Module IV - Applicability of Part I
Module IV - Applicability of Part I
Infrastructure)
• Issue of Arbitrability (Booz Allen Triple
Test)
• Varied application of Booz Allen
Recap: Principles:
IP Rights (IPRS v. Entertainment
Network, Eros Intl. v. Telemax)
Fraud (Swiss Timing v. Commonwealth
games OC, Ayyasamy v. Paramasivam)
The New York Arbitration Convention on Recognition
& Enforcement of Foreign Arbitral Awards, 1958
New York
Convention: More than 160 nations have signed up
International
Commercial Reflects worldwide
concensus on key aspects of
Arbitration, International Arbitration
1985
The PURPOSE:
Aribtration
&
Conciliation
Act, 1996 An Act to consolidate and amend the law relating
to domestic arbitration, international
commercial arbitration and enforcement of
foreign arbitral awards as also to define the law relating
to conciliation and for matters connected therewith or
incidental thereto.
The Act comprises of four parts and seven schedules –
Part I: General Provisions on Arbitration
Chapter 1 to 7 (taken from UNCITRAL Model Law)
• Ss. 2 to 6: Definitions, Scope, Construction of references,
mode and manner of receipt of written communications,
limits of judicial intervention and administrative
assistance
An Overview of • Ss. 7 to 9: Arbitration Agreement
• Ss. 10 to 15: Composition of Arbitral Tribunal
the 1996 Act: • Ss. 16 & 17: Jurisdiction of Arbitral Tribunals
• Ss. 18 to 27: Conduct of Arbitral Proceedings
• Ss. 28 to 33: Making of arbitral award and termination of
proceedings
• S. 34: Recourse against arbitral award
• Chapter 8 to 10
• Ss. 35 & 36: Finality and Enforcement of arbitral awards
• S. 37: Appeals
• Ss. 38 to 43: Misc.
q Part II: Enforcement of Certain Foreign Awards
§ Chapter 1
Seat Venue
Deciding factor for purposes of applicability of Does not decide any law applicable to
part I or Part II of the A&C Act, 1996 arbitration
WHETHER S.2(2) IS APPLICABLE TO FOREIGN
SEATED ARBITRATIONS?
Relevant Statutory Provisions:
• S.2(2): Part I of the Act shall apply where the place of arbitration is in India:
Provided that subject to an agreement to the contrary, the provisions of sections 9, 27 and clause (a) of subsection
(1) and sub-section (3) of section 37 shall also apply to international commercial arbitration, even if the place of
arbitration is outside India, and an arbitral award made or to be made in such place is enforceable and recognized
under the provisions of Part II of thisAct.
• S.2(5): Subject to S.2(4), Part I shall apply to all arbitrations and to all proceedings relating thereto; except if
otherwise provided by any agreement in force between India and any other country.
• S.2(7):An arbitral award made under Part I shall be considered as a domestic award.
• Judicial Dicta Prior to Bhatia International:
There were conflicting judgments of various High Courts: -
Delhi HC: S.2(2) is wide enough to include arbitrations even taking place outside India.
Calcutta, Delhi, Bombay, AP HCs: S.2(2) strictly applies to arbitrations in India.
BHATIA INTERNATIONAL vs. BULK TRADING
S.A. (2002) 2 SCC 105
• Facts: Bhatia Int’l entered into a contract with Bulk Trading on May 9, 1997. the contract
contained an arbitration clause which provided that arbitration was to be as per the rules of
the Int’l Chamber of Commerce (ICC). On Oct 23, 1997 Bulk Trading filed a request for
arbitration with ICC. Parties agreed that the arbitration be held in Paris, France. ICC had
appointed a sole arbitrator. In the meanwhile, Bulk Trading filed an application u/S.9 of A&C
Act in District Court, Indore against Bhatia Int’l seeking injunction restraining Bhatia Int’l
from alienating, transferring and/ or selling their business assets and properties.
• Bhatia Int’l raised a plea against maintainability contending that Part I of the Act would not
apply to arbitrations where the place of arbitration is not India but the plea was dismissed.
Then it filed a writ in the HC which was again dismissed and then this appeal in the SC
which was also dismissed.
The three-judge bench held that –
Section 2(2) does not provide that Part I shall not apply where place of arbitration is not in India. It also
does not provide that Part I will "only" apply where place of arbitration is in India. Therefore, Part I of the
Act necessarily applies to arbitrations which are held in India between Indian nationals, and to int’l
commercial arbitrations whether held in India, or out of India.
Where such arbitration is held in India (including ICA), the provisions of Part I would compulsorily apply and
the parties cannot, by agreement, deviate from such non-derogable provision (Section 2(2)) of Part I.
In cases of arbitrations held out of India provisions of Part I would apply unless the parties by agreement,
express or implied, exclude all or any of its provisions. In that case, the laws or rules chosen by the parties
would prevail.
Part II only applies to arbitrations which take place in a Convention country because it deals with
enforcement of foreign awards covered by arbitrations under the New York Convention (Chapter I) & the
Geneva Convention (Chapter II) respectively.
S.2(2) is based on Article 1(2) of UNCITRAL Model law which clearly used the word ‘only’ in describing the
application of the provisions – “The provisions of this law apply only if the place of arbitration is in the
territory of this State.” But S.2(2) omits the use of this word and it changes the whole complexion of the
sentence.
• S. 1 says ‘Act’ applicable to whole of India. This shows that the entire Act, including Part I, applies to the
whole of India. For J&K, Part I, III and IV will apply only in case of ICA. It doesn't state that Part I will apply
to J&K only if place of ICA is in J&K.
• The words “every arbitration” in S.2(4) and the words “all arbitrations and to all proceedings relating
thereto” in S.2(5) are wide. S. 2(2) has to be read harmoniously with S.2(4) & (5) and S. 1.
• Definitions of arbitral award, ICA and Court do not provide that there is no jurisdiction if arbitration
takes place outside India. Therefore, ouster of jurisdiction cannot be implied, it should be express.
• With respect to non-convention country, the Act nowhere provides that its provisions would not apply to
such arbitrations otherwise it would leave a party remediless.
• Relying on S.2(7) and Part II, since the Act only classifies awards as ‘domestic awards’ or ‘foreign awards’
made in a Convention country, an award passed in an arbitration which takes place in a non-convention
country, even though strictly speaking would not be a domestic award, it would be covered by Part I.
• S. 28 begins with the words, “where the place of arbitration is situated in India” – if Part I was to apply to
arbitrations taking place in India only then S. 28 would not have started like this.
• S. 45 & 54 begin with the non-obstante clause “Notwithstanding anything contained in Part I” implicating
that provisions of Part I apply to Part II.
• Part I is about “General Provisions” applicable to all arbitrations and such provisions will not be repeated
in all Chapters and Parts.
Consequences of the
Bhatia Judgment
• “The use of the words ‘place’, ‘seat’, ‘situs’ and ‘venue’ in the context of arbitration
indicate the juridical or legal seat of arbitration which determines the curial law i.e. the
law that shall govern the arbitration proceedings. What this judgment holds is that if the
legal or juridical seat of arbitration is outside India, then Part I of the Act shall be
inapplicable to such arbitrations; and even in case a clause in the arbitration agreement
purports to apply Part I of the Act to an arbitration where the juridical seat of arbitration is
outside India, Part I shall be inapplicable to the extent inconsistent with the arbitration
law of the seat of arbitration. ‘Venue of arbitration’ as distinguished from the ‘place’ or
‘seat’ or ‘situs’, is the actual physical location where the arbitrator(s)/ Arbitral Tribunal (for
reasons of convenience, etc.) might actually conduct their proceedings, which may be a
location physically outside the juridical or legal seat of arbitration. Thus, wherever the
phrase ‘outside India’ is used, it means that the juridical or legal seat of arbitration is
outside India, and whenever the phrase ‘inside India’ or ‘in India’ is used, it means that
the juridical or legal seat of arbitration is India or is inside India. “ - Ed Note in the
judgment.
• Facts: An agreement dated 22-04-1993 was executed between BALCO and
Kaiser, under which Kaiser was to supply and install a computer-based system
for shelter modernization at BALCO’s Korba Shelter. The agreement contained
an arbitration clause for resolution of disputes arising out of the contract. The
clause in Article 17 and 21 was as follow:
• “17.1: Any dispute or claim arising out of or relating to this agreement shall be
in the first instance, endeavored to be settled amicably by negotiation between
the parties hereto and failing which the same will be settled by arbitration
pursuant to the English arbitration law and subsequent amendments thereto.
• 17.2: The arbitration proceedings shall be carried out by two arbitrators, one
appointed by BALCO and one by KATSI chosen freely and without any bias. The
Court of Arbitration shall be held wholly in London, England and shall use
English language in the proceeding.The findings and award of the Court of
Arbitration shall be final and binding.
• 22:The agreement will be governed by the prevailing law of India and in case of
arbitration, the English law shall apply.”
• Awards (02) were given by the arbitral tribunal by arbitration held in England.
BALCO then filed application u/S.34 of A&C Act for setting aside of the awards.
District Court dismissed the application; HC dismissed the appeal which was
challenged in the SC.
• Number of other appeals and SLPs and transferred cases were listed along
with this appeal.
• Held:
• Constitutional bench over-ruled Bhatia International wherein it was
Question: held that the omission of the word ‘only’ from Section 2(2) indicates
the applicability of Part I of the Act not only to domestic arbitration but
Whether Part would also extent to arbitrations held outside India.
I of the Act • S.1(2) does not extend the application of Part I to ICA held outside
India. Proviso to S.1(2) was added to incorporate the provisions to the
would apply J&K Arbitration Act as far as they relate to ICA, which were absent in
the previous legislations and consequently absent in J&K’s Arbitration
to foreign Act. Section 2(2) which states the territoriality principle is not affected
by the proviso which is restricted to Section 1(2).
seated • S.2(2) makes it clear that Part I is limited in its application to
arbitrations which take place/seated in India. Legislature has done so to
international give recognition to the territorial principle.
• Article 1(2) upon which S.2(2) is based is a model and a guide to all the
commercial States, which have accepted the UNCITRAL Model Law. Model Law
used the word ‘only’ in view of exceptions referred to in that Article
arbitrations? which could have extra-territorial effect. The Indian legislature did not
include the exceptions mentioned in Article 1(2) and therefore,
inclusion of the word “only” would have been superfluous.
• There is no conflict between S.2(2) on the one hand and S.2(4) & (5) on the other.
• S.2(4) makes Part I applicable to “every arbitration under any other enactment for the time being in force”.
Hence, there must be an enactment under which arbitration takes place. Here enactment is the one made by the
Indian Parliament. It is impossible to accept that “every arbitration” would include arbitrations which take place
outside India.
• S.2(5) has to be read with S.2(2) in the background meaning Part I shall apply to all arbitrations and proceedings
relating thereto, where the seat is in India and if it is not a statutory arbitration or subject of an agreement
between India and any other country.
• S.2(7) also does not alter the proposition that Part I applies only where the “seat” or “place” of the arbitration is
in India. The provision reinforces the territorial criterion by providing that, when two foreigners arbitrate in India,
under a Foreign Arbitration Act, the provisions of Part I will apply. Indian Courts being the supervisory Courts, will
exercise control and regulate the arbitration proceedings, which will produce a "domestically rendered
international commercial award". It would be a "foreign award" for the purposes of enforcement in a country
other than India.
• Only if the agreement of the parties is construed to provide for the “seat/place” of arbitration being in India –
would Part I be applicable. If the agreement is held to provide for a “seat/place” outside India, Part I would be
inapplicable to the extent inconsistent with the arbitration law of the seat, even if the agreement purports to
provide that the A&C Act 1996 shall govern the arbitration proceedings. A choice of seat for arbitration must be a
choice of forum for remedies seeking to attack the award.
• Section 2(1)(e) and 47 (definition of court): The purpose of section 2(1)(e) “Court” is to identify courts having
supervisory control over the arbitration proceedings. Hence, it refers to a court which would essentially be a court
of the seat of the arbitration process. The Section 2(1)(e) read with Section 20 (Party Autonomy) provides that the
Legislature has given jurisdiction to the court which would have jurisdiction where the cause of action is located
and the courts where the arbitration takes place. On the other hand, under section 47 “court” means a court
having subject matter jursidiction of the award in case of enforcement of certain foreign awards. The Section 2(1)
(e) being purely jurisdictional in nature, it can have no relevance to the question whether Part I applies to
arbitrations which take place outside India. The court has to undertake a detailed examination to discern from
the agreement and the surrounding circumstances the intention of the parties as to whether a particular place
mentioned mentioned refers to the "venue" or "seat" of the arbitration. The choice of another country as the seat
of arbitration inevitably imports an acceptance that the law of that country relating to the conduct and supervision
of arbitrations will apply to the proceedings.
• S.28(1) indicates that in an arbitration in India other than ICA, there is no choice but for the Tribunal to decide “the
dispute” by applying the Indian “substantive law applicable to the contract.” So that Indian parties do not
circumvent the substantive Indian law by resorting to arbitrations. Whereas, for ICA held in India, the parties
would be free to agree to any other “substantive law” and if not so agreed, the “substantive law” applicable would
be as determined by the arbitral tribunal.
• Indian courts do not have the power to grant interim measures under Section 9 when the seat of arbitration is
outside India.
• Lacuna w.r.t. non-convention award cannot be incorporated in the Act by process of interpretation. This task is
with the Parliament, instead.
Prospective Ruling of Bhatia International by BALCO
• Ruling in BALCO would apply only to arbitration agreements entered into from the date of
the judgment, September 6, 2012.
• Bhatia International continues to hold the field and is applicable to proceedings arising out
of any arbitration agreement executed prior to September 6, 2012.
• General rule: Judgments of the courts interpreting statutory provisions of law apply
retrospectively as it is based on the principle that the courts only find the law, meaning that
they interpret and declare the law as it existed and was originally intended.
• A subsequent judgment overruling a prior view of the law has the effect of obliterating or
erasing that prior decision, with the effect that the interpretation of the law as newly
declared in the subsequent judgment is to treated as having always existed.
• Doctrine of prospective overruling allows the court to overrule an earlier judgment and yet
hold that its decision would apply only prospectively.
Bhatia International v. Bulk Trading S.A. (2002) 4 SCC 105 [3 Bharat Aluminium Company and Ors.
Judge Bench] Vs. Kaiser Aluminium Technical Service, Inc. and Ors.
(2012) (8) SCALE 333 [5 Judge Bench]
1. If seat is in India, then Part I applies. It includes 1. Part I applies to arbitrations seated in India.
both Domestic and International Commercial Arbitrations. 2. Part II applies to arbitrations seated in
Subject to agreement between the parties, the parties Convention countries. Therefore, no application of
can derogate from derogable provisions under Part I. section 9.
2. For foreign seated arbitrations:- 3. The lacuna in law for arbitration cases where the
(a) For Convention (New York or Geneva Convention) awards are passed in non convention countries - the
countries- Part II applies. For the aspects not provided in Legislature is required to step in. Part I is not applicable.
Part II, Part I applies unless impliedly or explicitly excluded. 4. Part I and Part II are mutually exclusive.
(b) For Non-Convention countries- Part I applies unless
parties by agreement (express or implied) exclude all of any
of its provisions. If excluded, the laws agreed upon by parties
would apply.
The "award" under Section 2(7) includes awards The term "award" includes the awards for
from non convention countries. arbitration seated in India and also International
Commercial Arbitration that takes place in India
Bhatia International case (2002) BALCO case (2012)
The section 2(2) ["This Part shall apply where the place UNCITRAL Model uses the word "only" because the
of arbitration is in India"] does not include the word "only" parent provision includes certain exceptions. However,
like UNCITRAL Model. So, the Legislature did not intend for India has not enacted those exceptions, therefore the
Part I to only apply to arbitration seated in India. [Note: section 2(2) does not use the word "only".
"place" in section 2(2) read with section 20 means seat of Section 2(2): Territoriality principle
arbitration]
Bhatia International case (2002) BALCO case (2012)
Section 2(4) and (5) makes Part I applicable to The section 2(4) is limited to statutory or
all arbitrations irrespective of where it is held. compulsory arbitrations.
The section 2(4) uses the term "every Section 2(2) read with 2(4) and 2(5) provides that
arbitration". Therefore, limiting applicability "all arbitrations" mentioned in section 2(5) means that
of Part I to arbitrations that takes place in barring statutory arbitrations under section 2(4) and
India would make Section 2(2) in conflict with arbitrations pursuant to International Agreements, all
section (4) and (5). other arbitration proceedings in India shall be subject to
Part I of the Act. Therefore, there is no conflict among
section 2(2), 2(3) and 2(4) of the Act.
Retrospective Application: application from enactment Prospective Application: 06.09.2012- governed by Date
of 1996 Act to 06.09.2012 (BALCO Decision): governed by of Arbitration Agreement
Date of Arbitration Agreement
APPLICATION: BHATIA
INTERNATIONAL vs. BULK
TRADING S.A. (2002) V. BALCO
VS. KAISER
ALUMINUM TECHNICAL SERVICE
S INC. (2012)
Harmony Innovation Shipping Ltd.
vs. Gupta Coal India Ltd. (2015)
WHAT SHOULD APPLY? BHATIA OR BALCO? WHAT DO YOU
THINK?
• Facts: An agreement was entered into between the parties on 20-10-2010 in respect of 24 voyages of
coal shipment. Gupta Coal India undertook only 15 voyages and that resulted in disputes which
ultimately stood referred to arbitration. Clause 5 of the agreement clearly stated that arbitration will be
held in London for any dispute that may arise and the agreement is to be governed and construed
according to the English law and if claim under the dispute does not exceed US $50,000, the arbitration
should be conducted in accordance with small claims procedure of the London Maritime Arbitration
Association. After this dispute arose in respect of the main agreement, an addendum to agreement was
executed as regards the remaining voyages on 3-4-2013. Arbitration proceedings were initiated in
London and eventually an award was passed.
• After the award was passed, Harmony Innovation filed an application u/S.9 before the Distt. Court
seeking security from Gupta Coal India. Court issued an order for attachment of the cargos as an
interim measure and asked Gupta Coal India to furnish a security of Rs 6,60,00,000. Gupta Coal filed a
writ in HC seeking to set aside Distt. Court's order for want of jurisdiction. The order was set aside on
the ground that BALCO decision is declaratory in nature and thus a party is bound by the same even if
the agreement was entered into before BALCO judgment. Now Harmony Innovation has appealed in
the SC.
Harmony Innovation Shipping Ltd.
vs. Gupta Coal India Ltd. (2015)
• Issue: Whether Bhatia or BALCO judgment will apply to the arbitration agreement between the
parties?
• Held: Here, the arbitration agreement was executed prior to 6-9-2012 and the addendum came
into existence afterwards on 3-4-2013. Therefore, there can be no scintilla of doubt that the
authority in BALCO case would not be applicable for determination of the controversy in hand.
• Pronouncement in Bhatia International would be applicable to the facts of the present case
inasmuch as there is nothing in the addendum to suggest any amendment to the arbitration
clause and therefore, it is controlled and governed by conditions postulated in the principal
contract.
• To apply the doctrine of implied exclusion as stated in Bhatia, the court has to test “presumed
intention” by adopting an objective approach as to what would have been the intention of
reasonable parties in the position of the actual parties to the contract.
Harmony Innovation Shipping Ltd.
vs. Gupta Coal India Ltd. (2015)
• Quoting from BALCO, the court stated “an agreement as to the seat of an arbitration is analogous
to an exclusive jurisdiction clause. Any claim for a remedy as to the validity of an existing interim or
final award is agreed to be as made only in the courts of the place designated as the seat of
arbitration.”
• Since the parties intended to keep the Juridical seat as London which is evident from various
phrases in the principal contract, it is an implied exclusion of the applicability of Part I of the Act.
Therefore, petition under S. 9 for interim measures is not maintainable.
• HC had allowed the petition on the foundation that BALCO case would govern the field which was
not held to be a correct view by the SC. But even applying the principles laid down in Bhatia
International (as stated by the SC) and considering the arbitration clause, the courts in India will not
have jurisdiction as there is implied exclusion.
• SC concurred with the conclusion arrived at by the HC but for different reasons.
UOI vs. Reliance Industries
(2015) WHAT SHOULD APPLY? BHATIA OR BALCO?
WHAT DO YOU THINK?
• Facts: Two Production Sharing Contracts (PSC) were executed between Reliance Industries (RIL), UOI,
Enron Oil and Gas India Ltd. (later BG Exploration) and the ONGC. Parties agreed u/Article 32 and 33 that
proper law of contract shall be the law of India, arbitration proceedings shall be conducted as per
arbitration rules of UNCITRAL, 1985, the arbitration agreement shall be governed by the laws of England.
Proceedings shall be conducted in English and the venue shall be London, England. However, on 14-09-
2011 UOI, Reliance and BG Exploration agreed to the seat of arbitration as London, England. Dispute
arose between RIL and UOI.
• Procedural history:
• Arbitral tribunal passed the award on 12-9-2012.
• UOI filed petition u/S. 34 in Delhi High Court whereby the Court in its judgment delivered on 22-3-
2013 decided that the petition under S.34 was maintainable.
• Supreme Court’s decision on 28-5-2014 reversed Delhi HC’s judgment applying Bhatia and finding
implied exclusion of Part I by choosing a foreign seat and foreign law governing the arbitration
agreement.
• Review petition and curative petition against the SC’s judgment have been dismissed.
• This SLP arises out of a judgment dated 3-7-2014 whereby Delhi HC dismissed an application u/S.14
on the ground that Part I of the Act is not applicable.
UOI vs. Reliance Industries
(2015)
• Supreme Court’s decision on 28-5-2014 was based on the law declared in Bhatia
International. It stated that since in the articles of contract stated that the proper law of the
contract is Indian law; proper law of the arbitration agreement is the law of England –Part I
of the Act is not applicable to present arbitration agreement. Applicability of Part I is not
dependent on the nature of challenge to the award. Whether or not the award is
challenged on the ground of public policy, it would have to satisfy the precondition that the
Act is applicable to the arbitration agreement.
• Held:
• Prior to 1996, the three Acts which governed the Arbitration law in India were based on
the doctrine of concurrent jurisdiction. However, in 1996 Act this doctrine was done
away with. But Bhatia International resurrected this doctrine and it was supported by
judgment of Venture Global. Further, BALCO judgment overruled these judgments and
declared the law to apply prospectively.
• The juridical seat is outside India or where law other than Indian law governs the
arbitration agreement. Thus, Part I of the Arbitration Act, 1996 would be excluded by
necessary implication.
UOI vs. Reliance Industries
(2015)
• Therefore, even in the cases governed by the Bhatia principle, it is only those cases in which
agreements stipulate that the seat of the arbitration is in India or on whose facts a judgment
cannot be reached on the seat of the arbitration as being outside India that would continue to be
governed by the Bhatia principle.
• Also, it is only those agreements which stipulate or can be read to stipulate that the law governing
the arbitration agreement is Indian law which would continue to be governed by the Bhatia rule.
• In this case, as already held by the SC, both the juridical seat of the arbitration is at London and
that the arbitration agreement is governed by English law. Therefore, Part I would be inapplicable.
• The application under Section 14 is dismissed both on the question of res judicata and the law laid
down in the SC decision of 28-5-2014.
IMAX Corporation v. E-city
Entertainment (I) Pvt. Ltd. (2017)
WHAT SHOULD APPLY? BHATIA OR BALCO?
WHAT DO YOU THINK?
• The parties entered into a contract on 28/9/2000.
• Clause 14 of the agreement contained an arbitration Clause which read : This Agreement
shall be governed by and construed according to the laws of Singapore, and the parties
attorn to the jurisdiction of the courts of Singapore. Any dispute arising out of this master
agreement or concerning the rights, duties or liabilities of E-City or Imax hereunder shall
be finally settled by arbitration pursuant to the ICC Rules of Arbitration.
• The ICC Rules provide for the entire conduct of arbitration from its commencement to the
passing of an award. Rules provide that “the place of the arbitration shall be fixed by the
Court unless agreed upon by the parties.”
• When dispute arose on 16/06/2004, IMAX had proposed the venue of arbitration to be
Paris in France. The Respondent, in their answer stated that the venue suggested by the
claimant i.e. Paris in France would unnecessarily increase the cost of arbitration and
therefore suggested that Singapore would be the most appropriate and convenient venue
for the arbitration.
IMAX Corporation v. E-city
Entertainment (I) Pvt. Ltd. (2017)
• The International Court of Arbitration decided that London, United Kingdom will be the
juridical seat of the arbitration in view of Article 14(1) of the ICC Rules and, therefore,
proceeded on the basis of the Part-I of the English Arbitration Act,1996 after consulting the
parties.
• Two partial final awards and one final award was passed on 11/02/2006, 24/08/2007 and
27/03/2008, respectively.
• On 21/07/2008, Respondent filed an application under S.34 in the Bombay HC. The Court
condoning the delay, admitted the application.
• IMAX filed an appeal against the interim order of the Bom HC challenging the applicability
of Part I to their arbitration.
• Held:
• Though the parties have not chosen the seat of arbitration but agreed to conduct the
arbitration as per rules of the ICC thereby expressing willing that the seat of arbitration can
be outside India. When ICC decided the seat to be in London, parties agreed. Therefore,
there is an agreement that arbitration shall be held in London and thus Part I should be
excluded.
2015 AMENDMENT TO SECTION 2(2)
Harmony Innovation Shipping Ltd. vs. Gupta Coal 1. Here, the arbitration agreement was executed prior to 6-
India Ltd. (2015) 9-2012 and the addendum came into existence afterwards
[APPLICATION: Bhatia v. BALCO] on 3-4-2013. Therefore, there can be no scintilla of doubt
that the authority in BALCO case would not be applicable
for determination of the controversy in hand.
To apply the principal of implied exclusion, the court has
to test the “presumed intention” by adopting an objective
approach as to what would have been the intention of
reasonable parties in the position of the actual parties to
the contract.
Case/Amendment Development in law
Section 2(2): "This Part shall apply where the place of arbitration is
2015 Amendment in India:
[Provided that subject to an agreement to the contrary, the
provisions of sections 9, 27 and clause (a) of sub-section (1) and
sub-section (3) of section 37 shall also apply to international
commercial arbitration, even if the place of arbitration is outside
India, and an arbitral award made or to be made in such place is
enforceable and recognized under the provisions of Part II of this
Act.]"
2019 Amendment Section 2(2): "This Part shall apply where the place of arbitration is
in India:
[Provided that subject to an agreement to the contrary,
the provisions of sections 9, 27 and clause (b) of sub-section (1)
and sub-section (3) of section 37 shall also apply to international
commercial arbitration, even if the place of arbitration is outside
India, and an arbitral award made or to be made in such place is
enforceable and recognized under the provisions of Part II of this
Act.]"
Section 2(2): Present Provision
(2) This Part shall apply where the place of arbitration is in India:
Provided that subject to an agreement to the contrary, the provisions of sections
9, 27 and clause (a) of sub-section (1) and sub-section (3) of section37 shall also
apply to international commercial arbitration, even if the place of arbitration is
outside India, and an arbitral award made or to be made in such place is
enforceable and recognized under the provisions of Part II of this Act.
SECTION 26 of THE ARBITRATION AND
CONCILIATION (AMENDMENT) ACT, 2015
• Only arbitral proceeding itself or also the court matters that arise in relation to
arbitral proceedings?
• State of confusion: arbitral proceedings commence before 23-10-2015 but
court proceedings in relation to the same commence after 23-10-2015.
• Is the object of legislature to give retrospective effect to the application of
2015 Amendment Act?
Issue 2: Whether the date of arbitration
agreement is to be considered or the date of
commencement of arbitral proceedings?
• Bhatia principle: applicable from the date of 1996 Act till BALCO judgment (6-09-
2012) based on the date on arbitration agreement.
• BALCO principle: applicable from the date of judgment (6-09-2012) based on the
date on arbitration agreement.
• 2015 Amendment: applicable from the date of amendment (23-10-2015) based on
the date of commencement of arbitral proceedings?
• Confusion: Where as per date of arbitration agreement, Bhatia/BALCO principle will
apply and, as per date of commencement of arbitral proceedings proviso to S. 2(2)
introduced by 2015 amendment will apply.
Suggested amendments by 246th Law Commission
Report not included in the 2015 Amendment Act
• Insertion of the word “only” after the words “shall apply” and insertion of the word “seat” instead of the word
“place” in sub-section (2) to mean-
“This Part shall apply only where the seat of arbitration is in India”.
• 246th Law Commission Report: “This amendment ensures that an Indian Court can only exercise jurisdiction
under Part I where the seat of the arbitration is in India. To this extent, it over-rules Bhatia principle, and re-
enforces the “seat centricity” principle of BALCO judgment”.
• In order to protect the applications which were filed on the basis of Bhatia rule and were still pending in an Indian
court that, insertion of sub-section (2A) after the S. 2(2) proviso was recommended.
“(2A) Notwithstanding any judgment/ decree to the contrary, the amendment to this sub-section (2)
shall not apply to applications which are pending before any judicial authority on the date of such
amendment, and which have arisen in relation to arbitrations where the date of the arbitration agreement
is prior to 06.09.2012.”
• 246th Law Commission Report: “The proposed amendment to S. 2 (2) does away with the prospective over-ruling
of Bhatia principle in BALCO judgment. However, applications that are already pending in an Indian court and
which have been filed on the basis of the Bhatia rule, should be protected”.
BCCI v. Kochi Cricket (2018) 6 SCC 287:
Interpretation of “in relation to arbitration
proceedings” commenced after 23-10-2015 as used
in S. 2(2) proviso
• Held:
• Section 2(2) proviso shall apply to arbitration
proceedings that have commenced as per section 21 of the
principal Act, on or after 23.10.2015 (date of 2015
amendment), unless parties otherwise agree.
• The section 2(2) proviso shall also apply to court
proceedings which have commenced on or after
23.10.2015 (date of 2015 amendment).
THE ARBITRATION AND CONCILIATION
(AMENDMENT) ACT, 2019
In 2019 amendment, the Section 87 was inserted and Section 26 of the 2015 amendment was
deleted. It clarified that the Section 2(2) proviso shall only apply to
i. arbitral proceedings which commenced on or after 23.10.2015 (date of 2015 amendment); and
ii. court proceedings arising out of or in relation to arbitral proceedings which commenced on or
after 23.10.2015 (date of 2015 amendment).
In effect, it meant that unless the parties otherwise agreed, the Section 2(2) proviso shall not apply
to
(i) arbitral proceedings commenced before 23.10.2015 (date of 2015 amendment); and
(ii) court proceedings that arise from the arbitral proceedings commenced before 23.10.2015 (date
of 2015 amendment), irrespective of whether such court proceedings are commenced prior to or
after 23.10.2015 (date of 2015 amendment).
Hindustan Construction Co. v. U.O.I (W.P. Civ
1074/2019)
• The court struck down the insertion of Section 87 of the 2019 Amendment Act
and deletion of Section 26 of the 2015 Amendment Act as unconstitutional.
• As a result, the Section 26 of the 2015 amendment which governed the
application of section 2(2) proviso is revived. That means, BCCI v. Kochi being
law of the land, the current position on applicability of 2015 amendment is
that-
Section 2(2) proviso shall apply to arbitration proceedings that
have commenced as per section 21 of the principal Act, on or after
23.10.2015 (date of 2015 amendment), unless parties otherwise agree.
The section 2(2) proviso shall also apply to court proceedings
which have commenced on or after 23.10.2015 (date of 2015
amendment).
DEFINITION OF
COURT
Section 2(1)(e)
Territorial jurisdiction v. Jurisdiction of
court at seat
Indus Mobile Distribution Pvt. Ltd. v.
Datawind Innovations Pvt. Ltd. (2017)
• The parties entered into an agreement on 25/10/2014. The agreement had the following
dispute resolution clause:
• 18. ...such Dispute shall be finally settled by arbitration conducted under the provisions of the
Arbitration & Conciliation Act 1996 by reference to a sole Arbitrator which shall be mutually
agreed by the parties. Such arbitration shall be conducted at Mumbai, in English language...
• 19. All disputes & differences of any kind whatever arising out of or in connection with this
Agreement shall be subject to the exclusive jurisdiction of courts of Mumbai only.”
• The Appellant’s registered office is in Chennai, and as per the commercial arrangement
between the parties, goods were to be shipped from Amritsar to New Delhi.
• Dispute arose on 25/9/2015.
• Respondent filed an application under S. 9 in the Delhi HC to prevent the Appellant from
alienating or creating a charge on the property which was the subject matter of dispute.
Indus Mobile Distribution Pvt. Ltd. v.
Datawind Innovations Pvt. Ltd. (2017)
• The Delhi HC assumed the jurisdiction stating that since no part of the subject matter
jurisdiction arose in Mumbai, the courts of Mumbai would not be able to assert jurisdiction
and decide the Section 9 petition. On facts, there were only three courts which had
jurisdiction, i.e., the relevant courts at New Delhi, Chennai and Amritsar. Since the HC at
Delhi was first approached, it would have jurisdiction and no other court, especially the
courts of Mumbai could exercise jurisdiction over the Section 9 petition. Accordingly, the HC
allowed the interim relief prayed for in the Section 9 Petition.
• Appellant approached the SC in appeal where it was held:
• Once the seat of arbitration has been fixed, courts of such seat will exercise exclusive
jurisdiction on the proceedings arising out of or in connection with the arbitration,
including proceedings initiated under Section 9 of the Act.
• The ‘seat’ may not in the classical sense (as stated in CPC Ss. 16 to 21) have jurisdiction
i.e. no cause of action may have arisen there, but, in arbitration law, the
moment ‘seat’ is determined it vests the courts in the seat with exclusive jurisdiction for
the purposes of regulating arbitral proceedings arising out of the agreement between
the parties.
Indus Mobile Distribution Pvt. Ltd. v.
Datawind Innovations Pvt. Ltd. (2017)
SECTION 2(9): “Where this Part, other than clause (a) of Section 25 or clause (a) of sub-section
(2) of section 32, refers to a claim, it shall also apply to a counter-claim, and where it refers to a
defence, it shall also apply to a defence to that counter-claim.”
• Terms ‘claim’ and ‘defence’ in Part I should be read as including counter-claims and counter
defences respectively.
SECTION 3: RECEIPT OF WRITTEN COMMUNICATIONS
Procedural provisions that apply to all the notices that are required to be served under the Act.
• Provides:
• Unless otherwise agreed by the parties; any written communication is deemed to have been
received,
• if it is delivered to the addressee personally or at the place of business, habitual residence, or
mailing address.
• If the above mentioned places cannot be found after making reasonable inquiry, the
communication will be deemed to have been received by the addressee if it is sent to his last
know place of business, habitual residence or mailing address by a registered letter or by any
other means which provide a record of attempt to deliver it as per S.3(1).
• The communication will be deemed to have been received by the addressee on the date when
it is so delivered to him.
• This section is not applicable to written communications in respect of proceedings of any
judicial authority.
SECTION 4: WAIVER OF RIGHT TO OBJECT
• The right of waiver can be exercised when a party knows that there has been non-
compliance of:
a) Any derogable provision of Part I of the Act; or
b) Any requirement under the arbitration agreement
But does not raise any objection of such non-compliance without undue delay, or within the
time limit provided for stating that objection, he shall be deemed to have waived his right to
so object. Waiver arises out of consent or acquiescence which must be an intentional act
with knowledge.