Company Management and Related Issues I
Company Management and Related Issues I
related issues
Lecture 1
Lecture presentation
• Introduction
• Company organs
• The shareholders as an organ
• The board of directors
• Directors, appointment
• Powers and duties of directors: an overview
Lecture outcomes
By the end of this lecture, leaners must be able to:
• Define the organs of the company.
• Explain the concept of a director
• Outline the process of director appointment.
• Explain the concept of directors’ powers.
• Explain the Turquand rule.
• Discuss the applicability of the Turquand rule in company
management.
Introduction
• Who manages a company?
• What is to direct or controlling a company?
• who appoints a director?
• Who can be a director?
• What powers do company directors have?
• What are the duties of company directors?
• This discussion deals with company management, representation,
organs agents/functionaries, their authority and related matters.
• A company as defined is a legal entity existing separately from its
management and owners.
• This concept of a company as a juristic person is only a fiction.
• This necessitates entrusting of company’s functions and
responsibilities into the hands of its representative organs such as
the board of directors.
• This organ manages the company’s affairs.
• A company cannot act on its own person (Salomon v Salomon and
Company Ltd [1897] AC 22 (HL) 30, 50).
• A company can only act through organs (company
brains) which lays down policy and agents (limbs)
acting within their powers and authority.
• In courts cases involving the company (litigation) , the
courts requires a copy of a directors’ resolution
sanctioning the litigation and an affidavit from its legal
representative stating that he/she was duly appointed
as legal representative.
• Signatures on documents on behalf of the company are
deemed to be that of the company itself eg. on cheques
or other negotiable instruments.
Company organs
• The acts of a director are valid and binds the company regardless of any
defect in the way the director was appointed.
• A director may however not bind the company on ordinary rules of agency
if: (i) the person claiming to be a director was never appointed as such (N/B)
There is a difference between a defective appointment and where there
was never an appointment at all.
• (ii). If the board exceeds it authority, the company will not be bound. This is
because the company is only bound by authorised acts.
• However, the company may be bound by estoppel.
• Here, a third party dealing with the company through an unauthorised
director would be trying to show that the company itself is the one which
mislead him to believe hat the director had authority therefore by such
misrepresentation on the company should be held bound to the
unauthorised acts.
• The party relying on estoppel to bind the company need
to establish the following;
• (i). he was induced to enter into the contract in
question by the agent being represented as occupying a
certain position in the company,
• (ii). That the representation was made by person with
actual authority to manage the company, and,
• (iii). That the contract was one that a person in the
position of the agent was held out as occupying would
usually have authority to occupy.
• Freeman and Lockyer v Buckburst Park Properties (1964).- a
director who was never appointed as a managing director assumes
powers of management with the company’s approval.
• Subsequent thereto, he entered into a contract with another.
• The company was held liable to
• the performance in terms of the contract because the nature of the
contract was within the scope of authority of a managing director of
a company.
• The other party was not obliged to enquire whether the person was
properly appointed .it was enough that the Board had allowed the
Director to act as an MD thus misleading the other party to think
that he had authority.
The Turquand rule
• The principle in the Royal British Bank v Turquand is relevant
here. This principle is known as the TURQUAND RULE.
• if the articles do not prohibit authority, but requires that certain
internal pre-requisites be met before authority exists, and an
outsider dealing with the company cannot with reference to the
public documents (articles, memorandum) to which she/he has
access, establish compliance with such pre-requisites for
authority to exist, the company will be bound to any
transaction/contract involving such a third party regardless of
lack of compliance with the pre-requisites for authority.
• The rule protects bona fide outsiders in that they may assume
that the pre-requisites where complied with.
• Examples of such pre-requisites are;
• Directors may only after prior approval of the general
meeting, conclude loans exceeding a stated amount.
• From the articles we cannot know whether the general
meeting did consent or even whether it was required to.
• The board may delegate powers to committees,
managing directors etc. We cannot by reading the
articles, find out whether person X was appointed
to that position and if so, the power/ authority in
question was in fact delegated to X.
• In terms of the Turquand rule, a bona fide third party
may assume compliance unless (i). He/she knows of no
compliance.
• (ii). the articles prohibit a particular transaction.
• (iii). the third party ought to have suspected lack of authority or
no-compliance, eg. If a transaction clearly does not fall within
the normal functions of the purported agent, or is clearly
outside the company’s capacity (ultra vires).
• The Turquand rule cannot held an outsider to bind the company,
if he/she have realised that the transaction is beyond the usual
scope of the official (purported agent) concerned.
Conclusion
• Define a director
• Under what circumstances can the shareholders
preform the functions of directors?
• What powers does company directors have?
• Explain the Turquand rule.
References
• Companies and other Business Entities Act
[Chapter 24: 31].
• Freeman and Lockyer v Buckhurst Park
Properties (Mangal) Ltd [1964] 2 QB 480.
• Royal British Bank v Turquand (1856) 6 E&B 327.
• Salomon v Salomon and Company Ltd [1897] AC
22 (HL).