Scribd
Upload
10 views

Lecture 09

This document discusses biological terrorism and security. It provides an overview of historical events involving biological weapons. Potential agents that could be used in a bioterrorist attack are described, including bacteria, viruses, and toxins. Means of delivering these agents and monitoring for their detection are addressed. The document outlines security issues and procedures for responding to hazardous materials emergencies according to OSHA regulations. Personal protective equipment for emergency responders is also summarized.

Uploaded by

Terry Leung
Copyright
© © All Rights Reserved
We take content rights seriously. If you suspect this is your content, claim it here.
Available Formats
Download as PPT, PDF, TXT or read online on Scribd
10 views

Lecture 09

This document discusses biological terrorism and security. It provides an overview of historical events involving biological weapons. Potential agents that could be used in a bioterrorist attack are described, including bacteria, viruses, and toxins. Means of delivering these agents and monitoring for their detection are addressed. The document outlines security issues and procedures for responding to hazardous materials emergencies according to OSHA regulations. Personal protective equipment for emergency responders is also summarized.

Uploaded by

Terry Leung
Copyright
© © All Rights Reserved
We take content rights seriously. If you suspect this is your content, claim it here.
Available Formats
Download as PPT, PDF, TXT or read online on Scribd
You are on page 1/ 42

BIOLOGICAL TERRORISM

AND SECURITY

EMD545b
Lecture #9
Biological Terrorism
Intentional or threatened release of viruses,
bacteria, fungi or toxins derived from living
organisms to produce disease or death in humans,
animals, or plants
Outline
• Historical events
• Potential agents of bioterrorism
• Means of delivery
• Monitoring and detection
• Hazardous materials/emergency response
• Security issues
• Suspicious materials
• Discussion and comments
Historical Events
6th Cent. BC: Rye ergot, plant toxins

1300’s: Plague-infected corpses catapulted into


defenders during Siege of Kaffa

1500’s: Strategic value of smallpox-laden blankets


during Spanish conquest of Central and
South America

1700-1800’s: Smallpox-laden blankets repeatedly traded


to North American Indians
More Recent Events
WW II: Japan’s Unit 731

1940’s-1969: US offensive use research

1972: Biological Weapons Convention Treaty

1978: Assassination by KGB using ricin

1979-1982: “Yellow-rain” by Soviet Army in Afghanistan

1979: Accidental Soviet anthrax release at bioweapons


facility in Sverdlovsk - ca. 80 cases, 60+ deaths
Most Recent Events
1984: Purposeful Salmonella contamination of
food by Oregon religious cult - 700+ cases

1995: Sarin released in Tokyo subway religious


cult
12 deaths, thousands exposed

1998: Vengeful use of radiolabeled saxitoxin


stolen from Brown University laboratory

2001-2002: Anthrax distribution in/on US Mail


1995 Tokyo Subway Sarin Release by Aum Shinrikyo
Why BioWeapons?
• Fear and hysteria
• Overwhelm medical resources
• Can be lethal or cause severe incapacitation
• Delayed effects (but acute from toxins)
• Relatively easy to obtain, produce, and use
• Potential for secondary infections
• Multiple routes for exposure
• Compared to chemical and nuclear materials:
– Very difficult to detect in field
The Perfect BW
• Highly pathogenic/toxic
• Highly infectious
• Incapacitation may be preferable to lethality
• Symptoms confused with non-BW diseases
• Transmissible by desired route of exposure
• Stable for packaging and delivery
• Easily harvested, selected, or created
• Vaccination/treatment only available to aggressor
Epidemiology of BW Attack
• Case chronology differences from natural epidemics
• Observations of signs/symptoms likely most
sensitive surveillance means
• Reportable symptoms and diseases

Time
Factors for Disease Transmission

• Presence of pathogenic organism


• Viable
• Infectious dose (minimum [ ] and qty)
• Susceptible host
• Effective route of exposure
Potential Agents of Bioterrorism
• Bacterial agents
• Viral Agents
• Biological/biologically-derived toxins
• Recombinant organisms
Bacterial Agents
• Single cell microscopic organisms typically with
diameter 0.5 - 1.0 um
• Capable of causing disease by infection and/or
producing toxins
• Spore forms often very
stable in environment
Anthrax
• Bacillus anthracis (spore former)
• Cutaneous, inhalational, and ingestion forms
• Common among livestock and livestock product workers
• Spore-form very stable
• Flu-like illness, respiratory failure, shock, meningitis
• Highest CFR from inhalation (90-100%)
• Antibiotic treatment must
be early to be effective
• Vaccine available
Plague
• Yersinia pestis
• Transmitted by flea bites or aerosol droplets
• Wild rodents are natural reservoir
• Bubonic and pneumonic forms (“black death”)
• Swollen lymph nodes, rapid progressive pneumonia
• High case fatality rates
• Vaccine and antibiotic
therapies available
Tularemia
• Francisella tularensis (“rabbit fever”)
• All routes of exposure, including vector
• Low infectious dose
• Fever, chills, headache, weight loss, pneumonia
• Moderate case fatality rate untreated
• Vaccine and antibiotic therapies
Brucellosis
• Brucella spp. (abortus, melitensis, ovix, others)
• Zoonotic, primarily from infected mammals and
contaminated milk/other dairy products
• Highly infectious by aerosolization
• Variable symptoms, but many “flu-like”
Viral Agents
• Very small particles (ca. 0.02 - 0.2 um diameter)
• Not truly “living”
• Outer shell and DNA or RNA, but no organelles for
metabolism or reproduction
• Rely exclusively upon host
cells - “parasites”
• Typically very short lived
outside of host or vector
Smallpox
• Variola major
• Highly contagious by aerosols
• Moderately high case fatality rate (~30%)
• Incapacitating malaise, fever, vomiting, lesions and
pustules
• WHO initiative claims eradication (except for stored
specimens in US and Russia)
• Quarantine essential
• Vaccine available
Viral Equine Encephalites
• Venezuelan, Western, and Eastern
• Vector & aerosol transmission (vector primary in nature)
• Fever, headache, malaise, nausea/vomiting, neurological
damage from encephalitis
• Highly incapacitating, high lethality
(CFR for EEE 50 - 75%)
• Experimental vaccines
• Palliative care only
Viral Hemorrhagic Fevers
• e.g., Marburg, Ebola, Congo-Crimean
• BL4 agents
• Poorly understood, difficult to work with
• Arthropod vectors, contact, possible aerosol routes
• Natural epidemics with severe consequences - marked by
fever, malaise, headache, internal hemorrhaging, multi-
organ failure
• Seriously incapacitating
• Very high CFRs: 25 - 90%
• Palliative care only
Biological Toxins
• Any toxic substance or compound produced by an
animal, plant, or microorganism
• Typically high MW proteins or toxic chemicals
• Hazardous by most routes of exposure - contact
facilitated by dermal penetrants like DMSO
• Range of effects from tissue necrosis to nervous
system interruption
• Most are readily inactivated by heat, steam, or
common chemicals
Comparative Toxicity
Agent LD50 (ug/kg) Source
Botulinum toxin 0.001 Bacterium

Tetanus toxin 0.002 Bacterium

Diptheria toxin 0.10 Bacterium

Ricin 3 Plant (Castor bean)

a-Conotoxin 5 Cone snail

Saxitoxin 10 Marine dinoflagellate

Sarin 100 Chemical/nerve agent

T-2 toxin 1,210 Fungal mycotoxin


Delivery and Release
• Acquisition/production in sufficient
quantity/concentration to achieve desired outcome
• Stability under storage conditions
• Packaging
• Actual delivery and release
• Exposure
Routes of Exposure
• Airborne - inhalational
• Food/water supplies - ingestion
• Contact - dermal
• Vector - percutaneous
Sources of BW Agents
• Field, clinical, and veterinary samples
• Type culture collections
• Commercial distributors
• Foreign laboratories and suppliers
• Museums and universities
• Genetically engineered (rDNA) or selected
Monitoring and Detection
• Comparison vs. chemical, explosive, and radioactive
• Medical signs and symptoms - healthcare providers
become first line of surveillance
• Laboratory analysis
– Antibody titers
– Cultures
– DNA fingerprinting
• Field tests
• Future/emerging methods (GC/MS, semi-conductors)
HAZWOPER
• OSHA standard (29 CFR Part 1910.120)
• “Hazardous waste operations and emergency
response”
• Comprehensive requirements for written safety
programs, training, protective equipment, field
exercises, medical surveillance, and at least annual
re-certifications
HAZWOPER/
Emergency Response
• First responders
• Incident commander and IC system
• Site/scene health and safety officer
• Technician-level responders
• Potential crime scene investigation issues
• Other specialists as-needed
HAZWOPER/
Emergency Response
• All-hazards approach
– Biological, chemical, and radiological
• Site/perimeter controls
• Work zones
• Decontamination systems
Knowledge and Information
• Incident/facility information
• Eyewitnesses critical
• On-going process
• Monitoring and predictions where possible
• Weather and local environmental factors
HAZMAT Ensemble Levels

Low
D Safety shoes and glasses/goggles, work gloves,
and work clothing
C Above plus more enclosing garments, and air
purifying respirator
B Above plus even more enclosing garments, and
upgrading of respiratory protection to self-
contained breathing apparatus (SCBA)
A Fully encapsulating garments, SCBA
High
HAZMAT Ensembles

B
C

D A
Key Selection Factors for
Protective Clothing
• Contaminants and concentration
• Consequences of equipment failure
• Permeation/penetration resistance
• Anticipated duration of use
• Exposure type (e.g., incidental contact, immersion)
• Anticipated work activities (e.g., dexterity, tactility)
• Cost, size, availability, manufacturer’s
differences
Personal Protective Equipment
• Low on controls hierarchy
• Advantages
• Disadvantages
– No one ensemble
– Selection criteria
– Training
– Formal “fitting” process
– Maintenance and inspection
– Periodic review
Medical Interventions
• e.g., pre-exposure immunizations, blocker
administration, and immediate post-exposure
treatment
• Excellent protection but for only very limited
suite of exposures
• Duration of protection highly variable
• Potential contraindications of treatment
• Timing of administration critical
Biosecurity Issues
• “Select Agents” transfer rule
• Revisions now include “possession”
• Basic requirements:
– Registration of entity and individuals possessing, using,
storing, etc. “select” biological agents and toxins
– Inventory controls
– Physical security of storage and use
– Periodic inspections
– Emergency procedures and notifications
– Individual background/security clearances
Related Security Issues
• Building perimeter controls and access
• Public vs. non-public areas
• Mechanical equipment and HVAC intakes
– Collateral benefits of modern filtered HVAC systems
• Identify and report strangers/suspicious persons
Suspicious Materials
• Mail, packages, objects
• Return address, condition, and appearance (leaking,
discoloration, odor, etc)
• Expected or unexpected? Verify source if possible.
• Follow recommended procedures.

???
Sources for More Information
• US Government:
Occupational Safety and Health Administration
Nuclear Regulatory Commission
National Institute for Occupational Safety and Health
Centers for Disease Control and Prevention
Federal Emergency Management Agency
Federal Bureau of Investigation/Department of Justice
• Advisory Groups:
American Biological Safety Association
American Industrial Hygiene Association

American and International Red Cross


Discussion and Comments

You might also like