1 Calculate the Risk Level

• Hazard identification usually establishes

what risk assessment techniques should be
used and care needs to be taken in the
selection of a technique, as similar
techniques may not necessarily yield the
same results .

• Risk assessment techniques may be either

“subjective – qualitative” or “objective –
quantitative”

2 Calculate the Risk Level

 Cont.

• Both streams, ideally in combination can be

very effective in the process of hazards
management.

• The oil and gas industry is now familiar with

the use of qualitative techniques.

• There is a growing recognition of the value

and effectiveness of quantitative studies
particularly when assessing system hazards.

3 Calculate the Risk Level

• Some quantitative techniques such as Fault
Tree analysis are ideally suited for
assessments of large electro-mechanical
systems and effects of human unreliability.

• Use of quantitative techniques will require

a more disciplined approach to recording
and interpreting incident, accident and
maintenance information to provide
accurate and auditable inputs to those
studies.
4 Calculate the Risk Level
• Qualitative techniques are comparatively
cheap and readily applied but are unable to
provide numerical estimates and therefore
relative ranking of identified risks.

• Semi-quantitative techniques allow some

relative risk ranking, but these techniques
are still unable to provide detailed
assessments of system safety, effects of
common cause failures and redundancy
features.
5 Calculate the Risk Level
 Cont.

• Similarly neither can effectively be used in

the prediction of low frequency high
consequence events – i.e. catastrophic risks.

6 Calculate the Risk Level

• Quantitative methods overcome these
shortfalls and are ideally applied where
system safety and criticality is to be
assessed.

• Catastrophic risks can be assessed using

Fault Tree and Event Tree methods, ideally as
part of a probabilistic risk analysis (PRA),
provided reliable input data exists and
numerical results can be used in estimating
the likely range of risks to both employees,
7 plant, society and thetheenvironment.
Calculate Risk Level
 Cont.

• Results can be used in cost benefit studies

and demonstration that risks are “as low as
reasonably practicable” (ALARP) can be
supported defensively only by quantitative
analysis.
• Truly probabilistic methods such as “first
order reliability methods” (FORM) are the
most complex type of RA, and its advantage
over any other method is the ability to
successfully cope with the statistical
uncertainty in the data and to use it to its
advantage.
8 Calculate the Risk Level
 Cont.

• Results from a FORM evaluation also provide

further information on system vulnerability
as a function of input variables.
• Analysis utilizing Monte Carlo (MC)
techniques is more commonplace than FORM
and has found widespread acceptance in
many professions such as engineering and
finance.

• However, MC methods lack some of the

direct leverage that FORM provides for
engineering solutions.
9 Calculate the Risk Level
 Cont.

• RA methods should be chosen, not just

based on the hazard, but also after
consideration of the capabilities of each
technique as each may provide different
outputs (or parameters) that may be
particularly useful towards the solution of
the problem.

10 Calculate the Risk Level

 Cont.

• Such outputs could be

1. simple lists of individual failures (HAZOP,

‘What if’ etc),

2. numerical estimates of system failure

probabilities (FTA),

3. listings of event scenarios and their

likelihoods (ETA, PRA)

4. numerical system failure probabilities and

sensitivities to input variables (FORM).
11 Calculate the Risk Level
 Cont.

• FORM methods also provide numerical

estimates of the most likely failure scenario
(the design point) which comprises a listing
of all input variables and their estimates at
the point of system failure.

• FORM has the added advantage that it is

able to synthesize failure data (which is
usually scarce) from basic engineering data
through the adaptation of design
calculations that can then be used to
supplement other techniques such as FTA.
12 Calculate the Risk Level
• The context (procedure) in a facility should identify the
situations where application of risk assessment is
required.

• The selected applications would likely include

identification of expected deliverables such as
procedures, plans, operating guidelines, design review
information or others.

• Defining the deliverables of the risk assessment is

necessary before the selection of the most appropriate
analytical method.
13 Calculate the Risk Level
 Cont.

• Resources are required for a risk assessment and

should be recognized in the relevant policy or procedure.

• Resources for some risk assessment methods include a

facilitator, a suitable team, a suitable room, information
recording equipment, the required time, etc.

• There may be resources to scope or design the risk

assessment and resources to gather information on the
existence, nature or magnitude of hazards, as well as
resources to take the required action as a result of the
assessment.

14 Calculate the Risk Level

 1. Project Concept
2. Project Design
3. Construction/Acquisition
4. Commissioning
5. Operation
6. Maintenance
7. Modification
8. Disposal/Closure

• The timing of a risk assessment depends on the required

deliverable but the earlier the better.
• Use the life cycle approach (various stages in a project).
15 Calculate the Risk Level
 Cont.

• The context of risk assessment (such as a procedure)

should include
1. Guidance on timing and resource expectations.
2. The accountability for areas such as
 initiation of a risk assessment in defined circumstances,
 planning or scoping the risk assessment,
 meeting the resource requirements,
 utilization of facilitators,
 methods for implementing deliverables, and
 checking the quality of risk assessment activities.

16 Calculate the Risk Level

 Cont.

• If risk assessment is not used with care and

understanding, the outcomes may well be totally incorrect
and lead to bad decisions being made that are not
supportable in reality.

17 Calculate the Risk Level

• Carrying out a risk assessment to attempt to justify a
decision that has already been made.
• Using generic assessment when a site specific
assessment is needed.
• Carrying out a detailed, quantitative risk assessment
without first considering whether any relevant good
practice was applicable, or when relevant good practice
exists.
• Carrying out a risk assessment using inappropriate good
practice.
18 Calculate the Risk Level
 Cont.

• Making decisions on the basis of individual risk

estimates when societal risk is the appropriate measure.
• Only considering the risk from one activity.
• Dividing the time spent on the hazardous activity
between several individuals.
• Not involving a team of people in the assessment or not
including employees with practical knowledge of the
process/activity being assessed.
• Ineffective use of consultants.
• Failure to identify all hazards associated with a particular
activity.

19 Calculate the Risk Level

 Cont.

• Failure to consider all possible outcomes.

• Inappropriate use of data.
• Inappropriate definition of a representative sample of events.

• Inappropriate use of risk criteria.

• No consideration of ALARP arguments.
• Not doing anything with the results of the assessment.
• Not linking hazards with risk controls.

20 Calculate the Risk Level

• To identify the specific unwanted events select the
appropriate Risk Identification method or tool.
• It is important to match the Objective (Expected
Deliverable, System & Issue) to the risk identification
method or tool.
• The most relevant risk assessment techniques from the
suggested deliverables are:
1. Informal Risk Assessment (RA),
2. Job Safety Analysis / Job Hazard Analysis (JSA / JHA),
3. Energy Barrier Analysis (EBA),
21 Calculate the Risk Level
 Cont.
4. Consequence Analysis,
5. Preliminary Hazard Analysis (PHA),
6. Hazard Analysis (HAZAN),
7. Workplace Risk Assessment and Control (WRAC),
8. Hazard and Operability Study (HAZOP),
9. Fault Tree Analysis (FTA),
10. Event Tree Analysis (ETA),
11. Failure Modes, Effects and Criticality Analysis (FMECA),
12. Human Error Analysis (HEA),
13. Level of Protection Analysis (LOPA).

22 Calculate the Risk Level

• Risk Analysis is about developing an understanding of risk.
• It provides an input to decisions on whether risks need to
be treated and the most appropriate and cost effective
strategies.
• Risk analysis involves consideration of the sources of risk,
their positive and negative consequences and its
likelihood.
• Risk Analysis involves different ways of calculating risk
considering "how often" (probability or likelihood) and
consequences (or severity).

23 Calculate the Risk Level

 Cont.

• It is important to match the Risk Analysis method to the

Objective / Expected Deliverable.
• There are 3 types of risk analysis methods, qualitative,
quantitative and semi-quantitative.

24 Calculate the Risk Level

• Qualitative analysis uses words to describe the magnitude
of potential consequences and its likelihood.
• These scales can be adapted or adjusted to suit the
circumstances and different descriptions may be used for
different risks.
• Qualitative risk analysis methods are used to set priority
for various purposes including further analysis.
• They are useful when reliable data for more quantitative
approaches is not available.

25 Calculate the Risk Level

 Cont.

• Some techniques are basic, suitable for categorizing

risked based on individual or team opinion.
• There is no description of the difference between high,
medium or low, simply the words.
• Therefore it remains for the person(s) who use this
method to decide of those differences.
• As such, it is a very rough method of risk analysis
that simply divides the identified risks into 3 categories –
red, green and yellow.
• When estimating risk there is often an important question;
Should the likelihood or probability be estimated
considering existing controls or without controls in place ?
26 Calculate the Risk Level
 Cont.
• There is no absolute answer to this question.
• It may be important for the Scope to identify which approach
will be taken in the exercise.
• It is recommended that if controls exist and are credible, the
assessment should consider them.
• It would be sensible to include consideration of existing
controls whenever estimating Likelihood or Probability when
the system being examined has a significant operating
history.
• If the risk assessment is being Scoped to review a new
project or system, the team must decide and record the
decision whether or not the risk is to be looked at with or
without the new or planned controls.
27 Calculate the Risk Level
 Cont.

• The important point is to establish whether or not existing

controls will be considered while estimating Likelihood or
Probability in the Scoping stage of the risk assessment.
• Once the Probability and Severity numbers are selected, a
comparative risk can be identified from the shown
diagram.
• The description or numerical ranges must be carefully
defined to meet Objectives as well as provide discreet and
suitable choices.

28 Calculate the Risk Level

29 Calculate the Risk Level
30 Calculate the Risk Level
31 Calculate the Risk Level
• The "What if?" procedure is an unstructured method.
• It considers the results of events that could lead to
an undesirable result.
• It uses questions that begin with "What if?”
• Example: consider a tank being filled with liquid.
• What if the tank-filling pump fails to stop?
• What if the inlet valve fails to close?
• What if the high level alarm fails?
• What if the operator ignores the high level alarm?
32 Calculate the Risk Level
 Cont.

• The "What If?" method is not concerned with how

the situation develops.
• Questions should be based on the previous
experience of the analysis team
• It will vary for each process unit.
• It is designed to identify problems in design or
operation that can lead to accidents.

• This analysis is applicable to the design,

modification, or operation phase of a facility.
• It is often used for plant modifications or non-routine
maintenance procedures.
33 Calculate the Risk Level
 Cont.

• The analysis results in 1) a list of problem areas that

can lead to accidents and 2) suggested methods for
preventing or mitigating the accidents.
• A complete set of PFD, P&ID diagrams and
operating procedures are needed to perform the
analysis.

• Two or three experts are assigned for each area

(such as electrical safety, fire protection, and personnel
safety experts).
• The time required is proportional to the plant size
and number of areas to be investigated.
34 Calculate the Risk Level
• First, decide which consequence categories are to
be considered.
• The choices are public risk, worker risk, and
economic risk.
• The choice may be further refined into a specific
area, (such as risk to off-site population due to toxic
material releases).
• Second, define the physical boundaries for the study
(decide which portions of the facility can produce the
undesired consequence).

35 Calculate the Risk Level

 Cont.

• Third, gather and review all pertinent information,

including plot plans, PFD'S, P&ID's, etc.

• Much of the review can be done off site, however, it

is beneficial to inspect the physical equipment to
see how it is actually installed and verify the
completeness of the data.

• Fourth, the set of "What if?" questions are

prepared.

• This set of questions may be modified as the review

progresses.
36 Calculate the Risk Level
 Cont.

• The review team then takes the gathered information along

with the list of questions, and begins the actual review.

• Then, the review team addresses each "What if?" question,

answer it, identify any unsafe conditions or operations, and
suggest possible solutions to the problems.
• It is common for the team to request more information or
recommend further study of certain scenarios as the review
proceeds.
• The report of a 'What If?" analysis is a series of forms that
include the questions, the possible consequences or hazards,
and the recommendations.
• A sample of a "What if?" worksheet follows this subsection.

37 Calculate the Risk Level

What If Consequence/Hazard Recommendation

Water flow is Water in shell freezes and may rupture Automatic interlock to
stopped? shell; stop LNG flow if water
natural gas temperature too low. flow is stopped.

LNG flow is Not hazardous None

stopped?

Natural gas Downstream piping may become Monitor gas

temperature is embrittled temperature; low
too low? temperature alarm

Water flow is Natural gas temperature may be too low Monitor flow rate; low
too low? water may freeze on outside of tubes flow alarms

39 Calculate the Risk Level

40 Calculate the Risk Level
• Failure Modes and Effects Analysis (FMEA) is a tabulation
of plant equipment items, the failure modes for each item,
and the effects of the failures on the equipment or plant.

• The failure mode is simply a description of what caused the

equipment to fail.

• The effect is the accident or system response to the failure.

• FMEA identifies single failure modes that can cause or

contribute to the cause of an accident.

41 Calculate the Risk Level

 Cont.

• FMEA is not useful for identifying combinations of failures

that can lead to accidents, and generally does not
examine operator errors.

• An FMEA is used to identify equipment failure modes and

the effect of each failure mode on the process system.
• In the design phase, FMEA can be used to identify the
need for additional protective systems or redundancy.
• During facility modifications, FMEA can be used to identify
the effects of field modifications to existing equipment.
• FMEA is also useful during operation to identify single
failures that could result in significant accidents.
42 Calculate the Risk Level
 Cont.

• An FMEA will result in a systematic tabulation of

equipment failure modes and their effects.

• To perform the analysis P&ID's and equipment lists are

needed.
• It requires two analysts who are very familiar with the
process and equipment in their area.

• The analysts may change from one section of a plant to

another.
• This analysis is less time consuming than many other
methods of hazard identification.

43 Calculate the Risk Level

Failure Modes and Effects Analysis (FMEA)

44 Calculate the Risk Level

A typical FMEA table should have columns for
1. Equipment identification of the specific items of equipment
to be analyzed.
• The identifier should be unique to that item, such as a
serial number or equipment number from a P&ID.
• Equipment description which includes:
A. equipment type (pump, valve, heat exchanger, etc.),
B. operating configuration (normally open, normally off, continuous
running),
C. any other service characteristics that could influence the failure
modes (high pressure, salt water service, etc.).
45 Calculate the Risk Level
 Cont.

2. Failure modes, which should include all failure modes for

the equipment item.

• Be sure to limit yourself to failure modes.

• For example, a valve body may rupture due to several
different causes, but the failure mode, valve body rupture, is
the same for all causes.

3. Effects of each failure mode should be identified.

• The effects are the immediate and expected results that the
failure will have on other equipment or parts of the system.
• The effects of interest are those that ultimately result in the
release of a flammable, toxic material, or explosive events.
46 Calculate the Risk Level
 Cont.

4. The FMEA result is a tabulation of the effects of various

equipment failures within a facility.

5. If desired, the criticality of each failure mode can also be

included in the analysis and report (FMECA).

6. Those failures with high criticality rankings may call for

protective measures to be taken.

47 Calculate the Risk Level

48 Calculate the Risk Level
• Quantitative Risk Analysis involves the calculation of probability
and sometimes consequences, using numerical data where the
numbers are not rank (1st, 2nd, 3rd) but rather “real numbers”
(i.e. 1, 2, 3, 4 ).

• As such, accurate quantification of risk offers the opportunity to

be more objective and analytical than the qualitative or semi-
qualitative approaches.
• Most commonly, quantification of risk involves generating a
number that represents the probability of a selected outcome,
such as a fatality.

49 Calculate the Risk Level

 Cont.

• The shown diagram gives an example of probabilistic

information concerning the risk of a fatality per year.

Risk of a Fatality / Year

• The risk of a total large petroleum storage tank structural failure

might be .003 per year.
50 Calculate the Risk Level
51 Calculate the Risk Level
• Fault Tree Analysis (FTA) is a deductive technique that
focuses on one particular accident event and then
constructs a logic diagram of all conceivable event
sequences (both mechanical and human) that can lead
to the accident event.
• The fault tree is a graphic illustration of various
combinations of 1) equipment faults and failures and 2)
human errors that can result in an accident.
• FTA is a method for analysing hazardous events once
they have been identified by some other technique.
52 Calculate the Risk Level
 Cont.

• As a qualitative tool, FTA is useful because it breaks an

accident down into the basic failures and errors that
could cause an accident.
• It also allows the analyst to determine the effect of
changing or adding components to a system, e.g.,
supplying redundant, independent high-level alarms or
shut offs.
• An FTA is used to identify failure pathways, both
mechanical and human, that could lead to an accident.
• The FTA can be used during design, modification, or
operation of a facility.

53 Calculate the Risk Level

 Cont.

• It can be especially useful in analysing new or novel

processes for which there is no operating history.
• It produces a set of logic diagrams that illustrate how
certain combination failures and/or errors can result in
specific accidents.
• The results are qualitative, but can be made quantitative
if failure rate data are available for the failure events.

• P&ID's, equipment drawings and specifications,

operating procedures, knowledge of failure modes, and
failure rate data should be made available.

54 Calculate the Risk Level

 Cont.

• Normally, one person is assigned to prepare a single fault

tree for a given accident.
• This person must have a thorough knowledge of the plant
processes.

• The preparation of fault trees can be very time consuming

for large or complex facilities.

55 Calculate the Risk Level

 Tank Rupture

OR

Over Pressure Material

Failure
AND

Excessive Heat Pressure Relief

Input Valve Fails Toopen

OR OR

Controller Thermocuple Valve Valve

Fails To Fails to Gas Valve Mechanically Temporally
Close Gas Sense High Fails Open Defective Adjusted
Valves Temperature

56 Calculate the Risk Level

 A Basic Intiating Fault
Basic Event
(Component Failure)

Occures as a Result of Events at a

Intermediate Lower Level Action through
Event Logic Gates

Undeveloped Undeveloped Event due to Lack

of Information or Singificance

“AND” GATE Output Occures if All Input

Events Occure

Output Occures If at Least One

OR” GATE“
Input Event Occures

57 Calculate the Risk Level

58 Calculate the Risk Level
59 Calculate the Risk Level
• Each fault tree considers a single failure of the system
being analysed.
• The fault tree is then developed backwards by using
deductive logic until the system failure is described in
terms of the failure of components that make up the
system.

• The following steps should be considered.

1. Identify the system failure that is to be analysed and

place this event at the top of the tree.

60 Calculate the Risk Level

 Cont.

2. Proceed to the next lower level of the system & identify

subsystem failures that could lead to the top event
(system failure).
3. Determine the logical relationship between the subsystem
failures that are required to produce the top event.
4. Use the "AND" and "OR" gate logic structure to show the
relationship of subsystem failures that produce the top
event.
5. Proceed to the next lower system level and repeat (2)
through (4) until the component level failures have been
identified.
61 Calculate the Risk Level
 Cont.

6. Beginning with component failure rate data, compute the

probability of failures described in the fault tree.
7. Follow the logic structure indicated by the "AND" and
"OR" gates in the fault tree until the probability of the top
event has been calculated.

62 Calculate the Risk Level

63 Calculate the Risk Level
• An event tree is a graphical illustration of potential
outcomes that can result from a specific equipment failure
or human error.
• Event tree analysis considers the response of personnel
and safety systems in dealing with the failure.
• The results of an ETA are accident sequences, i.e., a
multi-branched, chronological set of failures/errors that
define an accident.
• ETA is used to identify the sequence of events that follow
a failure or error as it leads to an accident.
64 Calculate the Risk Level
 Cont.

• Event Tree Analysis is suitable for identifying hazards,

but is useful in analysing the effect of safety systems or
emergency procedures on preventing and mitigating
hazardous events.

• It is used during the design, modification, or operation

phase of a facility.
• It is particularly useful as a tool for demonstrating the
efficacy of accident prevention and mitigation techniques.

• It produces a series of event trees that illustrate the event

sequences that result in accidents following the
occurrence of an initiating event.

65 Calculate the Risk Level

 Cont.

• The results are qualitative, but can be quantitative if the

event probabilities are known.

• To perform the analysis, knowledge of initiating events

(equipment failures and human errors) and mitigating
equipment and procedures are needed.
• A small team of two to four persons is preferred as it
allows a group "brainstorming" approach.
• The members must have a good understanding of the
process and equipment.
• The time required is dependent on the size and
complexity of the facility, but is always time consuming.
66 Calculate the Risk Level
1. Identify an initiating event
• This may be a system failure, equipment failure,
human error, or process upset that could result in any
one of several effects.
• Which effect might actually occur depends on how the
system or operators respond to the event.

• Identify which safety system or operator response is

designed to handle the initiating event.

67 Calculate the Risk Level

 Cont.

• Safety functions can include:

1. systems that respond automatically to the event (such
as automatic emergency shutdown systems);
2. alarms to alert operators and operator actions taken in
response to alarms;
3. dikes, drainage, etc., intended to limit the effects of the
initiating event.
• The analysts identify these safety functions in the
chronological order that they are expected to respond.
• Safety functions are listed in the order in which they are
intended to occur.
68 Calculate the Risk Level
 Cont.
2. Construct the Event Tree
• First enter the initiating event on the left hand side of the
page, and then list the safety functions across the top of
the page in chronological order.
• Next, decide whether or not the success or failure of the
safety function affects the course of the accident.
• If the course of the accident can be affected, the event tree
is branched to distinguish between success and failure of
the safety function; success branching upward, failure
downward.
• If the safety function has no effect, the tree does not
branch, but proceeds to the next safety function.
69 Calculate the Risk Level
 Cont.

3. Describe the Accident Sequences

• The sequences are a variety of outcomes that can

occur following the initiating event.

• Some of the sequences may represent success, i.e., a

return to normal or an orderly shutdown.

• Those that result in failure should be analysed to

determine how to improve the responses to the event
in order to minimize the probability of failure.

70 Calculate the Risk Level

Event Tree (Loss of water to LNG vaporizer)
Low flow alarm -Operator re
Safety Function
Establishes System stops Automatic
Alerts operator Water flow flow Of LNG shutdown

Success
Success Return to normal

Failure Success
Orderly shutdown

Failure Unsafe condition

Operator unaware
Initiating Event Of problem

Success
Orderly shutdown

Failure Unsafe condition

Operator unaware
Of problem

71 Calculate the Risk Level

 Event Tree (Gas Release)

72 Calculate the Risk Level

 Event Tree (Power Supply)

73 Calculate the Risk Level

74 Calculate the Risk Level
• Human Error Analysis is a systematic evaluation of the
factors that influence the behaviour and performance of
plant personnel.

• It examines the physical and environmental factors

involved in the job, and the skills, training level,
knowledge, etc., of the personnel.

• This analysis should locate areas or situations in which

the person in charge is likely to make an improper
decision that could lead to an accident.
75 Calculate the Risk Level
 Cont.

• Human error analysis is used to identify areas or

situations that could lead to human error and is useful
during design, modification, or operation.

• The analysis results in

1. a listing of human errors that might occur during normal or
emergency operations;
2. a list of factors that contribute to the errors;
3. proposed modifications for eliminating or reducing these
errors.

76 Calculate the Risk Level

 Cont.

• Data required for the analysis are

1. normal and emergency operating procedures,
2. knowledge of employee training levels,
3. layout of control and alarm panels,
4. job descriptions for personnel.

• One person who is skilled in human error analysis or

human factors engineering should be sufficient.

• In many cases, an outside consultant is necessary.

• The time required depends on the number of tasks and

errors being analysed.
77 Calculate the Risk Level
• Human error analysis requires the skill and knowledge of
a professional who is well versed in human factors
engineering and human behaviour and reliability.

• Such analyses are best left to outside experts.

• Generally, human error analysis is one part of a more

complete hazards analysis.

• Exceptions to this might include the design of a new

process or hazard control panel board or a proposed
change in shift schedules.
78 Calculate the Risk Level
79 Calculate the Risk Level
• Fractional Dead Time (FDT) is the fraction of time that the
equipment is dead (cannot operate properly).

• The failure of the equipment itself does not pose a threat

until there is a realisation of another hazard, such as fire.

• The probability of the

uncontrolled hazard (the
overall failure rate) can be
determined through simple
AND gate argument.
80 Calculate the Risk Level
81 Calculate the Risk Level
• It is used to demonstrate adequacy of protection.

• LOPA is a variation of event tree analysis where only the

two outcomes (unwanted impact or no event) are
considered.
• Each analysis starts at the unwanted event frequency that
starts the event tree.

• Beyond the initiating event there are a number of event

tree branches, each of which represents a layer of
protection.
82 Calculate the Risk Level
83 Calculate the Risk Level
84 Calculate the Risk Level
 Cont.

• Each branch has only two paths, one for propagation of

the event and the other for "no event”

• Each layer of protection has to be independent of the

unwanted event and other layers of protection, these are
referred to as Independent Protection Layers (IPLs).

• IPLs need to detect or sense a condition in the scenario,

make a decision on action and deflect the undesired
consequence.

• Procedures and Inspections cannot be treated as

protection as they do not meet the tests.

85 Calculate the Risk Level

86 Calculate the Risk Level
 Cont.

• The unwanted event is given in the centre of the Bow Tie

diagram.

• The causes and hazards that potentially lead to the event

are given on the left hand side.

• The controls or barriers to the event occurring, these are

the proactive controls and are typically classified as
Elimination (of the Hazard) or Prevention (of the event).

• The event tree (the various outcomes that potentially can

occur and the controls/barriers that are in place for/after
an event occurs) is shown on the right hand side.
87 Calculate the Risk Level
 Cont.

• These are the Reactive Controls and are typically

classified as Reduction (of the consequence) or Mitigation
(of the consequence).
• The preference is for successful proactive control but
reactive control is also essential to minimize harm after an
event.

• Should the risk assessment require quantitative

consideration of different events, consequences can be
quantified by establishing a common unit for all of the
potential losses, such as dollars.

88 Calculate the Risk Level

 Cont.

• Depending on the circumstances, this may require

establishing the value of a human life.

• The accuracy of probabilistic data is sometimes

challenged, especially when the numbers are multiplied,
potentially exacerbating any inaccuracies.

89 Calculate the Risk Level

90 Calculate the Risk Level
• The SQRA technique has been used extensively and
successfully in the Oil Industry.
• There are currently two spectral extremes in risk
assessment methodologies:

1. Quantitative Risk Assessment (QRA)

2. Qualitative Risk Assessment

• The approach In Quantitative Risk Assessment, although

exhaustive and detailed, is clearly not perfect and has
two primary shortcomings.

91 Calculate the Risk Level

 Cont.

1. One is the misleading output when the selection of

failure statistics is not well considered.
2. The second is the fact that much of the decision
making in the assessment of risk is inevitably done by
a consultant.

• The SQRA approach is something of a mixture of the

two extremes.
• The SQRA has the potential to match the thoroughness
of QRA in identifying all of the failure modes but then
asks a series of questions of a representative
site/engineering team to establish the risk value.

92 Calculate the Risk Level

 Cont.

• The process is less costly than QRA but the balance of

the primary objectives is often considered to be
substantially better than either of the other options
(quantitative or qualitative).
• It must be recognized that the SQRA process probably
provides greater accuracy in regard to the relativity of
the risks than it does in regard to absolute values.

• There is no generally accepted maximum level of risk at

which a facility should operate and regulators continue
to avoid specifying criteria for demonstrating maximum
risk levels.

93 Calculate the Risk Level