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Security-040330-cryptography

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Cryptography

CSSE 490 Computer Security


Mark Ardis, Rose-Hulman Institute
March 30, 2004

1
Overview
 Classical Cryptography
 Cæsar cipher
 Vigenère cipher
 DES
 Public Key Cryptography
 Diffie-Hellman
 RSA
 Cryptographic Checksums
 HMAC

2
Cryptosystem
 Quintuple (E, D, M, K, C)
 M set of plaintexts
 K set of keys
 C set of ciphertexts
 E set of encryption functions e: M  K  C
 D set of decryption functions d: C  K  M

3
Example
 Example: Cæsar cipher
 M = { sequences of letters }
 K = { i | i is an integer and 0 ≤ i ≤ 25 }
 E = { Ek | k  K and for all letters m,
Ek(m) = (m + k) mod 26 }
 D = { Dk | k  K and for all letters c,
Dk(c) = (26 + c – k) mod 26 }
 C=M

4
Attacks
 Opponent whose goal is to break cryptosystem is
the adversary
 Assume adversary knows algorithm used, but not key
 Three types of attacks:
 ciphertext only: adversary has only ciphertext; goal is to
find plaintext, possibly key
 known plaintext: adversary has ciphertext, corresponding
plaintext; goal is to find key
 chosen plaintext: adversary may supply plaintexts and
obtain corresponding ciphertext; goal is to find key

5
Basis for Attacks

 Mathematical attacks
 Based on analysis of underlying mathematics
 Statistical attacks
 Make assumptions about the distribution of letters,
pairs of letters (digrams), triplets of letters
(trigrams), etc. (called models of the language).
Examine ciphertext, correlate properties with the
assumptions.

6
Classical Cryptography
 Sender, receiver share common key
 Keys may be the same, or trivial to derive from
one another
 Sometimes called symmetric cryptography
 Two basic types
 Transposition ciphers
 Substitution ciphers
 Combinations are called product ciphers

7
Transposition Cipher
 Rearrange letters in plaintext to produce
ciphertext
 Example (Rail-Fence Cipher)
 Plaintext is HELLO WORLD
 Rearrange as
HLOOL
ELWRD
 Ciphertext is HLOOL ELWRD

8
Attacking the Cipher

 Anagramming
 If 1-gram frequencies match English frequencies,
but other n-gram frequencies do not, probably
transposition
 Rearrange letters to form n-grams with highest
frequencies

9
Example
 Ciphertext: HLOOLELWRD
 Frequencies of 2-grams beginning with H
 HE 0.0305
 HO 0.0043
 HL, HW, HR, HD < 0.0010
 Implies E follows H

10
Example
 Arrange so the H and E are adjacent
HE
LL
OW
OR
LD
 Read off across, then down, to get original
plaintext

11
Substitution Ciphers

 Change characters in plaintext to produce


ciphertext
 Example (Cæsar cipher)
 Plaintext is HELLO WORLD
 Change each letter to the third letter following it (X
goes to A, Y to B, Z to C)
 Key is 3, usually written as letter ‘D’
 Ciphertext is KHOOR ZRUOG

12
Attacking the Cipher

 Exhaustive search
 If the key space is small enough, try all possible
keys until you find the right one
 Cæsar cipher has 26 possible keys
 Statistical analysis
 Compare to 1-gram model of English

13
The Result
 Most probable keys, based on , the correlation with
expected frequencies of letters in English :
 i = 6, (i) = 0.0660
 plaintext EBIIL TLOLA

 i = 10, (i) = 0.0635


 plaintext AXEEH PHKEW

 i = 3, (i) = 0.0575
 plaintext HELLO WORLD

 i = 14, (i) = 0.0535


 plaintext WTAAD LDGAS

 Only English phrase is for i = 3


 That’s the key (3 or ‘D’)
14
Cæsar’s Problem

 Key is too short


 Can be found by exhaustive search
 Statistical frequencies not concealed well
 So make it longer
 Multiple letters in key
 Idea is to smooth the statistical frequencies to
make cryptanalysis harder

15
Vigenère Cipher
 Like Cæsar cipher, but use a phrase
 Example
 Message THE BOY HAS THE BALL
 Key VIG
 Encipher using Cæsar cipher for each letter:
key VIGVIGVIGVIGVIGV
plain THEBOYHASTHEBALL
cipher OPKWWECIYOPKWIRG

16
Relevant Parts of Tableau

G I V  Tableau shown has relevant


A G I V rows, columns only
B H J W  Example encipherments:
E L M Z  key V, letter T: follow V
H N P C column down to T row
(giving “O”)
L R T G  Key I, letter H: follow I
O U W J
column down to H row
S Y A N (giving “P”)
T Z B O
Y E H T

17
Establish Period
 Kaskski: repetitions in the ciphertext occur when
characters of the key appear over the same
characters in the plaintext
 Example:
key VIGVIGVIGVIGVIGV
plain THEBOYHASTHEBALL
cipher OPKWWECIYOPKWIRG
Note the key and plaintext line up over the repetitions
(underlined). As distance between repetitions is 9, the period
is a factor of 9 (that is, 1, 3, or 9)

18
Attacking the Cipher

 Approach
 Establish period; call it n
 Break message into n parts, each part being
enciphered using the same key letter
 Solve each part
 You can leverage one part from another
 We will show each step

19
The Target Cipher

 We want to break this cipher:


ADQYS MIUSB OXKKT MIBHK IZOOO
EQOOG IFBAG KAUMF VVTAA CIDTW
MOCIO EQOOG BMBFV ZGGWP CIEKQ
HSNEW VECNE DLAAV RWKXS VNSVP
HCEUT QOIOF MEGJS WTPCH AJMOC
HIUIX

20
Repetitions in Example
Letters Start End Distance Factors
MI 5 15 10 2, 5
OO 22 27 5 5
OEQOOG 24 54 30 2, 3, 5
FV 39 63 24 2, 2, 2, 3
AA 43 87 44 2, 2, 11
MOC 50 122 72 2, 2, 2, 3, 3
QO 56 105 49 7, 7
PC 69 117 48 2, 2, 2, 2, 3
NE 77 83 6 2, 3
SV 94 97 3 3
CH 118 124 6 2, 3

21
Estimate of Period

 OEQOOG is probably not a coincidence


 It’s too long for that
 Period may be 1, 2, 3, 5, 6, 10, 15, or 30
 Most others (7/10) have 2 in their factors
 Almost as many (6/10) have 3 in their factors
 Begin with period of 2  3 = 6

22
Check on Period

 Index of coincidence is probability that two


randomly chosen letters from ciphertext will
be the same
 Tabulated for different periods:
1: 0.066 5: 0.044
2: 0.052 10: 0.041
3 : 0.047 Large: 0.038
4 : 0.045

23
Splitting Into Alphabets

alphabet 1: AIKHOIATTOBGEEERNEOSAI
alphabet 2: DUKKEFUAWEMGKWDWSUFWJU
alphabet 3: QSTIQBMAMQBWQVLKVTMTMI
alphabet 4: YBMZOAFCOOFPHEAXPQEPOX
alphabet 5: SOIOOGVICOVCSVASHOGCC
alphabet 6: MXBOGKVDIGZINNVVCIJHH
 ICs (#1, 0.069; #2, 0.078; #3, 0.078; #4, 0.056;

#5, 0.124; #6, 0.043) indicate all alphabets


have period 1, except #4 and #6; assume statistics
off

24
Frequency Examination

ABCDEFGHIJKLMNOPQRSTUVWXYZ
1 31004011301001300112000000
2 10022210013010000010404000
3 12000000201140004013021000
4 21102201000010431000000211
5 10500021200000500030020000
6 01110022311012100000030101
Letter frequencies are (H high, M medium, L low):
HMMMHMMHHMMMMHHMLHHHMLLLLL

25
Begin Decryption
 First matches characteristics of unshifted alphabet
 Third matches if I shifted to A
 Sixth matches if V shifted to A
 Substitute into ciphertext (bold are substitutions)
ADIYS RIUKB OCKKL MIGHK AZOTO EIOOL
IFTAG PAUEF VATAS CIITW EOCNO EIOOL
BMTFV EGGOP CNEKI HSSEW NECSE DDAAA
RWCXS ANSNP HHEUL QONOF EEGOS WLPCM
AJEOC MIUAX

26
Look For Clues
 AJE in last line suggests “are”, meaning second
alphabet maps A into S:
ALIYS RICKB OCKSL MIGHS AZOTO
MIOOL INTAG PACEF VATIS CIITE
EOCNO MIOOL BUTFV EGOOP CNESI
HSSEE NECSE LDAAA RECXS ANANP
HHECL QONON EEGOS ELPCM AREOC
MICAX

27
Next Alphabet
 MICAX in last line suggests “mical” (a common
ending for an adjective), meaning fourth alphabet
maps O into A:
ALIMS RICKP OCKSL AIGHS ANOTO MICOL
INTOG PACET VATIS QIITE ECCNO MICOL
BUTTV EGOOD CNESI VSSEE NSCSE LDOAA
RECLS ANAND HHECL EONON ESGOS ELDCM
ARECC MICAL

28
Got It!

 QI means that I maps into U, as Q is always


followed by U:
ALIME RICKP ACKSL AUGHS ANATO
MICAL INTOS PACET HATIS QUITE
ECONO MICAL BUTTH EGOOD ONESI
VESEE NSOSE LDOMA RECLE ANAND
THECL EANON ESSOS ELDOM ARECO
MICAL

29
One-Time Pad
 A Vigenère cipher with a random key at least as
long as the message
 Provably unbreakable
 Why? Look at ciphertext DXQR. Equally likely to correspond
to plaintext DOIT (key AJIY) and to plaintext DONT (key
AJDY) and any other 4 letters
 Warning: keys must be random, or you can attack the
cipher by trying to regenerate the key
 Approximations, such as using pseudorandom number
generators to generate keys, are not random

30
Overview of the DES
 A block cipher:
 encrypts blocks of 64 bits using a 64 bit key
 outputs 64 bits of ciphertext
 A product cipher
 basic unit is the bit
 performs both substitution and transposition (permutation)
on the bits
 Cipher consists of 16 rounds (iterations) each with a
round key generated from the user-supplied key

31
Generation of Round Keys
 Round keys are 48 bits
key
each
PC-1

C0 D0

LSH LSH
PC-2 K1

C1 D1

LSH LSH
PC-2 K16

32
Encipherment
input

IP

L0 R0

 f K1

L1 = R 0 R1 = L0  f(R0 , K1)

R16 = L 15 ­ f (R15, K16) L =R


16 15

IPŠ1

output

33
The f Function

RiŠ1 (32 bits) Ki (48 bits)

RiŠ1 (48 bits)  6 bits into each

S1 S2 S3 S4 S5 S6 S7 S8

4 bits out of each


P

32 bits

34
Controversy

 Considered too weak


 Diffie, Hellman said in a few years technology
would allow DES to be broken in days
 Design using 1999 technology published
 Design decisions not public
 S-boxes may have backdoors

35
Undesirable Properties
 4 weak keys
 They are their own inverses
 12 semi-weak keys
 Each has another semi-weak key as inverse
 Complementation property
 DESk(m) = c  DESk´(m´) = c´
 S-boxes exhibit irregular properties
 Distribution of odd, even numbers non-random
 Outputs of fourth box depends on input to third box

36
Differential Cryptanalysis
 A chosen ciphertext attack
 Requires 247 plaintext, ciphertext pairs
 Revealed several properties
 Small changes in S-boxes reduce the number of pairs
needed
 Making every bit of the round keys independent does not
impede attack
 Linear cryptanalysis improves result
 Requires 243 plaintext, ciphertext pairs

37
DES Modes
 Electronic Code Book Mode (ECB)
 Encipher each block independently
 Cipher Block Chaining Mode (CBC)
 XOR each block with previous ciphertext block
 Requires an initialization vector for the first one
 Encrypt-Decrypt-Encrypt Mode (2 keys: k, k´)
 c = DESk(DESk´–1(DESk(m)))
 Encrypt-Encrypt-Encrypt Mode (3 keys: k, k´, k´´) c
= DESk(DESk´(DESk´´(m)))

38
Current Status of DES
 Design for computer system, associated software
that could break any DES-enciphered message in a
few days published in 1998
 Several challenges to break DES messages solved
using distributed computing
 NIST selected Rijndael as Advanced Encryption
Standard (AES), successor to DES
 Designed to withstand attacks that were successful on DES

39
Public Key Cryptography
 Two keys
 Private key known only to individual
 Public key available to anyone
 Public key, private key inverses
 Idea
 Confidentiality: encipher using public key,
decipher using private key
 Integrity/authentication: encipher using private
key, decipher using public one

40
Requirements

1. It must be computationally easy to encipher


or decipher a message given the
appropriate key
2. It must be computationally infeasible to
derive the private key from the public key
3. It must be computationally infeasible to
determine the private key from a chosen
plaintext attack

41
Diffie-Hellman

 Compute a common, shared key


 Called a symmetric key exchange protocol
 Based on discrete logarithm problem
 Given integers n and g and prime number p,
compute k such that n = gk mod p
 Solutions known for small p
 Solutions computationally infeasible as p grows
large

42
Algorithm
 Constants: prime p, integer g ≠ 0, 1, p–1
 Known to all participants
 Anne chooses private key kAnne, computes public
key KAnne = gkAnne mod p
 To communicate with Bob, Anne computes Kshared
= KBobkAnne mod p
 To communicate with Anne, Bob computes Kshared
= KAnnekBob mod p
 It can be shown these keys are equal

43
Example
 n = gk mod p
 Assume p = 53 and g = 17
 Alice chooses kAlice = 5
 Then KAlice = 175 mod 53 = 40
 Bob chooses kBob = 7
 Then KBob = 177 mod 53 = 6
 Shared key:
 KBobkAlice mod p = 65 mod 53 = 38
 KAlicekBob mod p = 407 mod 53 = 38

44
RSA

 Exponentiation cipher
 Relies on the difficulty of determining the
number of numbers relatively prime to a large
integer n

45
Background
 Totient function (n)
 Number of positive integers less than n and relatively prime
to n
 Relatively prime means with no factors in common with n
 Example: (10) = 4
 1, 3, 7, 9 are relatively prime to 10
 Example: (21) = 12
 1, 2, 4, 5, 8, 10, 11, 13, 16, 17, 19, 20 are relatively prime
to 21

46
Algorithm
 Choose two large prime numbers p, q
 Let n = pq; then (n) = (p–1)(q–1)
 Choose e < n such that e relatively prime to (n).
 Compute d such that ed mod (n) = 1
 Public key: (e, n); private key: d
 Encipher: c = me mod n
 Decipher: m = cd mod n

47
Example: Confidentiality
 Take p = 7, q = 11, so n = 77 and (n) = 60
 Alice chooses e = 17, making d = 53
 Bob wants to send Alice secret message HELLO
(07 04 11 11 14)
 0717 mod 77 = 28
 0417 mod 77 = 16
 1117 mod 77 = 44
 1117 mod 77 = 44
 1417 mod 77 = 42
 Bob sends 28 16 44 44 42

48
Example
 Alice receives 28 16 44 44 42
 Alice uses private key, d = 53, to decrypt message:
 2853 mod 77 = 07
 1653 mod 77 = 04
 4453 mod 77 = 11
 4453 mod 77 = 11
 4253 mod 77 = 14
 Alice translates message to letters to read HELLO
 No one else could read it, as only Alice knows her private
key and that is needed for decryption

49
Example:
Integrity/Authentication
 Take p = 7, q = 11, so n = 77 and (n) = 60
 Alice chooses e = 17, making d = 53
 Alice wants to send Bob message HELLO (07 04 11 11 14) so
Bob knows it is what Alice sent (no changes in transit, and
authenticated)
 0753 mod 77 = 35

 0453 mod 77 = 09

 1153 mod 77 = 44

 1153 mod 77 = 44

 1453 mod 77 = 49

 Alice sends 35 09 44 44 49

50
Example
 Bob receives 35 09 44 44 49
 Bob uses Alice’s public key, e = 17, n = 77, to decrypt message:
 3517 mod 77 = 07
 0917 mod 77 = 04
 4417 mod 77 = 11
 4417 mod 77 = 11
 4917 mod 77 = 14
 Bob translates message to letters to read HELLO
 Alice sent it as only she knows her private key, so no one else could have
enciphered it
 If (enciphered) message’s blocks (letters) altered in transit, would not decrypt
properly

51
Example: Both
 Alice wants to send Bob message HELLO both enciphered and
authenticated (integrity-checked)
 Alice’s keys: public (17, 77); private: 53

 Bob’s keys: public: (37, 77); private: 13

 Alice enciphers HELLO (07 04 11 11 14):


 (0753 mod 77)37 mod 77 = 07

 (0453 mod 77)37 mod 77 = 37

 (1153 mod 77)37 mod 77 = 44

 (1153 mod 77)37 mod 77 = 44

 (1453 mod 77)37 mod 77 = 14

 Alice sends 07 37 44 44 14

52
Security Services

 Confidentiality
 Only the owner of the private key knows it, so text
enciphered with public key cannot be read by
anyone except the owner of the private key
 Authentication
 Only the owner of the private key knows it, so text
enciphered with private key must have been
generated by the owner

53
More Security Services

 Integrity
 Enciphered letters cannot be changed
undetectably without knowing private key
 Non-Repudiation
 Message enciphered with private key came from
someone who knew it

54
Warnings
 Encipher message in blocks considerably
larger than the examples here
 If 1 character per block, RSA can be broken using
statistical attacks (just like classical
cryptosystems)
 Attacker cannot alter letters, but can rearrange
them and alter message meaning
 Example: reverse enciphered message of text ON to get
NO

55
Cryptographic Checksums
 Mathematical function to generate a set of k
bits from a set of n bits (where k ≤ n).
 k is smaller then n except in unusual
circumstances
 Example: ASCII parity bit
 ASCII has 7 bits; 8th bit is “parity”
 Even parity: even number of 1 bits
 Odd parity: odd number of 1 bits

56
Example Use

 Bob receives “10111101” as bits.


 Sender is using even parity; 6 1 bits, so character
was received correctly
 Note: could be garbled, but 2 bits would need to have
been changed to preserve parity
 Sender is using odd parity; even number of 1 bits,
so character was not received correctly

57
Definition
 Cryptographic checksum function h: AB:
1. For any x  A, h(x) is easy to compute
2. For any y  B, it is computationally infeasible
to find x  A such that h(x) = y
3. It is computationally infeasible to find x, x´  A
such that x ≠ x´ and h(x) = h(x´)
– Alternate form (Stronger): Given any x  A, it is
computationally infeasible to find a different
x´  A such that h(x) = h(x´).

58
Collisions
 If x ≠ x´ and h(x) = h(x´), x and x´ are a
collision
 Pigeonhole principle: if there are n containers for
n+1 objects, then at least one container will have
2 objects in it.

59
Keys
 Keyed cryptographic checksum: requires
cryptographic key
 DES in chaining mode: encipher message, use
last n bits. Requires a key to encipher, so it is a
keyed cryptographic checksum.
 Keyless cryptographic checksum: requires no
cryptographic key
 MD5 and SHA-1 are best known; others include
MD4, HAVAL, and Snefru

60
HMAC
 Make keyed cryptographic checksums from keyless
cryptographic checksums
 Useful for distribution to countries that prohibit
keyed cryptography

61
Key Points
 Two main types of cryptosystems: classical and
public key
 Classical cryptosystems encipher and decipher
using the same key
 Or one key is easily derived from the other
 Public key cryptosystems encipher and decipher
using different keys
 Computationally infeasible to derive one from the other
 Cryptographic checksums provide a check on
integrity

62

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