Lecture 6 Transfer Pricing
Lecture 6 Transfer Pricing
TRANSFER PRICING
Relevant Reading
Transfer Price
Market Price
Required:
Compare the likely decisions of the headoffice and Division Q
regarding the special offer.
EXAMPLE
• The Division Q manager will reject the special offer since the division’s
marginal cost is £52 (TP = £40 + £12 (own VC). The offer price gives
negative contribution of £12.
• The head office will like the offer accepted since the group marginal
cost is £37 [£25 (Div. K) + £12 (Div. Q)]. A special offer of £40
generates £3 positive contribution to the group.
• Head office may impose acceptance but Div. Q manager will resist it
since it compromised divisional autonomy principle, and the impact on
divisional performance.
TRANSFER PRICING
COST BASED PRICE
• FULL COST / VARIABLE COST +: TP set at full or Variable cost plus
increases the TP by a mark-up.
• Will motivate the transferring division as it allows profit to be made possibly
in both the transferring and receiving divisions.
• Problems:
– Can create dysfunctional behaviour/decisions since buying division can make profit
maximising decision but which may not maximise group profit, particularly if the final selling
price falls.
– Both full cost+ and variable cost + approaches result in fixed costs and profits (mark-up)
being treated as marginal costs in receiving division. Therefore receiving division has wrong
data for economic decision for the group should it wish to.
– Mark up may lead to dysfunctional behaviour + how do you fix mark up?
TRANSFER PRICING
NEGOTIATED PRICE
Pro fit 3 10 13
TRANSFER PRICING GUIDELINE
• Minimum Transfer Price – TP from Selling division’s position
• The minimum = Marginal Cost + Opportunity Cost (OC)
• i.e. the value of the best alternative foregone when a course of a action is taken.
• There will be opportunity cost if the seller is operating at full capacity (i.e. no spare
capacity available).