LABOUR AND EMPLOYMENT LAW ppt-1
LABOUR AND EMPLOYMENT LAW ppt-1
LAW
BY.BARISO DUKALE
INTRODUCTION
• Definition and Nature of Labor Law
• is a branch of law that sets rules of law governing an
individual employment relationship between
employee(s) and employer and determining the rights
and obligations of the parties thereto by prescribing
minimum standard working conditions, and/or also
governing collective labor/employment relations by
establishing conducive legal frame-work for collective
bargaining or for other concerted activity so as to
enable the parties to obtain better terms and conditions
than the minimum set by the law
Nature of Labor Law
A.Tripartism:- Tripartite Nature of the Relationship at all Levels/Dimensions
• is not a simple bilateral relation between employer and employees, but a
sophisticated tripartite interaction at different levels between employees,
employers, associations, and Government (in all its three capacities, i.e. legislative,
judiciary, and executive).
B. Inherent Conflicts
These four different parties have their own various interests building the
core element of the relationship supposed to be governed by Labor
Law. These conflicting interests in this relationship are as follows:-
N.B. In the FCSP regime, there is no similar rule or arrangement for the modification of
• Suspension of Employment Contract
“Suspension” refers to temporary suspension of rights and
obligations (Art. 17(1)).
Suspension normally results in full legal interruption of rights and
obligations, i.e. (1) the worker’s obligation to work, and (2) the
employer’s obligation to pay wage, other benefits and allowances
(Art. 17(2)).
However, the law under Article 17(2) allows also for partial
interruption of rights to be set by law or by collective agreement.
So, a collective agreement can be made, for example as per Article
27(4), for a suspension of a worker from work but with pay and
other benefits.
This is partial interruption because only the worker’s obligation to
work is suspended.
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Grounds of Suspension:-
1.Legal Suspension: here there are exhaustive legal grounds under Art 18;
2.Contractual Suspension:
(a)suspension for the purpose of investigation of offense as per Art. 27(4) and the details
of the conditions of the suspension shall be agreed by collective agreement; and
(b)suspension as penalty for offenses as agreed in collective agreement.
Duty to Report: Article 19 imposes a reporting duty on the MoLSA only for
two suspension cases as provided under Articles 17(5) and (6).
Non-compliance to this obligation has a criminal consequence as provided
under Art. 184(1) (c).
The roles of MoLSA are provided under Articles 20 and 21 as follows:-
1.Determination of grounds for suspension within 3 days (Art. 20(1)).
2.Issuance of order for resumption of the work and for back-payment of wage
(Art. 20(2)).
3.Fixing duration of suspension up to maximum of 90 days. (Art. 21(1)).
4.Deciding (?) on the fact that the employer can not resume its activities within 90
days period (Art. 21(2)).
In the FCSP, the ground for suspension is provided only in
relation to offense and for the purpose of investigation process
Article 70 of the FCSP clearly provides four grounds for
which suspension measure can be taken.
The three basic departures of the FCSP from the labor law
regime with regard to suspension are:
(1) no similar grounds of suspension as provided under Article
18 of the labor law;
(2) suspension for investigation purpose is a legal right for a
government institution, not contractual right;
(3) the suspension period under FCSP is for 2 months.
Termination of Employment Under the Two Legal Regimes
Types of Termination under Labor Proc. 377/03:
According to Article 23(1) there are four types of terminations;
namely,
A. Termination by Law: Article 24 exhaustively lists down the
following five legal grounds the occurrence of which will by
operation of law terminate contract of employment:-
1.Expiry of Definite period/completion of piece of work
2.Death of worker
3.Retirement of the worker per law
4.Ceasing of operation permanently for any cause
5.Worker's partial or total permanent incapacity and inability to
work
• Here, it is again important to note that Article 23(2) clearly
spells out that amalgamation, division, or transfer of
ownership of an undertaking shall not have the effect of
terminating a contract of employment.
• The issue of privity of contract can also be raised here and
you can question the fairness of the law to oblige the new
owner to continue with workers employed by previous
owner. Do you agree with the rationale of the law? Why?
Why not?
B. Termination by Agreement: Article 25 of the Proclamation provides two conditions for the validity
of Termination by Agreement:-
Requirement in writing (Art. 25(2)):- It is important to note here that this legal requirement is
only for the agreement to bind the worker; otherwise, it is clear from the wordings of the
provision that the employer can be bound even by oral agreements. As a legal requirement in
writing it shall fulfill all the necessary elements of written form in the civil code general contract
provisions.
No legal effect for waiver by worker of his/her legal rights (Art.25(1)):-This rule deviates from
the general contract principle of freedom of contract of the parties and it seems that unqualifiedly
the provision makes any minor waiver invalid even if made for a better and favorable exchange
made to the employee.
Example: if a worker entitled for Birr 10,000.00 by way of severance pay agrees for termination
of his/her employment contract provided that the employer pays him/her Birr 100,000.00 by way
of separation package and also agrees that he/she will not claim any other right what so ever, then
it seems that the latter part of the agreement is invalid. And so, according to Article 25(1) the
worker seems to be entitled to further claim his severance pay of Birr 10,000.00. Do you think
this is fair? What do you suggest to make the provision equally protective to both parties?
It is important to note the difference between the legal effects of the two provisions above, i.e.
Art. 25(1) makes invalid only the waiver provision of the termination agreement whereas Article
C. Termination by Employer: The provisions governing
termination by the employer are from Article 26 up to Article 29.
The major legitimate grounds for termination are categorized in
to categories and are provided under Article 26(1) as follows:-
The worker's conduct.
Capacity to do the work.
Organizational or operational requirements of the undertaking.
• Depending on the type of category of termination, the
termination can be either with notice for the latter two categories
above whereas or without notice for the former category above.
1.
This provision deals with the list of illegitimate grounds of termination,
and from the list one can easily see that the listed items are related
with the violation of basic rights of the worker
• As a result it seems that the legal consequences of violating this
provision are different from the other types of unlawful terminations,
i.e. terminations which are not made contrary to Art. 26(2) but are
unlawful because they are made to the contrary of Articles 27, 28 or
29.
• The consequences of these unlawful terminations are which are
purely civil remedies
• However, violating Article 26(2) has also criminal consequence as
provided under Article 184(2) (d) of the Proclamation.
2. Termination with out notice: Art. 27(1) provides the grounds for as it
entitles the employer to terminate without notice
The important phrase in this provision is the one which says “unless
otherwise determined by a collective agreement” and this phrase as
well as sub-article 27(1) (k) give the employer and the Labor Union
the right to come up with similar grounds of terminations but favorable
ones (absence for 7 consecutive working days) or other new grounds
of terminations (example: for a pilot missing four scheduled flights).
How do you reconcile the phrase ‘without notice’ in Article 27(1) with
the phrase ‘written notice’ in Article 27(2)?
The Amharic version of the provision correctly denotes the intention of
the lawmaker and thus the phrase ‘written notice’ in the latter
provision should be understood just as a written communication or
notification, rather than as advance notice requirement
• Article 27(3) provides for 30 working days prescription period, and the
rationale behind seems to prevent any abuse of power or biased actions against
the worker.
• The important phrase in this provision is “ f ”. So, what is important is not the
date of the commission of the offense, but the date when the employer knows
the ground for termination
• Here, it also important to note that it is not the mere information or report that
matters, but the investigated result clearly letting the employer to know that
there is a ground for termination.
Article 27(4), which permits the parties to incorporate a provision in the
collective agreement for the “conditions” (not “grounds”) of suspension before
terminating a worker. This is a mere permissive provision that unless the parties
agree otherwise the employer will not have a legal right to suspend a worker on
the pretext of an investigation
The rationale behind this provision seems that according to Article 17
suspension will have automatically the effect of suspending wage and thus the
lawmaker does not want to let the employer have legal right for suspension and
Basically there are 2 categories of grounds for termination with notice by the employer;
namely, and
I. (Capacity and Situations affecting the worker (Art. 28(1)):- provides two
categories of cases about loss of capacity and situations affecting the worker:-
L -Manifest Loss of capacity or lack of skill of the worker (para.(a));
-Health or disability and inability to carry out obligation permanently (para.(b));
Situations affecting the worker
a. Unwillingness to move/transfer to a place where the undertaking moves (para.(c));
b. Cancellation of worker's post for good cause & no possibility of
transfer (para.(a));
Here, we can raise the following legal issues: How can we show that the person really loses
capacity or skill under article 28(1) (a) to distinguish same from article 27(1) (e), where the
worker has the potential? Is it possible to show this? What is the difference between article
28(1) (b) and article 24(5)? Should the health problem under article 28(1) (b) approved by
board? Is it fair for the undertaking to give notice in the case of article 28(1) (c)? Why? What
constitutes good cause under article 28(1) (d)?
ii. Reduction of work force
There are basically four scenarios/cases enabling an employer to undertake reduction of
workforce (Art. 28(2) & 28(3)):-
(Due to Organizational or operational requirements of undertaking)
1.Any event entailing direct and permanent cessation of worker’s activities (partial or whole);
2.Fall in demand resulting in the reduction of volume of work and profit;
3.Altering work methods or introducing new technology to raise productivity; and
4. Cancellation of post affecting at least 10% of the workers.
Definition of reduction of work force (Art. 29(1)):- The important legal issue that
may arise from the provisions of Articles 29(1) & (2) is as to whether the term
“workers” therein does also include managerial employees for the purpose of
applying reduction of work force.
Example: an employer had 100 workers, out of which 10 are managerial employees,
and due to any of the reasons under Article 28(2) and (3), the employer decided to
reduce 10 workers, but out of them one is to be a managerial employee. The Labor
Union argues that the legal requirement of 10% is not fulfilled as the employer is
reducing 9 non-managerial employees. On the other hand, the employer argues that
the term “workers” under Article 29(1) and (2) includes managerial employees.
What will be your judgment if the case is submitted to you? Try to analyze this
issue in line with the definition of “worker” in the proclamation and other relevant
provisions.
• Legal procedural requirements (Art. 29(3)):-
Consultation with union/representative
Rules of priority
In view of the clarity and exhaustive list of priority
provided by the law, what do you think will be the necessity
of consultation with the Union? Do you think this provision
allows the employer and the Union to negotiate on this
matter? Try to see this issue in line with Article 129(3) of
the Proclamation. What do you think is the exact intention
of the legislator on this matter?
Exception for construction work (Art. 30):- normal decrease
in volume of construction work due to successive
completion.
Termination by Worker (Art. 31 & 32):(Resignation)
With 30 days notice (art. 31 ).(Ordinary Resignation)
Sanction for not complying with notice requirement (art.45)
maximum of 30 days wages of the worker.
With out notice (art. 32(1)):- In some jurisdictions, they call such kind of
termination as Constructive dismissal because the worker is forced to
terminate his/her employment relation due to the employer’s commission or
inaction affecting the worker’s basic rights. Acknowledged by our Labor
Proclamation as entitling the worker for termination without notice:-
1.Commission of an act against the worker contrary to his dignity, moral, or
any other act punishable under the penal code;
2.Employer’s failure to act to avert imminent danger threatening worker’s
safety or health after being informed;
3.Repeated failure of the employer to fulfill its basic obligations.
Obligation to inform (art. 32(2)).
Period of limitation (Art. 33):- after 15 working days from the date on which
the act occurred or ceased to exist.
Notice of Termination (Arts. 34-35):
1.In writing (art. 34(1)).
2.Specification of reason and effective date of termination (art. 34(1)).
3.The rule is to give notice to the worker in person (art. 34(2)).
4.Exception to the rule-affixing the notice on notice board in the work place of the worker for 10
consecutive days (Art. 34(2)).
5.To employer/Representative/office (art. 34(3)).
6.Restriction of giving termination notice during suspension period (art. 34(4)):-The language of
the English version of 34(4) seems to be erroneous and that of the Amharic version is the
correct one. What do you think is the rationale behind this restriction? It is important to note
that this restriction does not seem to apply for termination without notice cases. So, if an
employer has learnt that a worker has committed an offense which entails termination, then it
can terminate him/her even if they are under suspension period as per art. 17. But what is the
logic behind the law to prohibit an employer from terminating a worker with notice while it
does not have similar prohibition for cases of termination without notice?
7.Notice period (art. 35):-
o According to service (art. 35(1).
o For definite period (art. 35(2):- to be agreed in the contract, but it seems that in the absence
of such agreement, the rule under art. 35(1) shall also apply for definite period contract.
o Commencement of notice period (art. 35(3):- starting from next working day.
8.Obligations during notice period (art. 35(4)):- Rights and obligations shall continue
Effects & Consequences of Termination:
Basically, there are five major legal effects and consequences of termination
1. Payment of Wages & Other Payments (Arts 36 -38)
o The Rule (art. 36, 1st sentence before the proviso)
o Exceptions (art. 36, the proviso and art. 37): The Right to Lien(Legal claim) and
amount in dispute.
o Effect of Delay (art. 38):- Up to max of 3 months wages.
2. Severance Pay (39)
What is severance pay? = it is a sort of to protect the worker from financial instability
Arguments in favor and against severance pay:-
For Against
Protection from financial instability -Not Employer’s responsibility
Profit sharing - Contrary to business justification
Contribution of worker - Why for termination due to force
majeure?
Incentive/motivations - Why for a resigning worker?
The grounds for severance pay can be either lawful or unlawful
terminations
Lawful terminations
- Ceasing of operation due to bankruptcy
- For reduction of force
- Termination due to disability(partial or total and certified by medical board)
- Sickness.
- Death.
- Resignations after 5 yrs of service or due to HIV/AIDS.
- Retirement age, provided no
- Pension
- Provident fund
Unlawful terminations
- 39(1) (b)
- Constructive dismissals 39(1) (d) & (e):-
Query: what about 32(1) (c)?Why?
Amount of calculation (Art. 40)
3.Compensation Payment:- mainly applicable for unlawful terminations:-
• Arts. 40(3) & 41 & 44:- sort of compensation in lieu of notice
• Art. 43(1) & (2) & (3), Alternative Remedy: maximum for six months wage.
• Art. 43(3): two legal issues: (i) what is the extent of the court’s discretion? Is it appeal able?
(ii) can the execution court decide compensation or shall the employee go back to the initial
court for judgment review?
• Applicable also for pensioners. Does that mean those who are covered by provident fund
scheme are excluded? The answer is no, but it needs judiciary interpretation.
4. Reinstatement (43(1) & (2))
• Issues raised on reinstatement:-specific/forced performance vis-à-vis art. 1776 of the Civil
Code (which provides two conditions for its exception: (i) special interest to creditor and (ii)
without affecting personal liberty of the debtor).
• It seems that our Labor Law provides an exception to the exception rule in the civil code.
What do you think is the rationale behind this exception rule?
Two types of reinstatement rules:-
(i) Mandatory reinstatement (art.43(1) &
(ii) Discretionary reinstatement (art. 43(2) & (3).
• No reinstatement for constructive dismissal in our labor law. In some jurisdictions,
5. Back Payment
• What is it and what is its legal basis? And the legal issues related to
back pay will be: is it damage? What about the rule of no work-no
wage? Is there fault on the employer’s side? How?
• The previous Labor Proclamation no. 42/1993 was silent on this
aspect: - the silence and the consequence followed there from called
for amendment of the law with specific provision to that effect (Art.
43(5)).
• Issues to be raised on the new provision Art. 43(5):- (i) is the one year
back pay by appellate court in addition to the 6 month back pay by
lower court or is the total sum? (ii) Can the appellate court also
award this additional back pay even if the appellant is the worker?
• (iii) shall/can the courts, both the lower court and the appellate court,
award such back-payment remedy even if same is not demanded by
the worker?
Grounds, Procedures, and Effects of Termination under the
FCSP:
• Termination rules of civil servants is provided under PART-7 of the FCSP from
Articles 78-86, and basically most of the termination grounds are almost similar
with that of the labor law regime with some differences here and there.
• Among the modalities of terminations acknowledged by the labour law regime,
termination by agreement of the parties is not incorporated in the FCSP
Grounds
The main termination grounds in the FCSP are:-
Resignation (Art. 78):- resignation with one month notice is possible
but the head of the government institution may delay the release of the
civil servant for a maximum period of three months.
Termination due to Illness (Art. 79):- the rule in the FCSP is more
clear on this regard compared to the situation in the labor law regime,
where it is not clear whether the employer can terminate the
Termination for Inefficiency (Art. 80):- a civil servant whose performance
is below satisfactory for two successive evaluation periods will be
dismissed. Again here, the rule is clearer than similar rule in the labor law
regime, where the law uses (under Art. 27(1) (e)) very general and abstract
phrases that make the implementation of the rule difficult to apply
Termination for absenteeism (Art. 81):- this provision uses the standard of
Force Majeure for tolerating the absence of a civil servant while a similar
rule under the labor law regime (Art. 27(1) (b)) uses a very lenient
standard of good cause (its meaning is not even defined by law).
Besides, this same provision clearly provides that the maximum period for
tolerance of absenteeism even for Force Majeure is six months while such
rule is not clear from the provisions of the labor law, the lack of which
becomes a cause for a lot of court cases.
Nullification of appointment (Art. 82):- such nullification of appointment
will be made for false representation of educational records or work
experience.
Retrenchment (Art. 83):- a civil servant will be retrenched where
his. There are no such requirements like good cause or minimum of
10% workforce, etc…as in the case of reduction of workforce in the
labor law regime.
Termination for Disciplinary cases (Art. 84):- Those offenses that
entail dismissal from civil service are those listed down under Article
68 of FCSP. The basic differences of these offenses from those
offenses under the labor law regime are: clarity of the offenses,
different degree of standards used, non-exhaustively listed offenses,
etc…
Retirement (Art. 85):- the rule here is cleared compared to similar rule
in the labor law regime
Termination due to death (Art. 86):- the rule is the same in both
regimes on this regard.
Procedures:-
Two basic differences of the FCSP regime compared to the labor law regime are the
following:-
1. No notice requirement:-except for the case of retirement which requires 3 months
advance notification, there is no any notice requirement for the other termination
cases. Even the case of retirement is a matter of notification, not as such advance
notice requirement which will have legal consequence. In fact, the Amharic version
of Art. 85(1) clearly states that the termination of the civil servant upon attainment
of the legal retirement age shall be effected without any additional procedure.
2. Disciplinary committee:-According to Art. 69 a government institution shall
establish a disciplinary committee which shall investigate disciplinary charges
brought against civil servants and thereby submit recommendations to the
concerned officials. According to Articles 7-20 of the Council of Ministers
Regulation no. 77/2002 the disciplinary charges against a civil servant shall be
investigated by the Disciplinary Committee by formal investigation processes and
finally the Committee shall give its recommendations to the head of the government
for final decision.
So, for a termination of a civil servant on account of discipline case to be legal it
should be made in line with this clear procedure.
There is no such similar procedure requirement in the labor law regime, but similar
Effects:-
• The effects of terminations and unlawful terminations in the FCSP are different
from those provided in the labor law regime. The following can be some for
demonstration purpose:-
1.One major difference of the rule of resignation under FCSP is that the civil servant
may be subjected to criminal liability in case of failure to resign without notice (Art.
78(2)).
2. Severance pay is only for retrenchment case. It seems that when it comes to civil
service regime, the concept of severance pay is properly applied.
3. Though there is no clear provision for reinstatement ruling in case of unlawful
termination, it can be deducted from Article 76(1) of the FCSP that the
Administrative Tribunal may reverse the administrative decision of dismissal
against civil servant (and may decide for reinstatement). However, the provision is
not clear and moreover it is provided in a permissive style with the word “may”,
and so it seems that the Tribunal may also decide otherwise. From this we can
conclude that reinstatement is not a legal right in the civil service regime and ruling for
reinstatement is purely discretionary which depends on the mercy of the Tribunal.
4. No legal right of compensation for unlawful dismissal
5. No legal right of back payment for unlawful dismissal
Therefore, from legal effect point of view, it can be said dismissal/termination of a
civil servant is easier than dismissing a worker under labor law regime
3.Special Categories of Employees
3.1. Home workers
• It is important to note the following points regarding home workers in
general and their treatment under Ethiopian Labor law
• ILO Homework Convention no. 177/1996 is the relevant international
instrument; but unfortunately Ethiopia did not ratify this Convention
• This Convention obliges member states to come up with national policies
and local laws to ensure the minimum standards and protections of home
workers such as the right to form association, regarding safety matters,
equal treatment like other workers, etc…
• According to the Home work Convention a home worker is a person who
works for remuneration in his/her home or in other premises of his/her
choice other than the work place of the employer, which results in a
product or service as specified by the employer irrespective of who
provides the equipment, materials or other inputs used, unless this person
is an independent contractor of autonomy or economic independence.
(Article 1(a)).
• Our Labor proclamation defines “home worker” almost similarly as “a person
habitually performs work for an employer in his home or any other place freely
chosen by him in return for wages without any direct supervision or direction by the
employer.” (Article 46(1)).
• The basic differences of these two above definitions are:
(1) our law uses the adjective “habitually” while we do not find such qualification in the
ILO definition; and
(2) the ILO definition uses the term “remuneration”, which is a wider concept than the
word “wage” as used in our Labor law because “wage” is defined in our law as a
regular payment excluding other types of payments.
It is important to note that the word ‘habitually’ in our Labor law has the objective to
exclude those workers who might work at their home or at their own chosen place
intermittently, not regularly.
• Article 46(4) gives power to MoLSA to issue a directive to prescribe the provisions
that shall apply to home workers and the manner of their application.
• Does this provision have an exclusionary effect? One may argue by saying that
unless MoLSA comes up with such directive, the Labor proclamation will not be
applicable on home workers and since MoLSA did not issue any directive so far the
• Three important provisions worth of mentioning are: (1) Art. 46(3) a
legal presumption, which is an exception to the legal presumption of
indefinite employment contract made under Art. 9; (2) Art. 47-
Obligation on employers for keeping records on their home workers;
and (3) Art. 169-Legal lien right given to home workers in case of
liquidation of the employer.
EXERCISES:-Do home workers fall under the definition of
“workers” as per Art. 2 (2) vis-à-vis Art.4? Why do you think the law-
maker did not exclude home workers under Art.3 (scope of
application clause)? Will Art.169 applicable and enforceable without
MoLSA’s directive envisaged under Art. 46 (4)? Do you agree to the
position that the issue of home workers is not a concern for Ethiopian
current context?
3.2. Apprentices
• It is important to note the following points regarding apprenticeship under
Ethiopian law:-
• Definition of apprenticeship: Article 48(1) states that apprenticeship contract
exists “...when an employer agrees to give a person complete and systematic
training in a given occupation related to the function of his undertaking in
accordance with the skills of the trade and the person in return agrees to
obey the instruction given to carry out the training and works related
thereto.”
• One difficult part of this definition is as to how to identify contract of
apprenticeship from other types of employment contract for training purpose
as excluded under Art. 3(2)(b).
• Both contracts have training objective behind them and no guideline is put
by the law to distinguish one from the other. One possible way of
distinguishing these two types of contracts can be as to whether the trainer is
a licensed training institution or not-if it is a licensed training institution,
then the contract will fall under Art. 3(2)(b) whereas if the trainer is just an
undertaking and not licensed for training, then the contract will be
apprenticeship
The other important distinction between the two contracts is that while the contract under
Art. 3(2)(b) is a contract of employment, but the contract under Art 48 is not a contract of
employment because:
(1) the principal purpose is training, not to perform work which is just incidental; and
(2) wage is not a requirement for apprenticeship, it is remuneration-which can be any kind of
payment arrangement
Apprenticeship on what occupation? The other problem with regard to the above
definition is as to what “occupation related to the function of his undertaking” means?
Again, there is no guideline to find out what occupation is or is not allowed for
apprenticeship contract.
For example, can a Hotel give an apprenticeship to an accountant? Can an oil marketing
company give an apprenticeship to a civil engineer? Can a Bank give an apprenticeship
to a secretary?
MoLSA has been given power to come up with appropriate directives to identify the
types of occupations and works in which apprenticeship need to be given, also regarding
duration of apprenticeship, and also regarding theoretical and practical aspects of
apprenticeships as well acome s the manner of giving tests (Art. 170(1)(g)(h)&(i)).
However, so far the Ministry did not up with any directive regarding such matters and
because of this various labor offices at different levels attest apprenticeship contracts just
blindly-no rules, no guidelines!
There are three legal requirements for the validity of apprenticeship contract;
namely,
1. minimum age of the apprentice should be 14 years (Art. 48(2);
2. the contract should be in writing (art. 48(3); and
3. the contract should be attested by MoLSA.
The non-fulfillments of these requirements will have the effect of making the
Contract invalid and same can be challenged by either party.
What will be the legal effect of challenging such apprenticeship contract? Will the
person have automatically the status of an ordinary worker, rather than an
apprentice? Why?
Contents of apprenticeship contract (art. 49)
From the mandatory nature of this provision, it is important to note that the three
listed down elements shall be always included in the contract of apprenticeship, the
concerned Labor officer attesting such contracts shall at least check the existence
of these elements. Another important point to note is the element of
“remuneration”, which is different from “wage” as used for contract of
employment under art. 4(1).
So, for the purpose of apprenticeship contract regular payment is not required, i.e.
Obligations of the parties:
Art. 50(1) imposes an obligation of diligence on the apprentice. On the other art. 50(2)
prohibits the employer from assigning the apprentice on an occupation not related to his
training.
The rationale behind this latter provision is to prevent employers from exploiting apprentices
by assigning them on other duties.
Art. 52 of the proclamation also imposes an obligation on the employer to give to the
apprentice certificate indicating the occupation for which he has been trained and the
duration of the training.
Termination of apprenticeship contract and consequences:
Art. 51(1) provides a general rule for grounds of terminations while art. 51(2)-(4) provide
detailed grounds of terminations.
Art. 51(2) gives the employer the right to terminate the apprenticeship contract with notice
due to the specified grounds.
Does that mean the employer can, however, terminate the contract of apprenticeship without
notice due to the grounds of art. 27? How do you see this issue vis-à-vis art. 51(2)(b) which
requires the employer to give notice even for disciplinary violations of the apprentice?
Art. 51(3) gives the apprentice the right to terminate his contract with notice due to
employer’s failure to observe his obligations, or due to health or some other family problems.
It seems that art. 51(3)(a) is an exception to the rule under art. 32(1)(c). Otherwise, art. 51(3)
seems to require the apprentice good cause to terminate the apprenticeship contract with
notice, which is also an exception to the general rule enshrined under art. 31 for an ordinary
Art. 51(4) entitles the apprentice to terminate the contract without notice in the event of
the occurrence of any of the grounds listed under paragraphs (a) & (b) of art. 51(4). Can
we say that this rule is a clear exception to the rule of art. 32, or can we say that these
are just additional grounds in addition to art. 32?
Can you really distinguish the difference of the grounds provided under art. 51(3)(a) vis-
à-vis art. 51(4)(b)? Similarly, the difference of the grounds under art. 51(3)(b) vis-à-vis
art. 51(4)(a)?
What is the duration of the notice period requirement under arts. 51(2) and 51(3)? It
seems that we can apply the rules provided under Arts. 31, 34 and 35 since these
provisions of the proclamation are not excluded from application on apprenticeship (ref.
to art. 51(5)).
But when it comes to legal effects and consequences of violating these termination rules,
we can argue that a party who violates any of the legal conditions and requirements will
not be subject to any liability (ref. to art. 51(5)).(The prov. Of severance payment,
compensation and reinstatement not applicable)
Partial Exclusion clause of Article 51(5): Query- So, what is the purpose of including
apprenticeship under labor proclamation? May be, it is just to entitle apprentices to all
other minimum working conditions (i.e. max. working hours, leaves, overtime
pay, entitlement for occupational injury, etc…) of the proclamation during
their stay in the undertaking.
3.3 Young employees
Article 36(1)(d) of the 1995 FDRE Constitution provides a constitutional protection for
children against exploitive practices, hazardous or harmful works that affect their education,
health, or well-being.
Ethiopia has also ratified the following international conventions related to Children:-
1. UN Child Rights Convention,
2. ILO Minimum Age Convention No. 138, 1973, and
3. ILO Worst Forms of Child Labor Convention No. 182, 1999.
Apart from the above constitutional and international protections, the relevant provisions of the
Labor Proclamation no. 377/2003 also provide certain protections and limitations regarding
young workers between 14 and 18 years old.
Article 89(3) provides a general prohibition against employment of young workers for a work
which on account of its nature or due to the condition in which it is carried out endangers
the life or health of young workers performing it.
Article 89(4) also gives power to MoLSA to come up with the list of activities prohibited to
young workers, which list shall also include the list of activities provided from (a) to (d) of Art.
89(4).
Not only engaging young workers on these activities, but it is also prohibited under Art. 91 to
engage them at night, on overtime, on weekly rest time, or on public holidays.
Finally, the law also made an exception to the normal working hours of 8 hours per day by
reducing same to 7 hours per day for young workers under Art. 90.
It is important to note here that engagement of young persons below 18 years old for civil
An important issue to be raised with regard to the legal protections of young
workers is the practical enforcement of the law, i.e. are the concerned Labor
Inspectorate offices capable of enforcing the law? Do we really have the
financial, manpower, facility, information network, etc… necessary for the
enforcement of these legal protections?
EXERCISES:-Given the factual economic situation of Ethiopia, where
children will be forced to work so as to support themselves and their poor
families, do you agree the above protections are really protections for them?
Or do you consider them as prohibitions against children?
3.3.Female employees
It is important to note the following points regarding female workers:-
The 1995 FDRE Constitution enshrined two basic rights for women; namely,
(1) the right to equality with men (art. 35(1); and
(2) the right for affirmative action (preferential treatment) as per article 35(3).
The Constitution does also provide other special types of rights and
protections pertaining to their special status (maternity leave, prenatal leave,
property right, equality in employment and pay, etc….).
In 1999, Ethiopia has ratified the ILO Equal Remuneration Convention no. 100,
which dictates that women shall not be discriminated with regard to
remuneration and thus employers shall pay equal pay for similar posts
irrespective of sex.
Moreover, Ethiopia has also ratified, in 1966, the ILO Discrimination
(Employment & Occupation) Convention no. 111, 1958, which prohibits any
kind of discrimination based on sex and other status.
Apart from the above constitutional and international instruments, the relevant
employments laws in both the public and the private sector have also come up
with some kinds of protections and preferential treatments.
Art. 13(1) of the FCSP and Art. 14(1)(b)& (f) and Art. 87(1) of the Labor Law
clearly prohibit any kind of discrimination against female workers.
The FCSP further proceeds and provide the right of preferential treatment for
female workers under Art. 13(3) by stating that in recruitment, promotion and
development preference shall be given to female candidates with equal or close
scores.
Though there is no such similar preferential requirement in the private sector, it
is however one step to introduce same in the civil service.
The relevant employment laws do also provide special rights and protections for
female workers for some special circumstances such as pregnancy and maternity
(refer to Articles 87 & 88 of Labor Proclamation, and also Article 41 of the FCSP).
It is important to note that the right of female workers against discrimination is not
an absolute right, i.e. there might be some acceptable discrimination due to the very
nature of the job.
For example, it is legally prohibited to employ female workers on type of work that
may be listed by MoLSA to be particularly harduous and harmful to their health.
However, it seems that unless MoLSA comes up with such list, an employer can
not discriminate female workers on the basis of their sex.
There is some controversy with regard to whether female workers are really
beneficiaries of some special rights like prenatal or maternity leaves with pay.
The controversy is that though the special rights are provided for their protections,
in practice however employers might be naturally forced to opt for a male
candidate rather than a female candidate so to avoid unnecessary costs related to
their pregnancy and maternity.
So, due to this factual situation can we really say that such special rights are for the
protection of female workers or against them? What is your opinion on this
controversy? Do you think the protections are beneficial or not? Why? Why not?
3.5.Employees with Disability
It is important to note the following points regarding workers with disability:
Apart from Article 25, which enshrines the principle of equality and anti-
discrimination in general, and also apart from Article 41(5), which provides for
special assistance for disabled persons, there is no other constitutional provision
dedicated for disabled persons.
However, there is a separate proclamation dealing with the Right to Employment of
Persons with Disability (Proc. No. 568/2008), which provides detailed rights and
protections for persons with disability.
This proclamation has made the following important changes and advancements
compared to the previous proclamation no. 101/1994:-
1. It abolishes the obligation of employers to reserve suitable posts for disabled
persons. The rationale behind such abolition is specified in the preamble of the law,
i.e. providing for reservation of vacancies for disabled persons created an image
that people with disability are incapable of performing jobs based on merit.
2.It introduced a preferential treatment for disabled persons with equal or close
scores with others (Art. 4).
It provides for prohibition of discriminations and specifies various scenarios of discriminations
(Art. 5).
It stipulated obligations on employers to avail reasonable accommodations for disabled workers
(Art. 6).
It shifts the burden of proof from employees or applicants to the employer (Art. 7) so to make
easier for them to exercise their rights.
Article 13 of the FCSP has also incorporated both the principles of non-discrimination based on
disability (Art. 13(1)) and the principle of preferential treatment (Art. 13(3)).
The Labor Proclamation does also prohibit discrimination on any ground under Article 14(1)(f),
which prohibition definitely includes discrimination based on disability. Though the Labor law
does not provide right for preferential treatment, this gap will be filled by the special law (Proc.
No 568/2008).
It is again important to note that the right against non-discrimination is not an absolute right
because Article 4(1) of Proc. No 568/2008, for example, starts its rule by saying “unless the
nature of the work dictates otherwise”, which qualification allows for reasonable discrimination.
Though we do not find similar qualification in the two employment laws of the public and
private regimes, we can however apply this rule of exception since this is a special law on the
matter.
EXERCISES:-In case of a disabled male candidate and a female candidate, to whom shall the
employer give better preferential right? Can you find a guiding principle in the provisions of the
3.6.Non Ethiopian employees
It is important to note the following points regarding non-Ethiopian workers
and their treatment under the two employment law regimes:-
Under the FCSP (Art. 22(2), the employment of a non-Ethiopian national in
the civil service will be only for temporary period, and only on condition
that it is impossible to fill a vacant position that requires high level
professional by an Ethiopian through promotion, transfer, or recruitment.
So, it seems that engagement of a foreign national to a civil service
institution is very restrictive.
However, the rule regarding employment of foreign national in the private sector is
less clear than the rule in the civil service. Article 170(1)(e) empowers MoLSA to
issue directive to identify the types of works which require work permits for
foreigners in general, and the manner of giving work permits. Since work permits
are being issued for different foreign nationals, we can assume that MoLSA has
already some sort of directive on this matter.
However, from the types of work permits being issued for foreigners we can
tell that the rule in the private sector is not as restrictive as in the civil
service because the trend is that MoLSA gives work permits even for those
Article 174(1) stipulates that any foreigner may be employed in any type of
work in Ethiopia where he possesses a work permit given to him by the
Ministry.
The work permit to be given to a foreigner will be time barred for three years,
subject to renewal (Art. 174(2)).
The issue to be raised here is what is the effect of employing a foreign citizen
without work permit? Will the employer have the right to terminate the
employment contract subsequently due to this ground? If so, on which of the
termination grounds of the law? Isn’t the relationship between the foreigner and
the employer distinct from the relationship of the foreigner and the
government? What amendments do you recommend in the labor law to address
such problem?
Do you think Article 174(2) dictates the employment contract of a foreign
citizen to be for a definite period only?
How do you see this in line with the legal presumption provided under Article 9
and the exhaustive grounds of definite period employment contracts under
Article-10? Let us assume that a foreigner’s work permit expires after 3 years
period, does that mean the employment contract will be terminated
automatically? What measures can the employer legally take on the foreign
4.DISPUTE RESOLUTION MECHANISMS AND PERIOD OF LIMITATIONS
Basically there are two modalities of dispute resolution mechanism; namely,
submission of cases to a body with judicial power, or alternatively to take industrial
actions.
Especially, the latter modality might be useful to enforce rights and demands when
the former option is not possible; and vise versa, submission of disputes to a
judicial body will be an indispensible option when industrial action is not legally
possible.
Meaning and Types of Labor Disputes
‘Labor dispute’ is defined under Article 136(3) as follows:-“ any controversy
arising between a worker and an employer or trade union and employers in respect
of the application of law, collective agreement, work rules, employment contract or
customary rules and also any disagreement arising during collective bargaining or
in connection with collective agreement.”
Though this provision defines ‘labor dispute’ in terms of any controversy, it
is however, important to understand that it does not cover all controversies
between worker(s) and employers because the definition is given with
restriction to controversies related to employment matters.
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