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426 Fall10 Lect27

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19 views10 pages

426 Fall10 Lect27

Uploaded by

Phan Thế Duy
Copyright
© © All Rights Reserved
We take content rights seriously. If you suspect this is your content, claim it here.
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CS 426 (Fall 2010)

Quantum Cryptography

Fall 2010/Lecture 27 1
• Quantum Cryptography
– based on a survey by Hoi-Kwong Lo.
http://www.hpl.hp.com/techreports/97/HPL-97-151.htm
l
– And on
http://en.wikipedia.org/wiki/Quantum_key_distribution

Fall 2010/Lecture 27 2
Quantum Mechanics & Cryptography

• Quantum communication
– protecting communication using principles of physics

• Quantum computing
– building quantum computers
– developing quantum algorithms
• e.g., Shor’s efficient algorithm for factoring

Fall 2010/Lecture 27 3
Properties of Quantum Information
• Heisenberg Uncertainty Principle (HUP)
– If there is a particle, such as an electron, moving
through space, it is impossibly to measure both its
position and momentum precisely.
• A quantum state is described as a vector
– e.g., a photon has a quantum state,
– quantum cryptography often uses photons in 1 of 4
polarizations (in degrees): 0, 45, 90, 135
Basis 0 1
Encoding 0 and 1  (rectilinear)  
under two basis  (diagonal)  

Fall 2010/Lecture 27 4
Properties of Quantum Information
• No way to distinguish which of  a photon is
• Quantum “no-cloning” theorem: an unknown quantum
state cannot be cloned.
• Measurement generally disturbs a quantum state
– one can set up a rectilinear measurement or a diagonal
measurement
• a rectilinear measurement disturbs the states of those
diagonal photons having 45/135
• Effect of measuring

Basis    
    or   or 
  or   or   

Fall 2010/Lecture 27 5
Quantum Key Agreement
• Requires two channels
– one quantum channel (subject to adversary and/or
noises)

– one public channel (authentic, unjammable, subject to


eavesdropping)
• Protocol does not work without such a channel

Fall 2010/Lecture 27 6
The Protocol [Bennet & Brassard’84]

1. Alice sends to Bob a sequence of photons, each of


which is chosen randomly and independently to be in
one of the four polarizations
– Alice knows their states

2. For each photon, Bob randomly chooses either the


rectilinear based or the diagonal base to measure
• Bob record the bases he used as well as the measurement

Fall 2010/Lecture 27 7
The Protocol [Bennet & Brassard’84]

3. Bob publicly announces his basis of


measurements
4. Alice publicly tells Bob which measurement
basis are correct and which ones are not
• For the photons that Bob uses the correct
measurement, Alice and Bob share the same results

See the following page for an example:


http://en.wikipedia.org/wiki/Quantum_key_distribution

Fall 2010/Lecture 27 8
The Protocol [Bennet & Brassard’84]

5. Alice and Bob reveals certain measurement


results to see whether they agree
• to detect whether an adversary is involved or the
channel is too noisy

• Why attackers fail


– Any measurement & resending will disturb the
results with 50% probability

Fall 2010/Lecture 27 9
Additional Steps
• Information reconciliation
– Figure out which bits are different between Alice and
Bob
– Conducted over a public channel
• Privacy amplification
– Reducing/eliminating Eve’s partial knowledge of a key

Fall 2010/Lecture 27 10

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