Security: 8- 38
Authentication: ap5.0
ap4.0 requires shared symmetric key - can we authenticate
using public key techniques?
ap5.0: use nonce, public key cryptography

“I am Alice”
Bob computes
R + -
- K (K (R)) = R
K A (R) A A
and knows only Alice could
Send me your public key have the private key, that
+ encrypted R such that
K A (R) + -
K (K (R)) = R
A A
Security: 8- 39
 Authentication: ap5.0 – there’s still a flaw!
man (or woman) in the middle attack: Trudy poses as Alice (to Bob) and
as Bob (to Alice)

I am Alice I am Alice
R
-

?
K T (R)
R Where are Send me your public key
- mistakes +
K (R) KT Bob computes
A made here? + -
Send me your public key K (K T(R)) = R,
+ T
K authenticating
A Trudy as Alice
Trudy recovers m: +
Trudy recovers Bob’s m: - + K (m)
- + + m = K (K (m)) T
Bob sends a personal
m = K (K (m)) K (m) T T message, m to Alice
A A A sends m to Alice
and she and Bob meet a week encrypted with
later in person and discuss m, Alice’s public key
not knowing Trudy knows m
Security: 8- 40
Chapter 8 outline
 What is network security?
 Principles of cryptography
 Authentication, message integrity
 Securing e-mail
 Securing TCP connections: TLS
 Network layer security: IPsec
 Security in wireless and mobile networks
 Operational security: firewalls and IDS

Security: 8- 41
Digital signatures
cryptographic technique analogous to hand-written signatures:
 sender (Bob) digitally signs document: he is document owner/creator.
 verifiable, nonforgeable: recipient (Alice) can prove to someone that Bob,
and no one else (including Alice), must have signed document
 simple digital signature for message m:
• Bob signs m by encrypting with his private key KB, creating “signed” message, KB-(m)
- Bob’s private -
Bob’s message, m KB m,K B(m)
key
Dear Alice Dear Alice
Oh, how I have missed Oh, how I have missed
you. I think of you all the
Public key you. I think of you all the
time! …(blah blah blah) encryption time! …(blah blah blah)
algorithm -
Bob Bob K B(m)

Security: 8- 42
Digital signatures
-
 suppose Alice receives msg m, with signature: m, KB(m)
+ -
 Alice verifies m-signed by Bob by applying Bob’s public key KB to KB(m) then
+
checks
+ - K (K (m) ) = m.
B B

 If KB(KB(m) ) = m, whoever signed m must have used Bob’s private key

Alice thus verifies that:
 Bob signed m
 no one else signed m
 Bob signed m and not m’
non-repudiation: -

 Alice can take m, and signature KB(m) to court and prove that Bob signed m
Security: 8- 43
Message digests
computationally expensive to public-key-encrypt long messages
goal: fixed-length, easy- to-compute digital “fingerprint”
 apply hash function H to m, get fixed size message digest, H(m)

large
message H: Hash
Function H(m)
m

Hash function properties:

 many-to-1
 produces fixed-size msg digest (fingerprint)
 given message digest x, computationally infeasible to find m such that x = H(m)
Security: 8- 44
Internet checksum: poor crypto hash function
Internet checksum has some properties of hash function:
 produces fixed length digest (16-bit sum) of message
 is many-to-one
but given message with given hash value, it is easy to find another
message with same hash value:
message ASCII format message ASCII format
IOU1 49 4F 55 31 IOU9 49 4F 55 39
00.9 30 30 2E 39 00.1 30 30 2E 31
9BOB 39 42 D2 42 9BOB 39 42 D2 42
B2 C1 D2 AC different messages B2 C1 D2 AC
but identical checksums!
Security: 8- 45
Digital signature = signed message digest
Bob sends digitally signed message: Alice verifies signature, integrity
of digitally signed message:
large
message H: Hash
m Function H(m) encrypted
message digest
-
KB(H(m))
digital
Bob’s large
private signature
- (encrypt) message
key KB
m digital
Bob’s
public signature
+ (decrypt)
encrypted H: Hash key KB
message digest
+ - function
KB(H(m))
H(m) H(m)

?
equal
Security: 8- 46
Hash function algorithms
 MD5 hash function widely used (RFC 1321)
• computes 128-bit message digest in 4-step process.
• arbitrary 128-bit string x, appears difficult to construct msg m whose
MD5 hash is equal to x
 SHA-1 is also used
• US standard [NIST, FIPS PUB 180-1]
• 160-bit message digest

Security: 8- 47
 Authentication: ap5.0 – let’s fix it!!
Recall the problem: Trudy poses as Alice (to Bob) and as Bob (to Alice)

I am Alice I am Alice
R
-

?
K T (R)
R Where are Send me your public key
- mistakes +
K (R) KT Bob computes
A made here? + -
Send me your public key K (K T(R)) = R,
+ T
K authenticating
A Trudy as Alice
Trudy recovers m: +
Trudy recovers Bob’s m: - + K (m)
- + + m = K (K (m)) T
Bob sends a personal
m = K (K (m)) K (m) T T message, m to Alice
A A A sends m to Alice
and she and Bob meet a week encrypted with
later in person and discuss m, Alice’s public key
not knowing Trudy knows m
Security: 8- 48
Need for certified public keys
 motivation: Trudy plays pizza prank on Bob
• Trudy creates e-mail order:
Dear Pizza Store, Please deliver to me
four pepperoni pizzas. Thank you, Bob
• Trudy signs order with her private key
• Trudy sends order to Pizza Store
• Trudy sends to Pizza Store her public key,
but says it’s Bob’s public key
• Pizza Store verifies signature; then
delivers four pepperoni pizzas to Bob
• Bob doesn’t even like pepperoni
Security: 8- 49
Public key Certification Authorities (CA)
 certification authority (CA): binds public key to particular entity, E
 entity (person, website, router) registers its public key with CE
provides “proof of identity” to CA
• CA creates certificate binding identity E to E’s public key
• certificate containing E’s public key digitally signed by CA: CA says “this is E’s
public key”

Bob’s digital
public + signature +
key KB (encrypt) KB

CA’s
private
K
- certificate for Bob’s
Bob’s key
identifying
CA public key, signed by CA
information

Security: 8- 50
Public key Certification Authorities (CA)
 when Alice wants Bob’s public key:
• gets Bob’s certificate (Bob or elsewhere)
• apply CA’s public key to Bob’s certificate, get Bob’s public key

+
digital Bob’s
KB signature + public
(decrypt) KB key

CA’s
public +
key K CA

Security: 8- 51
Chapter 8 outline
 What is network security?
 Principles of cryptography
 Authentication, message integrity
 Securing e-mail
 Securing TCP connections: TLS
 Network layer security: IPsec
 Security in wireless and mobile networks
 Operational security: firewalls and IDS

Security: 8- 52
Secure e-mail: confidentiality
Alice wants to send confidential e-mail, m, to Bob.
KS

m K (.)
S
KS(m ) KS(m )
KS( ) . m

+ Internet - KS

KS
+ .
KB ( ) +
KB(KS )
+
KB(KS )
-
.
KB ( )

K+ K-B
Alice: B

 generates random symmetric private key, KS

 encrypts message with KS (for efficiency)
 also encrypts KS with Bob’s public key
 sends both KS(m) and K+B(KS) to Bob
Security: 8- 53
Secure e-mail: confidentiality (more)
Alice wants to send confidential e-mail, m, to Bob.
KS

m K (.)
S
KS(m ) KS(m )
KS( ) . m

+ Internet - KS

KS
+ .
KB ( ) +
KB(KS )
+
KB(KS )
-
.
KB ( )

K+
B K-B
Bob:
 uses his private key to decrypt and
recover KS
 uses KS to decrypt KS(m) to recover m

Security: 8- 54
Secure e-mail: integrity, authentication
Alice wants to send m to Bob, with message integrity, authentication

K-A K+
A
- -
m H(.) K (.)
-
A
KA(H(m)) KA(H(m)) + .
KA ( )
H(m )

+ Internet - compare

m H( ). H(m )
m

 Alice digitally signs hash of her message with her private key,
providing integrity and authentication
 sends both message (in the clear) and digital signature

Security: 8- 55
Secure e-mail: integrity, authentication
Alice sends m to Bob, with confidentiality, message integrity, authentication
K-A confidentiality
-
H(.) K (.)
- KA(H(m))
m KS
A

K (.)
KS(m )
+ S

m + Internet
message integrity, authentication
KS
+
KB ( ). +
KB(KS )
K+
B

Alice uses three keys: her private key, Bob’s public key, new symmetric key
What are Bob’s complementary actions?
Security: 8- 56
Chapter 8 outline
 What is network security?
 Principles of cryptography
 Authentication, message integrity
 Securing e-mail
 Securing TCP connections: TLS
 Network layer security: IPsec
 Security in wireless and mobile networks
 Operational security: firewalls and IDS

Security: 8- 57
Transport-layer security (TLS)
 widely deployed security protocol above the transport layer
• supported by almost all browsers, web servers: https (port 443)
 provides:
• confidentiality: via symmetric encryption
all techniques we
• integrity: via cryptographic hashing have studied!
• authentication: via public key cryptography
 history:
• early research, implementation: secure network programming, secure sockets
• secure socket layer (SSL) deprecated [2015]
• TLS 1.3: RFC 8846 [2018]

Security: 8- 58
Transport-layer security (TLS)
 widely deployed security protocol above the transport layer
• supported by almost all browsers, web servers: https (port 443)
 provides:
• confidentiality: via symmetric encryption
all techniques we
• integrity: via cryptographic hashing have studied!
• authentication: via public key cryptography
 history:
• early research, implementation: secure network programming, secure sockets
• secure socket layer (SSL) deprecated [2015]
• TLS 1.3: RFC 8846 [2018]

Security: 8- 59
Transport-layer security: what’s needed?
 let’s build a toy TLS protocol, t-tls, to see what’s needed!
 we’ve seen the “pieces” already:
 handshake: Alice, Bob use their certificates, private keys to
authenticate each other, exchange or create shared secret
 key derivation: Alice, Bob use shared secret to derive set of keys
 data transfer: stream data transfer: data as a series of records
• not just one-time transactions
 connection closure: special messages to securely close connection

Security: 8- 60
t-tls: initial handshake
t-tls handshake phase:
 Bob establishes TCP connection
TCP SYN with Alice
SYNACK  Bob verifies that Alice is really
Alice
ACK
t-tls hello  Bob sends Alice a master secret
key (MS), used to generate all
public key certificate
other keys for TLS session
KB+(MS) = EMS  potential issues:
client request • 3 RTT before client can start
receiving data (including TCP
server reply handshake)
Security: 8- 61
t-tls: cryptographic keys
 considered bad to use same key for more than one cryptographic
function
• different keys for message authentication code (MAC) and encryption
 four keys:
Kc : encryption key for data sent from client to server
Mc : MAC key for data sent from client to server
Ks : encryption key for data sent from server to client
Ms : MAC key for data sent from server to client
 keys derived from key derivation function (KDF)
• takes master secret and (possibly) some additional random data to
create new keys Security: 8- 62
t-tls: encrypting data
 recall: TCP provides data byte stream abstraction
 Q: can we encrypt data in-stream as written into TCP socket?
• A: where would MAC go? If at end, no message integrity until all
data received and connection closed!
• solution: break stream in series of “records”
• each client-to-server record carries a MAC, created using Mc
• receiver can act on each record as it arrives
 t-tls record encrypted using symmetric key, Kc, passed to TCP:

Kc( length data MAC )

Security: 8- 63
t-tls: encrypting data (more)
 possible attacks on data stream?
• re-ordering: man-in middle intercepts TCP segments and reorders
(manipulating sequence #s in unencrypted TCP header)
• replay
 solutions:
• use TLS sequence numbers (data, TLS-seq-# incorporated into MAC)
• use nonce

Security: 8- 64
t-tls: connection close
 truncation attack:
• attacker forges TCP connection close segment
• one or both sides thinks there is less data than there actually is
 solution: record types, with one type for closure
• type 0 for data; type 1 for close
 MAC now computed using data, type, sequence #

Kc( length type data MAC

)

Security: 8- 65
Transport-layer security (TLS)
 TLS provides an API that any application can use
 an HTTP view of TLS:

HTTP 1.0 HTTP/2 HTTP/2 (slimmed)

Application HTTP/3
TLS QUIC

Transport TCP TCP UDP

Network IP IP IP

HTTP/2 over TCP HTTP/2 over TCP HTTP/2 over QUIC

(which incorporates TLS)
over UDP

Security: 8- 66
TLS: 1.3 cipher suite
 “cipher suite”: algorithms that can be used for key generation,
encryption, MAC, digital signature
 TLS: 1.3 (2018): more limited cipher suite choice than TLS 1.2 (2008)
• only 5 choices, rather than 37 choices
• requires Diffie-Hellman (DH) for key exchange, rather than DH or RSA
• combined encryption and authentication algorithm (“authenticated
encryption”) for data rather than serial encryption, authentication
• 4 based on AES
• HMAC uses SHA (256 or 284) cryptographic hash function

Security: 8- 67
TLS 1.3 handshake: 1 RTT
1 client TLS hello msg:
 guesses key agreement
client hello:
protocol, parameters
1  supported cipher suites  indicates cipher suites it
 DH key agreement supports
protocol, parameters
2 server TLS hello msg chooses
server hello:  key agreement protocol,
2
 selected cipher suite parameters
 DH key agreement
protocol, parameters
 cipher suite
3  server-signed certificate
3 client:
 checks server certificate
 generates key
client server  can now make application
request (e.g.., HTTPS GET)
Security: 8- 68
TLS 1.3 handshake: 0 RTT
 initial hello message contains
client hello: encrypted application data!
 supported cipher suites
 DH key agreement • “resuming” earlier connection
protocol, parameters between client and server
 application data
• application data encrypted using
server hello:
“resumption master secret”
 selected cipher suite from earlier connection
 DH key agreement
protocol, parameters  vulnerable to replay attacks!
 application data (reply)
• maybe OK for get HTTP GET or
client requests not modifying
client server server state

Security: 8- 69
Chapter 8 outline
 What is network security?
 Principles of cryptography
 Authentication, message integrity
 Securing e-mail
 Securing TCP connections: TLS
 Network layer security: IPsec
 Security in wireless and mobile networks
 Operational security: firewalls and IDS

Security: 8- 70
IP Sec
 provides datagram-level encryption, authentication, integrity
• for both user traffic and control traffic (e.g., BGP, DNS messages)
 two “modes”: payload

payload

payload

tunnel mode:
transport mode:  entire datagram is encrypted,
authenticated
 only datagram payload is  encrypted datagram encapsulated
encrypted, authenticated in new datagram with new IP
header, tunneled to destination
Security: 8- 71
Two IPsec protocols
 Authentication Header (AH) protocol [RFC 4302]
• provides source authentication & data integrity but not confidentiality
 Encapsulation Security Protocol (ESP) [RFC 4303]
• provides source authentication, data integrity, and confidentiality
• more widely used than AH

Security: 8- 72
Security associations (SAs)
 before sending data, security association (SA) established from
sending to receiving entity (directional)
 ending, receiving entitles maintain state information about SA
• recall: TCP endpoints also maintain state info
• IP is connectionless; IPsec is connection-oriented!
200.168.1.100 193.68.2.23

SA
R1 stores for SA:
 32-bit identifier: Security Parameter Index (SPI)
 origin SA interface (200.168.1.100)  encryption key
 destination SA interface (193.68.2.23)  type of integrity check used
 type of encryption used  authentication key
Security: 8- 73
IPsec datagram
authenticated
encrypted
new IP ESP original Original IP ESP ESP
header header IP hdr datagram payload trailer auth
tunnel mode
ESP
Seq pad next
SPI padding
# length header

 ESP trailer: padding for block ciphers

 ESP header:
• SPI, so receiving entity knows what to do
• sequence number, to thwart replay attacks
 MAC in ESP auth field created with shared secret key
Security: 8- 74
ESP tunnel mode: actions payload

at R1:
R1
 appends ESP trailer to original
datagram (which includes original payload
header fields!)
 encrypts result using algorithm & key
specified by SA
 appends ESP header to front of this
encrypted quantity
 creates authentication MAC using
algorithm and key specified in SA
 appends MAC forming payload
 creates new IP header, new IP header
fields, addresses to tunnel endpoint
Security: 8- 75
IPsec sequence numbers
 for new SA, sender initializes seq. # to 0
 each time datagram is sent on SA:
• sender increments seq # counter
• places value in seq # field
 goal:
• prevent attacker from sniffing and replaying a packet
• receipt of duplicate, authenticated IP packets may disrupt service
 method:
• destination checks for duplicates
• doesn’t keep track of all received packets; instead uses a window

Security: 8- 76
IPsec security databases
Security Policy Database (SPD) Security Assoc. Database (SAD)
 endpoint holds SA state in security
 policy: for given datagram, sender association database (SAD)
needs to know if it should use IP sec  when sending IPsec datagram, R1
 policy stored in security policy accesses SAD to determine how to
database (SPD) process datagram
 when IPsec datagram arrives to R2, R2
 needs to know which SA to use examines SPI in IPsec datagram,
• may use: source and destination IP indexes SAD with SPI, processing
address; protocol number  datagram accordingly.

SAD: “how” to do it SPD: “what” to do

Security: 8- 77
Summary: IPsec services
Trudy sits somewhere between R1, R2. she
doesn’t know the keys
• will Trudy be able to see original contents of
datagram? How about source, dest IP address,
transport protocol, application port?
• flip bits without detection?
• masquerade as R1 using R1’s IP address?
• replay a datagram?

Security: 8- 78
IKE: Internet Key Exchange
 previous examples: manual establishment of IPsec SAs in IPsec endpoints:
Example SA:
SPI: 12345
Source IP: 200.168.1.100
Dest IP: 193.68.2.23
Protocol: ESP
Encryption algorithm: 3DES-cbc
HMAC algorithm: MD5
Encryption key: 0x7aeaca…
HMAC key:0xc0291f…
 manual keying is impractical for VPN with 100s of endpoints
 instead use IPsec IKE (Internet Key Exchange)

Security: 8- 79
IKE: PSK and PKI
 authentication (prove who you are) with either
• pre-shared secret (PSK) or
• with PKI (pubic/private keys and certificates).
 PSK: both sides start with secret
• run IKE to authenticate each other and to generate IPsec SAs (one
in each direction), including encryption, authentication keys
 PKI: both sides start with public/private key pair, certificate
• run IKE to authenticate each other, obtain IPsec SAs (one in each
direction).
• similar with handshake in SSL.

Security: 8- 80
IKE phases
 IKE has two phases
• phase 1: establish bi-directional IKE SA
• note: IKE SA different from IPsec SA
• aka ISAKMP security association
• phase 2: ISAKMP is used to securely negotiate IPsec pair of SAs
 phase 1 has two modes: aggressive mode and main mode
• aggressive mode uses fewer messages
• main mode provides identity protection and is more flexible

Security: 8- 81
IPsec summary
 IKE message exchange for algorithms, secret keys, SPI
numbers
 either AH or ESP protocol (or both)
• AH provides integrity, source authentication
• ESP protocol (with AH) additionally provides encryption
 IPsec peers can be two end systems, two routers/firewalls,
or a router/firewall and an end system

Security: 8- 82
Chapter 8 outline
 What is network security?
 Principles of cryptography
 Authentication, message integrity
 Securing e-mail
 Securing TCP connections: TLS
 Network layer security: IPsec
 Security in wireless and mobile networks
• 802.11 (WiFi)
• 4G/5G
 Operational security: firewalls and IDS
Security: 8- 83
802.11: authentication, encryption
mobile
AS
wired network Authentication Server
AP

Arriving mobile must:

 associate with access point: (establish) communication over
wireless link
 authenticate to network

Security: 8- 84
802.11: authentication, encryption
mobile
AS
wired network Authentication Server
AP
discovery of security capabilities
1

1 discovery of security capabilities:

 AP advertises its presence, forms of authentication and encryption provided
 device requests specific forms authentication, encryption desired
although device, AP already exchanging messages, device not yet authenticated,
does not have encryption keys
Security: 8- 85
802.11: authentication, encryption
mobile
AS
wired network Authentication Server
AP
discovery of security capabilities
1
mutual authentication, key derivation
2

2 mutual authentication and shared symmetric key derivation:

 AS, mobile already have shared common secret (e.g., password)
 AS, mobile use shared secret, nonces (prevent relay attacks), cryptographic
hashing (ensure message integrity) to authenticating each other
 AS, mobile derive symmetric session key

Security: 8- 86
802.11: WPA3 handshake
mobile AS Authentication Server
Initial shared secret Initial shared secret

NonceAS
derive session key KM-AP using initial- a
shared-secret, NonceAS, NonceM c derive session key KM-AP using initial
b
shared secret , NonceAS, NonceM
NonceM, HMAC(f(KAS-M,NonceAS))

a AS
generates NonceAS, sends to mobile
b mobile receives Nonce
 AS
• generates NonceM
• generates symmetric shared session key KM-AP using NonceAS, NonceM, and
initial shared secret
c
• sends NonceM, and HMAC-signed value using NonceAS and initial shared secret
 AS derives symmetric shared session key KM-AP Security: 8- 87
802.11: authentication, encryption
mobile
AS
wired network Authentication Server
AP
discovery of security capabilities
1
mutual authentication, key derivation
2
Shared symmetric key distribution
3

3 shared symmetric session key distribution (e.g., for AES encryption)

 same key derived at mobile, AS
 AS informs AP of the shared symmetric session

Security: 8- 88
802.11: authentication, encryption
mobile
AS
wired network Authentication Server
AP
discovery of security capabilities
1
mutual authentication, key derivation
2
shared symmetric key distribution
3
encrypted communication over WiFi
4

4 encrypted communication between mobile and remote host via AP

 same key derived at mobile, AS
 AS informs AP of the shared symmetric session

Security: 8- 89
802.11: authentication, encryption

mobile AS
wired network Authentication Server
AP

EAP TLS
EAP
EAP over LAN (EAPoL) RADIUS
IEEE 802.11 UDP/IP

 Extensible Authentication Protocol (EAP) [RFC 3748] defines end-to-end

request/response protocol between mobile device, AS

Security: 8- 90
Chapter 8 outline
 What is network security?
 Principles of cryptography
 Authentication, message integrity
 Securing e-mail
 Securing TCP connections: TLS
 Network layer security: IPsec
 Security in wireless and mobile networks
• 802.11 (WiFi)
• 4G/5G
 Operational security: firewalls and IDS
Security: 8- 91
Authentication, encryption in 4G LTE
Home Subscriber
Mobility Service (HSS)
mobile Management
Entity (MME)

Base station (BS) Visited network Home network

 arriving mobile must:

• associate with BS: (establish) communication over 4G wireless link
• authenticate itself to network, and authenticate network
 notable differences from WiFi
• mobile’s SIMcard provides global identity, contains shared keys
• services in visited network depend on (paid) service subscription in
home network
Security: 8- 92
Authentication, encryption in 4G LTE
Home Subscriber
Mobility Service (HSS)
mobile KBS-M Management
Entity (MME) K HSS-M
KHSS-M Base station (BS) Visited network Home network

 mobile, BS use derived session key KBS-M to encrypt communications

over 4G link
 MME in visited network + HHS in home network, together play role of
WiFi AS
• ultimate authenticator is HSS
• trust and business relationship between visited and home
networks
Security: 8- 93
Authentication, encryption in 4G LTE
Home Subscriber
Mobility Service (HSS)
mobile KBS-M Management
Entity (MME) K HSS-M
KHSS-M Base station (BS) Visited network Home network

attach attach AUTH_REQ (IMSI, VN info)

a

a authentication request to home network HSS

• mobile sends attach message (containing its IMSI, visited network info)
relayed from BS to visited MME to home HHS
• IMSI identifies mobile’s home network

Security: 8- 94
Authentication, encryption in 4G LTE
Home Subscriber
Mobility Service (HSS)
mobile KBS-M Management
Entity (MME) K HSS-M
KHSS-M Base station (BS) Visited network Home network

attach attach AUTH_REQ (IMSI, VN info)

a
auth token auth token
b
AUTH_RESP (auth token,xresHSS,keys)

b• HSS use shared-in-advance secret key, KHSS-M, to derive authentication

token, auth_token, and expected authentication response token, xresHSS
• auth_token contains info encrypted by HSS using KHSS-M , allowing mobile to know
that whoever computed auth_token knows shared-in-advance secret
• mobile has authenticated network
• visited HSS keeps xresHSS for later use
Security: 8- 95
Authentication, encryption in 4G LTE
Home Subscriber
Mobility Service (HSS)
mobile KBS-M Management
Entity (MME) K HSS-M
KHSS-M Base station (BS) Visited network Home network

attach attach AUTH_REQ (IMSI, VN info)

a
auth token auth token
b
AUTH_RESP (auth token,xresHSS,keys)
c resM

c• authentication response from mobile:

• mobile computes resM using its secret key to make same cryptographic
calculation that HSS made to compute xresHSS and sends resM to MME

Security: 8- 96
Authentication, encryption in 4G LTE
Home Subscriber
Mobility Service (HSS)
mobile KBS-M Management
Entity (MME) K HSS-M
KHSS-M Base station (BS) Visited network Home network

attach attach AUTH_REQ (IMSI, VN info)

a
auth token auth token
b
AUTH_RESP (auth token,xresHSS,keys)
c resM

OK, keys
OK d

d• mobile is authenticated by network:

• MMS compares mobile-computed value of resM with the HSS-computed value
of xresHSS . If they match, mobile is authenticated ! (why?)
• MMS informs BS that mobile is authenticated, generates keys for BS
Security: 8- 97
Authentication, encryption in 4G LTE
Home Subscriber
Mobility Service (HSS)
mobile KBS-M Management
Entity (MME) K HSS-M
KHSS-M Base station (BS) Visited network Home network

attach attach AUTH_REQ (IMSI, VN info)

a
auth token auth token
b
AUTH_RESP (auth token,xresHSS,keys)
c resM

OK, keys
OK d
key derivation e mobile, BS determine keys for
e encrypting data, control frames over
4G wireless channel
 AES can be used

Security: 8- 98
Authentication, encryption: from 4G to 5G
 4G: MME in visited network makes authentication decision
 5G: home network provides authentication decision
• visited MME plays “middleman” role but can still reject

 4G: uses shared-in-advance keys

 5G: keys not shared in advance for IoT

 4G: device IMSI transmitted in cleartext to BS

 5G: public key crypto used to encrypt IMSI

Security: 8- 99
Chapter 8 outline
 What is network security?
 Principles of cryptography
 Authentication, message integrity
 Securing e-mail
 Securing TCP connections: TLS
 Network layer security: IPsec
 Security in wireless and mobile networks
 Operational security: firewalls and IDS

Security: 8- 100
Firewalls
firewall
isolates organization’s internal network from larger
Internet, allowing some packets to pass, blocking others

administered public
network Internet
trusted “good guys” untrusted “bad guys”
firewall
Security: 8- 101
Firewalls: why
prevent denial of service attacks:
 SYN flooding: attacker establishes many bogus TCP connections, no
resources left for “real” connections
prevent illegal modification/access of internal data
 e.g., attacker replaces CIA’s homepage with something else
allow only authorized access to inside network
 set of authenticated users/hosts
three types of firewalls:
 stateless packet filters
 stateful packet filters
 application gateways

Security: 8- 102
Stateless packet filtering
Should arriving
packet be allowed
in? Departing
packet let out?

 internal network connected to Internet via router firewall

 filters packet-by-packet, decision to forward/drop packet based on:
• source IP address, destination IP address
• TCP/UDP source, destination port numbers
• ICMP message type
• TCP SYN, ACK bits
Security: 8- 103
Stateless packet filtering: example
Should arriving
packet be allowed
in? Departing
packet let out?

 example 1: block incoming and outgoing datagrams with IP protocol field = 17

and with either source or dest port = 23
• result: all incoming, outgoing UDP flows and telnet connections are blocked
 example 2: block inbound TCP segments with ACK=0
• result: prevents external clients from making TCP connections with internal
clients, but allows internal clients to connect to outside

Security: 8- 104
Stateless packet filtering: more examples
Policy Firewall Setting
no outside Web access drop all outgoing packets to any IP
address, port 80
no incoming TCP connections, drop all incoming TCP SYN packets to any
except those for institution’s public IP except 130.207.244.203, port 80
Web server only.
prevent Web-radios from eating up drop all incoming UDP packets - except
the available bandwidth. DNS and router broadcasts.
prevent your network from being drop all ICMP packets going to a
used for a smurf DoS attack. “broadcast” address (e.g.
130.207.255.255)
prevent your network from being drop all outgoing ICMP TTL expired traffic
tracerouted

Security: 8- 105
Access Control Lists
ACL: table of rules, applied top to bottom to incoming packets: (action,
condition) pairs: looks like OpenFlow forwarding (Ch. 4)!
source dest source dest flag
action protocol
address address port port bit
outside of any
allow 222.22/16 TCP > 1023 80
222.22/16
allow outside of 222.22/16
TCP 80 > 1023 ACK
222.22/16
outside of
allow 222.22/16 UDP > 1023 53 ---
222.22/16
allow outside of 222.22/16
UDP 53 > 1023 ----
222.22/16
deny all all all all all all
Security: 8- 106
Stateful packet filtering
 stateless packet filter: heavy handed tool
• admits packets that “make no sense,” e.g., dest port = 80, ACK bit set, even though no
TCP connection established:

action source dest protocol source dest flag

address address port port bit
allow outside of 222.22/16
TCP 80 > 1023 ACK
222.22/16

 stateful packet filter: track status of every TCP connection

• track connection setup (SYN), teardown (FIN): determine whether incoming,
outgoing packets “makes sense”
• timeout inactive connections at firewall: no longer admit packets

Security: 8- 107
Stateful packet filtering
ACL augmented to indicate need to check connection state table before
admitting packet
action source dest proto source dest flag check
address address port port bit connection
outside of any
allow 222.22/16 TCP > 1023 80
222.22/16

allow outside of
222.22/16
222.22/16
TCP 80 > 1023 ACK x
outside of
allow 222.22/16 UDP > 1023 53 ---
222.22/16

allow outside of 222.22/16

UDP 53 > 1023 ----
x
222.22/16

deny all all all all all all

Security: 8- 108
Application gateways
 filter packets on host-to-gateway
telnet session application
application data as well gateway
router and filter
as on IP/TCP/UDP fields.
 example: allow select
internal users to telnet gateway-to-remote
host telnet session
outside

1. require all telnet users to telnet through gateway.

2. for authorized users, gateway sets up telnet connection to dest host
• gateway relays data between 2 connections
3. router filter blocks all telnet connections not originating from gateway
Security: 8- 109
Limitations of firewalls, gateways
 IP spoofing: router can’t know  filters often use all or nothing
if data “really” comes from policy for UDP
claimed source  tradeoff: degree of
 if multiple apps need special communication with outside
treatment, each has own app. world, level of security
gateway  many highly protected sites
 client software must know still suffer from attacks
how to contact gateway
• e.g., must set IP address of
proxy in Web browser

Security: 8- 110
Intrusion detection systems
 packet filtering:
• operates on TCP/IP headers only
• no correlation check among sessions
 IDS: intrusion detection system
• deep packet inspection: look at packet contents (e.g., check character
strings in packet against database of known virus, attack strings)
• examine correlation among multiple packets
• port scanning
• network mapping
• DoS attack

Security: 8- 111
Intrusion detection systems
multiple IDSs: different types of checking at different locations
firewall

internal
network
Internet

IDS Web demilitarized

server DNS zone
sensors FTP server
server

Security: 8- 112
Network Security (summary)
basic techniques…...
 cryptography (symmetric and public key)
 message integrity
 end-point authentication
…. used in many different security scenarios
 secure email
 secure transport (TLS)
 IP sec
 802.11, 4G/5G
operational security: firewalls and IDS
Security: 8- 113