Legal language

Case Summary

1) Joseph Shine v. Union of India - AIR 2018 SC 4898

2) Aruna Shanbaug v. Union of India – AIR 2011 SC
1290
3) Young Lawyers Association v. the State of Kerala –
AIR 2018 SC 1690
Joseph Shine v. Union of India - AIR 2018 SC 4898

Facts
Section 497 of the Indian Penal Code criminalized adultery, allowing a husband
to prosecute the man with whom his wife had committed adultery. However, it did
not permit a wife to prosecute the woman with whom her husband had committed
adultery. Section 198(2) of the Code of Criminal Procedure, 1973, also allowed
only a husband to prosecute the adulterer. The petitioner argued that these
provisions were discriminatory and violated Articles 14, 15, and 21 of the Indian
Constitution.
Issue
1) Constitutionality of Section 497, IPC (Adultery):
The issue was whether Section 497 of the Indian Penal Code and Section 198(2) of the Code of Criminal
Procedure were unconstitutional for being discriminatory and violating the right to equality and life

2) Gender Discrimination and Equality:

Does Section 497 create arbitrary gender-based distinctions by treating men and women unequally,
subordinating women to men, and perpetuating patriarchal stereotypes?
Does it offend the constitutional guarantee of equality and non-discrimination?

3) Violation of Dignity and Personal Liberty:

Does the law infringe on the dignity, liberty, and sexual autonomy of women, as protected under Article 21?
Does criminalizing adultery amount to unjustified state interference in the privacy of individuals and the
matrimonial sphere?

4) Legitimacy of Criminalizing Adultery:

Is adultery, a personal and moral issue, suitable for criminal sanctions?
Should adultery be treated as a civil wrong rather than a criminal offense?
Arguments by the Petitioner (Joseph Shine):
1) Violation of Fundamental Rights:
Section 497 of IPC and Section 198(2) of CrPC were argued to violate Articles 14 (equality before law), 15
(prohibition of discrimination based on sex), and 21 (right to personal liberty) of the Constitution.
The law treated women unequally, portraying them as property of their husbands and denying them agency.
2) Gender Discrimination:
The provision criminalized only the man in an adulterous relationship, exempting the woman entirely,
irrespective of her consent.
Women were excluded from filing complaints under Section 198(2) of CrPC, reinforcing gender inequality.
3) Arbitrariness of the Law:
Section 497 did not criminalize adultery involving an unmarried woman or widow, highlighting inconsistency in
its application.
The consent of the husband determined criminality, reducing women to objects and denying them autonomy.

4) Violation of Privacy:
The petitioner cited the K.S. Puttaswamy v. Union of India judgment, arguing that criminalizing adultery
infringed upon the right to privacy, including the sexual autonomy of consenting adults.
5) Global Perspective:
Many countries had decriminalized adultery, treating it as a civil issue rather than a criminal offense.
The petitioner urged the Court to align Indian law with international trends and human rights principles.
6) Outdated Social Morality:
Section 497 reflected Victorian-era morality, which was inconsistent with contemporary constitutional values
and social progress.

Arguments by the Respondent (Union of India):

1) Preservation of Marital Sanctity:
The government defended Section 497 as a law aimed at protecting the sanctity of marriage and deterring
infidelity.
2) Moral Grounds:
Adultery was argued to be an offense that disrupted family life and caused social harm, justifying criminal
sanction.

3) Non-Violation of Articles 14 and 15:

The exemption of women was claimed to be in line with Article 15(3) of the Constitution, which allows for
special provisions for the benefit of women.
5) Constitutional Validity:
Previous judgments, such as Yusuf Abdul Aziz v. State of Bombay (1954), had upheld the validity of Section
497, indicating that the law did not violate constitutional provisions.
6) No Change in Circumstances:
The respondent argued that societal conditions had not changed sufficiently to warrant striking down the law.

Judgment
The decision of the Supreme Court of India in Joseph Shine v. Union of India (2018) was as follows:
1) Section 497, IPC and Section 198, CrPC Declared Unconstitutional:
The Court unanimously held that Section 497 of the Indian Penal Code (criminalizing adultery) and Section
198(2) of the CrPC (restricting the right to file a complaint) were unconstitutional as they violated Articles 14
(Equality before the law), 15 (Prohibition of discrimination), and 21 (Right to life and personal liberty) of the
Constitution.
2) Key Findings:
Arbitrariness and Gender Inequality:
Section 497 treated women as subordinate to men and was based on archaic notions of male dominance.
The law was manifestly arbitrary and failed to treat men and women as equals in marital relationships.
It perpetuated the idea of a woman being the property of her husband, which violated her dignity and
autonomy.
Privacy and Autonomy:
Adultery as a criminal offense intruded into the private sphere of marriage and undermined the dignity and
sexual autonomy of individuals.
The right to privacy, as recognized in Justice K.S. Puttaswamy v. Union of India (2017), includes the
autonomy to make intimate choices, which the criminalization of adultery infringed upon.

Marriage and Constitutional Morality:

The law aimed to protect the sanctity of marriage but did so by subordinating women. It was inconsistent with
the constitutional guarantee of equality and dignity for all individuals.

3) Not a Crime but a Civil Matter:

The Court clarified that adultery might be a valid ground for divorce but could not be treated as a criminal
offense.
Criminalizing adultery was seen as a disproportionate intrusion into personal life and relationships.

4) Impact of the Judgment:

Adultery is no longer punishable as a criminal offense in India.
The judgment emphasized gender equality, individual dignity, and personal liberty in marital relationships.
The Court overruled previous judgments that had upheld the constitutionality of Section 497, including
Sowmithri Vishnu v. Union of India (1985) and V. Revathi v. Union of India (1988)​.
Ratio Decidendi
The Court reasoned that these provisions were based on stereotypes about
gender roles, treating women as the property of their husbands and infringing
upon their dignity. The Court also found that these provisions violated the right
to equality, as they discriminated on the grounds of sex, and the right to life, as
they infringed upon women's dignity and personal liberty.

Conclusion
In this case, the Supreme Court of India unanimously declared Section 497 of
the Indian Penal Code unconstitutional, decriminalizing adultery. The Court
held that the law violated constitutional principles of gender equality,
autonomy, and privacy, as it treated women as property of their husbands and
lacked a rational basis. The decision emphasized that while adultery could be
grounds for civil issues like divorce, it should not be a criminal offense.
Aruna Shanbaug v. Union of India – AIR 2011 SC 1290

Facts
Aruna shanbaug was a nurse at King Edward Hospital in Mumbai. In 1973 she
was sexually assaulted by a ward boy at the hospital and strangled with a dog
chain which cut off oxygen supply to her brain and left her in a vegetative state.
She was cared for by the hospital staff for 37 years. Pinki Virani, who had
written a book about Shanbaug, filed a petition in the supreme court seeking
permission for passive euthanasia.
Issue

The issue before the court was whether passive euthamasia.could be allowed under the Indian
law and whether the court could issue directives for the same.

Does the right to live with dignity under Article 21 include the right to refuse medical
treatment and the right to die with dignity in cases of incurable and terminal conditions?
Could allowing euthanasia align with the fundamental rights guaranteed by the Constitution?
In cases where the patient is in a persistent vegetative state (PVS) or unable to express their
wishes:
Who should decide on the withdrawal of life-support systems—family members, hospital
staff, or a court of law?
What safeguards should be in place to prevent misuse of euthanasia?

The Court considered whether the state has a duty to preserve life at all costs, even in cases
of extreme suffering or terminal conditions.
The issue raised questions about balancing the state's role with an individual's autonomy and
dignity.
Arguments by Pinki Virani (Petitioner):
Right to Die with Dignity:
Argued that keeping Aruna alive in a persistent vegetative state (PVS) violated her right
to live with dignity under Article 21 of the Constitution.
Emphasized that Aruna was incapable of feeling or expressing herself, and her continued
existence was akin to prolonged suffering.
Passive Euthanasia as a Moral Choice:
Advocated for passive euthanasia, stating that withdrawing life-support would allow Aruna
to die peacefully and with dignity.
Referred to international practices where passive euthanasia was recognized as a humane
option for terminally ill or irreversibly incapacitated patients.
Support from Medical Ethics:
Cited ethical principles from medical literature that advocate against prolonging suffering
when there is no hope of recovery.
Pointed out that Aruna had no possibility of regaining consciousness, as confirmed by
medical opinions.
Global Precedents:
Referred to cases such as Airedale NHS Trust v. Bland (1993) in the UK, where the withdrawal of life-support
for a PVS patient was permitted by the courts.

Arguments by KEM Hospital Staff:

Opposition to Euthanasia:
The staff who cared for Aruna for 37 years argued against euthanasia, stating they were committed to her care
and did not wish to terminate her life.
Claimed that Aruna showed some reflexes and responded to their presence, suggesting she had some level of
awareness.
Quality of Care Provided:
Highlighted that Aruna was not in pain or distress and was being looked after with great care and compassion
by the hospital staff.
Stated that her life, though limited, was not entirely devoid of meaning, as she was loved and cared for by the
staff.

Moral and Ethical Concerns:

Opposed the idea of euthanasia on moral grounds, arguing that terminating Aruna’s life would set a dangerous
precedent.
Arguments by the Union of India (Respondent):
No Legal Framework for Euthanasia:
Emphasized that euthanasia, whether active or passive, was not recognized
under Indian law.
Stated that the Court should not make decisions on such a sensitive issue in the
absence of specific legislation.
State's Duty to Protect Life:
Argued that the state has a duty to preserve life under Article 21 and should not
allow any action that could lead to the termination of life.
Concerns About Misuse:
Highlighted the potential for abuse if euthanasia were to be permitted,
particularly in cases involving vulnerable individuals who cannot express their
consent.
Alternative Relief:
Suggested that Aruna’s care should continue as it had been for decades, ensuring
her dignity and well-being without resorting to euthanasia.
Judgment
The Court, while rejecting the specific plea to withdraw Aruna's life support, recognized the
legality of passive euthanasia under stringent conditions. It distinguished between active
euthanasia (illegal in India) and passive euthanasia, which involves withdrawing life-
sustaining treatment. The Court permitted passive euthanasia in "rarest of rare
circumstances," outlining a procedure that requires the High Court's approval under Article
226 of the Constitution. This procedure involves the Chief Justice forming a bench,
referring the case to a committee of three doctors, notifying family and the state, and
ensuring a prompt decision. This judgment marked a significant shift in Indian law,
legalizing passive euthanasia and addressing prolonged patient suffering.
Ratio Decidendi
The court reasoned that the right to life under Article 21 of the Indian Constitution includes
the right to live with dignity. The court also referred to international cases and laws on
euthanasia. The court held that passive euthanasia could be allowed when the person is in a
persistent vegetative state and the decision is made in the best interest of the patient.
Guidelines for Passive Euthanasia
The Court laid down the following procedures to regulate passive euthanasia until formal legislation was
enacted:
i. Application to High Court:
A request for passive euthanasia must be made to the respective High Court under Article 226 of the
Constitution.
ii. Bench Formation:
The High Court must constitute a bench of at least two judges to decide on the application.
iii. Consultation with Medical Experts:
The Court must seek the opinion of a board of three reputable doctors with expertise in neurology,
psychiatry, and critical care.
These doctors should thoroughly examine the patient and submit a detailed report on their condition.
iv. Notice to Parties:
The Court must issue notices to the state, the patient’s relatives, and any other concerned parties to
gather all relevant perspectives.
v. Court’s Satisfaction:
The High Court must carefully evaluate all evidence, including the patient’s medical condition, and satisfy
itself that the decision to withdraw life-support is in the best interests of the patient.
Conclusion
In this case, the Supreme Court of India addressed a petition seeking
permission for the withdrawal of life support for Aruna Shanbaug, who
had been in a persistent vegetative state for decades. The Court declined
the specific request to withdraw life support, emphasizing the dedicated
care provided by the KEM Hospital staff, who opposed the euthanasia
plea. However, the Court recognized the legality of passive euthanasia
under strict guidelines, allowing withdrawal of life-sustaining treatment
in certain circumstances with High Court approval.
Young Lawyers Association v. the State of Kerala – AIR
2018 SC 1690

Facts

The Sabarimala Temple, located in Kerala, India, had an ageold custom

of not allowing women of menstruating age (1050 years) to enter the
temple premises. This practice was based on the belief that the temple
deity, Lord Ayyappa, is a celibate and the presence of women of
menstruating age would disturb the deity's celibacy. The Young Lawyers
Association challenged this practice, arguing that it violated women's
right to equality, nondiscrimination and religious freedom
Issue
The issue was whether the prohibition of women aged between 10 to 50
years from entering the sabarimala Temple in Kerala amounts to
discrimination and violates the Constitution of India.

Does the exclusion of women from the temple violate Articles 14, 15, 17,
19(1), and 25(1) of the Constitution?

Do devotees of Lord Ayyappa constitute a separate religious denomination

under Article 26, thereby justifying the exclusion?
Is the exclusion an essential religious practice protected under Article 25?
Is Rule 3(b) of the Kerala Hindu Places of Public Worship (Authorization
of Entry) Rules, 1965, permitting such exclusion, constitutionally valid?
Arguments
Petitioners' Arguments:

Violation of Fundamental Rights: The petitioners contended that the exclusion of women based on
their biological characteristic of menstruation amounted to discrimination, infringing upon Articles
14 (equality before the law) and 15(1) (prohibition of discrimination on grounds of religion, race,
caste, sex, or place of birth) of the Constitution.
Non-Essential Religious Practice: They argued that the restriction on women's entry was not an
essential part of the Hindu religion and, therefore, should not be protected under the right to religious
freedom.

Respondents' Arguments:

Essential Religious Practice: The respondents maintained that the prohibition was integral to the
temple's religious practices, rooted in the deity Lord Ayyappa's celibate nature, and thus protected
under Articles 25 (freedom of conscience and free profession, practice, and propagation of religion)
and 26 (freedom to manage religious affairs) of the Constitution.
Religious Denomination: They asserted that the devotees of Lord Ayyappa constituted a separate
religious denomination with the autonomy to manage their own religious affairs, including the
regulation of temple entry.
Judgment
The Supreme Court, in a 4:1 majority, held that the practice of excluding women of menstruating age from the
Sabarimala Temple is unconstitutional. The Court ruled that this practice infringes upon women's right to
equality, nondiscrimination and religious freedom under Articles 14, 15 and 25 of the Constitution.

Majority Opinion

Violation of Fundamental Rights: The Court held that the exclusion of women based on biological factors
violated Articles 14 (right to equality) and 25(1) (freedom of religion) of the Constitution. It emphasized that
any exception placed on women due to biological differences is unconstitutional.
Non-Essential Religious Practice: The majority opined that the practice of excluding women was not an
essential part of the religion and, therefore, did not merit protection under the Constitution.
Invalidation of Rule 3(b): The Court struck down Rule 3(b) of the Kerala Hindu Places of Public Worship
(Authorization of Entry) Rules, 1965, which permitted the exclusion of women, declaring it unconstitutional.

Minority Opinion

Judicial Non-Interference in Religious Practices: Justice Malhotra asserted that constitutional morality
should not override the freedom to practice religion, and that the Court should not interfere in religious matters
unless they contravene public order, health, or morality.
Essential Religious Practices:
She contended that the determination of what constitutes an essential religious practice
should be left to the religious community, not the judiciary.

Religious Denomination Rights:

Justice Malhotra opined that the Sabarimala Temple's management has the right to
manage its own religious affairs, including the exclusion of certain groups, under Article
26 of the Constitution.

Potential Implications:
She cautioned that judicial intervention in such matters could lead to challenges against
various religious customs across different faiths, potentially causing social unrest.

Justice Malhotra's dissent underscores the delicate balance between religious freedom
and constitutional principles, advocating for minimal judicial intervention in deeply held
religious beliefs and practices
Ratio Decidendi
The majority opinion, delivered by Chief Justice Dipak Misra and Justice A.M. Khanwilkar,
held that religion cannot be used as a cover to deny rights of worship to women and it is also
against human dignity. Justice R.F. Nariman and D.Y. Chandrachud concurred with the
majority opinion, adding that the custom is a form of Untouchability which is abolished under
the Constitution

Conclusion

In the Indian Young Lawyers Association v. State of Kerala case, the Supreme Court of
India delivered its verdict on September 28, 2018, with a 4:1 majority. The five-judge
bench comprised Chief Justice Dipak Misra and Justices A.M. Khanwilkar, R.F.
Nariman, D.Y. Chandrachud, and Indu Malhotra. The majority opinion, authored by
Chief Justice Misra and supported by Justices Khanwilkar, Nariman, and Chandrachud,
held that the prohibition of women aged 10 to 50 from entering the Sabarimala Temple
was unconstitutional, violating Articles 14, 15, 17, 19(1), and 25(1) of the Indian
Constitution. Justice Indu Malhotra provided the sole dissenting opinion, emphasizing
the importance of respecting religious customs and the autonomy of religious
denominations.