Admissions and Confessions

- Arpan Acharya
  Statement, admission and confession
 S.17 – statement which suggests an inference as to fact in issue or
relevant fact. Made by specific people under specific
circumstances.
 The implication of the statement must clear and conclusive before
we dispense with the need for proof. No doubt or ambiguity.
 Statements should be read as a whole. The whole statement of
Introduction which the admission was a part must be read (and produced)
together.
 They must be comprehensive and go the whole hog in giving
requisite evidence of the fact in issue or relevant fact.
 Admissions can only be regarding facts not law.
 Why are admissions admissible? 1) waiver of proof, 2) statements
against the interests of the maker, 3) proving contradictions in a
party’s case, and 4) evidence of truth
  Formal - s.58 – no further proof of judicial admissions is
required. Hence informal admissions are sometimes called
evidentiary admissions since evidence must be given of the
same.
 May be recorded explicitly or implicitly
 Stand on a higher footing and can constitute waiver of proof
and serve as foundations of rights of parties.
Types  Informal – can be made to anyone who has to then prove them.
Happen in the ordinary course of life, business or casual
conversation. Can occur in journals, diaries, account books, etc.
 Can be by conduct as well. Examples – promise to marry, not
replying to letter which had an insinuation of promise to marry,
illustration g to section 8
  S.21 – one cannot prove admissions for oneself. Would defeat
the purpose of admissions. Everyone could prove their own
case.
 When are the exceptions applicable and why are they
Who can prove applicable.

admissions  The log book in the illustration is a day to day record of all the
route details of the ship.
 Bodily feelings, etc are something one cannot lie about if they
are associated with conduct in a natural way
  What is a confession? Two possible views – James Stephens’ view that
confession is an admission made by a person charged with a crime stating or
suggesting an inference that he committed a crime.
 The other view – Pakala Narayan Swamy (the prevalent view in India) – no
statement containing any self-exculpatory matter can amount to a confession.
A confession must be either in terms of the offence or substantially in terms of
the facts that constitute the offence. An admission, even of a gravely
incriminating fact still does not amount to a confession.
 Confessions are voluntary and they can be made only by the accused. Co-
Confessions accused can be taken under s.30
 Confessions may be judicial and extra-judicial. If judicial they come with
s.164 CrPC.
 Extra judicial confessions are a weak form of evidence and may be used with
certain safeguards. 1) the witness must state the exact words of the accused or
in words as nearly as possible, 2) Prosecution should provide motive, occasion
or reason for the confession by the accused, 3) why did the accused choose
that person?, 4) credible witness, 5) other facts and circumstances, 6) must be
proved by prosecution that it was voluntary
  The question was of s. 27 of IEA and art. 14. But there was a lot of deliberation on
s.24-s.27 and how they are basically read as one long provision with s.27 being the
proviso. Essentially the reason for challenge was the distinction made between
persons in custody and those not in custody.
 The case was one of murder where the murder weapon was found as a result of the
accused’s statement to the police. There was corroboration by the fact that two
witnesses had seen him near the water tank where he had placed the murder weapon.
There were also his words to the victim the day before the murder.
State of UP v  Paras 7-9 – Scheme of s.24 to s.27 is laid out along with s.162 of the CrPC. S. 25 and

Deoman
26 are so that people who are vulnerable are not exploited in police custody. It is
clear that those who are in custody that require the most protection. Other than the

Upadhyaya
police taking you into custody, if you approach the police to give information
voluntarily, you are deemed to be in custody.
 There must be a balance between punishing crime and protecting those who may be
compelled to give confessional statements.
 ‘Accused of any offence’ – anyone against whom evidence is lead falls under this
phrase, whether they were formally charged while making the statement or not.
 Para 56 – protection scheme for both witnesses and accused described, and hence the
scope of s.27
  He murdered his cousin, cousin’s wife, aunt and nephew in a
single morning and went and confessed to the police. The only
question was that of the confessional FIR.
 There was no other substantive evidence. The legal question
thus is…can the confession be split into confessional and non

Aghnoo confessional sections?

 A confession may consist of parts which have nothing to do
Nagesia v State with the killing itself but speak of circumstances, motive,

of Bihar preparation, opportunity, etc (that is also why you have s.27
and s.30). In that case, can one part be severed from another
and read as such?
 Even if we were to accept constructive custody for the purpose
of s.27, it is difficult to hold him guilty with what is left of the
statement.
  The accused made a confessional statement to an Excise
officer. There was no other evidence of sufficient weightage to
convict the accused. The question then is; who is a police
officer under s.25 of IEA?
 Under the Excise Act, an excise officer shall be ‘deemed to be
an officer charge of the police station with respect to area to
which his appointment extends’
Raja Ram  Para 10 – Police power is not the totality of the powers enjoyed
Jaiswal v State by the officer but whether such powers would facilitate the
obtaining a confession by virtue of the privileges and powers
of Bihar conferred on that position.
 The mischief contemplated by s.25 is an egregious one and thus
the interpretation must be to give effect to the substance rather
than a formal one.
  No assumption of compulsion simply because accused was in
custody.
 The mere questioning by a police officer resulting in a
voluntary statement which is incriminatory is not compulsion
 To be a witness is not the same as ‘furnishing evidence’.

Kathi Kalu Merely giving thumb impression, handwriting samples or

showing parts of body for identification is not ‘to be a witness’.
Oghad It means to impart knowledge in respect of relevant facts orally
or in writing, both in court and outside.
 The accused must have stood in the character of the accused
when ‘they were a witness against themselves’. It is not enough
that they should become the accused anytime after the
statement is made.
  Involuntary administration of narcoanalysis, brain mapping,
polygraph tests – is it ultra vires art 20(3)? Along with this, we
have sections 161, 313 and 315 CrPC and sections 24-27 of
IEA
 Whether the investigative use of such techniques creates a
likelihood of self-incrimination? Is it confined to trial stage, the

Selvi v State of right? It is not. If police could interrogate to the point of self-
incrimination, this right would be meaningless.
Karnataka  Who can invoke the protection of art 20(3)? Same as Kathi
Kalu Oghad. But the protection afforded by s.161 is wider.
 What is incrimination? Do the techniques advocated and the
results derived from such amount to testimonial compulsion?
Difference between ‘testimonial’ and ‘physical’.
  S. 30, s. 133 and s. 114(b) – confessions of co-accused, testimony of approver
and evidentiary presumptions
 Is the confession of a co-accused ‘evidence’ under the IEA? It is not obligatory to
take it into account according to this and the words of s.30. It is very weak
evidence and must be treated as such by the court. No oath or cross-examination
since it is not at trial.
 The way to look at it, is to first look at all the other evidence that has been

Haricharan marshalled and see if it is enough to sustain a conviction. Only if it is, the court
may look at the confession to reassure itself. The court cannot begin by an

Kurmi & Jogia examination of the co-accused confession.

 The best kind of confessional material (in terms of weightage) in this sense
Hajam v State would be natural, cogent, sequential with detailed references and containing
meticulous descriptions of men, material, date, times and events.
 What happens if one of them retracts? How does it affect the person themselves
and the other co-accused? Nothing said in the Act about retraction. The court has
to ascertain the truth of the confession by corroborating with other evidence in
case of the person himself. In case of the co-accused, the court has to see if it is
corroborated in material particulars i.e not just the factum of the crime but the
other accused’s connection to it.
  Who is an accomplice – people who participate as principals or accessories
both. Someone who turns prosecution witness in return for not being
prosecuted is an approver. While technically no longer a co-accused, the
position will still be that of someone who participated in the crime. Hence
the caution in accepting testimony. Does not stand at the same level as a
normal witness.

Rameshwar v  S.133 and s.114(b) – is there a contradiction? Not really if you take ‘may’

State of
into account. No irrebuttable presumption arises. Yet the court is entitled to
presume that if the testimony is not corroborated in material particulars, it

Rajasthan may not be relied on. “A rule of prudence so universally accepted that it
has become almost a rule of law to not accept an accomplice’s
uncorroborated testimony.”
 Corroborated in material particulars – some other independent evidence
which makes it likely that 1) story is true and reasonable to act upon, 2)
identifying the accused as one who committed the offence, 3) some
circumstantial or direct evidence of his connection with the crime, and 4)
one accomplice cannot ordinarily corroborate another.