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3. Unreasonable Search and Seizure Pnp Version

The document outlines the constitutional protections against unreasonable searches and seizures as stated in Article III, Sections 2 and 3 of the 1987 Constitution. It details the requirements for valid search and arrest warrants, the definition of probable cause, and the importance of personal knowledge by complainants and witnesses. Additionally, it discusses the implications of non-compliance with these legal standards, emphasizing the necessity of protecting individual rights and privacy.

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0% found this document useful (0 votes)
11 views120 pages

3. Unreasonable Search and Seizure Pnp Version

The document outlines the constitutional protections against unreasonable searches and seizures as stated in Article III, Sections 2 and 3 of the 1987 Constitution. It details the requirements for valid search and arrest warrants, the definition of probable cause, and the importance of personal knowledge by complainants and witnesses. Additionally, it discusses the implications of non-compliance with these legal standards, emphasizing the necessity of protecting individual rights and privacy.

Uploaded by

Ate Kiking
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© © All Rights Reserved
We take content rights seriously. If you suspect this is your content, claim it here.
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UNREASONABLE SEARCH AND

SEIZURE
ARTICLE III, SECTIONS 2 AND 3, 1987 CONSTITUTION
Section 2
The right of the people to be secure in their persons,
houses, papers, and effects against unreasonable searches
and seizures of whatever nature and for any purpose shall
be inviolable, and no search warrant or warrant of arrest
shall issue except upon probable cause to be determined
personally by the judge after examination under oath or
affirmation of the complainant and the witnesses he may
produce, and particularly describing the place to be
searched and the persons or things to be seized.
The Right to Security of Persons
1. Freedom from fear.
2. A guarantee of bodily and psychological
integrity or security.
3. A guarantee of protection of one’s rights by
the government.
SEARCHES AND
SEIZURES
SEARCHES AND SEIZURES
The inviolability of the home is one of the most
fundamental of all the individual rights declared and
recognized in the political codes of civilized nations.
No one can enter the house of another without the
consent of its owners or occupants.
It may be frail; its roof may
shake; the rain may enter; the
wind may enter. But the King
of England may not enter; all
his forces dare not cross the
threshold of the ruined
tenement.
U.S. vs. Arceo, 3 Phil. 381; attributed to William Pit
Awe surrounded and majesty clothed
King, but he humblest subject might
shut the door of his cottage against
him and defend from intrusion that
privacy which was as sacred as the
kingly prerogatives.
Cooley, Constitutional Limitations
Applicable to both types of
warrants
Persons
• Natural
• Citizen or Alien
• Juridical/Artificial
Houses
• Dwelling
• Garage, warehouse, shop, store, office, and safety deposit box
Papers and Effects
• Sealed letters and packages in the mail
It is a safeguard against wanton and
unreasonable invasion of the privacy and
liberty of a citizen as to his person, houses,
papers and effects1 by officers of the law
acting under legislative or judicial sanction
and gives remedy against such usurpation
when attempted.2
1
People vs. Burgos, 166 SCRA 1 [1986]
2
Alvero vs. Dizon, 76 Phil. 637, [1946]

GENERAL IMPORTANCE AND PURPOSE


The inviolability of the home is one of the
most fundamental of all the individual
rights declared and recognized in the
political codes of civilized nations. No one
can enter into the home of another without
the consent of its owners or occupants.”
U.S. vs. Arceo, 3 Phil. 381, [1964]

SPECIFIC IMPORTANCE AND PURPOSE:


To value the privacy of the home
The State cannot simply intrude
indiscriminately into the house,
papers, effects, and most importantly,
on the person of an individual
People vs. Aruta, 288 SCRA 626, [1998]

SPECIFIC IMPORTANCE AND PURPOSE:


To value human dignity and protect the peace and personal security
of every individual
seizure in turn is at the top of the hierarchy of
rights, next only to, if not on the same plane as,
the right to life, liberty and property, which is
protected by the due process clause. This is as
it should be for, as stressed by a couple of
noted freedom advocates, the right to personal
security which, along with the right to privacy,
is the foundation of the right against
unreasonable search and seizure “includes the
right to exist, and the right to enjoyment of life
while existing.”
People vs. Tudtud, 412 SCRA 142, [2003]
2 Types of Warrants
1.Search warrant;
2.Warrant of arrest.
Search Warrant
Is an order in writing, issued in the name of the
People of the Philippines, signed by a judge and
directed to a peace office, commanding him to search
for certain personal property and bring it before the
court. (See Rules of Court, Rule 126, Sec. 1)
Warrant of Arrest
If the command is to arrest a person
designated, i.e., to take him into custody in
order in order that he may be bound to answer
for the commission of an offense, the written
order is called Warrant of Arrest.
Applicable only to government
Intended as a restraint directly against the
government and its agents tasked with law
enforcement.
EXCEPTION:
Searches by private individuals who are not law
enforcement officers were, in, certain cases,
considered as searches made by government
agents. As such, their actions were measured against
the rigid standards imposed by the Bill of Rights. This
happens when such civilians "act under the color
of state-related functions."
EXCEPTION:
Thus, even if port personnel are not necessarily police
officers, the actions of port personnel during routine
security checks at ports have the color of state­related
authority. Searches made by members of a barangay­
based volunteer group or Bantay Bayan operatives
relating to the preservation of peace and order in their
respective areas were also deemed to have the color of
a state-related function. As such, they should be
deemed as law enforcement authorities for the purpose
of applying the Bill of Rights (See Miguel v. People, G.R.
No. 227038, July 31, 2017)
Requisites for valid search
warrant or warrant of arrest
1. It must be issued upon probable cause
2. The probable cause must be determined personally by the judge himself and
not by the applicant or any other person.
3. Such determination of the existence of probable cause must be made after
examination under oath by the judge of the complainant and the witnesses
he may produce.
4. The complainant and the witnesses must testify on facts personally known to
them; and
5. The warrant must particularly describe the place to be searched, and the
persons or things to be arrested or searched.
Effect of non-compliance
The absence of any of these requisites will cause the nullification of
the warrant.
1. Any evidence obtained in violation of the requirements or without
a warrant except in those cases where a warrant is not required,
shall be inadmissible for any purpose in any such proceeding such
as a subsequent trial even if such evidence clearly establishes his
guilt.
Effect of non-compliance
The absence of any of these requisites will cause the
nullification of the warrant.
2. The rule is that search and seizure must be carried out
through or with a validly issued judicial warrant;
otherwise, such search and seizure becomes
unreasonable and unlawful within the meaning of section
2, subject to certain exceptions.
Effect of non-compliance
The absence of any of these requisites will cause the nullification of the warrant.

3. A mere invitation to the police precinct may be covered by the


proscription on a warrantless arrest where it is actually in the nature of
an arrest designed for the purpose of conducting an investigation when
construed in the light of the circumstances (i.e., none of the exceptions
for a valid warrantless arrests is present). X x x, any evidence taken by
the police form the place of illegal arrest is inadmissible. (People vs.
Olivarez, Sr., 299 SCRA 635 [1998].) Under R.A. 7438 “custodial
investigation” covers the practice of issuing an “invitation” to a person
who is investigated in connection with an offense he is suspected to
have committed.
Effect of non-compliance
The absence of any of these requisites will cause the nullification of the warrant.

4. A waiver of an illegal warrantless arrest does not mean a waiver of the


inadmissibility of evidence seized during an illegal warrantless arrest.
In spite of such waiver, things seized during a warrantless search which
was not lawful cannot be admitted in evidence. (People vs. Lapitaje,
G.R. No. 132042, Feb. 19, 2003.)
When search and seizure
unreasonable
1. In general - The constitutional guarantee is not a blanket
prohibition against all searches and seizures as it obviously
operates only against searches and seizures that are
“unreasonable.” (People vs. Bolasa, 321 SCRA 459 [1999].) There
are instances when they are not deemed unreasonable even in
the absence of a warrant. Whether a search is reasonable or not
is not determined by any fixed formula but is to be resolved
according to the facts of the case. (People vs. Susuki, 414 SCRA 43
[2003].)
When search and seizure unreasonable
2. A judicial question – In cases were warrant is necessary, the steps prescribed by
the Constitution and reiterated in the Rules of Court must be complied with. In
the exceptional events where warrant is not necessary to effect a valid search
and seizure, or when the latter cannot be performed except without warrant,
what constitutes a reasonable or unreasonable search or seizure in any
particular case is a purely judicial question, determinable from a consideration
of the circumstances involved, including the purpose of the search or seizure,
the presence or absence of probable cause, the manner in which the search
and seizure was made, the place or thing searched, and the character of the
articles procured. (Alvarez vs. CFI of Tayabas, 64 Phil. 35 [1937].)
The burden is upon the State to demonstrate the reasonableness of the
search or seizure. In case of doubt, the same should be resolved against the
exercise of power.
When search and seizure unreasonable
3. Where there is consent or waiver – Without a proper search warrant, no
public official has the right to enter the premises of another without his
consent for the purpose of search and seizure. It does not admit of
doubt, therefore, that a search or seizure cannot be considered as
unreasonable and thus offensive to the Constitution if consent is shown.
For this immunity from unwarranted intrusion is a personal right which
may be waived, either expressly or impliedly (Lopez vs. Comm. Of
Customs, 68 SCRA 320 [1976].) of by failing to object during the trial to
the legality of the search warrant and to the admissibility of the evidence
obtained thereby. (People vs. Exala, 221 SCRA 494 [1993].)
When search and seizure unreasonable
4. Where there is no copy of search warrant – In a case, the records fail to
disclose a copy of a search warrant. However, the prosecution was able
to present its return, and the judge who granted the search warrant was
the same judge who initially heard the case. It was held: “It can,
therefore, be presumed that the search was made with a search warrant
and absent of any showing that it was procured maliciously, the items
seized are admissible in evidence.” (People vs. Umali, 193 SCRA 493
[1991].)
What is Probable Cause?
Probable Cause means such facts and circumstances antecedent to
the issuance of a warrant that are in themselves sufficient to induce a
cautious man to rely upon them.
Two types of probable cause
Probable Cause for the issuance of warrant of arrest.
Probable Cause for a search
Two types of probable cause
Probable Cause for the issuance of warrant of arrest would mean such facts
and circumstances which would lead a reasonably discreet and prudent man to
believe that an offense has been committed by the person sought to be
arrested.
Probable Cause for a search would mean such facts and circumstances which
would lead a reasonably discreet and prudent man to believe that an offense
has been committed and that the objects sought in connection with the offense
are in the place to be searched. (Henry v. United States, 361 U.S. 98, 102
(1959)).
Who may determine probable cause
for the purpose of issuing a warrant?
Only a judge.
Determination of Probable
Cause by the Judge
No exact test for the determination of probable cause
The framers of the Constitution confined the determination
of probable cause as basis for their issuance to judges to
better secure the people against unreasonable searches and
seizures. (Mantaring vs. Roman, Jr. 254 SCRA 158 [1996])
Determination of Probable
Cause by the Judge
Existence dependent upon state of facts of particular
case.
No formula or standard, or hard and fast rule may be laid
down which may be applied to the facts of every situation.
Hearing is not necessary.
Rules of evidence not to be applied.
Determination of Probable
Cause by the Judge
Personal Examination of complainant and witnesses not always
essential
May rely on the report or supporting documents submitted by the
prosecutor.
The prosecutor can perform the same functions as a commissioner for the
taking of the evidence. (Lim vs. Felix, 187 SCRA 292 [1991].)
The examination or investigation of the complainant and his witnesses which
must be under oath may not be in public. It may even be held in the secrecy
of the judge’s chambers (Mata vs. Bayona, 128 SCRA 389 [1984].)
The judge must make his own inquiry on the intent and justification of the
application.
Determination of Probable
Cause by the Judge
Personal evaluation of the report and supporting documents
required.
What is emphasized merely is the exclusive and personal responsibility of the
issuing judge to satisfy himself of the existence of probable cause.
It is the duty of the judge: 1) to personally evaluate the report and the
supporting documents submitted by the prosecutor regarding the existence of
probable cause and, on the basis thereof, issue the warrant; or 2) if on the
basis thereof, he finds no probable cause, he may disregard the report and
require the submission of supporting documents to aid him in arriving at a
conclusion on the existence of probable cause. (Supreme Court Cir. No. 12,
June 30, 1987; Soliven vs. Makasiar)
Determination of Probable
Cause by the Judge
Evidence supporting finding of probable cause
essential
Determination of Probable
Cause by the Judge
Need for naming respondent in application for a warrant
◦ Issuance of a search warrant and of a warrant of arrest requires
the showing of probabilities as to different facts.
Determination of Probable
Cause by the Judge
Issuance of warrant of arrest discretionary/mandatory.
When determination may be
made
May be determined by the judge at the preliminary inquiry or
examination which is an ex parte proceeding,
or after the filing of the information following a preliminary
investigation proper where no warrant has as yet been issued.
Personal Knowledge of facts by
complainant and his witnesses.
The Constitution requires no less than personal knowledge
by the complainant or his witnesses of the facts upon which
the issuance of a search warrant may be justified.
Personal Knowledge of facts by
complainant and his witnesses.
Purpose of Oath
Test of sufficiency of affidavit
When affidavit insufficient
Taking of sworn written depositions in
answer to searching questions.
Meaning of Depositions
Mere affidavits of the complainant and his witnesses are not sufficient.
Nature of searching questions to applicants
Rule 126, Sec. 5, ROC
Rule 11, Sec. 6, ROC

NOTE: Searching examination of witnesses is not necessary before issuing


warrants of arrest, no is the issuance of an order of arrest required prior to the
issuance of warrant of arrest. (Webb vs. De Leon, 247 SCRA 653 [1995].)
Sufficiency of description
Purpose of the requirement
Place
Person
Property
Effect of non-compliance
Will cause nullification of the warrant. (Republic vs. Sandiganbayan, 255 SCRA
438, [1996])
Things seized shall be inadmissible for any purpose in any proceeding.
A waiver of an illegal warrantless arrest does not mean a waiver of the
inadmissibility of evidence seized during an illegal warrantless arrest. In spite
such waiver, things seized during a warrantless search which was not lawful
cannot be admitted in evidence. (People vs. Lapitaje, GR No. 132042,
2/19/2003)
GENERAL
WARRANTS
Meaning of general
warrant/general search warrant
General Warrant – a search warrant that is not particular as to the person to be
arrested or the property to be seized.
General Search Warrant – is one that allows the “seizure of one thing under a
warrant describing another” and gives the officer executing the warrant the
discretion over which items to take. (Worldwide Web Corporation vs. People,
713 SCRA 18 [2014.)
General search warrants
constitutionally objectionable
They were outlawed because they place the sanctity of the domicile and the
privacy of communication and correspondence (Sec. 3) at the very mercy of the
whims, caprice or passion of peace officers. (Stonehill vs. Diokno, 20 SCRA 383
[1967].)
To satisfy the requirement of probable cause, a specific offense must be alleged in the
application; abstract averments will not suffice.
A search warrant that is too general, in effect, mentions no specific offense or covers more
than one specific offense.
Only one offense per search warrant.
Warrant to Search for evidence
to be used against the accused
A warrant is not a sweeping authority empowering a raiding party to
undertake a fishing expedition to seize and confiscate any and all
kinds of evidence or articles relating to a crime. (People vs. Del
Rosario, 234 SCRA 246 [1994].)
Disposition of property seized
The responsibilities of the judge does not end with the granting of
the search warrant but extends to the custody of the articles seized.
(Summerville Gen. Merchandising Co. vs. CA, 525 SCRA 603 [2007].)
The police officer must forthwith deliver the property seized by him to the
judge who issued the warrant, together with the tur and accurate inventory
thereof duly verified under oath (Sec. 12[a], Rule 126, ROC)
Property wrongfully seized, either without a search warrant or by virtue of an
illegal warrant, or where the property taken is not the same as that described
in the warrant, upon showing of the illegal seizure, the property should be
returned to the owner on his application therefor. It is not admissible in
evidence because it is “the fruit of the poisonous tree.”
Disposition of property seized
Where the articles seized are illegal or the possession of which is prohibited,
such as stolen or smuggled goods, firearms, and the like, their return to the
owner even if illegally seized may not be ordered by the court. (Mata vs.
Bayona, 128 SCRA 389 [1984]; although they remain inadmissible as evidence.
Pending resolution of the case, however, the said articles must remain in
custodia legis.
Where property is the subject of litigation, it must remain in custodia legis
until the case is terminated. (Alih vs. Castro, 151 SCRA 279 [1987].) Replevin
will not lie for property in custodia legis. (Chua vs. CA, 222 SCRA 85 [1993].)
Right against unreasonable
search and the seizure personal
The legality of a search and seizure can be contested only by the
party whose rights were involved and have been impaired thereby,
and objection thereto is purely personal and cannot be availed of by
third parties. (Uy vs. BIR, 344 SCRA 36 [2000].)
Officers of certain corporations, from which documents, papers and
things were seized by means of search warrants, have no cause of
action to assail the legality of the seizure because said corporations
have personalities distinct and separate from those said officers.
WHEN SEARCH AND
SEIZURE MAY BE
MADE WITHOUT
JUDICIAL WARRANT
WARRANTLESS ARRESTS AND WARRANTLESS SEIZURES
WARRANTLESS
ARRESTS
Sec. 5, Rule 111, ROC
Sec. 5. Arrest without warrant; when lawful. – A peace officer or
private person may, without a warrant, arrest a person:

a) When, in his presence, the person to be arrested has committed,


is actually committing, or is attempting to commit an offense;
b)When an offense has just been committed, and he has probable
cause to believe, based on personal knowledge of the facts or
circumstances, that the person to be arrested has committed it;
and
c) When the person to be arrested is a prisoner who has escaped
from a penal establishment or place where he is serving final
judgment or is temporarily confined while his case is pending, or
has escaped while being transferred from one confinement to
another.
OTHER GROUNDS FOR A
LAWFUL WARRANTLESS ARREST
a) When a person, previously lawfully arrested, escapes or is
rescued. Any person may immediately pursue or retake him
without a warrant at any time and in any place within the
Philippines (Sec. 13, Rule 113, ROC)
b) A warrant of arrest is not necessary if the bondsman arrests the
accused for purposes of surrendering him. The bondsman may
even cause the arrest of the accused by a police officer or any
other person of suitable age and discretion upon a written
authority endorsed on a certified copy of the undertaking (Sec.
23, Rule 114, ROC)
c) When an accused released on bail attempts to depart from the
Philippines without permission of the court where the case is
pending, he may be re-arrested without a warrant (Sec. 23, Rule
114, Rules of Court)
IN FLAGRANTE DELICTO
EXCEPTION; BASIS; REQUISITES
TWO REQUISITES MUST CONCUR:
a) The person to be arrested must execute an overt act indicating
that he has just committed, is actually committing, or is
attempting to commit a crime; and
b) Such overt act is done in the presence or within the view of the
arresting officer. (People vs. Pardillo, G.R. No. 219590, June 7,
2017; Miguel v. People, G.R. No. 227038, July 31, 2017; Dacanay v.
People, G.R. No. 199018, September 27, 2017).
IN FLAGRANTE DELICTO
EXCEPTION; BASIS; REQUISITES
In an arrest in flagrante delicto under Sec. 5(a), Rule 113, mere
“suspicion” and “reliable information” are not justification for a
warrantless arrest. Such words are not found in the rule.
On the contrary, the requires that the accused perform some overt
act that would indicate that he has committed, is actually
committing, or is attempting to commit an offense.
IN FLAGRANTE DELICTO
EXCEPTION; BASIS; REQUISITES
In this type of warrantless arrest, the person making the arrest
himself witnesses the crime and. Hence, has personal knowledge of
the commission of the offense (People v. Villareal, 693 SCRA 549,
556-557, March 18, 2013), as when, for example, he sees Mr. AA fire
a gun at Mr. BB.
IN FLAGRANTE DELICTO
EXCEPTION; BASIS; REQUISITES
An arrest made after an entrapment operation does not require a
warrant inasmuch as it is considered a valid “warrantless arrest.”
Considering that an arrest was lawfully made, the search incidental
to such arrest was also valid. A person lawfully arrested may be
searched, without a search warrant, for dangerous weapons or
anything which may have been used or constitute proof in the
commission of an offense (People v. Almodiel, 680 SCRA 452, 484,
June 13, 2013). Also a prior surveillance is not a prerequisite for the
validity of an entrapment operation (People v. Villahermoso, G.R. No.
218208, January 24, 2018).
IN FLAGRANTE DELICTO
EXCEPTION; BASIS; REQUISITES
A police officer’s act of soliciting drugs from the accused during a
buy-bust operation, or what is known as decoy solicitation, is not
prohibited by law and does not render the operation invalid (See
People v. Dumagay, G.R. No. 216753, February 7, 2018). Hence,
where the prosecution proved that appellant was apprehended after
she exchanged the shabu in her possession for the marked money of
the poseur-buyer, in the presence of the officers, the arrest was in
flagrante delicto. Having been caught in flagrante delicto, the police
officers were not only authorized but were even duty-bound to
arrest her even without a warrant (People v. Marcelo, G.R. No.
181541, August 18, 2014).
WHEN NOT IN FLAGRANTE
DELICTO EXCEPTION
When the accused was arrested while merely talking to a police informant,
and there was no overt act indicative of a felonious enterprise that could be
properly attributed to the said accused to arouse suspicion in the mind of the
arresting officer that the accused has just committed, was actually
committing, or was attempting to commit a crime, the warrantless arrest was
not valid. As testified to by the arresting officer himself in the same case, the
accused and the informant were just talking to each other and there was no
exchange of money and drugs when he approached the car. He also admitted
on cross-examination that he had no personal knowledge on whether there
was a prohibited drug and gun inside the vehicle of the accused when he
approached it (People v. Edaño, G.R. No. 188133, July 7, 2014).
WHEN NOT IN FLAGRANTE
DELICTO EXCEPTION
1) The police officers claim that they were alerted when they saw two
unidentified men suddenly rush out of a house. Since they suspected that a
crime had been committed, the natural thing for them to do was to give
chase to the jeep that the two fleeing men boarded, given that the officers
were in a patrol car and a tricycle. Although running after the fleeing
suspects was the more urgent task, the officers instead, gave priority to the
house even when they heard no cry for help from it; (2) Admittedly, the
police officers did not notice anything amiss going on in the house from the
street where they stood. Indeed, even as they peeked through its partially
opened door, they saw no activity that warranted their entering it. Clearly,
no crime was plainly exposed to the view of the arresting officers that
authorized the arrest of accused without a warrant (Antiquera v. People, 712
SCRA339, 344, December 11, 2013).
WHEN NOT IN FLAGRANTE
DELICTO EXCEPTION
The Court, in Villareal, also instructed that it would be error to rule in
favor of the validity of a person's arrest based on personal
knowledge of facts regarding appellant's person and past criminal
record. Even "a previous arrest or existing criminal record, even for
the same offense, will not suffice to satisfy the exacting
requirements provided under Sec. 5, Rule 113 in order to justify a
lawful warrantless arrest."
WHEN NOT IN FLAGRANTE
DELICTO EXCEPTION
The mere act of darting away when approached by a policer officer should
not be construed against the accused. Flight per se is not synonymous with
guilt and must not always be attributed to one's consciousness of guilt. It is
not a reliable indicator of guilt without other circumstances. An attempt to
run away from an officer is susceptible of various explanations. It could
signify guilt or may signify innocence. There are many innocent reasons for
flight like fear or retribution for speaking to an officer, unwillingness to
appear as witnesses, and fear of being apprehended even if he is innocent.
Also, the act of walking along the street and holding something in one's
hand, even if they appeared to be dubious, coupled with his previous
criminal charge for the same offense, are not by themselves sufficient to
incite suspicion of criminal activity or to create probable cause enough to
justify a warrantless arrest (People v. Villareal, 693 SCRA 549, 560-561,
March 18, 2013).
WHEN NOT IN FLAGRANTE
DELICTO EXCEPTION
In Comerciante v. People, G.R. No. 205926, July 22, 2015, the Court
rejected the validity of an arrest made by an officer on the basis of
his observation that the accused was standing around and showing
"improper and unpleasant movements.” Such acts, declared the
Court, cannot be considered criminal acts. At that time, the officer
was aboard a motorcycle cruising at a speed of 30 kilometers per
hour when he allegedly saw the accused, while standing on the side
of a street, handing over something to another, at a distance of 10
meters. The Court found it highly implausible, even assuming that
he had a perfect vision, to have been able to identify minuscule
amounts of crystalline substances inside two plastic sachets.
WHEN NOT IN FLAGRANTE
DELICTO EXCEPTION
A 1988 case, People v. Aminnudin, 163 SCRA 402, demonstrates the legal infirmity of an arrest for
noncompliance with the requisites of the flagrante delicto exception and in which the mere tip of an
informant became the basis of a warrantless arrest and subsequent search.
The Court declared as inadmissible in evidence the marijuana found in the possession of the accused
as a product of an illegal search since it was admittedly made not as an incident to a lawful arrest.
Emphatically, the Supreme Court declared that the accused was not, at the moment of his arrest,
committing a crime nor was it shown that he was about to do so or that he had just done so. He was
merely descending the gangplank of the ship holding a bag and there was no outward indication that
called for his arrest. To all appearances, he was like any of the other passengers innocently
disembarking from the vessel. It was only when the informer pointed to him as the carrier of the
marijuana that he suddenly became a suspect and so subject to apprehension. The Court added that,
from the information received by the officers, they could have obtained a warrant since they had at
least two days to apply for the same but the officers made no efforts to comply with the Bill of Rights.
They chose to ignore the law. The Bill of Rights was ignored altogether because the head of the
arresting team, had determined on his own authority that a “search warrant was not necessary.
WHEN IN FLAGRANTE DELICTO
EXCEPTION
In People v. Claudio, 160 SCRA 646, the accused, who was carrying a
woven buri-like plastic bag which appeared to contain camote tops,
boarded a bus bound for the province. Instead of placing the bag by
her side, which is the usual practice of a traveler, she placed the same
on the back seat where a trained anti-narcotics agent was seated.
Since the act of the accused was unusual for a traveler, the suspicion
of the agent was aroused. Feeling that something was unusual, the
agent inserted his finger inside the bag where he felt another plastic
bag in the bottom from which emanated the smell of marijuana.
Right after she got off the bus, the agent arrested the accused.
WHEN IN FLAGRANTE DELICTO
EXCEPTION
When a police officer, for instance, sees the offense, although at a
distance, or hears the disturbance created, and proceeds at once to
the scene thereof, he may effect an arrest without a warrant since
the offense is deemed committed in his presence (People v. Del
Rosario, 305 SCRA 740, 759-760).
WHEN IN FLAGRANTE DELICTO
EXCEPTION
In People v. Maspil, 188 SCRA 751, because of confidential reports from informers that
two persons would be transporting a large quantity of marijuana, officers set up a
checkpoint in Benguet to monitor, inspect and scrutinize vehicles bound for Baguio City.
A couple of hours after midnight, a jeepney was flagged down in the checkpoint. On
board were the persons identified by the informers who were also with the policemen
manning the check point. When the sacks and tin cans inside the jeepney were opened,
they contained marijuana leaves. The policemen then placed the two accused under
arrest. Again, the Court distinguished Maspil from Aminnudin. In the latter, the officers
were aware of the identity of the accused, his planned criminal enterprise and the
vessel he would be taking. Further, in Aminnudin, the Court found that the officers had
sufficient time to obtain a search warrant. In Maspil, the officers had no exact
description of the vehicle of the accused, and no idea of the definite time of its arrival.
The Court explained that a jeepney on the road is not the same as a passenger boat the
route and time of arrival of which are more or less certain and which ordinarily cannot
deviate or alter its course or select another destination.
THE HOT PURSUIT EXCEPTION
TWO stringent requirements before a warrantless arrest can be effected:

(a) an offense has just been committed; and


(b) the person making the arrest has personal knowledge of facts indicating
that the person to be arrested has committed it (People v. Villareal, 693
SCRA 549, 556, March 18, 2013; Pestilos v. Generoso, 739 SCRA 337,
362, November 10, 2014; Comerciante v. People, G.R. No. 205926, July
22, 2015; Miguel v. People, G.R. No. 227038, July 31, 2017).
THE HOT PURSUIT EXCEPTION
Under this exception, law enforcers need not personally
witness the commission of the crime but they must have
personal knowledge of facts and circumstances
indicating that the person sought to be arrested
committed it (Veridiano v. People, G.R. No. 200370, June 7,
2017). In fact, the offense was not committed in his presence
although said offense, as required by the Rules, ''has just been
committed." The tenor of the rule obviously emphasizes the
immediacy of the arrest reckoned from the commission of the
commission of the crime. Hence, the hot pursuit exception. A
warrantless arrest made one year after the offense was
allegedly committed, is an illegal arrest (Bar 1997, 2004, 2017)
THE HOT PURSUIT EXCEPTION
A warrantless arrest effected the day after the commission of the crime of
robbery with homicide does not fall within the purview of the hot pursuit
exception. The requirement of "immediacy" between the time of the
commission of the crime and the time of the arrest is absent (See People v. Del
Rosario, 305 SCRA 740, 760).

In People v. Cendana, 190 SCRA 538, an arrest made, based on information


from unnamed sources, a day after the crime was committed was held to be
invalid.

In Rolito Go v. Court of Appeals, 206 SCRA 138, the accused was arrested six
(6) days after the commission of the crime. The arrest was held invalid because
the offense has not just been committed.

In Posadas v. Ombudsman, 341 SCRA 388, a warrantless arrest was invalidated


because it was made three days after the commission of the crime.
THE HOT PURSUIT EXCEPTION
It must be emphasized that the 'personal knowledge' referred to under the
hot pursuit exception does not refer to actual knowledge of the crime
because the officer did not witness its commission. The knowledge referred to
is knowledge that a crime was committed even if it was not committed in his
presence.

"Under the flagrante delicto exception, the person making the


arrest himself witnesses the crime. In the hot pursuit exception, the
person making the arrest knows for a fact that a crime has been
committed" (People v. Villareal, 693 SCRA 549, 557, March 18,
2013; Miguel v. People, G.R. No. 227038, July 31, 2017).
THE HOT PURSUIT EXCEPTION
The person making the arrest has personal knowledge
of the fact that a crime was committed because at the
time of the arrest, he has reasonably worthy
information in his possession coupled with his own
observation and fair inferences therefrom that the
person arrested has probably committed the offense.
The arresting officer may even rely on information
supplied by a witness or a victim of the crime (Pestilos
v. Generoso, 739 SCRA 337, 364-365, November 10,
2014).
THE HOT PURSUIT EXCEPTION
Personal knowledge of facts must be based on probable
cause, which means an actual belief or reasonable grounds
of suspicion. The grounds are reasonable when the
suspicion that the person to be arrested is probably guilty of
committing the offense is based on actual facts, i.e.,
supported by circumstances sufficiently strong in
themselves to create the probable cause of guilt of the
person to be arrested. A reasonable suspicion, therefore,
must be founded on probable cause, coupled with good
faith on the part of the peace officers making the arrest
(Abelita v. Doria, 596 SCRA 220, 227).
THE HOT PURSUIT EXCEPTION
The facts or circumstances, that would lead an officer to
acquire personal knowledge that a crime was in fact
commit­ted, pertain to actual facts or raw evidence
which are sufficiently strong in themselves to create the
required probable cause (Pestilos v. Generoso, 739
SCRA 337, 367, November 10, 2014).
THE HOT PURSUIT EXCEPTION:
EXAMPLE
In People v. Acol, 232 SCRA 406, two robbers divested
the passengers of a jeepney of their belongings
including the jacket of one passenger. The passengers
immediately sought the help of police officers which
formed a team to track down the suspects. One of the
passengers, who went with the responding police
officers, saw one of the robbers casually walking in the
same vicinity and wearing his jacket. The warrantless
arrest of the accused was sustained by the Court as
well within the hot pursuit exception.
THE HOT PURSUIT EXCEPTION:
EXAMPLE
In People v. Gerente, 219 SCRA 756, the Valenzuela police station
received a report of a mauling incident, which resulted in the death of
the victim, who received a massive skull fracture caused by a hard
and heavy object. The policemen saw the dead victim in the hospital
and saw the instruments of death in the crime scene. Right away, the
officers went to the crime scene and found a piece of wood with blood
stains, a hollow block and two pouches of marijuana. A witness told
the police that the accused was one of those who killed the victim.
They proceeded to the house of the accused and arrested him some
three (3) hours after the alleged killing. The Court ruled that, based on
their knowledge of the circumstances of the death of the victim and
the report of an eyewitness, in arresting the accused, the officers had
personal knowledge of facts leading them to believe that it was the
accused who was one of the perpetrators of the crime.
THE HOT PURSUIT EXCEPTION:
EXAMPLE
In Abelita v. Doria, 596 SCRA 220, the petitioner alleged that he was
arrested based merely on information relayed to the police officers about
a shooting incident and that they had, at the time of the arrest, no
personal knowledge of the facts. The Court found that as soon as the
police received a phone call about a shooting incident, a team was
dispatched to investigate. The investigation disclosed that a victim was
wounded and that the witnesses tagged the petitioner as the one involved
and that he had just left the scene of the crime. After tracking down the
petitioner, he was invited to the police headquarters but the petitioner,
who initially agreed, sped off prompting the authorities to give chase.
The Court ruled that the petitioner's act of trying to get away, coupled
with the incident report which they investigated, is enough to raise a
reasonable suspicion on the part of the police authorities to the existence
of a probable cause.
THE HOT PURSUIT EXCEPTION:
EXAMPLE
In a recent case, the arresting officers went to the scene
of the crime, upon complaint of the offended party that
he Was mauled, less than an hour after the alleged
mauling. They say the bloodied state of the victim and
how the latter identified the assailants. The accused
when confronted by the police did not deny the mauling
although they gave another version of the incident.
These circumstances qualify as to the officers' personal
knowledge of the commission of a crime to justify the
warrantless arrest (Pestilos v. Generoso, 739 SCRA. 337,
377, November 10, 2014).
WARRANTLESS
SEARCHES
When search and seizure may be
made without judicial warrant
 Where there is consent or waiver.
 Where search is an incident to a lawful arrest.
 Plain view
 Search of a moving vehicle
 Checkpoint
 Customs search or Seizure of goods concealed to avoid duties.
 Stop and frisk
 As incident of inspection, supervision and regulation in the exercise of police power
WHERE THERE IS CONSENT OR
WAIVER
A consented search occurs when a person gives a law
enforcement agent permission to search in areas in
which such person has a reasonable expectation of
privacy.
WHERE THERE IS CONSENT OR
WAIVER
Jurisprudence requires that in case of consented
searches or waiver of the constitutional guarantee
against obtrusive searches, it is fundamental that to
constitute a waiver, it must first appear that (1) the
right exists; (2) the person involved had knowledge,
either actual or constructive, of the existence of such
right; and (3) the said person had an actual intention to
relinquish the right (People v. Nuevas, 516 SCRA 463,
482)
WHERE THERE IS CONSENT OR
WAIVER
The consent to a warrantless search must be voluntary.
This means that it must be unequivocal, specific, and
intelligently given, uncontaminated by any duress or
coercion. Consent to a search is not to be lightly
inferred, but must be shown by clear and convincing
evidence. It is the State which has the burden of proving,
by clear and positive testimony, that the necessary
consent was obtained and that it was freely and
voluntarily given (Valdez v. People, 538 SCRA 611, 614;
See also People v. Cogaed, G.R. No. 200334, July 30,
2014; Veridiano v. People, G.R. No. 200370, June 7, 2017).
WHERE THERE IS CONSENT OR
WAIVER
Consent cannot be inferred from mere silence. There can be no
valid waiver, of the accused's constitutional rights even if it is
assumed that he did not object when the police asked him to
open his bags. "Appellant's silence should not be lightly taken as
consent to such search. The implied acquiescence to the search,
if there was any, could not have been more than mere passive
conformity given under intimidating or coercive circumstances
and is, thus, considered no consent at all within the purview of
the constitutional guarantee.
WHERE THERE IS CONSENT OR
WAIVER
[His] silence or lack of aggressive objection was a natural
reaction to a coercive environment brought about by the police
officer's excessive intrusion into his private space. The
prosecution and the police carry the burden of showing that the
waiver of a constitutional right is one which is knowing,
intelligent, and free from any coercion. In all cases, such waivers
are not to be presumed" (People v. Cogaed, G.R. No. 200334, July
30 2014).
SEARCH INCIDENT TO A LAWFUL
ARREST
A person lawfully arrested may be searched, without a search
warrant, for dangerous weapons, or anything which may have
been used or constitute proof in the commission of an offense
(People v. Almodiel, 680 SCRA 306, 322, September 5, 2012;
Peralta v. People, G.R. No. 221991, August 30, 2017).
SEARCH INCIDENT TO A LAWFUL
ARREST
The "search-incident-to-a-lawful-arrest" exception is authorized by
Sec. 13, Rule 126 of the Rules of Court which provides:

"Sec. 13. A person lawfully arrested may be searched for


dangerous weapons or anything which may have been used or
constitute proof in the commission of an offense, without a search
warrant.”
SEARCH INCIDENT TO A LAWFUL
ARREST
The Court has, however, ruled on several occasions that: "x xx
When an arrest is made, it' is reasonable for the arresting officer
to search the person arrested in order to remove any weapon that
the latter might use in order to resist arrest or effect his escape.
Otherwise, the officer's safety might well be endangered, and the
arrest itself frustrated. In addition, it is entirely reasonable for the
arresting officer to' search for and seize any evidence on the
arrestee's person order to prevent its concealment or destruction.
SEARCH INCIDENT TO A LAWFUL
ARREST
Moreover, in lawful arrests, it becomes both the duty and the right of
the arresting officer to conduct a warrantless search not only on the
person of the suspect but also within the permissible area within the
latter's reach. x x x a valid arrest allows the seizure of evidence or
dangerous weapons either on the person of the one arrested or within
the area of his immediate control. 'The phrase "within the area of his
immediate control" means the area from within which he might gain
possession of a weapon or destructible evidence. A gun on a table or
in the drawer in front of the person arrested can be as dangerous to
the arresting officer as one concealed in the clothing of the person
arrested x xx (Valeroso v. Court of Appeals, 598 SCRA 41, 55-56 citing
People v. Leangsiri, 252 SCRA 213; People v. Cubcubin, Jr., 360 SCRA
690; and People v. Estella, 895 SCRA 553; See also People v. Calantiao,
G.R. No. 203984, June 16, 2014).
PLAIN VIEW DOCTRINE
Under the plain view doctrine, objects falling in the plain
view of an officer who has a right to be in the position to
have that view are subject to seizure and may be
presented as evidence.
PLAIN VIEW
DOCTRINE:REQUISITES
The plain view doctrine applies when the following
requisites concur:
(1)the law enforcement officer in search of the evidence
has a prior justification for an intrusion or is in a
position from which he can view a particular area;
(2)the discovery of the evidence in plain view is
inadvertent; and
(3)it is immediately apparent to the officer that the item
he observes may be evidence of a crime, contraband
or otherwise subject to seizure (Abelita III v. Doria, 596
SCRA 220, 228; Zalameda v. People, 598 SCRA 537,
553-559).
THE "INADVERTENCE"
REQUIREMENT UNDER THE
PLAIN VIEW DOCTRINE
The "inadvertence" requirement appears, however, to be
the consistent norm in Philippine jurisprudence and
requires that the officer must discover incriminating
evidence inadvertently (United Laboratories v. Isip, 461
SCRA 574 595; Abenes v. Court of Appeals, 515 SCRA
690, 702). The requirement of inadvertence means that
the officer must not have known in advance of the
location of the evidence and discovery is not anticipated
(United Laboratories v. Isip, 46l SCRA 574, 596).
THE "IMMEDIATELY APPARENT"
REQUIREMENT UNDER THE PLAIN
VIEW DOCTRINE
That it must be immediately apparent to the officer that the items
observed may be an evidence of a crime is another important
element of the doctrine. This requirement means that the
incriminating nature of the evidence becomes apparent if the
officer, at the moment of seizure, had probable cause to connect
it to a crime without the benefit of an unlawful search or seizure.
To be immediately apparent, the rule does not require an unduly
high degree of certainty as to the incriminating character of the
evidence. "It requires merely that the seizure be presumptively
reasonable assuming that there is probable cause to associate the
property with criminal activity; that a nexus exists between a
viewed object and criminal activity" (United Laboratories v. Isip,
461 SCRA 574, 596-597).
SEARCH OF A MOVING VEHICLE
Is one of the doctrinally accepted exceptions to
the Constitutional mandate that no search or
seizure shall be made except by virtue of a
warrant issued by a judge. This exception has
been earlier called the car search doctrine, often
called the Carroll Doctrine, as it was first
enunciated in Carroll v. United States, 267 U.S.
132[1925].
SEARCH OF A MOVING VEHICLE:
THE NEED FOR PROBABLE
CAUSE
The rules governing searches and seizures have been
liberalized when the object of a search is a vehicle for
practical purposes. Police officers cannot be expected to
appear before court and apply for a search warrant when
time is of the essence considering the efficiency of
vehicles in facilitating transactions involving contraband
or dangerous articles. However, the inherent
mobility of vehicles cannot justify all kinds of
searches. Law enforcers must act on the basis of
probable cause (Veridiano v. People, G.R. No. 200370,
June 7, 2017).
SEARCH OF A MOVING VEHICLE:
THE NEED FOR PROBABLE
CAUSE
"x x x Peace officers are limited only to routine checks
where the examination of a vehicle is limited to visual
inspection. When a vehicle is stopped and subject to
extensive search, such would be permissible only if the
officers made it upon probable cause, i.e., upon a belief,
reasonably arising out of circumstances known to the
seizing officer, that an automobile or other vehicle
contains a[n] item, article or object which by law is
subject to seizure and destruction" (People v. Libnao,
395 SCRA 407, cited by People v. Breis, G.R. No. 205823,
August 17, 2015).
CHECKPOINT
A checkpoint search is a variant of a search of a
moving vehicle (Veridiano v. People, G.R. No.
200370, June 7, 2017).
CHECKPOINT
A checkpoint search is a variant of a search of a
moving vehicle (Veridiano v. People, G.R. No.
200370, June 7, 2017).
CHECKPOINT
In Valmonte v. De Villa, 185 SCRA 665, 668-669, the Court declared
that nowhere in its decision did it legalize all checkpoints, i.e., at all
times and under all circumstances, and what it declared was that
the checkpoints are not illegal per se. The Court went on to hold
that "under exceptional circumstances, as where the survival of
organized government is on the balance, or where the lives and
safety of the people are in grave peril, checkpoints may be allowed
and installed by the government. Implicit in this proposition is, that
when the situation clears and such grave perils are removed,
checkpoints will have absolutely no reason to remain. x x x for as
long as the vehicle is neither searched nor its occupants subjected
to a body search, and the inspection of the vehicle is limited to a
visual search, said routine checks cannot be regarded as violative of
an individual's right against unreasonable search."
CHECKPOINT
Also, automobiles, because of their mobility, may be
searched without a warrant upon facts not justifying a
warrantless search of a residence or office. The cases
justifying warrantless searches of moving vehicles,
however, always insisted that the officers conducting
the search have reasonable or probable cause to
believe that they will find the instrumentality of a crime
or evidence pertaining to a crime before they begin
their warrantless search (Valmonte v. De Villa, 185
SCRA 665, 670 citing Brinegar v. United States, 338 US
160; Carroll v. United States, 267 US 132).
CHECKPOINT
If vehicles are stopped and extensively searched, it is
because of some probable cause which justifies a
reasonable belief of the men at the checkpoints that
either the motorist is a law -offender or the contents of
the vehicle are or have been instruments of some
offense (Valmonte v. De Villa, 185 SCRA 665, 670).
CHECKPOINT
''There is nothing in the law that authorizes checkpoint-
manning policemen to order the occupant of a car to
get out of the vehicle for a search of both his body and
the vehicle" (Sydeco v. People, 202692, November 12,
2014).
TERRY SEARCHES
Jurisprudence discloses that the "stop-and-frisk"
principle serves a dual purpose: (1) the general
interest of effective crime prevention and
detection; and (2) the safety of the police officer
to take steps to assure himself that the person
with whom he deals with is not armed with a
deadly weapon that could be used against him.
TERRY SEARCHES
The Terry Doctrine is of two parts: the "stop" and
the "frisk." A valid "stop" by an officer requires that
he has a reasonable and articulable belief that
criminal activity has happened or is about to
happen. The "frisk" made after the "stop" must be
done because of a reasonable belief that the person
stopped is in possession of a weapon that will pose
a danger to the officer and others. The "frisk" must
be a mere pat down outside the person's outer
garment and not unreasonably intrusive.
TERRY SEARCHES
The test of the conduct of an officer under similar circumstances
was not the existence of probable cause because no full arrest is
made. But it cannot be mere suspicion. It has to be a genuine
reason, according to a Philippine decision (Comerciante v.
People, G.R. No. 205926, July 22, 2015; Veridiano v. People, G.R.
No. 200370, June 7, 2017).
TERRY SEARCHES
Because of the important interest in protecting the safety of police
officers, the Court held that a law enforcement officer has the authority
to stop someone and do a quick surface search of their outer clothing
for weapons. This is allowed if the officer has a reasonable belief
based on a genuine reason, and in the light of the officer's experience
and the surrounding circumstances, that a crime has either taken place
or is about to take place and the person to be stopped is armed and
dangerous. This reasonable suspicion must be based on "specific and
articulable facts" and not merely upon the officer's bare suspicion
hunch. Terry emphasized that a reasonable belief for making a stop
may also be followed by a frisk which is equally reasonable which
means it should not be broader than is necessary to find weapons in
the person briefly stopped. The ruling that probable cause is not
required in a stop-and-frisk situation is Terry's significant contribution
jurisprudence.
TERRY SEARCHES
jurisprudence discloses that the "stop-and-frisk"
principle serves a dual purpose: (1) the general
interest of effective crime prevention and
detection; and (2) the safety of the police officer
to take steps to assure himself that the person
with whom he deals with is not armed with a
deadly weapon that could be used against him.
Section 3, Art. III,
1987 Constitution
Section 3
(1) The privacy of communication and correspondence shall
be inviolable except upon lawful order of the court, or when
public safety or order requires otherwise as prescribed by
law.
(2) Any evidence obtained in violation of this or the
preceding section shall be inadmissible for any purpose in
any proceeding.
Meaning of right of privacy
The right to be left alone. It has also been defined as the right of
person to be free from unwarranted publicity, and as the right to live
without unwarranted interference by the public in matters with
which the public is not necessarily concerned.
Purpose and Importance
There is a recognition that persons may communicate and
correspond with each other with the State having a right to pry into
such communication and correspondence except only upon lawful
order of the court and subject to the ever pervading police power of
the State.
The concept of liberty would be emasculated if it does not likewise
compel respect for one’s personality as a unique individual whose
claim to privacy demands respect. (Morfe vs. Mutuc, 22 SCRA 424
[1968].)
Relationship with right against
unreasonable searches and seizures
Complements or implements the security of the citizen
against unreasonable searches and seizures. The right is but
an aspect or a facet of the right to be secure in one’s person
against unreasonable searches and seizures. (Material
Distributors [Phils.], Inc. vs. Natividad, 84 Phil. 127 [1949].)
Limitation on the right
1. Upon lawful order of the court; or
2. When public safety or order requires otherwise as
prescribed by law.
Evidence illegally obtained
Non-admissibility rule. - Any evidence obtained by the
government in violation of the right against unreasonable
search and seizure and the right to privacy of
communication and correspondence is inadmissible for any
purpose in any proceeding, whether judicial, quasi-judicial,
legislative, civil or administrative. Verily, all items seized in
violation of the right are “fruits of the poisonous tree.”
Evidence illegally obtained
Reason – It exclusion, as has been proved by historical
experience, to be the only practical way of enforcing the
constitutional injunction against unreasonable search and
seizure and violation of privacy of communication and
correspondence and thereby removing the incentive on the
part of peace officers to disregard these basic rights.
Presumption of regularity – is unavailing in aid of the search
process when an officer undertakes to justify it.
Evidence illegally obtained
Exception – waiver or consent to the warrantless arrest, the
court is bound to admit the evidence.
Right of owner – since evidence obtained illegally is not
admissible, the owner has the right that the articles seized
by returned, unless they are in themselves prohibited or
forbidden by law, such as illegal drugs, unlicensed firearm,
etc. (Uy Kheytin vs. Villareal, 42 Phil. 812 [1922].)
Remedy
Writ of habeas data
CRIMINAL LIABLITY UNDER
RPC
 Art. 124 – Arbitrary Detention
 Art. 125 - Delay in the Delivery of Detained
Persons to the proper Judicial authorities
 Art. 126 – Delaying Release.
CRIMINAL LIABLITY UNDER
RPC
 Art. 128 – Violation of Domicile
 Art. 129 – Search Warrants Maliciously Obtained
and abuse in the service of those legally obtained
 Art. 130 – Searching Domicile without witnesses.

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