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The oldest rule beginning with general
average is the law of the Rhodians which
has been preserved by the fact that it was reproduced in the Digest of the Roman Emperor Justinian. This is provided in the Rhodian Statute on jettison i.e. if goods are thrown overboard in order to keep the ship afloat, the loss incurred for the benefit of all concerned shall be made good by a contribution of all co-adventurers. Though the principles of the law are common to all maritime countries, important differences exist which make for uncertainty especially as general average adjustments may have to take place in various countries. Due to these reasons after pro long deliberations by interested parties the known York-Antwerp Rules were created. The first York Rules were created in 1864 and the first York-Antwerp Rules were created in 1890. The present rules date from 1974. In various countries there is legislation incorporating these rules but in other situations they are incorporated as contractual terms in the charter parties and bills of lading. The scheme of the Rules is to start off with a Rule of Interpretation, followed by seven rules, lettered A to G, setting out general principles. The lettered Rules are followed by twenty-two numbered Rules covering special circumstances, For some time doubts existed as to what was the relation between the lettered and the numbered Rules particularly whether a contribution was due when the event came within the numbered rules but not within in the lettered. Roche J in The Makis decided that the event had to be covered by the lettered rules if it was to require general average contribution. The trade countered with what came to be known as the Makis Agreement, whereby parties agreed that it was enough if the event was covered by one of the numbered rules. The Makis Agreement was effectively adopted by the York-Antwerp Rules when they were revised in 1950. After providing for the adjustment of general average according to the Rules to the exclusion of inconsistent law and practice, this Rule provides: Except as provided by the numbered Rules, general average shall be adjusted according to the lettered Rules. Rule A states as follows:-
“There is a general average act when, and
only when, any extraordinary sacrifice or expenditure is intentionally and reasonably made or incurred for the common safety for the purpose or preserving from peril the property involved in a common maritime adventure”. Danger
There has to be actual danger for a sacrifice or
expenditure to be treated as a general average. Watson v. Firemen’s Fund Insurance Co. 1922 2 K.B. 355
The master of a vessel mistakenly but
reasonably believed that there was fire in the hold. He turned steam into it with a view to extinguishing the fire, and thereby damaged the cargo. It was held that since there was no actual danger the loss was not a general average loss. But in terms of Rule V if a master makes a sacrifice in a situation of actual danger that later turns out to have been unnecessary the master is protected. In the case of Lowndes and Rudolf it was held that for general average rule to come into play the ship must be in actual danger, and it does not matter if the master is mistaken about the real source of danger and orders not altogether appropriate action to be taken Vlassopoulos v. British & Foreign Marine Insurance Co. While a ship was engaged in loading cargo at Bordeaux the foremast broke, fell on the main deck and caused a derrick to fall into the hold, The ship was at not time in danger, but she was moved into a wet dock for repairs. After completion she finished loading and put out to sea. There she fouled submerged wreckage and damaged the blades of her propeller. This accident rendered the vessel unfit to encounter the ordinary perils of the sea, and she put into Cherbourg for inspection and repairs, these being necessary for the common safety of ship, cargo and freight. Held: Expenses at Bordeaus were not general average expenditure, since the ship was at not time in danger. But the expenses at Cherbourg were general average expenditure, for the interests in the adventure were in danger. Per Roche J, at p.200: Peril, which means the same thing as danger, is the word used in the General Rule A, just as it is the word used in the Marine Insurance Act 1906, s. 66. The phrase is not “immediate peril or danger”. It is sufficient to say that the ship must be in danger, or that the act must be done in order to preserve her from peril. It means, or course, that the peril must be real and not imaginary, that it must be substantial and not merely slight of nugatory, In short, it must be a real danger. At p. 199 the learned judge had said that it was not necessary for the ship to be actually in the grip, or even nearly in the grip, of the disaster that may arise from a danger. It would be a very bad thing if shipmasters had to wait until that state of things arose in order to justify them doing any act which would be a general average act. General Average Acts
Supposing then that danger exists, what acts can
be done which the law will recognize as general average acts? There are two, as we have already mentioned: an extraordinary sacrifice, or a like expenditure. These must now be discussed. First it should be noticed that both sacrifice and expenditure must be extraordinary. This means that what is done to escape the calamity is something not in incidental to an ordinary voyage of the kind on which the ship is engaged. The borderline is finely drawn as appears from the following illustrations. Wilson v. Bank of Victoria A sailing ship with an auxiliary engine was so damaged by perils of the sea that she had lost all her sailing power. She therefore proceeded under her auxiliary steam, and the expenses of her voyage were thereby increased by £ 1400. These the ship owner endeavoured to spread over the interests involved.
Held: He could not do so, for the
expenditure was not extraordinary. Robinson v. Price
A ship sprang a leak while at sea and was
kept afloat only by constant pumping, the pumps being driven by the donkey engine. The coal, which was sufficient for an ordinary voyage, ran short, and ship’s spars and cargo were used for fuel.
Held: This was an extraordinary sacrifice
and the damage was to be made good by general average contribution. Jettison
The best-known form of sacrifice is jettison
of the cargo in order to lighten the ship and keep her afloat.
Deck cargo is nearest at hand when jettison
becomes necessary, and for this reason the owner of jettisoned deck cargo could in the old days never expect a contribution from the other interests. Of course, if his cargo was in fact saved he had to contribute to the other interests. In course of time, it became usual for certain cargoes, for instance, timer and, later, containers to be carried on deck, and indeed to adapt or build ships for those purposes. That is reflected in the modern York-Antwerp Rules. Rule 1 provides that ‘no jettison shall be made good as general average, unless such cargo is carried in accordance with the recognized custom of the trade’. The Rule does not mention deck cargo specifically, but it follows from its wording that jettisoned cargo carried on deck in accordance with a recognized trade custom ranks as a general average loss. Thus, only such cargo does not so rank that is not stowed in accordance with a custom, and that applies both to deck and under deck cargo. Other sacrifices are the burning of spars and cargo after the ship had sprung a leak and additional fuel was required to work the pumps, again, where a vessel had stranded and in an endeavour to refloat her the engines were intentionally overstrained and additional coal was burnt, the ship owner was held entitled to contribution in general average.
Finally, damage inflicted on third parties,
such as pier and dock owners, may constitute a general average sacrifice, and all parties must contribute to the damages which one of them becomes liable to pay. Austin Friars S.S.Co. v. Spillers & Bakers
A ship had stranded in the Severn; she was
seriously damage, and ship and cargo were in imminent danger. The vessel was got off with the assistance of tugs. The pilot intended to take her into dock, which involved her striking a pier, since she was difficult to handle, having no steam of her own and only her hand-steering gear available. The ship hit the pier and inflicted £ 5000 worth of damage, which the ship owner had to pay to the pier owners.
Held: This was a general average act, it was a
reasonable thing to do in the interests of ship and cargo, and the latter had to contribute. Expenditure The other form a general average act may take is special expenditure. As was pointed above, the expenditure, in order to qualify for contribution, must occur in the same sort of circumstances as the sacrifice. But this is not altogether true; for the actual expenditure, that is, the payment, is usually made long after the measures for the safety of ship, cargo and freight have been taken. Suppose a steamer develops engine trouble preventing her from reaching port under her own steam; if the master enters into a salvage agreement with another vessel whereby this vessel is to tow the disabled steamer, the remuneration payable to the salvors may be a general average expenditure though payment is made when there is no longer any danger of the adventure failing. But not every salvage agreement is covered; the other conditions necessary to qualify for general average must, of course, also subsist. If it turns out that the salvage agreement was unreasonable, that is, for example, if there existed at the time no extraordinary peril, the ship owner alone has to bear the costs. Even if the master acted reasonably in incurring expenses for the common safety, it does not follow that the whole amount must be contributed to by the other interests. It may have been reasonable to make a towage agreement, but the sum promised to the tug may have been unreasonably high. Other very important instances of general average expenditure are necessary repairs and other expenses incidental thereto. A ship may have to put into a port of refuge for repairs without which the voyage cannot be completed. When entering and leaving the harbour port charges, pilotage and towage fees are incurred; moreover, cargo may have to be temporarily discharged to enable workmen to reach the damaged part of the ship, and where this happens payments must be made for discharging, lighters, warehousing and reloading. Again, the first port of refuge may have inadequate repair facilities, so that the damaged ship needs towing to a suitable port. Which of these expenses qualify for general average treatment?
Purists may entertain doubt because some of
the expenses are incurred when the ship is no longer in actual danger. Most doubts are now set at rest by Rule X, which provides that all these expenses, including those at the second port of refuge, are general average expenses. Voluntary, or Intentional Act
To qualify for contribution, sacrifice or
expenditure must be voluntary, to use the words of the common law and section 66(2) Marine Insurance Act, or intentional, to use those of the York-Antwerp Rules; both words have the same meaning. This principle is strictly applied. For instance, fire breaks out on board, a serious danger to ship and cargo, and everything done to extinguish the fire, which includes beaching or scuttling the ship, is allowable, for those acts are intentional. But damage done by smoke and heat alone does not attract a contribution (Rule iii), for the fire engendering smoke and heat was not intended. Of course, smoke created by pumping water on the fire was created intentionally, but no one can distinguish between smoke created by fire and smoke created by water. So all smoke damage must be borne by whoever owns the affected property. Again, suppose part of the ship, for instance masts, have been carried away by the storm; they overhang the side of the ship and though still connected with it are effectively lost. Then the master given the order to cut those overhanging parts away – surely an intentional act, and yet the cutting away is not a general average loss (Rule IV). Why not? Because what was cut away was already lost involuntarily when the order was given.
This strict interpretation of the term ‘intentional’
does not, however, mean that the order to sacrifice or to incur expenditure must lead to the exact loss contemplated when the order was given. M’Call & Co. v. Houlder Bros.
A ship’s propeller sustained damage so that the
ship ceased to be navigable and the master put into a port of refuge for repairs. There was a perishable cargo on board which could not be warehoused. In order to facilitate repairs the master set the ship down by the head with cargo on board. The tipping of the ship caused seawater to run into the hold and to damage part of the cargo. It was contended that this was not a general average loss inasmuch as the damage to the cargo had not been foreseen as a consequence of the tipping of the ship, and that the damage to the cargo was not incurred voluntarily. Held: It was ‘not necessary that a particular loss should have been contemplated if it be incidental to the general average act’.
The act must be ordered by the person in
control of the vessel. This is, in the ordinary way, the master, who in this respect is the agent of all parties concerned. It makes no difference that the actual order is given by some other authority, provided the master sanctions it. Papayanni v. Grampian S.S. Co.
A fire broke out on board, and the master put
into port where the fire increased so that he sent for the captain of the port where the fire increased so that he sent for the captain of the port. The latter ordered the scuttling of the ship, and the master believed this course to be best in the interests of ship and cargo, raised no objection, and in the opinion of the court, sanctioned it and thereby made it his own. It was therefore held to be voluntary. In an old case it was also held that where the master was taken prisoner, and the ship was in control of a prizemaster and both the latter and mate together ordered a jettison for the commons safety, this act was ordered by the proper person. Reasonable Act
In carrying out the
general average act the master must act reasonably in the interests of all concerned, even if his act is one of considerable hazard. The Seapool
A ship with a cargo of coal on board was anchored
off the pier. A sudden gale sprang up causing the ship to drag her anchor. There was a danger of the ship losing the propellers and possibly breaking her back. The master accordingly decided to put the ship broadside against the pier, using the latter as a lever so as to get the ship’s head into such a position that he could steam out to sea. The operation was successful, but through bumping the ground and grinding the pier, £ 14000 damage was caused to ship and pier.
Held: The action taken by the master was
reasonable in the circumstances and the loss was a general average loss. Common Safety
The act must have been done ‘for the common
safety for the purpose of preserving from peril the property involved in a common maritime adventure’. Common safety, or common benefit, as the common law terms it, means safety or benefit to all parties interested in the adventure. In one case, where the cargo was removed from a stranded vessel into lighters, not with the object of lightening the ship, but of preserving the cargo, and subsequently expenses were incurred for getting the ship off, it was held that the cargo put into lighters need not contribute. Wills J laid down: If the object of the removal has been the lightening of the ship for the common safety, and the object of effecting the removal in such a fashion as to avoid jettison has been to do that which must be got overboard something less wasteful than actual jettison, there seems to be no reason whatever for drawing a distinction between such a case and that of actual jettison, so far as liability to general average is concerned. But if the lightening of the ship formed no part, or no appreciable part, of the purpose for which the removal was effected, if the object of the removal was not to minimize the cost of jettison but to get out of harm’s way the thing removed and to prevent it from being or remaining at risk at all, it seems to me that a different result may very well ensue, and that a portion of cargo landed under such circumstances may well be regarded as separated from the adventure, and no longer liable for contribution. There is authority for saying that the purpose for which an act causing loss is done may determine whether it constitutes general average or not’. Time of loss
In order to be a general average loss, the
loss must have happened during the adventure, and it is useful to remember that this is not terminated until the discharge of the cargo has been completed. Thus where 1300 tons had already been discharged, and only 100 tons remained on board, and fire broke out in the hold which made it necessary to pour in water, thereby damaging the cargo, it was held that the ship owners were liable to contribute to the damage. Loss Direct Consequence
A master’s general average act may lead to many
kinds of loss, not all of which can be allowable, just as damage caused by a common law tort may be too remote to qualify for compensation, as will be explained when we discuss collision damage in Chapter 21. Under Rule C of the York-Antwerp Rules, a general average contribution can be claimed only for the direct consequences of a general average act, that is, those which flow in an unbroken sequence from the act, as opposed to indirect consequences, where the sequence is broken by an intervening extraneous cause. In the case where this was lid down the ship was carried from her moorings in a storm. A tug was signaled to tow her to safety and was engaged under United Kingdom Standard Towing Conditions, which contained a clause obliging the tow to indemnify the tug for loss or damage suffered as a result of the towage operation. After a ten-minute tow the line parted and wrapped itself round the tug’s propeller, which in turn led to the loss of the tug. Under the indemnity clause the tow was liable to pay for the tug’s loss, and this payment was held to be a direct consequence of the general average act, namely, the engagement of the tug to guard the ship against a marine danger, and for this expenditure the owners were entitled to a general average contribution. Since this case was decided the new Rule VI expressly provides that savage expenditure, whether by contract or otherwise, is allowable.
Rule C declares not allowable, as not
being direct consequences of the general average act, loss or damage to ship or cargo through delay or loss of market suffered by the cargo. Success Finally, both at common law and under the York-Antwerp Rules, contribution can be demanded only if the general average act is successful, in other words if the adventure as a whole has really been saved; otherwise the loss lies where it falls. The whole idea underlying the doctrine of general average is that it is just that those whose property has been saved should contribute to those whose property has been sacrificed to save theirs. If the sacrifice is not successful, in the sense that no property escapes the dangers from which the sacrifice was intended to save it, this does not apply.
It is convenient here to mention a special
problem. What happens if the general average act has been successful, but subsequently, owing to new causes, ship and cargo are lost? Suppose a ship has suffered a general average loss, for instance, in the form of expenses incurred at a port of refuge for repairs, and incidental expenses, and subsequently ship and cargo are totally lost before the destination is reached. The question arises as to whether the interests which have benefited by the general average expenditure must still contribute though subsequently this benefit has been lost. The answer is that no contribution is due. At first sight this might seem inequitable, but the reason is fairly clear. Every maritime adventure is, to a certain extent, governed by a rule of limited liability; in principle no co-adventurer is supposed to lose directly more than the amount originally staked. In other words, if a party to the adventure, say, a cargo-owner, is called upon to make a payment directly arising from the adventure, such as a general average contribution, he must be able to make the payment from the goods on board, out of the fund that has been saved by the general average act. If after the general average loss, but before the end of the adventure, the cargo originally liable is lost, there is no longer any fund out of which the cargo interest can pay its contribution. Who must contribute?
Having thus determined the conditions under
which an act amounts to a general average act, and the sacrifices and expenses that are apportionable, we now proceed to inquire what interests are liable to contribute to the general average loss. Now, as we have see, there are in the normal case three interests engaged in the adventure, namely, the ship, the cargo and the freight. The position of ship and cargo owners is easy to understand; but when we come to freight it may not, at first sight, appear that there is reasons receives the freight. This may, of course, be so, but not necessarily, since the person entitled to the freight may be the charterer, and even if the owner of the sip and the person entitled to the freight are identical it is still necessary to distinguish between ship and freight are identical it is still necessary to distinguish between ship and freight. The reason briefly is this: it is one thing to suffer a loss as ship owner because, say, the engines were overstrained; it is another matter not to receive freight on jettisoned cargo. The position will perhaps become clearer if we disregard for the time being, the persons who have to contribute, and look at ship, cargo and freight as if they were persons or interests; in doing so no confusion is likely to arise where two interests happen to be united in the same individual. Lives
Ship, cargo and freight are liable for
contribution to a general average loss. Everything not falling within this category need not bear any share in the loss though other interests are in fact involved in the adventure. This applies first of all to lives. Neither passenger nor crew need contribute, for the life of man has no assessable value, it cannot be part of a fund out of which the contribution can be paid. Passengers’ luggage Probably by reason of its negligible value of the difficulty of assessing it, passengers’ luggage is free; similar considerations apply to mails and, perhaps, passengers’ luggage stored in the hold. Seamen’s wages
Finally, seamen’s wages do not form part
of the fund that contributes to a general average loss. Ship
As regards the ship, it should be
remembered that the ship owner’s liability is excluded I the case of fire on board, and if the general average loss occurred owing to a fire the ship owner might say that as he is ot liable in damages, neither need he contribute to the loss as general average contribution. But it has been held that this defence does not avail the ship owner, since section 502 of the Merchant Shipping Act has no application to general average. Cargo
No particular difficulty exists with regard to
the cargo owner’s duty to contribute, though valuation is complicated. Mails because of valuation difficulties, do not, in practice, contribute. The cargo cannot escape contribution merely because the general average loss was occasioned by one of the perils excepted in the bill of lading. Of course, if we speak of a general average contribution this contribution cannot be expected to cover the whole value of the loss. For it is the very idea of general average to distribute such loss equally, and if the owner of jettisoned cargo were fully compensated, he would suffer no loss at all, but the contributory interests would do so to the extent of their contribution. General Average and carrier’s fault
Of course, a party who is responsible for the loss
he has suffered cannot claim contribution though it may have been a general average loss, as where damage to the ship was due to starting on the voyage in an unseaworthy condition, or without due diligence having been exercised to make her seaworthy, where the Carriage of Goods by Sea Act 1971 applies. Indeed inmost cases where the right to contribution was disputed, the defence has been the actionable fault of the party seeking contribution, for instance the unseaworthiness of the ship, or the carrier’s deviation. But where the party claiming contribution, though having occasioned the loss, has contracted out of his liability by exception clauses in the contract of carriage, or where the party is exempted by statute, e.g. under section 502 of the Merchant Shipping Act 1894, his right to claim general average is not loss. Dreyfus & Co. v. Tempus Shipping Co.
A ship took on board bunker coal which was
unsuitable; the ship was therefore unseaworthy. Fire broke out in the bunker and general average expenditure was incurre to save ship and cargo. The cargo owners refused to contribute and based their refusal on the contention that the ship was unseaworthy.
Held: Ship owners entitled to contribution, since
unders section 502 of the Merchant Shipping Act 1894, they were not liable for damage caused by fire; moreover the unseaworthiness was not the cause of the casualty. General Average Bond
So far we have seen the duty to contribute to a
general average loss was founded either on a term I the contract of affreightment implied by the common law, or expressly inserted into it by reference to the York-Antwerp Rules or some other system. Sometimes, however, an express contract is made before the cargo is delivered at the port of destination by making the cargo owners sign a general average bond. The rights and duties created by such a bond are specially important where the contract of affreightment had been previously discharged, for instance by deviation, and no claim for general average contribution could any longer be founded on the contract. Again, where cargo owners, other than shippers, had signed a Lloyd’s Average Bond it was held that they were bound by the term in the bill of lading providing for general average to be determined according to general average rules, and could not be heard to say that, as they were not parties to the original contract, they were only liable at common law. Finally, such bonds may carry with them advantages relating to time bars. Thus although a general average dispute in principle arises out of the contact of carriage and is therefore subject to a time bar in an arbitration clause, the alteration of such a contract by a separate undertaking to pay general average is to subject to that time bar but to the general period of limitation governing contacts. Moreover, agreement to the Lloyd’s Average Bond may have the effect of postponing the commencement of limitation from the time of the general average event to the time of final adjustment, the bond being ‘a fresh agreement which stands on its own independently of the bill of lading’. Assessment of contribution
The general average loss must be borne by all who
are interested proportionately. This involves the fixing of values on the basis of which the contribution is assessed. As any contribution must come out of the fund saved, it is natural that the material value is the saved value, that is, the value at the port of destination, even though since the general average loss the relative values of ship and cargo have substantially changed. The estimation of these values, including the items to be allowed, is expert work, and is invariably carried out by professional men, called average adjusters. Their practice, however, varies from country to country, as also do the various laws. Where, therefore, the port of destination is a foreign port the foreign average statement is only binding if the contract of affreightment so provides. These difficulties are overcome by agreeing on the application of the York- Antwerp Rules, which not only lay down principles of general average, but also establish a system of adjustment. Thus under Rule XIII certain deductions from the cost of repairs of the ship are made in respect of ‘new for old’, one-third for vessels built more than fifteen years before the casualty, and Rule XVII provides for cargo to contribute on the basis of the invoice value, and the ship without taking account of its charter value, a solution that simplifies adjustment compared with earlier practice, when the market value determined calculation. Each interest which has suffered a general average loss becomes a creditor of the interests saved and has a direct claim against each of them for a pro rata contribution towards his indemnity, which can be enforced by action as well as by lien.
General average contribution may, of course, be
sued for in the courts, with interest a 7 per cent (Rule XXI), but special remedies have been developed to meet the situation; just as in other branches of law the person entitled to general average contribution is given the means of safeguarding himself against possible failure by the contributors. First in importance ranks the lien. It is exercises by the master, who is regarded as the agent of all the parties for the purpose of enforcing the lien; as such he is bound to take reasonable steps for safeguarding their interests. Strangely enough, general average did not come within the jurisdiction of the Admiralty Court, so that contributions had to be sued for at common law. It follows that the lien against a contributor is not in the nature of the wide maritime lien; rather is it a possessory lien, which is discharged when possession is given up. The actual exercise of the lien, e.g. on cargo, would usually, especially in modern times, work great hardship; the process of working out, or adjusting, the amounts owning by way of contribution from the various interests involved is a lengthy one and may take some months, The courts have, therefore, decided that the master sufficiently discharges his duty if he accepts a sufficient deposit in cash or other suitable security for the amount owing. In practice the security takes the form of a Lloyd’s Average Bond, so called from the fact that it was drafted under the auspices of Lloyd’s. It can be seen that the general average rules are complex, and a little thought will disclose that average adjustments, involving as they do difficult valuations, are protracted and costly. For some time it has therefore been discusses whether it would not be better to abolish the general average concept, let the loss lie where it falls as elsewhere, so that any loss is covered by insurance, Remember that general average became a problem many centuries before insurance had been developed as a refined and comprehensively used instrument. We cannot go into this argument, but only wish to indicate that those believing in the need to retain general average argue that in fact not all interests in jeopardy in a sea adventure are fully insured. Besides, they point out that abolition would confront the master with additional problems; after the event he may face complaints that he had deliberately favoured, say, his owner’s interests at the expense of those of cargo owners.
Eagle Terminal Tankers, Inc., As Owner of The "Eagle Courier," Plaintiff v. Insurance Company of U.S.S.R. (Ingosstrakh), LTD., 637 F.2d 890, 2d Cir. (1981)